Overview of SFR Safety in India

P.Chellapandi
Idira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research,
Kalpakkam-603 102, India

Second Joint GIF-IAEA/INPRO Consultancy Meeting on

Safety Aspects of SFRs
IAEA, Vienna, 30th Nov-1st Dec 2011
 FBR Programme in India
• Indigenous Design & Construction
Future FBR
• Comprehensiveness in development of • 1000 MWe
Design, R&D and Construction • Pool Type
• Metallic fuel
• High Emphasis on Scientific Breakthroughs • Serial constr.
• Synthesis of Operating Experiences • Indegenous
• Beyond 2025
• Synthesis of Emerging Concepts (Ex.GENIV)
• Focus on National & International
Collaborations CFBR 07 08
N

0
10 09

• Emphasis on high quality human resources •500 MWe

0

•Pool Type 06
0

• Creation of environment for enabling

0

•UO2-PuO2 Ø11950 0

13725
0

innovations •3 twin units 04 05 11

0

•Indigenous
0

• Marching towards world leadership by 2025

1
03

•From 2023…
1
02 01
12
1

PFBR
FBTR •1250 MWt
• 40 MWt •500 MWe
• 13.5 MWe •Pool Type
• Loop type •UO2-PuO2
• PuC – UC •Indigenous
• Design: CEA •From 2013..
• Since 1985
 FBTR and Its Fuel Cycle
• FBTR in operation since 1985:
• It uses a unique U,Pu mixed carbide fuel
with high Pu content (Mk-I:70%, Mk-II: 55
%)
• Over 1000 fuel pins have reached a burn-up
(165 GWd/t)
• PFBR test fuel SA attained allowable burnup
of 112 GWd/t.

The performance of FBTR has been excellent in recent years, with

plant availability during each campaign exceeding 80 %.
• Since no direct data was available, physical, chemical and irradiation
behaviour of fuel were obtained through extensive out-of-pile tests
and with the gradual increase of burnup in the reactor.
FBTR would operate further around 10 EFPY for irradiation tests on
metallic fuel, sol-gel fuel and advanced clad materials
 Operating Experiences with FBTR

Sodium Leak inside Purification Cabin

Post Irradiation Examination Facility for FBTR Fuel due to a hole in valve body

25 GWd/t BURN-UP 50 GWd/t BURN-UP 100 GWd/t BURN-UP 155 GWd/t BURNUP
Operating Experiences with FBTR – contd…

Fuel Handling Incident

During the transfer of the fuel subassembly
from the 3rd ring to the storage location in 1987,
the foot of the assembly got bent as it was
projecting below the guide tube. This resulted
in curtailed movement of the gripper tube and
finally jamming of the fuel subassembly along
with the gripper tube inside the guide tube.

• Appropriate remedial measures, including mechanical stopper for

fuel handling gripper and redundant interlocks for authorizing plug
rotation, were implemented.
• Proper maintenance and operating procedures for the fuel handling
mechanism were evolved.
• The remedial measures were so effective that the subsequent fuel-
handling operations (about 600 nos.) have been carried out for the
past 20 years without any incidents.
 Cladding Failure in FBTR
Campaign started in Dec ‘10 with 48 fuel SA 27 MK-I, 13 MK-II & 8 MOX

In Feb 2011, at 18 MWt with TG feeding the grid, scram took place on
DND signal provided for detection of fuel clad failure

• From DND signals and the ratio of Kr85

/ Kr87 in cover gas samples, failed fuel
identified to be one with a burn-up of
148 GWd/t.
• From the DND signals during the flux
tilting experiment with operation of
control rod at 2 MWt power, the failed
fuel was identified in the first instance
itself, with only a single fuel handling
• The failed fuel has been presently
discharged for further investigation and
PIE.
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR)
Power : 1250 MWt
: 500 MWe

Fuel : UO2-PuO2

Material : SS 316 LN

Temp. : 400 C (inlet)

550 C (outlet)

Steam : 493 C;17 MPa

Design Code: RCC-MR

PFBR under construction at Kalpakkam India

Installation of Reactor Assembly components
• Manufacture of large thin walled shell structures with
stringent manufacturing tolerances (tighter tolerances
achieved compared to international SFRs)
• Construction of inter-connected buildings on the common
base raft
• Extensive technology development exercise before start
of construction
• Confidence through full scale mock-ups
• Innovative Handling Scheme: Minimum material, no weld
attachments, minimum assembly time Safety vessel

Main vessel Thermal baffles Grid plate Inner vessel Roof slab
PFBR will be commissioned in 2012
Enhanced Safety with improved Economy for PFBR
• Longer design life: 40 y extendable to 60 y (extensive modeling, testing and
evaluation, extensive ISI)
• Inter-Connected Buildings on common base raft (high seismic rigidity)
• Two loop concept (improved reliability and availability in view of less number of
components, systems and welds)
• Single wall concept for inner vessel (simpler pool thermal hydraulics)
• Mechanical seals for IHX (no gas entrainment problem, lesser dia for Main vessel)
• Single skirt for Core Support Structure (with ISI of critical welds)
• Longer SG tubes (lesser number of tubes & shell dia and lesser number of welds)
• Efficient Sodium fire Handling (LBB justification for sodium piping and SG shell,
high sensitive leak detection system, innovative sodium fire extinguishers)
• Enhanced post accident heat removal systems (DHXs and core catcher having
capacity and capability to remove the decay heat resulting from CDA)
• Rectangular containment building (lower design pressure due to moderate energy
release 100 MJ substantiated through extensive analysis, testing and review)
• Components manufactured with insignificant weld repairs and tight tolerances
(enhanced reliability, higher buckling strength resulting in high earthquake
resistance potential)
 Major Domains of Safety
Seismic Loading Effects
• Understanding of nonlinear behaviour & FSI effects
• Integrated Tests (Civil and Mechanical, Mechanics and
Hydraulics, e.g. PSP with HSB, ARDM with RA mockup)
• Quantification of cliff-edge effects
• Seismic Qualification of special structures (Fuel Storage racks,
large stem sodium valves, piping with multiple snubbers)

Severe Accidents
• Reactor Physics (Theoretical, FBTR, Literature on Int. Tests)
• Thermal Hydraulics (Theory & Tests on PAHR modes)
• Structural Mechanics (Theory and Experiments)

Sodium Safety
• All aspects of Science and Technology (chemical, thermal and
mechanical effects)
• Simple to large scale Test facilities
• High emphasis on modeling and simulations
 Investigations to Comply Seismic Design Criteria
Theoretical and Experimental Investigations on:
• Buckling of vessels
• Reactivity oscillations
• Pump seizure
• Performance of absorber rod drive mechanisms

ARDM model
3D FE model of RA Buckled mode shapes of RA vessels under seismic loadings Experimental Validation

0's

Integrated FEM model of Dynamic displacements IDrop time of absorber rods 20's
HSB orbit under SSE
core, GP and CSS of core SAa during SSE to ensure no impact Pump Seizure
 Testing of Components in Sodium
Critical components operating in sodium are qualified by
simulated tests in sodium and temperatures

USS SGDHR CSRDM DSRDM TA IFTM

Operating Experiences of FBR – Thermal Baffle
Flow Induced Vibration of
thermal baffle shells of
main vessel cooling
system experienced during
commissioning tests in
SPX-1 (FRANCE)
In PFBR, detailed theoretical analysis and experimental
studies on 1:4 scale model, have been carried out to
preclude the occurrence of vibrations.
70
Theory Unstable Unstable
60

Flow (m3/h)
50
Stable Stable

40

30 Test
Theory Test
20
0 50 100 150 200 250
Dynamic displacement of tip of thermal baffle Fall Height (mm)
 Safety Grade Decay Heat Removal System
Failure of all Pumps

In mixed mode circuit

EM pump is provided in
intermediate circuit and
air blower is provided in
air circuit.
Inter Wrapper Flow

Analysis with multi-dimensional model for pools with inter-wrapper

space (StarCD) and 1-D model for equipments and piping (DHDYN).
Availability any two circuits for 7 h and one circuit subsequently with
primary circuit under natural convection is sufficient to limit the
temperatures below category 4 limits
Performance Evaluation of DHR Capability
• Temperature & flow distributions in the hot pool
• Confirmation of SGDHR system Performance
• Assessment of Inter Wrapper Flow contribution

Facilities Utilized
FBTR, SAMRAT and SADHANA

SAMRAT Model (1/4 scale) Natural convection flow paths SADHANA loop
 Typical Cliff-Edge Effects Analysed in SFR
To quantify the capacity of structures and components and
strengthen the weak links to achieve the highest potential of
the plant to withstand higher internal & external loadings

• Leakage from both main and safety vessels

• Multiple primary pipe rupture
• Total loss of all Decay Heat Removal Systems on
demand
• Multiple pump seizure
• Failure of core support structure
• Ejection of all control rods from the core
• Core Disruptive Accident
• Sodium fire on roof slab
 Electronics and Instrumentation: A Step Towards
Enhanced Plant Safety
• Advanced visualization centre: a powerful tool to aid the design of
fast breeder reactors to reduce cost and time
• Full scope replica type operator training simulator
• Development of wireless sensor network
• Fine impulse test & diverse pulse coded safety logic to ensure the
healthiness of the hardware logic without disturbing the reactor
operation: two systems are provided to enhance reliability
• Static and dynamic diverse logics
• Real-time computer systems for safety systems

State of the art manufacturing technology

Built-in self diagnostics
Testability, Maintainability, High Availability
Reliability
Standardization and
Application Specific Integrated Circuits
 Severe Accident Scenarios
Fig.8 Core disruptive accident severe accident analysis

Accident Consequences
Unprotected loss of flow • Bulk core melting
with subsequent transient • Criticality events
overpower • Mechanical energy release
Local Blockage • Melt propagation from one
subassembly to neighboring
subassemblies
Slow power transients • Core melting
(ATWS) • Recritcality
Failure of post accident • Recriticality
heat removal systems • Vessel integrity
Source term uncertainty • Release of fission products
Core Disruptive Accident Analysis

a. Mechanical consequences (vessel deformations)

b. Molten fuel coolant interactions

c. Post accident heat removal conditions

 International Collaborations on Core Safety
• Coupled studies including core, hot & cold
pools, decay heat exchangers, intermediate
sodium loops and air heat exchangers
• Multi-scale simulation to quantify the role of
inter-wrapper flow In natural convection

• Participation in Coordinated Research Projects (IAEA)

• Hot Pool Hydraulics in Monju
• Simulation of Natural Convection in Hot Pool of Inter Wrapper Flow
Phenix
• Round Rabin Analysis on SGDHR System of PFBR

Time = 1 min. Time = 5 min.

Time = 0 min.

Time = 10 min. Time = 60 min.

CFD Model of Phenix Thermal stratification in Monju CFD Model of SGDHR Circuit
 Regulatory Experiences for PFBR
• Three tier system of review (International safety committee,
Project Design Safety Committee and Apex Committee for
Plant Safety Review)
• To assist the reviews, who are mainly experts of water
reactors, specialists groups were formed
• Safety criteria for PFBR checked with relevant safety
guidelines of water reactors (NS-R-1).
• Events and Incidents in other FBRS as well as thermal
reactors (for any impact) were analysed critically and
feedback incorporated.
• Apart from safety, Review covered manufacturing and
erection aspects (in view of first-of-kind project)
• Based on the review experiences, safety criteria for future
FBRs revised and under review by regulators
Safety Features: Current & Future Directions
SGDHR - Safety Grade Decay Heat Removal
BDBA - Beyond Design Basis Accident
CDA - Core Disruptive Accident • Safety Criteria 2011
RCB - Reactor Containment Building
SA - Subassembly • Number of scrams ~240*
SDS - Shutdown systems • CDA is Residual risk*
• < 100 MJ Energy release*
• Core Catcher for whole core
Convincing • RCB for 15 kPa*
Safety No.
• Component
Weight in t
Coupled 3D Analyses
PFBR CFBR
07 08 01 Main vessel 134 116
features 10 09
02 • Full scale Testing of SDS
Core support 44.8 36
structure

•
03 Grid Plate 76 34

• Safety Criteria 1990 04 Core

PFBR data for SGDHR
-- --
06

•
05 Inner vessel 61 55

• Number of scrams ~800 Ø11950 06

Tests on sodium Leak
Transfer Arm -- --

13725
• CDA is BDBA 07
• Extensive sodium fire tests
Large Rotatable
Plug
-- --

08 SRP/Control Plug -- --

• 100 MJ Energy release 04 05 11

09 •
IHX CDA: 20 mSv / event*
-- --

• Core Catcher for 7 SA 03

10

11
•
Primary Pump

Anchor safety
--

110
--
< 100 P-mSv/y (cumulative)*
95
01
•
02 vessel
RCB for 25 kPa 12
12 Thermal -- --

* Current study
Insulation

• Decoupled 2D Analyses
• Full scale Testing of SDS
• Scaled down tests-SGDHRs CFBR
• Extensive Tests on Structural
integrity under CDA
• Open Fire Sodium Tests Innovations &
• CDA: 50 mSv / event Collaborations
• < 350 P-mSv/ y (cumulative)
PFBR
Thank You