Political Analysis

Series Editors:

Series Editors: B. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre and Gerry Stoker

Theory and Methods

in Political Science

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Political Analysis

David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds)

Theory and Methods In Political Science (2nd edition)

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Governance, Politics and the State

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Research Methods In Politics

Keith Dowding

The Philosophy and Methods of Political Science

Vivien Lowndes
Why Institutions Matter

David Marsh

Political Behaviour

Martin Smith

Power, Politics and the State

Edited by
David Marsh
and

Gerry Stoker

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REVIZE 2008
Selection, editorial matter, Introduction and Conclusion
© David Marsh and Gerry Stoker 1995, 2002

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Hugh Ward; Vivien Lowndes; Vicky Randall; Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes;
David Marsh; Steve Buckler; Fiona Devine; Peter John; Melvyn Read and
David Marsh; Jonathan Hopkin; Stuart McAnulla; Mark Blyth 2002

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Contents

List of Figures, Tables and Boxes x

Preface to the Second Edition xi

Notes on Contributors xiii

Introduction 1

Gerry Stoker and David Marsh

The discipline of political science: a celebration of diversity 3

What is politics? What is it that political scientists study? 8

What is a scientific approach to politics? 11

Connecting to the world of politics 12

Is there a standard method for undertaking political science? 15

Conclusion ^ 16

1 A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in

Political Science 17

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

Ontology and epistemology 18

Different approaches to ontology and epistemology 22

Ontology and epistemology in political science: two cases 32

Conclusion 40

Further reading 41

PART I APPROACHES

2 Behavouralism 45

David Sanders
The rise of the behavioural movement and its core

characteristics 46

Criticisms of the behavioural approach 51

The strengths of the behavioural approach: an example 55

Conclusion: the behavioural legacy in the twenty-first century 62

Further reading 63

vi Contents

Contents vii

3 Rational Choice

Hugh Ward

The development of rational choice theory

The key commitments and assumptions of the
mainstream variant
Criticisms of rational choice theory
Developments: where is rational choice going?
Conclusions
Further reading

4 Institutionalism

Vivien Lowndes

Introduction

The ‘traditional’ institutional approach

The rise of the ‘new institutionalism’
What’s new about new institutionalism? The cor
of the approach
New institutionalist dilemmas
Conclusion
Further reading

5 Feminism

Vicky Randall

Debates within feminism

Feminism and political science

Critical responses to feminist political science

Conclusion: the way forward

Further reading

6 Interpretive Theory

Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes

The importance of interpretation

Varieties of interpretation

An anti-foundational approach to interpretation

Criticisms of interpretive theory
Conclusion
Further reading

65

65

68

71
84

88

89

90

90

92

94

features

97

101

107

108

109

110

113

127

129

130

131
132

134

139

149

151

152

7 Marxism 153

David Marsh

The development of Marxism 153

What has Marxism to offer? 163

Conclusion 170

Further reading 171

8 Normative Theory 172

Steve Buckler

Logical positivism and the death of political philosophy 172

Interpretive theory 176

Critical theory and dialectics 181

Deontological theory and value pluralism 185

Conclusion 192

Further reading 193

PART II METHODS

9 Qualitative Methods 197

Fiona Devine

The role of qualitative methods in political science 197

The epistemological underpinnings of qualitative methods 200

Criticisms of qualitative research 204

Illustration of qualitative research 207

Conclusion 215

Further reading 215

10 Quantitative Methods 216

Peter John

The collection and management of data 218

The power of description 220

Tables and inferential statistics 222

Multivariate analysis 225

Beyond ordinary least squares 225

Conclusion 229

Further reading 230

11 Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 231

Melvyn Read and David Marsh

Quantitative and qualitative methods: a false dichotomy? 231

Combining research methods 231

Problems of combination 240

viii Contents

Two case studies

Conclusion
Further reading

12 Comparative Methods

Jonathan Hopkin

Introduction

Theory and the comparative method

Basic forms of comparative explanation
Large Ns: quantitative comparative strategies
Limitations of the quantitative comparative approach
Small Ns: qualitative comparative strategies
Quantity or quality? Quantitative versus qualitative
comparative research

Conclusion: challenges to the comparative method

Further reading

PART III ISSUES

13 Structure and Agency

Stuart McAnulla

Introduction: structure and agency - a problem for all?

Structure and agency: what’s really in it for us?

The postmodern onslaught

The morphogenetic approach
Conclusion
Further reading

14 Institutions and Ideas

Mark Blyth

Introduction

Don’t worry about the philosophy...

Why institutions? Producing a ‘conventional’ wisdom in

political science

Changing the conventional wisdom: reinventing institutions

Historical and rational institutionalism
Explaining change and stability: the turn to ideas
Rationalism and ideas
Historical institutionalism and ideas

Conclusion: rival ontologies and progress in political science

Further reading

Conclusion

David Marsh and Gerry Stoker

Contents ix

311

The importance of ontological and epistemological issues 311

The growth of diversity in the formal study of politics 313

Beware gatekeeping 315

A plea for dialogue 316

Bibliography 318

Author Index 350

Subject Index 355

List of Figures, Tables and Boxes

Figures

13.1 The three-phase cycle of change (1) 287

13.1 The three-phase cycle of change (2) 289

Tables

1 Approaches to political science 6

2.1 Theoretical concepts and the empirical indicators employed

to measure them in Whiteley and Seyd’s analysis of party

activism 60

6.1 Traditions and Thatcherism 142

9.1 The political profile of the sample, 1992-97 208

Boxes

4.1

Traditional institutional analysis in action: some

contrasting examples

93

4.2

The seven strains of new institutionalism

96

4.3

New intstitutionalist analysis: some diverse examples

102

Preface to the Second Edition

When we planned the first edition of this book a decade or so ago it was
with a clear purpose. In our view, too many politics degrees, particularly in
UK universities, failed to give students a thorough grounding on the
various approaches to the study of politics or political science. After
completing a politics degree students had little idea of the scope of the
subject or the ways in which it could be studied - rather they had
considerable knowledge about different, often discrete, aspects of politics.
We set out to commission articles that covered various approaches to the
discipline. At the same time, we also felt that, while many US degrees in
politics did provide modules in research methods, most UK degrees in
politics did not. As such, we aimed to provide an informed introduction to
some of the methods used and methodological issues raised in the
discipline. Theory and Methods in Political Science clearly met a need felt
by lecturers and students, as the first edition sold well. This edition aims to
build on that relative success, but there have been some changes that, in
large part, reflect comments on the first edition.

The most important new addition is a separate chapter on issues of

ontology and epistemology that allows us to discuss the fundamental
questions of what there is to know about the political world and how
knowledge of it can be constructed. We have also added a chapter on
Marxism, which although perhaps out of fashion at the beginning of the
twenty-first century nevertheless constitutes an important approach to
political studies, a chapter on how to combine qualitative and quantitative
methods and a chapter on the role of ideas in explaining political
phenomena. All of the other chapters have either been completely revised
by the authors from the first edition or taken forward in new directions by
different authors. As a result of these changes there have been some
casualities. The main section to go has been the discussion of theories of
the state. These chapters were a valuable part of the first edition and we
hope that the issue of state theory can form the heart of a new book in
Palgrave’s Political Analysis series. For the second edition we have given
priority to chapters that more directly address the issues of how political
science is done.

In putting together the second edition we would like to thank our

authors for their forbearance in responding to the editors’ requests. We
owe a considerable debt to Clare Bambra who helped sort out the book in
its final stages. Her efficiency and insightful interventions in the editing of

xii Preface to the Second Edition

the final text testify to her abilities. She was perhaps also helped by her
experience of being taught by David Marsh with the first edition of the
book. Clare was a PhD candidate at Manchester University and is now a
Research Assistant at the Department of Public Health Studies, University
of Liverpool, UK. We would also like to thank the three anonymous
referees for their comments, which helped us improve the second edition in
the late stages of its production. Steven Kennedy, our publisher, has also
provided much valuable help. Chapters 1, 7 and 11 were written and much
of the editing undertaken while David Marsh was a Visiting Fellow in the
Political Science Programme of the Research School in Social Sciences at
the Australian National University during 2000-1. He would like to
acknowledge the institutional and personal support he received during
that year.

David Marsh
Gerry Stoker
Notes on the Contributors

Mark Bevir is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of

California. His recent publications include The Logic of the History of
Ideas.

Mark Blyth is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Johns Hopkins

University in Baltimore. His research focuses on comparative political
economy, American politics and West European politics. He has recently
published a number of articles on globalisation, comparative political
economy and the state.

Steve Buckler is Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of

Birmingham. His research centres on political theory and philosophy. He
has published numerous articles on political theory and is co-author of two
forthcoming works: The Ideology and Politics of New Labour and 20th
Century Political Thinkers.

Fiona Devine is a Professor in Sociology at the University of Manchester.

Her research concentrates on social inequality, political sociology and the
social basis of electoral behaviour, and gender, unemployment and the
labour market. She has a number of publications including Class Analysis
and the Stability of Class Relations and Social Class in America and
Britain.

Paul Furlong is Professor of European Studies and Head of School at the

University of Cardiff. His research interests include Italian and West
European politics, religion and politics, party politics and European
integration. His recent publications include the co-edited EU at the
Crossroads , Modern Italy: Representation and Reform and co-authored
Power in Capitalist Society: Theory , Explanation and Cases.

Jonathan Hopkin is a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of

Birmingham. His research and publications centre on the development and
organisation of political parties, the impact of globalisation on political
parties and Southern European politics.

xiv Notes on the Contributors

Notes on the Contributors xv

Peter John is Professor of Politics and Head of School at Birkbeck College

(University of London). His research interests are public policy, public
management, urban politics, rational choice theory and political
behaviour. His recent publications include Analysing Public Policy and
Urban Governance in Europe.

Vivien Lowndes is Professor of Local Government Studies at De Montfort

University (Leicester). Her research interests include local democracy,
public participation, citizenship and new institutional theory. She has
published widely on local government issues and is an adviser to
numerous public bodies including the House of Commons Select
Committee on Public Administration.

Stuart McAnulla is a Lecturer in Political Science Approaches at the

University of Leeds. His research interests include critical realism, political
change and transformations of the British polity. He has published on a
number of topics including Thatcherism, New Labour and public policy
reform.

David Marsh is Professor of Political Science at the University of

Birmingham. His research interests are broad and currently include
political sociology, British politics and public policy. His most recent
publications are Policy Networks in Comparative Perspective , Marxism
and Social Science and Post-war British Politics in Perspective .

Vicky Randall is Director of Gender Studies at the University of Essex. Her

research interests currently centre on the politics of childcare and political
parties in the Third World. Her recent publications include Women and
Politics and The Politics of Childcare in Britain. She is also the co-editor of
the Journal for Commonwealth and Comparative Studies.

Melvyn Read is a Lecturer in Politics at Queens University, Belfast. His

research focuses on the British political process and the role of
Westminster, research methods, and the politics of pressure groups. He
has published a variety of articles and The Politics of Tobacco.

R.A.W. Rhodes is Professor (Research) at the University of Newcastle. His

research includes British politics, public administration and government
narratives. He has recently published Control and Power in Central-Local
Government Relations and The Changing World of Top Officials:
Mandarins or Valets?. He is also the editor of the journal Public
Administration.

David Sanders is a Professor of Politics and Pro-Vice Chancellor (research)

at the University of Essex. His current research interests are international
relations theory, British foreign policy, electoral behaviour and electoral
forecasting. His publications include Patterns of Political Instability ,
Lawmaking and Cooperation in International Politics and Losing an
Empire y Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since 1945. He is also the co¬
editor of the British Journal of Political Science.

Gerry Stoker is Professor of Politics at the University of Manchester. His

research focuses on local government, public administration, and research
methods. He has published and edited numerous articles and books, the
most recent of which is the co-authored Towards Holistic Governance.

Hugh Ward is a Reader in Political Science at the University of Essex. His

current research examines the political and social impacts of technology
and the interface between Marxian and neo-classical political economy
and game theory. He has published various articles on rational choice
theory, environmental politics and the politics of science.

Introduction

GERRY STOKER AND DAVID MARSH

This book aims to provide an introduction to the way that political

scientists carry out their studies. The book looks at the general ways of
thinking or theorising offered by political scientists and the methods they
use to discover more about the subject. It is inevitable that the book will
neither be fully comprehensive in its coverage of political science nor
provide sufficient depth in approaching all of the issues that are
considered. Our claim is rather that we can provide an introduction to
the main approaches to political science and a balanced assessment of
some of the debates and disagreements that are an appropriate feature of a
discipline that has several thousand years of history behind it and many
thousands of practitioners in the modern world.

The book is divided into three broad parts. The first eight chapters aim
to map the broad ways of approaching political science that have had and
will, we think, continue to have a major effect on the development of
political science. We begin with a chapter that encourages students of
political science to be more self-conscious about what it is they think they
can find out and how they think they can find out about it. These issues of
ontology and epistemology - to use the technical terms - should be a
central element in the debate between different approaches to political
science. Thereafter six different approaches to political science are outlined
in the chapters that follow. Specifically we deal with behavioural, rational
choice, institutional, feminist, interpretive and Marxist approaches. Each
of the approaches combines a set of attitudes, understandings and practices
that define a certain way of doing political science. We have asked each of
our authors to not simply advocate their approach but also take on board a
range of critical comments and concerns about that approach. In this
respect we hope that each author offers a robust but self-aware and critical
understanding of his or her way of doing political science. The final
chapter in this first part of the book deals with the issue of normative
theory - a focus that takes us back to one of the most traditional of
approaches to political science but one which, we would argue, still has
considerable relevance. Political science should be interested not only in
understanding ‘what is’; it should also be concerned with the normative
issues of ‘what should be’.

2 Introduction

The second part of the book moves on from our discussion of broad
approaches to consider in detail some of the methods and methodological
challenges. We examine the range of both qualitative and quantitative
techniques that are available and how these techniques can be combined.
We move on to consider the potential and limitations of the comparative
method in understanding political phenomena. There is a particular set of
issues thrown up by the attempt to understand politics on a cross-national
basis.
The third part of the book deals with what can be described as two of
the key meta-theoretical challenges faced by political science and social
science in general. The first examines how best to combine a sense of
action and choice with a sense of constraints and opportunities in the study
of politics. ‘People make history but not in circumstances of their own
choosing’ may be a truism but it is one that political scientists need to take
account of in their explanations. There is also a broad concern shared by
many when they undertake political science with how to allow both
sufficient space to the role of ideas in explaining political phenomena
and scope for the role of institutions. This is the concern of the final
chapter in the main body of the book. Some general and brief conclusions
about the study of political science are presented at the end of the book.

Here, by way of introduction to the book, the aim is to present an

overview of the answers to various important questions about the nature
of political science. The study of politics can trace its origins at least as far
back as Plato (Almond, 1996), but our concern is with its contemporary
expression. The American Political Science Association was formed in
1903. Other national associations for the profession of political science
followed, such as the Political Studies Association of the UK in 1950. The
American association had at the beginning of the twenty-first century over
13,500 members from over seventy different countries. It is still true to say
that the Americans are the most powerful force in political science but we
agree with the assessment of Goodin and Klingemann (1996) that in the
last few decades the discipline has become a genuine international
enterprise. Excellent and challenging political science is produced in many
countries and this book seeks to reflect an appreciation of the internatio¬
nalisation of political science. All of our authors have British connections
but it is to be hoped that their writings deal with issues of concern to the
political science community across the world.

This introduction addresses itself initially to five questions. We aim to

focus discussion on this central set of questions that anyone approaching a
discipline such as political science would want to ask.

Gerry Stoker and David Marsh 3

• Is there one best approach to the study of politics?

• What is covered by the umbrella of the subject matter of politics?

• What is meant by a scientific approach to the study of politics?

• What is the connection between the study of politics and the actual
practice of politics?

• Is there a standard method to use when undertaking political science

research?

Answering these questions will provide a suitable backcloth to the more

detailed study of theories and methods offered in the core of the book.
Each of the questions is addressed in a section of the introduction
presented below.

The discipline of political science: a celebration

of diversity

Read many of the recent reviews of political science and they agree that
political science has become more diverse and more cosmopolitan in
character (see, for example, Almond 1990 and Goodin and Klingemann
1996). Some of those who pioneered what they called the scientific
treatment of the subject (see the further discussion below) had expected
that the scientific revolution would lead to a unity in the understanding of
political science (Weisberg 1986: 4). There can be little doubt that those
ambitions have not been realised. There is a basis for some common
agreement about what constitutes ‘minimal professional competence’ but,
as Goodin and Klingemann (1996: 6) note, when it comes to judging the
value of work beyond some agreed baseline of coherence and craftsman¬
ship, ‘the higher aspirations are many and varied’. There is a de facto
pluralist view of the nature of political science endeavour.

We would emphasise only two points beyond supporting the pluralism

that is now widely acknowledged. First, there is a need to recognise just
how considerable is the variety of political science at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. There are many distinct approaches and ways of
undertaking political science. Our book presents a particular focus on six
options in terms of approaches that seek to explain the way that politics
works in our world. The spread of our coverage is greater than that offered
in recent reviews of political science in Britain (wider, for example, than
that offered in Hayward 1999; see on this point also Bevir 2000) and the
international review offered by Goodin and Klingemann (1996). We
believe that at this stage in its development it is important for political
science not to depict itself as a small club of like-minded people. The better

4 Introduction

image is of a broad church with different starting points and concerns but
a shared commitment to developing a better understanding of politics.

This observation leads on naturally to our second point, namely that the
key challenge is not to launch a campaign for unity but to argue for
diversity to be combined with dialogue. Almond (1990, 1996) warns that
the discipline should avoid constructing itself into an uneasy collection of
separate sects. There is a pluralism of method and approach out there that
should not be denied but it should not be ‘isolative’ but rather interactive.
It should be eclectic and synergistic. That is what is meant by our claim to
celebrate diversity. We argue that political science is enriched by the
variety of approaches that are adopted within the discipline. Each has
something of considerable value to offer. But each benefits from its
interaction with other approaches. Our book, in giving space and room
to a variety of ways of doing political science, aims to provide the essential
ingredients for an on-going exchange so that different approaches to the
discipline can gain a baseline understanding of each other.

Table 1 below tries to capture the diversity of the approaches dealt with
by this book. For each approach, its response to five issues is addressed.
First, we consider its definition of politics, and then we look at what it
regards as a scientific contribution and its preferred methods. We then
examine its relationship to the world of politics and its attitude to
normative political theory. Each of these issues will be dealt with
thematically below but it is worth just spelling out the variety of
approaches that constitute our understanding of political science at the
beginning of the twenty-first century.

After a broad thematic discussion of ontology and epistemology the

book begins with the behavioural approach to political science in
Chapter 2. It is appropriate to start with this approach since the
behavioural revolution perhaps can be seen as constituting the key
development in the establishment of modern political science against
which all other approaches have to situate themselves. Above all the
behavioural movement decisively shifted attention away from the formal,
legalistic study of political institutions and constitutions. That shift
remains an accepted part of the terrain for all political scientists. Modern
institutional analysis discussed in Chapter 4, for example, eschews a
narrow focus on formal organisation for a wider definition of institution
in terms of stable and recurring patterns of behaviour and, as such, is as
interested in informal conventions as in formal constitutions. All empiri¬
cally oriented political science shares with the behaviouralists a concern
with the way politics operates in practice.

The second approach to be considered is rational choice theory

(Chapter 3). It too claimed to bring a revolutionary new approach to the
discipline. There can be little doubting the impact of this approach within

Gerry Stoker and David Marsh 5

the discipline, with some of its advocates not being slow to argue that it
constitutes the key approach for delivering a political science that is
cumulative in its knowledge production and a powerful member of a
wider group of social scientists unified in their approach in axioms and
methods initially derived from economics. While some emphasise the
overweening virtues of an approach which favours formal theory and
mathematical rigour, others now see the rational choice approach as one
among a variety of paths that can be taken. That is certainly the position
taken by Ward in this book and one shared with the editors. The way of
thinking and the challenge posed by rational choice analysis has something
to offer all in the discipline but its claim to be a high priest is rightly
regarded with scepticism. Indeed, Ward makes the argument that while
rational choice in its mainstream formation may constitute an approach -
defined by its particular set of assumptions - rational choice methods of
analysis could perhaps better be seen as a toolkit from which a variety of
approaches could draw.

The third style of political science that is a focus of attention in the book
and Table 1 is institutional analysis. As Lowndes points out in Chapter 4,
those interested in institutional studies may have found themselves out of
favour as first behaviouralists and then rational choice advocates looked to
blaze a trail for a new political science unencumbered by the old interest in
institutions and constitutions. However, a new institutionalism has
emerged, as a check to the undersocialised accounts of political action
offered by behaviouralism and rational choice, that shares a core view that
institutions significantly structure political relationships. There are many
ways in which that interest in institutionalism has been expressed (see
Chapter 14). As Goodin and Klingemann (1996: 11—12) suggest the new
interest in institutions has indeed provided a basis for a rapprochement
within the discipline with both behaviouralists and rational choice students
giving recognition to the importance of institutions in the last decade or so.

Reconciliation is not the theme pursued by the next approach outlined

in this book. As Randall points out in Chapter 5, feminist analysis has
challenged political science on two fronts. First, it calls for a fully rounded
account of the role of women in politics and, second, it raises fundamental
questions about the way that politics is conceptualised, including the
conventional distinction between public and private, and as such has
major implications for the scope and boundaries of political science as a
discipline.

The sense of challenge also emerges in the anti-foundational literature

that has come to increased prominence within the discipline and is
reviewed in Chapter 6 of the book as part of a broader account of the
interpretist approach to political science. These writers oppose the view
that there are foundations to the real world that can be discovered; rather

Table 1 Approaches to political science

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8 Introduction

Gerry Stoker and David Marsh 9

their position is that the challenge is to present the world as it is interpreted

by human thought and practice. Writers from within this tradition argue
that understanding of actions and events cannot be read off from
behaviour, assumptions about self-interested motivation or the constrain¬
ing impact of institutions. For them the key to understanding politics is the
world of diverse meanings and understandings in which it operates. A
variety of approaches have formed part of a broad attempt to approach
political science in a distinctive way. They share in a commitment to focus
on interpreting politics through narrative, through the beliefs, ideas or
discourses held in society.

The final element in the patchwork of approaches that we identify is

Marxism. The broad political economy approach offered by this form of
analysis is, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, out of fashion. Yet,
as Marsh argues in Chapter 7, there remains within Marxism a powerful
set of analytical tools and ideas that will perhaps in a revised form most
likely gain prominence in political analysis again, especially in the context
of the continuing impact of global capitalism.

So, to answer the first question we posed very directly, there is no one
best way to undertake political science. We have identified six main
approaches but recognise that others could identify more. Our point is
that we should celebrate diversity and enable the different elements of
political science to understand one another better. We should also not
forget that normative political theory continues to play a key role in
political science and Buckler in Chapter 8 provides an overview of that
theory. For now it is appropriate to move on to examine the issue of the
content of political science.

What is politics? What is it that political

scientists study?

When people say they ‘study politics’ they are making an ontological
statement because there is an implicit understanding within the statement I

of what the polity is made of and its general nature. They are also making |

a statement that requires some clarification. In any introduction to a

subject it is important to address the focus of its analytical attention. So,
simply put, we should be able to answer the question: what is the nature of
the political that political scientists claim to study? A discipline, you might
think, would have a clear sense of its terrain of enquiry. Well, this is not so |

in respect of political science. Just as there are differences of approach to

the subject, so there are differences about the terrain of study. |

As Hay (2002: ch. 2) argues, ontological questions are about what is and |

what exists. Indeed he puts the point even more straightforwardly: |

ontology asks what is there to know about. Although a great variety of

ontological questions can be posed, a key concern for political scientists
relates to the nature of the political. There are a range of other ontological
or meta-theoretical questions such as the relationship between structure
and agency and the role of ideas in explaining political outcomes that
could also be addressed. Indeed, discussion devoted to these issues is
featured later in the book in Chapters 13 and 14. For now our attention is
focused on the ‘primary’ ontological question for political science, namely
what is the nature of the political world?

There are two broad approaches to defining the political (Leftwich 1984;
Hay 2002). The first defines the field of study by reference to an arena or
particular set of institutions. Much of the interest of political scientists in
the first three approaches that were identified above - behaviouralists,
rational choice theorists and institutional analysis - is devoted to the
formal operation of politics in the world of government and those who
seek to influence it. This idea about what is political makes a lot of sense
and relates to some everyday understandings. When people say they are fed
up or bored with politics they usually mean that they have been turned off
by the behaviour or performance of those politicians most directly
involved in the arena.

The second approach to the definition of the political sees it as a social

process that can be observed in a variety of settings. Politics is about more
than what governments choose to do or not do; it is about the uneven
distribution of power in society, how the struggle over power is conducted,
and its impact on the creation and distribution of resources, life chances
and well-being. This broader definition of the political is particularly
associated with the other three approaches to political science identified
earlier - feminism, anti-foundational work and Marxism. For feminists in
particular there has been much emphasis on the idea that the personal is
political, that issues defined as private by some are indeed deeply political
in the sense that they involve the exercise of power and the practice of
domination. As Randall argues in Chapter 5, feminists have been in the
forefront of demands for a wider definition of politics with ‘the emphasis
on power relations between men and women and whenever and wherever
they occur - as much, if not more, in the bed or the kitchen, for example,
as in Westminster or Whitehall’. Marxists have also preferred generally a
definition of politics that defines it in terms of a wider struggle between
social groups in society. Anti-foundationalists are also more likely to see
politics as a process conducted in a range of arenas.

The alarm bells might be ringing here since it appears that political
scientists cannot even agree what the subject matter of their discipline
should be. Yet, our view is that both arena and process definitions have
their value. Moreover, all of the different approaches to political science

10 Introduction

we identify could accommodate themselves to much shared ground on the

issue of what is the political

It would be fair to say that in the abstract all of the approaches to politics
with which we are concerned could go along with a definition of politics as
a struggle over power. Indeed, Goodin and Klingemann (1996: 7) suggest
that a broad consensus could be built around a definition of politics along
the lines: ‘the constrained use of social power’. The political process is
about collective choice without simple resort to force or violence. It is
about what conditions and constrains those choices. It is about the use of
that power and its consequences. It would cover unintended as well as
intended acts. It would deal with passive as well as active practices. Politics
enables individuals or groups to do some things that they would not
otherwise be able to do and it also constrains individuals or groups from
doing what it is they would otherwise do. Although the different
approaches to political science may have their own take on that definition
of politics — in the sense that how power is put into practice would be a
matter of dispute between them — they could well be willing to sign up to
such a definition. Although, as we argue below, it is still possible to
identify different shades of opinion.

Politics is much broader than what governments do but there is some¬

thing especially significant about political processes that are or could be
considered to be part of the public domain. As Randall points out, the
slogan ‘the personal is political’ has sometimes been misinterpreted as
‘only the personal is political’, whereas feminist analysis is and should be
deeply concerned about the relative underinvolvement of women in formal
politics as well as emerging forms of informal involvement in social
movements, grass-roots organisations and community groups. In a prag¬
matic sense it is probably true to say that most political scientists tend to
concentrate their efforts in terms of analysis and research on the more
collective and public elements of power struggles. The key is to retain a
sense of the collective or public arena that takes you beyond the narrow
machinations of the political elite.

In Table 1 below, we suggest that different shades of opinion are held by

our six approaches to political science with respect to the definition of the
political. All share an idea of politics as a power struggle in a collective
arena but each expresses the idea in a different way. Behaviouralists tend
to look at the political world as a system (including public opinion, interest
groups and so on) oriented towards the process of formal government. For
rational choice analysis the key political question is how the conditions for
political action are created: what drives self-interested individuals to
compromise or acquiesce to a collective political arrangement. The
institutionalists in turn will look for the rules, norms and values that
govern political exchanges or struggles. For those engaged in feminist
Gerry Stoker and David Marsh 11

analysis the gender dimension of political inequalities is the key: the

personal is political in that sense. For anti-foundationalists politics is a
struggle between narratives. For many Marxists the key struggle is that
driven by the economic division between classes.

What is a scientific approach to politics?

As Goodin and Klingemann (1996: 9) comment, ‘much ink has been spilt
over the question of whether, or in what sense, the study of politics is or is
not truly a science. The answer largely depends upon how much one tries
to load into the term “science” ’. If one adopts what is called a minimalist
approach (Stoker 1995: 3), the question can be answered fairly
straightforwardly, namely, that political science is science in the sense
that it offers ordered knowledge based on systematic inquiry. There is no
reason to doubt that political science in all its forms has or could achieve
that level of knowledge.

As such, there may be basic agreement among all (except, perhaps, for a
few of the more extreme feminists or anti-foundationalists) that political
science concerns the production of systematic knowledge about the
political. However, there are some fundamentally different views on this
issue of what is politics taken by the approaches that we consider in this
book and these differences are worth some consideration here.

What is at stake here is the various epistemological positions taken by

the different approaches. As Marsh and Furlong argue in Chapter 1,
ontology is concerned with what we can know about the world and
epistemology with how we can know it. There is a fundamental difference
between foundationalists, who argue that a real world exists independently
of our knowledge of it, and anti-foundationalists, who argue that the
world is socially constructed. In epistemological terms, positivists, who are
foundationalists, believe that we can establish the real world through
empirical observations. As such, they would claim that they are in tune
with modernist scientific methods. In contrast, interpretists believe we can
only interpret the world; that is, establish an understanding of that world.
This position can call on a long tradition of political studies and draws
inspiration from more recent post-modern thought.
Among foundationalists there is a further distinction to be drawn
between positivism and realism. Positivists look to follow the style of
the natural scientists and establish causal relationships developing expla¬
natory or even predictive models. The realists in contrast do not privilege
direct observation. In their view, deep structures which cannot be directly
observed have crucial effects on outcomes. Similarly, as Bevir and Rhodes

12 Introduction

point out in Chapter 6, there are a number of different positions within

anti-foundationalist and interpretist thought.

The behavioural and rational choice approaches are the most obviously
positivist. The former sees its task as to produce knowledge that allows the
development of general laws about the ways things work, the latter places
more of an emphasis on the predictive capabilities of its models. In this
book Chapter 6 clearly reflects an anti-foundationalist and interpretist
position. However, both institutionalism and feminism also have many
authors who operate from within an interpretist position (see Chapters 4
and 5). The Marxist camp is dominated by the realist position, although
more recently it has given some ground to the interpretist argument (see
Chapters 6 and 7). At the same time, both institutionalism and feminism
have realist strands, as is clear in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.

This last point is an appropriate one with which to concude this section.
As Marsh and Furlong will elaborate in Chapter 1, the epistemological
positions of the different approaches reviewed in this book have been
subject to change and development. Different parts of the discipline have
listened to and learnt from each other. We would support the idea of
further dialogue. However, it cannot be denied that political scientists are
more fundamentally divided over what constitutes science than over what
constitutes politics.

Connecting to the world of politics

If you say you are a Professor of Politics in social settings people are
inclined to one of several reactions. Some simply look perplexed, uncertain
what to say next, others try quickly to move the subject on to another topic
on the grounds that it is unpleasant or uninteresting to talk about politics,
some tell you in detail their opinions of politicians or their views on
particular political issues, and some suggest that in some way you must be
connected to the political process. Some very kindly assume you know a lot
about politics and the way it works and ask you what your job involves.

In practice, rather like the rest of the population, political scientists have
different views of political issues and values. That is as it should be, as
individuals the political position of political scientists is a matter for them.
But, at a more abstract level what should be the relationship between the
world of political analysis and the practice of politics in the world?

There are some that hold the view that the job of political scientists
begins and ends with their description and analysis of politics. It is
probably true to say that much political science is written in such a way
that it would be difficult for those involved in politics to relate to, or gain

Gerry Stoker and David Marsh 13

much from, the work or the understanding that is presented. Does that
matter? Some may feel there is no issue to be addressed. Why should
political science care if its work is useful or used? Others might take the
view that a discipline that studied politics but had nothing to say to those
involved in politics or who might be involved, if politics was constructed in
a different way, was somehow failing. The question is: if you are studying
an aspect of human society, as political scientists do, what should be the
relationship to that human activity?

A related question is what is the stance of political science regarding the

normative issues raised by politics? Should the discipline restrict itself to
studying what is rather than examine what should be? A number of the
concepts used by empirically oriented political scientists, such as democ¬
racy or justice, are contested or disputed. So, there are also issues about the
appropriate connection between empirical and normative theorising that
need to be considered.

Given the theme of this introduction thus far, the reader will perhaps
not be surprised to learn that different approaches to political science have
tended to develop different answers to the questions about their attitude to
normative theorising and their relationship to the practice of politics.
Again Table 1 presents the arguments in summary form.
We begin again with behaviouralism that has, in the past at least, taken
a stance that suggests that there is a great divide between normative
theorising and its practice of political science. That armchair debates about
the way politics should be organised would give way to a scientific
understanding of the way it worked in reality was the vision offered by
many early behaviouralists. The critique by logical positivists of traditional
political philosophy was taken to heart by many behaviouralists. That
critique, as Buckler notes in Chapter 8, identified two forms of knowledge,
one driven by empirical inquiry that was the realm of science and the other
that dealt with investigation into the logical properties of, and relations
between, concepts. As Buckler comments: ‘the job of the philosopher, then,
was mainly one of linguistic and analytical clarification, clearing up the
conceptual errors and intellectual confusions that historically had inhibited
a clear understanding of the world’. The traditional normative debates of
political philosophy were of the past, something that the new discipline of
political science was to leave behind. The job of the philosopher was to do
some ground-clearing conceptual clarification for the new science of
politics.

The new science of politics was keen to stress also that it was beyond
politics: its claim was to value-free neutrality in its analysis. During the
professional day its exponents are presented as simply scientific experts;
what they do in the evenings as citizens to pursue politic issues is a matter
of personal preference and choice. It was nothing to do with their day job

14 Introduction

any more than it would be if a physical scientist decided to serve as a local

councillor or join a community campaign.

Modern behaviouralists, as Sanders makes clear in Chapter 2, are not as

dismissive of the concerns of political philosophy as they once were.
Hostility has given way to tolerance, driven in part by a recognition that
many of the concepts that political scientists use are value-loaded. So what
is required for effective analysis is something more than conceptual fine-
tuning. Moreover, it recognised that there are fundamental issues that
cannot be resolved by empirical work alone.

The claims of behaviouralists’ work to be value-free in the analysis of

politics have also been subject to sustained challenge. For example, as
Randall points out, some political scientists have been ‘happy to reproduce
stereotypical and sexist understandings of woman s nature .

The claims to value-freedom have been rightly ridiculed and so such

claims are now rarely made explicitly, although there is an assumption
held among many behaviouralists, and in fairness many other political
scientists, that the connection between the discipline and the world of
politics is appropriately detached: they are neutral, observers of the
political world, happy to offer their thoughts to the media, policy-makers
and community groups as experts, but otherwise not engaged.

Rational choice theorists share much the same territory as modern

behaviouralists on the issue of their connection to the wider world of
politics. They, if anything, are more inclined to be engaged. Rather like the
economists from which their methods are drawn, they do think that the
predictive modelling of their approach makes them especially suitable for
the role of expert adviser. As to the issue of political philosophy, the
position of rational choice theorists might be: well, if it satisfies some
individual’s utility function who are they to object. However, it can be
nothing more than a hobby.

Those engaged in institutional analysis are likely to adopt a mixed range

of responses to issues outlined above. The reaction to normative political
theory is likely to be a positive one, especially where it might be possible to
open up a dialogue about the connection between desired normative
political conditions and the institutional arrangements that are most likely
to promote their achievement or ingrain their embodiment.

Institutionalists may be happy to stay as simply observers of the political

scene. If they get involved it is perhaps more likely that it will be as
engaged and explicitly value-laden advocates standing alongside others
engaged in political battles. Their claim will be to offer a particular
informed and insightful analysis, but there will be no pretence at value-
neutrality. They will be policy advocates working with others in a messy,
uncertain world of political choices and options.

Gerry Stoker and David Marsh 15

Feminists, in contrast to all of the other approaches so far considered,

would have to regard themselves as engaged. The struggle for gender
equality is in part fought out in the discipline of political science itself
(including the demand that normative political theory needs to be
feminised) and there is considerable legitimacy given to political involve¬
ment in the wider world of feminist politics. Marxism too would share a
commitment to making a connection between theory and practice. There is
an expectation that at some point there should be a connection between
intellectual endeavour and political involvement. As for the broad group of
anti-foundational writers it is difficult to generalise, but perhaps the most
common position is one where the relationship could be described as the
academic offering wry commentary on the practice of politics.

Is there a standard method for undertaking

political science?

It is probably true that by now most readers can guess the answer to this
question. There is no one method of acquiring knowledge about politics
but rather a variety of methods. Methodological issues are addressed
directly in Chapters 9 through 12.

There is a broad distinction that can be drawn between qualitative and

quantitative methods. The former stretches from observation through
interviews to focus group discussion as ways to find out about politics.
The latter involves the collection of data on a repeated incidence of a
political phenomenon and using statistical techniques to analyse those
data. In short, qualitative data collection leans towards focusing on a few
cases, while quantitative work usually deals with many cases.

The distinction between methods is sometimes associated with different

approaches to political science. Broadly speaking, behavioural and rational
choice approaches tend to favour quantitative methods, as these are more
likely to provide data to test generalising theories that these approaches
favour. Qualitative work is more obviously associated with interpretive or
anti-foundational theories as for this approach the crucial thing is data
production that is likely to reveal the meanings and understandings that
people attach to politics. Marxism would draw on different types of data
depending on the question posed. Feminism would perhaps tend to favour
qualitative data collection, although there are feminist political scientists
who use quantitative data.

This simplistic distinction is not the main message of Chapters 9 and 10

on qualitative and quantitative methods respectively. Rather, both authors
are at pains to point out the range and subtlety of the methods available
16 Introduction

under their broad headings. Both point to the challenges associated with
using data of either sort. The argument of both Devine and John is that
political science is coming of age and trying to develop a greater
sophistication in the way it collects and uses data of whatever variety.

The association between certain types of data collection and analysis

and approaches to political science should not be pushed too far. In
practice political scientists using different types of approach are increas¬
ingly using a mix of quantitative and qualitative data in order to answer
research questions. Indeed this theme is the focus of Chapter 11 by Read

and Marsh. , ,

Chapter 12 addresses another key methodological issue, namely the role

of comparative work. The comparative method takes advantage of the

position that in the world there is a mix of political systems, institutions
and actors. Comparing provides the opportunity to test ideas about the
way that politics works by looking at issues in the context of the ‘natural
laboratory’ of the mixed systems of the world. There are a number of
difficult issues to be addressed in using the comparative method, as
Hopkin points out in Chapter 12, but it is difficult to think of a political
science that could do without it.

Conclusion

The aim of this introduction has been to get you into the foothills of
understanding the political science range. We cannot promise that the
whole of the book is going to be as easy to read. As you scale the heights of
political science it is going to be hard going at times. However we ope
that each of the chapters is well signposted and structured. In addition,
each also provides a guide to further reading to help you with your studies.
Chapter 1

A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology

and Epistemology in Political
Science

DAVID MARSH AND PAUL FURLONG

This chapter introduces the reader to the key issues that underpin what we
do as social or political scientists. Each social scientist’s orientation to their
subject is shaped by their ontological and epistemological position. Most
often those positions are implicit rather than explicit, but, regardless of
whether they are acknowledged, they shape the approach to theory and the
methods which the social scientist utilises. At first these issues seem
difficult but our major point is that they are not issues that can be avoided
(for a similar view see Blyth, Chapter 14). They are like a skin not a
sweater: they cannot be put on and taken off whenever the researcher sees
fit. In our view, all students of political science should recognise and
acknowledge their own ontological and epistemological positions and be
able to defend these positions against critiques from other positions. This
means they need to understand the alternative positions on these
fundamental questions. As such, this chapter has two key aims. First, we
will introduce these ontological and epistemological questions in as
accessible a way as possible in order to allow the reader who is new to
these issues to reflect on their own position. Second, this introduction is
crucial to the readers of this book because the authors of the subsequent
chapters address these issues and they inform the subject matter of their
chapters. As such, this basic introduction is also essential for readers who
want fully to appreciate the substantive content of this book.

The chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section
describes what we mean by these two terms ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’
and considers briefly why these questions are important. The second
section then outlines the different positions on ontology and epistemology
and the arguments which have been put forward for and against these
positions. Finally, we shall illustrate how these different positions shape
the approaches that researchers take to their research by focusing on
research in two broad areas: globalisation and multilevel governance.
18 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

Ontology and epistemology

Ontological and epistemological positions are related, but need to be

separated. To put it crudely, one’s ontological position affects, but far
from determines, one’s epistemological position.

Ontology

Ontological questions are prior because they deal with the very nature of
‘being’; literally, an ontology is a theory of ‘being’ (the word derives from
the Greek for ‘existence’). This sounds difficult, but really it is not. The
key question is whether there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is
independent of our knowledge of it. For example, are there essential
differences between genders, classes or races that exist in all contexts and
at all times?

A simple illustration easily makes the point. Over the last ten years John
Gray’s book Men are from Mars and Women are from Venus (1992) has
sold seven million copies in the USA and millions more in forty countries
worldwide. He argues that men and women are very different and that
men and women can only understand and deal with one another better if
they recognise this fact of life. This book takes a clear ontological position;
there are fundamental differences between men and women that are
features of their very existence. These differences persist over time and
are common across cultures. This is an essentialist or a foundationalist
ontological position. So, its proponents argue that there are essential
differences of ‘being’ that provide the foundations upon which social life
is built.

Of course, this is a contentious position; one which is strongly attacked

by many, if not most, feminists. They believe that the differences between
men and women are socially constructed. As such, they are not essential
differences but are particular to a given culture and time. They are the
product of patriarchy, in which male dominance shapes the culture and
values of society, affects patterns of socialisation and perpetuates gender
inequality. This argument reflects a different ontological position that is
anti-foundationalist and emphasises the social construction of social
phenomena.

Epistemology

If an ontological position reflects the researcher’s view about the nature of

the world, their epistemological position reflects their view of what we can

David Marsh and Paul Furlong 19

know about the world and how we can know it; literally an epistemology
is a theory of knowledge. Again, this sounds difficult, but the basic
concerns are not too difficult. There are two key questions. Can an
observer identify ‘real’ or ‘objective’ relations between social phenomena?
If so, how? The first question itself subsumes two issues. Initially, it takes
us back to ontology; if one is an anti-foundationalist, then one argues that
there is not a ‘real’ world, which exists independently of the meaning
which actors attach to their action, to discover. At the same time, such an
anti-foundationalist would also suggest that no observer can be ‘objective’
because they live in the social world and are affected by the social
constructions of ‘reality’. This is sometimes called the double hermeneutic;
the world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level) and their
interpretation is interpreted by the observer (a second hermeneutic level).

The second question raises another important, and clearly related, issue.
To the extent that we can establish ‘real’ relationships between social
phenomena, can we do this simply through direct observation, or are there
some relationships which ‘exist’ but are not directly observable? The
answers one gives to these questions shapes one’s epistemological position.

Of course, there are different ways of classifying epistemological

positions and there is no agreement as to the best way. Probably the most
common classification distinguishes between scientific (sometimes positi¬
vist) and hermeneutic (or interpretist) positions. We shall begin with a
brief review of that distinction, before proposing an alternative, which
distinguishes between positivist, realist and interpretist positions.

Scientific versus hermeneutic approaches

Social science was influenced by the ideas of science as the nomenclature
clearly indicates. In particular, the empiricist tradition played a crucial role
in the development of social science. David Hume argued that knowledge
starts from our senses. On the basis of such direct experience we could
develop generalisations about the relationships between physical phenom¬
ena. The aim was to develop causal statements which specified that, under
a given set of conditions, there would be regular and predictable outcomes
(on this see Hollis and Smith 1990: ch. 3). The adherents of the scientific
tradition saw social science as analogous to science. In ontological terms
they were foundationalists; they thought there was a real world ‘out there’
which was external to agents. Their focus was upon identifying the causes
of social behaviour. The emphasis was upon explanation and many felt
that the use of rigorous ‘scientific’ methods would allow social scientists to
develop laws, similar in status to scientific laws, which would hold across
time and space.

20 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

In methodological terms, the scientific tradition was greatly influenced

by logical positivism that posited a very straightforward characterisation
of the form of scientific investigation. As Hollis and Smith put it (1990: 50):

To detect the regularities in nature, propose a generalisation, deduce

what it implies for the next case and observe whether the prediction
succeeds. If it does, no consequent action is needed; if it does not, then
either discard the generalisation or amend it and [test the] fresh
[predictions].

In contrast, there is an alternative hermeneutic (the word derives from

the Greek for ‘to interpret’) or interpretist tradition. The adherents of this
position are anti-foundationalists, believing that the world is socially
constructed. They focus upon the meaning of behaviour. The emphasis
is upon understanding , rather than explanation . As such, in the interpretist
tradition it is not possible to establish causal relationships between
phenomena that hold across time and space.

Positivist, realist and interpretist positions

We prefer this classification because the scientific tradition identified by

Hollis and Smith conflates two distinct positions, positivism and realism.
Positivists adhere to a foundationalist ontology and are concerned to
establish causal relationships between social phenomema, thus developing
explanatory, and indeed predictive, models. The realist is also founda¬
tionalist in ontological terms. However, realists, unlike positivists, do not
privilege direct observation. The realist believes that there are deep
structural relationships between social phenomena which cannot be
directly observed, but which are crucial for any explanation of behaviour.
So, as an example, a realist might argue that patriarchy as a structure
cannot be directly observed, although we can see many of the
consequences of it; we return to this example later.

The distinction between positivist, realist and interpretist approaches is

examined in much more depth in the next section. However, the key point
here is that any classification that we adopt would annoy some social
scientists. We use this particular distinction because we are realists and, as
such, do not like the conflation between positivism and realism involved in
the first distinction. However, many other authors would question our
distinction. In particular, many, like Bevir and Rhodes (see below) would
want to make further distinctions within the tradition of interpretive
theory. The point is that any way of classifying epistemological positions
can be contested; we choose one, but are aware of the criticism of it. In
addition, we shall deal with many of those criticisms when we look at the
variants within the three positions we identify.

David Marsh and Paul Furlong 21

Why are such distinctions important?

In our view, ontological and epistemological concerns cannot, and should

not, be ignored or downgraded. Three points are important here:

1. First, these concerns should not be put in what the Australians, with
typical directness, call the ‘too hard basket’. Certainly, the issues
involved are not easy, but neither are they difficult, if they are
explained simply and with appropriate examples.

2. Second, ontological and epistemological positions should not be

treated like a sweater that can be ‘put on’ when we are addressing
such philosophical issues and ‘taken off’ when we are doing research.
In our view, the dominance of a fairly crude positivist epistemology
throughout much of the postwar period encouraged many social
scientists to dismiss ontological questions and regard epistemological
issues as more or less resolved, with only the details left to be decided
by those interested in such matters. Such social scientists have tended
to acknowledge the importance of epistemology without considering it
necessary to deal with it in detail; positivism has been regarded as a
comforting sweater that can be put on where necessary. In contrast, we
would argue that epistemology, to say nothing of ontology, is far from
being a closed debate.

3. Third, researchers cannot adopt one position at one time for one
project and another on another occasion for a different project. These
positions are not interchangeable because they reflect fundamental
different approaches to what social science is and how we do it. This is
the key point. As we pointed out in the introduction, a researcher’s
epistemological position is reflected in what is studied, how it is
studied and the status the researcher gives to their findings. So, a
positivist looks for causal relationships, tends to prefer quantitative
analysis (for a more detailed discussion of the relationship between
ontology, epistemology and methodology, see Chapter 11) and wants
to produce ‘objective’ and generalisable findings. A researcher from
within the interpretist tradition is concerned with understanding, not
explanation, focuses on the meaning that actions have for agents, tends
to use qualitative evidence and offers their results as one interpretation
of the relationship between the social phenomena studied. Realism is
less easy to classify in this way. The realists are looking for causal
relationships, but think that many important relationships between
social phenomena cannot be observed. This means they may use
quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data will only be
appropriate for those relationships that are directly observable. In
contrast, the unobservable relationships can only be established

22 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

David Marsh and Paul Furlong 23

indirectly; we can observe other relationships which, our theory tells

us, are the result of those unobservable prelationships. We return to
these issues in the next section.

Different approaches to ontology and epistemology

Here we outline the positivist, the interpretist and the realist positions in
more detail. We shall focus on: the major criticisms of the positions; the
variations within these positions; and the way the positions have changed
over time. At the outset, however, it is important to emphasise that the
distinctions between the positions, and more specifically that between
interpretism and realism, are not clear-cut.

Positivism

The core of positivism is fairly straightforward, although of course there

are variants within it:

• Positivism is based upon a foundationalist ontology. So, to the

positivist, like the realist, but unlike those from the interpretist position,
the world exists independently of our knowledge of it.

• To the positivist, natural science and social science are broadly

analogous. We can establish regular relationships between social
phenomena, using theory to generate hypotheses which can be tested
by direct observation. In this view, and in clear contrast to the realist,
there are no deep structures that cannot be observed. Traditionally,
positivism contended that there is no appearance/reality dichotomy and
that the world is real and not socially constructed. So, direct
observation can serve as an independent test of the validity of a theory.
Crucially, an observer can be objective in the way they undertake such
observations. Researchers from the interpretist tradition rarely accept
any notion of objectivity. Realists accept that all observation is
mediated by theory (to the realist, theory plays the crucial role in
allowing the researcher to distinguish between those social phenomena
which are directly observable and those which are not).

• To positivists the aim of social science is to make causal statements; in

their view it is possible to, and we should attempt to, establish causal
relationships between social phenomena. They share this aim with
realists, while interpretists deny the possibility of such statements.
• Positivists also argue that it is possible to separate empirical questions -
that is, questions about what is - from normative questions - that is,
questions about what should be. Traditionally, positivists thought that

the goal of social science was to pursue empirical questions, while

philosophy, metaphysics or religion pursued the normative questions.
Because we can separate empirical and normative questions, it is
possible for social science to be objective and value-free. Realists and,
especially, those from within the interpretist tradition would reject that
proposition.

Many social scientists are positivists, although much of the positivism is

implicit rather than explicit. The behavioural revolution in the social
sciences in the 1960s, dealt with by David Sanders in Chapter 2, was an
attempt to introduce scientific method into the study of society. It was an
explicit reaction to political theory, which it saw as concerned with
normative questions, and institutionalism, which it saw as lacking theore¬
tical and methodological rigour. In contrast, it was based upon a
foundationalist ontology and, most often, a quantitative methodology
(but see below and Chapter 10). The view was that a social ‘science’
was possible if we followed the scientific method; deriving hypotheses
from theory and then testing them in an attempt to falsify them. We
needed ‘objective’ measures of our social phenomena, our variables; as
such, we would focus upon ‘hard’ data - from government statistics,
election results and so on — rather than soft data — from interviews or
participant observation. So, for example, if a positivist was studying
political participation, they would be interested in measuring the level of
voting, party or pressure group membership, direct action or whatever,
and relating it to demographic variables such as class, gender, race and
education. The aim would be to establish the precise nature of the
relationship between these variables and participation in order to produce
causal models. We shall return to this example later. The key point here is
that, as always, the ontological and epistemological position adopted had
clear methodological implications.

The criticism of positivism takes two broad forms. The first line of
criticism broadly argues that, in following the methods of science,
positivists misinterpret how science really proceeds. Two lines of argument
have been particularly important here. First, there is the pragmatist
position of Quine (1961) who develops two crucial critiques of positivism
(for a fuller exposition see Hollis and Smith 1990: 55-7; they deal with a
third, less important, criticism):

(i) Quine argues that any knowledge we derive from the five senses is
mediated by the concepts we use to analyse it, so there is no way of
classifying, or even describing, experience without interpreting it.

(ii) This means that theory and experiment are not simply separable,
rather theory affects both the facts we focus on and how we interpret
them. This, in turn, may affect the conclusions we draw if the facts

24 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

David Marsh and Paul Furlong 25

appear to falsify the theory. As such, if we observe ‘facts’ which are

inconsistent with the theory, we might decide that the facts are wrong
rather than that the theory is wrong. Of course, this undermines the
notion that observation alone can serve to falsify a theory.

Second, there is Kuhn’s view (1970) that, at any given time, science tends
to be dominated by a particular paradigm that is unquestioned and which
affects the questions scientists ask and how they interpret what they
observe (for a fuller discussion, see Hollis and Smith 1990: 57-61).
Consequently, scientific investigation is not ‘open’, as positivism implies,
rather certain conclusions are almost unthinkable. There is a ‘paradigm
shift’ when a lot of empirical observation leads certain, brave, scientists to
question the dominant paradigm, but until that time, and for the most
part, scientists discard observations which do not fit (obviously this fits
well with the second of Quine’s criticisms above) and embrace the results
which confirm the paradigm.

The second main line of criticism of positivism is more particular to

social science. It argues that there are obvious differences between social
and physical or natural phenomena that make social ‘science’ impossible.
Three differences are particularly important. First, social structures, unlike
natural structures, do not exist independently of the activities they shape.
So, for example, marriage is a social institution or structure, but it is also a
lived experience, particularly, although not exclusively, for those who are
married. This lived experience affects agents’ understanding of the
institution and also helps change it. Second, and related, social structures,
unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of agents’ views of
what they are doing in the activity. People are reflexive; they reflect on
what they are doing and often change their actions in the light of that
reflection. This leads us to the third difference. Social structures, unlike
natural structures, change as a result of the actions of agents; in most
senses the social world varies across time and space. Some positivist social
scientists minimise these differences, but, to the extent they are accepted,
they point towards a more interpretist epistemological position.

Many positivists avoid these critiques which are put in the ‘too hard
basket’. However, the more sophisticated positivists are aware of these
criticisms and the position has changed significantly as a result. Fortu¬
nately, this volume boasts two sophisticated behaviouralists who are
positivists, Sanders and John. It is particularly worth examining David
Sanders’ view in a little more detail because it represents an excellent
example of the modern, more sophisticated, positivist position. Sanders
(Chapter 2) accepts he has been strongly influenced by the positivist
position, but acknowledges the ‘ferocious philosophical criticism’ to which
it was subjected. He argues that ‘post-behaviouralists’, who might also be

called ‘post-positivists’: acknowledge the interdependence of theory and

observation; recognise that normative questions are important and not
always easy to separate from empirical questions; and accept that other
traditions have a key role to play in political and social analysis. As such,
this post-positivism has moved a significant way from more traditional
positivism, largely as a result of the type of criticisms outlined here.

However, the ontological and epistemological problems have not gone

away, rather they have been elided. Two quotes from Sanders illustrate the
point. First, he argues (see Chapter 2: 51):

Modern behaviouralists - ‘post-behaviouralists’ - simply prefer to

subject their own theoretical claims to empirical tests. They also suspect
that scholars working in non-empirical traditions are never able to
provide a satisfactory answer to the crucial question: ‘How would you
know if you were wrong?’
Later he continues (Chapter 2: 54):

For modern behaviouralists, the ultimate test of a good theory is still

whether or not it is consistent with observation - with the available
empirical evidence. Modern behaviouralists are perfectly prepared to
accept that different theoretical positions are likely to produce different
observations. They insist however, that, whatever ‘observations’ are
implied by a particular theoretical perspective, those observations must
be used in order to conduct a systematic empirical test of the theory that
is being posited.

This is a sophisticated statement of a positivist epistemological position,

but it is still essentially positivist. The aim is to use observation (of
whatever type) to test hypothesised relationships between the social
phenomena studied. Research from within other traditions must still be
judged against the positivists’ criteria: ‘observation must be used in order
to conduct a systematic empirical test of the theory that is being posited’.
Yet, that is not a standard most researchers from within an interpretist
tradition could accept (even Bevir and Rhodes 1999 could only do so with
major qualifications), because they do not believe that direct observation
can be objective and used as a test of ‘reality’. Most realists would also
have a problem with Sanders’ position because they would see many of the
key relationships as unobservable.

One other aspect of Sanders’ position is important here. He accepts that

interpretation and meaning are important, which might suggest that the
differences between positivist and interpretist traditions are beginning to
dissolve. So, Sanders argues (Chapter 2: 53), in criticising prior studies of
voting behaviour: ‘There are other areas — relating to the way in which
individuals reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, upon themselves — where

26 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

David Marsh and Paul Furlong 27

behavioural research has simply not dared to tread.’ He recognises that

such factors might, or might not, be important, but emphasises that they
would be difficult to study empirically. However, the crucial point is that
Sanders wants to treat interpretation and meaning as intervening variables.
In this view, how a voter understands the parties and their own position
may affect their voting behaviour. At best, this acknowledges only one
aspect of the double hermeneutic; the interpretist tradition would argue
that we also need to acknowledge the subjectivity of the observer.

So, positivism has changed in response to criticism. Post-positivism is

much less assertive that there is only one way of doing social science.
However, it still emphasises explanation, rather than understanding, and
the primacy of direct observation. In our terms, it is still foundationalist
and firmly located in the scientific tradition.

The interpretist position

The interpretist tradition is the obvious ‘other’ of positivism. However, it

is a much broader church than positivism and much of this subsection will
deal with its variants. Nevertheless, it is useful to begin with an outline of
the core of the position.

• In the interpretist tradition researchers reject the notion that the world
exists independently of our knowledge of it. Rather, they contend that
the world is socially or discursively constructed. This view is
diametrically opposed to positivism, but shares certain features with
some modern variants of realism. In ontological terms, then, this
position is anti-foundationalist.

• This means that for researchers working within this tradition social
phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretation of them;
rather it is this interpretation/understanding of social phenomena which
affects outcomes. As such, it is the interpretations/meanings of social
phenomena that are crucial; interpretations/meanings which can only be
established and understood within discourses or traditions. Conse¬
quently, we should focus on identifying those discourses or traditions
and establishing the interpretations and meanings they attach to social
phenomena.

• However, we must also acknowledge that ‘objective’ analysis is

impossible. Social ‘scientists’ (of course interpretists would not use this
term) are not privileged, but themselves operate within discourses or
traditions. Consequently, knowledge is theoretically or discursively
laden. As such, this position acknowledges the double hermeneutic.
This position has clear methodological implications. It argues that there
is no objective truth, that the world is socially constructed and that the role

of social ‘scientists’ [sic] is to study those social constructions. Quantitative

methods can be blunt instruments and may produce misleading data. In
contrast, we need to utilise qualitative methods - interviews, focus groups,
vignettes and so on - to help us establish how people understand their
world. So, for example, someone operating from within this tradition
studying political participation would start by trying to establish how
people understand ‘the political’ and ‘political’ participation

The major criticism of the interpretist tradition comes, unsurprisingly,

from positivists, though some realists would agree with elements of that
critique. To positivists, the interpretist tradition merely offers opinions or
subjective judgements about the world. As such, there is no basis on which
to judge the validity of their knowledge claims. One person’s view of the
world, and of the relationship between social phenomena within it, is as
good as another’s view. To many positivists, this means that such research
is akin to history, or even fiction, whereas they aspire to a science of
society. It is difficult for someone in the interpretist tradition to answer
this accusation, because it is based on a totally different ontological view
and reflects a different epistemology and, thus, a different view of what
social science is about. However, as we shall see, most researchers do
believe that it is possible to generalise, if only in a limited sense. Perhaps
more interestingly, Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) attempt to defend
their approach against this positivist critique by establishing a basis on
which they can make knowledge claims; on which they can claim that one
interpretation, or narrative, is superior to another. We shall return to their
argument below.

Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming: ch. 2) distinguish between the herme¬

neutic and postmodern, or post-structuralist, strands in the interpretist
position. In essence, the hermeneutic tradition is idealist; it argues that we
need to understand the meanings people attach to social behaviour. So,
hermeneutics is concerned with the interpretation of texts and actions.
This involves the use of ethnographic techniques (participant observation,
transcribing texts, keeping diaries and so on) to produce what Geertz
(1973) calls ‘thick description’. As Bevir and Rhodes put it, quoting Geertz,
the aim is to establish ‘our own constructions of other people’s construc¬
tions of what they and their compatriots are up to’. However, ethnogra¬
phers do generalise. They develop a narrative about the past based upon
the meanings which the actions had for social actors. Then, on the basis of
this ‘thick description’, they offer an interpretation of what this tells us
about the society. The point is that these interpretations are always partial,
in both senses of the world, and provisional; they are not ‘true’.

More recently, as Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) emphasise, post¬

structuralism and postmodernism have provided a powerful challenge to
foundationalism in both philosophy and social science. Yet, as Bevir and

28 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

Rhodes also point out, this variant of the interpretist tradition is itself so
diverse that it is difficult, if not impossible, to characterise. They overcome
this problem by focusing on the work of Michel Foucault, who is perhaps
the best-known writer in this broad tradition. He, like most post¬
structuralists and postmodernists, is a strong opponent of foundationalism
and the modernisation project associated with the Enlightenment. This
project argues that: the basis of human knowledge is direct experience; as
such, it is possible to develop an ‘objective’ view of the ‘real’ world (thus, it
denies both elements of the double hermeneutic); language is transparent
or neutral; and that human history is inevitably progressive, with present
knowledge building on past knowledge to improve our information about
the world and our ability to control it.

In contrast, Foucault argues that experience is acquired within a prior

discourse. As such, language is crucial because institutions and actions
only acquire a meaning through language. Thus, as Bevir and Rhodes
(forthcoming) argue, for Foucault: ‘to understand an object or action,
political scientists have to interpret it in the wider discourse of which it is
part’. This means that, as Bevir and Rhodes stress, it is the social discourse,
rather than the beliefs of individuals, which are crucial to Foucault’s
version of the interpretist position. The identification of that discourse,
and the role it plays in structuring meanings, is thus the key concern of
those adopting this approach (for an example of this broad approach in
use see Howarth (1995).

Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) develop their own take on the inter¬
pretist tradition. It is particularly interesting because it directly addresses
the key issue raised in the positivist critique of this tradition. They argue
that social science is about the development of narratives, not theories. As
such, they stress the importance of understanding and the impossibility of
absolute knowledge claims, but they want to explain and they defend a
limited notion of objectivity.

Broadly, Bevir and Rhodes are within the hermeneutic, rather than the
postmodern, or post-structuralist, stream of the interpretist tradition. As
such, they follow Geertz and others in arguing that it is possible to produce
explanations within the interpretist tradition. However, their understand¬
ing of explanation is very different from that of a positivist. In their view,
the researcher can produce an explanation of an event or of the relation¬
ships between social phenomena. But, this explanation is built upon their
interpretation of the meanings the actors involved gave to their actions.
What is produced is a narrative which is particular, to that time and space,
and partial, being based on a subjective interpretation of the views of, most
likely, only some of the actors involved. Consequently, any such narrative
must be provisional; there are no absolute truth claims.

David Marsh and Paul Furlong 29

However, Bevir and Rhodes do wish to make some, more limited,

knowledge claims. They argue (forthcoming): ‘Although we do not have
access to pure facts that we can use to declare particular interpretations to
be true or false, we can still hang on to the idea of objectivity.’ They
suggest that a field of study ‘is a co-operative intellectual practice , with a
tradition of historically produced norms, rules, conventions and standards
of excellence that remain subject to critical debate, and with a narrative
content that gives meaning to it’ (original emphasis).

They continue:

[Practice, tradition and narrative provide] for a negotiated and dynamic

set of standards through which rational debate and argumentation
between proponents of rival perspectives or approaches is possible
[where] these standards are historically embedded within social
practices, traditions and narratives which provide ‘embedded reasons’
... for judging an argument true or false or an action right or wrong.

Such criteria are not universal or objective; rather, they are ‘shared criteria
for assessing ... knowledge claims’. To Bevir and Rhodes, postmodernism
errs in failing to acknowledge ‘significant, grounded rationality’ that is to
be found in these practices and traditions.

In Bevir and Rhodes’ view, such knowledge claims are not self-
referential because they can be ‘reconfirmed’ at three distinct points:

The first is when we translate our concepts for fieldwork: that is, are
they meaningful to practitioners and users and if not, why not? The
second is when we reconstruct narratives from the conversations: that is,
is the story logical and consistent with the data? And the third is when
we redefine and translate our concepts because of the academic
community’s judgement on the narratives: that is, does the story meet
the agreed knowledge criteria?

Overall, they argue:

To overcome this difficulty, we should conceive of objective knowledge,

less as what our community happens to agree on, and more as a
normative standard embedded in a practice of criticising and comparing
rival accounts of ‘agreed facts’. The anti-foundational nature of this
practice lies in its appeal, not to given facts, but to those agreed in a
particular community or conversation. In addition, and of key
importance, the normative, critical bite of our approach lies in
conducting the comparison by the rules of intellectual honesty. These
rules originate in anti-foundationalism and not in a straightforward
acceptance of the norms of the relevant community or conversation.

30 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

David Marsh and Paul Furlong 31

As we can see then, there are a number of variants within the interpretist
tradition. However, they are all anti-foundationalist and critical of
positivism. These approaches have become much more common in
political science since the 1970s for a number of reasons. First, increasingly
philosophical critiques have led to the questioning of positivism. Second,
the postmodern turn in social science has had an affect on political science,
although much less so than in sociology. Third, normative political theory
has changed fundamentally. Historically, it was foundationalist; the aim
was to establish some absolute notion of the good or of justice. As Buckler
argues in Chapter 8, that is no longer the case. Some normative political
theorists have been influenced by postmodernism, again variously defined,
and more by the work of Quine and others. Now, most political theorists
are anti-foundationalists or, at the very least, have a very limited
conception of any universal foundations. Fourth, as Randall shows in
Chapter 5, much, but by no means all, feminist thought has been strongly
influenced by postmodernism; it is anti-foundationalist and operates
within the interpretist tradition. As such, we can see the influence of this
interpretist tradition very broadly across political science.

Realism

Realism shares an ontological position with positivism, but, in epistemo¬

logical terms, modern realism has more in common with relativism. The
core views of classical realism are again fairly clear and owe much to
Marx’s work:

• To realists, the world exists independently of our knowledge of it. In

ontological terms they, like positivists, are foundationalists.

• Again like positivists, realists contend that social phenomena/structures

do have causal powers, so we can make causal statements.

• However, unlike positivists, realists contend that not all social

phenomena, and the relationships between them, are directly
observable. There are deep structures that cannot be observed and
what can be observed may offer a false picture of those phenomena/
structures and their effects (for an excellent exposition of this position
see Smith, in Hollis and Smith 1990: 205-8). But, as Smith puts it,
although we cannot observe those structures, ‘positing their existence
gives us the best explanation of social action. To use a phrase familiar
to the philosophy of science, we are involved in “inference to the best
explanation” (Hollis and Smith 1990: 207). As such, to a realist there is
often a dichotomy between reality and appearance. This is a very
important issue because it has clear methodological implications. It
means that realists do not accept that what appears to be so, or, perhaps

more significantly, what actors say is so, is necessarily so. As an

example, classical Marxism, and Marxism is the archetypal classical
realism, argued that there was a difference between ‘real’ interests,
which reflect material reality, and perceived interests, which might be
manipulated by the powerful forces in society. Given this view, we
cannot just ask people what their interests are, because we would
merely be identifying their manipulated interests, not their ‘real’
interests.

The criticisms of classical realism were of two sorts, which reflect

different epistemological positions. The positivists denied the existence of
unobservable structures. More importantly, they argued that positing them
makes the knowledge claims of realism untestable and, thus, unfalsifiable.
As such, realist claims that rely on the effect of unobservable structures
have the same status to positivists as the claims of scholars from within the
interpretist tradition. In contrast, authors from the interpretist tradition
criticise the foundational claims of realism. In their view, there are no
structures that are independent of social action and no ‘objective’ basis on
which to observe the actions or infer the deep structures. So, the realist
claim that structures cause social action are rejected on ontological and
epistemological grounds.

In our view, contemporary realism has been significantly influenced by

the interpretist critique. In particular, this modern critical realism ac¬
knowledges two points. First, while social phenomena exist independently
of our interpretation of them, our interpretation/understanding of them
affects outcomes. So, structures do not determine; rather they constrain
and facilitate. Social science involves the study of reflexive agents who
interpret and change structures. Second, our knowledge of the world is
fallible; it is theory-laden. We need to identify and understand both the
external ‘reality’ and the social construction of that ‘reality’ if we are to
explain the relationships between social phenomena.

Realism also has clear methodological implications. It suggests that

there is a real world ‘out there’, but emphasises that outcomes are shaped
by the way in which that world is socially constructed. As such, it would
acknowledge the utility of both quantitative and qualitative data. So, for
example, realists might use quantitative methods to identify the extent to
which financial markets are ‘globalised’. However, they would also want
to analyse qualitatively how globalisation is perceived, or discursively
constructed, by governments, because the realist argument would be that
both the ‘reality’ and the discursive construction affect what government
does in response to global pressures. We shall return to this example later.
Modern realism then attempts to acknowledge much of the interpretist
critique, while retaining a commitment to causal explanation. The key

David Marsh and Paul Furlong 33

32 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

problem here of course is that it is not easy, indeed many would see it as
impossible, to combine scientific and interpretist positions because they
have such fundamentally different ontological and epistemological under¬
pinnings, one focusing on explanation and the other on understanding (on
this point, see Hollis and Smith 1990: 212).

One of the main criticisms of realists has been that they often treat
concepts as if they related to some fixed, or at least more or less given,
‘essences’ or cores. It should be noted first that this is not a necessary tenet
for realists; it reflects rather the philosophical traditions from which they
derive. Nevertheless, the question of what a concept is for is an important
one, and it affects ontology directly. If a concept cannot be tied firmly to
an underlying reality, as traditional philosophy seems to imply, the concept
of ‘being’ itself may be detached from the real world of experience. This is
one of the reasons why modern philosophy has considerable difficulty even
recognising that there may be a subject of ontology. It should also be noted
that this is one of those issues on which positivists and interpretists can
find themselves temporarily in agreement, even though, as we have seen,
they have fundamentally different views about knowledge and being. Any
apparent agreement between them, however, has limited scope, as they
have different origins and are heading for different destinations. Having
considered how these categories relate to some important issues in the
social sciences, we can now move on to apply the arguments to particular
cases so as to illustrate their use and their limits.

Ontology and epistemology in political science:

two cases

The aim in this section is to examine how a researcher’s ontological and

epistemological position affects the way they approach empirical questions
in political science. We shall focus on two areas: globalisation and
multilevel governance. These areas have been chosen because they reflect a
broad spread of the concerns, but, in our view, similar arguments could be
made in relation to other substantive areas.

Case 1: Globalisation

The literature on globalisation mushroomed in the 1990s. It has been

common to distinguish between processes or aspects of globalisation: so
many authors have distinguished between economic, political and cultural
processes, while acknowledging that they are interrelated. In this vein,
many have argued that economic globalisation has grown apace and that
this process has significantly restricted the autonomy of the nation state.

Indeed, Ohmae (1990) goes as far as to argue that only two economic
forces, global financial markets and transnational corporations, will play
any role in the politics of the future. In his view, the future role of states
will be analogous to the current role of local councils. At the same time,
other authors have focused on cultural globalisation, suggesting that world
culture is becoming increasingly homogeneous: in the view of most,
reflecting a growing US hegemony. Certainly, there is little doubt that the
issue of globalisation in a crucial one for those interested in questions of
contemporary political economy and governance.

Political scientists have probably been most concerned with economic

globalisation and the way in which it restricts the autonomy of the state,
and have utilised a foundationalist ontology and a positivist epistemology,
although, as we shall see below, some more recent work is realist. In
contrast, sociologists, particularly those who focus on cultural studies,
concentrate upon cultural globalisation, operating from an anti-founda-
tionalist and interpretist position.

The main debate about economic globalisation has concerned the extent
to which it has increased. There are two main positions. Some authors, like
Ohmae (1990), who are christened hyperglobalists by Held et ai (1999)
and seen as first-wave theorists by Hay and Marsh (2000), argue that there
has been a massive increase in various indicators of economic globalisa¬
tion: direct foreign investment; international bank lending; transnational
production; international trade and so on. In contrast, authors such as
Hirst and Thompson (1999), christened sceptics by Held et al. (1999) and
seen by Hay and Marsh (2000) as second-wave theorists, argue that the
process is more limited. More specifically, they suggest that: globalisation
is not a new phenomenon; regionalisation, rather than globalisation, is a
better description of the changes that have occurred; and the only area in
which there has been significant globalisation is in relation to financial
markets. We are not concerned here with the detail of this argument. Our
point is that both sets of authors agree about what constitutes evidence of
globalisation and how we can go about studying that evidence. Globalisa¬
tion is an economic process that can be measured quantitatively, indeed
there is large agreement as to the appropriate measures, and which, to the
extent that it exists, has an effect on patterns of governance.

More recently, other authors have been, in most cases implicitly rather
than explicitly, critical of this ontological and epistemological approach.
The point is easily made if we return to two ways of classifying the
literature on globalisation to which we have already referred. Held et al.
(1999) contrast hyperglobalist and sceptical approaches to globalisation
with a third approach to which they adhere: the transformationalist thesis.
In contrast, Hay and Marsh (2000) identify a third wave of the globalisa¬
tion literature that builds upon a critique of the first two waves. These two

34 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

‘third ways’ share something in common, but do differ significantly in a

manner that reflects ontological and epistemological debates.

The transformationalists differ significantly from the sceptics in that

they share:

a conviction that, at the dawn of a new millennium, globalisation is a

central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic
changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order ... In this
respect, globalisation is conceived as a powerful transformative force
which is responsible for a massive shake out of societies, economies,
institutions of governance and world order. (Held et al. 1999: 7)

Held et al. also emphasise the major way in which the transformationalist
account parts company with both the other two positions (1999: 7):

The transformationalists make no claims about the future trajectory of

globalisation ... Rather [they] emphasise globalisation as a long-term
historical process which is inscribed with contradictions and which is
significantly shaped by conjunctural factors.

So, they argue that: there are ‘real’ social, political and economic changes
occurring in the world; globalisation is a cause of these changes, a
transformative force; but there is no inevitable process of globalisation
which, as social scientists, we can identify. This last point is especially
important here. The putative development of globalisation is dependent on
the actions of agents, whether individuals, companies, institutions or
states; as such it is a socially constructed process. It seems clear then that
the transformative position is a realist one.

This position has methodological consequences. It points strongly to

comparative analysis, because the emphasis is upon how different coun¬
tries, and indeed different companies and markets, are affected by, and
respond to, this process of globalisation in different ways. If globalisation
is not an inevitable or universal process, then we need to focus on how it is
differently experienced in different contexts.

This point is even clearer if we turn to what Hay and Marsh call the
third-wave literature on globalisation. Hay and Marsh (2000: 6) follow
Held et al . in arguing that we: ‘shouldn’t make essentialising and reifying
assumptions about the effects, consequences, or even the very existence, of
globalisation’. Rather, globalisation is a series of contradictory and
contingent processes. More specifically, they suggest that, for many
authors, especially the hyperglobalists, globalisation is a process without
a subject. In contrast, they argue that it is agents who construct globalisa¬
tion and, as such, the researcher should identify the actors involved and
how they perceive and discursively construct globalising tendencies.

David Marsh and Paul Furlong 35

However, Hay and Marsh go further to contend that these discursive

constructions have significant effects on outcomes. So, they suggest that it
is the discursive construction of globalisation that affects government
economic policies, rather than the ‘real’ processes of globalisation. As
such, and taking the UK as an example, their argument would run along
the following lines:

• While there has been a significant increase in regionalism in patterns of

trading and a globalisation of financial markets, there is limited
evidence that Britain is locked into a globalised political economy which
determines the economic policy which the British Government can
adopt.

• However, British governments, and especially the Blair Government,

have argued that it is constrained in that way. It suggests that the extent
of globalisation is such that the pursuit of neo-liberal policies is
inevitable: there is no alternative.

• As such, it is not the ‘reality’ of globalisation that is shaping British

economic policy, but the dominant discursive construction of that
reality.

We are not concerned here about the validity or otherwise of this

argument. The crucial point for us is that this view clearly marks a break
with the positivism that underpins most work on globalisation. To Hay
and Marsh, there may be ‘real’ processes at work, but the way they affect
outcomes is mediated by the discursive construction(s) of these processes.
This argument has both realist and interpretist elements. There is an
appeal to a real world, but the emphasis is on the discursive construction
of that world. This position illustrates how realist and interpretist
positions interface. In our view, this position is a realist one if it recognises
that there is an interactive or dialectical relationship between the ‘real’
world and the discourses. A realist would acknowledge not only that
discourses have real effects, in this case that the dominant discourse of
globalisation shapes economic policy, but also that the ‘real’ processes of
globalisation constrain the resonance of different discourses. So, if the
dominant discourse is at odds with the ‘reality’, alternative discourses can
appeal to that ‘reality deficit’. However, if it is merely the discourses that
have the causal power, then, in our view, it is an interpretist position.

There are other approaches to globalisation which are clearly located in

an interpretist tradition. As we emphasised above, most of these ap¬
proaches stress cultural globalisation. Of course, as Held et al. point out
(1999: 328), the concept of culture has a long and complex history but
‘normally refers to the social construction, articulation and reception of
meaning’. This definition immediately suggests an anti-foundationalist
ontology and, most often, an interpretist epistemology.

36 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

It is possible to approach the issue of cultural globalisation utilising a

positivist epistemology. So, one could focus empirically on the extent to
which certain cultural icons, such as Coca-Cola, McDonald’s or Madonna,
have become universal, or whether colonialism was associated with a
similar global culture. However, the focus of a cultural studies approach to
globalisation is much more likely to be on difference. Two points are
important here. First, the argument would be that there are various
discourses about globalisation, none of which is ‘true’, although at any
time one discourse may be dominant. Second, while one discourse may
dominate, it can be, and will always be, resisted: different agents - citizens
and researchers - will offer different narrations of globalisation and its
effects. In this way, this alternative ‘cultural studies’ approach reflects an
anti-foundationalist and an interpretist position.

Case 2: Multilevel governance

Multilevel governance and intergovernmentalism: realism

versus positivism

The term ‘multilevel governance’ covers a variety of familiar phenomena

that are normally located in the areas of regional policy and European
integration. Though ‘multilevel governance’ (MLG) is rapidly acquiring
the status of a fashionable mainstream concept, it is not as established as
‘globalisation’ in the vocabulary of politicians and commentators. Here
again, the contemporary debates in large part reflect different ontological
and epistemological positions. In this case study, we concentrate not on the
different uses of the term, although these can be significant, but rather on
the contrast between MLG and its main opponent, which is liberal
intergovernmentalism.

A useful definition of MLG is provided by Hunt (1999): ‘[According to

multilevel governance theories] the policy process involves the interaction
between a constellation of public and private actors located at the supra¬
national, national and sub-national level.’ This interaction is usually
understood as non-hierarchical and as lacking a central, predominant
authority, and similar usages can be found in Marks et al. (1996) and
Armstrong and Bulmer (1998). These theorists argue against the view of
the EU as an international organisation whose decision-making is based
predominantly on national interests determined by member states, a view
known as intergovernmentalism.

The intergovernmentalist perspective is closely associated with interna¬

tional lawyers, but an influential political analysis is provided by Andrew
Moravscik (1993), who argues that the European policy process can be

David Marsh and Paul Furlong 37

understood as a nested game played out both in the domestic politics of

member states and in the international arena of the EU’s institutions.
While the MLG theorists derive their frameworks from institutionalist
perspectives (see Chapter 4), arguing that ‘institutions matter’ in shaping
interaction, analysts such as Moravscik generally utilise rational choice
perspectives (see Chapter 3 below). Both approaches would claim to be
empirically grounded, but the nature of the empirical grounding differs.

Most MLG theorists are realists in epistemological terms, emphasising

how the continuity of rules, norms and operating procedures, and some¬
times of ‘deep, non-observable structures’, can, and does, determine the
outcomes of decision-making in the long term. As such, their logic is
inductive rather than deductive. Overall, MLG is not so much concerned
with the debate between neo-federalists and intergovernmentalists as with
the consequences of different possible forms of integration for normative
issues such as democratic participation, effective government and distri¬
butive justice.

In contrast, liberal intergovernmentalists seek to identify the preferences

and the parameters of the individual actors (usually member states) and
show how, after the event, the outcomes can be understood as the result of
rational calculated behaviour. Their logic is therefore deductive: they
argue from the general to the particular. Liberal intergovernmentalism is
foundationalist in ontological terms and operates with a positivist episte¬
mology. In its treatment of European integration it is clearly unsympa¬
thetic to neo-federalism and to supranationalism.

The normative underpinnings of multilevel governance and

intergovermentalism
MLG theorists argue that, rather than conceptualising regional policy as a
national issue in which the lead role is taken by the national state
institutions, it should be identified as an arena in which the European
Union plays an integral role in policy-making, together with the separate
regional authorities and the central national institutions. In this sense,
theories of multilevel governance make a distinction between ‘government’
and ‘governance’. ‘Government’, it is argued, is too narrowly concerned
with the formal structures of state authority, and with the associated
processes and issues, whereas ‘governance’ is concerned with much wider
notions of politics, encompassing the production, accumulation and
regulation of collective goods at all levels including the international.
Power relations in multilevel governance are structured by reciprocal
interdependence on each other’s resources, rather than on conflict over
either scarcity or fundamental values. Typically, these theories argue that
relations of decision-making between the various levels should be seen as

38 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

loosely interconnected rather than as tightly nested; that is, characterised

by multilateral links, and non-hierarchical in form, rather than by a
hierarchical chain of bilateral links in which the national state authority
has a predominant role, as is the case with intergovernmental approaches.

There is thus a strong normative element in multilevel governance. From

describing the increased evidence of the multiplicity of decision-making
forms and levels in European integration, proponents move to arguments
about the value of multilevel governance in enhancing democratic legiti¬
macy and effective decision-making under conditions of globalised poli¬
tical economy. In comparison with state-centred accounts, multilevel
governance is said to be ‘closer to the people’, and therefore more
acceptable, and more flexible and adaptable, so better able to respond
to the rapidly changing economic climate (Marks et al. 1996).

The arguments against multilevel governance, if it is regarded as a policy

prescription as well as empirical analysis, concentrate on two main issues
(Moravscik 1993; Scharpf 1988). The first is what is known as the joint
decision trap’. This focuses upon the danger of deadlock in decision¬
making where there are many participants, interdependent arenas and a
variety of possible combinations of policy-making processes. Though
multilevel governance may offer the prospect of policy-making close to
the people and greater legitimacy, it risks sacrificing efficiency in decision¬
making if there is no authoritative procedure for resolving disagreements
among equal participants. A second criticism denies even that multilevel
governance provides greater legitimacy and argues that, when the smaller
units and more local levels of decision-making are included, the greater
complexity of procedures results in opacity of decision-making and,
therefore, in less accountability. In practice, multilevel governance can
mean obscure elite-led agreements and public incomprehension. Neo¬
liberal arguments try to resolve these problems by emphasising how the
member states in the EU remain both the focus of popular legitimacy,
albeit with some rebalancing towards regional authorities, and the main
guarantors of effective governmental decision-making.

In response to this, Marks et al. (1996) have three main criticisms of the
intergovernmental approach. Underlying these disagreements is a funda¬
mental dispute about the nature of social reality. First, positivist explana¬
tions of societal phenomena neglect the structural constraints within which
individuals operate. These are varied in kind, but the most important are
generally the impact of differential allocation of resources, the culturally-
given nature of the value framework within which individuals choose and
the unpredictability of external factors, such as the international economic
and security climate.

Second, the realist perspective emphasises how the institutional frame¬

works have a primary effect in shaping decision-making through their

David Marsh and Paul Furlong 39

formal rules, their informal procedures, their value structures and their
effect on office-holding and internal role-oriented behaviour. In one sense,
the institutions are no more than the sum of countless individual choices,
but merely to state this does not get us very far. Realists seek to find ways
of characterising different institutional frameworks so as to move beyond
this and to introduce other levels of analysis and explanation which
recognise the weight of the long-term structural and institutional context.

Third, it is argued that intergovernmentalists are insufficiently critical

about what time-frames are relevant and why. The term ‘path dependency’
used in this context (Pierson 1996) does not just refer to the given nature of
resource allocations at ‘point zero’ which the researcher takes as the start.
It also directs our attention to the impact of decisions prior to point zero,
and of the ways in which the institutional frameworks lock actors into
particular sets of choices. This implicitly asks positivists to justify why they
adopt diachronic modes of explanation, which imply social understanding
as a set of discrete operations in fixed points in time, as opposed to
synchronic explanations, which emphasise a more continuous and context-
led understanding of the social nature of time.

Despite these epistemological and methodological differences, writers

such as Moravscik and Scharpf (Scharpf 1988, 1997) appear to be able to
integrate some of the concerns of multilevel governance into their own
perspective, so that, despite the methodological differences between the
positivists and realists, we can identify these as distinct strands in the study
of the European policy process, marked by an attentiveness to similar
policy problems and with some of the same language.

The constructivist approach

This is not true of the social constructivist approach (see, for example,
Jorgensen 1998; Weldes 1996; Wendt 1994). This rejects the language of
causality, with which positivists and realists are content in their different
ways, and in contrast, is based upon an interpretist epistemological
position. Constructivists argue that, if there is a problem of increasing
complexity of decision-making associated with the decline of the nation
state, this complexity must be understood as an intentional social construct
on the part of decision-makers, part of a set of political projects associated
with responses to perceptions of external and internal constraints. The
questions which arise are concerned with political decision-making as a
series of attempts to resolve conflicts over meaning and identity,
understood in the broadest sense. Constructivists take issue with the
positivist understanding of the nature of political choice. They argue
against the acceptance of individual preference as a given and instead
interrogate specifically why and how preferences come to be formed and

40 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

how these preferences and choices relate to the strategic aims of powerful
interests in society. Multilevel governance then would not be seen as a set
of objectively perceived phenomena, but as a normative framework which
is itself part of the political conflict between the interests associated with
neo-liberal economic restructuring and those seeking a more social
democratic accommodation with technological change.

This locates the arguments about multilevel governance within the

discussion about the nature of globalisation, which we dealt with above,
and in which one of the main disputes is about the underlying realities of
technological economic and social change and their relationship with the
discursively constructed political uses made of them within specific
political projects.

Conclusion

The point here is not to attempt to resolve these disputes. Rather, what we
have sought to do is to show how the different approaches in different
issues relate to epistemological and methodological assumptions, and to
one another. The terms introduced here can be used as signposts,
suggesting how we can come to terms with the deeper implications of the
theories and groups of concerns which are the focus of the individual
chapters which follow. One of the temptations in so doing is to attempt to
find a synthesis of all the available positions, in the hope that, at some level
of analysis, agreement is possible over fundamental issues. Unfortunately,
experience and logic combine to warn against this temptation. These
debates have been part of the intellectual and moral climate of Western
thought for centuries and continue because they reflect disagreements not
just about logic or technicalities but also about the proper scope of human
action in society. In other words, they are questions which relate to deep-
rooted moral positions that may be internally coherent, but are
incompatible with one another, except in so far as they all include some
appeal to intellectual and ethical tolerance of diversity. In the face of these
difficulties, another strategy, alluring at least to risk-averse researchers, is
to avoid the issue. Far from being safe, this position is actually rather
unsafe, since it does not enable one to distinguish between good and bad
research and between good and bad arguments. The least one can say
about these issues is that they are of sufficient importance to warrant a
genuine commitment to coming to terms with them. Coming to terms with
the issues requires one to think through the different arguments separately,
to compare them and to evaluate them. As we argued at the beginning of
this chapter, this means identifying, as far as possible, what are the
epistemological and ontological underpinnings and what these imply in
David Marsh and Paul Furlong 41

terms of argumentation, practical research method, explanatory logic and

research construction. The purpose of this chapter has been to encourage
this and to attempt to provide an introduction to some of the main ideas
and methods involved.

Further reading

• The best introductions to the philosophy of science and social science

are Chalmers (1985, 1990) and Winch (1958).

• For an accessible overview of ontology and epistemology, see Hay

( 2002 ).

• On the positivist approach, see Kuhn (1970), Hempel (1965, 1966) or

Halfpenny (1982).

• On the interpretive approach, see Bevir and Rhodes (1999).

• On realism, see Sayer (1992).

Chapter 2

Behaviourafism

DAVID SANDERS

The behavioural approach to social and political analysis concentrates on

a single, deceptively simple, question: why do people behave in the way
they do? What differentiates behaviouralists from other social scientists is
their insistence that: (a) observable behaviour, whether it is at the level of
the individual or the social aggregate, should be the focus of analysis; and
(b) any explanation of that behaviour should be susceptible to empirical
testing.

Scholars working in the behavioural tradition have investigated a wide

range of substantive problems. Behaviouralists have extensively analysed
the reasons that underlie the main form of mass political participation in
democratic countries: voting (for example. Heath et al. 1994). They have
also examined the origins of participation in other, more unconventional,
forms of political activity such as demonstrations, strikes and even riots
(for example, Barnes and Kaase 1979; Parry et al. 1992). At the elite level,
behaviouralists have analysed leadership behaviour, placing particular
emphasis on the connections between the way in which leaders view the
world (their attitudes and values) and the particular actions that they take
(for example, Allison 1971; King 1985; Sanders 1990; Dunleavy et al. 1993).
In terms of social aggregates, behavioural analysis has examined the
actions of interest groups (for example, Grant and Marsh 1977; Wilson
1990) and political parties (for example, Budge and Fairlie 1983; Budge and
Laver 1992). At the international level, behavioural analysis has also
focused on the actions of nation states (for example, Rosenau 1969), as
well as on the behaviour of non-state actors such as multinational
corporations, international terrorist groups and supranational organisa¬
tions like the EU (for example, Keohane 1984; Baldwin 1993). In all these
diverse contexts, the central questions that behaviouralists seek to answer
are simple: what do the actors involved actually do and how can we best
explain why they do it? These are obviously not the only questions that can
be asked about individual and social actors. Behaviouralists simply believe
that they are the most important ones.

46 Behaviouralism

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first provides a brief
outline of the origins of behaviouralism and summarises the core analytic
assertions that underpin it. The second section reviews the main criticisms
that, with varying degrees of justification, have been levelled at the
behavioural approach. The third part describes one major study - White-
ley and Seyd’s analysis of political activism - which illustrates some of the
more positive features of behavioural analysis. The final section considers
the influence that behaviouralism continues to exert on contemporary
political researchers.

The rise of the behavioural movement and its

core characteristics

The behavioural movement assumed an important position in the social

sciences in the 1950s and 1960s. Its philosophical origins were in the
writings of Auguste Comte (Comte 1974) in the nineteenth century and in
the logical positivism of the ‘Vienna Circle’ in the 1920s. Positivism, which
was popularised in Britain by Alfred Ayer and in Germany by Carl
Hempel, asserted that analytic statements made about the physical or
social world fell into one of three categories. First, such statements could
be useful tautologies: they could be purely definitional statements that
assigned a specific meaning to a particular phenomenon or concept. For
example, we might define families living on less than one-third of the
average weekly wage as ‘living below the poverty line’. Second, statements
could be empirical, that is to say, they could be tested against observation
in order to see if they were true or false. Third, statements that fell into
neither of the first two categories were devoid of analytic meaning. For the
positivists, in short, meaningful analysis could proceed only on the basis of
useful tautologies and empirical statements: metaphysics, theology,
aesthetics and even ethics merely introduced meaningless obfuscation into
the process of inquiry.

It would not be correct, of course, to assume that behaviouralism

accepted all the philosophical precepts of positivism. Even as behaviour¬
alism was gaining increasingly wide acceptance among social scientists in
the 1950s, positivism itself was being subjected to ferocious philosophical
criticism — not least on the grounds that it was unclear whether positi¬
vism’s assertion that there were only three types of statement was itself
tautological, empirical or meaningless. This said, behaviouralism’s view of
the nature of empirical theory and of explanation was strongly influenced
by the positivist tradition. Although there are many definitions of these

David Sanders 47

two critical terms, most behaviouralists would probably accept something

along the lines of the following:
• An empirical theory is a set of interconnected abstract statements,
consisting of assumptions, definitions and empirically testable
hypotheses, which purports to describe and explain the occurrence of
a given phenomenon or set of phenomena.

• An explanation is a causal account of the occurrence of some

phenomenon or set of phenomena. An explanation of a particular
(class of) event(s) consists in the specification of the minimum non-
tautological set of antecedent necessary and sufficient conditions
required for its (their) occurrence.

The importance of these definitions of theory and explanation lies in the

implications that they have for theory evaluation. For positivists, the
crucial question that should always be asked about any purportedly
explanatory theory is: ‘How would we know if this theory were incorrect?’
Behaviouralism’s endorsement of the central importance of this question is
precisely what demonstrates its intellectual debt to positivism. For both
positivists and behaviouralists there are three main ways in which
explanatory theories can be evaluated:

1. A good’ theory must be internally consistent: it must not make

statements such that both the presence and the absence of a given set of
antecedent conditions are deemed to ‘cause’ the occurrence of the
phenomenon that is purportedly being explained.

2. A good theory relating to a specific class of phenomena should, as far

as possible, be consistent with other theories that seek to explain
related phenomena.

3. And crucially, genuinely explanatory theories must be capable of

generating empirical predictions that can be tested against observation.
The only meaningful way of deciding between competing theories
(which might appear to be equally plausible in other respects) is by
empirical testing. This testing can be conducted either at the level of
the individual social actor or at the level of the social aggregate -
whichever is appropriate given the nature of the theory that is being
tested.

It is this emphasis on empirical observation and testing that produces the

two characteristic features of the behavioural approach to social inquiry.
The first - and least contentious - of these is behaviouralism’s
commitment to the systematic use of all the relevant empirical evidence
rather than a limited set of illustrative supporting examples. This

48 Behaviour alism

commitment simply means that, when a particular theoretical statement is

being investigated, researchers must not limit themselves to a consideration
of only those observed cases that provide ‘anecdotal’ support for the
theoretical claims that are being made. Rather, the researcher must
consider all the cases - or at least a representative sample of them - that
are encompassed by the theoretical statement that is being evaluated.

It is in this context that the use and development of statistical techniques

are justified by behaviouralists - as a vehicle for analysing large amounts
of ‘relevant empirical evidence’. It should be emphasised in the strongest
possible terms, however, that behaviouralism is not synonymous either
with quantification or with the downgrading of qualitative research.
Certainly, behavioural researchers have frequently used quantitative tech¬
niques as heuristic devices for handling evidence. There is nothing intrinsic
in behaviouralism’s epistemological position, however, that requires
quantification. On the contrary, quantitative and qualitative forms of
empirical analysis are equally acceptable to behavioural researchers. What
matters for them is not whether evidence is qualitative or quantitative but
(a) that it is used to evaluate theoretical propositions, and (b) that it is
employed systematically rather than illustratively.

The second characteristic feature of behavioural analysis is slightly more

subtle in its implications - but no less important. It is simply that scientific
theories and/or explanations must, in principle, be capable of being
falsified. Note here that the reference is to ‘scientific’ rather than simply
to ‘empirical’ or ‘explanatory’ theories. This usage reflects behavioura¬
lism’s commitment to Karl Popper’s revision of traditional positivism in
which he (a) substituted the principle of falsifiability for that of verifica¬
tion, and (b) simultaneously identified the falsifiability criterion as the line
of demarcation between ‘scientific’ and ‘pseudo-scientific’ enquiry (Popper
1959).

In order fully to appreciate the import of this statement, a brief

digression is necessary. We need to consider precisely what is meant by
a theory or an explanation being ‘falsifiable’. Consider the familiar
statement that Popper himself used as an example: ‘All swans are white’.
Suppose that we observe a black swan. What does this tell us about the
statement? One interpretation is that observing the black swan shows the
statement to be empirically false: the statement was in principle capable of
being falsified and it has been falsified. But there is another way of
interpreting the statement in the light of a black swan being observed.
The statement says that all swans are white. It follows that the black swan
that we have observed cannot be a swan because it is not white: the
statement, therefore, is not false.

Can both of these interpretations be correct? The answer is that they

can. Each interpretation makes a different set of assumptions about the

David Sanders 49

definition of a swan. The first assumes that a swan is a large bird with a
long neck that looks very pretty when it paddles through water; it says
nothing of the bird’s colour. In these circumstances, the definitions of
swan and ‘colour’ are independent: there is no overlap between them. In
other words, it is possible to observe something that has all the character¬
istics of a swan regardless of its colour. We have observed a black swan
and, therefore, the initial statement must have been false. The second
interpretation assumes that a swan is a large bird with a long neck that
looks very pretty when it paddles through water and that it is also white .
In other words, this second interpretation assumes that whiteness is part of
the definition of being a swan. In these circumstances, when a black ‘swan’
is observed it cannot be a swan, because part of the definition of being a
swan is that it is white.

What is clear from this discussion is that the status of the statement
depends upon whether or not its constituent terms are independently
defined. With the first interpretation, the terms ‘swan’ and ‘white’ are
independently defined. As a result, the statement is an empirical or
falsifiable one: it is possible to test it against the world of observation.
With the second interpretation, however, the terms ‘swan’ and ‘white’ are
not independently defined. As a result, the statement is (partially)
tautological: it is simply an untestable assertion that one of the defining
features of a swan is that it is white.
This problem of interpretation is common in the social sciences.
Consider the following statement: ‘In general elections people vote against
the incumbent government if they are dissatisfied with its performance.’
Without further information, we cannot tell whether this is a testable
empirical statement or merely a definitional tautology. The statement can,
in fact, be interpreted in two completely different ways. First, we can
interpret the statement in purely tautological terms. Looking at a parti¬
cular election, we could say: (a) that every voter who voted for the
government must have been satisfied with its performance (otherwise they
would not have voted for it); and (b) that every voter who did not vote for
the government could not have been satisfied with its performance
(otherwise they would have voted for it). With this interpretation, we
can always ‘believe’ in the statement but we have not demonstrated that it
is empirically correct; we have treated it purely as a tautology. The second
interpretation is to regard the statement as an empirical one - but this is
possible only if we provide a definition of dissatisfaction with the
government that is independent of the act of voting. If we were to devise
some independent way of measuring dissatisfaction, then we would
obviously be able to test our initial statement against any available
empirical evidence. We might find that all those who voted for the
government were satisfied with its performance and that all those who

50 Behaviour alism

David Sanders 51

voted against it were dissatisfied - in which case we would have

corroborated the statement. Crucially, however, by providing independent
definitions of ‘voting’ and of ‘dissatisfaction’ we create the possibility that
the statement might be empirically incorrect: we render the statement
falsifiable - even though we might hope that it will not be falsified.

Having distinguished between falsifiable and non-falsifiable statements,

Popper goes on to suggest that theories can only be regarded as ‘scientific’
if they generate empirical predictions that are capable of being falsified.
Theories that do not generate such predictions are merely sophisticated
tautologies that explain nothing - no matter how elegant and elaborate
they might appear. Many behaviouralists are unconcerned as to whether or