SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 1

THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE FALL OF THE DEVIL

By: Mark Henrick Corado

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

A. Background of the Study

One very interesting discussion on the Christian faith falls on the topic of

angels and demons, where the former is attributed as good and the latter as evil.

Angels, on one hand, do not seem to have any problem to solve within them for

they portray in their being the goodness of the Creator. But the existence of the

devil, on the other hand, seems to pose a problem for the reason they are believed

to be angels before they have fallen or sinned.

The fall of the devil usually is introduced to the ordinary person through

the scriptures and only focuses on one thing, that the devil sinned because of his

pride and thus has caused his fall. And from then, he, alongside his angels, is

condemned to hell for all eternity. Aside from this, a discussion that is of most

importance is disregarded. And so, considering the concept of the fall introduced

to the ordinary person as acceptable as it is, what is missed is the beauty of the

discussion of such a bewildering fall. Such discussion tries to unfold some truths

on the mysteries of the fall of the devil.

To be confronted with this circumstance, one could ask how such a fall

happened. There seems to be an absurdity in the event of the fall of the angels.

Why is this so? It so happened that there is a notion that teaches that angels are
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spiritual creatures, with higher intelligence than that of man, who are ever

contemplating the face of God. From this notion on the nature of angels, it could

almost be impossible to think of such a fall to happen, for how could there be the

absence of goodness in the presence of all goodness. Furthermore, if angels are

attributed with such high intelligence, would it be that their understanding of

goodness and truth be also higher than that of man, which could be erroneous at

times, making their knowledge on goodness and truth without error and so making

the idea of the fall improbable. And also, as they are said to be spiritual beings,

they must be immaterial or incorporeal, making them impossible to have

concupiscence, the inclination to sin, which is present only in corporeal beings.

Having the thought of the nature of angels may give an erroneous

judgment whether there are no such things as the devil or whether the devil was

created by God, as a creature who is evil in nature. On the first judgment, it can

already be countered with the existence of evil spirits. The evidence of such can

be drawn from events of demonic possessions and from what is revealed in the

scriptures. The second judgment also is impossible and incomprehensible since

what is rightfully in the Divine is benevolence or all goodness. Being all good

then means that there can be no such absence as evil in Him. Thus, He who is all

good cannot be a cause of evil. Removing the possibility of such erroneous

judgment leads to the thought that on one occasion, the devil has truly committed

sin in front of the presence of an ever-good God and now is condemned to eternal

punishment.
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Confronted with absurdity and inconsistencies presented by the problem of

the fall of the devil, there calls for the need for further refinement of the

knowledge of this subject. And as to approach this matter of refinement, it calls on

the study of the nature and faculties of created spiritual beings. And this is

beautifully discussed by St. Thomas Aquinas in his treatise on Angels, where he

discusses the nature of angels from metaphysical and theological standpoints

concerning different philosophers such as St. Augustine, and St. Anselm of

Canterbury.

B. Statement of The Problem

In the discussions on angels and demons, especially on the fall of the devil,

one can find an inconsistency which may lead a person, a believer, to an erroneous

judgment if he or she is not careful in analyzing the factors that need great

concern. If not careful, one may be led to a heretic belief e.g., that God created the

devil as naturally wicked or God’s creative action is flawed. To prevent such

misunderstanding in the Christian faith, it is but important to learn from the

doctrines of the Church with regard to this matter. But in order to clearly

understand such doctrines, St. Thomas of Aquinas wrote a treatise which focuses

on this discussion. Thus, through reading the text of the Treatise of Angels of St.

Thomas, the researcher, will present important matters in the discussion and draw

out a conclusion proving that the fall of the devil is the fault of his own.
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As a guide to the readers through this paper, the following questions will

be answered and will serve as the flow of the whole discussion.

1. What is the nature of angels?

2. What do angels need in order to merit ultimate beatitude?

3. Considering angelic knowledge and free will, and their inclination towards

goodness how is it possible for angels to fall?

4. How can it be said that the fall was truly the fault of angels?

C. Significance of the Study

The discussion on the fall of the devil is not really a major concern for the

majority of the faithful since its context lies much more on theology and

philosophy, and not so much into the pastoral aspect of the Church which

discusses more on humanism. However, it is deemed by the Church that the

faithful should have adequate knowledge of the doctrines of the Church which is

crucial for the integrity of the faith. Examples of doctrines that need actual

attention are The Mystery of the Holy Trinity, The Humanity and Divinity of

Christ, teachings about Mary, teachings about angels and demons, etc.

These crucial teachings, which are of most importance, seem to be

disregarded or given less attention, to sugarcoat what is happening in the

congregation. From here, this whole opus draws its importance. This paper will

serve as a guide for a clearer understanding of a part of an important doctrine of

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the Church, on angels and demons. And thus, will help seminarians and catechists

in teaching the common faithful on the discussion of the fall of the devil.

D. Scope and Limitations

In this study, the researcher is tasked to expose the reason behind the fall

of the devil by analyzing the theological and philosophical standpoints of St.

Thomas Aquinas with regard to his Treatise on Angels.

It is mentioned above that this study will be focusing only on the topics

which show importance in the discussions on the fall of the devil. As such, this

paper will primarily focus on the nature of angels, on how the angels sinned, the

intellect and will of angels, and whether some angels were created naturally evil.

Aside from this, the researcher will also use thoughts of other philosophers who

tackled the same matter, e.g., Anselm’s “De Casu Diaboli”.

E. Review of Related Literature

St. Thomas Aquinas [St. Thomas Aquinas. 1959. Treatise on Separate

Substances. Translated by Francis J. Lescoe. West Hartford: Saint Joseph College.] in the

Treatise on Separate Substances discusses extensively on the natures of intellectual

natures separate from corporeal bodies by tracing the development of the thought from

the early naturalist towards the views of Plato and Aristotle, wherein the matter of
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discussion was to look for the first principle which then came up with the existence of

intermediary beings. The researcher finds this work to be very significant for it discusses

the nature of such separate substances and showcases the points wherein such

intermediary beings are separate and distinct from the One, who at present is called God.

Mary C. FitzPatrick and John James Wellmuth. [Mary C. FitzPatrick and John

James Wellmuth. St. Thomas Aquinas on Spiritual Creatures. Marquette University Press.

(1949).] discusses the work of St. Thomas Aquinas on Spiritual Creatures. This work

deals with the question on the nature of intellectual substances both separate and united to

bodies. The way this work discusses such a matter by presenting first objections with

regard to the nature of intellectual substance and replying to each objection. This work

does not only differentiate intellectual substances from God but poses a very great

distinction on the nature of intellectual substances that are separate from bodies (angels)

and intellectual substances united to bodies (man). This work is significant in this paper

since it deals with the operations which are proper to intellectual substances. Thus, in the

study of angels, since they are purely intellectual substances, it is but proper for the

researcher to know what operations they have in their very nature.

St. Thomas Aquinas in Book II of Summa Contra Gentiles chapters 46-58 and 96-

10 gives great [1956. On The Truth of the Catholic Faith Summa Contra Gentiles Book

Two: Creation. Garden City, New York: Image Books: A division of Doubleday &

Company, Inc.] focus on the study of angels as separate substances. It discusses on their

immateriality, their creation is part of the perfection of the whole creative action of God,

their intellect and will, and their acquisition of knowledge. This work of St. Thomas helps

the researcher greatly in the whole discussion with regard to the nature of angels. It

seemingly summarizes what is being discussed in his works, On Spiritual Creatures and
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Treatise on Separate Substances.

St. Augustine in his work “On Grace and Free will” [Augustine. 2010. "On Grace

and Free Choice." In Augustine On Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice,

and Other Writings, edited and translated by Peter King, 141-184. New York: Cambridge

University Press.] discusses, in his letter to Valentine and his monks, that grace does not

diminish free will and free will does not diminish grace. The point of this letter that

Augustine made is to defend that grace and free will come hand-in-hand. It speaks that

free will is existent in man since he is able to choose between good and evil and that

grace, at the same time is not diminished, because it helps man to will what is good.

Augustine says “Yet the choice of the human will is not sufficient unless God grants

victory to the one who prays that he not enter into temptation.” 1 In this statement,

Augustine points greatly that it is only by the grace of God that man is able to turn to Him

and will what is good. This work of Augustine is crucial in the discussion on angels being

created in grace and their meriting beatitude. Although, the work speaks of man, yet it is

the same with angels since they are intelligent and willing beings. Thus, they are also in

need of the grace of God that they may will Him and merit their beatitude.

Augustine in Book XII of his “The City of God” [Augustine. 2000. "Book XII."

In The City of God, by Saint Augustine, translated by Marcus Dods, D.D. New York:

Random House, Inc.] discusses that God created good will in angels and by that good will

they are able to will what is good. This work of Augustine would pertain to the whole

discussion on grace and meriting beatitude. What is being said in this book is that it is

1
Augustine. 2010. "On Grace and Free Choice." In Augustine On Free Choice of the
Will, OnGrace and Free Choice, and Other Writings, edited and translated by Peter King, 141-
184. New York: Cambridge University Press. Marked as On Grade and Free Choice
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necessary for angels to first be created with good will in order for them to stay steadfast

for without the grace of God they will not be able to will what is good or to merit their

final end. Aside from this, Augustine also mentions the misery of those who did not stay

steadfast in their will-for-goodness. That by going away from what they are supposed to

will, that is by willing another, they are hurting their nature and thus misery befalls them.

The researcher finds such discussion essential to the whole opus for it already points

towards the conclusion of the study being made, since it profoundly discusses two

elements that are crucial for this study, grace and merit.

St. Anselm on De Casu Diaboli [Anselm. 2000. De Casu Diaboli. Translated by

Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson. Minneapolis, Minnesota: The Arthur J. Banning

Press.] discusses on the truths of the fall of the devil. In this work, he points out four

points; 1. Angels before receiving their end were able to sin. 2. The devil sinned because

he did not receive what he ought to receive. 3. God is not at fault for the devil’s not-being

able to receive, rather God did not give because the devil was unwilling to receive. 4.

That the devil sinned because he willed to be like God, inordinately. The researcher finds

that the work of St. Anselm is necessary for the fruition of the whole opus since such

work was dedicated mainly to what is being studied by the researcher. Other than this, it

coincides with the teaching of St. Thomas with regard to the fall of the devil.

F. Research Methodology

This study is a philosophical inquiry that tries to decipher the truth about the fall

of the devil. By this, the researcher longs to expose such truth by using St. Thomas

Aquinas’s Treatise on Angels as his main source. But in order to comprehensively discuss

the truth about the fall of the devil, it is a must that the researcher discusses two important
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elements, the nature of angels and the discussion of grace and merit. The researcher then,

to achieve a comprehensive discussion on this matter, made a close reading on some other

works of St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Augustine, and St. Anselm.

CHAPTER TWO

Nature of Angels

A. The Existence of Angels and Their Incorporeity

The discussion on the existence of angels and their incorporeity can be

traced back to the early Greek philosophers. Although it only became evident in

Plato’s Idea of Forms and in Aristotle’s discussion on Motion, still the early

thinkers made a very great impact on postulating such existence of separate

substances, since their goal was to arrive at the principle of all things, by which

everything was made. The goal of such a search was to arrive at a principle in

which they may call as a god. 2 But Plato, however, had a different opinion from

the early Naturalist, since they were proposing a divinity from corporeal nature.

Plato, on the other hand, posited an existence of natures that are separate from

matter since it was held by the Naturalists that man could not understand the truth

of things because corporeal things pass and that there are certain deceptions in the

2
St. Thomas Aquinas. 1959. Treatise on Separate Substances. Translated by Francis J.
Lescoe. West Hartford: Saint Joseph College. Marked as Treatise on Separate Substances
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senses of the body.3 By what was proposed by Plato, the Forms of things will be

able to make man understand the truth of things.

Having posited the existence of Forms separate from matter, Plato, again,

posited an order in the Forms on the ground that the simpler a Form, then it must

be prior from all things. Thus, he held that the first idea be the One and the Good,

which then be called God. And under what is One-in-itself and Good-in -itself,

there are be said substances separate from matter which Plato would call

secondary gods any exist only by participation from the One. And these separate

substances that Plato held to be placed in between God, who is the highest of all,

and man, St. Thomas Aquinas will recognize them as angels.4

Aristotle, however, had a different opinion from Plato for he held that it

would not be necessary that what is understood by the intellect be of separate

existence since the universals being posited by Plato are essences of particular

things. By this, Aristotle proposes another way to investigate on the existence of

substances that are separate from matter, that is by his idea on Motion.5

St. Thomas finds that in this investigation of Aristotle, he first established

the existence of a prime mover, who is the cause of the movements of others yet

must himself remain unmoved, and the first movable. In establishing this prime

mover, he posited that such substance be incorporeal and without magnitude, and

to be an appetible good.6 This means that the prime mover is not a body because
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid. Defilpino mentions also that it is necessary that the first mover be incorporeal for
that which is corporeal shows potentiality. But the prime mover must be a substance of pure
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he is not limited or in potentiality and that he is an appetible good by which he is

desired by the first movable substance. Having this, Aristotle would then posit that

the moved substance seeks the unmoved mover by way of intellective appetite

thus, making the movable as appetitive and intelligent. But since for him only a

body is moved, he would then put separate substances as proximate ends of

heavenly motions.7 The method of Aristotle shows the existence of separate

substances, which will then be called later as angels, by the movements of

heavenly bodies. That such substances are the proximate end of the heavenly

movements.8

Having discussed how the early thinkers, as well as Plato and Aristotle,

stand on the existence of a singular perfect being and substances lower than that of

the perfect being, St. Thomas Aquinas then would take this problem by saying that

“it is apparent that there are substances wholly free from bodies, in consequence

of the perfection of the universe. For the perfection of the universe seems to be

such that it does not lack any nature that could possibly exist.” 9 But how could one

actually think of the existence of separate substances? St. Thomas from here

actuality. “If it were not, its casual influence in the first motion could cease.” ~Defilippo, Joseph
G. “Aristotle’s Identification of the Prime Mover as God.” The Classical Quarterly 44, no. 2
(1994): 393–409. http://www.jstor.org/stable/639643. (Retrieved on September 12, 2021)
The prime mover is also said to be appetible, by this Aristotle means that, “The Prime
Mover causes the movement of other things, not as an efficient cause, but as a final cause. ~
Fyodor Dostoyevsky. If God Does Not Exist, Then Everything Is Permitted.
http://www.scandalon.co.uk/philosophy/aristotle_prime_mover.htm. (Retrieved on September 12,
2021). What is meant by this is that God moves everything not as he is moving them by causing
them to move like how one pushes a cart to begin moving. Rather, he moves thing as by being the
purpose of their being, or as their final end.
7
Aquinas, Treatise on Separate Substances
8
Ibid.
9
Mary C. FitzPatrick and John James Wellmuth. St. Thomas Aquinas on Spiritual
Creatures. Marquette University Press. (1949).
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would resolve this problem by distinguishing characteristics of beings that can be

known to exist since they are already existing. For example, in the genus animal;

the genus animal can be predicated to both man and an ox. That is to say that a

man is an animal and an ox is an animal. But at the same time there are

differences between the two subjects that are in the same genus, that is the former

is rational and the latter is irrational. This only means that rationality and

irrationality do not properly belong to the genus animal. 10 Now, “if there are any

two things, one which does not depend on the other on the basis of its own

character, it is possible for the one to be found apart from the other.” 11 Taking

what was already given as an example, rationality does not necessarily depend on

the genus animal, since there exists a being which is completely irrational in such

nature. The same is true with being corporeal and being intelligent. Since not all

corporeal beings are intelligent, then the intelligent character does not properly

belong to corporeal beings.12 Now, “the substance of a thing must be proportionate

to its operation because operation is the act and good of the operator’s

substance.”13 Having said that intelligence is not proper to corporeal creatures,

then the operations of the intellect such as understanding must be only proper to

intellectual substances. Therefore, it must be posited that there are substances

separate from a body that exist.

10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Thomas Aquinas.1956. On The Truth of the Catholic Faith Summa Contra Gentiles
Book Two: Creation. Translated by James F. Anderson. Garden City, New York: Image Books: A
division of Doubleday & Company, Inc. (Chapter 91). Marked as SCG.
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B. Multitude of Separate Substances

St. Thomas mentioned in his Treatise on Separate Substances that Plato

and Aristotle mentioned the multitude of separate substances which exist. Plato

would mention them as existing after the One and the Good and call them as

secondary gods. On the other hand, Aristotle would mention their multiplicity by

assigning them to heavenly movements.14 He would say that “there are no separate

substances from which some movements do not arise in heaven, for heavenly

movements are directed to separate substances as their ends.” 15 Having said this,

what Aristotle concluded was that the number of separate substances is not

numerous that heavenly movements. But St. Thomas Aquinas debunked this

conclusion of Aristotle for he sees no necessity in saying that the number of

separate substances be the same with heavenly movements.16 Rather, he says that

“There are some separate substances of a higher nature than those which are the

proximate ends of the celestial movements.” 17 For it is not within the nature of an

intelligent substance to produce such movement. Because the argument of

Aristotle lacks necessity, Aquinas held that separate substances are much more

numerous than heavenly movements.18

Other than this, Thomas also proposed that the multitude of created

substances has something to do with nobility. He points out that the nobler things

14
Aquinas, Treatise on Separate Substances
15
Aquinas, SCG Chapter 92
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
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should exceed the less noble in quantity or number. This came from his

observation that incorruptible heavenly bodies far exceed the corruptible bodies.

Thus, he concludes that since separate substances are most noble among created

things, therefore, they must also surpass the whole multitude of corporeal things.19

C. The Intellect and Will of Angels

It has already been said above that angels, as separate substances, are

intelligent for intelligence is proper to their nature as substances without matter.

Now, in the matter of their intellect and will, what is to be discussed here is not

proving that they are creatures that are endowed with intellect, rather this will be

more on how angels acquire knowledge and the perfection of the will of angels.

a. Intellect and Knowledge of Angels

The question on angelic knowledge probes how such substances obtain

knowledge of things. Do angels acquire knowledge in the same mode as human

beings? In answering this it is necessary to go back to what has been discussed

above, that angels are separate substances, making it not proper for angels to

acquire knowledge in the same mode as man. Man acquires knowledge from

sensible things, Aquinas mentions that “every cognitive substance that derives

knowledge, and, consequently, has a body united to it naturally since such

knowledge is impossible without a bodily organ.” 20 Since angels are not naturally

19
Ibid.
20
Aquinas, SCG Chapter 96
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united to a body, hence it must be that angelic knowledge is not derived from

sensible things, but rather from something higher.21

In searching on how angels acquire knowledge, Aquinas has put emphasis

on the difference between the intellectual activity of the human soul and that of a

separate substance, angel. He states, “the intellective power of a separate

substance is higher than that of a human soul.”22 He points out even further that the

human intellect is the lowest among the order of intelligences for its object is

phantasm and that it acquires and operates its cognitive powers by being united to

a body. Hence, if separate substances are of a higher form of intelligence, its

knowledge therefore must be outside the soul and from phantasm, since phantasm,

though is a higher than sensible things, is still the lowest form of intellectual

objects.23 Thus, its knowledge must come from something higher than phantasm,

and that is “that which is intelligible in act.” 24 The same is pointed out in Thomas’

Treatise on Angels, “since the intellectual light is perfect in the angel, for he is

pure and most clear mirror… it follows that as the angel does not understand by

reasoning, so neither does he understand by composing and dividing.” 25 As such

the angel’s mode of acquiring knowledge is by way of knowing the truth and the

essence of things all at once.26 “In truths which they know naturally, they at once

behold all things whatsoever that can be known in them.” 27 Nevertheless, angels,
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Aquinas, Treatise on Separate Substances Q. 58 A.4
26
Ibid.
27
Aquinas, Treatise on Separate Substances Q. 58 A. 3
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although separate substances, do not acquire knowledge in the same mode with

the human soul, can syllogize for the reason that they know syllogisms, but it

remains that they do not acquire knowledge by such mode. Because their

understanding is simple and thus, know things in their essences. 28

In trying to understand the knowledge of angels as separate

substances, the notion, which Thomas quoted from St. Augustine, of evening and

morning knowledge in angels dives deeper into explaining how such substances

understand things.29 Here St. Thomas Aquinas clearly states, “their knowledge of

the primordial being of things is called morning knowledge, and this is according

as things exist in the Word. But their knowledge of the very being of the thing

created, as it stands in its nature, is termed evening knowledge.” 30 Taking evening

knowledge into account, it speaks of things being pointed out in the discussion

above about how such substances acquire knowledge by their own intellectual

powers. From that discussion, it can be pointed out that the evening knowledge of

angels is their knowledge of the essences of things which is brought about to them

by intuition. On the other hand, the morning knowledge of angels speaks of a co-

recognition of things as things exist in the Word. 31 Thus, it can be said that angels

know things by way that in beholding the Word, they know all things. Hence, it

may seem that their morning knowledge comes from what is revealed to them by

the Word. From this being said, there is a great difference between their evening

28
Ibid.
29
Aquinas, Treatise on Separate Substances Q.58 A.6
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
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knowledge and morning knowledge, the former by knowing the essences of things

as long as they are intelligible and the latter, knowing the nature of things by their

existence in God, in other words, knowing things by their participation in the

Being of the Creator.32 But Such difference is only visible in the context of their

evening knowledge, “that the evening knowledge is in angels in so far as they

know [the essences of things as they appear to be intelligible.]”33 That is to say that

as long as angels are capable of knowing things, they are always capable of

evening knowledge but not necessarily of morning knowledge. For an inferior

knowledge is not the same with a superior knowledge. 34 But in the case of morning

knowledge, not only do angels know things as they exist in the Word, but they

also know the essences of things as they appear to be intelligible. Thus, in

morning knowledge, evening knowledge and morning knowledge is one and

same. They only differ when it is called evening knowledge.35

Another thing that is crucial in the discussion of angelic knowledge or

intellect would be its greatness. Now, what is asked here is whether there can be

something false in the intellect of a separate substance. Given that, somehow,

there is the existence of demons who have in them a perverted knowledge, could it

be that in angelic intellect, there can be falsehood?

In answering this question, St. Thomas quotes Aristotle and Augustine and

made it clear that “the intelligence is always true and that there can be no other

32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
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object of the intellect other than what is true.”36 To further discuss this matter, it is

then necessary to look back to the discussion above with regards to how angels

acquire knowledge. Since it has been already stated that angels acquire their

knowledge by intuition, that is knowing things in their simple quiddities. Now

Aquinas makes it clear that deception and falsehood only come in if a thing is

understood by composition, which is not the mode of angelic knowledge. 37 As

such there can be no falsehood in the knowledge of angels. As it is also stated,

“there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities…, for either they

are not grasped at all, and so we know nothing respecting them; or else they are

known precisely as they exist.”38 Therefore, since the knowledge of angels comes

from the very essence of a thing, which is simple, it cannot have any falsehood or

error.

b. The Will and Freedom of Choice of Angels

Another faculty that is important in studying angels is their will. Now it is

said, “There is in all things appetite for the good, since…the good is what all

desire.”39 Aquinas makes this clear by saying that every creature has a tendency

toward good, as such animals find food and hide from danger by natural

inclination, and for the same reason plants bear fruit and produce flowers. All of

these are good but such inclination is not proper to man and angels for they do not

act only by such kind of inclination but by their reason and intellect. 40 Aquinas
36
Aquinas, Treatise on Separate Substances Q.58 A.5
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Aquinas, SCG Chapter 47
40
Ibid.
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would then say, “In things possessed of understanding it is called intellectual and

rational appetite, and this is the will.” 41 And since it has already been proved that

angels are intellectual substances, therefore it must be postulated that they are

endowed with will.42

In the will, there are two things that need to be clarified. These two things

lie towards its inclination towards the good and its relation to the intellect. In

terms of its inclination towards the good, it has already been said that “all

creatures have in them the natural inclination towards good since it is what all

desire.”43 Nothing can be said about this since it can be seen clearly by the

observation that all things have a natural inclination towards particular goodness,

examples are protection, pleasures, and etc. Now, in terms of the human will, such

inclination is higher than that of the brutes, for his inclination is connected with

his reasoning. Much more it is when it comes to angels, for the intellect of angels

is higher than that of man since he does not need reasoning to know things, only

by intuition. Thus, as angels know things simply and in a higher degree, then their

willing must be more perfect than that of man. 44 But one must not be confused and

say that the intellect and will of angels are one and same. For the intellect takes

things which are outside of it within and the will tends to what is outside of it by

mode of inclination.45 This means that the intellect in angels concerns itself with

what can be known by known by the knower, thus, it can know things whether
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
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they are good or evil as long as they are intelligible. But the will only regard the

object that it tends to, that is the good. In other words, the will regards the end of

the agent willing. And in terms of angels, their will regards their ultimate end,

who is God.46

With regards to the presence of intellect and will in angels, as intellectual

substances, St. Thomas postulates that they are substances that have freedom of

choice.47 He states clearly “[that] they act by judgment is evident from the fact that

through their intellectual cognition they judge of things to be done.” 48 By this, it

can be said that they have in their nature free will or free choice for they are in

control of their actions.49 But how is this different from the actions of the brutes,

which are attributed to be irrational? One could always observe that it seems that

the brutes also have a form of judgment in them when they flee from danger or

hunt when hungry.

In explaining freedom of choice further, St. Thomas gives out three points;

first that the agent must know its own judgment, second that the agent must

apprehend the all-embracing essence of the good or the fitting, and the will of the

agent is not determined to one by nature.50

The first point can be explained by what St. Thomas said, “no judging

power moves itself to judge unless it reflects on its own action; for, if it moves

46
Ibid.
47
Aquinas, SCG Chapter 48
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 21

itself to judge, it must know its own judgment; and this only an intellect can do.” 51

This means that judgment is manifested only when the acting agent knows his

action making his action a knowing act. But since only intellectual substances are

capable of cognition, it can then be said that only intellectual substances have free

will.52 This is the same with the second point of St. Thomas. He says, “if he who

judges moves himself to judge, he must do so in the light of a higher form

apprehended by him. And this form can be none other than the very intelligible

essence of the good and the fitting…”53 And since it is only the intellect that is

capable of grasping the essence of what is good and fitting, therefore, only

intellectual substances are free in their judgment, which then will point that they

have free choice in them.54

Now, the third point that St. Thomas points to is that free judgment is “not

determined by to one thing by nature of necessity.”55This then distinguishes the

judgment of a brute from the judgment of intellectual substances. A brute would

run from danger or hunt for food because it is determined by their nature.

However, for man and angels, it is different. 56 As intellectual substances, their will

is not determined by one thing rather, “it is possible for [their] will to be inclined

toward anything whatever is presented to it under the aspect of good…” 57 From

51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 22

here it can be drawn that intellectual substances are endowed with will by reason

that they judge with their intellect.

D. Angels as Created Substances

From the discussions above, it has already been known that angels are

entirely incorporeal, intelligent and free in a higher degree than man. In other

words, they are seen as simple substances. What is meant here is that since angels

are said to have simplicity in them, by the cause of their immateriality, it might

appear that there is total unity within them. This can be seen in one of the

objections on question 61 of article 1 of the Summa Theologica, “that if any

substance be form without matter, ‘straightaway it has being and unity of itself,

and has no cause of its being and unity.’”58 But such nature cannot be in any nature

that is not being in itself, which can only be proper to divine simplicity. 59 Now,

Aquinas would counter the claim above by saying, “Although intellectual

substances are incorporeal it is not supposed that they are equal to divine

simplicity.”60 That is to say that there is a distinction between the Being in itself

and incorporeal beings. And this has already been proved above. 61 Thus, Aquinas

is right to say that “there is composition in [separate substances] by the fact that

their being is not the same as what is.” 62 That is their existence is not the same

58
Aquinas, Treatise on Separate Substances Q61 A1
59
Ibid.
60
Aquinas, SCG Chapter 52
61
In the Treatise of Separate Substances, Aquinas cited Plato’s Idea that in the order of
forms, from the simple to lesser simplicities. Now the Simple must come first from all other things,
which he calls it as the Good and the One. And under what is Simple, there are incorporeal
substances which participates from the One, which he calls as the secondary gods. ~ St. Aquinas,
Treatise on Separate Substances.
62
Aquinas, SCG Chapter 52
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 23

with their essence but is only united by accident. This then distinguishes the

nature of God from angels. Wherein God alone is Being in himself or God alone is

His own existence, by this, all other substances cannot be their own being for what

belongs to one nature cannot belong to another. Thus, in separate substances, their

being is different from their essence. Then it is right to say that angels, as

creatures, are essences that need to be actualized. 63 What can be seen here is that in

such substances, there can found act and potency, thus are created substances.

Now, in Being in itself, there cannot be found potency, for such implies

imperfection and causality.64

E. Chapter Summary

This chapter has discussed four important elements which will pave the

way toward the conclusion of this paper. The discussions on the incorporeity of

angels, the multitude of angels, the intellect and will of angels, and the mode of

their creation will serve as the philosophical foundation which the researcher will

utilize in the discussion of certain topics of this study which deals with theological

truths in the teachings of the Catholic Church with regards to angels and the fall of

some of them. The next chapter will comprise the topics: Grace in Angels and

Angels meriting Beatitude or holiness,

63
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 24

CHAPTER THREE

Grace and Merit

A. Angels are endowed with Grace

To begin the discussion on the grace that angels enjoy upon their creation,

it is necessary to first know what grace is. Now, sanctifying grace is defined as “a

habitual gift, a stable and supernatural disposition that perfects the soul itself to

enable it to live with God.” 65 In this very definition of grace or sanctifying grace

are two elements that need focus in this study, first is it is a “habitual gift” and

second, “it perfects and enables one to live with God.” It is a habitual gift because

grace is something that is always given by God. St. Augustine says, “God’s grace

is not given in accordance with our deserts, since we see that it is given, and given

daily.”66 And it perfects and enables one to live with God because it allows one to

act toward God, the ultimate end. “It was by turning to God that the angel reached

beatitude.”67 Now, it is evident that grace is a gift of God by which those who are

capable of receiving grace be able to act, not solely by their own power but by the

help of God, to attain their ultimate end, unity with God.68

Are angels then created in the grace of God? In answering this question,

St. Thomas Aquinas clings to the teachings of St. Augustine by which he says that

65
Catechism of the Catholic Church, paragraph 2000. Marked as CCC
66
Augustine, On Grace and Free Choice
67
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part, Q62 A2. Marked as TA
68
Those who are capable of receiving grace are the creatures that are endowed with
intellect and will since they only are capable of knowing and loving God. ~CCC 2002
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 25

grace is the “Seed of God”. And that “sanctifying grace bears the same relation to

beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natural effect.” 69 This means

that sanctifying grace of God is implanted in the nature of angels by which they

are able to cling to Him naturally. Now if sanctifying grace is implanted by God in

angels that they may cling to Him, then it must be correct to say that God created

them in grace and although sanctifying grace helps them to achieve beatitude, it is

of no necessity that they will receive it by their own will.70

The first statement that God created angels in grace points towards that

they were created good and that they cling to God naturally. By saying that they

are created naturally good, this only means that they have not caused their own

good will nor will they be able to have good will by their own power but only

through the grace of God.71 Thomas would what Augustine said, “if good angels

existed for a time without good will, and produced it in themselves without God’s

interference, then it follows that they made themselves better than He made

them.”72 This would then result in denying the perfection of the creative power of

God and that his work can be surpassed by his creatures. But this cannot be since

to be able to be surpassed is a form of defect which is contrary to the perfection of

God. Now Augustine then adds by saying that if angels existed for a time without

good will, then they could have been evil. Or if not, they could not be better than

69
Aquinas, TA Q62 A2
70
Ibid.
71
Augustine. 2000. "Book XII." In The City of God, by Saint Augustine. New York:
Random House, Inc.
72
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 26

having a good will.73 This only means that it is only by the help of God that they

will be able to come to the good and will the ultimate good. 74 In agreement, St.

Thomas Aquinas says, “if there is anything which is above nature, the will cannot

be inclined towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural principle” 75

Hence, since the ultimate end of angels is the beatitude, which is above his nature,

then it is impossible for them to achieve it on their own but only by the help of

God’s grace by which they desire it. Therefore, it is evident here that angels are

created in grace for the reason that they desire the good beyond their nature which

can only be achieved by the grace of God.76

Although it has already been given that God created angels in sanctifying

grace, it must not be forgotten that one of the faculties of angels is the will, by

which this means that angels have free choice. Thus, the second statement,

although sanctifying grace is given to them upon their creation, it is of no

necessity that they will abide by it with their own will. 77 Augustine quotes from St.

Paul, “Let him do what he will, he does not sin if he marries; nevertheless, he does

well who stands steadfast in his heart, having no necessity, but, having power over

his own will.”78 Thus, if man, according to the statement of St. Paul, has free

73
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
Aquinas TA Q62 A1
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Although the statement of St. Paul is directed towards the free choice of man, still it has
already been stated in the first chapter of this work that angels have will that is in a higher degree
than that of man. Thus, it must be said since there is free choice in man by the cause of his will
then more so it must be in angels. ~ Augustine, On Grace and Free Will.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 27

choice more so do angels.79 Then it would follow that “the true cause of the

blessedness of the good angels is found to be this, that they cleave to Him who

supremely is… [And] that they are miserable because they have forsaken Him

who supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no such essence.” 80

And by cleaving to God they achieve or merit beatitude, which will be discussed

later, and by turning away from Him, they fall.81

To sum up, in this discussion, Angels are created in grace since it is

impossible for them to reach their ultimate end, the beatitude, by their own powers

for the reason that it is beyond their nature. Thus, they rely on the sanctifying

grace of God, so that they may be able to desire their ultimate end. Nevertheless,

although it is true that it is only with the sanctifying grace of God, that intellectual

creatures be able to desire truly what is good, it still remains that by their faculty

of free choice, they are to act by their own will to cleave to the good they desire or

to turn away from Him.

B. Angels Merit Beatitude

In the Treatise on Angels, although, St. Thomas did not really define the

meaning of beatitude, it is clear that he assigns it as the end that intellectual

creatures long for. However, he writes of this clearly in Question 69 of the second

part of the first part of his Summa Theologica, “happiness is the last end of human

life…wherefore the Philosopher says that ‘the children are said to be happy

79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 28

because they are full of hope’; and… we are suitably moved towards an end.” 82

There are two things that need to be clarified in this definition, first is that

beatitude is an end and second, operation is needed to achieve that end.83

Beatitude is an end; thus, it speaks of one’s desire. It has been already said,

that all creatures have in them an inclination toward something that is good. Now,

could this be reconciled immediately to Aquinas’s idea on the beatitude? If so,

then it can be said that all creatures can achieve beatitude. But the problem here

lies that since beatitude is called as the final end or the ultimate end, then it

requires some faculties for it to be merited. St. Thomas Aquinas is very clear that

to merit beatitude requires that the agent desiring be endowed with intellect and

will, “those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way

in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end

partly through his intellect, and partly through his will.” 84 The intellect is needed

for the attainment of the beatitude. It is but of great importance that the agent

knows his final end or at least it pre-exists in the mind that he going after an end.

And since only man and angels are able to know or behold their final end, then it

must be that only intellectual creatures be able to merit beatitude. Aside from

intellectual faculty, another requirement in meriting beatitude is the will. 85 It is in

the will, where one’s inclination can be found. Now Aquinas says, “through the

will, first by love which is the will’s first movement towards anything.” 86 Now the
82
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First part of the Second part, Q 69, A1
83
Ibid.
84
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First part of the Second part Q4, A3
85
Ibid.
86
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 29

mode of inclination that is said here is that of love. Aquinas states clearly that,

“since God is the universal good, and under this good both man and angel and all

creatures are comprised, because every creature in regard to its entire being

naturally belongs to God, it follows that from natural love angel and man alike

love God before themselves and with a greater love.”87 This then follows the

second point, that the beatitude is achieved by operation since love is an act of

free choice.

In saying that angels merit beatitude by operation there are two things that

are given point; 1. angels attain beatitude not sole by their own power, and 2. it is

necessary for angels to be created in grace in order to merit beatitude. Since it has

already been said that beatitude, as an end can be achieved by operation, it seems

to be right to think that such end can be achieved by one’s own power or

capacity.88 An example of this would be understanding a particular thing. The end

here is understanding and such needs proper operation to achieve it, such as

abstractions, investigation, etc. Now if beatitude is as simple as trying to

understand a thing, then the agent capable of achieving beatitude can achieve

beatitude by one’s own capacity. But this is not the case. St. Thomas speaks of

two modes of achieving one’s end, it is either it is productive of the end or

deserving of the end. The former mode of achieving one’s endpoints to that the

end being longed is not outside the nature of the agent. 89 Thus, the example above

87
Aquinas, TA Q60 A5
88
Ibid.
89
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 30

falls under this mode since understanding is not outside the nature of man and

angel, thus they understand because understanding is proper to their nature. The

latter on the other hand speaks of an end that is outside of one’s nature. This

means that naturally one cannot achieve this end by one’s own power but through

another’s bestowing, who has such end proper to his nature. 90 This is the case of

beatitude. Now St. Thomas clearly states that “perfect beatitude is natural only to

God because existence and beatitude are one and same thing in Him.” 91 From here

it can be said that God is the ultimate end of angels and men and that only through

the bestowing of God that they are able to achieve such end. 92 For “ultimate

beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature.”93

Having said that angels merit beatitude not by their own power but by the

bestowing of another since beatitude is beyond their nature points to the second

point of this discussion. That is to say that it is necessary that angels be created in

grace to achieve beatitude.94 This has already been discussed above when it was

said that “the will's natural inclination is directed towards what is in keeping with

its nature. Therefore, if there is anything which is above nature, the will cannot be

inclined towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural principle.” 95 What is

being pointed out here is that there is an external principle that allows the agent to

go beyond his nature to achieve an end that is beyond his nature. Also, it was said

90
Aquinas, TA Q62 A4
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.
94
Aquinas, TA Q62 A2
95
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 31

above that grace is a gift that perfects the soul so that it may live or see God. Thus,

God, who is the beatitude and the ultimate end, then by the help of God, angels are

able to achieve beatitude.

Another reason to say that it is necessary for angels to be created in grace

in order to attain beatitude is shown that “if he had no grace before entering upon

beatitude, it would then have to be said that he had beatitude without merit.” 96 This

then would pose various problems since such a statement speaks of something

which goes contrary to the meaning of an ultimate end, that it needs to be

achieved by operation. Now given that if angels have beatitude already in the first

place, then it will not subscribe to the idea that an end is a reward for a virtuous

act.97 Another problem would be to say that angels merit their beatitude while in

beatitude.98 This statement, same as the one before, shows conflicting ideas of

moving towards an end while enjoying an end at the same time. St. Thomas takes

this by saying that “no one merits to produce what he already enjoys.” 99 Thus, it

cannot be that angels did not have grace before entering into beatitude for the

reason that beatitude is their end, and yet it is beyond their nature. Then it is

correct to say that angels have grace in the first place and move towards their

ultimate end with the help of God.100 To add, “free-will is not the sufficient cause

of merit; and consequently, an act cannot be meritorious as coming from free-will,

except in so far as it is informed by grace… it cannot be at the same time informed

96
Aquinas, TA Q62 A4
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 32

by imperfect grace, the principle of meriting, and by perfect grace, which is the

principle of enjoying.”101

Having done with the discussion that angels merit beatitude, there is still a

problem present since the discussion above did not yet provide any difference

between angels and man with regards to how they acquire beatitude. Since it has

been said above that “the measure of angels in the heavenly Jerusalem is the

measure of man.”102 It can be concluded that the ultimate end of man and angels is

one and same since the perfect beatitude is God himself. Now although there is no

difference with regards to the final end of angels and man, there must be a

difference in the way they merit beatitude since they are of two different natures. 103

Now, St. Thomas Aquinas says that angels achieve beatitude by one act of charity,

unlike man who merits beatitude by every act of charity. 104 The reason of such is

“because grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature; as every

perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection, according to its

mode.”105 Hence, angels receive grace more perfectly than man. If this is so, thus it

can be said that although angels and man have the same ultimate end, that is

beatitude, it is still held that angels are more capable of receiving beatitude than

101
Ibid.
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Aquinas TA Q62, A5
105
This is the same with the Latin dictum “Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis
recipitur” which is translated as “whatever is received is received according to the manner of the
receiver.” This is true to how angels and man receives grace and merit beatitude. Now, the
intellectual operations of angels are more perfect than that of man as was discussed in the first
chapter. It was also said above that in receiving grace, intellectual faculty is needed as well as the
will. Now since angels are superior to man in terms of intellectual faculty and will, it must follow
that they receive grace in a more perfect manner than that of man. ~ Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 33

man by the reason that they are more perfect than man. 106 Such superiority is

pointed out by St. Thomas by referring to Question 58 articles 3 and 4 of the

Treatise on Angels, which discusses the simplicity of the angelic knowledge,

whereby they understand things more simply than how man understands. 107 Now,

since angels, unlike man, understand things intelligibly, that is without the use of

any form of reasoning or without any progressive action, it follows also that in

acquiring beatitude, angels merit beatitude by one act of charity. The reason for

this is that first they are not created at once in beatitude but are capable of

meriting it and second, that their understanding does not come from progressive

actions nor from reasoning like that of man. Thus, it would follow that they merit

beatitude by one act of charity.108

Done with the discussion on beatitude and how angels merit beatitude, an

important question to be answered will then follow, is it possible for an angel who

merited beatitude to sin? One might think to ask on this matter, whether beatitude

changes the nature of a created being, or do angels cease to have free will after

achieving beatitude?

In answering the first question, St. Thomas clearly states that achieving

beatitude does not destroy the nature of the creature. 109 So does this mean that

106
Ibid.
107
These articles discuss on the mode of understanding of angels. it is said here that
angels do not understand things by discursion nor by composition and division. Rather they
understand things by intuitive burst, that is, they understand things immediately with intuition
without any form of reasoning or passing from one truth to another. ~Aquinas, TA Q 58, AA 3 and
4.
108
Aquinas TA Q62, A5
109
Aquinas, TA Q62 A7
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 34

since in angels there is a possibility of falling since their end is different from their

being, then despite achieving beatitude will they still be able to sin? The question

seems to be misleading since it is somehow trying to propose that it is natural for

angels to commit sin, thus to say that angels are naturally evil. But such a

statement is contrary to what has already been said in the second chapter of this

paper and in the discussion on grace. It has already been stated in the second

chapter that “all creatures have in them the natural inclination towards good since

it is what all desires.”110 Now, to say that all creatures are naturally inclined to

what is good, then to say that to sin is in the nature of angels does not at all follow.

But it cannot be denied that angels are capable to sin before achieving beatitude,

but it does not necessarily mean that it is within their nature but only united to it

accidentally.111

Angels, however by the nature of their will has an inclination towards the

good, can be said to be naturally good. Aquinas says, “it is common to every

nature to have some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love.” 112 This

then clarifies that since the will of angels is inclined to their end, the beatitude or

perfect goodness, then it would follow that it is in the nature of angels to be

naturally good.113

Having clarified that angels are naturally inclined to do good rather than to

commit sin and that beatitude does not destroy the nature of angels but rather

110
Aquinas, SCG Chapter 47
111
Ibid.
112
Aquinas, TA Q60 A1
113
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 35

preserves it after being received by them, St. Thomas would also say that

“beatitude is superadded to the nature.” 114 This means that it does not replace the

goodness that is in the nature of angels rather it perfects it, or in other terms, it

adds perfection to what was already there. Now in perfecting the goodness in

angels, or some would say the grace that was given to angels, after meriting

beatitude the angels are able to see God through His essence. And since it was

already said above that in God, beatitude and existence are one and same, then it

can be said that God in his very essence is the perfection of all goodness. 115 “Now

it is impossible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming at what

is good; or for him to wish to turn away from good.” 116 Now if beatified angels, by

meriting beatitude, are united to the presence of all goodness, God, then it does

not follow that they will still be able to sin for it has already been said that “the

good is what all desires”. St. Thomas adds, “Created good, considered in itself,

can fail. But from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the union

of beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin”117

C. Chapter Summary

This chapter has discussed two things first is that angels are created in

grace and second angels merit beatitude with the help of grace. Grace is necessary

for the creation of angels since it is the force or the gift of God, who is the
114
Aquinas, TA Q62 A6
115
Ibid.
116
Aquinas, TA Q62 A7
117
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 36

presence of all goodness, that allows them to desire what is ultimately good, for to

desire such is not of their nature. Thus, it is said that grace perfects nature.

Secondly, although angels are created in grace, angels did not enjoy the ultimate

beatitude immediately, rather they merited by God’s bestowing. Beatitude, as the

ultimate end of angels, must not be enjoyed by angels immediately, since an end

must be achieved by operation. Thus, beatitude must be merited by a meritorious

act. But in achieving beatitude, it is always with the grace of God, since it is only

Him who has beatitude by nature, for His existence and beatitude are one and

same.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Fall of the Devil

 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 37

A. The Possibility of the Fall of Angels

In the previous chapters, a lot of things has been already been established.

The topics on the nature of angels focused on the discussion of their incorporeity,

intellect, and will, and the discussion about the grace that angels enjoy as well as

the beatitude which they must merit in order to achieve their end. In this chapter,

what will be discussed are the fruits of the investigation that has been done in the

previous chapters.

Having known the nature of angels with regards to their intellect and will

as well as that they are created in grace but yet need to do one meritorious act in

order to achieve their ultimate end, the beatitude or the perfection of their nature,

it can be reasoned out that before they merited their ultimate end, there must be an

instance that they are able to or not to move towards their end. By this, it can be

said that before they achieved beatitude, they were able to sin. 118
Thomas takes

from St. Anselm that, “if good angels were not able to sin, then they kept justice

not by their own ability but by necessity.” 119 Since it has been already established

that angels have free will, then it would be necessary to say that before angels

achieved beatitude, they were able to sin. Aside from their freedom of choice,

there are other factors that would prove that it was possible for angels to fall. First

is that by reason that they are moving towards an end, and second, by reason that

they did not receive beatitude because they were unwilling to.120
118
Anselm. 2000. De Casu Diaboli. Translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert
Richardson. Minneapolis, Minnesota: The Arthur J. Banning Press. Marked as De Casu Diaboli
119
Ibid.
120
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 38

Taking the first reason into account, it can be observed in the previous

chapter that an end needs to be achieved by operation. This means that in order for

one to achieve his/her end, he/she must move from one point to another, in other

terms, to act. Now the same is true with angels, since they do not have within their

nature their end, it must be that they move towards their end, this is why it was

said that they need to do one meritorious act in order for them to achieve

beatitude.121 To further clarify this statement, St. Thomas uses the idea of the

passing from evening knowledge to morning knowledge in angels. He states in the

Treatise on Angels,

So the first instant in the angels is understood to respond to

the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects
itself by its evening knowledge because on the first day
evening is mentioned, but not morning. This operation was
good in them all. From such operation some of them were
converted to the praise of the Word by their morning
knowledge while others, absorbed in themselves, became
night, ‘swelling up with pride,’122

From the context of angelic knowledge, it has been clearly said in the second

chapter of this work that angels understand things in two ways; that they are

intelligible in themselves, evening knowledge, and by co-recognition of all things

as they exist in the Word, morning knowledge. Now at first, what they understand

are the mere essences of things by their intuitive knowledge. And by meriting

beatitude, their understanding of things advances, understanding them by

beholding God’s very being. In the case of those who fell, “they became absorbed

121
Aquinas, TA Q63 A6
122
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 39

in themselves, became night”123 This means, that they were unable to advance in

beatitude, thus they were unable to gain the perfection of their evening

knowledge, the morning knowledge. From here it can be postulated that because

angels are moving towards an end, it can so happen that they do not achieve such

end.124

The second reason goes that they did not receive beatitude because they

were unwilling to receive it. St. Anselm clearly states here that “God granted him

to be able to, and to will to, receive perseverance.” 125 This coincides with what was

already established in the previous chapter that before they received beatitude,

they had grace from God which allowed them to merit beatitude. But Thomas

looks at what St. Anslem makes clear, that being able to receive does not

necessarily mean receiving altogether. For although the angels, in the beginning,

were created good some of them were unable to stay steadfast to persevere. 126

Now, the question posed here is, why did they not persevere if they were able to

persevere? In answering this question St. Anselm asks, “When you did not

complete what you willed and were able to, why did you not complete it?”127

The question of St. Anselm points to two things; first that the end is willed

by the agent and second, although it was willed it has not been completed. The

first point has already been established in the second chapter of this work, where it

was said that the will of intellectual creatures has an inclination to what is good.
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid.
125
Anselm, De Casu Diaboli
126
Ibid.
127
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 40

And by saying that the ultimate end of intellectual creatures is the perfect

beatitude, then it must be said that by the nature of their will, they are inclined to

their end, what is ultimately good. However, the second point of the question

states that some of the angels, although able to achieve their end, did not will it

completely, thus caused their fall.128 “The Devil, who received the ability and the

will to receive perseverance, and the ability and the will to persevere, did not

receive perseverance and did not persevere because he did not will it

completely.”129 Thus, it was possible for the devil to fall by way that he was

unwilling to receive beatitude.

B. The Place of God on the Fall

Knowing that the devil did not receive beatitude because he was unwilling

to receive it poses another question on the deficiency of his will. One might think

that the devil has not received beatitude because God did not give it in the first

place.130 As the person conversing with St. Anselm would ask, “when he no longer

will what he willed at first, why did he not will it except that he did not have the

will?”131 The question puts that God is the cause of the devil’s not-being able to

receive. And thus, proposes that the sin of the devil is not a sin of his own but a

deficiency of his will because God did not give what he ought to receive. But such

proposition questions the perfection of God by putting an infirmity on His creative

128
Ibid.
129
Ibid.
130
Ibid.
131
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 41

power.132 St. Thomas takes the clarification of St. Anselmn, that the devil did not

receive beatitude not because God did not give it, rather it is the fault of the

receiver, that is God did not give it because he does not receive it. 133 To explain

this further, it has already been stated that angels were given the ability to receive

beatitude, their ultimate end. This is the same with the devil. The problem here is

that the devil did not stay steadfast and thus, he did not receive his end, because he

willed something that he ought not to will. Thus, the sin of the devil is entirely the

fault of his own and cannot be the fault of God. 134

The Sin of the Devil

It has now been established that angels are able to sin before they received

beatitude, yet the question about the fall was not yet answered. How did the devil

fall? St. Anselm would try to answer this by going back first to how the devil was

created. Since it has already been said that the devil, before the fall, was created

good. Now what St. Anselm thought of was that, God cannot be the cause of any

infirmity nor can he be the cause of the evil will of the devil. So it must be that the

devil at the beginning of his creation had only a “will-for-happiness”. Now having

such a will, the devil must not be able to will other than happiness. 135 St. Anselm

would say, “someone who wills something for happiness does not will anything

other than happiness.”136 But how could the devil sin if what is in his will was only

the will-for-happiness which is actually directed to his end, the beatitude, the
132
Ibid.
133
Ibid.
134
Ibid.
135
Ibid.
136
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 42

ultimate happiness? But St. Anselm adds to this, “he is able to will what he thinks

is conducive to happiness and will only happiness.” 137 Now, this is how the devil

sinned, since he willed a happiness that which he thinks is greater than what is

given. Thus, he willed something that he should not will, “he willed to be like

God.”138

The idea of willing to be like God might be confusing for it has also been

said by Jesus, “Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect.” 139 If this

is the idea of willing to be like God, then there can be no sin in willing such.

However, St. Thomas clarifies that there are two modes of willing to be like God;

1. To obtain such likeness from God, and 2. To desire such likeness unnaturally,

by his own power.140 It is by the second mode that the devil sinned, that he desired

to achieve something, as his last end, that which he can attain by his own power.

Thus, he deserted his inclination towards the ultimate end that is attainable only

through the grace of God.141 This is what St. Anselm is trying to say when he said,

“that which he did not receive to keep because he deserted it.” 142. Now, the devil

sinned because he willed what he ought not to will, to desire his last end by his

own power, without the grace of God. By this, he puts his will above God, and

such is the sin of pride. Thus, the devil sinned because of pride.143

C. Chapter Summary
137
Ibid.
138
Ibid.
139
Matthew 5:48
140
Aquinas, TA Q63 A3
141
Ibid.
142
Anselm, De Casu Diaboli
143
Ibid.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 43

In this chapter, three things have been discussed; the possibility of the fall

angels, the place of God in the fall of angels, and the sin of the devil. The first

topic speaks that before angels merited beatitude, they were, at one instance, able

to sin. This is by the reason that they must keep justice by their own will and not

by necessity, for if their beatitude came out of necessity, they would never merit

their final end, which is contrary to what has already been established. Next, is

that God has no fault on the fall. The Devil was solely responsible for his tragic

fall, for he did not receive beatitude because he was unwilling to. And lastly, the

devil sinned because of pride. It was because he willed inordinately to be like God

by putting his will above the will of God. That he willed to desert his final end and

willed another by his own power and not with the grace of God.

CHAPTER 5

Summary and Conclusion

A. Summary

The discussion on angels and demons may have lost its prominence in the

present era yet is not lost completely. To cite a very recent and famous discussion

on this matter can be found in various films which speak of demonic possessions,

and the war between good and evil. Now, a film series titled “Lucifer” poses great
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 44

questions with regards to the nature of angels, especially with regards to their

intellect and will, the fall of angels, freedom of choice, and the place of God with

regards to their tragic fall. A glimpse of the said film series, speaks of the fall as

not the fault of the devil alone but as a part of the divine plan of God, which is

contrary to what has been discussed in this study. Now, since such film, although

fictional, might still cause confusion about the truths with regard to the fall of the

devil. This then makes the whole purpose of the study, to clarify such truths for all

the faithful and to those who might read this paper.

In the discussion on the nature of angels, it has been said that angels are

created incorporeal substances who are endowed with intellect, will, and freedom

in a higher degree than man or any created being. With regards to the incorporeity

of angels, it can be drawn from here the properties which are truly proper to

intellectual substances. Being said that angels are purely intellectual substances,

wholly incorporeal, thus their operation must only be what is proper to intellectual

substances, that is understanding and willing. Now to say that understanding and

willing are proper to angelic nature, then it can be said that by nature they are

endowed with intellect, will, and freedom of choice.

Focusing on the will of angels, which speaks of a certain inclination

towards what is good, and their freedom of choice, which speaks of their ability to

act according to their judgment, it can be drawn that angels are also moving

towards an end which is the good. From here it can already be pointed out that by

nature, angels are moving towards a final end which is their ultimate end, the
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 45

beatitude. Now given that their nature speaks that they operate by understanding

and willing and that an end is merited or acquired only by operation, it can

therefore be said that angels merit their end by knowing and willing their end.

This is the same with meriting their final end, the beatitude.

In the third chapter, it can be seen that it has already been established that

angels are moving towards their ultimate end. But the problem that is faced here is

that the ultimate end of angels, the beatitude, is beyond the nature of angels. Now,

saying that their ultimate end is beyond their nature, there must be someone, by

which beatitude is proper to His nature, who bestows beatitude to them in order

for them to merit it. Therefore, it can be said that angels merit beatitude with the

help of the One, who in His nature, beatitude and His essence is one and same,

God. That which God provides angels in order for them to attain their ultimate end

is what St. Thomas calls grace.

Now with regards to grace, it was discussed that angels are created in

grace. This means that angels with the help of grace are able to will their final end

which is beatitude, or others would say, ultimate happiness or the perfection of

being. But to have grace does not mean that they immediately have glory or their

final end, since such end is yet to be acquired by them by operation. This is the

same with regards to how man acquires his final end. Yet, it differs only because

angels only need to do one meritorious act to achieve their end. The reason for this

can be drawn from the superior intellectual powers that they have since they
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 46

understand things more perfectly by not needing reasoning. In other words, they

understand things without any progressive action, rather by intuitive burst.

As was said above, although it is said that they merit beatitude by

operation, beatitude cannot be merited unless with the help of God since such end

is beyond their nature. Now, it has been clearly said that one cannot acquire

something that is outside one’s nature. Since St. Thomas clearly states that

beatitude is only natural to God because his essence and beatitude is one and same

in Him. Given that beatitude is proper to the nature of God, then it must be said

that beatitude exceeds the nature of angels, since what is proper to one nature

cannot be proper to other natures. Thus, beatitude can only be merited with the

help of God’s grace.

Aside from this, angels after meriting beatitude become unable to sin. The

reason is not that beatitude rewrites one’s nature but rather perfects it. Although, it

is true that before angels merit beatitude, they are first able to sin. But there is a

misconception of the idea of freedom and sin here. Sinning is not a part of the

nature of freedom, this can be drawn from the idea of creation, that all beings are

inclined to what is good. By this, it would not follow that sin be part of the nature

of freedom. Now, since meriting beatitude perfects one’s nature it would then

follow that it perfects that natural appetite for the good. Thus, by perfecting their

will-for-happiness or will-for-good, they are no longer able to sin or to turn away

from good.
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 47

But going back to the instance where angels have not yet merited beatitude

and considering their angelic knowledge and free will and their natural inclination

towards goodness, how was it possible for angels to fall? It can be read in the

fourth chapter of this work that before angels merited beatitude, they were able to

sin by two modes, by reason that they are moving towards an end and by reason

that they did not receive their end because they were unwilling to. Thus, it was

possible for them to fall in the first place. Yet let it not cause confusion that the

possibility of the fall of angels entails that sinning is natural to them since it is not.

Rather it must be seen from the perspective of St. Anselm that their ability to

choose steadfastness over turning away speaks that angels merited beatitude

without necessity but by free will. From here it can be drawn that angels were able

to sin because they are moving towards an end, which may include also the

possibility of not attaining their end, and that because they used their free will

inordinately by willing an end other than what is given to them to will.

From here, the question of whether the fall of the devil is the sin of his

own can be answered. St. Anselm clarifies that God did not cause the devil’s not-

being able to receive his end, and thus he said that it was the fault of the receiver

that God did not give beatitude because he was unwilling to. That the devil did not

stay steadfast, abandoning what he ought to will in order to achieve beatitude. And

after abandoning what he ought to will, the devil willed what he ought not to will,

to be like God. This is the sin of the devil, he willed what was not supposed to

will. He willed something that will bring him happiness by his own power and
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 48

deserted what was given for him to merit. Thus, he, full of pride, put his will

above God’s will and grace. From here it has been said that he desired to be like

God, inordinately.

B. Conclusion

In the recent discussions with regards to angels and demons, one might

find ideas which goes against the truths which the Church is teaching. It may

come across to the ideas that angels are corporeal creatures with wings in the form

of man. Also, it may give the idea that angels have the same intellectual functions

of man. And it may give the idea that the fall of the devil is part of the Divine plan

of God, making God as a proponent of their tragic fall. Now, this paper discusses

through its chapters, from the discussion of the nature of angels, towards the mode

of their creation and how they merit their end, and the truths of the fall of the

devil. The purpose of this is to clarify the truths about the fall of the devil that the

Church teaches by referring to the St. Thomas Aquinas’s Treatise on Angels and

the works of St. Augustine and St. Anselm. And thus, it is said that the devil fell

by his own free will by willing something which he thinks is greater than the

happiness that God had given for him to merit. That he sinned because he put his

will above the will of God. He sinned because of his pride, that he willed to be

like God, inordinately.

C. Recommendation
 SMCB DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 49

Having done with exposing the philosophical standpoint of St. Thomas

with regards to the fall of the devil, the researcher finds that this study still limited

in explaining the truth between three concepts; free will, goodness, and evil. Thus,

the researcher moves to encourage his audience to further investigate to the truths

with regards to this matter. The researcher recommends to the following topics for

research.

1. St. Thomas on Free will and Aetiology of Evil

2. A Philosophical Inquiry on the Fall of the Devil as the Origin of Evil

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