Quimiguing vs.

Icao
FACTS
Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the lower court. She
averred that:
 the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential
relations;
 that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse
with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent;
 that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by
defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying.
Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney’s fees.
Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege
that the child had been born;
the trial judge dismissed the complaint on the basis of Icao’s argument.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl;
However, the court ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint
averred no cause of action.
Appeal to the SC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the conceived child may receive donation as prescribed in the Civil
Code.
RULING
YES.
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion
to dismiss), even if the said child is only “en ventre de sa mere;” just as a conceived
child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of
the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if
such child should be born after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).
Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it” adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions,
specified in the following article” (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother’s womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent
to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become
entirely useless and ineffective.
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to
force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this
case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused.
“ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

“ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (3)
Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

Geluz vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS
Nita (the wife) met Geluz through her aunt. Few years later, she got pregnant by her
present husband but they weren’t married then. They then decided to abort the baby by
Geluz.
After marriage, she then again became pregnant, but because of work constraints (she
was employed in the COMELEC), she had herself aborted again by Geluz.
For the third time, Nita again was aborted of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of
the sum of fifty pesos. However, this was without the knowledge of the husband (the
plaintiff) for he was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election
to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
Hence, the plaintiff filed an action for damages against Geluz.
The lower courts ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages against Geluz.
ISSUE
whether or not the unborn child acquired civil personality.
RULING
NO.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such
right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place
from one that lacked juridical personality
Article 40 of the Civil Code expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: “provided it be born later with
the condition specified in the following article”. In the present case, there is no
dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb.
May recover moral damages; however
Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn
child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the
normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress
and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations
(Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should
warrant them (Art. 2230).
In this case however, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any
basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee’s indifference to
the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates
that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken
interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern
appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment,
since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney’s fees, an “indemnity”
claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated

Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation vs. Montaño

FACTS
Hortillano, an employee of Continental Steel and a member of the respondent Union
(Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for
Empowerment and Reforms) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and
Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife
premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. According to the
Certificate of Fetal Death, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia
secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied
his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and
accident insurance.
the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA, to no avail.
Thus, they have undergone arbitration.
- The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other
death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section
2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the
dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired
juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the
CBA death benefits.
- On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the
CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without
legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to
the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of
which existed in Hortillano’s case.
- relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one
with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it
never acquired juridical personality.
- A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it
never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Arbitrator Montaño, ruled that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and
death benefits.
- there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent
occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent,
although he/she died during the labor or delivery.
CA – affirmed Atty. Montaño
- the term “death” is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for
ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is
intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil
personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow
that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a “death” as to
be covered by the CBA provision

ISSUE
Whether or not only those who have acquired juridical personality could die as argued
by Continental Steel.
RULING
NO.
elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are:

(1) death;
(2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee;
and
(3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee.

requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are:

(1) death;
(2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married
employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and
(3) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same
Code.
“Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations,
is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.”
There is no need to establish the civil personality of the unborn child herein since
his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of
death. While the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
And third, Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with
civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.
Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes
the life of the unborn from conception.
If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies on another for support;
one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else.”

Joaquin vs. Navarro

FACTS
On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the
spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters,
Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's
wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the
German Club which was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the
Club was set on fire.
The Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building, and the three
daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr.,
and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They could not
convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his
son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, and a friend and former
neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out,
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately
dropped. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many
people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin. Joaquin Sr, Adela Conde, and
Francisco Lopez managed to escape the premises, however, only 3 days later, only
Lopez was able to miraculously survive as Joaquin Sr and his daughter-in-law was fired
to death by the Japanese soldiers. Three proceedings then were instituted for the
summary settlement of the estates of the deceased by the petitioner Ramon Joaquin,
an acknowledged natural child of Angela and adopted child of the deceased spouses,
and by the respondent, who is the son of Joaquin Sr. by his first marriage.
The RTC ruled that the mother survived her son, Joaquin Jr. while the Court of Appeals
ruled that Joaquin survived his mother.
ISSUE
Whether Angela Joaquin died before her son, Joaquin Jr.
RULING
NO.
It is the Court’s opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to
solve the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and
keep the statutory presumption of survivorship out of the case. It is believed that in the
light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived
at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads: When two person perish
in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who
died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it can be inferred, the
survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of
the sexes, according to the following rules: xxx
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889, now Article 43 of the New Civil Code, provides:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons
who would inherent one from the other, the persons who alleges the prior death of either
must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they
died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take
place
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing
decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect,
circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a
rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls.In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin
de Navarro died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or
conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory — that the
mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which, weighed by
common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by
the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this
inference ought to prevail.the distribution of the decedents' estates should be made in
accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of
passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the
hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son.