The Reality of Trade:

The WTO and Developing Countries

 Chapter 1
Impact of the Uruguay Round on the Multilateral Trading System
Pranav Kumar

The Uruguay Round (Uruguay Round) of multilateral trade negotiations (1986-94) was an important
milestone in over fifty years of GATT/WTO history. In the seven previous General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rounds of trade negotiations, discussions were mainly focused on tariff
reductions. Developing countries focused most of their attention on obtaining preferential access to
industrial country markets. Only a few developing countries participated actively in the core business of
the negotiations — the exchange of market access concessions.

By contrast, many developing countries were very active participants in the Uruguay Round both
individually and in coalitions with industrial countries. Not only did they participate in formulating new
rules for the world trading system, but they also made important market access offers in the conventional
area of reducing tariff protection on manufactures trade and in new areas, such as trade in services and
trade in agricultural products.

The Uruguay Round trade negotiations, which went on for nearly 8 years, brought a sea change in the
multilateral trading system. Its impact could be seen in the increase in participation and number of areas
covered. While the early rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, up to the Dillon Round in 1961,
typically involved some 20 to 30 countries, the Kennedy Round (1964-67) involved over 60 countries, the
Tokyo Round (1973-79) involved more than 100 countries, and the Uruguay Round (1986-94) had 125
participants. The WTO’s membership stands at 146 countries today, and this could potentially grow to
over 160 in the next few years. With the accession of China as the 143rd member, the WTO members now
account for more than 90% of world merchandise trade. Significant traders that are still outside the
multilateral trading system, but in the process of accession to the WTO, are the Russian Federation and
Saudi Arabia.

This chapter tries to examine the overall impact of the Uruguay Round on the multilateral trading system.
Section 1 briefly highlights the results of the Uruguay Round. Section 2 discusses its institutional impact.
Institutional reforms were one of the major tasks of Uruguay Round. In Section 3, we analyze the impact
in terms of actual growth in exports of world merchandise and commercial services over the last decade.
How much have developing and poor countries been able to increase their share in world trade and to
diversify their exports? In Section 4, the paper highlights some major market access impediments faced
by many developing and poor countries. How are developed and even some middle-income developing
countries manipulating the provisions of the WTO to their own advantage? Finally, Section 5 concludes
the paper with some policy implications.

4 The North-South Institute

Outcomes of the Uruguay Round

Unfinished business from the previous Tokyo Round was only a small part of the Uruguay Round
negotiating agenda. Despite difficulties in launching the Uruguay Round, the negotiating agenda finally
adopted in 1986 was wide-ranging and ambitious. The round encompassed traditional tariff cutting, and
tackled long-standing and intractable issues such as textiles and clothing and agriculture. It also
refurbished the dispute settlement system, instituted the trade policy review mechanism for examining the
trade policies of individual countries, transformed aspects of the institution and the GATT’s legal status,
and took on the entirely new issues of trade in services and trade-related intellectual property rights.

In view of the extraordinary comprehensiveness of this agenda, it is not surprising that the Uruguay
Round proved nearly as difficult to close as it was to launch. In December 1993, some decisions were
adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee. Even then, a few loose ends had to be tied up, and
negotiations in various areas, most notably services, continued. The Uruguay Round really ended in April
1994, eight years after the negotiations had begun. The negotiations had proved challenging precisely
because governments were seeking far-reaching agreement in difficult areas. No government could agree
easily to such a wide-ranging package, knowing that important commitments were at stake which would
involve significant policy changes.

The Uruguay Round is a complex agreement that covers six broad areas:

1. Tariff reductions in manufactured products.

2. The tariffication of non-tariff barriers in agriculture, as well as binding commitments to reduce
the level of agricultural protection.
3. The elimination of voluntary export restraints (VERs) and of quotas in textiles and clothing.
4. Institutional and rule changes, such as the creation of the WTO and safeguards, anti-dumping,
and countervailing duty measures.
5. New areas such as Trade -Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
6. Areas receiving greater coverage than earlier, such as customs valuation.

In the field of tariffs, the Uruguay Round saw average cuts of 40% on industrial products. Prior to the
Uruguay Round, developing countries had on average only bound 21% of their tariff lines. This figure
rose to 73% after the Uruguay Round. Developed countries and transition economies increased their
shares of bindings in total tariff lines from 78% and 73% to 99% and 98% respectively. These
commitments added significantly to security and predictability in world trade (WTO 1998).

After more than four decades of futile efforts to bring trade liberalization to the agricultural sector, the
Uruguay Round finally put in place a comprehensive program of reform, encompassing liberalization
commitments with respect to tariffs, domestic supports, and export subsidies. All quantitative restrictions
and other non-tariff measures used against imports were replaced by tariffs. In textiles, following years of
special arrangements entailing discriminatory restrictions maintained by most developed countries against
developing country exports, an agreement was reached to phase out these arrangements. Under the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), country-specific quotas are to be phased out in three phases
over a period of ten years, ending in 2005.

A new safeguards agreement was established in the Uruguay Round — an achievement that had eluded
negotiators for many years. This new agreement instituted strengthened procedures and public
accountability, combined with greater flexibility to allow governments to take the necessary temporary
measures to deal with pressing adjustment problems. Its adoption entailed the elimination of “grey area”
measures, such as voluntary export restrictions. Provisions relating to trade remedy measures such as anti-

The Reality of Trade: The WTO and Developing Countries 5

dumping and countervailing duties were strengthened, as were those on state trading, technical barriers to
trade, customs valuation, and import licensing procedures. The provisions on subsidies were further
developed, establishing a definition of subsidies for the first time, and making the rules and remedies
clearer. Additional clarifications were made to GATT Article XXIV, dealing with customs unions and
free trade areas.

New agreements were reached on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, rules of origin, and import
licensing procedures. An agreement on TRIMs, applying only in the area of goods, seeks to control the
use of investment-linked measures that affect trade, such as local content and trade balancing
requirements. The Uruguay Round General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) represented the first
attempt to bring a sector of ever-growing importance into the multilateral framework of rule making.
Built on the conceptual foundations of the GATT, the GATS is both a set of rules and a mechanism for
progressively pursuing trade liberalization. Under the agreement, a framework was established for WTO
members to bind, reduce, or eliminate impediments to the supply of services by foreign providers,
followed up by the agreements on basic telecommunications and financial services in 1997.

The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is as remarkable as that
on trade in services. It establishes standards for the protection of all the main intellectual property rights,
copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout
designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information. The agreement also establishes a range of
obligations designed to ensure that adequate enforcement mechanisms exist at the domestic level.

Impact on Institutional Setup

After more than four decades of legal limbo, during which the GATT was essentially a provisional
arrangement, it was, on January 1, 1995, finally transformed into the WTO — a permanent organization
with a sound legal basis. Under the GATT 1947, all decision-making authority was attributed to (and then
delegated by) a single organ, the “Contracting Parties” acting jointly. The framers of the Agreement
Establishing the WTO, however, carefully negotiated a more complex institutional structure under which
separate judicial and political bodies are empowered to make binding decisions that confirm, define or
alter the rights and obligations of members. The decision-making in the WTO is divided between:

• The membership of the WTO acting under the amendment and other rule -making provisions of the
WTO Agreement (the “legislative branch”);
• The political organs of the WTO, such as the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, the
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Safeguards Committee, and the
Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions (the “executive authorities”); and
• The judicial organs of the WTO, in particular the panels, arbitrators, and the Appellate Body (the
“judicial powers”).

The Uruguay Round resulted in the most profound institutional reform of the multilateral trading system
since the establishment of the GATT in 1947. The trading rules were reformed across the whole spectrum,
and the new rules were brought in under the aegis of the WTO. Some of the distinct features, which make
the WTO a potentially better-equipped organization to administer the world trading system, are discussed
below in brief.

6 The North-South Institute

Trade Policy Review Mechanism

The first major result of Uruguay Round negotiations was the decision to establish a trade policy review
mechanism. Participants agreed to start the reviews at the December 1988 ministerial meeting that was
intended to be the mid-way assessment of the Uruguay Round. Initially , these reviews took place under
the GATT, and like the GATT, they focused on trade in goods only. With the creation of the WTO in
1995, their scope was extended, like the WTO, to include services and intellectual property. The objective
was to increase the transparency and understanding of countries’ trade policies and practices, through
regular monitoring, as well as to improve the quality of public and intergovernmental debate on the issues
and to enable a multilateral assessment of the effects of policies on the world trading system. While the
reviews focus on a member’s own trade policies and practices, they also take into account countries’
wider economic and developmental needs, their policies and objectives, and the external economic
environment.

Dispute Settlement System

No review of the institutional achievements of the Uruguay Round would be complete without mention of
the dispute settlement system. The dispute settlement procedures of the WTO are substantially stronger
than those of the GATT. A procedure for settling disputes existed under the GATT too, but it had no fixed
timetables, and rulings were easily blocked. Many cases dragged on over several months inconclusively.
The Uruguay Round agreement introduced a more structured process with more clearly defined stages in
the procedure. It introduced greater discipline for the length of time a case should take to be settled, with
flexible deadlines set in various stages of the procedure, all on the understanding that prompt settlement
was essential if the WTO was to function effectively. The Uruguay Round agreement also made it
impossible for countries losing a case to block the adoption of a ruling, a complete reversal from the
previous GATT provisions for settling disputes. Under the previous GATT procedure, rulings could only
be adopted by consensus, meaning that a single objection could block the ruling. Now, a ruling is
automatically adopted unless there is a consensus to reject it.

The new WTO system is stronger, more automatic , and more credible than its GATT predecessor. This is
reflected in the diversity of countries now using it. In 2000, the number of complaints filed under the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) since the start of the WTO ha d reached 200 (WTO
2001a). This indicates a continued heavy use of the dispute settlement procedures by WTO members. In
contrast, only some 300 cases were brought before the GATT during its entire life span.

Technical Cooperation

Technical assistance to developing countries, least developed countries (LDCs) and countries in transition
from centrally-planned economies is an integral part of WTO work. The objective is to help build the
necessary institutions and to train officials. It aims to improve the understanding of the agreements and
facilitate implementation of obligations. At the same time, emphasis is increasingly being placed on
enhancing the capacity of countries to integrate into the world economy in order to realize the benefits of
the market access opportunities that are available to them as a result of being WTO members.

Despite their vital nature, technical assistance and cooperation activities in 1999 and 2000 have been
sustained only by the generous extra-budgetary voluntary donations of certain WTO members, given that
the regular budget for such activities has remained inadequate to respond to needs, funding just 10% of
activities in 1999 (WTO 2001a). Increased funding for technical assistance in the core budget of the WTO
would create a more permanent basis for such activities. In the fourth Ministerial Conference at Doha,
members agreed that there is a need for technical assistance to receive secure and predictable funding.
Pursuant to this, in December 2001 the WTO’s Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration agreed

The Reality of Trade: The WTO and Developing Countries 7

to the establishment of a “Doha Development Agenda Trust Fund” of at least 15 million Swiss Francs
(CHF) — approximately US$9.1 million. This proposed amount would go toward the implementation of
technical assistance commitments as mandated by the Doha Ministerial Declaration. The existing WTO
Global Trust Fund was established in July 1999 to receive extra-budgetary donations from WTO
members to finance technical cooperation activities carried out by the WTO.

Ministerial Conference

Negotiators also paid attention to other important institutional aspects of the multilateral trading system.
In order to ensure an adequate degree of high-level political involvement in the WTO, it was agreed that
members would meet at the ministerial level at least once every two years. The Ministerial Conference is
the highest WTO body. So far, four WTO Ministerial Conferences have been held since 1995.

Impact on World Trade

The real success of the eight years of intensive Uruguay Round trade negotiations, followed by over
seven years of implementation of WTO agreements, can be judged in terms of their contributions toward
establishing a free and fair trade regime, and in terms of how far the integration of poor countries,
especially LDCs, into the multilateral trading system has advanced. Potential indicators are the share of
developing countries in world merchandise exports and the composition of their export basket.

World Exports of Merchandise

The 1990s witnessed a boom in world trade, with an average annual increase of 6.3% in the volume of
global merchandise trade (1990-99). It outpaced global gross domestic product (GDP) growth by an
average of 4.2% per year over the same time period. Exports grew faster than output in every major
region (World Bank 2001). Developing countries made a significant contribution to the vigorous
expansion of world trade in the last decade. The share of developing countries in global export markets
rose by almost seven percentage points, to about 25% of world non-energy merchandise trade, primarily
based on superior performance in manufacturing. They accounted for 27% of world exports of
manufactures in 2000, a remarkable increase from their 17% share in 1990. However, the details behind
these headlines reveal divergent trends. Some countries enjoyed exceptional growth, while others
remained stagnant (Table 1).

Table 1: Share in World Merchandise Exports by Region, 2000

Share in 1990 (%) Share in 2000 (%)

North America 15.4 17.1
Latin America 4.3 5.8
Western Europe 48.3 39.5
Central/Eastern 3.1 4.1
Europe/Baltic States/CIS
Africa 3.1 2.3
Middle East 4.0 4.2
Asia 21.8 26.7
Source: WTO, 2001b.

Developing countries as a whole improved their penetration of world markets, but the export share of the
49 LDCs shrank from 3% in the 1950s to around 0.5% in the early 1980s, and has hovered around this

8 The North-South Institute

very low level over the last two decades (UNCTAD 2001). In the year 2000, aggregate merchandise
exports from the LDCs were at a record level ($34 billion), while at the same time more than one-third of
the LDCs saw their exports decline. The LDCs continue to depend on agriculture and labour-intensive
manufactures, which together account for about 70% of their exports. The share of manufactures in total
exports of Africa, where 33 of the 49 LDCs are located, is only 24.6% (Table 2). This is significantly
lower than the world’s share of 74.9%. The expansion of trade volumes in these sectors did not keep pace
with world trade growth, which has undermined the LDCs’ growth prospects and hindered their battle
against poverty.

Table 2: Share of Manufactures in Total Merchandise Trade by Region, 2000

Exports (%) Imports (%)

World 74.9 74.9
North America 78.0 80.0
Latin America 60.5 76.9
Western Europe 80.3 75.4
Central/Eastern 54.2 72.0
Europe/Baltic States/CIS
Africa 24.6 68.4
Middle East 21.7 74.6
Asia 84.2 70.5
Source: WTO, 2001b.

Further, progress in lowering trade barriers has lagged in agriculture and labour-intensive manufactures
(such as textiles and clothing) — the two sectors with the most impact on poverty. Both these sectors are
highly protected. Agriculture and other labour-intensive products matter to the world’s poor because they
represent more than half of the low-income countries’ exports, and about 70% of the least-developed
countries’ export revenues.

World Exports of Commercial Services

Although the GATS commitments are of relatively recent vintage, a number of WTO members have
actively pursued unilateral liberalization in the services sector. World exports of commercial services
grew at the rate of 6% per annum from 1990 to 2000, reaching US$1.4 trillio n. Western Europe alone
accounted for almost 45% of world services trade in 2000. North America, Latin America, and Asia
increased their share in world exports of services over the 1990s. Once again the share of Africa, which
includes most LDCs, decreased to 2.1% in 2000 from 2.4% in 1990 (Table 3).

Table 3: World Exports of Commercial Services by Region, 2000

Share in 1990 (%) Share in 2000 (%)

North America 19.3 21.7
Latin America 3.8 4.2
Western Europe 53.0 45.0
Africa 2.4 2.1
Asia 16.8 21.1
Source: WTO, 2001b.

The Reality of Trade: The WTO and Developing Countries 9

Some Serious Concerns

There is no doubt that the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations made a significant contribution toward
lowering global barriers to merchandise trade on two fronts: improving market access, thanks to the
reduction of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on a number of products; and extending multilateral
disciplines to previously excluded sectors, particularly agriculture, and textiles and clothing.

However, the poor countries have still not been able to penetrate the markets of developed countries.
Many tariff bindings are at levels much higher than the applied tariffs, creating a degree of uncertainty for
exporters wishing to access these markets. While the overall use of non-tariff measures has declined, the
use of certain trade remedy measures such as anti-dumping and countervailing measures is on the rise.
Moreover, there is growing evidence of the difficulties faced by developing countries, especially LDCs,
in implementing the WTO commitments in new areas such as TRIPS, SPS (the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures), and TBT (the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade).

Slow Pace of Elimination of Quotas on Textiles and Clothing

For more than 30 years, an important part of world trade in textiles and clothing was governed by a
special regime known as the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which provided for waivers from GATT
rules. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) provides for the gradual phase-out
of the country-specific quotas over a 10-year period ending in 2005. The ATC was an important step to
improve developing countries’ access to high-income countries’ markets, because it made it very difficult
for importers to introduce new quotas. However, the effectiveness of the ATC in freeing up markets has
been limited by two main drawbacks. First, scheduled quota integration is “back-loaded,” with quota-free
market access for nearly half of all imports due only at the end of the transition (i.e., in 2005).

Second, the ATC rules for the removal of quotas are framed in terms of overall import shares in textiles
and clothing, rather than in terms of the number of existing quotas. This allows importing countries the
leeway to select the products to be freed of quota restrictions at each step, which slows the pace of
liberalization. Up to 2000, more than 33% of trade was integrated, fulfilling the minimum ATC
requirements. But products that were freed of quotas by the EU and the US at that time represented only
small shares of their total textile and clothing imports — about 6% of 1995-97 imports for the US and less
than 5% for the EU (ITCB 1999).

Distortions in Agriculture Trade

The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) marked an important step in improving access to sheltered
agricultural markets in high-income countries. A wide range of non-tariff barriers were abolished and
converted to ordinary tariffs (tariffication). Existing and new tariffs were bound, and these bindings were
subject to reduction. Developing countries were allowed more flexibility through longer implementation
periods and lower reduction commitments.

Even seven years following the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA), the agriculture market was still highly protected. Developed countries continued to apply
several measures to protect their farm sectors. Some of them are discussed below in brief. Since the
international agricultural prices in the base period for the URAA (1986-88) were way below high
domestic prices supported by quotas, the conversion of quotas into tariff equivalents resulted in high rates
of tariff protection (OECD 2001a). Tariff peaks in agriculture occur frequently on processed products and

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temperate commodities. They are less common on unprocessed fruits and vegetables and tropical
commodities, which are not produced in high-income countries but are major export crops of LDCs.

At an estimated $245 billion in 2000 (which was about five times the level of annual international
development assistance), support to agricultural producers in high-income countries remained sizeable
(OECD 2001b). Total support to agriculture (as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD)) was even higher, at about $327 billion in 2000 (i.e., 1.3% of OECD
countries’ GDP). Export subsidies in agriculture allow countries to export production surpluses to the
world market at prices below the high prices prevailing in their domestic markets. In 1995-98, export
subsidies were about $7 billion, on average, of which 95% was granted by the EU.

Rising Game of Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures

Import-competing firms are often tempted to resort to anti-dumping laws, which are permitted by WTO
rules, to allege unfair trade practices by foreign competitors. Anti-dumping laws enable nations to impose
offsetting duties on imports found to be products dumped in the domestic market and causing “material
injury” to a domestic industry. The main users of these laws initially were developed countries, but,
increasingly, developing countries have had recourse to them. As can be seen from Figure 1, WTO
members notified 360 initiations of anti-dumping investigations in 1999, up 42% over 1998 (WTO
2001a).

The use of countervailing duties — in terms of the number of WTO members using them, initiations, and
measures in force — remains much lower than for anti-dumping, although also on a rising trend (Figure
1). As of mid-2000, an estimated 95 final countervailing measures were in place, of which the US had the
most (46), mainly on steel products, followed by the European Union (13) and Mexico (10) (WTO
2001a).

Figure 1

Source: WTO, 2001a.

The Reality of Trade: The WTO and Developing Countries 11

Growing Threats from Standards and Technical Barriers

While traditional trade barriers in agriculture, such as tariffs, continue to decline, technical and regulatory
barriers are increasingly subject to debate. In recent years, Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures and
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) have emerged as the greatest threat for poor countries’ exports. Both
WTO agreements in this area, by their very nature, may result in restrictions on trade. All governments
accept the fact that some trade restrictions may be necessary and appropriate in order to ensure food
safety and animal and plant health protection. However, arbitrary use of these measures by developed
countries has been increasing. In developed countries, consumer groups, environmental protection
agencies, and food safety enforcement agencies are increasingly prescribing stricter and stricter standards
for cleanliness, microbial loads, aflatoxin, and pesticide residues. For instance, Japan insists on a DDT
residues level of 0.4 PPM on unmanufactured tobacco, while the international standard is as high as 6
PPM.

Developing countries are vulnerable to regulatory changes in developed countries because of a relative
scarcity of public resources to finance compliance with new and more restrictive SPS and TBT standards.
While middle -income developing countries have shifted their export to processed food to avoid
complying with high SPS standards (though even here they can be onerous), countries in the lowest
income regions (such as Africa) still largely depend on raw food exports. The cost of compliance with
WTO Agreements on SPS and TBT in the LDCs can exceed total government budgets. Fast technological
changes have enhanced inspection capacities in developed countries and allowed them to adopt
progressively more restrictive SPS and TBT standards. Securing sales in these major markets is expected
to become more challenging and costly over time.

Besides these major impediments to developing and poor countries’ exports, some other equally serious
barriers in market access, which have surfaced in the post-WTO period, are tariff escalation and tariff
peaks. Tariffs often rise significantly with the level of processing (tariff escalation) in many high-income
and developing countries. This has the potential of reducing demand for processed imports from
developing countries, hampering diversification into higher value-added exports. Low average duties
conceal high tariffs in place for major agricultural and industrial export products of developing countries.
Extremely high and often prohibitive peak tariffs of 100-900% continue to be applied by many developed
countries for such major agricultural products as sugar, rice, cereals, dairy products, and meat as well as
for food industry products and footwear (Supper 2001).

Conclusions and Policy Implications

The overall impact of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations on the multilateral trading system is mixed.
It brought some really significant institutional changes, which have resulted in relatively better
governance of the world trading system under the aegis of the WTO. The Uruguay Round did also
advance the integration of the world economy, especially the integration of developing countries into the
multilateral trading system. It has contributed to the liberalization of developing countries’ own trade
regimes and improvements in the conditions affecting access to the major markets for their export
products.

However, unilateral liberalization is not enough to integrate any economy into the world unless it is
reciprocated. So far, the integration process has been especially impressive for only 15-20 middle- and
higher-income countries in Latin America and Asia. For many others, especially LDCs, progress has been
slower. The implementation record of Uruguay Round agreements is still very poor. Until the fourth
Ministerial Conference at Doha, some 90 implementation issues raised by developing countries were

12 The North -South Institute

unresolved. At Doha, trade ministers issued a separate declaration on implementation, addressing half of
these issues.

Openness to trade has long been seen as an important element of good economic policy. Certainly,
empirical evidence indicates that trade liberalization can be a positive contributor to poverty alleviation. If
the international community is serious about establishing a free and fair multilateral trading system and
sharing the fruits of global trade expansion with the poor countries, the factors enhancing their trading
opportunities must be addressed on a priority basis. For the world’s 2.8 billion poor, reducing barriers to
agricultural products, textiles and clothing, apparel, and several other labour-intensive manufactures are
crucial. Both the high- and middle -income countries will have to reduce their levels of protection in
agriculture.

References

International Textiles and Clothing Bureau. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing: Evaluation of
Implementation. Geneva: ITCB, 1999.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture: An Evaluation of its Implementation in OECD Countries. Paris: OECD, 2001a.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries:
Monitoring and Evaluation. Paris: OECD, 2001b.

Supper, E. Is There Effectively a Level Playing Field for Developing Country Exports? Policy Issues in
International Trade and Commodities Study Series No.1. New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2001.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Trade and Development Report 2001. New York
and Geneva: United Nations, 2001.

World Bank. Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2002. Washington, DC: World
Bank, 2001.

World Trade Organization. The Multilateral Trading System: 50 Years of Achievement. Geneva: WTO,
1998.

World Trade Organization. Annual Report 2001. Geneva: WTO, 2001a.

World Trade Organization. International Trade Statistics 2001. Geneva: WTO, 2001b.

The Reality of Trade: The WTO and Developing Countries 13