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THE INFORMATION GIVEN IN THIS DOCUMENT
IS NOT TO BE COMMUNICATED EITHER DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY TO ANY PERSON NOT AUTHORISED TO RECEIVE IT

NIGERIAN AIR FORCE

BASIC AIR POWER
DOCTRINE

FOURTH EDITION
2016

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CHAPTER 1

C ON T E N T S

Para P a ge

Record of Changes i

Contents ii

Foreword v

CHAPTER 1: CONCEPT OF DOCTRINE

Introduction 1.1 - 1.8 1

Basic Tenets of NAF Doctrine 1.9 4

Types and Levels of Doctrine 1.10 - 1.14 4

Doctrinal Development 1.15 – 1.16 7

CHAPTER 2: NATIONAL DEFENCE

Introduction 2.1-2.2 11

National Interests 2.3 11

Instrument of National Power 2.4 12

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Defence Policy 2.5 13

Defence Contribution 2.6-2.7 14

The Role of Nigerian Armed Forces 2.8 15

The Role of Nigerian Air Force 2.9 15

Civil Military Relations 2.10 – 2.11 15

Fundamental Principles of Civil Military Relations 2.12 16

Media/Public Relations 2.13 17

CHAPTER 3: NATURE OF CONFLICTS

Definitions 3.1 18

Spectrum of Conflicts and Military Involvement 3.2 – 3.3 19

Types of Conflicts 3.4 – 3.10 20

Important Notes on Conflicts 3.11 – 3.16 21

The Nature of War 3.17 – 3.20 24

Levels of Warfare 3.21 - 3.25 25

Principles of War 3.26 - 3.36 27

Styles of Warfare 3.37 – 3.40 31

Peace Support Operations 3.41 – 3.48 33

Chapter 4: AIR POWER

Definitions 4.1 35

Characteristics of Air Power 4.2 - 4.6 35

Air Power and the Principles of War 4.7 - 4.8 40

Air Power and the Manoeuvrist Approach 4.9 41

The Applications of Air Power 4.10 - 4.13 41

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Air Power Education in the NAF 4.14 – 4.15 46

CHAPTER 5: ROLES OF AIR POWER

Introduction 5.1 - 5.2 48

Role 1: Control of the Air 5.3 – 5.5 48

Role 2: Strike 5.6 - 5.9 51

Anti Surface Force Air Operations 5.10 - 5.12 52

Air Operations for Strategic Effects 5.13 – 5.15 56

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences 5.16 57

Electronic Warfare 5.17 – 5.19 58

Information Operations 5.20 – 5.23 59

Role 3: Air Mobility 5.24 – 5.26 61

Air Transport Operations 5.27 – 5.29 61

Air-to-Air Re-fuelling 5.30 63

Airborne Operations 5.31 63

Role 4: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 5.32 – 5.38 64

Enabling Role 1: Force Protection 5.39 – 5.44 66

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Enabling Role 2: Sustainability 5.45 – 5.47 70

The Role of Air Power in Hybrid and Irregular Warfare 5.48 - 5.49 72

Air Power Strengths and Weaknesses in Irregular Warfare 5.50 – 5.51 72

CHAPTER 6: AIR POWER COMMAND AND CONTROL

Definitions 6.1 - 6.5 75

Supporting Relationship 6.6 – 6.12 77

Air Power and Mission Command 6.13 79

Command and Control Organisation 6.14 - 6.18 79

Responsibilities of JFACC 6.19 – 6.23 83

Basic Characteristics and Principles of Air Control 6.24 – 6.25 85

Airspace Control 6.26 – 6.28 87

CHAPTER 7: FUNDAMENTALS OF SPACE POWER

Introduction 7.1 – 7.2 90

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Features of Space Medium 7.3 – 7.4 91

Characteristics of Space Power 7.5 – 7.8 92

Tenets of Employing Space Forces 7.9 – 7.13 94

CHAPTER 8: GLOSSARY/ABBREVIATIONS

Air Power Definitions and Terms 8.1 – 8.100 97

Abbreviations and Acronyms 108

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CONCEPT OF DOCTRINE

“At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the

central beliefs for waging war in other to achieve victory.
Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and knowledge
reinforced by experience, which lays the pattern for the
utilisation of men, equipment and tactics. It is the building
material for strategy and is fundamental to sound judgement”
..........General Curtis Lemay

INTRODUCTION
[[

1.1 The Oxford English Dictionary defines doctrine as a belief or set of

beliefs held and taught by a church, political party, or other groups. It is a
stated principle of government policy, mainly in foreign or military affairs.
In some organisations, it is simply defined as "that which is taught", in
other words the basis for institutional teaching of its personnel’s internal
ways of doing business. Since our business in the military is war, military
doctrine can be said to be advanced teaching of the fundamental beliefs
on the subject of war, its nature and theory, to its preparation and conduct.
In its simplest form, military doctrine can be defined as the “fundamental
principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their
actions in support of national objectives”

1.2 Accordingly, military doctrine must do more than merely record what
happened in the past. It must reflect a vision of a future in order to shape
the manner in which we organise, train, equip and sustain forces. It
prepares us for future uncertainties, and combined with our basic shared
core values, provides a common set of understanding upon which those
who practice the art of war base their decisions. Our doctrine does not
consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations but establishes
general guidance that requires judgement in application. Therefore, while
authoritative, doctrine is not prescriptive.

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1.3 Air power doctrine, likewise, espouses the beliefs and principles,
which adequately describe and guide the proper use of air power in
military action. It offers a conceptual framework for the best way to
prepare and employ air assets including its organisation, training,
equipment and logistics.

1.4. Air power doctrine development is a process derived from

accumulation of knowledge, which is gained primarily from the study, and
analysis of experiences. It is also influenced by advancement in
technology. The development of air power doctrine can be divided into 5
phases; the First World War, the inter-war years, the Second World War,
the Cold War and the current doctrine. As such, doctrine reflects what
has usually worked best. These experiences may include actual combat
operations as well as tests, exercises or manoeuvres. In those less
frequent instances where experience is lacking or difficult to acquire
(theatre nuclear operations), doctrine may be developed through analysis
or postulated actions. It enables commanders at all levels to work in
synergy for the attainment of the overall objective along a suggested
course of action. A lot of air power doctrinal guidelines may sound and
actually be prescriptive but are nevertheless, not mandatory. Doctrine
should never be static; doctrine which is rigidly interpreted runs the risk of
becoming dogmatic. According to JFC Fuller, “Adherence to dogma has
destroyed more armies and cost more battle than anything in war”.

Fig 1.1: Air Power Doctrine Process.

1.5 It should be noted that doctrine should be relevant for the past,
present and future in the following ways:
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a. The Timeless Intellectual Component. The timeless

intellectual component implies the enduring tenets, lessons from
history and experiences embodied in the principles of war.

b. The Practical and Dynamic Component. The practical and

dynamic component takes those timeless elements, interprets and
applies them in the light of current circumstances.
c. The Predictive Component. The predictive component
takes cognisance of the current elements, the trends in operations,
technology and potential for future warfare in order to apply them to
force development. The absence of a particular capability from our
air force does not invalidate the doctrinal relevance of that role; it
simply means that we could fit in when the capability is inducted.

Fig 1.2: Components of Air Power Doctrine.

1.6 An awareness of doctrine is important in this respect, particularly

under the stress of combat. It enables a subordinate to act in accordance
with his commander’s recommended course of action and support the
larger scheme of operations even when he is unable to communicate with
his superiors.
1.7 Because of the complexity of modern warfare, there is a significant
degree of interdependence between the Services. Combat operations in
any one environment; air, land or sea may facilitate and provide direct
support to operations in the other environments. While major operations
may be invariably joint or combined, the contribution of the single Service
is the foundation on which those operations will depend. The development
of specialist single Service way of fighting through an appropriate doctrine
remains a pre-requisite to the conduct of joint operations in the Nigerian
Armed Forces.
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1.8 An understanding of the relationship of basic doctrine to defence

strategy and the force structuring process is crucial. The key distinction is
that, while doctrine should be a factor in the development of the national
defence strategy and therefore, the force structure, it need not necessarily
be an overriding determinant. This therefore leads to the initial point
regarding doctrine. Defence strategy can and do change and different
countries have different strategies. Only by possessing a deep knowledge
of the full range of capabilities their particular form of combat power can
generate, can military professionals properly advice senior commanders
and government. The key to that knowledge is strategic doctrine.

BASIC TENETS OF NAF DOCTRINE

1.9 The basis of NAF doctrine is rooted in its history. NAF primary
mission is the defence of the Nation by air. NAF air power is therefore
designed to ensure the protection of Nigeria’s territorial integrity, vital
economic and other critical interests. The evolution and formulation of
doctrinal guideline for the employment of NAF assets are based on NAF
experiences of the Civil War, ECOMOG operations and other joint military
exercises/operations such as EX SEA DOG, TAKUTE EKPE, OLOGUN
META, PULO SHIELD, LAFIYA DOLE as well as other counter insurgency
and counter terrorism operations. In addition, it drew lessons from military
history. From these collective experiences, the NAF doctrine is predicated
on 3 fundamental beliefs which are:
a. The NAF can best be developed and employed in accordance
with the principle of Unity of Command, Centralisation of Control and
Decentralisation of Execution.
b. The best employment of the NAF is in the offensive.
c. Air superiority is essential to the successful conduct of combat
operations.

TYPES AND LEVELS OF DOCTRINE

1.10 The Nigerian Air Force recognises 3 types of doctrine:

a. Service Doctrine. – Service Doctrine describes Service
competencies and guides the application of Service air power
resources.
b. Joint Doctrine. Joint Doctrine describes the best way to
integrate and employ air resources with surface forces in military
actions.

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c. Multinational Doctrine. Multinational Doctrine – describes the

best way to integrate and employ our air force with the forces of our
allies in combined operations.

Fig 1.3: The Structure of Military Doctrine

The Service doctrines cover the full spectrum of conflict and place the
utility of air power at 3 different levels and depth of details. These are;
strategic, operational and tactical doctrine.

1.11 Strategic Doctrine. Doctrine at the strategic level of war

establishes the basic framework and foundation for the employment of a
nation’s military strength in pursuit of national objectives. Strategic air
power doctrine is the fundamental philosophy for the employment of air
power and it emanates from the highest level of the Service in accordance
with the national defence policy. Therefore, the NAF strategic doctrine is
adopted as its Basic Air Power Doctrine (BAPD). In general, the NAF
BAPD contains:
a. The fundamental beliefs of the NAF.
b. A set of endorsed principles for the guidance of the NAF
commanders contemplating the use of air power or directing the
employment of air assets in operations.
c. The basis for joint and multinational doctrines.
d. The basis for operational and tactical level air power doctrines.
There are 2 significant characteristics of basic doctrine. The first is the
almost timeless nature of basic doctrine. It seldom changes because it
deals with basic concepts rather than contemporary techniques. The
second characteristic, which is really the basis of the first, is that basic
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doctrine is relatively insensitive to political philosophy or technological

change.
1.12 Operational Doctrine. Operational doctrine applies the principles
of basic doctrine to military actions by describing the use of forces in the
context of force capabilities, mission types and operational environments.
Operational doctrine describes the organisation necessary for the effective
use of assets. It also anticipates the changes and influences that might
affect future operations. Advances in technology might be one of those
influences. It provides the focus for developing the missions and tasks that
must be executed through tactical doctrine. It is expressed through
organisational arrangement and campaign planning.

1.13 Tactical Doctrine. Tactical doctrine applies strategic and

operational doctrines to military actions by describing the proper use of
specific weapons system and other types of system to achieve detailed
objectives. Tactical doctrine deals with the execution of roles and tasks
and can be found in the units’ Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).

Fig 1.4: Levels of Doctrine

1.14. Interrelationship of the 3 Levels of Air Power Doctrine. The 3

levels of air power doctrine are neither mutually exclusive nor rigidly
limited to precise boundaries. The following example helps to illustrate
their interrelationship:

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Table 1.1: Interrelationship of Doctrine

DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT

1.15 The Doctrinal Loop. A doctrine is formulated on the basis of

inputs. The output would then provide the framework within which viable
military capability can be developed. These capabilities would require
validation through peace-time exercises or war experiences so that the
feedback could be employed to further refine the doctrine. The doctrinal
loop is pictorially depicted below.

Fig 1.5: The Doctrine Loop

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1.16 Factors Affecting Doctrinal Development. There are a

number of factors that influence development of doctrine. While some
derive from higher national policy, others derive from feedback gotten in
the process of operationalizing doctrine. These factors, depending on their
interaction with doctrine, could either be input factors or output factors.
The input factors are; National interest and national military objective,
perceived threat, politics/policies and experience. Others are theory and
lessons of war, current combat and training results. Output factors include;
education, organisation, force structure, training requirements and plans.
These factors are discussed below.

a. The National Interest and National Military Objective. The

military is an instrument of state power. The use of the military will
therefore be guided by the national interests and military objectives.
The resources available for defence and the national strategic aim in
event of conflict will also influence such objectives.
b. The Perceived Threat. Operational doctrine depends on
a clear and concise assessment of the threat posed by a potential
adversary. However, threat is dynamic and a change in the intent
and or capability of the adversary could negate the relevance of
doctrine and could well demand a rapid reassessment and change
in the doctrine.
c. Politics/Policies. The wishes of the Government are
paramount in a democratic setting where the Armed Forces are
subject to civil control. Changes to political structures, security
policies, foreign policies and defence policy of a government will
have an influence on doctrine.
d. Experience. As illustrated previously, the lessons from
history are fundamental ingredients in the formulation of doctrine.
e. Theory and Lessons of War. The writings of strategists and
theorists continue to influence doctrine. For example, study of the
writings of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini remain useful in any
study of conflict. Specifically, with regard to air power, the writings of
Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell and Warden explain the historical
formulation of air power doctrine. This does not mean that one
theory fits all scenarios. History shows that every conflict will be
different and hence offers different lessons for the future.
f. Current Combat. Lessons learnt from actual combat are
important for doctrine development. However, forces do not
necessarily have to be in combat for important lessons to be
obtained. Analysis of the outcomes from combat involving other

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countries who employ equipment and doctrine similar to one’s own

could produce important lessons. Obviously, lessons drawn from
combat in which one’s own forces are involved may be more
relevant, but may be learned at a greater cost.
g. Training Results. The results of training exercises can be
used to validate and refine doctrine at all levels. There should
always be lessons learnt from training; whether in the classroom or
during field exercises, that would form an input for formulation of
future doctrine.

h. Education. Study of previous conflicts and the utilisation of

air power produce better commanders in conflict and war. All
persons involved with the command, planning and execution of air
operations should continue this personal preparation. Once doctrine
has been formulated, it will have a continuous effect and impact on
the routine operations of all forces.

i. Organisation. Nigerian Air Force organisation must be a

clear reflection of national military objectives and how those
objectives will be achieved.
j. Force Structure. Force structure is best defined as the
mix of people, weapons, associated systems and equipment
allocated to execute given tasks. This is based on government
defence policy, capability analysis, capability options, acquisition
options and national resource capacity.
k. Training Requirements. Training must be an accurate
reflection of doctrine. Training requirements should therefore derive
directly from doctrine.

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Fig. 1.6: Basic Trainer Aircraft – L 39 ZA.

l. Plans. Plans are the most specific output of doctrine.

Doctrine informs and influences strategy hence plans should reflect
current doctrine. However, plans may have to change in response to
the dynamism of context and scenario. At the core of the doctrinal
system is the formation of strategy. To ensure that all elements of
the process are focused on formulating realistic and coherent
strategy, there should be a validation system through feedback.
Accordingly, feedback from changed plans is necessary for doctrine
development.

Key elements in the formulation of strategy might include; The need to

maintain a medium to long term objective, the requirement for all functions
of an organisation to work together harmoniously towards the same
objective or end–state, a unified command system which integrates the
decision – making machinery in a comprehensive structure and ensuring
unity of purpose and effort. Others are the need to retain a balance
between planning and flexibility to respond to events and the vision to
remain ready to exploit opportunities for action whilst ensuring that long
term objectives are not prejudiced. Overall doctrine should remain flexible
and adaptable to meet the ever changing demands of conflict in all its
guises. In a changing environment, we need to be ready to respond all-
round the spectrum of conflict and, when necessary, change our doctrine
to meet the demands of a new strategic environment.

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CHAPTER 2

NATIONAL DEFENCE
INTRODUCTION

2.1 Nigeria’s position in the world is determined by our interests as a

nation and our role as a leading player in African affairs. Thus, the
principal aim of Nigeria’s security policy is to maintain peace and
safeguard our country’s freedom and independence. Also, being a leading
member of the AU and ECOWAS, we have a fundamental interest in the
security and stability of the region as a whole and the West African sub-
region in particular.
2.2 Our economy, though predicated on oil and gas, attracts a sizeable
percentage of all Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) into Africa. This shows a
depth of foreign economic penetration into our economy, and suggests
that we could be easily affected by changes in the global financial system
and other external influences. The global economic meltdown
of 2008/2009 and the significant crash in crude oil prices from 2014 are
examples of these influences. Our national security and prosperity
therefore depend on promoting international stability, freedom and
economic development. These elements are most effective when
coordinated as part of a cohesive national strategy to influence the will of
other states or group of people in pursuance of own national interests.

NATIONAL INTERESTS

2.3 Nigeria’s national interests are derived from the shared values, goals
and aspirations of her citizenry. These goals and values could be broadly
described as territorial, political, economic, scientific and socio-cultural.
Specifically, they include; national survival, maintenance of sovereign
independence and indivisibility of the Nigerian State. Others are territorial
integrity, survival of our democracy, protection of vital economic
installations, welfare and dignity of the populace. Prevention of civil unrest,
technological development and maintenance of regional peace are also
some of our national interests. The protection of these interests is not
always a military prerogative, but requires the combined efforts of the
whole nation. The nation’s interests have been categorised into vital,
strategic and peripheral:
a. Vital Interests. The vital interests of the Nation concerns the
inviolability of her territory, the guarantee of her sovereignty,
protection of democracy, economic resources and citizens wherever
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they may be as well as preservation of her culture. This is a priority

task for the Nigerian Armed Forces and would not be compromised.
The nation’s territorial interests are based principally on the need to
be in full control of the land, airspace and maritime environment that
legally belong to her, including all the resources lying within her
geographical boundaries. The protection of the vital interests would
ensure stable democratic institutions, where sovereign decisions
could be taken to improve the social well being of people.
b. Strategic Interests. Nigeria’s strategic interests refer to
those interests that are important to her but are less than vital
interests. They are in keeping with the desire to conduct economic,
political and diplomatic relations with other nations in consonance
with national goals. Regional security, by way of combating terrorism
and other transnational crimes also fall into this category. The
defence of these interests would contribute to or enhance the
protection of Nigeria’s vital interests. The nation will resort to
diplomatic means to ensure that this is achieved. However, if
essential trade or maritime routes are in jeopardy, the use of force
could become necessary.
c. Peripheral Interests. Peripheral interests relate to Nigeria’s
obligation to the international community as a member of the comity
of nations. In keeping with the demands of these peripheral
interests, Nigeria shall participate in support of international peace
and security under the auspices of the UN, AU and ECOWAS.
The Nation uses all instruments of power available to her to protect these
interests.

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

2.4 At the strategic level, governments exercise power to achieve their

policy goals. This is done through the ‘instruments of national power’.
Military planners and commanders need to know these instruments and
understand their positive and negative interactions. In this regard, the
instruments of national power include:
a. Diplomacy. For centuries, diplomacy has been
fundamental to the pursuance of policy. It is usually the first
instrument applied to resolve problems before recourse to other
instruments. However, the graduated use of economic or military
power often supports diplomatic negotiations. Diplomacy is often
relevant in times of war, for example when negotiating a settlement
through a third party.

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b. Economy. Trade, investment and aid are ways in which the

economic instrument can be used to positively enhance national
influence. Military capability may be required to deliver aid as well as
enforce economic sanctions.

c. Military. Military power is always subordinate to political

ends. It is often the instrument of last resort. It also has uses in
conflict prevention through defence diplomacy. However, this would
only be viable if force levels are potent and military professionals are
credible.

d. Information. Information is recognised as an instrument of

power not mainly on its own, but as part of the aforementioned
instruments of power. However, it is particularly important in coalition
operations that a coherent standpoint is presented, not only to the
adversary, but also to coalition partners and neutral parties.

DEFENCE POLICY

2.5 The overall objective of national defence is the protection of

Nigeria’s interests under the ambit of the Constitution. However, economic
realities and overall military capabilities determine the extent to which the
nation’s strategic interests may be defended. The degree of protection that
can be provided is therefore determined by our foreign policy objectives.
To this end, Nigeria’s Defence Policy objectives shall proceed as follows:
a. Protection of Nigeria’s sovereignty, citizens, values, culture,
interests, resources and territory against external threats.
b. Provision of defence as well as strategic advice and
information to government.
c. Promotion of security consciousness among Nigerians.
d. Responses to requests for aid to civil authority.
e. Participation in disaster management and humanitarian relief
operations both at home and abroad.
f. Assistance to government agencies and levels of government
in achieving national goals.
g. Protection of Nigerians wherever they may reside.
h. Ensuring security and stability in the West African sub-region
through collective security.
i. Participation in bi-lateral and multi-lateral operations.
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j. Contribution to international peace and security.

DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION

2.6 For the Armed Forces to make effective contribution to Nigeria’s

defence objectives, they must be sufficiently robust and flexible, not only
to cope with tasks from current priorities, but also to cope when
circumstances and priorities change. The military tasks which define the
activities that the Armed Forces are required to undertake to give effect to
the Government’s security and defence policy could be summarised as
follows:
a. Providing advice and information to government on global
developments in defence.
b. Protecting the sovereignty of Nigeria through surveillance and
control of Nigeria’s land and maritime territory as well as airspace.
c. Protecting Nigeria’s onshore and offshore strategic assets.
d. Participating in national SAR activities.
e. Providing Military Aid to Civil Power (MACP) and Military Aid to
Civil Authorities (MACA).
f. Embarking on non-combatant evacuation of Nigerians in crisis
ridden countries in collaboration with Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA).
g. Initiating bilateral and multi-lateral contacts and exchange with
selected countries.
h. Participating in multi-national operations to stabilize any state
or group of states in the West African sub region.
i. Participating in peace missions sponsored by the AU and the
UN.
j. Attaining the capabilities to carry out other functions as may be
prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

2.7 Forces and capabilities are identified to carry out tasks which then
provide the explicit link between policy, goals and the forces required to
achieve them.

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THE ROLE OF NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES

2.8 The principal components of defence are the Nigerian Armed

Forces. The Nigerian Armed Forces provide the Government with the
military option required to implement its national policy and to attain
national security objectives, which cannot be achieved by other means.
Although, military operations do not always require the use of force,
military forces must be capable of achieving success across a wide
spectrum of conflicts or crises. To accomplish national military objectives,
military forces train to fight as an interdependent team of land, sea and air
forces. The function of command integrates and employs these forces in a
joint effort to accomplish command objectives.

THE ROLE OF NIGERIAN AIR FORCE

2.9 The primary responsibility of the NAF is the defence of the Nation
and the protection of vital national economic interests by air. The NAF
shall be employed either singly or jointly with other Services in regional or
sub-regional operations. Such employment shall be enhanced for force
projection within the region. As a critical element of the interdependent
land, naval and air force synergy, air power is a decisive force in warfare.
Therefore, in the event of hostilities, the NAF shall deny control of the air
to adversary air force and provide own land and naval forces the
assistance necessary to control their environment. The primary mission of
the NAF is the attainment of air superiority. Therefore, the NAF shall be
equipped and modernized for this mission. In addition, it shall be equipped
to provide effective support for surface forces in all phases of conflict
including asymmetric warfare.

CIVIL – MILITARY RELATIONS

2.10 Civil-Military relations refer to the hierarchy of authority between the

Executive, the National Assembly and the Armed Forces, as well as to the
principle of civil supremacy over the forces. Cordial civil-military relations
shall be premised on the doctrine of civil control over the military or the
principle of subordination of the military to civil authority. The doctrine of
civil control of the military shall therefore be predicated on constitutional
provisions and rule of law.

2.11 A proper understanding of civil-military relations also implies the

recognition of the special place of the military institution in the polity. The
military is the only institution in the society, which is constitutionally and
directly charged with the defence of the State from external aggression
and the maintenance of her territorial integrity. This sacred duty, however,
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places enormous powers and responsibility on the military. For effective

role performance by the military, it is essential that both the military and
civil society understand their proper roles in a democratic society. This
understanding will include well defined areas of cooperation between the
military and the civil society.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS

2.12 The fundamental principles underpinning civil military relations in

Nigeria include the following:
a. Supremacy of the Constitution. In Nigeria, civil-military
relationship shall be predicated on the supremacy of the
Constitution. In particular, Section 1, sub-section (2) of the 1999
Constitution shall be upheld. This section which states that “the
Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any
person or group of persons take control of the Government of
Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the Provisions
of the Constitution” shall be the bedrock of civil-military relations.
b. The Democratic Imperative. It is widely accepted that
society is better served under democratic governance. Therefore,
everyone and every institution in the State shall unconditionally
accept and adhere to the principle of democracy. Consequently, the
role of the military in a democracy shall not only be to defend the
government of the day, but to defend democracy itself.
c. Civil Control of the Military. As a corollary to the
democratic imperative, there shall be strict adherence to the
classical doctrine of civil control of the military. The President and
C-in-C of the Armed Forces is constitutionally empowered to
authorise the use of the military, subject to the laws enacted by the
NASS. However, he can delegate some of his powers to the HMOD
at his discretion.
d. Military Professionalism. The military is a highly
specialised profession. Thus, by their training, members of the
Armed Forces acquire expertise in the art of warfare and related
military matters. Therefore, the society has a duty to ensure that the
military is given necessary support to enable it discharge its
functions at all times. Additionally, members of the Armed Forces
shall uphold the provisions of the Constitution.

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MEDIA/PUBLIC RELATIONS

2.13 Modern technology and the proliferation of media channels make

commanders unable to exercise significant control over the content of
broadcast materials and programmes. By bringing the war to every
household, the media exercise a powerful influence on public opinion. As
a result, tactical actions can have strategic impact. Therefore, the effect of
the media on public opinion is an issue military and political leaders will
have to assess very carefully before commencing future actions. After all,
the sympathy and understanding of Nigerians, allies and friendly states is
indispensible for international diplomatic and financial support. The roles
of media during ECOMOG operations as well as counter insurgency
operations in the North East are good examples.

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CHAPTER 3

NATURE OF CONFLICT AND WARFARE

3.1 A nation, state or definable group could be in a condition of peace or

in conflict (including war) at any time. To be clear on the defence
requirement for any of these, an understanding of the nature of conflict is
necessary, starting with a distinction between peace, conflict and war.

DEFINITIONS

a. Peace. Peace is a condition that exists in relations

between groups, classes or states when there is the absence of
violence (direct or indirect) or the threat of violence.

b. Conflict. Conflict, on the other hand is a situation in which

violence is either manifested or peace is threatened. It is a struggle
or clash between contending parties set to impose their will.
Although conflict can take many forms, it is broadly in 2 main
categories:

(1) Interest Based Conflict. A conflict arising from

disputes over trade or resources are interest based; for
example a dispute related to territory. Such conflicts are
usually amenable to resolution around a negotiating table with
the military acting in support. The Bakassi crisis is an example.

(2) Value Based Conflict. A conflict arising, for example,

from a dispute related to religious or ethnic antipathy can be
considered value based. Such conflicts tend to be deep-rooted
and hence generally less amenable to conciliation. Diplomatic
or political attempts at reconciliation are quickly exhausted;
one or both parties are then likely to resort to the use of force.
The Boko Haram insurgency is an example.

c. War. War can be described as the extreme form of armed

conflict; occurring between countries or between different groups in
a country.

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SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

3.2 Conflicts take a wide range of forms, constituting a spectrum which

reflects the magnitude of violence involved. The intensity of fighting is
another means by which conflict can be described. However, description
denoting the level of military deployment can be misleading. Thus, a
useful guide is to assess intensity by the rate of consumption of men and
materiel. In this way, the measure of intensity can be related to the battle
or campaign, as opposed to the other yardsticks, which may lead to false
deduction about the type of campaign being fought.

3.3 The extent of military involvement will depend on which condition

exists at the time and the level of support necessary. For example, in
conditions of peace; the military may be needed for disaster relief during
absolute peace and peace support operations during fragile peace.
Similarly, the military could be used for conflict resolution in conditions of
minor conflict and combat operations in conditions of extreme/armed
conflict. Fig 3.1 shows the spectrum of conflict and levels of military
involvement.

Fig. 3.1: Spectrum of Conflict and Levels of Military Involvement

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A broader view of conflict, war and military operations other than war will
make for better understanding of Air Power application during these
conflicts.

TYPES OF CONFLICTS

3.4 Conflict defies simple categorization. Dividing lines are often blurred,
categories are not exclusive and individual conflicts may spread across
boundaries. Thus, each crisis or conflict needs to be addressed in terms of
its specific circumstances. Conflicts range from general wars to limited
conflicts, regional conflicts, civil war, insurgency and terrorism.

3.5 General War. General war is conflict between major powers in

which their vital interests, perhaps even survival, are at stake. All the
resources of the opposing nations are likely to be harnessed to the war
effort and the conflict is likely to have few restrictions; indeed it may
become less restricted as it continues. General war might be limited to the
use of conventional forces initially, but could escalate at any time to the
use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In the current strategic
environment, few nations have the capacity to initiate such a war and it
seems likely that there could be a significant period of warning before one
could occur. The last general war was World War II.

3.6 Limited Conflict. During the Cold War, the classification

“limited war” was used to describe international conflict short of general
war in which there would be no recourse to the use of nuclear weapons. In
practice, virtually all conflicts are limited in some way and armed forces
will almost invariably be subject to constraints, the objectives to be
achieved, and the means by which they may be pursued. An example is
the Gulf War of 1990-1991.

3.7 Regional Conflict. The term regional conflict describes a limited

conflict arising out of regional issues. The conflict may be contained within
the region, but the political and economic effects could go beyond the
region. There could be involvement from non-belligerents supplying
military equipment, advisers or volunteers. There might be military
intervention under the authority of a United Nations’ (UN) or regional
organisations’ mandates to resolve or terminate the conflict. There will not
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necessarily be any constraints on the size of the forces deployed, the

types of weapons used, or the duration and ferocity of fighting. The
Liberian, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
Iran-Iraq wars are good examples of regional wars with dire
consequences for the entire regions. ECOMOG, a sub-regional military
intervention force intervened under the auspices of an ECOWAS mandate
in West Africa.

3.8 Civil War. Civil war is conducted largely within the boundaries of
a state in which a significant part of the population is associated with
opposing sides. Typically, the outcome would be to determine the
government of a state, regional autonomy or secession. One or both sides
may have external help. Civil War experiences of Nigeria, Angola and that
of Sudan are good examples.

3.9 Insurgency. Insurgency describes the actions of a minority

group within a state (or in some instances a majority group which lacks
power) intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of
subversion, propaganda and military pressure. The intent is to persuade
or intimidate a large percentage of the populace to accept such change.
Again, each side may have help from outside. There is no clear distinction
between civil war and insurgency. Indeed a civil war may pass through a
phase of insurgency. Insurgent forces tend to avoid conventional
engagement between larger forces while seeking the active support of the
population at large. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka is a typical example.

3.10 Terrorism. Terrorism may be defined as premeditated, motivated

violence perpetrated by groups or individuals and usually intended to
influence an audience wider than that of its immediate victims. In one
form, terrorism may be an element of insurgency. In another, it may be
employed for objectives short of the overthrow of the state. It may also be
used by one state against another. Examples include the El Shabab,
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Boko Haram Terrorist
activities in Somalia and Kenya, Iraq and Syria and Nigeria respectively.

IMPORTANT NOTES ON CONFLICTS

3.11 Having considered the types of conflicts, it is pertinent to take a

cursory look at other factors that shape the nature of conflicts. These
factors are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
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3.12 Dynamism of the Conflict Environment. The end of the Cold

War has loosened the constraints on conflicts based on ethnic and
ideological rivalries. Also, political freedom, economic pressures and the
proliferation of weapons have heightened local tensions, increased the
destructive potential of minor conflicts, and thus placed greater
responsibility on the international community to pre-empt, contain, police,
or deter hostilities. A feature of modern conflict is the increasingly stark
asymmetry between the opponents, and the intra-state nature, although
spill over potential remains high. They are increasingly non-conventional
and they are fought more often in developing countries. The drivers of
these wars include; conflicts over scarce resources, ethnic and religious
misunderstandings, border disputes and state collapse. Despite the
economic backwardness of some of these countries, the ORBAT involved
in these conflicts have become dynamic and random, hence, difficult to
predict. These groups are usually armed and equipped with an inventory
encompassing wide range of military capability as well as non-
conventional weapons. Their primary targets are people and civil
infrastructure, as well as military systems or platforms. As a deliberate
tactic; the distinction between civilian and combatants is made blurred.
They engage not in battles but in skirmishes, raids, ambushes, bombing
and massacres as in Bosnia Herzegovina, Mali, Libya and Nigeria. They
are prepared to wage a protracted war, striking suddenly, briefly and
unpredictably, compounding the difficulties of distinguishing friend from
foe.

3.13 Conflict and the Media. Modern conflict is now being fought in
the spotlight of the news media. The speed of media transmission can
magnify the importance of relatively minor incidents and influence public
opinion before political or military authorities can fully analyse the facts. As
a result, tactical action can have strategic impact. This trend has placed
additional pressure on political and military leaders and can influence the
overall conduct of a campaign. On the other hand, the media can also be
a powerful conduit for positive information to sustain public support and
boost national morale. An example is the media coverage of the Gulf War
of 1990-1991.

3.14 Law of Armed Conflict. The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is

the body of laws that regulates both the legal and customary justifications
for utilising force and the conduct of armed hostilities. It specifically applies
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to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict involving all
signatories including Nigeria. The principles and spirit of the LOAC apply
to all other military operations. Therefore, NAF personnel must be
particularly aware of the status of any conflict and the characterisation of
adversarial combatants and non-combatants.

3.15 Future Conflict Environment. The dynamism of the conflict

environment necessitates continuous projections about how the future
conflict environment will look like. Recent happenings in the world have
therefore engineered a focus on hybrid wars as well as cyber/space
conflicts.

a. Hybrid War. The term “hybrid” reflects more than a cross-

breeding or blurring of regular and irregular tactics. It was originally
defined as involving “Any adversary that simultaneously and
adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular
tactics, catastrophic terrorism, and criminal behavior in the battle
space to obtain desired political objectives”. The crime, socially
disruptive behavior, and mass terrorism aspects of hybrid warfare
should not be overlooked, but the fusion of advanced capabilities
with the fluidity of irregular tactics is key and has played out
repeatedly over the past decade.

b. Space and Cyber. Space and cyberspace activities will

likely gain prominence in future conflict environment. Current trends
in international arena relating to increased participation of nations in
space exploration will likely engender future conflicts. For instance,
Russia’s presence in Ukraine was revealed by satellite. Also, the
Islands being built by China in the South China Sea were made
public through satellite imageries. Thus, in future wars or conflicts,
nations will attempt to dominate space and cyberspace before the
commencement of actual battles. This would be done by trying to
knock out or neutralize each other’s satellite systems akin to blinding
radar system.

3.16 Force Structure and Conflict Management. Force structures of

defence forces should exhibit rapid mobility systems like helicopters, force
protection, improved technology in information gathering, precision guided
munitions and C4I battle management systems. Also, the ability to
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operate/fight at day, night and in all weather conditions will enhance

success. Acquisition of space based assets or access to it through
another party will be vital to the exploitation of space environment.
Importantly, there would be need for adequate security of space assets.

THE NATURE OF WAR

3.17 Three enduring truths describe the fundamental nature of war.

These are not likely to change even as technology provides what is often
referred to as a “revolution in military affairs”. War’s political nature and
the physical stress and agony of combat will outlive our attempts through
technological progress and our most fervent desire to make warfare
bloodless and devoid of violence. The means may change, but the
fundamental nature and risk of warfare will remain. These truths are
described below.

3.18 War is an Instrument of National Policy. Victory in war is not

measured by casualties inflicted, battles won or lost, or territory occupied,
but by whether or not political objectives were achieved. More than any
other factor, political objectives (one’s own and those of the adversary)
shape the scope and intensity of war. Military objectives and operations
must support political objectives and must be coordinated and
orchestrated with non-military instruments of power.

3.19 War is a Complex and Chaotic Human Endeavour. Human

frailty and irrationality shape war’s nature. Uncertainty and unpredictability,
what many call the “fog of war... combine with danger, physical stress and
human fallibility to produce friction’’ a phenomenon that makes apparently
simple operations unexpectedly, and sometimes even insurmountably
difficult. Uncertainty, unpredictability and unreliability are always present.
But sound doctrine, leadership, organisation, core personal values,
technologies and training can lessen their effects.

3.20 War is a Clash of Opposing Wills. An adversary can be highly

unpredictable. War is not waged against an inanimate or static object, but
against a living calculating adversary. Victory results from creating
advantages against thinking adversaries bent on creating their own
advantages. This produces a dynamic interplay of action and reaction in
which the adversary often acts or reacts unexpectedly. While physical
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factors are crucial in war; the national will and the leadership’s will are also
critical components of war. The will to prosecute or the will to resist can be
decisive elements.

LEVELS OF WARFARE

3.21 War takes place simultaneously at 4 correlated levels, each with

differing ends, means, characteristics and requirement. These are Grand
Strategic (Govt Level), Military Strategic (MOD DHQ/Services HQ),
Operational (Div/Comd/Field HQ) and Tactical (Component/Unit Comds).

3.22 Grand Strategic. The Grand strategic level is the level at which
the elements of national power (Diplomatic, Information, Military and
Economic) are used during peace and war to secure national objectives.
There are 2 types of strategy that are applied at this level: a deterrent
strategy to keep the peace and a war strategy to impose one’s will on the
adversary should deterrence fail.

3.23 Military Strategic. The Military Strategic level involves the

application of military resources to help achieve grand strategic objectives.
The strategy employed is formulated from political direction and guidance.
The Military Strategic level is concerned with military actions, the
resources to be allocated and the constraints to be applied.

3.24 Operational Level. The Operational level is the level at which

campaigns and major operations are planned, directed, conducted and
sustained in order to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or
areas of operation. This level links the strategic and tactical levels. The
operational level includes deciding when, where and under what
conditions to engage the adversary in battle, with reference to higher
aims. Its means are tactical results, and its ends are military strategic
objectives. The operational level is the responsibility of the Joint
Commander (Jt Comd) and of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC)
once deployed to the Joint Operations Area (JOA) where the campaign
takes place.

3.25 Tactical Level. The tactical level involves the direction of military
resources to achieve operational objectives. The tactical level is the level
at which engagements are planned, forces are deployed and battles are
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fought. The objectives are unambiguous; like taking a specific hill with a
company, sinking an adversary ship and engaging in air - air combat with
an adversary aircraft. The tactical level is primarily the concern of
component commanders. In a joint operation, the highest tactical
commanders are the component commanders who work directly with the
JTFC. The component commanders are:

a. Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC).

b. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC).
c. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC).

Depending on the situation, there may also be:

d. Special Forces Component Commander (JFSFCC).

e. Logistics Component Commander (JFLogCC).

Below the component commanders are the formation and unit

commanders and other commanders whose task is to engage in direct
combat with the adversary.

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Fig 3.2: The Levels of Warfare.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

3.26 The principles of war are maxims about waging war and apply to all
levels of war. In some cases they overlap and, on first examination, may
appear contradictory. They are not absolute nor is there a standardised list
of principles between nations. Indeed, nations change their principles from
time to time. Unlike the laws of natural science where observance of
certain condition produce a predictable result; or the rules of a game, the
breach of which entails a definite fixed penalty, the Principles of War
simply represent a series of factors, that in the past, successful
commanders have found necessary to consider. Their practical value as a
guide to action will depend very much on the individual’s skills and
understanding of war. The weight accorded each particular principle
depends on the circumstance; however, to disregard a principle involves
risk and may lead to failure. Effective employment of military force
anywhere within the spectrum of conflict, is the desired outcome of
applying the Principles of War. In line with universal maxims, the NAF
Principles of War are:

a. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.

b. Offensive Action.
c. Concentration of Force.
d. Economy of Effort.
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e. Security.
f. Surprise.
g. Flexibility.
h. Maintenance of Morale.
i. Sustainability.
j. Cooperation.

3.27 Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. In the conduct of war

and all military operations, it is essential to select and define the aim with
absolute clarity before air operations begin. Once the military aim is
decided all efforts must be directed at achieving the aim unless the
situation changes and re-appreciation requires the adoption of a new or
modified aim. Every plan of action at every level for the exploitation of air
power must be tested by the extent to which it contributes to the
achievement of the military aim at the next higher level of command. This
leads ultimately to the accomplishment of the overall military aim and
hence, to the fulfilment of the political aim and the desired end-state. In
conducting the Nigerian Civil War, the Federal Government’s aim was to
“Keep Nigeria one”. It follows therefore that:

a. The military objectives which should be attainable must be

directed to achieving the political aim and the intended strategic end-
state.

b. Commanders at all levels must know exactly what they are

required to achieve and must make it quite clear to their appropriate
subordinates. They should not waste effort on courses of action
which do not (directly or indirectly) contribute to the attainment of
their aim.

c. Air tasks, roles and missions must be consistent and coherent

with the overall strategy and campaign plan. This system is known
as strategy-to-tasks.

3.28 Offensive Action. Offensive action is the chief means open to a

commander to influence the outcome of a campaign or operation. Air
power remains geared to undertake offensive operations. It would be
virtually impossible to achieve a military aim without going on the
offensive. Although defensive action maybe inevitable, success eventually
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depends on the offensive use of available forces. Offensive air action

embodies a state of mind that brings the determination to gain and
maintain the initiative and withhold it from the adversary.

3.29 Concentration of Force. To achieve success in war, it is

essential to concentrate superior force against the adversary at a decisive
time and place. This is another enduring quality of air power.
Concentration does not mean that forces must be massed in one place,
but rather that they should be deployed in such a way that an adversary
threat could be countered or a decisive blow could be delivered.
Concentration of sufficient forces to achieve the decisive or most
important task at the time is the cardinal principle in the employment of air
power in war and conflict. This principle may entail the employment of all
available forces.

3.30 Economy of Effort. The corollary to concentration of force is

economy of effort. It is impossible to be strong everywhere and if decisive
strength is to be concentrated at the most critical time and place, there
must be no wasteful expenditure of effort where it cannot have a
significant impact on the issues at hand. Economy of effort implies that the
correct air power weapon systems need to be matched to the task in what
is termed ‘matching strategy-to-task’. It also implies that forces allocated
to task need to be carefully balanced.

3.31 Security. A degree of security by physical protection and

information denial is essential to all operations. Security should enable
friendly forces to achieve their objective despite the adversary’s
interference. Thus, air base defence is an integral part of air power
deployments. Critical to security is the understanding that air power is no
longer just aircraft, missiles, etc but information warfare tools as well. For
example, a country which is able to secure accurate information on
activities of a potential adversary could act appropriately as at when the
adversary’s attack is imminent. Information has therefore, become even
more central to the outcome of conflicts.

3.32 Surprise. The attainment of surprise can achieve result out of

proportion to the effort expended. In air operations, when other factors are
unfavourable to friendly forces, surprise might be essential to achieve
mission success. Air power can achieve surprise strategically,
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operationally, tactically or by exploiting new technologies, material or

techniques. The elements of surprise are secrecy, concealment,
deception, originality, audacity and speed. All these apply to the
exploitation of air power at all levels of military activity.

3.33 Flexibility. Flexibility is one of the prime advantages of air

power. Although the aim might not alter, a commander might be required
to exercise flexibility by modifying plans to meet changing circumstances,
take advantage of fleeting opportunities or shift the main effort of the joint
campaign or air operations. Flexibility demands trust, good training,
organisation, discipline, staff work and rapid decision-making when time is
of the essence. To be flexible requires sustainability and a degree of
mobility, which ensures that deployment can take place both rapidly and
economically so that the weight of effort can be altered as required.

3.34 Maintenance of Morale. Success in all forms of war depends

more on morale than on material conditions. Morale is a mental state but
is very sensitive to material conditions. It is based on a clear
understanding of the aim, on training and on discipline and is immediately
responsive to effective leadership. It is adversely affected by inferior or
inefficient equipment and depends to a large degree on sound
administration. Outstanding leadership, closely followed by success in
battle are the main factors that will sustain high morale when all other
factors are against it.

3.35 Sustainability. Sustainability encompasses all aspects of the

physical, moral and spiritual maintenance of a force. Sustainability is more
than logistics; it encompasses all equipment, personnel and industrial
support. As a Principle of War, sustainability involves force generation,
deployment, operations, recovery to home base, recuperation and
training. Sustainability is also the ability of a force to maintain the
necessary fighting power, in this case combat air power, for the time
needed to achieve military objectives. The physical and moral sustenance
of personnel, the maintenance and repair of equipment and aircraft, the
provision of combat supplies and expendable commodities and the
treatment, evacuation and replacement of casualties are all aspects of
sustainability. Disregarding any aspect of sustainability could diminish
combat power and hence jeopardise mission success.

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3.36 Cooperation. Cooperation entails the coordination of all activities

to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole. It is the means
by which concentration of force and economy of effort can be achieved.
Joint action is best achieved by the goodwill and desire to operate at all
levels not only within any one Service but also among national Services
and allied forces. Only by full cooperation among services can the right
balance of forces be achieved and plans effectively implemented.

STYLES OF WARFARE

3.37 Various aspects of war, particularly its technical aspect, fall within
the realms of science, which could be described as the methodical
application of the empirical laws of nature. For instance, the application of
fire, the effects of weapons, the rates and methods of movement and re-
supply are all examples of the application of science in war. However,
owing to the vagaries of human behaviour, there is far more to the conduct
of war than can be explained by science. The science of war stops short
of the need for military judgement, the impact of moral force, the influence
of chances, and other similar factors. Thus, the conduct of war is also an
art, an activity of human creativity and intuitions powered on by the
strength of a human will. There are 2 distinct styles of warfare recognised
by the NAF; attrition and manoeuvre. Military requirement in the
application of the styles differ significantly.

3.38 Attrition Warfare. Attrition warfare seeks victory through the

cumulative destruction of the adversary’s human and material assets by
superior firepower and technology. The attritionist gauges progress in
quantitative term; battle damage assessment, body count etc. He seeks
battle under any condition, pitting strength against strength to exert the
greatest toll on his adversary. Results are generally proportional to efforts;
greater expenditure yields greater results ie greater success demands the
willingness and ability to withstand attrition. Numerical superiority is
necessary for success, thus warfare by attrition is costly.

3.39 Manoeuvre Warfare. Warfare by manoeuvre stems from a desire

to circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage. The
objective is not really to destroy physically, but to shatter the adversary’s
cohesion, organisation, command and control, and psychological balance.
Successful manoeuvre depends on the ability to identify and exploit
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adversary weaknesses. It involves concentrating force or the threat of

force at decisive points to achieve surprise, shock and opportunities for
exploitation. Shattering an adversary’s overall cohesion and will to fight,
rather than his materiel is paramount. An illustration of the manoeuvrist
approach is at Fig 3.3. The approach aims to apply strength against
identified vulnerabilities. Its significant features are momentum and tempo,
which in combination, lead to shock action and surprise. The emphasis is
on disruption and defeat of the adversary by taking the initiative and
applying constant and unacceptable pressure at the times and places the
adversary least expects. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the
unexpected and seeking originality is combined with a determination to
succeed. Although the manoeuvrist approach is seen as opposite to the
attritionist approach, it is not about avoiding a decisive engagement. In
reality, attrition of an adversary’s forces to a predetermined level may be
part of the plan.

Fig 3.3: Illustration of the Manoeuvrist Approach

3.40 Key Functions Of The Manoeuvrist Approach. The key

characteristic of the manoeuvrist approach is the attack of the adversary
commander’s decision making process by attempting to get inside his
decision making cycle. Accordingly, at the operational level, the key
functions of the manoeuvrist approach are:

a. Shape the theatre of operations.

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b. Attack the adversary’s cohesion.

c. Protect the cohesion of the force.

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

3.41 The other contemporary type of military operation is Peace

Support Operations (PSO). PSOs are designed to achieve humanitarian
goals or a long-term political settlement. PSOs are multi-functional
operations conducted impartially in support of an appropriate legal
authority involving military forces, the police, diplomatic and humanitarian
agencies. Such operations come under UN charter or regional bodies like
AU and ECOWAS. These include peace keeping, peace enforcement,
conflict prevention, peace making, peace building and humanitarian
operations.

3.42 Peace Keeping. Clearly defined, peace keeping (PK) operations

involve deployment of forces to monitor or implement a peace or cease
fire agreement. Such operations are generally undertaken under Chapter
VI of UN Charter or regional authorisation with the consent of all the major
parties to a conflict. Peace keeping is usually initiated when there is
diplomatic impasse and other mediatory actions fail to resolve a crisis.

3.43 Peace Enforcement. Peace enforcement (PE) operations are

coercive in nature and undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
when the consent of any of the major parties to the conflict is uncertain.
They are designed to maintain and re-establish peace or enforce the
terms specified in the mandate.

3.44 Conflict Prevention. Conflict prevention activities are normally

conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They range from
diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployments of forces intended to
prevent disputes from escalating into armed-conflicts or spreading.
Conflict prevention can also include fact-finding missions, consultations,
warnings, inspections and monitoring.

3.45 Peace Building. Peace building (PB) covers actions, which

support political, economic, social and military measures and structures
aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress
the causes of the conflicts. This includes mechanisms to identify and
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support structures which tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of

confidence and wellbeing and support economic reconstruction.

3.46 Peace Making. Peace making covers the diplomatic activities

conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a
cease fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of
offices, mediation, conciliation, diplomatic pressure, isolation and
sanctions.

3.47 Humanitarian Operations. Humanitarian operations are conducted

to relieve human suffering; military humanitarian activities may accompany
or be in support of humanitarian operations conducted by specialized
civilian organizations.

3.48 Strategic Interphase of PSO. Because of the political nature of

PSO and the effects of real time media reporting, strategic considerations
often impact directly to the tactical level. The NAF doctrine in PSO shall
view military activities in a wider multi-functional context, focusing on the
strategic and operational levels. The framework of operations and
principles, together with planning considerations and techniques shall be
based on the political military interface.

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CHAPTER 4

AIR POWER

DEFINITION
4.1 Air power has always been a difficult concept to define. From the
birth of aviation to the development of independent air forces, many have
seen air power as an all embracing concept. It is the ability to use
platforms operating in or passing through the air for military purposes. In
the traditional manifestation of air power, manned fixed-wing aircraft
retains its primacy. However, it has now been joined by helicopters, carrier
aviation, airborne and automobile forces, cruise missiles, Surface-to-Air
Missiles (SAMs) and rapidly increasing range of unmanned aerial
vehicles. Air power can thus be defined as “the ability to project military
force in air or space by or from a platform or missile operating above the
surface of the earth”. Air platforms are defined as any aircraft, helicopter
or unmanned air vehicle.

CHARACTERICTICS OF AIR POWER

4.2 In comparison with land or sea, the air is a very unique fighting
environment because of the third dimension above the earth’s surface,
hence, air forces have quite different characteristics in terms of strengths
and limitations from land and sea forces. That in turn means that air power
has different application, demands specific skills and expertise.
Consequently, it generates different types of ethos amongst its
practitioners.

4.3 The Strengths of Air Power. Air power has the unique ability
to exploit the third dimension above the surface of the earth. As a result,
air vehicles are far faster and have greater reach than naval ships or land
vehicles. Thus, height, speed and reach must be considered as the
primary strength of air power. These strengths in turn, act together
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synergistically to produce additional strengths, which are: Ubiquity,

Flexibility, Responsiveness and Concentration.
a. Height. The ability of aircraft to operate at various heights
gives them the ability to observe and dominate activities on the
surface and below the sea. It allows direct fire to be used against all
of the adversary forces, whether or not they are in the front line. It
also permits manoeuvre in 3 rather than just 2 dimensions which is
an important factor in survivability. Height or altitude gives a different
physical perspective. Altitude allows you to see further around the
curvature of the earth (about 250 nm at 30,000ft) giving the sensor
of airborne ISTAR assets range advantage. This also increases the
survivability of these High Value Assets (HVAs) by enabling them to
operate from stand-off positions away from adversary ground and air
threats. The ultimate height advantage for perspective is that of
space.
b. Speed. The speed of aircraft allows rapid projection of
military power; greater speed allows mission to be completed in
shorter times and a larger number of tasks to be completed within a
given period. The absence of obstructions and low resistance to
objects moving through the air, when combined with aerodynamic
design and high powered engines, enable aircraft to fly at high
speeds. In terms of strategy, speed facilitates surprise and saves
time. At the tactical level, high speed reduces exposure of aircraft to
hostile fire and thus can increase their survivability in battle.
c. Reach. Reach is the ability to project force or achieve effects
over distance. Due to the ubiquity of the atmosphere around the
globe, air power has the potential for global reach. The attribute of
height enables most platforms, other than light aircraft and
helicopters, to operate unhindered by terrain above the earth’s
highest mountain ranges. Aircraft can project military power over
great distances in any direction unimpeded by surface features such
as mountain barriers or water expanses. However, reach may also
be limited by political necessities such as diplomatic clearance to fly
through the airspace of other states.
d. Ubiquity. The attribute of ubiquity, defined as “being
everywhere, (or seeming to be everywhere) simultaneously”
describes airpower’s potential to cover the whole battle space
whether for ISTAR, strike or mobility roles. There is an inherent
perception of ubiquity when a relatively small number of high
endurance platforms operate and persist for long periods over
multiple areas of interest. This is distinctively advantageous when
adversaries use asymmetric and dispersed techniques to avoid
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detection and engagement. Against a well-resourced and

sophisticated air defence system, achieving ubiquity requires air
superiority, and or the use of low observable (stealth) aircraft and
stand-off weapons which enhance survivability.
e. Flexibility. Aircraft can perform a wide variety of actions,
produce a wide range of effects and be adapted with comparative
ease to meet changing circumstances and situations. For example,
a multi role aircraft can be used for reconnaissance, air-to-surface
attack and air defence. It can, therefore, carry out more than one
role during a single mission and be re-tasked in the air if necessary.
f. Responsiveness. Speed and reach make air power
uniquely responsive. It can be used to counter or pose simultaneous
threats across a wider geographical area than is possible with
surface systems. Air power can be deployed rapidly into distant
theatres to provide visible and timely support for an ally (e.g
‘ECOMOG OPERATION SANDSTORM’) or to act as a deterrent to
aggression. For closer threats, it can be used to project military
power rapidly, direct from its peace time bases. The responsiveness
of air power is as important in crises management as it is in conflict.
g. Concentration. Speed, reach and flexibility allow air power
to concentrate military force in any of its many forms; in time and
space when and where required. The moral and physical effects of
such capability are often crucial to achieving operational success.
4.4 Limitations. The inherent limitations of air power are
impermanence, limited payload and fragility. Like the strength of air power,
these are relative rather than absolute and need to be understood in that
context.
a. Impermanence. Aircraft cannot stay airborne indefinitely.
Although air-to-air refuelling (AAR) can greatly extend the range and
endurance of aircraft, no means have yet been found to re-arm, re-
crew or service an aircraft in flight. To that extent, air power is an
impermanent form of military force. The effect it creates also tend to
be transient, and to sustain those effects, operations have to be
repeated. In certain circumstances, the impermanence of air power
can be an advantage.
b. Limited Payloads. The payloads that can be carried by
aircraft are far more limited than those that can be carried by ships
or by land vehicles. Thus, aircraft are most cost effective when they
are used for tasks which give high value pay offs. This applies
equally to combat and combat support tasks such as, air
transportation. While relatively small payloads are a disadvantage,
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they can in part be compensated for by the high sortie rate realisable
due to aircraft speed and by the lethality and precision of modern
air-to-surface munitions. Moreover, a small payload deployed quickly
may be of far more value in stabilising a critical situation than one
many times its size, which is deployed later. It is important to note
that payload limitations are common to all systems, which exploit the
third dimension.
c. Fragility. Because air vehicles are by their nature highly
stressed and have to be as light as practicable, they carry little or no
amour protection. Hence, relatively low levels of battle damage can
have catastrophic effects; a fact that tends to limit the extent aircraft
can be exposed to adversary fire. However, it is important to
distinguish between fragility and vulnerability. While aircraft are less
robust than land vehicles or ships, this is largely compensated for by
the ability of aircraft to exploit speed and height which increases the
adversary’s targeting difficulties.
4.5 Other Considerations. In addition to the strengths and limitations
discussed above, air power also possesses certain other important and
well known characteristics, which also affect its contribution to defence
and security. These are:
a. Cost. Military aircraft are high-tech equipment and as such are
expensive. Similarly, aircrew training can also be expensive.
However, the advantage derived from air power capabilities
outweigh these costs. Furthermore, the increase in capability they
provide over older/obsolete systems often permits a reduction in the
numbers of platforms required. A modern highly capable multi-role
aircraft will cost much more than a less capable aircraft. For certain
tasks, a highly capable aircraft is essential, but for others a far less
costly solution may suffice. Similarly, training costs are closely
related to the complexity of the aircraft that the aircrew are required
to fly. In every case, cost must be balanced against cost
effectiveness.
b. Dependence on Bases. All forms of modern military power
depend on base support. Armies in the field need depots to support
them and navies need harbour facilities. However, air power seems
to be more dependent on its bases than either land or sea power.
Helicopters and some fixed-wing aircraft can take-off and land
vertically, but most aircraft need runways. Additionally, all aircraft
need a high level of support if they are to operate at their maximum
sortie rate. If this base support is vulnerable to attack, then base-
dependency can be a source of potential weakness. However, if the
bases are difficult to find or close down, then the converse applies.
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In these circumstances, the unique ability of air forces to fight

directly from their peacetime bases enormously simplifies logistics
and expedites the delivery of ordnance from the factory or depot
onto the adversary.
c. Sensitivity to Light and Weather. Air power is sometimes
perceived as being far more sensitive to weather and light conditions
than other forms of military force. Bad weather can certainly create
difficulties with take-offs and landings, navigations and target
acquisition. But the operations of other types of forces are equally
affected by weather and light conditions. In very high sea states,
ships cannot fight and sometimes cannot even leave harbour.
Similarly, the mud caused by torrential rain can bog down armies,
while intense heat can be a major handicap to carrying out large-
scale land force operations. Fortunately, in recent years, the impact
of weather and light on air power operations has changed markedly.
With the rapid advancement in technology, many combat aircraft are
now able to operate in all light conditions and many of these can
also operate in all weather conditions. Indeed, the concealment
offered by darkness and bad weather is increasingly turning to the
advantage of air power, as more advanced all-weather navigation
and targeting aids are developed and deployed.
d. Sensitivity to Technology. Air power tends to be more
sensitive to technological change than sea power or land power.
Since Air Power is a product of technology, technological advances
would inevitably affect air power development. Experience has
shown that even relatively small technological innovations can have
a major impact on air power effectiveness. New generations of
mobile SAMs could threaten the offensive capabilities of air power.
But equally, aircraft survivability could be enhanced enormously by
developments in low observables (stealth) technology. The nature of
the balance will always depend on the overall direction and rate of
technological development.

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Fig. 4.1 Characteristics of Air Power

4.6 Principles for Air Power Application. Unified action is essential

for the effective use of air power; to achieve its greatest effects, it must be
concentrated at a decisive point in time and space. However, these same
inherent attributes of speed, reach and flexibility allow it to be exploited on
diverse and multiple tasks simultaneously which, if incorrectly employed,
can lead to its fragmentation and subsequent dissipation of effort.
Therefore, to achieve the strength of unified action, and to ensure that the
capabilities of air power are used as the overall situation demands, these
key principles must be applied: Unity of Command; Centralised Planning;
Decentralised Execution; and Strategy-to-Task.

AIR POWER AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

4.7 Two of the most important principles of war attributable to air power
are concentration of force and tactical surprise. Concentrated force
increases destructive capacity and surprise reduces own losses. This
factor emphasises why air power is best suited for offensive action; it is
easier to achieve a favourable ratio of losses by seizing the initiative with
attack than it is by reacting in defence. Hence, the NAF doctrine of ‘Active
Defence, Forward Engagement’. The concept of active defence requires
the maintenance of a credible defence posture that would act as
deterrence to potential enemies and if deterrence fails, bring a conflict to a
conclusion favourable to Nigeria. To achieve this, the NAF must maintain
superior intelligence and a well-integrated air defence system that will

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blunt and overwhelm any intruding air threat. Forward Engagement is the
ability to project force beyond national boundaries in support of Nigeria’s
security interests. This means having ready and capable forces that are
deployable at short notice, as well as maintaining a tactically offensive
stance to seize the initiative from the adversary early in the conflict. This
would give own surface forces freedom of action to operate with minimal
interference from adversary air action.
4.8 The flexibility to concentrate force when and where it is required
against any element of an adversary’s capability are fundamental to the
employment of air power. The flexibility and responsiveness of air power
enables the full spectrum of sustained air operations to be conducted at a
tempo which directly attacks an adversaries’ decision cycle.
Compromising the inherent flexibility erodes effectiveness and undermines
responsiveness.

AIR POWER AND THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

4.9 When the features of manoeuvre warfare are compared to the

factors which need to be applied to the exploitation of air power, it is
axiomatic that any exploitation of air power is inherently manoeuvrist. The
air power characteristics of reach, ubiquity, speed of response and
flexibility are relevant to manoeuvre at all levels of warfare. A manoeuvrist
approach to air operations allows the employment of air power to achieve
a position of decisive advantage. Air power can undertake manoeuvre
operation alone and, with land and maritime forces in support of joint
manoeuvre. Air power can bring a concentrated application of firepower to
bear rapidly anywhere in the battle space. With careful and joint planning,
the speed and precision provided by fixed and rotary wing air systems can
be linked with surface manoeuvre and indirect fire, increasing the
available combat power which might be applied to an adversary’s weak
point. For manoeuvre to be successful at any level of warfare, there must
be a culture among those involved which actively promotes initiative by
encouraging freedom and speed of action.

THE APPLICATIONS OF AIR POWER

4.10 The distinct and specific characteristics of air power lead in turn to
distinct and specific applications. Air power’s speed of reaction is
responsive to political needs; it commits and risks the minimum number of
personnel; it can deliver enormous punch from which it is almost

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impossible to hide and can do so with a precision that both opens up new
coercive possibilities and minimizes casualties.

4.11 Wartime Applications of Air Power. If crises management

measures fail and crises degenerate into war, air power can make a
decisive contribution to prosecuting operations successfully. The unique
ability of air power to concentrate combat power when and where needed
has become the dominant feature of modern wars. Air power offers
decision makers a wide range of options. These include:

a. Observation. Air power’s unique capability to exploit the

third dimension allows it to make a major contribution in monitoring
adversary activities and deployments and thus discovering his
intentions. Reconnaissance provides the basis for planning,
targeting and successful execution of military operations.
b. Destruction. Air power’s most obvious wartime application
is to destroy. The ability to concentrate firepower with a high degree
of accuracy over extended ranges gives it enormous potential
destructive power. This was evident in the Gulf War of 1991, where
air power destroyed nearly half the Iraqi armour and artillery before
the start of the Allied land offensive. At sea, the destructive potential
of air power became evident as early as 1942, when 5 Japanese
aircraft carriers were sunk as a result of air attacks during the battles
of Coral Sea and Midway.
c. Denial. Air power can be used to deny an adversary the
ability to employ his air, surface and maritime forces effectively. It
denies the adversary the freedom to wage war as intended. The
most prominent example of an air-to-air denial battle was the Battle
of Britain (WWII), where air power was the only practicable means
open to Britain of denying Germans the opportunity to launch an
invasion of England.
d. Dislocation. The capacity of air power to inflict dislocation is
a key quality. Even if an aircraft fails to destroy its target, the impact
on morale of a near miss or of collateral damage may still cause the
adversary major mental, moral and physical dislocation. Dislocation
causes delay and confusion, and it breaks up unit cohesion. It also
makes the adversary far more vulnerable to follow-up attacks by all
types of forces. For example, in June 1944, the German Panzer
Lehr Division was subjected to continuous allied air interdiction
attacks during its deployment from Le Mans to contain the Allied D-
Day landings. The attrition sustained by Panzer Lehr during this
journey was significant (about 10 per cent or 220 vehicles), but more

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importantly, unit cohesion was lost and the division arrived on the
battlefield in uncoordinated and ineffective units.
e. Diversion. Air power can be used to divert adversary forces
in order to delay or destroy them. At a strategic level, diversion can
be achieved by concentrating attacks against sensitive adversary
targets, compelling him to divert forces and resources from offensive
to defensive duties. For example, the Allied Strategic Bombing
offensive in WW II forced the Germans to divert 25-30 per cent of
their artillery production for anti aircraft artillery. At the tactical level,
air power can achieve diversion by selectively attacking choke points
such as bridges. This can either delay the arrival of adversary
surface forces or channel their movement into areas where they can
be more easily contained or destroyed.
f. Delay. Delay is a wartime effect of air power resulting from
the effects of dislocation, destruction or diversion. In defensive
situations, imposing delays on the adversary allows friendly forces to
regroup and strengthen defences. In offensive situations, it allows
friendly forces to prevent the adversary’s escape.
g. Demoralisation. One of the important effects that air
power can create is demoralisation. Air attacks had always had a
particularly sapping effect on morale, irrespective of the damage
inflicted. In OPERATION SANDSTORM, the losses suffered
(reported at 50 per cent) by rebel forces laying siege on the hydro-
power town of Bumbuna from an ECOMOG air strike completely
dissuaded the rebels from furthering their plans.

4.12 Application of Air Power in Crisis Situations. In times of

increasing tension, the unique ability of air power to be deployed rapidly
and to project power over long distances, unimpeded by surface features,
makes it a useful instrument of national power. Air power has a variety of
important crisis management applications. These are:
a. Deterrence. The proven ability to exact rapid retribution,
strike deep into hostile territory and deny a potential aggressor the
assurance that his homeland can be safe from attack, by air power
deployed against it, is by any measure a strong and explicit
deterrence. With timely warning and rapid deployment of a credible
force, air power has the capability of defusing a crisis before it really
develops. OPS SEA DOG of 1985 is a good example.

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Fig. 4.3 F-7NI.

b. Political Signalling. Air power can be used to send clear

political signals. These can help reduce uncertainty and reduce the
possibility of miscalculation by the adversary. Air power can do this
through a number of measures like an overt increase in alert states
or by operational deployment of air power assets such as the
deployment of A-Jets to Cote d’ Ivoire in response to the coup
of 2002. Deployment of surveillance assets to monitor adversary
activity would send clear signals that he is being watched and when
backed by offensive air power assets would make the adversary
rethink his course of action.
c. Punitive Air Strikes. In crisis situations, air power can be
used for punitive air strikes short of full-fledged war. One obvious
application of these punishment operations is as a response to
attacks by state sponsored guerrillas or terrorists. Such operations
are reactive rather than proactive, and depend on the element of
surprise for their success. A typical example was the reported strike
by the US on Libya during OPERATION ELDORADO CANYON and
the Israeli strikes against HAMAS in response to rockets fired into its
territories. Possible adversary reaction leading to an escalation of
conflict, and adverse international opinion are factors to be
considered before such operations are conducted. In many such
situations, air power will often be the only instrument which has the
requisite speed, reach and striking power to deter aggression.
d. Supporting Friendly Foreign Governments. A crisis
management application of air power is to provide timely moral and
physical support for friendly governments, thus strengthening their
resolve in times of tension. An example was Nigeria’s deployment to
Mali in 2013.
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e. Evacuation of Nationals from Crisis Zones. Air power can

be used to mount evacuation operations in crisis situations. The
evacuation of Nigerian nationals from Malabo in the 80s and from
Central African Republic in 2014 with NAF aircraft is an example of
the use of air power in conducting speedy evacuation.

4.13 Peacetime Applications.

a. Preserving Peace. Although the Air Force exists for the
purpose of war, the preparation for this role indirectly confers on it a
major peacetime role, that of deterrence. A well-balanced air force
with a credible operational capability to exact rapid retribution
constitutes an effective deterrence. The air force can also be used
to help avert threats to peace by exploiting the third dimension for
surveillance purposes. A potential antagonist could thus be assured
that any threatening moves will be detected and the intent
discerned.
b. Disaster Relief. When disaster strikes in the form of floods
or earthquakes, speedy response is vital. With its speed, air power
helps to play a key part in alleviating suffering. NAF transport
aircraft and helicopters have delivered food, medicine and other
supplies in numerous disaster relief operations. When done
abroad, it helps to promote international relations.
c. Emergency Rescue Operations. Air power has often been
called upon, and will continue to be called, to carry out rescue
operations of people in distress. A classical example was the
dramatic helicopter rescue of people from the roof of the burning
Nigerian External Telecommunication (NET) building in Lagos in
January 1983.

Fig 4.2 Emergency Rescue Aircraft: Super Puma

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AIR POWER EDUCATION IN THE NAF

4.14 Military capability and by extension air power capability can be

described in terms of 3 inter-related components; a conceptual
component, a moral component and a physical component. This provides
a suitable model by which the concept of combat air power can be
expressed. Fig 4.3 illustrates the inter relation of these components.

Fig 4.3: Inter-Relation of the Components of Military Capability

4.15 The model shows that air power capability comprises more than just
the physical things such as; manpower, air power assets and the
ability/readiness to operate these assets or provide support to those who
operate them. It also depends on leadership, management and an
understanding of a country’s air power doctrine by all persons involved
with air power projection. Accordingly, a well structured air power
education system is vital for any air force. An effective air power education
system should therefore address all the components of military capability
simultaneously and thoroughly since professional airmen are desired.
Therefore, the NAF should include teachings on her air power doctrine to
all NAF specialities. As a guide, basic air power doctrine should be taught
at the SNCO Academy. For officers, teaching should start at the Nigerian
Defence Academy in order to set the appropriate foundation in air power
knowledge. Thereafter, it should be re-emphasized at higher levels of
training. However the emphasis on doctrinal training at these higher levels
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should not be on basic doctrine but rather on tactical and operational

doctrines.

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CHAPTER 5
ROLES OF AIR POWER

INTRODUCTION
5.1 The NAF along with the other arms of the Armed Forces of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria is tasked with the defence of the territorial
integrity of a united Nigeria by land, sea and air. The Armed Forces are
primarily to deter any act of aggression against the Nation but where
deterrence fails they conclude such hostilities/conflicts on terms
favourable to the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In this context, the NAF is
saddled with the task of protecting Nigeria by air. The mission of the NAF,
therefore, is to project air power in pursuance of Nigeria’s national and
security interests.
5.2 This responsibility requires the NAF to maintain highly trained, well
equipped and highly motivated Air Force capable of performing 6
traditional air power roles; 4 core roles and 2 enabling roles. The 4 core
roles are:

a. Control of the Air.

b. Strike.
c. Air Mobility.
d. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).

While the 2 enabling roles are:

a. Force Protection.
b. Sustainability.

Achieving any one of these roles may require conduct of one or a

combination of various types of air operations. The types of air operations
could either be a subset of combat air operations or combat support air
operations. An understanding of the air power roles along with operations
necessary to achieve them is important. Additionally, given the fast
changing nature of war; where irregular and hybrid wars are becoming
prominent, an understanding of the complex involvement of air power in
their resolution is important.

ROLE 1: CONTROL OF THE AIR

5.3 Importance of Control of the Air. To ensure that friendly

military actions are safe from air attack, commanders seek to achieve and
maintain some degree of control of the air. Control of the air is the ability

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to use the third dimension and the surface below without being threatened
or attacked by the adversary’s air power. It creates the enabling
environment for own forces to conduct operations in the air, land and
maritime domains without effective interference from adversary’s air power
and air defence capabilities. It provides freedom from attack, freedom to
attack and freedom of manoeuvre, and is achieved through the
destruction, degradation or disruption of an adversary’s air power and air
defence capabilities. Having control of the air does not guarantee success
in a joint campaign, but failure to achieve adequate control of the air in
situations where a credible adversary air threat exists will constrain or
preclude the conduct of air, land or maritime activities.

5.4 Defining Control of the Air. Though achieving control of the air is
desirable, it may not be achievable at all times. In these circumstances
achieving control of the air at the required location and for the necessary
duration may be sufficient. This situation is referred to as ‘Favourable Air
Situation’. Control of the air is either achieved or not achieved. In each
instance the air situation can be further divided into one of two categories.
When control of the air is achieved, the favourable air situation falls into
one of 2 categories; Air supremacy or Air superiority.

a. Air Supremacy. Air supremacy is defined as that degree of air

superiority wherein the opposing air forces are incapable of effective
interference.
b. Air Superiority. This is defined as that degree of dominance
in the air battle of one force over another, which permits the conduct
of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive
interference by the opposing force.
When control of the air is not achieved, one of the following 2 categories
will apply:
c. Air Parity. Air parity exists when control of the air is being
contested and no force has been able to obtain an air power
advantage and/or air defence dominance over another.
d. Unfavourable Air Situation. An unfavourable air situation
exists when operations are expected to encounter prohibitive
interference from adversary’s air power and/or air defence
capabilities.
It is futile and maybe unrealistic, to assume total command of the air; a
situation where there is no opposition from the adversary. During the War
in Iraq, several US Apache helicopters were downed by the adversary
despite the assumed total command of the air achieved by coalition

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forces. Also, in NE Nigeria, Boko Haram terrorists incapacitated some

NAF aircraft despite NAF air supremacy. This is so because there is
always a present and constant danger even from small arms fire.

5.5 Achieving Control of the Air. In order to achieve ‘Control of the

Air’, air forces should be able to conduct Counter Air Operations. These
are operations directed against an opponent’s offensive and defensive air
capability. These could be offensive or defensive counter air operations.

a. Offensive Counter Air Operations. Offensive Counter Air

(OCA) operations, sometimes referred to as pre-emptive attack, are
operations mounted to destroy, disrupt or limit an opponent’s air
power as close to its source as possible. Such operations may be
pre-planned or immediate, and are conducted across enemy territory
at the initiative of friendly forces. Pre-planned operations depend on
continuous and accurate intelligence, while immediate operations
are conducted against unexpected mobile and time-sensitive
targets, where there may be only a small window available for
attack. OCA includes surface attack operations, air-to-air missions,
the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) and Electronic
Warfare (EW).

b. Defensive Counter Air Operations. Defensive Counter Air

(DCA) Operations are those measures designed to nullify or reduce
the effectiveness of hostile air action. DCA operations are
synonymous with Air Defence (AD). They consist of active and
passive operations to detect, identify, intercept and destroy or
negate enemy air and missile forces attempting to penetrate friendly
battlespace, or reduction of the effectiveness of such attacks, should
they escape destruction. Air Defence could be active or passive.

(1) Active Air Defence. Active AD involves any direct

defensive action taken to destroy, nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of enemy air and missile attack. It is achieved
through integrated detection, identification, assessment,
interception and engagement. It is frequently characterized by
layered defence-in-depth, permitting multiple engagements to
be made with reactive air-to-air fighters, surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) and other assets.

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Fig 5.1: F-7NI, One NAF Air Defence Fighter ac

(2) Passive Air Defence. Passive AD refers to all other

defensive measures taken to minimise the effects of
opponent’s offensive air action through the individual or
collective protection of friendly forces and critical assets.
Elements of passive AD include early warning, camouflage,
concealment and deception, hardening, dispersion,
reconstitution, and low-observable or stealth technologies.

ROLE 2: STRIKE

5.6 Strike portends the ability to attack with the intention of damaging,
neutralizing or destroying a target. Strike involves employment of lethal or
non-lethal, and kinetic or non-kinetic means to create the desired physical
and/or cognitive effect on the adversary. It has particular value for the use
of air power as a broader deterrent or coercive instrument. The
demonstrated capability to strike an adversary allows the application of a
range of strategies, such as a diplomatic warning or show of force,
through to the actual use of force. Strike can therefore be used to deter or
coerce the adversary, degrade, neutralize or destroy an adversary’s war-
making capabilities, or disrupt or deny courses of action. Strike missions
are proactive and offensive in nature and may be used to take the
initiative, gain surprise and minimize opposition to friendly operations. Like
all air power roles, strike can achieve synergistic effects when employed in
combination with other roles.
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5.7 Employment of precision weapons permits strike with a high

degree of accuracy, effectiveness and lethality. Precision weapons
provide commanders with the ability to apply decisive military force with
discrimination while minimizing collateral damage and unnecessary loss of
human life. This precision strike capability, when combined with air
power’s inherent characteristics of height, speed and reach, provides the
Government with a unique politico-military instrument that can be used to
swiftly and directly apply military power when and where required creating
the greatest strategic effect. However, strike can also create unintended
effects. Although kinetic weapons have become increasingly precise,
technical malfunctions or targeting errors can result in collateral damage
that may have undesired political, diplomatic and military repercussions.

5.8 Strike can either be deliberate or dynamic. Deliberate strike

missions are conducted as part of a line of operation to shape the
operational environment to enable joint manoeuvre, subsequent military
engagements and/or directly achieve desired strategic, operational or
tactical objectives. Accordingly, deliberate strike is normally focused on
critical vulnerabilities that underpin an adversary’s strategic and/or
operational centre of gravity. In order to maximize effectiveness,
deliberate strike missions attack selected and prioritized targets in a
synchronized manner. In contrast, dynamic strike missions are conducted
in short-term anticipation of, or in reaction to, emerging targets.

5.9 To enable the NAF achieve the “Strike” role, it should have the
capability to conduct the following operations:
a. Anti-Surface Force Operations.
b. Air Operations for Strategic Effect.
c. Suppresion of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) .
d. Electronic Warfare.
e. Information Operations.

ANTI-SURFACE FORCE AIR OPERATIONS

5.10 Anti-Surface Force Air Operations (ASFAO) involve the use of air
power, in co-operation with friendly surface forces, to deter, contain,
defeat or destroy the opponent’s land or naval forces. Thus, they may be
employed in land/air (if cooperating with land forces) and maritime/air (if
with maritime forces) operations. Furthermore, Anti-Surface Force Air
Operations may be classified as either direct or indirect.

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5.11 Direct Air Operations. Direct Air Operations are those operations
intended to directly affect the outcome of an engagement between friendly
and opposing forces. In a joint or multinational campaign, they are
intended to bring the flexibility and the precision of air power to bear where
and when needed. Such operations require close coordination and
possibly, control from other elements; be they land, sea or air.
Furthermore, direct air missions are dependent on joint target selection
and joint, secure, interoperable communications. The 2 types of direct air
operations are Close Air Support and Tactical Air Support for Maritime
Operations often referred to as TASMO.

a. Close Air Support. Close air support (CAS) is air action

against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces usually the
land forces. Due to the fluidity of most battle situations, CAS
operations require responsive and near-real-time recce of hostile
targets. In addition, it requires detailed integration of each air
mission with the fire and movement of own forces to prevent
fratricide (ie BLUE ON BLUE). The detailed integration of CAS
missions with the fire and movement of friendly forces is ensured by
the following measures:

(1) The Land Force Commander being supported originates

mission requests on the advice of his Air Liaison Officer.

(2) CAS is a collective action of the Joint staff agencies;

therefore, all are responsible for its effectiveness and safe
execution.

(3) Use of Forward Air traffic Controllers (FAC) to direct

attacking aircraft, indicate the target or illuminate the target
using laser or other suitable devices.

(4) Components and units must habitually emphasize joint

training for knowledge and better understanding of the use of
CAS.

CAS provides quick results and raises the morale of own troops who
see it. However, its effects are local and the less direct or less
obvious forms of offensive support such as interdiction will, in most
cases, be of greater value. There will seldom be enough air
resources to meet all requests for air support, thus, it is necessary to
make sure that requests for CAS are made only for targets that
cannot be engaged by artillery fire or other surface weapons.

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Fig 5.2: NAF Alpha Jet and Mi-24V ac used in Close Air Support
Role

b. Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations. Tactical Air

Support for Maritime Operations (TASMO) embraces all tactical air
operations performed in the maritime environment by non-organic
land based or ship-borne aircraft to assist the Maritime Commander
in completing his mission. Developments in weapon systems have
increased the area of threat to maritime force to well beyond the
range of organic sensors deployed within a maritime force.
Furthermore, the Maritime Commander may not know with any
certainty the position of the forces posing the threat, especially
submarines. In response to these conditions he has the
responsibility of anticipating the threat and, more importantly,
initiating co-ordinated operations in areas distant from the friendly
maritime force which may entail TASMO tasking. TASMO does not
include Maritime Patrol.

5.12 Indirect Air Operations. Indirect air operations are land or

maritime operations intended to disrupt and destroy an opponent’s military
assets and infrastructure in the rear area. Primarily, they are aimed at
depriving the adversary of the military power he needs to occupy territory
or exploit sea space. Indirect air operations enable a commander to take
advantage of friendly strengths and adversary’s weaknesses, without
losing his own freedom of action. Indirect air operations include air
Interdiction, Maritime Air Operations and Air Support for Amphibious
Operations.

a. Air Interdiction. Air Interdiction (AI) is an air/land indirect air

operation. It seeks to destroy, disrupt, neutralise or delay the
adversary’s military potential before it can be brought to bear
effectively against friendly forces. For example during the Persian
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Gulf War, coalition air attacks halted and destroyed an Iraqi column
of tanks en-route to the Saudi Arabian town of Khafji. The
destruction of these forces halted the Iraqi Army’s offensive and
reduced its overall will to fight. For optimum synergy, AI must be
conducted in concert with the land commander’s Concept of
Operations and Scheme of Manoeuvre. However, unlike CAS,
detailed integration of AI missions with the fire and movement of the
land forces is not required. AI will often be the best means of
exploiting the reach of air power against adversary’s ground forces,
as it can strike at the adversary where he is most vulnerable and
force him to extend his air defences over a far greater depth.

Fig 5.3: NAF Alpha Jet on an Interdiction Mission in NE

Nigeria

b. Maritime Air Operations. The 3 types of maritime air

operations are; Anti-Submarine Warfare, Anti-Surface Unit Warfare
and Maritime Anti-Air Warfare. In Anti-Submarine Warfare, MPA or
helicopters assist in the routine monitoring of adversary’s submarine
movements during peacetime. When conflict starts, these
submarines are tracked and destroyed either independently or in
conjunction with friendly surface forces. In Anti-Surface Unit
Warfare, either MPA or designated attack aircraft can attack
adversary’s shipping or provide maritime commanders with certainty
the positions of forces posing threat and vector own forces onto
target where necessary. Maritime Anti-Air Warfare is the term used
to describe the maritime aspect of counter-air operation.

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Fig 5.4: NAF ATR-42 ac on Maritime Patrol

c. Air Support for Amphibious Operations. Air support for

amphibious operations can be provided by both land-based and sea-
borne air elements depending upon the location of the area of
amphibious operations. They will normally include the AI and CAS
roles of air/land operations, but may also conduct counter-air and
combat support air operations. Responsibility for co-ordination of air
support lies with the Commander Amphibious Task Group.

AIR OPERATIONS FOR STRATEGIC EFFECT

5.13 It is not necessary for an air force, in order to defeat an adversary

nation, to defeat its armed forces first. Air power can dispense with that
intermediate step, can pass over the adversary’s navies and armies,
penetrate the air defences and attack directly the centres of production,
transportation and communications from which the adversary’s war effort
is maintained. Strategic effect is a core capability of air power. It exploits
the speed, reach and concentration of air power and strikes directly and
with precision at the opponent’s decisive points and centres of gravity.
The effect sought by air power could be destructive, non-destructive or a
combination of both, against target sets which undermine the adversary’s
ability, will and means to continue his aggression.

5.14 Air operations for strategic effect are not limited to bombing or solely
the domain of attack aircraft. All combat aircraft and associated weapon
systems are capable of action for strategic effect. Air operations for
strategic effect can be used either for political signalling purposes, to
coerce an opponent, or as an integrated element of a theatre campaign. It

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is the target, and not the weapon system employed that qualifies an attack
as strategic.

5.15 Historical Lessons from the Employment of Air Power for

Strategic Effect. There are 4 lessons which can be deduced from the
use of strategic bombardment:

a. Air Power as Shock Action. Firstly, the shock of aerial

bombardment can induce panic and destroy the morale of those
targeted. Historical data suggest that over time, target populations
become inured to the effects of air attack. However, the
psychological impact of air power, when employed together with
other forms of coercive activity such as Information Operations, can
be profound.

b. Effect on Target Population. The second lesson is that a

comprehensive bombing strategy can have profound effect on
civilian morale and divert the opponent’s military effort away from
offensive operations to home defence.

c. Leadership Reaction. The third lesson from the study of air

bombardment is that, if the opposing government or group is
inherently authoritarian, it is likely that the leadership will take little
notice of public opinion. Consequently, air bombardment of the
populace is unlikely to have any effect on the commitment of the
leadership to their strategic objectives or war aims.

d. Importance of Targeting. The fourth lesson of strategic

bombardment is that targets for strategic effect must be carefully
defined. One of the essential lessons of the history of strategic
bombardment is the paramount importance of targeting. As air
power assets become more versatile and multi-role, the same
platforms could be used for AI, CAS as well as missions for strategic
effect. Weapon systems will vary according to target sets, but it is
highly likely that delivery platforms will be in short supply. Therefore,
in a joint or multinational environment, strategic missions may need
to be justified alongside other priorities within a theatre of operation.
Accordingly, targeting priorities at theatre level are decided by the
Joint Target Coordination Board (JTCB).

SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENCES

5.16 SEAD is any activity that destroys, neutralizes, or temporarily

degrades the opponent’s surface based air defences by destructive and/or
disruptive means. The integration of SEAD into all combat operations is
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essential and can be regarded as a significant force multiplier. As

mentioned earlier, SEAD operations can contribute significantly to
offensive counter air operations. For example, at the onset of the Persian
Gulf War, US Apache helicopters crossed the Saudi-Iraqi border to attack
Iraqi early warning radar sites. These attacks facilitated the attainment of
air superiority, which expedited the ground offensive. Therefore, SEAD is
vital for the success of any offensive action. Please note that SEAD is not
the exclusive preserve of air forces. Surface forces could be employed to
knock holes in ground- based air defence systems. The Israelis used
naval and ground forces successfully from the war of 1973 to the Lebanon
incursions of 1982. The raid at Entebbe is one operation in which the
advantage of SEAD was exploited by the Israelis. SEAD can be applied as
follows:
a. Theatre or area air defence system suppression.
b. Localised suppression.
c. Self defence suppression.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

5.17 EW operations involve the military use of electronics to determine,

exploit, reduce or prevent the hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum,
and the actions taken by friendly forces to ensure they are still able to use
it effectively. The overall objective of EW in air operations is to enhance
mission effectiveness and increase the survivability of friendly aircraft and
other assets.

5.18 Applications of EW. EW considerations should form an integral

part of the planning and execution of all types of air operations. EW can
be used to disrupt the adversary’s command and control links and
facilities, his electromagnetic surveillance capabilities, his electromagnetic
acquisition and targeting capabilities and his electronic combat
capabilities. The overall aim is to confuse and deceive the adversary,
reduce friendly losses and increase the operational effectiveness of
friendly air, surface and sub-surface forces.

5.19 Categories of EW Operations. EW operations can be divided

into 3 main parts:

a. Electronic Support Measures. Electronic Support

Measures (ESM) involve action taken to search for, intercept,
identify and locate radiated electromagnetic energy to provide
electronic warning and surveillance data for the Commander. ESM
are passive and therefore available for use in peace, crisis and war.

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b. Electronic Counter Measures. Electronic Counter

Measures (ECM) involve the use of electromagnetic or directed
energy to attack personnel, facilities and equipment with the intent of
preventing or reducing an opponent’s effective use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. There are 3 sub-categories of ECM as
follows:

(1) Electronic jamming.

(2) Electronic neutralization.
(3). Electronic deception.

c. Electronic Protection Measures. Electronic Protection

Measures (EPM) involve active and passive measures taken to
ensure the friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite an
opponent’s use of electronic warfare techniques. Electronic warfare
is increasingly important to the success of all types of military
operations. Specialist manned aircraft and unmanned air vehicles for
EW support may be critical factors in support of air operations within
the joint campaign. Such aircraft and systems designed to counter
sophisticated SAM and AAG systems are invariably in short supply,
requiring priorities to be set as part of the apportionment process.
Moreover, there is a close interconnection between EW and the
associated task of the suppression of adversary air defences.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

5.20 Information Operations (Info Ops) are defined as co-ordinated

actions undertaken to influence an adversary or potential adversary in
support of political and military objectives by undermining his will,
cohesion and decision- making ability. This also includes undermining his
information, information based processes and systems while protecting
one’s decision makers and decision making process. Info Ops involves
forging and protecting perceptions, exploiting information and defending
against information attacks. Info Ops has both offensive and defensive
aspects.

5.21 Offensive Information Operations. These are actions taken to

influence a potential adversary’s available information, information based
process, C2 systems and CIS during peace, crisis or conflict, in pursuit of
specific objectives or in reaction to a specific threat.

5.22 Defensive Information Operations. These are actions taken to

protect friendly decision-makers including the maintenance of access to
the effective use of information, information based processes, C2 systems

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and CIS during peace, crisis or conflict and to protect alliance information
critical to achieving specific objectives.

5.23 Guiding Principles for Info Ops. The implementation of Info Ops
should be guided by certain fundamental principles which apply to all Info
Ops. These are:

a. Direction. Info Ops support the commander’s campaign at

every level. For Info Ops to be successful, clear direction in terms of
the effect to be achieved and the themes to be used must be given.
Info Ops objectives support the commander’s campaign objectives.

b. Timely Application. Info Ops planning and execution must

start early, ideally before troops deploy to theatre. Shaping
perceptions requires lengthy preparation and results can be slow to
emerge. Early identification of targets, analysis, objectives, themes,
desired effects, message and consequent direction will pay
dividends.

c. Intelligence. Info Ops rely upon detailed knowledge and

understanding of adversaries, and the way that they think and
process information. The analysis of psychological, political, cultural,
behavioural and other human attributes which influence decision-
making will be vital as well as detailed systems analysis of
infrastructure and military capability. High quality detailed
intelligence, focus on decision-makers and the decision making
process underpin Info Ops.

d. Coherence. A coherent message must be presented. Info

Ops should be closely integrated vertically and horizontally
throughout the chain of command and with multinational partners
and agencies. Info Ops areas of responsibility should be identified,
and action within them de-conflicted. Synchronisation with other
operational activities and the information campaign is essential so
that one activity does not compromise or negate another.

e. Continuous Monitoring and Flexibility. Attitudes and

events should be monitored continuously and progress analysed as
part of the Campaign Effectiveness Analyses (CEA), where the
necessary info ops plan should be adjusted accordingly. Whilst
shaping perception requires time, one-off incidents can have a
dramatic effect on opinions. The Info Ops plan must be flexible
enough to react to sudden swings, capitalizing on opportunities or
limiting damage.

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ROLE 3: AIR MOBILITY

5.24 Air mobility is the ability to move personnel, materiel or forces using
airborne platforms. It provides the capability to rapidly deploy, sustain and
redeploy personnel, materiel or forces to, from or within a theatre by air.
Air mobility is thus a key factor in force projection. It enables the conduct
of other operations and has utility across the full spectrum of conflict.
Notably, air mobility is often the transportation of choice when speed,
reach as well as obstacle and surface threat avoidance are required. In
some cases, air mobility can be the only means to create the desired
effect.

5.25 Air transport aircraft afford the NAF a credible inter-theatre air
mobility capability that is vital to enabling the AFN conduct expeditionary
operations in support of Nigeria’s national security objectives in the
broader geo-strategic environment. Also, they provide intra-theatre air
mobility; which is vital to facilitating rapid air movement of forces and
supplies within a theatre of operations. Intra-theatre air mobility enables a
numerically small force to dominate a large geographical area. Where
integral military assets are insufficient or unsuitable to meet the airlift
requirements of the AFN, civil charter aircraft may be employed to meet
some operational requirements.
5.26 To enable the NAF achieve the “Air Mobility” role, it should have or
seek to have the capability to conduct the following operations:
a. Air Transport Support.
b. Air-to-Air refueling.
c. Airborne Operations.

AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

5.27 Air transport operations are operations that involve the movement
by air of personnel and material both within and between theatres of
operations, generally referred to as Tactical Transport and Strategic
Transport respectively. Fixed or rotary wing aircraft could be used for Air
Transport Operations; however rotary wing platforms are best suited for
Tactical Transport.

5.28 Air Transport Operations (Fixed Wing). Fixed wing transport

aircraft are used for both strategic and tactical movement of men and
materiel. They are able to move a relatively large number of men and
materiel quickly and over long distances. They are however limited in
tactical airlift by their dependency on airfields. During Op SANDSTORM,
between May and Dec 1990, NAF C-130 airlifted 6,272 troops and 560
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metric tons of cargo. This clearly reaffirms the critical role of airlift in the
deployment and sustenance of military forces. It is the only tool that can
deliver considerable combat strength over long distances within hours.

Fig 5.5: NAF C-130H ac used in Air Transport Operations

5.29 Air Transport Operations (Rotary Wing). Support Helicopters

form part of the air transport operations and are capable of conducting a
variety of transport support missions in-theatre. NAF Super Puma
helicopter, during Op SANDSTORM from Oct 90 - Mar 91 airlifted 2000
troops and 10,000 metric tons of cargo in support of ECOMOG
Operations. Additionally, Super Puma helicopters were used extensively
for tactical movement of troops and logistic in-theatre during OP LAFIYA
DOLE. However, helicopters can be adversely affected by weather and for
the most part require local air superiority to guarantee successful
operations. The primary roles of support helicopters are as follows;

a. The tactical movement of troops, weapons, ammunition and

support stores in the battle field.
b. CASEVAC/MEDEVAC.
c. Ship-to-shore transfer.
d. Amphibious operations.
e Airfield re-supply.

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Fig 5.6: A NAF Support Helicopter used for Tactical Movement of

Troops in-theatre.

AIR-TO-AIR RE-FUELLING

5.30 Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR) is a force multiplier that can significantly

enhance the overall effectiveness and flexibility of air operations. Through
AAR, the range, endurance and payload i.e. weapon load of fighter aircraft
are increased. AAR can be conducted for strategic or tactical operations.

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

5.31 Air delivered combat power can be used to seize ground or

installations that are vital to the opponent by delivering land forces directly
onto the objective. This may be achieved by parachute insertion, tactical
air-landed operations or rappelling/fast rope. Airborne operations should
not be confused with tactical airlift operations. Airborne operations may
contribute to all levels of conflict within the joint campaign plan. They
pose high risk but the potential gains make them a valuable element of air
power capability. The potential for use of an air borne force at any time at
the opponent’s forward or rear areas creates a continuing uncertainty for
the opponent commander.

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Fig 5.7: NAF G-222 Dropping Paratroopers

ROLE 4: INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

5.32 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) also enables

the other core air power roles. It provides situational awareness of the
battle space or operations area by synchronizing and integrating the
planning and operation of sensors, assets, and Processing, Exploitation
and Dissemination (PED) systems in direct support of current and future
operations. The fundamental objective of ISR is to enable decision
superiority by providing key pieces of data, information and intelligence
that assist air and surface forces in achieving battle space awareness and
understanding, information superiority, and thus, decision superiority. In
basic terms, this involves getting the right information and intelligence to
the right people, in the right format, at the right time. The synergistic effect
of ISR also provides the best possible intelligence to the commander,
producing ‘actionable’ and predictive intelligence that can be quickly used
to make operational decisions.

5.33 ISR combines both physical and cognitive activities and relies on
the successful integration of technology with human processes. It is
generally characterized as a technological process, given its critical
dependence on technological factors such as sensors, platforms and
processing networks interconnected through a communications system.
ISR is also an inherently human process where knowledge, human
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initiative, thinking, judgement and decisions enable timely information

collection, processing, analysis and dissemination.

5.34 In military operations, ISR will be synchronized with, and contribute

to, the joint campaign. In this context, ISR is not only critical to operations
in the air domain but also to operations in the other domains. ISR
capabilities are not inherently strategic, operational or tactical; they can be
used to acquire data, information, and intelligence at all levels of
command, often simultaneously. ISR exploits the collection of information
from all domains in which it operates and is therefore domain neutral.

5.35 ISR should be viewed and understood and planned as an integrated

network of systems, including sensors, platforms and PED, that functions
across all domains of the operational environment and all command
levels. It also interfaces with diverse sub-systems comprising sensors,
platforms, humans and weapons. ISR missions are conducted by people,
systems and platforms across a range of capabilities, including those not
dedicated to ISR.

5.36 The development of ISR concepts and doctrine has paralleled the
exponential growth in technology. Likewise, as technology has increased
the capability of platforms, sensors and PED systems, collection capacity
has continued to exceed PED capacity. PED is key to transforming data
into information, and information into intelligence. The high demand for
ISR means that its activities should be prioritized and managed as a single
integrated activity with the appropriate level of centralized control.
Furthermore, the ubiquity and demand for ISR encourages smaller air
forces, such as the NAF, to consider all assets as potential data and
information collectors. Hence, NAF fixed wing ac (F-7NI, Alpha Jet and
L-39) and rotary wing ac (Mi-35, A109LUH) should have variants
configured for non-traditional ISR (NTISR) capability.

5.37 Air forces will invariably conduct its operations in a joint context
with allies and coalition partners. Consequently, NAF ISR enterprise
should possess the appropriate level of interoperability. As the context of
domestic and expeditionary operations expands to encompass non-
traditional partners, the complexity of information sharing and security
needs will increase, as will the required supporting resources.

5.38 While ISR is particularly important during military operations in

conflict, it should be viewed as a continuous activity throughout the
spectrum of peace and conflict, with ISR operations during peacetime
building the foundations for decision superiority during operations. ISR
achieves this by enabling air forces peacetime intelligence functions; such
as maintaining preparedness, monitoring the region, providing routine
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situational awareness, maintaining intelligence databases, guiding tactics

development, assisting capability development, and providing Indicators
and Warnings (I&W) analysis. During periods of escalating tension, ISR
enables Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB), I&W,
threat warning and broader situational awareness.

Fig 5.8: Some NAF ISR Assets

ENABLING ROLE 1: FORCE PROTECTION

5.39 Force Protection (FP) derives from the war principle of ‘security’. It
is a broad concept embracing a range of measures to ensure the physical
integrity and morale of the fighting force. Specifically, it encompasses all
means taken to protect the capability of a force from operational,
environmental and occupational threats. FP is a critical requirement for the
successful delivery of air power. It enables freedom of action and
enhances operational effectiveness. Aircraft are scarce, expensive and
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fragile. Additionally, operating bases are potentially vulnerable if located in

a hostile environment. Accordingly, FP capability is required to lessen the
consequences of the loss of freedom of manoeuvre in the air, or of a key
air platform. It is based on a detailed assessment of the threat and
hazards drawn from accurate and timely intelligence which are fused and
analyzed organically. This information is used to prioritize the allocation of
resources and risk is mitigated by the judicious application of proactive
and reactive FP measures. The ultimate aim is to reduce the likelihood or
effect of an attack thus enabling the continued prosecution or resumption
of air operations with the minimum of degradation or delay. In assuring
FP, air forces should have the capability for:

a. Air Base Protection.

b. Personnel Recovery.
c. Defensive Cyber Operations.
d. Defensive Information Operations.
e. Defensive Electronic Warfare (EW).

5.40 Air Base Protection in the NAF. In the NAF, the concept of
Force Protection takes into consideration the mix of man, machine and
material in air power projection. The main components of FP include
active ground defence, airfield defence, passive ground defence, active
defence and recuperation. Focus of FP therefore, is the protection of the
following:

a. Aircrew.
b. Aircraft.
c. Command and Control Centres.
d. Main Operating Surface (runway, apron, taxiway etc).
e. Fuel Installations.
f. Logistics area.
g. Ammunition areas.
h. Personnel accommodation.

The NAF concept of air base protection considers the following crucial
planning factors:

a. Formulation of appropriate Base Defence Plans for all bases.

b. Establishment of organic air force ground combat units (well

equipped regiment) to secure air bases.

c. Enhanced perimeter and base security measures.

d. Discrete command and control post.

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e. Battle Damage Repair teams and equipment.

5.41 Personnel Recovery Operations. Personnel recovery

missions are the aggregation of military, civil and political efforts to rescue,
release or recover personnel from permissive, uncertain or hostile
environments, whether they are captured, missing or isolated. Military
personnel recovery activities include Search and Rescue as well as
recovery operations:

a. Search and Rescue. Search and Rescue (SAR) entails the

recovery of isolated personnel in permissive environments. It could
involve deployment of military or civil SAR assets.

b. Recovery Operations. Recovery Operations (RO) cover

all actions aimed at recovering isolated personnel during and after
combat. They are conducted in threat environments and comprise
the following:

(1) Combat Recovery. Combat Recovery is the recovery of

isolated personnel during operations.

(2) Combat Search and Rescue. Combat Search and

Rescue is the detection, location, identification and rescue of
isolated personnel during conflict in a hostile environment. The
threat is usually significant. Hence, intelligence, careful
planning, co-ordinated action and well-trained units are
essential for success. CSAR operations contribute to the
prosecution of the air campaigns by denying the adversary a
potential source of intelligence and promoting high morale
amongst aircrew. It may be necessary to involve combat
forces such as attack helicopters, fighter-bombers and SEAD
to provide covering firepower for rescue aircraft. Such
operations can be costly, because an adversary may know the
area in which an aircraft has crashed and deploy air and
surface forces to that area. Hence, CSAR missions should
only be undertaken if the prospects of success are strong, if
there is an overriding operational reason to rescue the downed
aircrew or if there is intense political pressure to recover
downed aircrew to avoid the potentially negative impact of
hostages and the potential damage to public opinion.

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Fig 5.9: NAF Mi35 on CSAR Mission.

(3) Special Recovery Operations. Special Recovery

Operations involve the recovery of friendly or hostile military or
civilian personnel or materiel by Special Forces.

5.42 Cyber Defence. Defence of own networks and systems is

essential to protect against opponent’s Info Ops and to maintain the
integrity of own information capabilities and infrastructure. Computer
Network Defence (CND) must provide protection against the adversary’s
computer network attack (CNA) and CNE incorporates hardware and
software approaches alongside people based processes.

5.43 Defensive Information Operations. These are actions taken to

protect friendly decision-makers including the maintenance of access to
the effective use of information, information based processes, C2 systems
and CIS during peace, crisis or conflict and to protect alliance information
critical to achieving specific objectives.

5.44 Electronic Protection Measures. Electronic Protection Measures

(EPM) involve active and passive measures taken to ensure the friendly
use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite an opponent’s use of
electronic warfare techniques. Electronic warfare is increasingly important
to the success of all types of military operations. Specialist manned
aircraft and unmanned air vehicles for EW support may be critical factors
in support of air operations within the joint campaign. Such aircraft and
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systems designed to counter sophisticated SAM and AAG systems are

invariably in short supply, requiring priorities to be set as part of the
apportionment process. Moreover, there is a close interconnection
between EW and the associated task of the suppression of adversary air
defences.

ENABLING ROLE 2: SUSTAINABILITY

5.45 Sustainability in its broadest sense encompasses all activities

necessary for the employment of air power other than its execution.
Sustainability is defined as the ability of a force to maintain the necessary
level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objective.
NAF believes that any air operation must of necessity commence and end
with sustainability as it is concerned with sustenance of a force during
every stage of a campaign or operation; from force generation, through
deployment and operations in theatre, to recovery and recuperation. The
main components of sustainability are manpower (personnel), equipment
and logistics.
5.46 Components of Sustainability. The main components of
sustainability are manpower (personnel), equipment, organisation and
logistics.
a. Personnel. As a component of Sustainability, ‘Personnel’
implies the provision and management of trained manpower
(including reserves) in sufficient numbers to man the force
equipment. Management of personnel (feeding, water, shelter and
morale) is key to their performance. A well motivated group of
personnel produce great achievements.
b. Equipment. Equipment include all physical resources
provided to personnel to enable them perform an activity or

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operation. This ranges from tools to vehicles and ac but exclude

materials such as food, water, shelter and POL.

c. Organisation. Organisation covers the staff necessary to

command, plan, execute and control the sustenance of air power in
a campaign or other operations.

d. Logistics. Logistics is ‘the science of planning and carrying

out the movement and maintenance of forces’. Integrating logistics
with operational planning is essential to ensure success in military
operations. It covers planning, movement, maintenance, material,
transport, facilities, services and medicals. The challenge for air
logisticians is to deliver timely and assured support to enhance
freedom of manoeuvre through a combination of innovative
solutions, supported by established procedures and guided by
logistics principles and procedures laid down in the NAF Manual of
Logistics.

Fig 5.11: Components of Sustainability.

5.47 The Relationship Between Sustainability and Logistics.

Sustainability is more than logistics. However, there is a common belief
that the 2 are synonymous. They are certainly inter-linked but, as has
been shown, logistics is a sub-set of sustainability. Specifically, logistics
does not include the provision of manpower to the force. Sustainability is a
concept dealt with primarily at the grand strategic, military strategic and
operational levels of command and deals with the provision of resources
to an operation. Logistics may be considered the application of
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sustainability (less manpower) at the operational and tactical levels of

command and deals with the practical application of those resources
within the theatre of operations.

THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN HYBRID AND IRREGULAR WARFARE

5.48 The Challenge of Hybrid and Irregular Warfare. The concept of

Hybrid Warfare has been used to describe conflicts where high-technology
and conventional capabilities are mixed with irregular tactics. The
Lebanon conflict of 2006 is an example. The Israeli Air Force’s experience
in fighting Hezbollah during this conflict demonstrated that while air power
is decisive in the prosecution of conventional operations, it must be
applied with great care in irregular warfare if its capabilities are to be used
to best effect. This is so because targets are likely to be opportunistic and
distributed amongst the wider population. In this type of warfare, non-
kinetic air power roles may be as important as roles with kinetic effects.
Hence, a truly integrated, joint campaign is likely to be the best guarantor
of success.

5.49 Blurred Boundary Between Tactical and Strategic Application

of Air Power. As irregular and hybrid warfare have blurred the
boundaries between the strategic, operational and tactical levels, so
traditional air power roles have become less sharply delineated. Many
operations that would once have been described as tactical now have
impact at the strategic level. For instance, air attacks in Afghanistan
in 2008 were confined to limited target sets within a well-controlled
battlespace, yet their effects resonated strongly within the local population;
who were sensitive to the asymmetric application of force and represented
a centre of gravity at the operational or strategic levels. In Nigeria’s fight
against BHT in the NE, air action against targets which may have been the
holding point for the Chibok girls would have had serious strategic
implications. Air power has always offered the unique capability to provide
strategic influence, often entirely independent of the other components
and without a commensurate commitment of surface forces. However, an
appreciation of its strengths and weaknesses in irregular warfare is
necessary.

AIR POWER STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN IRREGULAR

WARFARE

5.50 Strengths. Air power brings essential capabilities to bear in

irregular warfare. The benefits include the following:

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a. Its capability as a force multiplier; the mobility and firepower it

delivers hugely increases the capability of surface forces, permitting
the ground footprint to be reduced. This may be critical if the political
environment is sensitive and a major commitment of land forces is
unacceptable to the local population, or to the domestic population
at home.

b. The ability to bring precise and proportionate firepower to bear,

maintaining the consent of the local populace.

c. Its speed of response, for either kinetic or non-kinetic effect,

including the delivery of humanitarian aid.

d. Its ability to place manpower and material where they are

required, in the most difficult terrain.

e. The unique ability to exert psychological pressure; shows of

force, for example, have a significantly beneficial effect on the
morale of friendly forces in addition to the cognitive impact inflicted
on the enemy.

f. The significant contribution it can make to building situational

awareness, ranging from persistent surveillance delivered by space
assets, to change detection enabled by airborne sensors, allowing
pattern of life to be established in areas of interest.

5.51 Weaknesses. While air power makes a huge contribution to the

successful prosecution of irregular warfare, it must be employed with
discretion and understanding. Pitfalls include:

a. The misperception that its employment is disproportionate,

particularly in an urban setting, because of its destructive potential.

b. A mechanistic implementation of inappropriate targeting

strategies; deep attack, or air interdiction, for example, may be of
limited utility where the enemy has a limited material infrastructure or
access to cross-border suppliers and sanctuaries.

c. The temptation to take substitution of air power for ground

forces beyond sensible limits. Moreover, success in irregular warfare
is only likely in a joint campaign, where the military contribution is
only one of the lines of operation in a Comprehensive Approach.

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d. Inadequate joint planning, where air operations are added as

an afterthought to a two-dimensional plan that has already been
conceived, rather than being integrated from the outset.

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CHAPTER 6
AIR POWER COMMAND AND CONTROL
DEFINITIONS

6.1 Command. Command is that authority vested in an individual of

the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of subordinate
formations, units and individuals. The following are the types of
Command:
a. Full Command. Full Command is the military authority and
responsibility of a superior to issue orders to subordinates. It covers
every aspect of military operations and administration and exists
only within national Services. No multinational commander will
therefore have full command over forces assigned him by other
nations.
b. Operational Command. Operational Command (OPCOM)
is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks
to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and
to retain or delegate operational and or tactical control as may be
deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for
administration or logistics.
c. Tactical Command. Tactical Command (TACOM) is the
authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under
his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by
higher authority.
6.2 Control. Control is defined as the authority exercised by a
commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or
other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses
the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this
authority may be transferred or delegated. The following are types of
control:
a. Operational Control. Operational Control is the authority
delegated to a Commander to direct forces assigned so that the
Commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are
usually limited by function, time or location, to deploy units
concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It
does not include authority to assign separate employment of
components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include
administrative or logistic control.

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b. Tactical Control. Tactical Control is concerned with the

detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or
manoeuvres necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.
6.3 Co-ordinating Authority. Co-ordinating authority refers to the
authority granted to the commander or individual assigned responsibilities
for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of 2 or more
countries, or 2 or more Services, or 2 or more forces of the same Service.
He has the ability to consult with other agencies involved or their
representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In
case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt
to obtain essential agreement by discussion. If he is unable to obtain
essential agreement, he must refer the matter to the appointing authority.

6.4 Delegation of Authority. The principle of delegation of authority

ensures that a commander always has appropriate control and authority
over forces assigned, and that he may delegate that authority where
appropriate. Delegation of authority does not divest the higher-level
commander of responsibility. The purpose of delegation is to grant a
subordinate commander the benefit of directly controlling the employment
of his forces without recourse to higher authority.

6.5 Support. Support is the function performed by the forces of one or

more components to assist the force of another component as directed by
the joint force commander. The commander of the supported force will
indicate the support missions he wishes to have fulfilled. In turn, the
commander of the supporting force will ascertain the requirements of the
supported commander and take such action to fulfil those that are within
his capabilities, using his own tactics and procedures only if joint
procedures have not been agreed on. The categories of support are:
a. General Support. The action given to the supported force
as a whole rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.
b. Mutual Support. The action that units render each other
against an adversary because of their assigned tasks, their position
relative to each other and to the adversary, and their inherent
capabilities.
c. Direct Support. A mission requiring a force to support
another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the
supported force’s request for assistance.
d. Close Support. The action of the supporting force
against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported
force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the

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supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the

supported force.

THE SUPPORTING RELATIONSHIP

6.6 In joint operations, forces from different Services are combined to

optimize the employment of offensive and defensive assets. Air Power
therefore seeks to create effect and exert influences primarily in the other
environmental domain. Consequently, the joint nature of most operation
involving the NAF in recent years has brought to the fore the importance
of support relationships. In an attempt to simplify the potentially complex
command and control arrangements, the term “supported” and
“supporting” commanders have been introduced.

a. Supported Commander. A supported commander has

primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by higher
authority.

b. Supporting Commander. A supporting commander

provides augmentation or other support to a supported commander,
or develops a supporting plan.

6.7 The relationship between supported and supporting commanders

must be defined, possibly through a directive, and the following
characteristics must be identified:

a. The forces and other resources allocated to the supporting

effort.
b. The time, place, level and duration of the supporting effort.
c. The relative priority of the supporting effort.
d. The authority delegated to the supporting commander.

It is the responsibility of the supported commander to ensure that the

supporting commander(s) understands the assistance required and that
the assistance required is provided when it is needed. A supporting
commander exercises general direction over the supporting effort using
his normal tactics, methods and procedures to deliver the supporting
effort. The very flexibility of air power and the multi-role versatility of air
power platforms mean that a Joint Air Component Commander (JFACC)
could be supporting more than one commander and may be a supported
commander at the same time. Individual aircraft may carry out supported
and supporting tasks during a single mission.

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PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

6.8 Effective command and control is fundamental to the efficient
application of any form of military power. Therefore, an understanding of
the essential elements of the command and control of air power is an
essential component of air power doctrine. The characteristics and
capabilities of air forces allow them to be employed in diverse and multiple
tasks. However, there will rarely be sufficient air resources to meet all
demands. To realize their full potential and effectiveness, available air
resources must be employed under command arrangement that preclude
undue dissipation and fragmentation of effort. To achieve unified air
action, and to ensure that air power is used effectively, the following 4 key
principles must be applied:
a. Centralized command and control.
b. Centralized planning.
c. Decentralized Execution.
d. Strategy-to-task.
6.9 Centralized Command and Control. Centralized command and
control promotes the integration of air effort and flexibility, and ensures the
exploitation of opportunities and concentration of forces at the critical
place and time in order to achieve decisive results. Centralized command
and control also prevents air power being split into “penny-packets” and
used in an uncoordinated manner for impractical objectives. Only the
highest practical level of command is informed of the relative priorities of
joint demands on those assets that can best be assessed.

6.10 Centralized Planning. Flowing from this, centralized planning for

the employment of air assets is essential to ensure an integrated effort to
meet the overall priorities. It will preclude air assets being exploited
randomly by uncoordinated users, tasked against impractical objective or
divided into small and ineffective packages which will inhibit flexibility and
hinder speedy concentration of force. Thus, the employment of limited air
assets can be concentrated at the critical time and place to achieve
decisive results.

6.11 Decentralized Execution. No single commander directs

personally the actions of a large force in detail. Decentralized execution is
accomplished by delegating authority to lower formations to execute tasks
and missions. This allows subordinate commanders to exercise their
judgement and initiative in the overall pattern of employment laid down by
their superiors – the air equivalent of mission commands. This aspect

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becomes important especially when command and control systems are

degraded through adversary action.
6.12 Strategy – to – Task. In order that scarce air assets are not
wasted, the objective of every mission must be traceable upward through
the command chain and be shown to be related to military strategy.
AIR POWER AND MISSION COMMAND
6.13 The Key command and control principles applicable to air power
require that the command philosophy of ‘mission command’ be adopted
when employing air power resources. This is a style of command that
seeks to convey to subordinate commanders the intention of the higher
commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out
missions with maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources. It is
characterized by decentralized command (consistent with achieving unity
of effort); freedom of speed and action; and initiative. It can be
summarized by stating that, with mission command, a commander makes
plain his intentions, the subordinates’ missions and context of those
missions. He allocates resources with only the maximum of control
measures but leaves subordinates to decide, within their delegated
freedom of action, how best to achieve their missions. In short, a
subordinate is told what to do and why but not how.

COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANISATION

6.14 Effective implementation of the key command and control principles
depends heavily on organisational arrangements. These consist of 2 basic
elements: a command and control process and an organisational
structure.

6.15 Command and Control Process. The process of command and

control of air forces is normally carried out along the following 4 main
phases:
a. Analyse. Effective analysis of a situation is fundamental to
the process of commanding and controlling air forces. It involves
continuous effort to collect and evaluate all available information on
the location, nature and actions of friendly and hostile forces.
b. Plan. The planning phase of command and control process is
based on the situation analysis. It examines the scope for
cooperation and coordinated actions with other commands, seeks to
exploit fully the forces available, develops and assesses alternative
options and sets out the best course of action. The net result is an
outline plan, which provides guidance in terms of space and time for
organising and coordinating the forces to be employed. This allows a
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detailed operational plan to be drawn up, which selects the required

resources, regroups missions, personnel and equipment, assign
responsibilities (usually on the functional or area basis) and
delegates authority within the organisational structure.
c. Direct. Once the planning phase is completed, operational
directives and orders must be promulgated to all participating units
and agencies.
d. Control. The progress of the operation must be monitored
and the result assessed. The effectiveness of friendly force actions
should be gauged, deficiencies corrected and any further step taken
that may be needed to achieve the desired objective.

Fig. 6.1: The Command and Control Process.

6.16 Structure. The successful execution of the command and control

process depends on the establishment of a structure composed of a
commander, his staff and facilities.
a. Commander. At the highest level of a military force there
should be only one overall commander. He alone must be
responsible to higher authority for all operational matters. His
responsibilities should be defined in terms of duties and areas of
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responsibility. Unity of command is essential for effective decision-

making; it not only fosters effective decision-making, but also
provides single point of contact for lateral and subordinate
commanders. Command and control organisations should at all
levels reflect the principle of unity of command, whether they are
functionally or geographically arranged.
b. Staff. A staff should support each commander. The structure
of this staff should reflect the composition of the resources under his
command.
c. Facilities. Commanders and their staff must have the
necessary facilities to execute their command and control functions.
These include operation centres and an appropriate range of
communication equipment.

Fig 6.2: Command and Control Structure

6.17 Assignment of Air Power. In keeping with the flexible nature of

manoeuvre warfare, the JTFC may need to move air support between
areas and operations so that the various component commanders can
have the support they need where and when they need it. Air assets can
be assigned at one of the following 4 levels:
a. Allotment. Allotment is the temporary change of assignment
of air forces between subordinate commands. The authority to allot
is vested in the commander having operational command. The
process of allotment is used to provide the balance of forces needed
to achieve the objectives stipulated by that command.
b. Apportionment. Apportionment is the determination and
assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by
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priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and or

geographic area for a given period of time.
c. Allocation. Allocation is the translation of appointment into
total number of sorties by aircraft type available for each
operation/task.
e. Tasking. Tasking is the process of translating the allocation
into orders, and passing those orders to the units involved. Each
order normally contains sufficient detailed instruction to enable the
executing agency to accomplish the mission successfully.

6.18 The Allotment /Apportionment/ Allocation Process. The

disposition of the total air resources to execute air operation should be
made by the commander in operational command. It should be made in
accordance with the priorities established between specific tasks and
which is normally based on the allotment (if necessary) and
apportionment. Factors, which have to be taken into consideration during
this process include:
a. The objective to be achieved.
b. The nature and the intensity of the conflict, the strategy being
employed, and in particular the threat, the probable type of targets,
the likely response times required and the force generation
requirements.
c. The operational capabilities, limitations and security of all
weapons systems, the terrain and the weather conditions.
d. The availability of logistics support.
e. The political restraints in effect.

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Fig 6.3: Allotment/Apportionment and Allocation Process

RESPONSIBILITIES OF JFACC

6.19. In order to understand the responsibilities of a JFACC, it is

necessary to have a brief understanding of how the joint estimate is
arrived at. Joint operations are primarily about war fighting, which is the
ability to collectively combine the full range of single-service capabilities
into a cohesive joint force that can conduct a campaign against a similarly
capable adversary. When air forces act in conjunction with surface forces
in support of land, sea or air objectives, the supporting commander and
the supported commander(s) and their staff must work in unison
throughout the period from the creation of joint surface/air plans to their
final execution. A joint headquarters should be established with separate
command centres under the control of that headquarters. When these
alternatives are not possible, adequate communications and coordinating
procedures are to be established between them.

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6.20 The Joint Estimate. The Joint Estimate is the central process for
the formulation and modification of military plans and action during a joint
campaign. In preparing the Joint estimate, there will be inputs from the
Land, Maritime, Air and Logistics Components. The Air component makes
its inputs through the air estimate.

6.21 The Air Estimate. The Air Estimate is the tool through which the
air component influences the air input to the joint estimate. It cannot be
carried out in isolation. The process closely mirrors the joint estimate but
concentrates on the specific integration of air matters into the joint plan. A
concept of operations is developed and a course of action is selected. It
serves to validate the air component commander’s mission and offers
advice on air matters to the joint estimate.

6.22 Specific Responsibilities of the JFACC. The JFACC is

responsible for producing the air estimate as well as joint air operations
planning, using the assets assigned to him. As air power can be used in
so many different ways, the Commander may well undertake both
supported and supporting operations within the JTFC’s campaign plan.
Specifically, JFACC responsibilities include:

a. Developing the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) that will best
support the JTFCs CONOPS and form the air element of the joint
campaign plan.
b. Taking the lead in the air apportionment recommendation to
the JTFC (in consultation with the other CCs).
c. Based on the air apportionment decision, provide centralised
direction for the allocation and tasking of the joint air contribution.
d. Controlling and monitoring the execution of joint air
operations.

e. Co-ordinating joint air operations with the operations of other

JFCCs, and forces assigned to, or supporting, the JTFC.

f. Evaluating the results of joint air operations.

g. Performing the duties of the Air Defence Commander (ADC)
and Airspace Control Authority (ACA) when that authority is
delegated by the JTFC.

h. Functioning as a supported and supporting commander as

directed by the JTFC.

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6.23 Organisation of the JFACHQ. In achieving the above

responsibilities, the JFACHQ will be organised along the A1 to A9 staff
divisions system. The size of each division should depend upon the
complexity, size and nature of the operation that the headquarters
commands. In some cases, certain divisions might be amalgamated or
even completely dropped. Larger divisions may be sub-divided into
branches. Specific branches are enumerated below:

a. A1: Personnel and Administration.

b. A2: Intelligence and Security.
c. A3: Operations.
d. A4: Logistics.
e. A5 Plans and Strategy.

f. A6: Communications and Information Systems.

g. A7: Doctrine and Training.

h. A8: Resources and Finances.

i. A9: Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC).

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS AND PRINCIPLES OF AIR CONTROL

6.24 Basic Characteristics. An air commander must be provided with

a suitable command and control system to enable him to exercise
command and control of his air assets in accordance with the principles
described above. An air force control organisation should possess the
following characteristics:
a. The flexibility to adapt to any scale or intensity of conflict
envisaged and to meet circumstances which may develop during the
conduct of operations.
b. The mobility, which will ensure, if necessary, easy and rapid
movement within the area of operations.
c. A high degree of survivability, when confronted with all forms
of adversary action.
d. A high degree of reliability under all environmental conditions.

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e. Inter-operability with other control systems within the same

area and the facilities for liaison at appropriate levels with those
systems.
f. Inter-operability with control systems in adjacent areas to
permit, as appropriate, support and liaison with those areas.
g. The capability of receiving, transmitting, analysing, storing and
retrieving, processing and displaying appropriate data concerning
command, control and co-ordinating functions to allow for effective
air operations. Examples include air and surface situation displays,
intelligence, weather, aircraft movements, weapons resource
catalogues, adversary order of battle and target analysis data.
h. The capability of ensuring, when appropriate, that the data
passed through or held within the system is secure and only handled
by appropriately cleared personnel in a physically secure
environment.
6.25 Composition of Air Control Organization. The composition of an
air control organisation includes control agencies and components with
appropriate staff. It includes communications and information – processing
equipment as well as situation display facilities; if functionally required, it
may also include active and passive sensors for identification, air
surveillance and weapons/traffic control. The number and size of the
various elements of an air control organisation depends on the
requirements of the area to be served and the nature of the task. Planning
and direction of air operations should originate or be supervised from a
primary agency such as the Air Operations Centre (AOC). Staff
composition of the agencies should reflect the functions (and/or
nationalities) of the element they control, to ensure that the air commander
appreciates the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs and limitations to
aid those elements. Facilities must be provided to allow the air
commander and his staff to maintain liaison with other commanders and
their staff. Control authority may be delegated to subordinate air agencies
or elements. The agency should be able to communicate with the various
elements that comprise the air control organisation. The following sub-
paragraphs describe the basic composition and structure of typical land
based, ship and air borne air control organisations.
a. Land – Based Air Control Organisations. Within a land-
based air control organisation the agencies and components are
related to the level of the control authority and/or the air activity
involved. Linked agencies and components should be established at
appropriate level with the supported land/maritime force and be able
to communicate with the primary air agency. They provide the

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means by which information and intelligence may be exchanged

with, and advice on the use of air support given to, the staff of the
appropriate headquarters. Additionally, they assist in processing
requests for and controlling air support.
b. Ship Borne Air Control Organisations. Ship borne air
control organisations can be compared to land-based air control
organisations in their essential characteristics, capabilities and
service. Dissimilarities are primarily ones of terminology and
organisation. Ship borne air control organisations are capable of
controlling and co-ordinating all air operations within an assigned
area of responsibility.
c. Airborne Air Control Organisations. Airborne air control
assets are intended to complement and supplement existing land
based and ship borne organisations. Although airborne systems may
be able to perform all air surveillance and control operations, their
limited availability and restricted time-on-task may curtail their
capability to conduct autonomous operations.

AIRSPACE CONTROL
6.26 An increasingly large and disparate mix of land and sea-based
aircraft (fixed wing and rotary wing), missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) and artillery systems are available to prosecute future operations.
Although the principles for de-conflicting the airspace used by these
systems are relatively simple, the actual practice of de-conflicting joint
airspace users is extremely complex. If not conducted correctly, this facet
of joint operations could jeopardise the outcome of an operation. The
Armed Forces of Nigeria can expect to be called upon to conduct a variety
of operations throughout the spectrum of conflict; from conflict prevention
through to post conflict activity, including counter insurgency, counter
terrorism, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and Peace
Support Operations (PSO). All operations will require a measure of
Airspace Control (ASC) and each solution will be unique. Airspace control
is a combination of airspace organisation and planning procedures. The
resulting control structure and co-ordination functions help to minimize
risks and allow for efficient and flexible use of airspace by all the elements
involved in joint land, sea and air operations. While airspace control is
provided to promote greater flexibility of operations, the authority to
approve, disapprove or deny combat operations is vested in only one
operational commander.

6.27 Methods. There are 2 basic methods of exercising ASC. These are
positive and procedural control.
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a. Positive Control. The use of positive control requires the

controlling authority to possess effective communication and
appreciable level of situation awareness. Consequently, weapon
systems may explore to their full capability within the given rules of
engagement (ROE), such as beyond visual range (BVR)
engagement. Units may be rapidly redirected to the match changing
tactical situations, facilitating high – tempo operations; and airspace
users can rapidly explore different volume of airspace to match their
evolving operational needs. However, because positive control
requires 2 – way communication between all airspace users and the
controlling authority, those who cannot comply are denied access.
Current equipment standard severely limit the opportunity for this
method of ASC. A measured goal for digitization of the joint battle
space is to widen the scope for exploitation of airspace through
positive control.
b. Procedural Control. Procedural control utilizes a wide range
of Airspace Control Means (ACMs). This enables the design of an
ACP, which defines ASC responsibilities. A Commander may be
allocated airspace (and be appointed subordinate control authority
for such areas) within which they have complete freedom of action,
albeit at the expense of other potential users. To improve flexibility,
provision may be made for either the functions, or the
communication or other technical criteria to be pre-requisite for
access to airspace. Other procedures or Weapon Control Orders
(WCOs) may also be used to ensure safety of users. ACOs are the
means for changing the purpose and disposition of ACMs to match
evolving operational needs. ACMs may, however, hinder the
operation of those other than for whom they were promulgated,
thereby limiting operational tempo.
6.28 Selection Factors. The degree to which each ASC method is used
should be determined by considering the following factors:
a. The nature and magnitude of the adversary threat operation.
b. The availability, capability and vulnerability of friendly
management facilities, including airborne and surface-to-air
defences as well as peacetime air traffic control and terminal control
facilities.
c. The number, flight profiles and speeds of friendly aircraft.
d. The type of terrain and likely weather conditions in the combat
zone.

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e. The number, deployment and characteristics of friendly

surface weapon systems.

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CHAPTER 7

FUNDAMENTALS OF SPACE POWER

“To begin with, it must be made clear that space is becoming,

or some would say, space has become the 4th medium in
which the military operates in the protection of our national
security interests. …… We say we are evolving toward
becoming a Space and Air Force because spacepower (sic)
and airpower are inextricably linked as components of the
vertical dimension of warfare.”

---- General Howell M. Estes III.

INTRODUCTION

7.1 Space is the physical universe beyond the earth’s atmosphere.

Space medium is the vast extent beyond the atmosphere where the laws
of astrodynamics rule the motion of objects. DESERT STORM was the first
war in which space systems played a significant military role. As a result,
the force enhancement capabilities of space forces are now accepted as a
vital part of the American arsenal. Accordingly, the question of a separate
Space Force is gaining more attention similar to that of the call for a
separate Air Force in the inter-war period following World War I. Nigeria
may not have the capability yet for a separate space force as is being
advocated by advanced countries. However, NAF officers need to be
conversant with space as a future medium for war and also appreciate the
benefits of space resources to application of air power. Of note, some of
the capabilities employed by the NAF such as navigation and
communications depend on space-derived services for their effectiveness.

7.2 Space power is defined as ‘the total strength of a nation’s

capability to conduct and influence activities to, in, through and from space
to achieve its objectives’. It is an integral adjunct to air power and
provides 2 fundamental benefits—global perspective and persistence.
Space power has a pervasive role in military operations, facilitating
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awareness and integrating different capabilities across joint and coalition

operations to create maximum effect. Space capabilities and the ability to
conduct operations in space have traditionally been hi-tech and
expensive. The recent growth in the commercial space sector has made
access to space more available and affordable. Nigeria has ventured into
the space environment through the National Space Research and
Development Agency (NARSDA); which operates satellites in orbit for
commercial purposes. However, the ability to operate in space, where the
primary purpose is to achieve military objectives in or through space, is
still restricted to a small number of nations. Accordingly, there is need for
the NAF to exploit space based information systems for the projection of
air power.

Fig 7.1: NASRDA NIGCOMSAT Ground Station in Abuja

FEATURES OF THE SPACE MEDIUM

7.3 In defining a form of military power, such as space power, it is

necessary to define the features of the medium in which it operates.
These features, or basic properties, are the foundation for understanding
how the medium will affect the forces operating in the medium and how
those forces may be employed. The features of the medium result from a
number of factors. The physical nature of the environment establishes the
fundamental laws of operation in the medium. Political and legal factors
often provide limits on the use of the medium. The resulting features form
the basis for distinguishing the opportunities and challenges presented by
the medium for generating and applying military power.

7.4 The physical features that the space medium provides are elevation
above the surface and atmosphere of the Earth, three-dimensional motion
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within the expanse of space, and the lack of natural barriers. The space
medium is hostile to human beings, materials, and electrical circuits.
Space provides direct access to the air medium as well as indirect access
to the surface through the air. Unlike aerodynamics, astrodynamics
provide space forces with continuous orbital presence. Thus the
permanent basing of platforms in space and their capabilities provide the
economic benefit of the use of space. Such economic uses are;
communications, earth observation, and navigation. These features are
listed in Table 7.1 and give rise to the characteristics of space forces.

Table 7.1: Features of the Space Medium

CHARACTERISTICS OF SPACE FORCES

7.5 It is also necessary to determine the characteristics of the forces to

be employed in the medium. These characteristics help build an
understanding of how a form of military power can be employed in the
medium. The characteristics result from a number of factors. Non-military
use of the medium determines what emphasis has been and will be
placed on developing capabilities in the medium. The resulting technical
capabilities determine to what extent the potential of the medium may be
exploited. Political and legal factors often provide limits on the nature or
employment of the forces. The resulting characteristics form the basis for
determining how military power will be employed in the medium.

7.6 Elevation above the atmosphere gives space forces a view of the
entire atmosphere and surface of the Earth. This view gives spacemen a
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global perspective unmatched by forces of the other mediums. The energy

required to change orbit significantly limits the maneuverability of space
forces. However, three-dimensional motion and the lack of barriers give
space forces freedom of movement. Elevation above the Earth and orbital
motion give space forces a global range, allowing a small number of
space forces to provide their capabilities to within the entire surface and
atmosphere. Presence in orbit and the technical capabilities of the
payloads, communications, and command and control of space forces
allow them to achieve rapid, often instantaneous, response.

7.7 Technology provides significant capabilities to and limitations on

space forces. The lack of rapid and assured launch capability makes
space forces slow to deploy. Their global range and speed of response
make space forces highly versatile, able to support or engage targets in
geographically separated areas of operations and to rapidly shift focus
between areas of operations. Restricted launch capabilities result in space
payloads that are capable in a narrow range of functions, limiting the
flexibility of space forces. The orbital nature of most space force
operations results in a variety of control paradigms. Geosynchronous
space forces are in constant view of ground terminals, providing real-time
control and autonomy. However, lower altitude space forces gain and lose
contact with control stations resulting in decreased timeliness of command
and control for such forces.

7.8 Technological limits on launch access, maneuvre, and propulsion

significantly restrict physical access to and from space. Restricted physical
access to the surface of the Earth combines with technological shortfalls
to limit the weapons effects available to space forces. Weight and
technical capability limitations combine with the lack of terrain and
masking opportunities make space forces extremely observable from the
air, land, and sea. An additional effect of the difficulty and expense of
launching space forces into orbit is that they must be made light and are
thus rather fragile. This, combined with the observability of space forces,
results in the relative vulnerability of space forces. These characteristics
are listed in Table 7.2.

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Table 7.2: Characteristics of Space Forces

TENETS OF EMPLOYING SPACE FORCES

7.9 Space forces are limited in number, costly, and provide significant
capability to theatre commanders. This will require centralized control of
space operations on a global scale. A knowledgeable theatre commander
will identify the focus of space forces efforts and prioritize those efforts.
The requests of theatre commanders will then be deconflicted based on
strategic priorities by a commander with global perspective and a sound
understanding of the trade-offs involved in applying space power.
Decentralized execution by space operators will maximize effects applying
specialized knowledge and situational awareness. Space forces will
require protection to achieve freedom of action and will need to limit the
enemy’s freedom of action in order to produce success in warfare. This
will require achievement of space superiority.

7.10 Optimum use of the global presence and versatility of space

power is achieved when it is employed to produce synergistic effects.
Space power differs from the surface forms of military power in that it
cannot directly occupy and control territory on the surface. Instead, lasting
effect upon targets and areas will be achieved by persistence, the
continual vigilance of space information systems combined with combat
power applied from all four mediums of military power. For
geosynchronous space forces, this will require constant access to the area
of interest. For space forces at other altitudes and non-orbital space

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forces, this will require revisit of the area of interest without an

unacceptably long gap in coverage.

7.11 The global presence and versatility of space power make its
application attractive for a multitude of uses in modern warfare, but to
achieve massed and persistent effects, concentration of space forces
towards achieving significant objectives is necessary. In addition, the
objectives to which space forces will be directed must be prioritized so that
they make the greatest contribution to the joint force. In applying space
forces, the commander must balance opportunities, necessity,
effectiveness, efficiency, and impact on accomplishing theatre objectives
against the associated risks. Use of space forces may incite enemy action
against them, so the risk to space forces and the global capability they
provide must be balanced against the benefit of their use, as space forces
will be the most difficult to rapidly replace and their loss would be most
difficult to work around.

7.12 Space is hostile to both human and machine, making

redundancy necessary for successful use of space power. Success will
require space systems whose forces have redundant sub-systems or that
employ a redundancy of platforms to ensure robustness of a space
provided function. The hostility of the space will also include enemy
threats to space forces. Due to the vulnerability and observability of space
forces, acting to counter or eliminate such threats before they can be used
will be critical to maintaining space control as well as information
dominance. This requires the application of the tenet of initiative in space
operations, especially those aimed at attaining space and information
superiority.

7.13 Satellites and systems operating in space are also vulnerable

to interference. Consequently reliance on these systems are potential
risks. Military operations need to consider the possibilities of disruption of
the activities in the space domain in the planning and execution of
terrestrial campaigns. These risks will have to be carefully managed by
mitigating vulnerabilities of space systems and countering emergent
threats. Fig 7.2 illustrates the security of space based information.

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Fig 7.2: Security of Space Sourced Information

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CHAPTER 8
AIR POWER DEFINITIONS AND TERMS
8.1 All terms and definitions are drawn from British Defence Doctrine,
the United States Joint Doctrine, the NATO Glossary of Terms and
Definitions or other sources as indicated. Those marked NTP are under
consideration in the NATO terminology programme.

8.2 Agency. A distinct non-military body which has objectives that are
broadly consistent with those of the campaign.
8.3 Active Air Defence. Direct defensive action taken to nullify or
reduce the effectiveness of hostile air missile threats against friendly
forces and vital assets. It includes such measures as the use of aircraft,
air defense weapons, weapons not used primarily in air defense role and
electronic warfare.
8.4 Aim (Military). A single unambiguous military purpose that must be
established before a plan can be developed at any level of command for a
military operation.
8.5 Air Borne Early Warning. Air surveillance and control; provided by
airborne early warning aircraft equipped with search and height finding
radar and communications equipment for controlling weapon systems.
8.6 Air Defence. All defence measures designed to destroy attacking
adversary aircraft and missiles to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of
such attacks.
8.7 Air Defence Operations Area. An area and the air space above it
within which procedures are established to minimize mutual interference
between air defence and other operations; it may include designation code
of one or more of the following: air defence action area, air defence area,
air defence identification zone, and or firepower umbrella(Joint Pub 1-02).
8.8 Airhead. A designated area in a hostile or threatened territory
which when seized and held ensures the continuous air landing of troops
and material and provides the manoeuvre space necessary for projected
operations. Normally it is an area seized in the assault phases of an
airborne operation.
8.9 Airspace Control Authority. The commander designated to
assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control
system in the airspace control area.
8.10 Airspace Control In The Combat Zone. A process used to
increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient and flexible
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use of airspace. Airspace control is provided in order to prevent fratricide,

enhance air defence operations, and permit greater flexibility operations.
Air space control does not infringe on the authority vested in commanders
to approve, disapprove or deny combat operations. Also called combat
airspace control; airspace control. (Joint Pub 1-02).
8.11 Air Interdiction. An air operation conducted to destroy, neutralize
or delay the adversary’s military potential before it can be brought to bear
effectively against friendly forces at such a distance from friendly forces
that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of
friendly forces.
8.12 Airlift. Strategic or inter – theatre airlift is the carriage of
passengers and cargos between theatres of operation. Tactical or intra
theatre airlift is the carriage of passengers and cargo within a theatre of
operation.
8.13 Air Operations For Strategic Effect. Air operations for strategic
effect are aimed to destroy or disrupt the defined strategic centre of gravity
of an opponent. The effect sought by air power could be destructive, on-
destructive or a combination of both, against target sets, which undermine
the opponent’s ability, will and means to continue his aggression. Air
operations for strategic effect are not limited to bombing or solely the
domain of attack aircraft. All combat aircraft and associated weapon
systems are capable of action for strategic effect.
8.14 Air Superiority. That degree of dominance in the air battle of one
force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former
and its related land, sea, air forces at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference by the opposing force.
8.15 Air Supremacy. That degree of air superiority where in the
opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.
8.16 Allocation (Air). The translation of the air apportionment decision
into total number of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or
task. (Joint Pub 1-02).
8.17 Allotment. Allotment is the temporary change of assignment of air
forces between subordinate commands. The authority to allot is vested in
the commander having operational command. The process of allotment is
used to provide the balance of forces needed to achieve the objectives
stipulated by that command.
8.18 Apportionment (Air). The determination and assignment of the
total expected air efforts by percentage and/or by priority that should be
devoted to the various air operations or geographic area for a given period
of time. (Joint Pub 1-02).
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8.19 Area Air Defence Commander. Within a unified command,

subordinate unified command, or joint task force the commander assigns
overall responsibility for air defence to a single commander. Normally, this
is the component commander with the preponderance of air defence
capability and the command, control and communication’s capability to
plan and execute integrated air defence operations. Representations from
the other components involved are provided, as appropriate to the area air
defence commander’s headquarters. Also called AADC. (Joint Pub 1-02).
8.20 Area of Responsibility. The geographical area assigned by the
military strategic authority within which the operational level commander
has authority to plan and conduct the campaign and controls all joint
actions supporting his mission. (NTP)
8.21 Attrition. The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by
loss of personnel and material.
8.22 Attrition Warfare. A style of warfare characterized by the
application of substantial combat power that reduces an adversary’s ability
to fight through loss of personnel and equipment. Essentially, it aims at the
physical destruction of the adversary.
8.23 Battle Damage Assessment. The timely and accurate estimate
of damage resulting from the application of military force lethal or
non–lethal against a predetermined objective.
8.24 Battle Space. All aspects of air, surface, sub-surface, land, space
and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompass the area of operations.
8.25 Battle Space Dominance. The degree of control over dimensions
of the battle space that enhances friendly freedom of action and denies
the adversary freedom of action. It permits power projection and force
sustainment to accomplish the full range of potential mission.
8.26 Campaign. A set of related joint military operations in a given
area(s) designed to achieve particular objectives. (NTP)
8.27 Centre of Gravity. Characteristics, capabilities or locality (ies) from
which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derive its
freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (NTP)
8.28 Close Air Support. Air action on hostile targets which are in close
proximity to friendly forces which require detailed integration of each air
mission with the fire and movement of those forces.
8.29 Collateral Damage. Damage to personnel and property adjacent
to, but not forming part of an authorized target.

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8.30 Combat Air Patrol. An aircraft patrol provided over an objective

area over the force protected, over the critical area of a combat zone or
over an air defence area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying
hostile aircraft before they reach their target.
8.31 Combat Power. The total means of destruction and/or disruptive
force which a military unit/force can apply against the opponent at a given
time.
8.32 Combined Operations. Military operations in which elements of
two or more allied nations participate.
8.33 Combine Joint Task Force. A multinational multi-service task
force. The CJTF headquarters concept provides for deployable
multinational multi-service headquarters of variable size formed to
command and control CJTFS of NATO and possible non –NATO nations.
A CJTF HQ could also be deployed for WEU led operations.
8.34 Command. Command is the authority vested in an individual for the
direction, coordination and control of military forces.
8.35 Commander’s Estimate of the Situation. A formal analysis of the
situation, mission, adversary and own courses of action conducted in
preparation for forming a commander’s intentions and concept of
operations.
8.36 Commander’s Intent. A concise expression of the purpose of a
campaign or operation, the desired results and how operations will
progress towards achieving the desired end-state. At the tactical level, the
commander’s intent should be focused on the effect that he wishes to
achieve on the adversary.
8.37 Commonality. A state achieved when groups of individuals,
organization or nations use common doctrines, procedures or equipment.
8.38 Compatibility. The capability of 2 or more items or components of
equipment or material to exist or function in the same or environment
without mutual interference.
8.39 Components. Component are forces of one or more services
grouped into functional force elements (i.e. Maritime, land, air, logistics
and special forces) or exceptionally by service or geographical area
organized under one or more component commander’s subordinate to the
operations level commander.
8.40 Concept of Operations. A clear and concise statement of the line
of action chosen by commander in order to accomplish his mission.

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8.41 Control. Authority which may be less than full command exercised
by a commander over part of the activities of subordinates or other
organizations. (Joint Pub 1-02).
8.42 Co-ordinating Authority. The authority granted to a commander
or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or
activities involving forces of 2 or more services or involving 2 or more
forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation
between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have
the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the
agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by
discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement, he
should refer the matter to the appropriate authority.
8.43 Coordinator of Supporting Command Functions. When
appointed by the CDS as Coordinator of Supporting Command Functions
(CSCF) for a particular operation, CJO is to assume responsibility for
coordinating the deployment, sustainment and recovery of assigned
forces, and is accordingly granted Coordinating Authority between all
commands. CJO will, in these circumstances, be the primary national
point of contact at the operational HQ level for dealing with NATO Military
Authorities (NMAS) or their equivalents. Coordinating authority does not in
itself carry any command authority or affect the responsibility of the
supporting commands to the COS.
8.44 Counter Air. A function that integrates and exploits the
mutually beneficial effects of offensive and defensive operations by fixed
and rotary winged aircraft, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, anti
aircraft guns, artillery, and electronic warfare to destroy or neutralize
adversary aircraft and missile forces and their infrastructure both before
and after launch.
8.45 Culminating Point. An operation reaches its culminating point
when the operation can just be maintained but not developed to any
greater advantage.
8.46 Deception. Those measures designed to mislead an adversary by
manipulation, distortion or falsification.
8.47 Decisive Condition. An event, the successful outcome of which is
a precondition for unlocking the adversary’s centre of gravity.
8.48 Defensive Counter-Air. Operations to detect, identify, intercept,
and destroy adversary air and missile forces attempting to attack or
penetrate the friendly air environment. Defensive counter-air
encompasses both active and passive measures and is normally

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conducted near or over friendly territory and generally reacts to the

initiative of adversary forces. Also DCA.
8.49 Direct Air Operations. Direct air operations are intended to bring
the flexibility and the precision of air power to bear where and when it is
needed. Direct air mission may include denial, disruption and mobility
operations in direct contact with opposing forces. Such operations require
close coordination and, possibly, control from other elements, be the land,
sea ,or air.
8.50 Directive. A military communication in which policy is established
or a specific action is ordered.
8.51 Doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces
guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires
judgement in application.
8.52 Electronic Warfare. Any military action involving the use of
electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic
spectrum or to attack the adversary. Also called EW. The 3 major sub
division within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic
protection and electronic warfare support.
a. Electronic Attack. Electronic attack is that division or electronic
warfare involving the use of electromagnetic, directed energy or
anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities or equipment
with the intent of degrading, neutralizing or destroying adversary
combat capability. EA includes:
(1) Actions taken to prevent or reduce an adversary’s
effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum such as jamming
and electromagnetic deception,
(2) Employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic
or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism
(lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams or radiation
weapons).
b. Electronic Protection. Electronic protection is that division of
electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel,
facilities, and equipments from any effects of friendly or adversary
employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize or destroy
friendly combat capability. Also called EP.
c. Electronic Warfare Support. That division of electronic
warfare involving actions tasked by or under direct control of an
operational commander to search for, intercept, identify and locate
sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic
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energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus,

electronic warfare support provides information required for
immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and
other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting and
homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used
to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), which includes both
communications intelligence (COMINT), and electronic intelligence
(ELINT).
8.53 End-State. The state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the
end of a campaign either by the adversary air forces is insufficient to
prejudice the success of friendly land, sea or air operation. (NTP)
8.54 Favourable Air Situation. An air situation in which the extent of air
effort applied by the adversary air forces is insufficient to prejudice the
success of friendly land, sea or air operation.
8.55 Force Protection. Process which aims to conserve the fighting
potential of the deployed force by countering the wider threat to all its
elements from an adversary, natural and human hazards and fratricide.
8.56 Fratricide. The accidental destruction of own, allied or friendly
forces. A result of what is colloquially known as a “blue on blue
engagement”.
8.57 Full Command. The military authority and responsibility of a
superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspects of
military operations and administration and remains a national
responsibility which cannot be delegated. No multinational commander will
therefore have full command over forces assigned him by other nations.
8.58 Host Nation Support. Civil and military assistance rendered in
peace, crisis and war by host nation to allied forces and organizations
which are located on or in transit through the host nation territory. Also
HNS.
8.59 Indirect Air Operations. Operations aimed at depriving the
adversary of the military power he needs to occupy territory or exploit sea
space by neutralizing, delaying or destroying surface forces. Indirect air
operations enable a commander to take advantage of both friendly
strengths and adversary weakness whilst preserving his own freedom
action.
8.60 Interchangeability. A condition which exists when 2 or more items
posses such functional and physical characteristics as to be equivalent in
performance and durability, and are capable of being exchanged one for
the other without alteration of the items themselves or adjoining items,
except for adjustment and without selection for fit and performance.
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8.61 Interoperability. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide

services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to
use the service so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively
together.
8.62 Joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations etc in which
elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.
8.63 Joint Force Air Component Commander. The joint force air
component commander derives his authority from the joint force
commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign
missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders redirect
and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the
overall mission. The joint force commander normally designates a joint
force air component commander. The joint force air component
commander’s responsibilities are designed by the joint force commander
(normally these includes, but are not limited to planning, coordination,
allocation and tasking based on the joint force commander’s
apportionment decision. Using the joint force commander’s guidance and
authority and in coordination with other service component commanders
and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air
component commander recommends to the joint force commander
apportionment of air sorties to various mission or geographic areas. Also
called JFACC.( Joint Pub 1-02).
8.64 Joint Task Force Commander. The operational commander of a
nominated joint force.
8.65 Lines of Operation. Lines of Operation link decisive conditions in
the air space on the path of the centre of gravity.
8.66 Main Effort. A concentration of forces or means, in a particular
area where a commander seeks to bring about a decision.
8.67 Manoeuvre Warfare. Manoeuvre warfare is a war fighting
philosophy that seeks to defeat the adversary by shattering his morale and
physical cohesion; his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole,
rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition.
8.68 Manoeuvrist. A term describing an approach that employs the
principles of manoeuvre warfare.
8.69 Mission Command. A style of command that seeks to convey
understanding to subordinates about the intentions of the higher
commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out
missions with the maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources.

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8.70 Multinational Operations. Operation in which elements of 2 or

more nations participate and which are normally based on a coalition.
8.71 No Fly Zone. Zone of air space established by international states
(or conceivably unilateral as a military or total exclusion zone) in which
special types of aircraft are prohibited.
8.72 Offensive Counter Air. Operations mounted to destroy, disrupt or
confine adversary air power as close to its base as practicable. Also OCA.
8.73 Operation. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic tactical
service training or administrative military mission, the process of carrying
on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence, and manoeuvres
needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign (NTP).
8.74 Operational Art. The skilful employment of military forces to attain
strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct
of campaigns and major operations.
8.75 Operational Command. The authority granted to a commander
to assign missions or task to subordinate commanders to deploy units, to
reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and or tactical control
as may be deemed necessary it does not include responsibility for
administration or logistics. Also OPCOM.
8.76 Operational Control. Transferable command authority that may
be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of
combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be
delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over
subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and
forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives and giving authoritative
direction necessary to accomplish the mission.
8.77 Operational Level of War. The level of war at which campaigns
and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to
accomplish strategic objective within areas of responsibility.
8.78 Operational Pause. A pause in operations while retaining the
initiative in other ways.
8.79 Order. A communication written or oral or by signal which conveys
instruction from a superior to a subordinate.
8.80 Passive Air Defense. All measures other than active air defense
taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air action. These measures
include deception, dispersion and the use of protective construction (joint
Pub 1-02).

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8.81 Peace Support Operations. Multi-functional operations involving

military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies, They are
designed to achieve humanitarian goals or long term political settlement
and are conducted impartially in support of an appropriate mandate.
These include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention,
peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations.
8.82 Phase. A phase is a discrete and identifiable activity along a
military line of operation in time and/or space that allows for the
reorganization and redirection of force part of the superior commander’s
plan.
8.83 Principles of War. The principles of war are guides to action and
fundamental tenets forming the basis for appreciating a situation and
planning but their relevance, applicability and relative importance change
with circumstances.
8.84 Recognized Air Picture. The fullest achievable agreed level of
identification and tracking of all airborne contacts in the area of interest.
8.85 Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain by visual
observation or other detection methods, information about the activities
and resources of an adversary or potential adversary or to secure data
about meteorological, hydrographical or geographical characteristics of a
particular area.
8.86 Sequence. The arrangement of activities within a campaign in the
order most likely to achieve the elimination of the adversary’s entire centre
of gravity.
8.87 Simultaneity. Element of campaign and operational design that
seeks to disrupt the decision making process of the adversary commander
by confronting him with a number of problems simultaneously.
8.88 Supported Commander. A commander having primary
responsibility from all aspects of a task assigned by higher authority.
(NTP).
8.89 Supporting Commander. A commander who furnishes forces,
equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander or who
develops a supporting plans.
8.90 Suppression of Adversary Air Defences. The purpose of SEAD
mission is to neutralize, destroy or degrade adversary surfaces-to-air
defence system, which could include parts of an integral air defence
system, radars and early warning systems. Also SEAD.

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8.91 Surveillance. The systematic observation of the aerospace

surface and sub-surface area, places, persons, or things by visual, aerial,
electronic, photographic or other means.
8.92 Sustainability. The ability of a force to maintain the necessary
level of combat power for duration required to achieve its objectives.
8.93 Synchronization. The focusing of resources and activities to
produce maximum combat power at the decisive time.
8.94 Tactical Command. The authority designed to a commander to
assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the
mission assigned by their higher authority. Also TACOM.
8.95 Tasking. Tasking is the process of translating the allocation into
orders, and passing those orders to the units involved. Each order
normally contains sufficient detailed instruction to enable the executing
agency to accomplish the mission successfully.
8.96 Theatre of Operation. A geographical area defined by the
military strategic authority which includes and surrounds the area
delegated to the operational commander within which he will conduct
operations.
8.97 Weapon Engagement Zone. In air defense, aerospace defined
dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats
normally rests with a particular weapon system.
8.98 Weapon Free. In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a
status whereby weapons systems may be fired at any target not positively
recognized as friendly. (Joint Pub 1-02).
8.99 Weapons Hold. In air defence, a weapon control order imposing
a status whereby weapons system may only be fired in self defence or in
response to a formal order. (Joint Pub 1-02).
8.100 Weapons Tight. In air defence a weapon control order imposing
a status whereby weapons systems may be fired only at targets
recognized as hostile. (Joint Pub 1-02).

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAA Anti Aircraft Artillery

AADC Area Air Defence Commander
AAR Air-to-Air Refuelling
ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Centre
ACA Airspace Control Authority
ACE Airborne Command Element
ACO Airspace Control Order
ACP Airspace Control Plan
AD Air Defence
AEW Airborne Early Warning
AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document
ADC Air Defence Commander
AFSST Air Force Space Support Team
AO Area of Operations
AOC Air Operation Centre
AOR Area of Responsibility
ASC Air Space Control
ASFAO Anti Surface Force Air Operations
ASFO Anti Surface Force Operations
ASOC Air Support Operation Centre
AU African Union
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
BCD Battlefield Coordination Detachment
C2 Command and Control
C3 Command, Control and Communications

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C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers and

Intelligence
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CAP Combat Air Patrol.
CAS Close Air Support
CCD Camouflage, Concealment and Deception
CEA Campaign Effective Analysis
CGIG Cross Government Implementation Group
CID Combat Identification
CIS Command and Information Systems
CIVPOL Civil Police
CJO Chief Joint Operations
CIMIC Civil Military Coordination/Cooperation
C-IN-C Commander in Chief
CND Computer Network Defence
CNE Computer Network Exploitation
CNO Computer Network Operations
CoA Course of Action
COCOM Combatant Commander
CoG Centre of Gravity
COMAFFOR Commander Air Forces
COMPUSEC Computerized Security
COMSEC Communications Security
CONOPS Concept of Operations
Comd Command, Commander
COP Common Operation Picture
CRC Control and Reporting Centre

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CSAR Combat Search and Rescue

CSCF Coordinator of Support Command Functions
DCA Defensive Counter Air
DFI Direct Foreign Investment
DFID Department for International Development
Div Division
DJA Defense Joint Air Force
DP Decisive Point
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECHO European Committee for Humanitarian Office
ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Cooperation of West African States
EMCON Emission Control
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
ERC Emergency Relief Coordinator
EOD Explosives Ordinance Disposal
EW Electronic Warfare
EWCM Electronic Warfare Counter Measures
Fd Field
FP Force Protection
GCCS Global Command and Control System
GBAD Ground Based Air Defence
HN Host Nation
HNS Host Nation Support
HO Humanitarian Operations
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HVA High Value Asset
HVAA High Value Airborne Asset
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ICRC International Committee for the Red Cross

ID Identification
IE Information Exploitation
IO/Info Ops Information Operations
INFOSEC Information Security
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and
Reconnaissance
IW Information Warfare
JACHQ Joint Air Command HQ
JAOC Joint Air Operations Centre
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JFC Joint Force Commander
JOA Joint Operations Area
J-SEAD Joint Suppression of Adversary Air Defences
J-STARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTF Joint Task Force
JTFC Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ Joint Task Force Headquarters
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
JTTP Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
LOC Lines of Communication
KP Key Point
MACA Military Aid for Civil the Authority
MACP Military Aid for the Civil Power
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MCS Modular Control System

MOD Ministry of Defence
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NALE Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element
NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NBCD Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence
NCA National Command Authority
NEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operations
NRG News Release Group
OA Operations Analysis
OCA Offensive Counter Air
OI Organisation for Immigration
OODA Observe Orientate Decision Action
OPS Operations
OPCON Operational Control
Ops Sup Operations Support
POL Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
PB Peace Building
PE Peace Enforcement
PJHQ Permanent Joint HQ
PK Peace Keeping
POW/PW Prisoner of War
PSO Peace Support Operations
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
RAF Royal Air Force
ROE Rules of Engagement
S/A POD Sea/Air Ports of Disembarkation
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
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SEAD Suppression of Adversary Air Defences

SF Special Forces
SH Support Helicopter
SHORAD Shortage-Range Air Defense
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOLE Special Operation Liaison Elements
TASMO Tactical Air Support Maritime Operations
TACON Tactical Control
TACS Theatre Air Control Systems
TBM Theatre Ballistic Missile
TBMS Tactical Battle Management System
TM Theatre Missile
TMD Theatre Missile Defence
TST Time-Sensitive Target
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces
US United States
USAF United States Air Force
WCO Weapon Control Order
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

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