1

Aristotle on Human Rights

Michael Pakaluk1

There is no theory of human rights in Aristotle, yet, Aristotelian political theory provides

a suitable context for the affirmation and development of a theory of human rights.

First, that there is no theory of human rights in Aristotle.

This claim can be approached in various ways. One way is to observe that Aristotle has

no language for human rights, and that, indeed, his central notions for political philosophy are

strikingly different—because what he wishes to emphasize are such notions as merit, virtue,

participation in the constitution, and citizenship.2 For Aristotle, dikaion, like the Latin ius,

signifies an objective equality of persons in relation to goods of fortune and with a view to some

transaction or exchange.3 Again, citizens subjectively may possess exousia, similar to Latin

potestas, but this exousia is acquired and based on some antecedent claim of merit.4 Finally, the

term kurios represents de facto control, or sometimes a lawmaking power, but not an immunity

from lawful restriction.5

As is well known, Fred Miller has claimed that Aristotle had a notion of human rights;6

yet it seems to me that Malcolm Schofield is correct in his assessment:

1
Department of Philosophy, Ave Maria University; formerly Associate Professor of Philosophy, Clark University,
and Director, Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy; author of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: An
Introduction (Cambridge University Press) and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, books VIII and IX (Clarendon
Aristotle Series).
2
Malcolm Schofield, “Sharing in the Constitution,” Review of Metaphysics, 49 (1996), 831–58, p. 857.
3
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 209; Michael Pakaluk, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: An
Introduction, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 181‐3.
4
See generally Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, Eerdman’s, 2001, pp. 17‐28.
5
Malcolm Schofield, “Sharing in the Constitution,” Review of Metaphysics, 49 (1996), 831–58, p. 857.
6
Fred D. Miller, Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
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In order to exhibit Aristotle's philosophy of political justice as a

rights-based theory, [Miller] has to undertake a massive exercise in
what we might call retranslation. The ordinary meanings of words
like dikaion ("just"), exousia ("power"), and kurios ("in
authority/control") are subject to a revisionist program of linguistic
regimentation. How Aristotle actually talks is the best clue we
have to how he thinks. If he thinks in terms of worth or desert, it is
not, at the end of the day, very helpful to recast that thinking in
terms of rights.7

The other way of approaching the thesis is to observe that Aristotle either rejects the

purposes for which the theory of human rights has typically been proposed, or achieves those

purposes through means, characteristic of his philosophy, other than through any such notion as

human rights, as will be the argument in the present paper.

The doctrine of human rights has had various purposes in political discourse and political action:

1. It may be invoked simply to assert a truth, the equality of all human beings, a “proposition”,

which political association is then meant to affirm through its institutions and procedures.8

Thus, Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence appeals to “truths” which are said to be

“self-evident”,9 and Lincoln astonishingly asserts that the purpose of the American republic

was to affirm a proposition, as the nation was “conceived in liberty and dedicated to the

proposition that all men are created equal.”10 Call this “Rights as Truths about Equality.”

2. It may serve to mark out a limited purpose of government,—namely, that of vindicating

certain enumerated rights—and therefore to establish a limited authority of government, so

7
Malcolm Schofield, “Sharing in the Constitution,” Review of Metaphysics, 49 (1996), 831–58, p. 857.
8
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
9
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html
10
http://myloc.gov/exhibitions/gettysburgaddress/Pages/default.aspx
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that the government may not licitly do more than vindicate those rights.11 Call this, “Rights

as Limiting Government.”

3. The doctrine has been used to establish a right to revolution, precisely by vesting the

authority to vindicate rights originally with the people: on this view, political sovereignty is

understood as the people’s transferring this right to the government in a social contract, and,

if the government fails to keep its end of the bargain, the people become justified in initiating

a revolution.12 Call this “Rights as Justifying Revolution.”

4. More recently, the theory is appealed to in order to place certain matters outside the

democratic process, not subject to ordinary democratic deliberation and debate: whatever is

alleged to be right in this sense, then, is regarded as forever fixed and irrevocable—since a

“right” is a political reality which cannot justifiably be altered even, supposing, in the

establishment of a new constitution in the wake of a revolution, since any valid social

contract must presuppose and be effected within the boundaries of these rights.13 Call this

“Rights as Trumping Deliberation.”

5. Finally, and also more recently,14 the doctrine is invoked to provide a popular framework in

which complaints may be easily formulable and which receive attention precisely because the

complaint alleges harm: the claim that “my rights are being violated” alleges harm and is

rhetorically simpler and more powerful than, “I am the incidental subject of this person’s

11
See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Chapter 1, Introductory.
12
John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, chapter XIX, “On the Dissolution of Government”. “it is the right of
any people, sufficiently numerous for national independence, to throw off, to revolutionize, their existing form of
government, and to establish such other in its stead as they may choose” Abraham Lincoln, “Resolutions on Behalf
of Hungarian Freedom,” January 9, 1852, Roy Basler, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 2, p. 116.
13
Dworkin, R., 1984, “Rights as Trumps”, in Waldron 1984, pp. 153–67 in Waldron, J., (ed.), 1984, Theories of
Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14
How, and how far, this truth is meant to be represented in a society’s institutions is the reason for the differences
between libertarians and social democrats. The former that hold it is enough if attacks on life-liberty, and property
are prevented; the latter hold, rather, that a modestly favorable standard of living, at least, needs to be insured for all,
or else human equality is effectively negated in a society.
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deliberate realization of an objective state of inequality”.15 What is referred to “rights talk”

is simply the habit, especially among Americans, of casting every disagreement in terms of

conflicting claims of violation of “rights” in this sense.16 Call this “Rights as Implying

Harms.”

There is one last purpose for the language of rights which is orthogonal to most of these

just mentioned. Most of the ones mentioned make claims of a kind of legal necessity, of

something which must be so – must be done, must not be omitted, must be honored, must not be

put up for grabs, and so on.17 Indeed, that is why we call them “rights”—the very logic of right

(as opposed to good) imports some notion of necessity.18 And yet “right” nonetheless can also

be used in the weaker sense of “what is owing to someone as a consequence of its being good.”19

In the sense in which anything good for a person is due to him, in that sense that person may be

said to have that by “right”, and, therefore (and only in that sense) to “have a right” to it.20 On

this way of speaking, everything good for someone is something to which he has a “right”, which

is simply to say that if he lacks it he is somehow incomplete or imperfect.21 Thus:

15
For the so‐called “Harm Principle” as providing the rationale for control through law, see John Stuart Mill (1859).
On Liberty. Oxford University Press. pp. 21–22.
16
Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk, Free Press, 1993.
17
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 198.
18
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 199‐205.
19
See the relation of the two senses of deō in Greek: Liddell, Scott, Jones, and McKenzie, Greek‐English Lexicon,
Oxford, 1968, s.v.
20
See Bl. Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris: “But first We must speak of man's rights. Man has the right to live. He
has the right to bodily integrity and to the means necessary for the proper development of life, particularly food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, rest, and, finally, the necessary social services. In consequence, he has the right to
be looked after in the event of illhealth; disability stemming from his work; widowhood; old age; enforced
unemployment; or whenever through no fault of his own he is deprived of the means of livelihood.” (n . 11).
21
Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights marks the transition to this notion of “right”: “Everyone,
as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and
international co‐operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic,
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.”.
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6. Finally, the appeal to rights may have the function of marking out that which political

authority is for; to identify the various goods—“external goods” in the classical sense, but

not necessarily commutable goods—which are such that a government understood as aiming

to serve its citizens cannot claim to be successful unless all citizens enjoy them.22 Call this

“Rights as Goods.”

Now, as I said, Aristotle shares none of these purposes, and thus he would have no use

for a theory of rights. As a theory of rights could play no role in his political philosophy, it is

misguided to attribute such a theory to him.

As regards 1, Aristotle has no notion of an association’s existing in order to represent in its

organization or procedures a truth.23 He holds that associations arise in order to procure goods

for their members: that the political association aims to procure a complete good would not be a

relevant difference.24 Moreover, of course, Aristotle does not think it is in fact true that all

human beings are equal, as he believes that there are human beings who by nature are slaves, and

that women lack an authoritative reasoning power which men have.25 These views are not

superficial endoxa for him, since he thinks generally that human reasonability has manifestations

which are different in kind and hierarchically ordered—as seen, he thinks, in the ordering and

subordination of that part of the soul which is rational insofar as it “shares in logos” to that part

which has logos on its own.26

22
As Article 28 in the Universal Declaration puts it: “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in
which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”
23
A political association’s formation and governance falls under practical reason, whereas it is the role of
theoretical reason to articulate truths. See Nicomachean Ethics I.1‐2 and VI.1‐2.
24
Aristotle, Politics, book I.1‐2.
25
Aristotle, Politics, book I.3‐7, 12‐13.
26
See Nicomachean Ethics I.13.
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As regards 2, I see no evidence of Aristotle’s holding to any in principle limits on

political authority. The deep reason for this is that he regards political authority as a kind of

knowledge (epistēmē) or expertise (dunamis, technē), and it would be strange to say that

knowledge is or should be limited, or that it is best when it is limited—since what could limit

knowledge besides ignorance?27 True, knowledge is always knowledge of one thing and

therefore not knowledge of something else—knowledge has something distinctive or

distinguishing (idion) about it, just like a function or role (ergon).28 But Aristotle holds that

political authority is governance over a complete form of association for the highest good,

happiness, which seems to imply that there are no in principle restrictions, at least, on the scope

of care of government.29 It would not follow that government so understood must be totalitarian,

since there are many good Aristotelian defenses of subsidiarity and intermediate institutions, and,

besides, Aristotle thinks that good rule is “constitutional” in character anyway, and in its

tendency often indirect, rather than despotic and exercised in an unmediated fashion.30

As regards 3, one finds in Aristotle no study or articulation of the grounds of justifiable

revolution.31 That task was taken up by later thinkers in the tradition, who regarded the right to

revolution as a kind of development of Aristotle’s doctrines.32 Rather, Aristotle’s view that

27
See Nicomachean Ethics I.1-2; compare Plato, Republic I.
28
When Aristotle gives “knowledge” (epistēmē) as an intellectual virtue in Nicomachean Ethics VI, he regards
“knowledge” as a type, of which types or branches of knowledge are instances.
29
See Nicomachean Ethics I.2
30
Michael Pakaluk, “Is the Common Good of Political Society Limited and Instrumental?” Review of Metaphysics,
vol. 55, 2001, pp. 799‐816
31
See Aristotle, Politics, book V. “Aristotle does not affirm the right of revolution; he merely says that revolutions
happen”, Harvey Mansfield, Jr., “The Right of Revolution,” Daedelus, Vol 105, No. 4, Fall, 1976, p. 160.
32
For instance, through the intermediary role of St. Robert Bellarmine who, in De Laicis, chapter 6, gives an
Aristotelian account of the origin of political society as part of the reason for the claim that political authority
depends in some way on the consent of the governed. But this claim within the Aristotelian tradition has been
widely contested: See for example, Sigmund, Paul. "The Role of Robert Bellarmine in the Filmer‐Locke Debate"
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel,
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political authority is by nature, and that it has evolved somehow out of the authority of the

family, would of course make him more reluctant to endorse a revolution, or revolutionary

principles, than someone who regarded political authority as conventional.33

As regards 4, Aristotle might just think that there is a natural law –that is, some

fundamental precepts of practical reason which are true by nature rather than convention, and

which set the boundaries within which ordinary political deliberation must operate.34 I believe

that he does: but, notoriously, the doctrine of natural law is not the doctrine of natural rights, in

part because natural law is directed at, or somehow exists “for”, a natural community which has

a common good, and in part because, although natural law implies a lawgiver, natural rights

themselves do not imply that anyone has endowed them.35

As regards 5, to say that we use “rights language” to advance claims of harm is

equivalent to saying that we lack other resources, or at best that we prefer not to use them; but

Aristotle had lots of favored resources at hand for this purpose: I mean not simply that he had

available the language of virtues and vices, of honor and kalon, and of contempt and shame,36

but also that “law” in the Athens of Aristotle was understood as somehow ruling out anything

bad, not simply violations of “rights” –think of how it was presumed by Socrates’ accusers that

he must have broken the law if he had been doing anything improper or unseemly—so that an

appeal to “unlawfulness” or “lawlessness” would be enough to provide a basis for a claim

Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009‐05‐26

<http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p63480_index.html>
33
Harvey Mansfield, Jr., “The Right of Revolution,” Daedelus, Vol 105, No. 4, Fall, 1976.
34
Michael Pakaluk, “Aristotle, Natural Law, and the Founders,” at “Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American
Constitutionalism,” http://www.nlnrac.org/classical/aristotle, accessed November 21, 2011.
35
See for example the disputes about the philosophical basis of the Universal Declaration as detailed by Mary Ann
Glendon in chapter 6, “The Nations Have Their Say,” of A World Made New, Random House, 2001.
36
See Aristotle’s detailed account of the individual moral virtues in Nicomachean Ethics III‐V.
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against another.37 (Consider in this regard how for Aristotle the general virtue of justice contrasts

with lawlessness in Nic Eth V.1.)

Obviously too Aristotle would not need a language of “rights” to spell out the common good, or

anyone’s particular good, because his theory of goods was full enough and rich enough for that

purpose; furthermore, for him “civic friendship” was supposed to play the role which is played,

in our case, by a sense of alarm and felt urgency in the realization that people’s “rights” are

being violated– and so this takes care of 6 as well.38

So I conclude that Aristotle endorsed none of the purposes for which theories of rights are

advanced or, if he did so, he accomplished those purposes other than through applying notions of

“human rights.”We should remember as well that the principles for which Aristotle was mainly

admired by those sober and balanced political theorists, the American Founders, had nothing to

do with theories of natural law or natural rights. Aristotle was frequently cited for his views that

political authority should be expressed in law rather than kept implicit in the will of a single

person or group of persons; that when the rule of law corresponds to truths of natural justice,

then in an important sense divine rather than human reason orders the affairs of the body politic;

that there is a natural aristocracy, related to real differences in virtue among persons, and skilled

statecraft arranges things so that this element acquires authority, or, failing that, blends

democratic and oligarchic influences in society to approximate to that outcome; and that the best

form of government in nearly all circumstances involves the balancing of aspects of all three

37
See Plato’s Apology; Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, Cornell University Press, 1978, chapters
1 and 3.
38
See for example the discussion of civic friendship in Aristotle in Anthony W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato
and Aristotle, Oxford, 1990, pp. 189‐205.
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pure regimes (kingship, aristocracy, and timocracy).39 We sometimes take political theory to be

expressible completely in a framework of rights, but for the Founders rights were something like

a presupposition of a free society, to which recourse was necessary mainly in emergencies;

hence, although natural rights were indeed appealed to by the Founders in the Declaration, at

such a time of emergency, it was obviously considered a live possibility among Framers that the

Constitution contain no mention of rights at all.40 Presumably to allot such a role to rights today

might count as sober and balanced as well, which Aristotle may indeed help us in doing.

Aristotelian thought about how political society relates to natural associations such as the

family, and to human nature generally, seems an important corrective to rights discourse.41 His

doctrine that political authority is a development of paternal authority implies that there is and

should be real authority in intermediate institutions—in parents and the school principal as much

as in Congress.42 His teaching that civic intelligence and civic friendship develop out of familial

affection provides an argument why the family must be safeguarded for the sake of the political

common good.43

Of course various antecedents of the doctrine of the dignity of the human person are

evident in Aristotle. Through his restriction, in principle, of slavery to natural slaves only, he

denied that any free human being may be made to exist for the sake of others44 Like many

39
Michael Pakaluk, “Aristotle, Natural Law, and the Founders,” at “Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American
Constitutionalism,” http://www.nlnrac.org/classical/aristotle, accessed November 21, 2011.
40
The Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution as a series of amendments, and many of the Framers regarded
that addition as not only unnecessary but also potentially harmful. See for example Hamilton, Alexander.
Federalist Papers, #84. "On opposition to a Bill of Rights."
41
See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.
42
Politics I.2; see also Mark C. Henrie, Rethinking American Conservatism in the 1990s: The Struggle against
Homogenization; Intercollegiate Review, 28:2, Spring 1993.
43
Michael Pakaluk, “Natural Law and Civil Society,” in Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka, eds., Alternative
Conceptions of Civil Society, Princeton University Press, 2002, 131‐150
44
See Politics I.4-8.
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classical philosophers, Aristotle regarded human beings as different in kind from other animals

and surpassing them in preciousness through a kind of likeness to the divine nature.45 Finally,

like many classical philosophers, he thought that some human beings, at least, had a vocation to

become immortal and therefore had a destiny that was prior to and transcended the merely

political, evident in exhortation in the Nicomachean Ethics, echoing his Protrepticus, that we

ought to strive to be immortal as much as possible.46

So, although no doctrine of human rights may be found in Aristotle, Aristotelian political

philosophy provides a context in which such a doctrine, if one wished, could be articulated and

developed with evident proportion and balance, and historically it played that role in fact.47

See Nic. Eth. X.6-8.

45

See Nic. Eth. X.7, 1177b31-4 and D.S. Hutchison and Monte Ransome Johnson, “Aristotle’s
46

Protrepticus: A Provisional Reconstruction,” at http://www.protreptic.info/, accessed November

21, 2011; D.S. Hutchson and Monte Ransome Johnson, “Authenticating Aristotle's
Protrepticus”. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XXIX (2005), 193-294
47
See A. S. Mcgrade, “Aristotle's Place In the History of Natural Rights,” Review of Metaphysics, 49:4, 1996, pp.
803 – 829.