conceptual constructivism

EDITORIAL

Editorial. The Constructivist Challenge

Alexander Riegler A Vrije Universiteit Brussel, ariegler@vub.ac.be
capture their behavior in neat formalisms in
Purpose: This is an attempt to define constructivism in a pluralistic way. It categorizes order to make reliable predications is ren-
constructivist work within a three-dimensional space rather than along one dimension only. dered impossible. It is the responsibility of the
Practical implications: The interdisciplinary definition makes it possible to perceive the scientist to decide these problems: “Only
rather heterogenous constructivist community as a coherent and largely consistent scien- those questions which are in principle unde-
tific effort to provide answers to demanding complex problems. Furthermore it gives cidable we can decide” (Foerster 1991/2003).
authors of Constructivist Foundation the opportunity to locate their own position within The solution to such “big problems” in sci-
the community. Conclusions: I offer a catalogue of ten points that outline the constructivist ence simply cannot be delegated to nature as
program. Each of these aspects invites authors to extensively reflect on it and to approach the monolithic “objective arbiter.” Therefore
it from their disciplinary background to do work in any of the types of investigations the pluralistic perspectives are of utmost impor-
journal covers. Key words: constructivist approaches, interdisciplinarity, dogmatism. tance when scientifically approaching phe-
nomena of organized complexity.
The present first issue of “Constructivist
What is constructivism? Consider the
following example. Suppose that we
lized (cf. the “If it ain’t broken don’t fix it” syn-
drome, Riegler 1998, 2001b), caught in the Foundations” is the attempt to provide this
take a piece of chalk and write on a blackboard momentary situational context as deter- plurality. It creates an interdisciplinary forum
“A = A.” Now we point at it and ask, “What is mined by the way we have learned to deal with for authors and readers, philosophers and
this?” We may get one of the following things. But secondly, the analogy also warns engineers, academics and practitioners, to
answers. (a) White lines on a black back- us of authoritarian attempts to think there is approach the most challenging scientific
ground; (b) An arrangement of molecules of only true solution to a whatever we identify as problems from the constructivist perspective.
chalk; (c) Three signs; (d) The law of identity. a problem. Their appeal to “reality” as the This perspective, however, is not a monolithic
Regardless whether you are an art critic, a ultimate arbiter of (scientific) disputes gives building, nor is it the philosopher’s stone.
chemist, a philosopher, or a mathematician, it rise to the belief that there exists a mind-inde- Rather, it “is a way of thinking, not a collec-
is obvious that the answer will depend on pendent reality which defines what is true and tion of facts,” as Ernst von Glasersfeld (1985/
your educational background. At first sight what is not. However, as Mitterer (1992) 1992) once said about cybernetics which is
we may find this example amusing and harm- pointed out, isn’t claiming authority by refer- one of the major roots for several contempo-
less. We all know that personal preferences ring to an external truth the attempt to make rary constructivist schools. For many it
bias the way we perceive the world. But what one’s own point of view unassailable? The two sounds unthinkable to refrain from searching
about the following example, originally analogies above should make it clear that sci- for the correct answer, for the correct solution
attributed to Danish nobel prize winner Niels ence and philosophy gain from variety and to a given problem. Unfortunately, unambig-
Bohr and retold by Humberto Maturana? A the possibility of choosing from other uous solutions work for simple systems and
teacher “who asks a student to measure the options. simply problems only. We are used to the sit-
height of a tower with the use of an altimeter, Such variety and freedom of choice has uation in Newtonian physics that deals with a
may flunk the student if he uses the length of always been a major aspect a constructivist small number of entities subject to a few
the altimeter to triangulate the tower and philosophies and sciences. Heinz von Foer- forces only. And we are used to thinking that
obtains the height of the tower through ster’s (1973/2003, p. 227) “ethical impera- such situations can be extrapolated to mas-
geometry and not through physics. The tive”: “Act always so as to increase the number sively large inhomogeneous systems. How-
teacher may say that the student does not of choices” does not only anthropo-morphize ever, as it has turned out over the last decades
know physics” (Maturana 1978, p. 42). What W. Ross Ashby’s (1956) Law of Requisite Vari- these systems of organized complexity such as
this episode suggests is twofold. Firstly, by ety which states that the variety of actions human cognition, quantum physics, life,
focusing on one particular approach only we available to a control system must be at least economy, global weather, and many more,
will quickly get caught in ignorance and as large as the variety of actions in the system evade our attempts to generate simple and
denial of other approaches that might turn to be controlled (so by having more choice clear-cut answers. These systems call for
out much more fruitful. Of course, such is the you stay in control). Foerster’s imperative is interdisciplinary approaches, for open
human psyche: functionally fixed (Duncker also a reminder to the fact that most problems inquiries that enable investigators to escape
1935/1945). Once we have found a viable in science are undecidable in principle. These the confinements of a specific discipline and
solution (such as reading the display of an are problems of “organized complexity” to become aware of aspects that are necessary
altimeter) we tend to stubbornly apply the (Weaver 1948), characterized by a “sizeable to satisfyingly solve the problem.
pattern of our solution to all other problems number of factors which are interrelated into By now it should have become obvious
as well. In other words, our thinking is cana- an organic whole” (p. 539). Any attempt to that there is no simple answer to the initial

Constructivist Foundations 2005, vol. 1, no. 1 1

 conceptual constructivism
EDITORIAL

question “What is constructivism?” There are ing the need for belief in mind-independent Psychologist Ulric Neisser (1975) devel-
many constructivist “schools” as constructiv- reality. oped a theory of schemata controlled informa-
ist concepts have been developed in various The cybernetic approach has a different his- tion pickup. A cognitive schema “accepts
scientific disciplines. In order to provide an tory. Originally hired as editor of the proceed- information as it becomes available at sensory
impression of how diverse constructivist ings of the Macy-conferences on cybernetics surfaces and is changed by that information.
“schools” can be I shall sketch a few of the (cf. Pias 2003) the subject of which was “cir- It directs movements and exploratory activi-
constructivisms relevant for the journal. cular-causal and feedback mechanisms in ties that make more information available, by
biological and social systems,” it soon struck which it is further modified” (p. 55).
Heinz von Foerster that a “cybernetics of For Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë (2001)
The plurality of observing systems” is far more interesting seeing is knowing sensorimotor dependen-
than a “cybernetics of observed systems.” His cies, and the brain is a device to extract alge-
constructivism so defined second-ordered cybernetics became braic structures between perception and
When some 30 years ago by Ernst von Glaser- the guiding paradigm of the Biological Com- action. The authors refer to the work of
sfeld started publishing on a concept he called puting Lab (BCL) he was running for many Donald MacKay (1969) on “sensorimotor
“radical constructivism” (Glasersfeld 1995; years. contingencies” and continued the work of
cf. also his recollection article in this edition) Starting from the insight that nervous sig- Paul Bach-y-Rita (1972) who pioneered with
he pioneered the philosophical-epistemologi- nals are merely electrochemical, Heinz von work on sensory substitution. In particular,
cal approach. He maintains that knowledge is Foerster formulated the Principle of Undiffer- Bach-y-Rita showed how a blind person could
not passively received but actively built up by entiated Encoding: “The response of a nerve gain some notion of sight by converting visual
the cognizing subject (first principle of radi- cell does not encode the physical nature of the camera images into tactile information, and
cal constructivism). Furthermore the func- agents that caused its response. Encoded is interpreted this as expression of brain plastic-
tion of cognition is adaptive; it serves the only ‘how much’ at this point on my body, but ity.
organization of the experiential world, not not ‘what’” (Foerster 1973/2003, p. 215). The The theory of autopoietic systems formu-
the discovery of ontological reality (second principle can be found in Maturana and lated by biologists Humberto R. Maturana
principle). He calls his version “radical” Varela’s assertion that the cognitive apparatus and Francisco J. Varela can be referred to as the
because he claims that constructivism has to is an “organizationally closed system” (see biological-neurobiological approach. Autopoi-
be applied to all levels of description. “Those biological approaches below). etic systems are a sub-class of self-organizing
who ... do not explicitly give up the notion It can be claimed that the psychological- systems which, if they exist in the physical
that our conceptual constructions can or cognitive approach started with developmen- domain, are the class of living systems. For
should in some way represent an indepen- tal psychologist Jean Piaget whose scientific them, the nervous system is a closed network
dent, ‘objective’ reality, are still caught up in conviction can be summarized in his state- of interacting neurons where any change in
the traditional theory of knowledge” (Glaser- ment “L’intelligence organise le monde en the state of relative activity of a collection of
sfeld 1991). s’organisant elle-même” (Piaget 1937/1954, neurons leads to a change in the state of rela-
Glasersfeld refers to the skeptic tradition p. 311). In his theory of cognitive develop- tive activity of other or the same collection of
in philosophy, especially to Sextus Empiricus, ment (e.g., he argued that in the beginning, a neurons. This is referred to as the “organiza-
Berkeley (Esse est percipi, i.e., to be is to be per- newborn knows little about how to cope with tional closure” of the nervous system. It can
ceived), Vico (Verum ipsum factum, i.e., the the perceptive impressions around her. Faces be argued that organizational closure repre-
truth is the same as the made), and to Hans might be funny or threatening colorful spots sents the starting point for the formal inter-
Vaihinger’s (1911/1952) as-if philosophy. For and voices unknown sounds. In fact, she pretation of radical constructivism (Riegler
Glasersfeld, skepticism points the way to the doesn’t even know that these are colors and 2001a).
insight that whatever world view we construct sounds. Only by assimilation and accommo- The work of neurophysiologist Rudolfo R.
we do not have any means of validating it. He dation the child constructs a collection of Llinás (2001) provides empirical backing. He
also quotes Jean Piaget from whom he took rules (schemata) during her ontogeny. Sche- too formulated a closed-system hypothesis:
over the idea that the child constructs his or mata serve as a point of reference when it “[The brain] is capable of doing what it does
her world by means of assimilation and comes to assimilating new experiences. If without any sensory input whatsoever” (p.
accommodation. impressions are too alien to be aligned to an 94). According to his dreaming machine-
Another philosophically oriented per- older, already assimilated experience, they are argument, we “are basically dreaming
spective is Herbert Müller’s (2000; cf. also his either not perceived at all or give rise to the machines that construct virtual models.”
article in this edition) epistemic structuring (of accommodation of those existing schemata, Neurophysiologist Gerhard Roth (Haynes
experience) approach. It assumes mental which are appropriately adjusted in order to et al. 1998) maintains that the limbic system,
structures to be tools for mastering unstruc- include the new “exotic” experience. With the unconsciously working part of the brain
tured experience. The principle of zero-deri- each of these assimilating or accommodating responsible for evaluations, is the ultimate
vation claims that reality structures are not steps the child constructs another piece of instance of volitional cognition. In their view,
derived from any given pre-structured enti- reality. Piaget’s theory has been interpreted in consciousness is just a pseudo-ruling ego. It is
ties inside or outside the subject thus obviat- a constructivist way especially by Glasersfeld. not the ego who constructs; it is constructed,

2 Constructivist Foundations
 conceptual constructivism
EDITORIAL

or as Wolfgang Prinz (1997, p. 155) put it, “We tional setting or viewpoint in another frame the actual and the potential infinite (Van
do not do what we want, but we want what we which fits the ‘facts’ of the same concrete situ- Bendegem 1999).
do.” In other words, this raises the question ation equally well or even better and thereby With Erlangen Constructivism Paul Loren-
who (or what) is responsible for the construc- changes its entire meaning” (p. 95). This zen and Wilhelm Kamlah (Kamlah & Loren-
tions that form our cognition (Riegler 2003). encourages the patients to find alternative zen 1967/1984, Lorenzen 1987) attempted a
Later on, Varela together with Evan constructions of their worldview. In other circular-free foundation of sciences and sci-
Thompson and Elenor Rosch developed words, it helps to escape canalizations I entific languages. Its basis is twofold: a pre-
another constructivist variant known as enac- referred to in the beginning. scientific vocabulary and standardized action
tivism or enactive cognitive science based on Psychologist George Kelly (1955) devel- schemata to generate objects. Later, Erlangen
key concepts such as autopoiesis, structural oped a challenging subjectivist theory, Per- Constructivism was transformed into Meth-
determinism and structural coupling. In the sonal Construct Psychology, that focuses on the odological Culturalism by Peter Janich (1996).
enactivist paradigm, experience is rooted concept of anticipation. His “man as scientist” He claims a relativism on the fact that all jus-
within the organizational autonomy of the metaphor expresses the idea that “a person’s tifications are based on pre-active and pre-
acting system and is considered fundamental processes are psychologically channelized by discursive consensuses, which are marked by
for social and cultural phenomena. As the the way in which he anticipates events” (p. 46) an already achieved cultural level. (“Alle
authors put it, it attempts to account for “how Human beings aim at a better control of their Begründungen und Rechtfertigungen finden
action can be perceptually guided in a per- world by predicting events and constructing zulässige Anfänge in präaktiven und prädis-
ceiver-dependent world” (Varela, Thomspon their reality. These constructions are con- kursiven Konsensen, die durch eine schon
& Rosch 1991, p. 173; cf. also the McGee’s sur- stantly subject to validation and subsequent erreichte Kulturhöhe ausgezeichnet sind.”)
vey in this edition). modification if necessary. As proponents of the computational
One could assume that the most “objec- The list of constructivist approaches could approach Steven Quartz (Quartz & Sejnowski
tive” of all disciplines, physics, does not con- be even further extended. For example, there 1997) and Gert Westermann (2000) could be
tribute to the constructivist spectrum. Inter- is the literature-media science approach cham- listed as well as Gary Drescher (1991) who
estingly, however, arguing from the pioned by Siegfried J. Schmidt (1987), Geb- cast Piaget into algorithms.
background of physics, Olaf Diettrich (2001) hard Rusch (1987) et al. in the 1980s in Ger- Last but not least Constructionism (Harel
developed a constructivist evolutionary episte- many. Part of the credit also goes to Wolfram & Papert 1991) as an educational philosophy
mology (or cognitive operator theory). He K. Köck who made excellent German transla- should be mentioned. It emphasizes that in
claims perceived patterns and regularities are tions of authors such as Maturana, Glasers- order to learn about abstract concepts it is
just invariants of inborn cognitive (sensory) feld, and Foerster, which triggered the great necessary to create and experiment with arti-
operators. Therefore, laws of nature are impact of radical constructivism on the facts. In this perspective, understanding and
human-specific. A different set of cognitive humanities in German-speaking countries. experience are closely related in the sense that
operators yields a different cognitive pheno- Further researchers in this area are Nancy learning is considered a process of active
type. Creatures equipped with such alterna- Spivey (1997) and Stefan Weber (2005) who knowledge construction rather than passive
tive phenotypes would be impossible to com- argues in favor of a non-dualistic media the- knowledge absorption.
municate with. Diettrich’s approach also ory as proposed by Mitterer (1992, 2001).
claims a homology between mechanisms gen- Building primarily on Maturana and Varela’s
erating mathematical terms and those gener- autopoietic theory, Niklas Luhmann (1984/ Does constructivism
ating observational ones, explaining thus why 1995) developed a system theoretical version,
mathematics is such an effective tool to which has found many followers especially in
matter?
describe the world. Germany. Ernst von Glasersfeld and Leslie Will constructivism change science? Carnap
In his quantum-physical world view, Ger- Steffe (Steffe & Gale 1995) contributed a great discussed the effect of epistemology in his
hard Grössing (2001) maintains that per- deal to implementing radical constructivism well-known thought experiment of two geog-
ceived non-classical structure of space and in educational sciences. Former BCL member raphers – a realist and an idealist – who travel
time in relativistic cases are human-specific Gordon Pask (1975) developed a constructiv- to Africa to investigate claims about an
artifact based on neurophysiological pro- ist theory of communication as applied to edu- unusual mountain. Carnap’s conclusion is
cesses. cation and extended by Bernard Scott (e.g., that the “two geographers will come to the
Paul Watzlawick’s well-known Palo-Alto Scott 2001). same result not only about the existence of the
group (Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch 1974) In reaction to mathematical Platonism, mountain, but also about its other character-
for family therapy uses constructivism to mathematical constructivists such as L. E. J. istics, namely position, shape, height, etc. In
make patients solve their interpersonal prob- Brouwer, Arend Heyting (1975), and Jean all empirical questions there is unanimity…
lems. Their approach can be called psychia- Paul Van Bendegem claim that mathematical [The epistemological] divergence between
trist-therapeutic. The basic therapeutic inter- objects exist only if a method can construct the two scientists does not occur in the empir-
vention is to disrupt patterns of symptomatic them. As a consequence they oppose, for ical domain, for there is complete unanimity
interaction by “reframing” a habitual situa- example, the notion of infinity, either by so far as the empirical facts are concerned.”
tion, i.e., to “place conceptual and/or emo- denying the actual infinite or by denying both (Carnap 1928/1967, p. 334). Similarly, Hel-

2005, vol. 1, no. 1 3

 conceptual constructivism
EDITORIAL

mut Schwegler (2001) argues that all science and object, and their argumentation is philosophies. Positivist Rudolf Carnap
including physics is basically a language game directed towards the object of thought. His expressed the necessity of this aspect in his
in the sense of Wittgenstein, i.e., scientists thesis says: The dualistic method of searching 1935 book saying that “we reject the thesis of
communicate via language and work via these for truth is but an argumentative technique the Reality of the physical world; but we do not
communications. But in order to play this that can turn any arbitrary opinion either true reject it as false, but as having no sense, and its
language game correctly one doesn’t need to or false. Therefore the goal of dualistic philos- Idealistic anti-thesis is subject to exactly the
adopt the constructivist world view. So, after ophies, i.e., philosophies based on the sub- same rejection. We neither assert nor deny
all, does a constructivist foundation matter? ject–object dichotomy, is to convince a public these theses, we reject the whole question.”
As Glasersfeld said, knowledge is always the audience (readers, listeners, discussion part- 6. Therefore, the focus of research moves
result of a constructive activity rather than the ners) of the truth. An example to surmount from the world that consists of matter to the
accumulation of propositional data (such as the separation is the concept of “co-enaction” world that consists of what matters. Since the
position and heights of mountains). In other (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991, p. 150) cognitive apparatus brings forth the world
words, constructivism shifts the focus of according to which “...knower and known, out of experiences, our understanding of
attention from the propositional “knowing mind and world, stand in relation to each what we are used to refer to as “reality” does
that” to the pragmatic “knowing how.” In a other through mutual specification or depen- not root in the discovery of absolute mind-
certain sense, scientists rather resemble shoe- dent coorigination.” independent structures but rather in the
makers who have to work with their given 2. As a consequence of point 1, construc- operations by which we assemble our experi-
material. In the “realist mode” shoemakers tivist approaches demand the inclusion of the ential world” (Glasersfeld 1984). Or in the
stick to the principles of shoemaking which observer in scientific explanations. Foerster words of Foerster, instead of being concerned
are believed to be true. Constructivist shoe- (quoted from Glasersfeld 1995) summarizes with “observed systems” the focus of atten-
makers, however, will more flexibly adopt the crucial point in a single statement, tion shifts to “observing systems.”
alternative approaches as for them the com- “Objectivity is the delusion that observations 7. Constructivist approaches focus on self-
mitment to a hypothetical truth is no longer could be made without an observer.” Mat- referential and organizationally closed sys-
an essential criterion (Dewey Dykstra, per- urana (1978, p. 3) made it a dictum: “Every- tems. Such systems strive for control over
sonal communication). If this analogy is cor- thing said is said by an observer to another their inputs rather than their outputs. Cogni-
rect, then one of the advantages of a construc- observer that could be him- or herself.” tive system (mind) is operationally closed. It
tivist-biased science certainly has more 3. Representationalism is rejected. Ques- interacts necessarily only with its own states
potential to come up with new solutions. tioning Wittgenstein’s correspondence theory (Maturana & Varela 1979). The nervous sys-
of representation (“in order to tell whether a tem is “a closed network of interacting neu-
picture is true or false we must compare it rons such that any change in the state of rela-
The common with reality”) induced Glasersfeld to formu- tive activity of a collection of neurons leads to
late the radical constructivist paradigm. In a change in the state of relative activity of
denominator the constructivist perspective knowledge is other or the same collection of neurons”
Let us pick up again the initial question, “What the result of an active construction process (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 42). This is a
is constructivism?” As argued above, giving a rather than of a more or less passive represen- consequence of the neurophysiological prin-
one-dimensional answer does not only con- tational mapping from the environment of an ciple of undifferentiated encoding: “The
tradict constructivist principles, it is above all objective world onto subjective cognitive response of a nerve cell does not encode the
counterproductive for scientific and philo- structures. Therefore, knowledge is a system- physical nature of the agents that caused its
sophical endeavors. It would be difficult if not related cognitive process rather than a repre- response.” (Foerster 1973/2003, p. 293).
impossible to lump together the many inde- sentation (Peschl & Riegler 1999). Humberto Maturana (1978) suggests that we
pendent disciplinary roots and proponents of 4. According to constructivist approaches, can compare the situation of the mind with a
constructivism. However, it is possible and it is futile to claim that knowledge approaches pilot using instruments to fly the plane. All he
desirable to distill their common denomina- reality. Instead, reality is brought forth by the does is “manipulate the instruments of the
tor. From what has been said so far in this edi- subject. As Glasersfeld (1991, p.16) put it, plane according to a certain path of change in
torial but without going into further details “those who merely speak of the construction their readings” (p. 42). In other words, the
(and thereby violating the idea of a denomina- of knowledge, but do not explicitly give up the pilot doesn’t even need to look “outside.” The
tor being wide enough to cover various para- notion that our conceptual constructions can enactive cognitive science paradigm expresses
digms) I present the “constructivist program.” or should in some way represent an indepen- clearly: “...autonomous systems stand in
It encompasses the following ten aspects. dent, ‘objective’ reality, are still caught up in sharp contrast to systems whose coupling
1. Constructivist approaches question the the traditional theory of knowledge.” with the environment is specified through
Cartesian separation between objective world 5. Constructivist approaches entertain an input/output relations. ...the meaning of this
and subjective experience. As argued by Josef agnostic relationship with reality, which is or that interaction for a living system is not
Mitterer (2001), such dualistic approaches, considered beyond our cognitive horizon. Any prescribed from outside but is the result of the
being the prevailing scientific orientation, are reference to it should be refrained from. This organization and history of the system itself.”
based on the distinction between description position is not necessarily limited to skeptical (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991, p. 157)

4 Constructivist Foundations
 conceptual constructivism
EDITORIAL

8. With regard to scientific explanations,

NAVIGATING THE PLURALITY
constructivist approaches favor a process-
oriented approach rather than a substance- Given the plurality of constructivist approaches it seems heretical to order them in one dimen-
based perspective. For example, following sion only. Hence Constructivist Foundations will navigate the constructivist space in three
Maturana living systems are defined by pro- dimensions.
cesses whereby they constitute and maintain
their own organization. Their structure Dimension 1: Discipline
refers to the “actual relations which hold Along this dimension we find the following disciplines.
between the components which integrate a [ biological-physiological
concrete machine in a given space” (Mat- [ cognitive-psychological
urana & Varela 1979) while their organiza- [ educational
tion defines the “dynamics of interactions [ engineering-computer scientific
and transformations” a system may undergo. [ historical
Material aspects are therefore secondary. [ philosophical-epistemological
9. Constructivist approaches emphasize [ physical
the “individual as personal scientist”
approach as their starting point is the cogni- Dimension 2: School
tive capacity of the experiencing subject. Since many scientists and philosophers have developed their respective version of constructivism
Sociality is defined as accommodating without necessarily paying much attention to historical or contemporary parallels a number of
within the framework of social interaction. labels for constructivist research have emerged.Therefore authors may align their submission to
While social interaction is not considered a Constructivist Foundation to any from the following (incomplete) list of “schools” (or paradigms).
new quality in contrast to interacting with [ constructivist evolutionary epistemology
non-living entities, its complexity is [ cybersemiotics
acknowledged. However, society is not a pri- [ enactive cognitive science (cf. McGee’s survey in this number)
ori given, not the “social precedes the per- [ epistemic structuring of experience (cf. Müller’s conceptual paper)
sonal” (Gergen 1997). Rather, “society” must [ radical constructivism (cf. Glasersfeld’s recollection article)
be conceptually analyzed. Constructivism is [ second order cybernetics (cf. Aerts’s interview with Foerster)
also rather pragmatic about “common [ theory of autopoietic systems
knowledge” such as texts. They “contain nei-
ther meaning nor knowledge – they are a Dimension 3: Types of inquiry
scaffolding on which readers can build their As different disciplines prefer different types of inquiry, submissions to Constructivist Founda-
interpretation” (Glasersfeld 1992, p. 175). tions investigations too may focus on different ways of how to use their insights. Contributions
10. Finally, constructivism asks for an will be classified according the following dimension.
open and more flexible approach to science Opinions are written from the personal perspective of constructivist researchers and philoso-
in order to generate the plasticity that is phers (and are therefore subject to editorial editing only).
needed to cope with the scientific frontier. Surveys provide an extensive overview with the goal to bracket single insights and results to
Also today’s knowledge-based society must provide a global picture.
be assessed through its ability and willing- Conceptual papers develop philosophical-argumentative support.
ness to continuously revise knowledge. Empirical studies focus on psychological, biological, physical etc. evidence.
Krohn (1997) refers to it as the society of self- Synthetic studies try to turn conceptual or empirical insights of constructivist theories into
experimentation. Luhmann (1994) defines models, simulation, or hardware devices.
knowledge as schemata that are regarded as
true but ready to be changed. Constructiv-
ism must be considered as a way to forgo the in a rather lucid and comprehensible way
dogmatism that prevents science from
The articles (being multilingual he has developed a pro-
becoming more fruitful and productive than in this edition found command of pragmatic language use)
today. and his personal account makes it easy to get
This list is deliberately painted with a big The present first edition provides a sample of a grip on his concepts even if one is meeting
brush. Rather than limit future develop- the sort of articles that will be published in them for the first time.
ments right from the onset, the list wants to upcoming editions of Constructivist Founda- The second opinion article is a voice from
give the necessary latitude to future authors tions. It starts with a recollection of Ernst von the past, an interview with Heinz von Foerster
in Constructivist Foundations to further Glasersfeld who summarizes the (personal) that he gave ten years ago at the large and
extend the constructivist program. This is history of the radical constructivist paradigm. stimulating conference “Einstein meets Mag-
the constructivist challenge, and the journal Newcomers to constructivism may find the ritte: An interdisciplinary reflection on sci-
will be one of its main champions. text particularly appealing. Glasersfeld writes ence, human action and society,” which fea-

2005, vol. 1, no. 1 5

 conceptual constructivism
EDITORIAL

tured nineteen famous plenary speakers such sion of thinking by thoroughly applying con- discussion. It is the conviction of the editors
as Ilya Prigogine, Brian Arthur, Francisco structivism at all levels. As a result the author that carefully crafted conceptual, empirical
Varela, Chrisopher Langton, Julian Jaynes, claims that many “hard” problems in philos- and synthetic articles as well as comprehen-
William Calvin, Bas van Fraassen, to name ophy such as the mind–body problem may sive surveys yielding a global perspective and
but a few. The interview has never been pub- find easy solutions. The article not only intro- personal opinions of senior scientists will
lished before and is also available as audio file duces a new constructivist variation, it has contribute to turning constructivist
for download from the journal’s web page. also been shaped in a novel way. Originally approaches into a valuable ingredient of the
Like Glasersfeld’s article it serves as a histori- written as a target article for the world-wide- scientific endeavor as they provide new per-
cal document for readers who want to get the web-based discussion forum “Karl Jaspers spective, insights, and inspiration in areas
whole picture. Therefore, endnotes were Forum” at http://www.kjf.ca, it received such where conventional epistemologies have
added that explain the relevance of people a large number of comments (which in turn proven increasingly insufficient research
mentioned by Foerster. He survived this spurred many responses by the author) that strategies.
interview by seven years and died on 2 Octo- the author wrote a revised version that
ber 2002 in California (cf. memorial volume includes the criticism and support from the
in Riegler 2005). comments. In other words, the paper has
The third contribution is the first part of undergone “public reviewing” which served ABOUT THE AUTHOR
an extensive overview of the enactive cogni- as a sufficient criterion for publication in
tive science (ECS) approach, mainly pio- Constructivist Foundations. Also in future, Alexander Riegler obtained a Ph.D. in artifi-
neered by Francisco Varela (1946–2001). the editors of the journal intend to exploit this cial intelligence and cognitive science in
Kevin McGee is brilliant at pulling many mode as an alternative to the standard dou- 1995 from the Vienna University of Tech-
aspects together into a coherent survey of the ble-blind peer reviewing used for other nology with a dissertation on constructivist
historical and conceptual background of ECS. papers in the journal. artificial life. His research interests include
By outlining research themes he proves that The last paper in this edition is an empiri- cognitive science, philosophy of science,
ECS is a fruitful research framework for the cal study of constructivist education that has and research in biological and cognitive
future. The second part of McGee’s survey become a well-known education paradigm in complexity. He worked at the department
will appear in the next edition of Constructiv- the US. Its author Dewey Dykstra dismisses a of Theoretical Biology (University of
ist Foundations. number of allegations against constructivist Vienna), and at the department of Com-
Another type of paper published in the education and presents a new constructivist puter Science (University of Zurich). Since
journal are conceptual-philosophical articles alternative to the “elitist-realist paradigm.” 1998 he has been a research fellow at the
that provide the foundation for further theo- The selection of papers for this edition Center Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary
retical reflections and practical empirical or reflects the flexibility of constructivist strate- Research (Free University of Brussels). He
synthetic work. Herbert Müller’s conceptual gies. It is evident that a broad variety of topics co-organized the interdisciplinary confer-
framework of “epistemic structuring of expe- and types of paper is difficult to find in most ences “New Trends in Cognitive Science”, in
rience” is introduced and discussed in the other journals. Variety and diversity, however, 1997 on knowledge representation and in
fourth paper. It opposes traditional meta- do not mean shallowness as the reviewed 2001 on virtual reality.
physical ontology and focuses on the inver- papers show; they are distinct in their deep

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