The Project Gutenberg EBook of Elements of Military Art and Science

by Henry Wager Halleck

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Title: Elements of Military Art and Science

Or, Course Of Instruction In Strategy, Fortification,
Tactics Of Battles, &C.; Embracing The Duties Of Staff,
Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, And Engineers; Adapted To
The Use Of Volunteers And Militia; Third Edition; With
Critical Notes On The Mexican And Crimean Wars.

Author: Henry Wager Halleck

Release Date: July 1, 2005 [EBook #16170]

Language: English

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Produced by Graeme Mackreth and the Online Distributed

Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net.
ELEMENTS
OF
MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE:
OR,
 COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IN STRATEGY,
FORTIFICATION, TACTICS OF BATTLES, &c.

EMBRACING THE DUTIES OF STAFF, INFANTRY,

CAVALRY, ARTILLERY, AND ENGINEERS.

ADAPTED TO THE USE OF VOLUNTEERS AND MILITIA.

THIRD EDITION.
WITH CRITICAL NOTES ON THE MEXICAN AND CRIMEAN WARS.

BY

H. WAGER HALLECK, A.M., MAJOR GENERAL, U.S.A.

NEW YORK:
D. APPLETON & COMPANY,
443 & 445 BROADWAY.
LONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIN
1862.
Entered, according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1846, BY D. APPLETON
& COMPANY, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for
the Southern District of New York.

I. INTRODUCTION.—Dr. Wayland's Arguments on the Justifiableness of War

briefly examined.
II. STRATEGY.—General Divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a
Campaign.—Analysis of the Military Operations of Napoleon.
III. FORTIFICATIONS.—Their importance in the Defence of States proved by
numerous Historical Examples.
IV. LOGISTICS.—Subsistence.—Forage.—Marches.—Convoys.—
Castrametation.
V. TACTICS.—The Twelve Orders of Battle, with Examples of each.—Different
Formations of Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers on the Field of Battle,
with the Modes of bringing Troops into action./p>
VI. MILITARY POLITY.—The Means of National Defence best suited to the
character and condition of a Country, with a brief Account of those adopted by
the several European Powers.
VII. DEFENCE OF OUR SEA-COAST.—Brief Description of our Maritime
Fortifications, with an Examination of the several Contests that have taken place
between Ships and Forts, including the Attack on San Juan d'Ulloa, and on St.
Jean d'Acre.
VIII. OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.—Brief Description of the
Fortifications on the Frontier, and an analysis of our Northern Campaigns.
IX. ARMY ORGANIZATION.—Staff and Administrative Corps.—Their
History, Duties, Numbers, and Organization.
X. ARMY ORGANIZATION.—Infantry and Cavalry.—Their History, Duties,
Numbers, and Organization.
XI. ARMY ORGANIZATION.—Artillery.—Its History and Organization, with a
Brief Notice of the different kinds of Ordnance, the Manufacture of Projectiles,
&c.
XII. ARMY ORGANIZATION.—Engineers.—Their History, Duties, and
Organization,—with a Brief Discussion, showing their importance as a part of a
modern Army Organization.
XIII. PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. Historical Notice of the progress of
this Art.—Description of the several parts of a Fortress, and the various Methods
of fortifying a Position.
XIV. FIELD ENGINEERING.—Field Fortifications.—Military
Communications.—Military Bridges.—Sapping, Mining, and the Attack and
Defence of a Fortified Place.
XV. MILITARY EDUCATION.—Military Schools of France, Prussia, Austria,
Russia, England, &c.—Washington's Reasons for establishing the West Point
Academy.—Rules of Appointment and Promotion in Foreign Services.—
Absurdity and Injustice of our own System.
EXPLANATION OF PLATES 409
 PREFACE

The following pages were hastily thrown together in the form of lectures, and
delivered, during, the past winter, before the Lowell Institute of Boston. They
were written without the slightest intention of ever publishing them; but several
officers of militia, who heard them delivered, or afterwards read them in
manuscript, desire their publication, on the ground of their being useful to a class
of officers now likely to be called into military service. It is with this view alone
that they are placed in the hands of the printer. No pretension is made to
originality in any part of the work; the sole object having been to embody, in a
small compass, well established military principles, and to illustrate these by
reference to the events of past history, and the opinions and practice of the best
generals.
Small portions of two or three of the following chapters have already appeared,
in articles furnished by the author to the New York and Democratic Reviews,
and in a "Report on the Means of National Defence," published by order of
Congress.
H.W.H.
MAY, 1846.
ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE.
 CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.

Our distance from the old world, and the favorable circumstances in which we
have been placed with respect to the other nations of the new world, have made
it so easy for our government to adhere to a pacific policy, that, in the sixty-two
years that have elapsed since the acknowledgment of our national independence,
we have enjoyed more than fifty-eight of general peace; our Indian border wars
have been too limited and local in their character to seriously affect the other
parts of the country, or to disturb the general conditions of peace. This fortunate
state of things has done much to diffuse knowledge, promote commerce,
agriculture, and manufactures; in fine, to increase the greatness of the nation and
the happiness of the individual. Under these circumstances our people have
grown up with habits and dispositions essentially pacific, and it is to be hoped
that these feelings may not soon be changed. But in all communities opinions
sometimes run into extremes; and there are not a few among us who, dazzled by
the beneficial results of a long peace, have adopted the opinion that war in any
case is not only useless, but actually immoral; nay, more, that to engage in war is
wicked in the highest degree, and even brutish.
All modern ethical writers regard unjust war as not only immoral, but as one of
the greatest of crimes—murder on a large scale. Such are all wars of mere
ambition, engaged in for the purpose of extending regal power or national
sovereignty; wars of plunder, carried on from mercenary motives; wars of
propagandism, undertaken for the unrighteous end of compelling men to adopt
certain religious or political opinions, whether from the alleged motives of
"introducing a more orthodox religion," or of "extending the area of freedom."
Such wars are held in just abhorrence by all moral and religious people: and this
is believed to be the settled conviction of the great mass of our own citizens.
But in addition to that respectable denomination of Christians who deny our
right to use arms under any circumstances, there are many religious enthusiasts
in other communions who, from causes already noticed, have adopted the same
theory, and hold all wars, even those in self-defence, as unlawful and immoral.
This opinion has been, within the last few years, pressed on the public with great
zeal and eloquence, and many able pens have been enlisted in its cause. One of
the most popular, and by some regarded one of the most able writers on moral
science, has adopted this view as the only one consonant with the principles of
Christian morality.
It has been deemed proper, in commencing a course of lectures on war, to make
a few introductory remarks respecting this question of its justifiableness. We
know of no better way of doing this than to give on the one side the objections to
war as laid down in Dr. Wayland's Moral Philosophy, and on the other side the
arguments by which other ethical writers have justified a resort to war. We do
not select Dr. Wayland's work for the purpose of criticizing so distinguished an
author; but because he is almost the only writer on ethics who advocates these
views, and because the main arguments against war are here given in brief space,
and in more moderate and temperate language than that used by most of his
followers. I shall give his arguments in his own language.
"I. All wars are contrary to the revealed will of God."
It is said in reply, that if the Christian religion condemns all wars, no matter how
just the cause, or how necessary for self-defence, we must expect to find in the
Bible some direct prohibition of war, or at least a prohibition fairly implied in
other direct commandments. But the Bible nowhere prohibits war: in the Old
Testament we find war and even conquest positively commanded, and although
war was raging in the world in the time of Christ and his apostles, still they said
not a word of its unlawfulness and immorality. Moreover, the fathers of the
church amply acknowledge the right of war, and directly assert, that when war is
justly declared, the Christian may engage in it either by stratagem or open force.
If it be of that highly wicked and immoral character which some have recently
attributed to it, most assuredly it would be condemned in the Bible in terms the
most positive and unequivocal.
But it has been said that the use of the sword is either directly or typically
forbidden to the Christian, by such passages as "Thou shalt not kill," (Deut. v.
17,) "I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy
right cheek, turn to him the other also," (Matt. v. 39,) &c. If these passages are to
be taken as literal commands, as fanatics and religious enthusiasts would have us
believe, not only is war unlawful, but also all our penal statutes, the magistracy,
and all the institutions of the state for the defence of individual rights, the
protection of the innocent, and the punishment of the guilty. But if taken in
conjunction with the whole Bible, we must infer that they are hyperbolical
expressions, used to impress strongly on our minds the general principle of love
and forgiveness, and that, so far as possible, we over come evil with good. Can
any sober-minded man suppose, for a moment, that we are commanded to
encourage the attacks of the wicked, by literally turning the left cheek when
assaulted on the right, and thus induce the assailant to commit more wrong?
Shall we invite the thief and the robber to persevere in his depredations, by
literally giving him a cloak when he takes our coat; and the insolent and the
oppressor to proceed in his path of crime, by going two miles with him if he bid
us to go one?
Again, if the command, "Thou shalt not kill," is to be taken literally, it not only
prohibits us from engaging in just war, and forbids the taking of human life by
the state, as a punishment for crime; it also forbids, says Dr. Leiber, our taking
the life of any animal, and even extends to the vegetable kingdom,—for
undoubtedly plants have life, and are liable to violent death—to be killed. But
Dr. Wayland concedes to individuals the right to take vegetable and animal life,
and to society the right to punish murder by death. This passage undoubtedly
means, thou shalt not unjustly kill,—thou shalt do no murder; and so it is
rendered in our prayer-books. It cannot have reference to war, for on almost the
next page we find the Israelites commanded to go forth and smite the heathen
nations,—to cast them out of the land,—to utterly destroy them,—to show them
no mercy, &c. If these passages of the Bible are to be taken literally, there is no
book which contains so many contradictions; but if taken in connection with the
spirit of other passages, we shall find that we are permitted to use force in
preventing or punishing crime, whether in nations or in individuals; but that we
should combine love with justice, and free our hearts from all evil motives.
II. All wars are unjustifiable, because "God commands us to love every man,
alien or citizen, Samaritan or Jew, as ourselves; and the act neither of society nor
of government can render it our duty to violate this command."
It is true that no act of society can make it our duty to violate any command of
God: but is the above command to be taken literally, and as forbidding us to
engage in just war? Is it not rather intended to impress upon us, in a forcible
manner, that mutual love is a great virtue; that we should hate no one, not even a
stranger nor an enemy, but should treat all with justice, mercy, and loving-
kindness? If the meaning attempted to be given to this command in the above
quotation be the true one, it is antagonistical not only to just war, but to civil
justice, to patriotism, and to the social and domestic affections.
But are we bound to love all human beings alike; that is, to the same degree?
Does the Bible, as a whole, inculcate such doctrine? On the contrary, Christ
himself had his beloved disciple,—one whom he loved pre-eminently, and above
all the others; though he loved the others none the less on that account. We are
bound to love our parents, our brothers, our families first, and above all other
human beings; but we do not, for this reason, love others any the less. A man is
not only permitted to seek first the comfort and happiness of his own family, but
if he neglect to do so, he is worse than an infidel. We are bound to protect our
families against the attacks of others; and, if necessary for the defence of their
lives, we are permitted to take the life of the assailant; nay more, we are bound
to do so. But it does not follow that we hate him whom we thus destroy. On the
contrary, we may feel compassion, and even love for him. The magistrate
sentences the murderer to suffer the penalty of the law; and the sheriff carries the
sentence into execution by taking, in due form, the life of the prisoner:
nevertheless, both the magistrate and the sheriff may have the kindest feelings
towards him whom they thus deprive of life.
So it is in the external affairs of the state. Next to my kindred and my neighbors
do I love my countrymen. I love them more than I do foreigners, because my
interests, my feelings, my happiness, my ties of friendship and affection, bind
me to them more intimately than to the foreigner. I sympathize with the
oppressed Greek, and the enslaved African, and willingly contribute to their
relief, although their sufferings affect me very remotely; but if my own
countrymen become oppressed and enslaved, nearer and dearer interests are
affected, and peculiar duties spring from the ties and affections which God has
formed. If my countrymen be oppressed, my neighbors and kindred will be made
unhappy and suffering; this I am bound to take all proper measures in my power
to prevent. If the assailant cannot be persuaded by argument to desist from his
wicked intentions, I unite with my fellow-citizens in forcibly resisting his
aggressions. In doing this I am actuated by no feelings of hatred towards the
hostile forces; I have in my heart no malice, no spirit of revenge; I have no
desire to harm individuals, except so far as they are made the instruments of
oppression. But as instruments of evil, I am bound to destroy their power to do
harm. I do not shoot at my military enemy from hatred or revenge; I fight against
him because the paramount interests of my country cannot be secured without
destroying the instrument by which they are assailed. I am prohibited from
exercising any personal cruelty; and after the battle, or as soon as the enemy is
rendered harmless, he is to be treated with kindness, and to be taken care of
equally with the wounded friend. All conduct to the contrary is regarded by
civilized nations with disapprobation.
That war does not properly beget personal malignity but that, on the contrary, the
effects of mutual kindness and courtesy on the battle-field, frequently have a
beneficial influence in the political events of after years, may be shown by
innumerable examples in all history. Soult and Wellington were opposing
generals in numerous battles; but when the former visited England in 1838, he
was received by Wellington and the whole British nation with the highest marks
of respect; and the mutual warmth of feeling between these two distinguished
men has contributed much to the continuance of friendly relations between the
two nations. And a few years ago, when we seemed brought, by our civil
authorities, almost to the brink of war by the northeastern boundary difficulties,
the pacific arrangements concluded, through the intervention of General Scott,
between the Governors of Maine and New Brunswick, were mainly due to
ancient friendships contracted by officers of the contending armies during our
last war with Great Britain.
III. "It is granted that it would be better for man in general, if wars were
abolished, and all means, both of offence and defence, abandoned. Now, this
seems to me to admit, that this is the law under which God has created man. But
this being admitted, the question seems to be at an end; for God never places
man under circumstances in which it is either wise, or necessary, or innocent, to
violate his laws. Is it for the advantage of him who lives among a community of
thieves, to steal; or for one who lives among a community of liars, to lie?"
The fallacy of the above argument is so evident that it is scarcely necessary to
point out its logical defects.
My living among a community of thieves would not justify me in stealing, and
certainly it would be no reason why I should neglect the security of my property.
My living among murderers would not justify me in committing murder, and on
the other hand it would be no reason why I should not fight in the defence of my
family, if the arm of the law were unable to protect them. That other nations
carry on unjust wars is no reason why we should do likewise, nor is it of itself
any reason why we should neglect the means of self-defence.
It may seem, to us short-sighted mortals, better that we were placed in a world
where there were no wars, or murders, or thefts; but God has seen fit to order it
otherwise. Our duties and our relations to our fellow-men are made to suit the
world as it is, and not such a world as we would make for ourselves.
We live among thieves: we must therefore resort to force to protect our property
—that is, to locks, and bars, and bolts; we build walls thick and high between the
robber and our merchandise. And more: we enact laws for his punishment, and
employ civil officers to forcibly seize the guilty and inflict that degree of
punishment necessary for the prevention of other thefts and robberies.
We live among murderers: if neither the law nor the ordinary physical
protections suffice for the defence of our own lives and the lives of our innocent
friends, we forcibly resist the murderer, even to his death, if need be. Moreover,
to deter others from like crimes, we inflict the punishment of death upon him
who has already taken life.
These relations of individuals and of society are laid down by all ethical writers
as in accordance with the strictest rules of Christian morality. Even Dr. Wayland
considers it not only the right, but the duty of individuals and of society to resort
to these means, and to enact these laws for self-protection. Let us extend the
same course of reasoning to the relations of different societies.
We live among nations who frequently wage unjust wars; who, disregarding the
rights of others, oppress and rob, and even murder their citizens, in order to
reach some unrighteous end. As individuals, we build fences and walls for the
protection of our grounds and our merchandise; so, as a nation, we build ships
and forts to protect our commerce, our harbors, and our cities. But the walls of
our houses and stores are useless, unless made so strong and high that the robber
cannot break through or scale them without great effort and personal danger; so
our national ships and forts would be utterly useless for protection, unless fully
armed and equipped.
Further: as individuals and as societies we employ civil officers for the
protection of our property and lives, and, when necessary, arm them with the
physical means of executing the laws, even though the employment of these
means should cost human life. The prevention and punishment of crime causes
much human suffering; nevertheless the good of community requires that crime
should be prevented and punished. So, as a nation, we employ military officers
to man our ships and forts, to protect our property and our persons, and to repel
and punish those who seek to rob us of our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.
National aggressions are far more terrible in their results than individual crime;
so also the means of prevention and punishment are far more stupendous, and
the employment of these means causes a far greater amount of human suffering.
This may be a good reason for greater caution in resorting to such means, but
assuredly it is no argument against the moral right to use them.
IV. War is unjustifiable because unnecessary:
"1st. The very fact that a nation relied solely upon the justice of its measures,
and the benevolence of its conduct, would do more than any thing else to prevent
the occurrence of injury. The moral sentiment of every community would rise in
opposition to injury inflicted upon the just the kind, and the merciful."
The moral duty of nations in this respect is the same as that of individuals.
Active benevolence and forbearance should be employed, so far as may be
proper; but there are points at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue. If we
entirely forbear to punish the thief, the robber, and the murderer, think you that
crime will be diminished? Reason and experience prove the contrary. Active
benevolence and kindness should always attend just punishment, but they were
never designed to prohibit it. The laws of God's universe are founded on justice
as well as love. "The moral sentiment of every community rises in opposition to
injury inflicted upon the just, the kind, and the merciful;" but this fact does not
entirely prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocent persons, and
therefore wise and just laws require that criminals shall be punished, in order
that those who are dead to all moral restraints may be deterred from crime
through fear of punishment.
"2d. But suppose the [national] injury to be done. I reply, the proper appeal for
moral beings, upon moral questions, is not to physical force, but to the
consciences of men. Let the wrong be set forth, but be set forth in the spirit of
love; and in this manner, if in any, will the consciences of men be aroused to
justice."
Argument, and "appeals to the consciences of men" should always be resorted to
in preference to "physical force;" but when they fail to deter the wicked, force
must be employed. I may reason with the robber and the murderer, to persuade
him to desist from his attempt to rob my house, and murder my family; but if he
refuse to listen to moral appeals, I employ physical force,—I call in the strong
arm of the law to assist me; and if no other means can be found to save innocent
life that is assailed, the life of the assailant must be sacrificed.
"If," says Puffendorf, "some one treads the laws of peace under his feet, forming
projects which tend to my ruin, he could not, without the highest degree of
impudence, (impudentissime,) pretend that after this I should consider him as a
sacred person, who ought not to be touched; in other words, that I should betray
myself, and abandon the care of my own preservation, in order to give way to
the malice of a criminal, that he may act with impunity and with full liberty. On
the contrary, since he shows himself unsociable towards me, and since he has
placed himself in a position which does not permit me safely to practice towards
him the duties of peace, I have only to think of preventing the danger which
menaces me; so that if I cannot do this without hurting him, he has to accuse
himself only, since he has reduced me to this necessity." De Jure Nat. et Gent,
lib. ii., ch. v., §1. This same course of reasoning is also applied to the duties of a
nation towards its enemy in respect to war.
"3d. But suppose this method fail. Why, then, let us suffer the evil."
This principle, if applied to its full extent, would, we believe, be subversive of
all right, and soon place all power in the hands of the most evil and wicked men
in the community. Reason with the nation that invades our soil, and tramples
under foot our rights and liberties, and should it not desist, why, then, suffer the
evil! Reason with the murderer, and if he do not desist, why, then, suffer him to
murder our wives and our children! Reason with the robber and the defaulter,
and if they will not listen, why, then, let them take our property! We cannot
appeal to the courts, for if their decisions be not respected, they employ force to
compel obedience to their mandates. But Dr. Wayland considers the law of
benevolence to forbid the use of force between men. He forgets this, it is true, in
speaking of our duties towards our fellow-men of the same society, and even
allows us to punish the murderer with death; but towards the foreigner he
requires a greater forbearance and benevolence than towards our neighbor; for if
another nation send its armies to oppress, and rob, and murder us by the
thousand, we have no right to employ physical force either to prevent or to
punish them, though we may do so to prevent or punish a neighbor for an
individual act of the same character. The greater the scale of crime, then, the less
the necessity of resorting to physical force to prevent it!
"4th. But it may be asked, what is to prevent repeated and continued aggression?
I answer, first, not instruments of destruction, but the moral principle which God
has placed in the bosom of every man. I think that obedience to the law of God,
on the part of the injured, is the surest preventive against the repetition of injury.
I answer, secondly, suppose that acting in obedience to the law of benevolence
will not prevent the repetition of injury, will acting on the principle of retaliation
prevent it?" Again; "I believe aggression from a foreign nation to be the
intimation from God that we are disobeying the law of benevolence, and that this
is his mode of teaching nations their duty, in this respect, to each other. So that
aggression seems to me in no manner to call for retaliation and injury, but rather
to call for special kindness and good-will."
This argument, if such it can be called, is equally applicable to individual
aggressions. We are bound to regard them as intimations of our want of
benevolence, and to reward the aggressors for the intimations! Is it true, that in
this world the wicked only are oppressed, and that the good are always the
prospered and happy? Even suppose this true, and that I, as a sinful man, deserve
God's anger, is this any reason why I should not resist the assassin, and seek to
bring him to punishment? The whole of this argument of Dr. Wayland applies
with much greater force to municipal courts than to war.
V. "Let us suppose a nation to abandon all means both of offence and of defence,
to lay aside all power of inflicting injury, and to rely for self-preservation solely
upon the justice of its own conduct, and the moral effect which such a course of
conduct would produce upon the consciences of men. * * * * How would such a
nation be protected from external attack, and entire subjugation? I answer, by
adopting the law of benevolence, a nation would render such an event in the
highest degree improbable. The causes of national war are, most commonly, the
love of plunder and the love of glory. The first of these is rarely, if ever,
sufficient to stimulate men to the ferocity necessary to war, unless when assisted
by the second. And by adopting as the rule of our conduct the law of
benevolence, all motive arising from the second cause is taken away. There is
not a nation in Europe that could be led on to war against a harmless, just,
forgiving, and defenceless people."
History teaches us that societies as well as individuals have been attacked again
and again notwithstanding that they either would not or could not defend
themselves. Did Mr. White, of Salem, escape his murderers any the more for
being harmless and defenceless? Did the Quakers escape being attacked and
hung by the ancient New Englanders any the more because of their non-resisting
principles? Have the Jews escaped persecutions throughout Christendom any the
more because of their imbecility and non-resistance for some centuries past?
Poland was comparatively harmless and defenceless when the three great
European powers combined to attack and destroy the entire nation, dividing
between themselves the Polish territory, and enslaving or driving into exile the
Polish people.

"Oh, bloodiest picture in the book of time,

Sarmatia fell, unwept, without a crime!"
We need not multiply examples under this head; all history is filled with them.
Let us to-morrow destroy our forts and ships of war, disband our army and navy,
and apply the lighted torch to our military munitions and to our physical means
of defence of every description; let it be proclaimed to the world that we will
rely solely upon the consciences of nations for justice, and that we have no
longer either the will or the ability to defend ourselves against aggression. Think
you that the African and Asiatic pirates would refrain, any the more, from
plundering our vessels trading to China, because we had adopted "the law of
benevolence?" Would England be any the more likely to compromise her
differences with us, or be any the more disposed to refrain from impressing our
seamen and from searching our merchant-ships? Experience shows that an
undefended state, known to suffer every thing, soon becomes the prey of all
others, and history most abundantly proves the wisdom and justice of the words
of Washington—"IF WE DESIRE TO SECURE PEACE, IT MUST BE
KNOWN THAT WE ARE AT ALL TIMES READY FOR WAR."
But let us bring this case still nearer home. Let it be known to-morrow that the
people of Boston or New York have adopted the strictly non-resisting principle,
and that hereafter they will rely solely on the consciences of men for justice; let
it be proclaimed throughout the whole extent of our Union, and throughout the
world, that you have destroyed your jails and houses of correction, abolished
your police and executive law officers, that courts may decide justice but will be
allowed no force to compel respect to their decisions, that you will no longer
employ walls, and bars, and locks, to secure your property and the virtue and
lives of your children; but that you will trust solely for protection to "the law of
active benevolence." Think you that the thieves, and robbers, and murderers of
Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and New Orleans, and the cities of the old world,
will, on this account, refrain from molesting the peace of New York and Boston,
and that the wicked and abandoned men now in these cities, will be the more
likely to turn from the evil of their ways?
Assuredly, if this "law of active benevolence," as Dr. Wayland denominates the
rule of non-resistance, will prevent nations from attacking the harmless and
defenceless, it will be still more likely to prevent individuals from the like
aggressions; for the moral sense is less active in communities than where the
responsibility is individual and direct.
Throughout this argument Dr. Wayland assumes that all wars are wars of
aggression, waged for "plunder" or "glory," or through "hatred" or "revenge,"
whereas such is far from being true. He indeed sometimes speaks of war as
being generally of this character; at others he speaks of it as being always
undertaken either from a spirit of aggression or retaliation. Take either form of
his argument, and the veriest schoolboy would pronounce it unsound: viz.,
All wars are undertaken either for aggression or retaliation;
Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws;—therefore,
All wars are immoral and unjustifiable.
Or,
Wars are generally undertaken either for aggression or retaliation;
Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws—therefore,
All wars are immoral and unjustifiable.
VI. "Let any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary expenditure, and the
awful waste of human life, which the wars of the last hundred years have
occasioned, and then we will ask him whether it be not evident, that the one-
hundredth part of this expense and suffering, if employed in the honest effort to
render mankind wiser and better, would, long before this time, have banished
wars from the earth, and rendered the civilized world like the garden of Eden? If
this be true, it will follow that the cultivation of a military spirit is injurious to a
community, inasmuch as it aggravates the source of the evil, the corrupt passions
of the human breast, by the very manner in which it attempts to correct the evil
itself."
Much has been said to show that war begets immorality, and that the cultivation
of the military spirit has a corrupting influence on community. And members of
the clergy and of the bar have not unfrequently so far forgotten, if not truth and
fact, at least the common courtesies and charities of life, as to attribute to the
military profession an unequal share of immorality and crime. We are declared
not only parasites on the body politic, but professed violators of God's laws—
men so degraded, though unconsciously, that "in the pursuit of justice we
renounce the human character and assume that of the beasts;" it is said that
"murder, robbery, rape, arson, theft, if only plaited with the soldier's garb, go
unwhipped of justice."[1] It has never been the habit of the military to retort these
charges upon the other professions. We prefer to leave them unanswered. If
demagogues on the "stump," or in the legislative halls, or in their Fourth of-July
addresses, can find no fitter subjects "to point a moral or adorn a tale," we must
be content to bear their misrepresentations and abuse.
[1]
Sumner's Oration.

Unjust wars, as well as unjust litigation, are immoral in their effects and also in
their cause. But just wars and just litigation are not demoralizing. Suppose all
wars and all courts of justice to be abolished, and the wicked nations as well as
individuals to be suffered to commit injuries without opposition and without
punishment; would not immorality and unrighteousness increase rather than
diminish? Few events rouse and elevate the patriotism and public spirit of a
nation so much as a just and patriotic war. It raises the tone of public morality,
and destroys the sordid selfishness and degrading submissiveness which so often
result from a long-protracted peace. Such was the Dutch war of independence
against the Spaniards; such the German war against the aggressions of Louis
XIV., and the French war against the coalition of 1792. But without looking
abroad for illustration, we find ample proof in our own history. Can it be said
that the wars of the American Revolution and of 1812, were demoralizing in
their effects? "Whence do Americans," says Dr. Lieber, "habitually take their
best and purest examples of all that is connected with patriotism, public spirit,
devotedness to common good, purity of motive and action, if not from the daring
band of their patriots of the Revolution?"
The principal actors in the military events of the Revolution and of 1812, held,
while living, high political offices in the state, and the moral tone which they
derived from these wars may be judged of by the character stamped on their
administration of the government. These men have passed away, and their places
have, for some time, been filled by men who take their moral tone from the
relations of peace. To the true believer in the efficacy of non-resistance, and in
the demoralizing influence of all wars, how striking the contrast between these
different periods in our political history! How infinitely inferior to the rulers in
later times were those, who, in the blindness of their infatuation, appealed to
physical force, rather than surrender their life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness!
Let us trace out this contrast:—
In the earlier ages of our republic, and under the rule of those whose moral
character had been corrupted by war, party spirit ran higher and was less pure
than at later periods in our history. The object of the principal leaders of the great
political parties was then to render the opinions of the opposite party odious:
now, their only object is to sustain their own opinions by argument. Then, each
party claimed to itself an exclusive love of country, and stigmatized the other as
aliens and the natural enemies of the state: now, they both practise great
forbearance, love, and charity, towards political opponents. Then, men obtained
place through intrigue and corruption, and a universal scramble for the loaves
and fishes of office on the one side, and a universal political proscription on the
other, were regarded as the natural results of an election: now, this disgusting
strife for office has ceased; men no longer seek place, but wait, like Cincinnatus,
to be called from their ploughs; and none are proscribed for opinion's sake.
Then, in electing men to office the most important social and constitutional
principles were forgotten or violated: now, we have the august spectacle of a
nation-choosing its rulers under the guidance of strict moral principle. Then, the
halls of congress were frequently filled with demagogues, and tiplers, and the
small men of community: now, the ablest and best of the country are always
sought for as representatives. Then, the magnates of party were the mere timid,
temporizing slaves of expediency, looking, not to the justice and wisdom of their
measures, but to their probable popularity with then sneaking train of followers:
now, they rely for respect and support upon the judgment of the honest and
enlightened. Then, the rank and file of party were mere political hirelings, who
sold their manhood for place, who reviled and glorified, and shouted huzzas and
whispered calumnies, just as they were bidden; they could fawn upon those who
dispensed political patronage with a cringing servility that would shame the
courtiers of Louis XIV., or the parasites and hirelings of Walpole: now, all
political partisans, deriving their moral tone from the piping times of peace, are
pure, disinterested patriots, who, like the Roman farmer, take office with great
reluctance, and resign it again as soon as the state can spare their services. Then,
prize-fighters, and blacklegs, and gamblers, having formed themselves into
political clubs, were courted by men high in authority, and rewarded for their
dirty and corrupting partisan services by offices of trust and responsibility: now,
no man clothed with authority would dare to insult the moral sense of
community by receiving such characters in the national councils, or by
bestowing public offices upon these corrupt and loathsome dregs of society.
Such, the advocates of non resistance would persuade us, are the legitimate
results in this country of war on the one hand and of a long-protracted peace on
the other. But there are men of less vivid imaginations, and, perhaps, of visions
less distorted by fanatical zeal, who fail to perceive these results, and who even
think they see the reverse of all this. These men cannot perceive any thing in the
lives of Washington, Hamilton, and Knox, to show that they were the less
virtuous because they had borne arms in their country's service: they even fail to
perceive the injurious effects of the cultivation of a military spirit on the military
students of West Point, whose graduates, they think, will compare favorably in
moral character with the graduates of Yale and Cambridge. Nay, more, some
even go so far as to say that our army, as a body, is no less moral than the
corresponding classes in civil life; that our common soldiers are as seldom guilty
of riots, thefts, robberies, and murders, as similarly educated men engaged in
other pursuits; that our military officers are not inferior in moral character to our
civil officers, and that, as a class, they will compare favorably with any other
class of professional men—with lawyers, for example. In justification of these
opinions—which may, perhaps, be deemed singularly erroneous—they say, that
in the many millions of public money expended during the last forty years, by
military officers, for the army, for military defences, and for internal
improvements, but a single graduate of West Point has proved a defaulter, even
to the smallest sum, and that it is exceedingly rare to see an officer of the army
brought into court for violating the laws.
But even suppose it true that armies necessarily diffuse immorality through
community, is it not equally true that habitual submission to the injustice,
plunder, and insult of foreign conquerors would tend still more to degrade and
demoralize any people?
With regard to "pecuniary expenditures" required in military defence, many
absurd as well as false statements have been put forth. With respect to our own
country, the entire amounts expended, under the head of war department,
whether for Indian pensions, for the purchase of Indian lands, the construction of
government roads, the improvement of rivers and harbors, the building of
breakwaters and sea-walls, for the preservation of property, the surveying of
public lands, &c., &c.; in fine, every expenditure made by officers of the army,
under the war department, is put down as "expenses for military defence."
Similar misstatements are made with respect to foreign countries: for example,
the new fortifications of Paris are said to have already cost from fifty to seventy-
five millions of dollars, and as much more is said to be required to complete
them. Indeed, we have seen the whole estimated cost of those works stated at
two hundred and forty millions of dollars, or twelve hundred millions of francs!
The facts are these: the works, when done, will have cost about twenty-eight
millions. We had the pleasure of examining them not long since, in company
with several of the engineer officers employed on the works. They were then
three-fourths done, and had cost about twenty millions. We were assured by
these officers that the fortifications proper would be completed for somewhat
less than the original estimate of twenty-eight millions. Had we time to enter into
details, other examples of exaggeration and misrepresentation could be given.
But it is not to be denied that wars and the means of military defence have cost
vast amounts of money. So also have litigation and the means deemed requisite
for maintaining justice between individuals. It has been estimated that we have
in this country, at the present time, thirty thousand lawyers, without including
pettifoggers. Allowing each of these to cost the country the average sum of one
thousand dollars, and we have the annual cost to the country, for lawyers, thirty
millions of dollars. Add to this the cost of legislative halls and legislators for
making laws; of court-houses, jails, police offices, judges of the different courts,
marshals, sheriffs justices of the peace, constables, clerks, witnesses, &c.,
employed to apply and enforce the laws when made; the personal loss of time of
the different plaintiffs and defendants, the individual anxiety and suffering
produced by litigation; add all these together, and I doubt not the result for a
single year will somewhat astonish these modern economists. But if all the
expenditures of this nature that have been made for the last fifty years, in this
individual "war of hate," be added together, we have no doubt a very fruitful text
might be obtained for preaching a crusade against law and lawyers! But could
any sane man be found to say that, on account of the cost of maintaining them,
all laws and lawyers are useless and should be abolished?
If, therefore, these vast sums of money are deemed necessary to secure justice
between individuals of the same nation, can we expect that the means of
international justice can be maintained without expenditures commensurate with
the object in view? If we cannot rely exclusively upon the "law of active
benevolence" for maintaining justice between brothers of the same country, can
we hope that, in the present state of the world, strangers and foreigners will be
more ready to comply with its requisitions?
The length of the preceding remarks admonishes us to greater brevity in the
further discussion of this subject.
It is objected to war, that men being rational beings, should contend with one
another by argument, and not by force, as do the brutes.
To this it is answered, that force properly begins only where argument ends. If he
who has wronged me cannot be persuaded to make restitution, I apply to the
court,—that is, to legal force,—to compel him to do me justice. So nations ought
to resort to military force only when all other means fail to prevent aggression
and injury.
But war often fails to procure redress of grievances, or to prevent repeated and
continued aggression.
So does a resort to civil force; but such a resort is none the less proper and just
on that account.
But in war the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer, while the guilty triumph.
So it often is in civil life: God, for some wise purpose, sometimes permits the
wicked to triumph for a season.
But in all wars one party must be in the wrong, and frequently the war is unjust
on both sides.
So in suits at law, one party is necessarily wrong, and frequently both resort to
the civil tribunals in hopes of attaining unrighteous ends.
But nations do not resort to tribunals, like individuals, to settle their differences.
For the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this character—a congress of
nations, as it has been called,—would be more productive of evil than of good.
By such an arrangement the old and powerful European monarchies would
acquire the authority to interfere in the domestic affairs of the weaker powers.
We see the effects of establishing such a tribunal in the so-called Holy Alliance,
whose influence is regarded by the friends of liberty as little less dangerous than
the Holy Inquisition. Moreover, such a tribunal would not prevent war, for
military force would still be resorted to to enforce its decisions. For these and
other reasons, it is deemed better and safer to rely on the present system of
International Law. Under this system, and in this country, a resort to the
arbitrament of war is not the result of impulse and passion,—a yielding to the
mere "bestial propensities" of our nature; it is a deliberate and solemn act of the
legislative power,—of the representatives of the national mind, convened as the
high council of the people. It is this power which must determine when all just
and honorable means have been resorted to to obtain national justice, and when a
resort to military force is requisite and proper. If this decision be necessarily
unchristian and barbarous, such, also, should we expect to be the character of
other laws passed by the same body, and under the same circumstances. A
declaration of war, in this country, is a law of the land, made by a deliberative
body, under the high sanction of the constitution. It is true that such a law may
be unjust and wrong, but we can scarcely agree that it will necessarily be so. The
distinction between war, as thus duly declared, and "international Lynch-law" is
too evident to need comment.
But it is said that the benefits of war are more than counterbalanced by the evils
it entails, and that, "most commonly, the very means by which we repel a
despotism from abroad, only establishes over us a military despotism at home."
Much has been said and written about military despotism; but we think he who
studies history thoroughly, will not fail to prefer a military despotism to a
despotism of mere politicians. The governments of Alexander and Charlemagne
were infinitely preferable to those of the petty civil tyrants who preceded and
followed them; and there is no one so blinded by prejudice as to say that the
reign of Napoleon was no better than that of Robespierre, Danton, and the other
"lawyers" who preceded him, or of the Bourbons, for whom he was dethroned.
"Cæsar," says a distinguished senator of our own country, "was rightfully killed
for conspiring against his country; but it was not he that destroyed the liberties of
Rome. That work was done by the profligate politicians without him, and before
his time; and his death did not restore the republic. There were no more
elections: rotten politicians had destroyed them; and the nephew of Cæsar, as
heir to his uncle, succeeded to the empire on the principle of hereditary
succession."
"And here History appears in her grand and instructive character, as Philosophy
teaching by example: and let us not be senseless to her warning voice.
Superficial readers believe it was the military men who destroyed the Roman
republic! No such thing! It was the politicians who did it!--factious, corrupt,
intriguing politicians—destroying public virtue in their mad pursuit after office
—destroying their rivals by crime—deceiving and debauching the people for
votes—and bringing elections into contempt by the frauds and violence with
which they were conducted. From the time of the Gracchi there were no
elections that could bear the name. Confederate and rotten politicians bought and
sold the consulship. Intrigue and the dagger disposed of rivals. Fraud, violence,
bribes, terror, and the plunder of the public treasury commanded votes. The
people had no choice; and long before the time of Cæsar, nothing remained of
republican government but the name and the abuse. Read Plutarch. In the 'Life of
Cæsar,' and not three pages before the crossing of the Rubicon, he paints the
ruined state of the elections,—shows that all elective government was gone,—
that the hereditary form had become a necessary relief from the contests of the
corrupt,—and that in choosing between Pompey and Cæsar, many preferred
Pompey, not because they thought him republican, but because they thought he
would make the milder king. Even arms were but a small part of Cæsar's
reliance, when he crossed the Rubicon. Gold, still more than the sword, was his
dependence; and he sent forward the accumulated treasures of plundered Gaul,
to be poured into the laps of rotten politicians. There was no longer a popular
government; and in taking all power himself, he only took advantage of the state
of things which profligate politicians had produced. In this he was culpable, and
paid the forfeit with his life. But in contemplating his fate, let us never forget
that the politicians had undermined and destroyed the republic, before he came
to seize and to master it."
We could point to numerous instances, where the benefits of war have more than
compensated for the evils which attended it; benefits not only to the generations
who engaged in it, but also to their descendants for long ages. Had Rome
adopted the non-resistance principle when Hannibal was at her gates, we should
now be in the night of African ignorance and barbarism, instead of enjoying the
benefits of Roman learning and Roman civilization. Had France adopted this
principle when the allied armies invaded her territories in 1792, her fate had
followed that of Poland. Had our ancestors adopted this principle in 1776, what
now had been, think you, the character and condition of our country?
Dr. Lieber's remarks on this point are peculiarly just and apposite. "The
continued efforts," says he, "requisite for a nation to protect themselves against
the ever-repeated attacks of a predatory foe, may be infinitely greater than the
evils entailed by a single and energetic war, which forever secures peace from
that side. Nor will it be denied, I suppose, that Niebuhr is right when he
observes, that the advantage to Rome of having conquered Sicily, as to power
and national vigor, was undeniable. But even if it were not so, are there no other
advantages to be secured? No human mind is vast enough to comprehend in one
glance, nor is any human life long enough to follow out consecutively, all the
immeasurable blessings and the unspeakable good which have resolved to
mankind from the ever-memorable victories of little Greece over the rolling
masses of servile Asia, which were nigh sweeping over Europe like the high
tides of a swollen sea, carrying its choking sand over all the germs of
civilization, liberty, and taste, and nearly all that is good and noble. Think what
we should have been had Europe become an Asiatic province, and the Eastern
principles of power and stagnation should have become deeply infused into her
population, so that no process ever after could have thrown it out again! Has no
advantage resulted from the Hebrews declining any longer to be ground in the
dust, and ultimately annihilated, at least mentally so, by stifling servitude, and
the wars which followed their resolution? The Netherlands war of independence
has had a penetrating and decided effect upon modern history, and, in the eye of
all who value the most substantial parts and elementary ideas of modern and
civil liberty, a highly advantageous one, both directly and through Great Britain.
Wars have frequently been, in the hands of Providence, the means of
disseminating civilization, if carried on by a civilized people—as in the case of
Alexander, whose wars had a most decided effect upon the intercourse of men
and extension of civilization—or of rousing and reuniting people who had fallen
into lethargy, if attacked by less civilized and numerous hordes. Frequently we
find in history that the ruder and victorious tribe is made to recover as it were
civilization, already on the wane with a refined nation. Paradoxical as it may
seem at first glance, it is, nevertheless, amply proved by history, that the closest
contact and consequent exchange of thought and produce and enlargement of
knowledge, between two otherwise severed nations, is frequently produced by
war. War is a struggle, a state of suffering; but as such, at times, only that
struggling process without which—in proportion to the good to be obtained, or,
as would be a better expression for many cases, to the good that is to be borne—
no great and essential good falls ever to the share of man. Suffering, merely as
suffering, is not an evil. Our religion, philosophy, every day's experience, prove
it. No maternal rejoicing brightens up a mother's eve without the anxiety of
labor."
One word more, and we must leave this subject. It has been said by some that the
duties of patriotism are less binding upon us than upon our ancestors; that,
whatever may have been the practice in years that are past the present generation
can in no manner bear arms in their country's cause, such a course being not only
dishonorable, but in the eye of the Christian, wicked, and even infamous! It is
believed, however, that such are not the general opinions and sentiments of the
religious people of this country. Our forefathers lighted the fires of Religion and
Patriotism at the same altar; it is believed that their descendants have not
allowed either to be extinguished, but that both still burn, and will continue to
burn, with a purer and brighter flame. Our forefathers were not the less mindful
of their duty to their God, because they also faithfully served their country. If we
are called upon to excel them in works of charity, of benevolence, and of
Christian virtue, let it not be said of us that we have forgotten the virtue of
patriotism.[2]
[2]
For further discussion of this subject the reader is referred to Lieber's Political
Ethics, Part II., book vii. chap. 3; Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy;
Legare's Report of June 13, 1838, in the House of Representatives; Mackintosh's
History of the Revolution of 1688, chap. x.; Bynkershock; Vatel; Puffendorf;
Clausewitz; and most other writers on international law and the laws of war.
Dr. Wayland's view of the question is advocated with much zeal by Dymond in
his Inquiry into the Accordancy of War with the Principles of Christianity; Jay's
Peace and War; Judd's Sermon on Peace and War; Peabody's Address, &c.;
Coue's Tract on What is the Use of the Navy? Sumner's True Grandeur of
Nations.
 CHAPTER II.
STRATEGY

War has been defined, "A contest between nations and states carried on by
force." But this definition is by some considered defective, inasmuch as it would
exclude all civil wars.
When war is commenced by attacking a nation in peace, it is called offensive,
and when undertaken to repel invasion, or the attacks of an enemy, it is called
defensive. A war may be essentially defensive even where we begin it, if
intended to prevent an attack or invasion which is under preparation. Besides
this general division of war, military writers have made numerous others, such as
—
Wars of intervention, in which one state interferes in favor of another. This
intervention may either have respect to the internal or to the external affairs of a
nation. The interference of Russia in the affairs of Poland, of England in the
government of India, Austria and the allied powers in the affairs of France
during the Revolution and under the empire, are examples under the first head.
The intervention of the Elector Maurice of Saxony against Charles V., of King
William against Louis XIV., in 1688, of Russia and France in the seven years'
war, of Russia again between France and Austria, in 1805, and between France
and Prussia, in 1806, are examples under the second head. Most liberal-
publicists consider intervention in the internal affairs of nations as indefensible;
but the principle is supported by the advocates of the old monarchies of Europe.
Wars of insurrection to gain or to regain liberty; as was the case with the
Americans in 1776, and the modern Greeks in 1821.
Wars of independence from foreign dictation and control as the wars of Poland
against Russia, of the Netherlands against Spain, of France against the several
coalitions of the allied powers, of the Spanish Peninsula against France and of
China and India against England. The American war of 1812 partook largely of
this character, and some judicious historians have denominated it the war of
Independence, as distinguished from the war of the Revolution.
Wars of opinion, like those which the Vendeans have sustained in support of the
Bourbons, and those France has sustained against the allies, as also those of
propagandism, waged against the smaller European states by the republican
hordes of the French Revolution. To this class also belong—
Religious wars, like those of Islamism, of the crusades, and of the Reformation.
Wars of conquest, like those of the Romans in Gaul, of the English in India, of
the French in Egypt and Africa, and of the Russians in Circassia.
National wars, in which the great body of the people of a state engage, like those
of the Swiss against Austria and the Duke of Burgundy, of the Catalans in 1712,
of the Americans against England, of the Dutch against Phillip II., and of the
Poles and Circassians against Russia.
Civil wars, where one portion of the state fights against the other, as the war of
the Roses in England, of the league in France, of the Guelphs and Ghibelines in
Italy, and of the factions in Mexico and South America.
It is not the present intention to enter into any discussion of these different kinds
of war, but rather to consider the general subject, and to discuss such general
principles and rules as may be applicable to all wars.
War in its most extensive sense may be regarded both as a science and an art. It
is a science so far as it investigates general principles and institutes an analysis
of military operations; and an art when considered with reference to the practical
rules for conducting campaigns, sieges, battles, &c. So is engineering a science
so far as it investigates the general principles of fortification, and also artillery, in
analyzing the principles of gunnery; but both are arts when considered with
reference to the practical rules for the construction, attack, and defence of forts,
or for the use of cannon.
This distinction has not always been observed by writers on this subject, and
some have asserted that strategy is the science, and tactics the art of war. This is
evidently mistaking the general distinction between science, which investigates
principles, and art, which forms practical rules.
In popular language, however, it is usual to speak of the military art when we
refer to the general subject of war, and of the military sciences when we wish to
call attention more particularly to the scientific principles upon which the art is
founded. We shall here consider the military art in this general sense, as
including the entire subject of war.
As thus defined, the military art may be divided into four distinct branches, viz.:
1st. Strategy; 2d. Fortification, or Engineering; 3d. Logistics; 4th. Tactics.
Several general treatises on this art add another branch, called The Policy of War,
or the relations of war with the affairs of state.
Strategy is defined to be the art of directing masses on decisive points, or the
hostile movements of armies beyond the range of each other's cannon.
Engineering embraces all dispositions made to enable troops to resist a superior
force the longest time possible; and also the means resorted to by the opposing
army to overcome these material obstacles. Logistics embraces the practical
details of moving and supplying armies. Tactics is the art of bringing troops into
action, or of moving them in the presence of an enemy, that is, within his view,
and within the reach of his artillery. All these are most intimately connected. A
fault in tactics may occasion the loss of strategic lines; the best combined
manœuvres on the field of battle may lead to no decisive results, when the
position, or the direction of the operation is not strategic; sometimes not only
battles, but entire campaigns, are lost through neglect of the engineer's art, or
faults in his dispositions; again, armies would be of little use without the
requisite means of locomotion and of subsistence.
1. Strategy regards the theatre of war, rather than the field of battle. It selects the
important points in this theatre, and the lines of communication by which they
may be reached; it forms the plan and arranges the general operations of a
campaign; but it leaves it to the engineers to overcome material obstacles and to
erect new ones; it leaves to logistics the means of supporting armies and of
moving them on the chosen lines; and to tactics, the particular dispositions for
battle, when the armies have reached the destined points. It is well to keep in
mind these distinctions, which may be rendered still more obvious by a few
illustrations. The point where several lines of communications either intersect or
meet, and the centre of an arc which is occupied by the enemy, are strategic
points; but tactics would reject a position equally accessible on all sides,
especially with its flanks exposed to attack. Sempronius at Trebbia and Varro at
Cannæ, so placed their armies that the Carthagenians attacked them, at the same
time, in front, on the flanks, and in rear; the Roman consuls were defeated: but
the central strategic position of Napoleon at Rivoli was eminently successful. At
the battle of Austerlitz the allies had projected a strategic movement to their left,
in order to cut off Napoleon's right from Vienna; Weyrother afterwards changed
his plans, and executed a corresponding tactical movement. By the former there
had been some chance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable
destruction. The little fort of Koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was
more useful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The little
fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the operations of
Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army; whereas, on the other
hand, the ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706, caused an army of 78,000 French
to be defeated by only 40,000 men under Prince Eugene of Savoy.
War, as has already been said, may be either offensive or defensive. If the
attacking army be directed against an entire state, it becomes a war of invasion.
If only a province, or a military position, or an army, be attacked, it is simply
regarded as taking the initiative in offensive movements.
Offensive war is ordinarily most advantageous in its moral and political
influence. It is waged on a foreign soil, and therefore spares the country of the
attacking force; it augments its own resources at the same time that it diminishes
those of the enemy; it adds to the moral courage of its own army, while it
disheartens its opponents. A war of invasion may, however, have also its
disadvantages. Its lines of operation may become too deep, which is always
hazardous in an enemy's country. All the natural and artificial obstacles, such as
mountains, rivers, defiles, fortifications, &c., are favorable for defence, but
difficult to be overcome by the invader. The local authorities and inhabitants
oppose, instead of facilitating his operations; and if patriotism animate the
defensive army to fight for the independence of its threatened country, the war
may become long and bloody. But if a political diversion be made in favor of the
invading force, and its operations be attended with success, it strikes the enemy
at the heart, paralyzes all his military energies, and deprives him of his military
resources, thus promptly terminating the contest. Regarded simply as the
initiative of movements, the offensive is almost always the preferable one, as it
enables the general to choose his lines for moving and concentrating his masses
on the decisive point.
The first and most important rule in offensive war is, to keep your forces as
much concentrated as possible. This will not only prevent misfortune, but secure
victory,—since, by its necessary operation, you possess the power of throwing
your whole force upon any exposed point of your enemy's position.
To this general rule some writers have laid down the following exceptions:—
1st. When the food and forage of the neighborhood in which you act have been
exhausted and destroyed, and your magazines are, from any cause, unable to
supply the deficiency, one of two things must be done; either you must go to
places where these articles abound, or you must draw from them your supplies
by detachments. The former is rarely compatible with your plan, and necessarily
retards its execution; and hence the preference which is generally given to the
latter.
2d. When reinforcements are about to join you, and this can only be effected by
a march through a country actually occupied by hostile corps, or liable to be so
occupied, you must again waive the general rule, and risk one party for the
security of the other; or, (which may be better,) make such movements with your
main body as shall accomplish your object.
3d. When you have complete evidence of the actual, or probable insurrection in
your favor, of a town or province of your enemy, or of a division of his army,
you must support this inclination by strong detachments, or by movements of
your main body. Napoleon's operations in Italy, in 1796-7, furnish examples of
what is here meant.
4th. When, by dispatching a detachment, you may be able to intercept a convoy,
or reinforcement, coming to the aid of your enemy.
These are apparent rather than real exceptions to the rule of concentration. This
rule does not require that all the army should occupy the same position. Far from
it. Concentration requires the main body to be in immediate and supporting
reach: small detachments, for temporary and important objects, like those
mentioned, are perfectly legitimate, and in accordance with correct principles.
Napoleon's position in Spain will serve as an illustration. A hand, placed on the
map of that country, will represent the position of the invading forces. When
opened, the fingers will represent the several detachments, thrown out on
important strategic lines, and which could readily be drawn in, as in closing the
hand, upon the principal and central mass, preparatory to striking some
important blow.
"If, as we have seen, it be the first great rule for an army acting on the offensive
principle, to keep its forces concentrated, it is, no doubt, the second, to keep
them fully employed. Is it your intention to seize a particular province of your
enemy? to penetrate to his capital? or to cut him off from his supplies? Whatever
measure be necessary to open your route to these objects must be promptly
taken; and if you mean to subsist yourself at his expense, your movements must
be more rapid than his. Give him time to breathe,—and above all, give him time
to rest, and your project is blasted; his forages will be completed, and his
magazines filled and secured. The roads of approach will be obstructed, bridges
destroyed, and strong points everywhere taken and defended. You will, in fact,
like Burgoyne, in 1777, reduce yourself to the necessity of bleeding at every
step, without equivalent or use."
"Such cannot be the fate of a commander who, knowing all the value of acting
on the offensive, shakes, by the vigor and address of his first movements, the
moral as well as physical force of his enemy,—who, selecting his own time, and
place, and mode of attack, confounds his antagonist by enterprises equally hardy
and unexpected,—and who at last leaves to him only the alternative of resistance
without hope, or of flying without resistance."
The British army, in the war of the American Revolution, must have been most
wretchedly ignorant of these leading maxims for conducting offensive war.
Instead of concentrating their forces on some decisive point, and then destroying
the main body of our army by repeated and well-directed blows, they scattered
their forces over an immense extent of country, and became too weak to act with
decision and effect on any one point. On the other hand, this policy enabled us to
call out and discipline our scattered and ill-provided forces.
The main object in defensive war is, to protect the menaced territory, to retard
the enemy's progress, to multiply obstacles in his way, to guard the vital points
of the country, and—at the favorable moment, when the enemy becomes
enfeebled by detachments, losses, privations, and fatigue—to assume the
offensive, and drive him from the country. This combination of the defensive
and offensive has many advantages. The enemy, being forced to take the
defensive in his turn, loses much of the moral superiority due to successful
offensive operations. There are numerous instances of this kind of war, "the
defensive-offensive," as it is sometimes called, to be found in history. The last
four campaigns of Frederick the Great of Prussia, are examples which may serve
as models. Wellington played a similar part in the Spanish peninsula.
To merely remain in a defensive attitude, yielding gradually to the advances of
the enemy, without any effort to regain such positions or provinces as may have
fallen into his power, or to inflict on him some fatal and decisive blow on the
first favorable opportunity; such a system is always within the reach of
ignorance, stupidity, and cowardice; but such is far from being the true Fabian
system of defensive war.
"Instead of finding security only in flight; instead of habitually refusing to look
the enemy in the face; instead of leaving his march undisturbed; instead of
abandoning, without contest, points strong by nature or by art;—instead of all
this, the true war of defence seeks every occasion to meet the enemy, and loses
none by which it can annoy or defeat him; it is always awake; it is constantly in
motion, and never unprepared for either attack or defence. When not employed
in efforts of courage or address, it incessantly yields itself to those of labor and
science. In its front it breaks up roads or breaks down bridges; while it erects or
repairs those in its rear: it forms abbatis, raises batteries, fortifies passes, or
intrenches encampments; and to the system of deprivation adds all the activity,
stratagem, and boldness of la petite guerre. Dividing itself into detachments, it
multiplies its own attacks and the alarms of the enemy. Collecting itself at a
single point, it obstructs his progress for days, and sometimes for weeks
together. Does it even abandon the avenues it is destined to defend? It is but for
the purpose of shielding them more securely, by the attack of his hospitals,
magazines, convoys, or reinforcements. In a word, by adopting the maxim, that
the enemy must be made to pay for whatever he gains, it disputes with him every
inch of ground, and if at last it yields to him a victory, it is of that kind which
calls forth only his sighs."
In discussing the subject of strategy, certain technical terms are employed, such
as theatre of war; theatre of operations; base of operations, or the line from
which operations start; objective points, or points to which the operations are
directed; line of operations, or the line along which an army moves; key points,
or points which it is important for the defensive army to secure; line of defence,
or the line which it is important to defend at all hazards: and in general, strategic
points, strategic lines, strategic positions, &c. As these terms are very generally
used in military books, it may be well to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted
with their import. After defining these terms and explaining their meaning and
application, it is deemed best to illustrate their use by reference to well-known
and striking historical examples.
The theatre of a war embraces not only the territory of the two belligerent
powers, but also that of their allies, and of such secondary powers as, through
fear or interest, may be drawn into the contest. With maritime nations it also
embraces the seas, and sometimes crosses to another continent. Some of the wars
between France and England embraced the two hemispheres.
The theatre of operations, however, is of a more limited character, and should
not be confounded with the theatre of war. In general, it includes only the
territory which an army seeks, on the one hand, to defend, and on the other, to
invade. If two or more armies be directed towards the same object, though by
different lines, their combined operations are included in the same theatre but if
each acts independently of the others, and seeks distinct and separate objects,
each must have its own independent theatre of operations.
A war between France and Austria may embrace all Italy and Germany, but the
theatre of operations may be limited to only a portion of these countries. Should
the Oregon question lead to hostilities between the United States and England,
the theatre of war would embrace the greater part of North America and the two
oceans, but the theatre of operations would probably be limited to Canada and
our northern frontier, with naval descents upon our maritime cities.
The first point to be attended to in a plan of military operation is to select a good
base. Many circumstances influence this selection, such as mountains, rivers,
roads, forests, cities, fortifications, military dépôts, means of subsistence, &c. If
the frontier of a state contain strong natural or artificial barriers, it may serve not
only as a good base for offensive operations, but also as an excellent line of
defence against invasion. A single frontier line may, however, be penetrated by
the enemy, and in that case a second or third base further in the interior becomes
indispensable for a good defence.
A French army carrying on military operations against Germany would make the
Rhine its first base; but if driven from this it would form a second base on the
Meuse or Moselle, a third on the Seine, and a fourth on the Loire; or, when
driven from the first base, it would take others perpendicular to the front of
defence, either to the right, on Béfort and Besançon, or to the left, on Mézières
and Sedan. If acting offensively against Prussia and Russia, the Rhine and the
Main would form the first base the Elbe and the Oder the second, the Vistula the
third, the Nieman the fourth, and the Dwina and the Dnieper the fifth.
A French army operating against Spain would have the Pyrenees for its first
base; the line of the Ebro for a second, resting its wings on the gulf of Gascony
and the Mediterranean. If from this position it advance its left, possessing itself
of the kingdom of Valencia, the line of the Sierra d'Estellas becomes its third
base of operations against the centre of Spain.
A base may be parallel, oblique, or perpendicular to our line of operations, or to
the enemy's line of defence. Some prefer one plan and some another; the best
authorities, however, think the oblique or perpendicular more advantageous than
the parallel; but we are not often at liberty to choose between these, for other
considerations usually determine the selection.
In 1806, the French forces first moved perpendicular to their base on the Main,
but afterwards effected a change of front, and moved on a line oblique or nearly
parallel to this base. They had pursued the same plan of operations in the Seven
Years' War. The Russians, in 1812, based perpendicularly on the Oka and the
Kalouga, and extended their flank march on Wiozma and Krasnoi; in 1813, the
allies, based perpendicularly on Bohemia, succeeded in paralyzing Napoleon's
army on the Elbe.
An American army moving by Lake Champlain, would be based perpendicular
on the great line of communication between Boston and Buffalo; if moving from
the New England states on Quebec and Montreal, the line of operations would be
oblique; and if moving from the Niagara frontier by Lake Ontario and the St.
Lawrence, the line would be nearly parallel both to our base and to the enemy's
line of defence—an operation, under the circumstances, exceedingly
objectionable.
Any point in the theatre of operations which gives to the possessor an advantage
over his opponent, is regarded as strategic. Their geographical position and
political and military character, give them a greater or less influence in directing
the campaign. These points are occupied by the defensive army, and attacked by
the offensive; if on or near the base, they become the key points for the former,
and the objective points for the latter.[3] There are also between these two a
greater or less number of strategic points, which have an important though
inferior influence upon the result of the war.
[3]
It may be well to remark that a strategic point is not necessarily a geometrical
point; an entire province, or a considerable portion of a geographical frontier, is,
in military language, sometimes denominated a point. In the same way, strategic
lines, instead of being mathematical lines, are frequently many miles in width.

The first object of the French in attacking Belgium, is to gain possession of the
Meuse, as this position would give them a decided advantage in any ulterior
operations. In attacking southern Germany, the course of the Danube offers a
series of points which exercise an important influence on the war. For northern
Germany, Leipsic and the country bordering on the Saale and the Elbe, are
objects often fiercely contested by the French and other belligerent powers. In a
war between this country and England, Montreal and the points on the St.
Lawrence between Montreal and Quebec, would become objects of the highest
importance, and their possession would probably determine the result of the war.
The capital of a state, from its political importance as well as its military
influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and its capture is therefore
frequently the object of an entire campaign. The possession of Genoa, Turin,
Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both from their political and military
importance, had a decided influence upon the results of the war in these several
states. In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the
campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in
1814 and 1815. If Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle
of Cannæ;, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking of
Washington, in 1814, had little or no influence on the war, for the place was then
of no importance in itself, and was a mere nominal capital. It, however, greatly
influenced our reputation abroad, and required many brilliant successes to wash
the blot from our national escutcheon.
Lines of defence in strategy are either permanent or temporary. The great military
frontiers of a state, especially when strengthened by natural and artificial
obstacles, such as chains of mountains, rivers, lines of fortresses, &c., are
regarded as permanent lines of defence. The Alpine range between France and
Piedmont, with its fortified passes; the Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe, with their
strongly-fortified places; the Pyrenees, with Bayonne at one extremity and
Perpignon at the other; the triple range of fortresses on the Belgian frontier—are
all permanent lines of defence. The St. Lawrence river is a permanent line of
defence for Canada; and the line of lake Champlain, the upper St. Lawrence, and
the lakes, for the United States.
Temporary lines of defence are such as are taken up merely for the campaign.
Napoleon's position in Saxony, in 1813; the line of the allies in Belgium, in
1815; the line of the Marne, in 1814, are examples of temporary lines of defence.
It will be seen from these remarks that lines of defence are not necessarily bases
of operation.
Strategic positions are such as are taken up during the operations of a war, either
by a corps d'armée or grand detachment, for the purpose of checking or
observing an opposing force; they are named thus to distinguish them from
tactical positions or fields of battle. The positions of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona,
and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797, to watch the Adige; his positions on the
Passarge, in 1807, and in Saxony and Silesia in front of his line of defence, in
1813; and Massena's positions on the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar, in
1799, are examples under this head.
Before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate the strategic relations of
lines and positions by the use of diagrams.
(Fig. 1.) The army at A covers the whole of the ground in rear of the line DC
perpendicular to the line AB, the position of the enemy being at B.
(Fig. 2.) AJ being equal to BJ, A will still cover every thing in rear of DC.
(Fig. 3.) If the army A is obliged to cover the point a, the army B will cover all
the space without the circle whose radius is aB; and of course A continues to
cover the point a so long as it remains within this circle aB.
A line of operations embraces that portion of the theatre of war which an army or
corps d'armée passes over in attaining its object; the front of operations is the
front formed by the army as it advances on this line.
When an army acts as a single mass, without forming independent corps, the line
it follows is denominated a simple line of operations.
If two or more corps act in an isolated manner, but against the same opposing
force, they are said to follow double or multiple lines.
The lines by which Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany in 1796, were double
lines; but Napoleon's advance by Bamberg and Gera, in 1806, although moving
in seven distinct corps d'armée, formed but a single line of operations.
Interior lines of operations are those followed by an army which operates
between the enemy's lines in such a way as to be able to concentrate his forces
on one of these lines before the other can be brought to its assistance. For
example, Napoleon's line of operations in 1814, between the Marne and the
Seine, where he manœuvred with so much skill and success against the
immensely superior forces of the allies.
Exterior lines present the opposite results; they are those which an army will
form in moving on the extremities of the opposing masses. For example, the
lines of the Marne and the Seine, followed by the army of Silesia and the grand
Austro-Russian army, in the campaign of 1814. Burgoyne's line of operations, in
1777, was double and exterior.
Concentric lines are such as start from distant points, and are directed towards
the same object, either in the rear or in advance of their base.
If a mass leaves a single point and separates into several distinct corps, taking
divergent directions, it is said to pursue eccentric lines.
Lines are said to be deep, when the end to be attained is very distant from the
base.
The lines followed by a secondary or auxiliary force are denominated secondary
lines.
The lines pursued by the army of the Sombre-et-Meuse in 1796, and by
Bagration in 1812, were secondary lines, as the former were merely secondary to
the army of the Rhine, and the latter to that of Barclay.
Accidental lines are those which result from a change in the primitive plan of
campaign, which give a new direction to the operations. These are of rare
occurrence, but they sometimes lead to important results.
The direction given to a line of operations depends not only on the geographical
situation of the country, but also on the positions occupied by the enemy. The
general plan of campaign is frequently determined on previous to beginning
operations, but the choice of lines and positions must ordinarily result from the
ulterior events of the war, and be made by the general as these events occur.
As a general rule, a line of operations should be directed upon the centre, or one
of the extremities of the enemy's line of defence; unless our forces be infinitely
superior in number, it would be absurd to act against the front and extremities at
the same time.
If the configuration of the theatre of operations be favorable to a movement
against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, this direction maybe best
calculated to lead to important results. (Fig.4.)
In 1800 the army of the Rhine was directed against the extreme left of the line of
the Black Forest; the army of reserve was directed by the St. Bernard and Milan
on the extreme right and rear of Melas's line of defence: both operations were
most eminently successful. (Fig. 5.)
It may be well to remark that it is not enough merely to gain the extremity and
rear of the enemy, for in that case it may be possible for him to throw himself on
our communications and place us in the very dilemma in which we had hoped to
involve him. To avoid this danger it is necessary to give such a direction to the
line of operations that our army shall preserve its communications and be able to
reach its base.
Thus, if Napoleon, in 1800, after crossing the Alps, had marched by Turin on
Alexandria and received battle at Marengo, without having first secured
Lombardy and the left of the Po, his own line of retreat would have been
completely cut off by Melas; whereas, by the direction which he gave to his line
of operations he had, in case of reverse, every means for reaching either the Var
or the Valois. (Fig. 6.) Again, in 1806, if he had marched directly from Gera to
Leipsic, he would have been cut off from his base on the Rhine; whereas, by
turning from Gera towards Weimar, he not only cut off the Prussians from the
Elbe, but at the same time secured to himself the roads of Saalfield, Schleitz, and
Hoff, thus rendering perfectly safe his communications in his rear. (Fig. 7.)
We have said that the configuration of the ground and the position of the hostile
forces may sometimes render it advisable to direct our line of operations against
the extremity of the enemy's line of defence; but, as a general rule a central
direction will lead to more important results. This severs the enemy's means of
resistance, and enables the assailant to strike, with the mass of his force, upon
the dissevered and partially paralyzed members of the hostile body. (Fig. 8.)
Such a plan of operations enabled Napoleon, in the Italian campaigns of 1796
and 1797, to pierce and destroy, with a small force, the large and successive
armies which Austria sent against him. In 1805 his operations were both interior
and central: in 1808 they were most eminently central: in 1809, by the central
operations in the vicinity of Ratisbonne, he defeated the large and almost
victorious army of the Archduke Charles: in 1814, from his central position
between the Marne and Seine, with only seventy thousand men against a force of
more than two hundred thousand, he gained numerous victories, and barely
failed of complete success. Again in 1815, with an army of only one hundred
and twenty thousand men against an allied force of two hundred and twenty
thousand, by his central advance on Charleroi and Ligny, he gained a most
decided advantage over the enemy—an advantage lost by the eccentric
movement of Grouchy: and even in 1813, his central position at Dresden would
have secured him most decisive advantages, had not the faults of his lieutenants
lost these advantages in the disasters of Kulm and the Katzbach.
For the same frontier it is objectionable to form more than one army; grand
detachments and corps of observation may frequently be used with advantage,
but double or multiple lines of operation are far less favorable than one simple
line. It may however sometimes occur that the position of the enemy's forces will
be such as to make this operation the preferable one. In that case, interior lines
should always be adopted, unless we have a vast superiority in number. Double
exterior lines, with corps several days' march asunder, must be fatal, if the
enemy, whether acting on single or double interior lines, take advantage of his
position to concentrate his masses successively against our isolated forces. The
Roman armies under the consuls Flaminius and Servilius opposed Hannibal on
exterior lines, the one by Florence and Arrezzio, and the other by Modena and
Ariminum. Hannibal turned the position of Flaminius and attacked the Roman
armies separately, gaining a complete and decisive victory. Such also was the
character of the operations of the French in 1795, under Pichegru and Jourdan;
they met with a bloody and decisive defeat. Again in 1796, the French armies
under Jourdan and Moreau, pursued exterior lines; the Archduke Charles, from
his interior position, succeeded in defeating both the opposing generals, and
forcing them to retreat. If the two armies united had pursued a single line, the
republican flag had been carried in triumph to Vienna.
Converging lines of operation are preferable, under most circumstances, to
diverging lines. Care should be taken, however, that the point of meeting be such
that it may not be taken as a strategic position by the enemy, and our own forces
be destroyed in detail, before they can effect a junction. In 1797 the main body
of the Austrians, under Alvinzi, advanced against Napoleon, on three separate
lines, intending to concentrate at Rivoli, and then attack the French in mass; but
Napoleon took his strategic position at Rivoli, and overthrew the enemy's corps
as they successively appeared. In the same way the Archduke Charles took an
interior position, between Moreau and Jourdan, in 1796, and prevented them
from concentrating their forces on a single point. Wurmser and Quasdanowich
attempted to concentrate their forces on the Mincio, by moving on the opposite
shores of Lake Garda; but Napoleon took an interior position and destroyed
them. In 1815 Blucher and Wellington, from their interior position, prevented the
junction of Napoleon and Grouchy.
Diverging lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy immediately
after a successful battle or strategic manœuvre; for by this means we separate the
enemy's forces, and disperse them; and if occasion should require it, may again
concentrate our forces by converging lines. Such was the manœuvre of Frederick
the Great, in 1757, which produced the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such
also was the manœuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at
Ratisbon in 1809.
Interior lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost invariably led
to success: indeed every instance of failure may be clearly traced to great
unskilfulness in their execution, or to other extraneous circumstances of the
campaign. There may, however, be cases where it will be preferable to direct our
forces on the enemy's flank; the geographical character of the theatre of war, the
position of other collateral forces, &c., rendering such a direction necessary. But
as a general rule, interior and central lines, for an army of moderate forces, will
lead to decisive results.
Napoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the campaign of the Archduke
Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against Austria, and of
1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 1808 in Spain, his manœuvres in
1814, between the battle of Brienne and that of Paris, and his operations
previous to the Battle of Ligny in 1815, are all brilliant examples under this
head.
To change the line of operations, in the middle of a campaign, and follow
accidental lines, is always a delicate affair, and can only be resorted to by a
general of great skill, and with disciplined troops. In such a case it may be
attended with important results. It was one of Napoleon's maxims, that "a line of
operations, when once chosen, should never be abandoned." This maxim,
however, must sometimes be disregarded by an army of undisciplined troops, in
order to avoid entire destruction; but the total abandonment of a line of
operations is always attended with great loss, and should be regarded as a mere
choice of evils. A regular army can always avoid this result, by changing the
direction of its line; thus frequently gaining superior advantages in the new
theatre of action. If the plan of this change be the result of a good coup d'oeil,
and it be skilfully executed, the rear of the operating army will be secure from
the enemy; and moreover, he will be left in doubt respecting its weak points. But
such is the uncertainty of this manœuvre, that it is very rarely taken by the best
troops, unless actually forced upon them. If the army be of incongruous
materials, generally a change of direction will be less advantageous than to
entirely abandon the line, and save as many as possible of the troops for some
new plan of operations. (Maxim 20.) If, however, the undisciplined army be
sustained by fortifications, it can take up the accidental line of operations in the
same manner, and with the same probability of success, as is done by a regular
force.
We have examples of accidental lines in the operations of the king of Prussia,
after the battle of Hohenkirchen, and of Washington, in New-Jersey, after the
action of Princeton. This is one of the finest in military history. Napoleon had
projected a change in his line of operations, in case he lost the battle of
Austerlitz; but victory rendered its execution unnecessary. Again in 1814 he had
planned an entire change of operations; but the want of co-operation of the
forces under Mortier and Marmont forced him to abandon a plan which, if
properly executed, had probably defeated the allies. Jomini pronounced it one of
the most brilliant of his military career.
Having explained the principal terms used in strategy, let us trace out the
successive operations of war in their usual strategic relations.
We will suppose war to be declared, and the army to be just entering upon a
campaign. The political and military authorities of the state determine upon the
nature of the war, and select the theatre of its enterprises. The chief selects
certain points, on or near the borders of the seat of war, where his troops are to
be assembled, and his materiel collected. These points, together, form his base of
operations. He now selects some point, within the theatre of the war, as the first
object of his enterprises, and chooses the line of operations most advantageous
for reaching this objective point. The temporary positions taken on this line
become strategic positions, and the line in his rear, a line of defence. When he
arrives in the vicinity of his first object, and the enemy begins to oppose his
enterprises, he must force this enemy to retreat, either by an attack or by
manœuvres. For this purpose he temporarily adopts certain lines of manœuvre,
which may deviate from his general line of operations. The ulterior events of the
campaign may possibly cause him to make these new, or accidental lines, his
lines of operations. The approach of hostile forces may cause him to detach
secondary corps on secondary lines; or to divide his army, and pursue double or
multiple lines. The primitive object may also be relinquished, and new ones
proposed, with new lines and new plans of operations. As he advances far from
his primitive base, he forms new dépôts and lines of magazines. He may
encounter natural and artificial obstacles. To cross large rivers in the face of an
enemy is a hazardous operation; and he requires all the art of the engineer in
constructing bridges, and securing a safe passage for his army. If a fortified place
is to be taken, he will detach a siege corps, and either continue his march with
the main army, or take a strategic position to cover this siege. Thus Napoleon, in
1796, with an army of only 50,000 combatants, could not venture to penetrate
into Austria, with Mantua and its garrison of 25,000 men in his rear, and an
Austrian force of 40,000 before him. But in 1806 the great superiority of his
army enabled him to detach forces to besiege the principal fortresses of Silesia,
and still to continue his operations with his principal forces. The chief of the
army may meet the enemy under circumstances such as to induce or compel him
to give battle. If he should be victorious, the enemy must be pursued and
harassed to the uttermost. If he should be defeated, he must form the best plan,
and provide the best means of retreat. If possible, he must take shelter in some
line of fortifications, and prepare to resume the offensive. Lines of intrenchment
and temporary works may sometimes serve him as a sufficient protection.
Finally, when the unfavorable season compels him to suspend his operations, he
will go into winter cantonments, and prepare for a new campaign.
Such are the ordinary operations of war: its relations to strategy must be evident,
even to the most superficial reader.
Not unfrequently the results of a campaign depend more upon the strategic
operations of an army, than upon its victories gained in actual combat. Tactics, or
movements within the range of the enemy's cannon, is therefore subordinate to
the choice of positions: if the field of battle be properly chosen, success will be
decisive, and the loss of the battle not disastrous; whereas, if selected without
reference to the principles of the science, the victory, if gained, might be barren,
and defeat, if suffered, totally fatal: thus demonstrating the truth of Napoleon's
maxim, that success is oftener due to the genius of the general, and to the nature
of the theatre of war, than to the number and bravery of the soldiers. (Maxim 17,
18.)
We have a striking illustration of this in the French army of the Danube, which,
from the left wing of General Kray, marched rapidly through Switzerland to the
right extremity of the Austrian line, "and by this movement alone conquered all
the country between the Rhine and Danube without pulling a trigger."
Again, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely paralyzed, and the main body
forced to surrender, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In 1806, the
Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of Jena. The
operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid, in 1808, the
manœuvres about Ratisbon, in 1809, the operations of the French in 1814, and
the first part of the campaign of 1815, against vastly superior numbers, are all
familiar proofs of the truth of the maxim.
Strategy may therefore be regarded as the most important, though least
understood, of all the branches of the military art.[4]
[4]
Strategy may be learned from didactic works or from general military histories.
There are very few good elementary works on this branch of the military art. The
general treatises of the Archduke Charles, and of General Wagner, in German,
(the former has been translated into French,) are considered as the best. The
discussions of Jomini on this subject in his great work on the military art, are
exceedingly valuable; also the writings of Rocquancourt, Jacquinot de Presle,
and Gay de Vernon. The last of these has been translated into English, but the
translation is exceedingly inaccurate. The military histories of Lloyd,
Templehoff, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Grimoard, Gravert, Souchet, St. Cyr,
Beauvais, Laverne, Stutterheim, Wagner, Kausler, Gourgaud and Montholon,
Foy, Mathieu Dumas, Ségur, Pelet, Koch, Clausewitz, and Thiers, may be read
with great advantage. Napier's History of the Peninsular War is the only English
History that is of any value as a military work: it is a most excellent book.
Alison's great History of Europe is utterly worthless to the military man; the
author is ignorant of the first principles of the military art, and nearly every page
is filled with the grossest blunders.
We subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy, either
directly or in connection with military history.
Principes de la Stratégie, &c., par le Prince Charles, traduit de l'Allemand, 3
vols. in 8vo. This is a work of great merit. The technical terms, however, are
very loosely employed.
Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, par le Baron Jomini. His chapter on strategy
embodies the principles of this branch of the art.
Grundsätze der Strategic, Von Wagner.
Cours Elémentaire d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire, par Rocquancourt. This work
contains much valuable information connected with the history of the art of war;
but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged for an elementary book.
Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire, par Jacquinot de Presle. This work is
especially designed for cavalry officers, and the other branches of military
service are but very briefly discussed.
De Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification contains much
valuable information; but, as an elementary book, it has the same objections as
that of Rocquancourt.
History of the Seven Years' War, by Lloyd and Templehoff. The military writings
of Lloyd and Templehoff are valuable as connected with the history of strategy;
but many of the principles laid down by these writers are now regarded as
erroneous.
Mémoires de Napoléon. The Memoirs of Napoleon, as dictated by himself to
Gourgaud and Montholon, have been translated into English. It is hardly
necessary to remark that they contain all the general principles of military art
and science. No military man should fail to study them thoroughly. The matter is
so condensed, and important principles are embodied in so few words, that they
are not easily understood by the ordinary reader, and probably will never be
popular with the multitude.
Essai général de Tactique, par Guibert. A work very popular in its day, but now
far less valuable than the writings already mentioned.
Ausführliche Beschreibung der Schlacht des Pirmasens, von Gravert. Regarded
by military men as a valuable historical fragment.
Mémoires sur les Campagnes en Espagne. Souchet.
Mémoires de Gouvion St. Cyr.
Statistique de la Guerre, par Reveroni St. Cyr.
Première Campagnes de la Revolution, par Grimoard.
Victoires et Conquêtes. Beauvais.
Campagnes de Suwarrow. Laverne.
Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule. Foy.
Précis des Evénements Militaires. Mathieu Dumas.
Histoire de Napoléon et de la Grande Armée en 1812. Ségur
Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809. Pelet.
La Campagne de 1814. Koch.
Vom Kriege—Die Feldzügge, &c. Clausewitz.
La Révolution, le Consulat et l'Empire. Thiers.
Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1812—sur la Campagne du Vice roi en Italie, en
1813 et 1814; Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1814; Histoire des
Campagnes de 1814 et 1815, en France. Vaudoncourt.
Essai sur l'Art Militaire, &c. Carion-Nisas.
Histoire de l'Expédition en Russie en 1812. Chambray.
War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France. John Jones.
Peninsular War. Napier.
Notices of the War of 1812. Armstrong
All the above are works of merit; but none are more valuable to the military man
than the military histories of Jomini and Kausler, with their splendid diagrams
and maps.
 CHAPTER III.
FORTIFICATIONS.

Fortifications, or engineering, may be considered with reference to the defence

of states and the grand operation of armies; or with reference to the details of the
construction, and attack, and defence of forts, and the influence of field-works
on the tactical manœuvres of armies. It is proposed to speak here only of its
general character, as a branch of the military art, without entering into any
professional discussion of details.
The connection of fortification and strategy may be considered under two
distinct heads: 1st, the choice of sites for constructing fortresses for defence; 2d,
their influence in offensive operations, and the determination of the question
whether they can be passed with safety, or whether the attacking force will be
under the necessity of besieging them.
The centre and extremities of a base of operations should always be secured
either by natural or artificial obstacles. This base is generally chosen so that
fortifications will be necessary for strengthening only a part of the line. But if a
frontier, like the side of France towards Belgium, be destitute of natural
obstacles, the artificial means of defence must be proportionally increased. Great
care should be taken that permanent fortifications be made only on such places
as may favor military operations. If otherwise, the troops detached from the
active army for garrisoning them, will only tend to weaken this force without
any corresponding advantages. In this way, fortifications may become actually
injurious to defence. A number of the European fortresses which were built
before the subject of strategy was properly understood, are now regarded as
utterly useless, from their ill-advised positions.
Whether a fortress may be safely passed with merely blockading or observing it,
depends very much upon the nature of the war, and the numbers and position of
the defensive army. The allies, in 1814, invading France with a million of
soldiers, assisted by the political diversion of factions and Bourbonists within the
kingdom, and treason in the frontier fortresses, and even in the ranks of
Napoleon's army, could conduct their military operations on a very different plan
from that which would be adopted by either Austria, Prussia, Russia, England,
Spain, Portugal, Holland, Italy, and the German powers, if singly waging war
with the French. Napoleon sometimes detached a corps to observe a fortress
which threatened his line of operations or of manœuvre; at others, he delayed his
advance till the place could be reduced.
"An army," says Jomini, "may sometimes penetrate between places on an open
frontier, to attack the enemy's forces in the field, taking care at the same time to
observe these places; but no invading army can cross a great river, like the
Danube, the Rhine, or the Elbe, without reducing at least one of the fortresses on
that river, so as to secure a line of retreat; but being in possession of such a
place, it can continue the offensive, while its matériel de siège successively
reduces the other places."
In case the main army is obliged to remain and cover the besieging corps, it
should take some central position, where it can command all the avenues of
approach, and fall with vigor on the enemy, should he attempt to raise the siege.
Napoleon's operations before Mantua, in 1796, offer the finest model for
imitation.
The old system of intrenched camps and lines of contravallation is unsuited to
the spirit of modern warfare. In ancient times, and more particularly in the
middle ages, too much importance was attached to tactical positions, and not
enough to strategic points and lines. This gave to fortifications a character that
never properly belonged to them. From the middle ages down to the period of
the French Revolution, wars were carried on mainly by the system of positions
—one party confining their operations to the security of certain important places,
while the other directed their whole attention to the siege and capture of these
places. But Carnot and Napoleon changed this system, at the same time with the
system of tactics, or rather, returned from it to the old and true system of
strategic operations. Some men, looking merely at the fact that a change was
made, but without examining the character of that change, have rushed headlong
to the conclusion that fortified places are now utterly useless in war, military
success depending entirely upon a good system of marches.
On this subject, General Jomini, the great military historian of the wars of the
French Revolution, remarks that "we should depend entirely upon neither
organized masses, nor upon material obstacles, whether natural or artificial. To
follow exclusively either of these systems would be equally absurd. The true
science of war consists in choosing a just medium between the two extremes.
The wars of Napoleon demonstrated the great truth, that distance can protect no
country from invasion, but that a state, to be secure, must have a good system of
fortresses, and a good system of military reserves and military institutions."
In all military operations time is of vast importance. If a single division of an
army can be retarded for a few hours only, it not unfrequently decides the fate of
the campaign. Had the approach of Blucher been delayed for a few hours,
Napoleon must have been victorious at the battle of Waterloo. An equilibrium
can seldom be sustained for more than six or seven hours between forces on the
field of battle; but in this instance, the state of the ground rendered the
movements so slow as to prolong the battle for about twelve hours; thus enabling
the allies to effect a concentration in time to save Wellington.
Many of Napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from merely bringing troops to
bear suddenly upon some decisive point. Rivoli in 1796-7, Marengo in 1800,
Ulm in 1805, Jena in 1806, Ratisbon in 1809, Brienne in 1814, and Ligny in
1815, are familiar examples. But this concentration of forces, even with a regular
army, cannot be calculated on by the general with any degree of certainty, unless
his communications are perfectly secure. And this difficulty is very much
increased where the troops are new and undisciplined. When a country like ours
is invaded, large numbers of such troops must suddenly be called into the field.
Not knowing the designs of the invaders, much time will be lost in marches and
countermarches; and if there be no safe places of resort the operations must be
indecisive and insecure.
To a defensive army fortifications are valuable as points of repose, upon which
the troops, if beaten, may fall back, and shelter their sick and wounded, collect
their scattered forces, repair their materials, and draw together a new supply of
stores and provisions; and as rallying points, where new troops may be
assembled with safety, and the army, in a few days, be prepared to again meet
the enemy in the open field. Without these defences, undisciplined and
inexperienced armies, when once routed, can seldom be rallied again, except
with great losses. But when supported by forts, they can select their opportunity
for fighting, and offer or refuse battle according to the probability of success;
and, having a safe place of retreat, they are far less influenced by fear in the
actual conflict.
The enemy, on the other hand, being compelled either to besiege or observe
these works, his army will be separated from its magazines, its strength and
efficiency diminished by detachments, and his whole force exposed to the
horrors of partisan warfare. It has therefore been estimated by the best military
writers, that an army supported by a judicious system of fortifications, can repel
a land force six times as large as itself.
Every government should prepare, in time of peace, its most prominent and
durable means of defence. By securing in a permanent manner its important
points, it will enable a small force to retain possession of these places against a
greatly superior army, for a considerable length of time. This serves the same
purpose as a battle gained; for, in the beginning of a war of invasion, the
economy of time is of the utmost importance to the defensive party, enabling it
to organize and prepare the great military resources of the state.
In all mountainous frontiers, or sides of states bordering on large rivers, or
chains of lakes, there will necessarily be but few points by which an invader can
penetrate into the interior of the country. Let us suppose that, for a frontier of
moderate extent, there are five passes, or avenues through which the enemy may
approach the interior. To effectually defend these approaches against the
invading army will require, for each, an army of ten thousand men. Not being
able to decide positively on the plans of the enemy, all these communications
must be defended at the same time. This requires a defending army of fifty
thousand men. Let us now suppose each of these passes to be fortified in such a
way, that one thousand men will be able to hold the enemy in check, and force
him to resort to the operations of a siege; or, at least, to retard his advance till an
active army can be organized in the interior, and prepared to meet him in the
field. We here see that five thousand men, by means of fortifications, can
accomplish the same defensive object as fifty thousand men without these
artificial means of security.
But let us enter a little more into the details of frontier defences, and examine the
character of the several systems which have been successively proposed or
adopted. Frontiers are divided into four distinct classes, according as the state
may be open on one or more sides, or bounded by mountains, large rivers and
lakes, or by the sea.
An open frontier is the most difficult of defence; and while there exists a perfect
uniformity among military men upon the vast importance of fortifying such a
frontier, there is an equal diversity of opinion respecting the best manner of
arranging these works. We shall here mention three general systems of arranging
forts for the defence of an open country, each of which has been advocated at
different times, and afterwards received various modifications and additions.
These three systems comprise the main features of all others worthy of much
consideration. They are:—

1st. The system of continuous lines, proposed by Montalembert.

2d. A system of three lines of detached works, strongly recommended by
D'Arçon and others.
3d. A system proposed by Vauban, and advocated by Rogniat, consisting of lines
of very strong works, placed at considerable distances from each other and
covering large intrenched camps.

The first of these systems was proposed in 1790, and for a time attracted
considerable notice in France, but has long since been discarded, as being utterly
incompatible with the principles of the military art. A writer, however, of some
pretensions in this country, recommends its adoption for the defence of
Baltimore and the shores of the Chesapeake. The same author would dispense
entirely with our present system of fortifications on the sea-coast, and substitute
in their place wooden Martello towers! This would be very much like building
120 gun ships at Pittsburg and Memphis, for the defence of the Ohio and the
Mississippi rivers, and sending out duck-boats to meet the enemy on the
Atlantic!
In the second system, the works on the extreme frontier are to be placed about
thirty or forty miles apart, and those of the second and third lines respectively
thirty or forty miles in rear of the first and second lines, and opposite the
intervals.
In the third system, first recommended by Vauban and more recently by Rogniat,
the works are to be arranged in the same manner as in that of D'Arçon, but the
distance between them is to be from seventy to one hundred miles, and each fort
arranged for covering a large intrenched camp.
Either of these last two systems is well suited to the defence of an open frontier.
The former is applied to the side of France towards Belgium, and the latter, with
certain modifications, to the defence of Western Germany. The first line of
fortifications on the northern frontier of France consists of Dunkirk, Lille,
Valenciennes, Condé, Quesnoy, Rocroi, Charlemont, Mézières, and Sedan; the
second line, of Calais, Andres, St. Omer, Béthune, Arras, Douai, Chambrai,
Landrecies, and Avesnes; the third line, of Boulogne, Montreuil, Hesdin,
Abbeville, Amiens, Bapaume, Peronne, Ham, and Laon.
For mountainous frontiers it is deemed necessary to secure all the important
passes with small redoubts or military works, and to defend with strong forts the
grand interior strategic points on which these communications are directed. For a
frontier of moderate extent there may be some six or eight gorges in the
mountains by which an army might penetrate; but it will always be found that
these roads concentrate on two or three points in the great valleys below. Take,
for example, the frontier of France towards Switzerland and Italy. The passes of
the mountains are secured by the little works of Fort L'Ecluse, Fort Pierre-châtel,
Fort Barraux, Briançon, Mont Dauphin, Colmars, Entrevaux, and Antibes; while
Besançon, Grenoble, and Toulon, form a second line; and Lyons a grand central
dépôt.
Where a great river or chain of lakes forms the boundary of a state, the system of
defence will be much the same as that of an open land frontier, the works of the
first line being made to secure the great bridges or ferries by which the enemy
might effect a passage; those of the second line, to cover the passes of the
highlands that generally approach more or less near the great watercourse; and
those of the third line, far enough in rear to protect the great internal
communications of the country. Let us take, for example, the side of France
bordering on the Rhine. Wissembourg and Lauterbourg, Fort Louis, Haguenau,
Strasbourg, Schelstadt, Neuf-Brisach, and Huneguen, cover the several passages
of the river; while Bitche, Phalsbourg, and Béfort form a second line; Thionville,
Metz, and Toul, a third line; and Verdun a grand central dépôt.
The following are the principal objects proposed to be accomplished by
fortifications on a sea-coast.
1st. To close all important harbors to an enemy, and secure them to the navy of
the country.
2d. To prevent the enemy from forming an establishment on our shores, from
which, by his naval superiority, he might destroy our commerce and keep the
whole frontier in continual alarm.
3d. To cover our great cities against a maritime attack and bombardment.
4th. To cover our ship-yards and great naval dépôts.
5th. To prevent, as much as possible, the great avenues of interior navigation
from being blockaded by naval means at their entrance into the ocean.
6th. To give to our navy facilities for protecting our coast trade from the enemy's
ships of war, and our internal communications, which lie near the coast, from
maritime descents.

Let us notice how France has attempted to accomplish this object. The
Mediterranean frontier has Fort Quarré, Fort St. Marguérite, St. Tropez,
Brigançon, the forts of Point Man, of l'Ertissac, and of Langoustier, Toulon, St.
Nicholas, Castle of If, Marseilles, Tour de Boue, Aigues-Montes, Fort St. Louis,
Fort Brescou, Narbonne, Château de Salces, Perpignan, Collioure, Fort St. Elme,
and Port Vendre. Toulon is the great naval dépôt for this frontier, and Marseilles
the great commercial port. Both are well secured by strong fortifications. The
Atlantic frontier has Bayonne; the forts of Royan, Grave, Medoc, Paté, &c., on
the Gironde; Rochefort, with the forts of Chapus, Lapin, Aix, Oleron, &c., to
cover the roadstead; La Rochelle, with the forts of the Isle of Ré; Sables, with
the forts of St. Nicholas, and Des Moulines, Isle Dieu, Belle Isle, Fort du Pilier,
Mindin, Ville Martin; Quiberon, with Fort Penthièvre; L'Orient, with its harbor
defences; Fort Cigogne; Brest, with its harbor defences; St. Malo, with Forts
Cézembre, La Canchée, L'Anse du Verger, and Des Rimains; Cherbourg, with its
defensive forts and batteries; Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk.
Cherbourg, Brest, and Rochefort, are great naval dépôts; and Havre, Nantes, and
Bordeaux, the principal commercial ports. Many of the works above enumerated
are small in extent and antiquated in their construction, and some of them quite
old and dilapidated nevertheless, they have heretofore been found sufficient for
the defence of the naval dépôts and commercial seaports of France against the
superior naval forces of her neighbor.
Omitting for the present all discussion of sea-coast defences, let us examine
more particularly the character and influence of fortifications on land frontiers.
All military writers agree that fortifications have heretofore exerted a great, and
frequently a decisive, influence on the operations of a war. Those of France are
frequently referred to as proofs of this influence. But, while all are disposed to
allow that these works contributed much in former times to the defence of states,
yet some have said that modern improvements in the mode of attack have
rendered forts far less valuable than formerly.
Such, however, is not the case. Improvements in the mode of attack have not
kept pace with the facilities of locomotion; and, although fortifications do not
now usually sustain a siege of as many days as in former times, still, as
compared with the relative lengths of campaigns in ancient and modern wars, the
proportional length of sieges is now even greater than formerly. When the same
is accomplished in a campaign of seven weeks as was formerly done in a war of
seven years, it is not necessary that fortified places should hold out a very long
time. A place that can sustain a siege of a month is now deemed sufficiently
strong for ordinary campaigns; for by the end of that time the defensive army
will either be destroyed, or be able to come to its succor. In either case a longer
defence would not be required.
A reference to the most important sieges of the last century or two will show that
forts are, on an average, capable of sustaining a siege for more than that length
of time. Lille, in 1708, held the allies in check for a whole year; and again, in
1792, compelled the Austrians to raise the siege after an unsuccessful attack of
fifteen days.
Antwerp, in 1585, sustained a siege of fourteen months against greatly superior
forces; in 1814 Carnot defended the citadel of this place for four months, and
until an armistice had been concluded between the contending parties; in 1832, it
sustained, with a garrison of only 4,500 men and 145 pieces of ordnance, a siege
of twenty-five days, against a force of 55,000 men and 223 cannon.
Namur, near the end of the seventeenth century, sustained a siege of ten weeks.
Ismaïl, in 1790, sustained a siege of more than two months against the Russians.
Maestricht, in 1793, sustained a siege of nearly two weeks; and again, in 1794,
sustained a blockade and siege of nearly two months.
Magdeburg, in the thirty years' war, resisted the army of Wallenstein for seven
months; and in 1813-14, although garrisoned by only 4,000 men, it for a long
time resisted the overwhelming forces of the allies.
Dantzic, at the same time, sustained a siege against superior forces for more than
nine months.
Landau, in 1793, sustained a siege of nine months.
Valenciennes and Mayence, in 1793, each sustained a siege of about three
months.
Charleroi, Fort Vauban, and L'Ecluse, in 1794, each sustained a siege of about
thirty days.
Quesnoy, in 1794, sustained a siege of about three weeks.
Rosas, in 1795, sustained a siege of some seventy days.
Mantua, in 1796-7, protected from invasion, for eight months, the Tyrol and the
heart of the Austrian monarchy.
Kehl and Huninguen, in 1796, sheltered Moreau for three months against all the
efforts of the Archduke Charles.
St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, sustained a siege of sixty days of open trench.
Ulm, in 1800, held Moreau in check for more than a month.
Genoa, in 1800, sustained a blockade of sixty and a siege of forty days.
Saragossa in 1808 sustained a close siege of near two months; and in 1809 it was
again besieged for two months.
Rosas in 1808 sustained a siege of thirty days.
Gerona in 1809 sustained a siege and blockade of seven months, nearly four of
them being of open trench.
Mequinenza (a very small work) in 1810 sustained a siege of more than two
weeks.
Astorga in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days; twenty-four being of open
trench.
Lerida in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days, two weeks being of open trench.
Ciudad Rodrigo in 1810 sustained a siege of two months.
Almeida in 1810 sustained a siege of more than a month.
Tortosa in 1810 sustained a siege of six months.
Tarragona in 1811 sustained a siege of nearly two months.
Badajos in 1811 sustained a siege of more than forty days open trench.
Lerida in 1811 sustained a siege of two weeks open trench.
Saguntum in 1811 sustained a siege of a month.
Valencia in 1811-12 sustained a siege of two months
Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812 sustained a blockade of several months, and a close
siege of two weeks.
Badajos in 1812 sustained twenty-one days of open trenches.
Burgos in 1812 sustained thirty-three days of open trenches.
St. Sebastian in 1813 sustained a siege and blockade of nearly three months,
with fifty-nine days of open trenches.
Pampeluna in 1813 sustained a siege of more than four months.
Monzon in 1813-14 also sustained a siege of more than four months.
This list might be increased with numerous other examples, to show that even
poorly fortified towns are capable of defending themselves, on an average, for
more than a month. These examples, be it remembered, are nearly all taken from
a period of history since any material improvements have been made in the art of
attack. Since the time of Vauban the improvements in attack have not kept pace
with the increased means of defence. Moreover, these examples are taken from
the sieges of towns defended mainly by old and antiquated works, and entirely
incapable of offering the same resistance as detached fortifications, with all the
modern improvements.
The value of fortifications, as land defences, is sufficiently proved by showing
their general capability of resisting an invader, even for a limited period; thus
affording us time and opportunity to provide other means of security. But it must
not be inferred that forts besieged en règle will necessarily fall after so many
days. Such is far from being the case. The besieged have usually great
advantages over the besiegers; and unless the latter are vastly superior in
number, or the work is of a very inferior character, or the garrison is destitute of
the requisite means and energy to resist an attack, they will not be taken.
Mezieres was not taken in 1520; nor Marseilles in 1524; nor Peronne in 1536;
nor Landrecies in 1543; nor Metz in 1552; nor Montauban in 1621; nor Lerida in
1647; nor Maestricht in 1676; nor Vienna in 1529, and again in 1683; nor Turin
in 1706; nor Conde in 1744; nor Lille in 1792; nor Landau in 1793; nor Ulm in
1800; nor Saragossa in 1808; nor Burgos in 1812. This list might be extended
almost indefinitely with the names of places that could be reduced neither by
force nor by starvation.
But, as has already been noticed, some have asserted that fortifications have
become of little comparative importance, under the new system of warfare
introduced during the wars of the French Revolution. On this subject let us
consult the opinions of the best military judges of the present century.
Napoleon says of fortifications, "they are an excellent means of retarding,
fettering, enfeebling, and disquieting a conquering foe."
"The possession of strategic points," says the Archduke Charles, "is decisive in
military operations; and the most efficacious means should, therefore, be
employed to defend points whose preservation is the country's safeguard. This
object is accomplished by fortifications, inasmuch as they can resist, for a given
time, with a small number of troops, every effort of a much larger force;
fortifications should, therefore, be regarded as the basis of a good system of
defence." "It should be a maxim of state policy in every country, to fortify, in
time of peace, all such points, and to arrange them with great care, so that they
can be defended by a small number of troops. For the enemy, knowing the
difficulty of getting possession of these works, will look twice before he
involves himself in a war." "Establishments which can secure strategic
advantages are not the works of a moment; they require time and labor. He who
has the direction of the military forces of a state, should, in time of peace,
prepare for war." "The proper application or neglect of these principles will
decide the safety or the ruin of the state." "Fortifications arrest the enemy in the
pursuit of his object, and direct his movements on less important points;—he
must either force these fortified lines, or else hazard enterprises upon lines which
offer only disadvantages. In fine, a country secured by a system of defences truly
strategic, has no cause to fear either the invasion or the yoke of the enemy; for
he can advance to the interior of the country only through great trouble and
ruinous efforts. Of course, lines of fortifications thus arranged cannot shelter a
state against all reverses; but these reverses will not, in this case, be attended by
total ruin; for they cannot take from the state the means nor the time for
collecting new forces; nor can they ever reduce it to the cruel alternative of
submission or destruction."
"Fortifications," says Jomini, "fulfil two objects of capital importance,—1st. The
protection of the frontiers; and 2d. Assisting the operations of the army in the
field." "Every part of the frontiers of a state should be secured by one or two
great places of refuge, secondary places, and even small posts for facilitating the
active operations of the armies. Cities girt with walls and slight ditches may
often be of great utility in the interior of a country, as places of deposit, where
stores, magazines, hospitals, &c., may be sheltered from the incursions of the
enemy's light troops. These works are more especially valuable where such
stores, in order not to weaken the regular army by detachments, are intrusted to
the care of raw and militia forces." It is not supposed that any system of
fortifications can hermetically close a frontier; "but, although they of themselves
can rarely present an absolute obstacle to the advance of the hostile army, yet it
is indisputable that they straiten its movements, change the direction of its
marches, and force it into detachments; while, on the contrary, they afford all the
opposite advantages to the defensive army; they protect its marches, favor its
debouches, cover its magazines, its flanks, and its movements, and finally
furnish it with a place of refuge in time of need."
These opinions were uttered, be it remembered, long since the period at which
modern military quacks date the downfall of fortifications as inland defences, by
men, too, who were not engineers, and consequently had no professional
predilections in favor of fortifications. The Archduke Charles, as a general, knew
no rival but Napoleon, and General Jomini is universally regarded as the first
military historian of the age. The truth of their remarks on fortifications is most
fully confirmed by the military histories of Germany and France.
For a long period previous to the Thirty Years' War, its strong castles and
fortified cities secured the German empire from attacks from abroad, except on
its extensive frontier, which was frequently assailed, but no enemy was able to
penetrate to the interior till a want of union among its own princes opened its
strongholds to the Swedish conqueror; nor then, did the cautious Gustavus
Adolphus venture far into its territories till he had obtained possession of all the
military works that might endanger his retreat.
Again, in the Seven Years' War, when the French neglected to secure their
foothold in Germany, by placing in a state of defence the fortifications that fell
into their power, the first defeat rendered their ground untenable, and threw them
from the Elbe back upon the Rhine and the Mayne. They afterwards took the
precaution to fortify their positions, and to secure their magazines under shelter
of strong places, and, consequently, were enabled to maintain themselves in the
hostile country till the end of the war, notwithstanding the inefficiency of their
generals, the great reverses they sustained in the field, the skill and perseverance
of the enemy they were contending with, and the weak and vacillating character
of the cabinet that directed them.
But this system of defence was not so carefully maintained in the latter part of
the eighteenth century, for at the beginning of the French Revolution, says
Jomini, "Germany had too few fortifications; they were generally of a poor
character, and improperly located." France, on the contrary, was well fortified:
and although without armies, and torn in pieces by domestic factions, (we here
use the language of the Archduke,) "she sustained herself against all Europe; and
this was because her government, since the reign of Louis XIII., had continually
labored to put her frontiers into a defensive condition agreeably to the principles
of strategy; starting from such a system for a basis, she subdued every country
on the continent that was not thus fortified; and this reason alone will explain
how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroying an army, and even an entire
state, merely by a strategic success."
This may be illustrated by reference to particular campaigns. In 1792, when the
Duke of Brunswick invaded France, she had no armies competent to her defence.
Their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable, it is true, but the license
of the Revolution had so loosened the bonds of discipline as to effect an almost
complete disorganization. "It seemed, at this period," says the historian, "as if the
operations of the French generals were dependent upon the absence of their
enemies: the moment they appeared, the operations were precipitately
abandoned." But France had on her eastern frontier a triple line of good
fortresses, although her miserable soldiery were incapable of properly defending
them. The several works of the first and second lines fell, one after another,
before the slow operations of a Prussian siege, and the Duke of Brunswick was
already advancing upon the third, when Dumourier, with only twenty-five
thousand men, threw himself into this line, and by a well-conducted war of
positions, placing his raw and unsteady forces behind unassailable
intrenchments, succeeded in repelling a disciplined army nearly four times as
numerous as his own. Had no other obstacle than the French troops been
interposed between Paris and the Prussians, all agree that France must have
fallen.
In the campaign, of 1793, the French army in Flanders were beaten in almost
every engagement, and their forces reduced to less than one half the number of
the allies. The French general turned traitor to his country, and the National
Guards deserted their colors and returned to France. The only hope of the
Republicans, at this crisis, was Vauban's line of Flemish fortresses. These alone
saved France. The strongholds of Lille, Condé, Valenciennes, Quesnoy,
Landrecies, &c., held the Austrians in check till the French could raise new
forces and reorganize their army. "The important breathing-time which the sieges
of these fortresses," says an English historian, "afforded to the French, and the
immense advantage which they derived from the new levies which they
received, and fresh organization which they acquired during that important
period, is a signal proof of the vital importance of fortresses in contributing to
national defence. Napoleon has not hesitated to ascribe to the three months thus
gained the salvation of France. It is to be constantly recollected that the
Republican armies were then totally unable to keep the field; that behind the
frontier fortresses there was neither a defensive position, nor a corps to reinforce
them; and that if driven from their vicinity, the capital was taken and the war
concluded."
In the following year, 1794, when France had completed her vast armaments,
and, in her turn, had become the invading power, the enemy had no fortified
towns to check the progress of the Republican armies; which, based on strong
works of defence, in a few weeks overran Flanders, and drove the allies beyond
the Rhine.
In the campaign of 1796, when the army of Moreau had been forced into a
precipitate retreat by the admirable strategic operations of the Archduke Charles,
the French forces owed their safety to the fortifications on the Rhine. These
works arrested the enemy's pursuit and obliged him to resort to the tedious
operations of sieges; and the reduction of the French advanced posts alone, Kehl
and Huninguen, poorly as they were defended, employed all the resources of the
Austrian army, and the skill of their engineers, from early in October till late in
February. Kehl was at first assaulted by a force four times as numerous as the
garrison; if the enemy had succeeded, he would have cut off Moreau's retreat,
and destroyed his army. Fortunately the place was strong enough to resist all
assaults; and Moreau, basing himself on the fortresses of Alsace, his right
covered by Huninguen, Neuf-Brisach, and Béfort, and his left by the iron barrier
of the Netherlands, effectually checked the waves of Austrian success.
Let us now turn to the campaigns of Napoleon. In his first campaign in Italy,
1796, the general was directed "to seize the forts of Savona, compel the senate to
furnish him with pecuniary supplies, and to surrender the keys of Gavi, a fortress
perched on the rocky height commanding the pass of the Bocchetta." Setting out
from Savona, he crossed the mountains at a weak point between the Alps and the
Apennines, and succeeded in piercing the enemy's line of defence. The king of
Sardinia, jealous of Austrian influence, had refused to permit the Austrian army
to garrison his line of fortifications. Napoleon, profiting by his victorious
attitude, the mutual jealousy of Austria and Sardinia, and the intrigues of his
diplomatists, soon gained possession of these important works. "These Sardinian
fortresses," he wrote to the Directory, "at once put the Republicans in possession
of the keys of the Peninsula." Basing himself on Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Gavi, and
Alessandria, with Tortosa as his dépôt of magazines, he advanced against
Lombardy. Now basing himself on the Adda and Po, with the fortress of
Pizzighettone as the dépôt of his magazines, he advanced upon the line of the
Adige. Pechiera became his next dépôt, and he now had four fortresses in
echelon between him and his first dépôt of magazines; and, after the fall of
Mantua, basing himself on the Po, he advanced against the States of the Church,
making Ferrara and then Ancona, his places of dépôt.
From the solid basis of the fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy, "he was
enabled to turn his undivided attention to the destruction of the Austrians, and
thus commence, with some security, that great career of conquest which he
already meditated in the imperial dominions." In this campaign of 1797, after
scouring his base, he fortified Palma-Nuova, Osapo, &c., repaired the old
fortifications of Klagenfurth, and, as he advanced, established, to use his own
words, "a good point d'appui at every five or six marches."
Afterwards, when the Austrians had nearly wrested Italy from the weak grasp of
Napoleon's successors, the French saved their army in the fortress of Genoa and
behind the line of the Var, which had been fortified with care in 1794-5.
Numerous attempts were made to force this line, the advanced post of Fort
Montauban being several times assaulted by numerous forces. But the Austrian
columns recoiled from its murderous fire of grape and musketry, which swept off
great numbers at every discharge. Again the assault was renewed with a vast
superiority of numbers, and again "the brave men who headed the column almost
perished at the foot of the intrenchment; and, after sustaining a heavy loss, they
were compelled to abandon the enterprise."
While the forces on the Var thus stayed the waves of Austrian success, Massena,
in the fortifications of Genoa, sustained a blockade of sixty, and a siege of forty
days, against an army five times as large as his own; and when forced to yield to
the stern demands of famine, he almost dictated to the enemy the terms of the
treaty. These two defences held in check the élite of the Austrian forces, while
the French reserve crossed the Alps, seized the important points of the country,
and cut off the Austrian line of retreat. "But even after the victory of Marengo,"
says Napoleon, "I did not consider the whole of Italy reconquered, until all the
fortified places between me and the Mincio should be occupied by my troops. I
gave Melas permission to return to Mantua, on condition of his surrendering all
these fortresses."
He now directed Chasseloup de Laubat and his engineers to repair and remodel
the fortifications of Verona, Legnano, Pechiera, Mantua, the line of the Adda,
Milan, Alessandria,[5] Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, and several smaller works; thus
forming a quadruple line of defence against Austrian aggression in Italy. These
works were of great service to the French in 1805, enabling Massena with fifty
thousand men to hold in check the Archduke Charles with more than ninety
thousand, while Napoleon's grand army, starting from the solid base of the
Rhine, traversed Germany and seized upon the capital of Austria.
[5]
More than twenty millions of money were appropriated for this place alone.

The neglect of the Prussians to place their country in a state of military defence,
previous to declaring war against Napoleon in 1806, had a most disastrous
influence upon the campaign. Napoleon, on the other hand, occupied and
secured all the important military positions which he had captured in the
preceding campaign. "The Prussians," said he, "made no preparations for putting
into a state of defence the fortifications on their first line, not even those within a
few marches of our cantonments. While I was piling up bastion upon bastion at
Kehl, Cassel, and Wesel, they did not plant a single palisade at Magdeburg, nor
put in battery a single cannon at Spandau." The works on the three great lines of
the Oder, the Elbe, and the Weser, had they been properly repaired, garrisoned,
and defended, were sufficient to have held in check the French, even after the
great victory of Jena, till the newly-organized forces, acting in concert with the
Russian army, could re-establish the Prussian monarchy in its ancient greatness.
Profiting by the neglect of the Prussians, Napoleon seized upon the great
defensive works of the country, which, to his great joy, were readily surrendered
into his hands by the old and inefficient generals who commanded them; and
French garrisons were almost immediately established in the fortresses of
Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Spandau, Hameln, Nieubourg, &c.
"Spandau," said he in the 19th Bulletin, "is an inestimable acquisition. In our
hands it could sustain two months of operations. But such was the general
confusion, that the Prussians had not even armed its batteries." The possession of
these fortifications inclined the scale at Eylau. All the historians of the war
notice their influence on the campaigns of Friedland and Tilsit.
These Prussian fortresses were retained by Napoleon at the treaty of Tilsit. The
campaign of 1809 proved the wisdom of this policy, as they effectually
prevented Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the flames of war. And
again in 1813, these works might have produced a decided influence on the
campaign, had not the political perfidy of Austria, and the treason of the French
generals, prevented Napoleon from profiting by the advantages of his position.
The influence of the fortifications of Spain upon the Peninsular campaigns has
often been alluded to by historians. Those works which had been given up to
Napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the
success of his arms; while those which had been retained by Spain and her allies
contributed in an equal degree to fetter and embarrass his operations. Some of
these, like Saragossa, Tarragona, Gerona, Tortosa, &c. &c., with their broken
walls and defective armaments, kept the enemy in check for months; and, by
compelling the French to resort to the tedious operations of sieges, did much to
weaken the French power in the Peninsula.
The influence of the fortifications of the French frontiers in furnishing a secure
basis for the successful operations of Napoleon into the enemy's territory, has
already been noticed. If these fortresses of France, after the disasters of 1812 and
'13, failed to save the nation, the cause must be sought for in the peculiar
features of the invasion itself, rather than any lack of military influence in the
French defences. As has been already remarked, a million of disciplined men,
under consummate leaders, were here assailing a single state, impoverished by
the fatal war in Russia,—torn in pieces by political factions,—deserted by its
sworn allies,—its fortresses basely betrayed into the enemy's hands, and its
military power paralyzed by the treason of generals with their entire armies. Its
only hope was in the fortresses which had remained faithful; and Napoleon said
at St. Helena, that if he had collected together the garrisons of these few
fortresses and retired to the Rhine, he could have crushed the allies even after
their entrance into Paris. But political considerations prevented the operation.
Again in 1815, Napoleon, even after the defeat of Waterloo, possessed lines of
defence sufficiently strong to resist all attempts at invasion. But again the want
of co-operation on the part of the government at Paris, and the treason of his own
generals, forced his second abdication. If he had retained the command of the
army, and the nation had seconded his efforts, the allies would never have
reached Paris. But the new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of
opening the way for the enemies of their country. "France," said Napoleon, "will
eternally reproach the ministry with having forced her whole people to pass
under the Caudine-forks, by ordering the disbanding of an army that had for
twenty-five years been its country's glory, and by giving up to our astonished
enemies our still invincible fortresses."
History fully supports Napoleon's opinion of the great danger of penetrating far
into a hostile country to attack the capital, even when that capital is without
fortifications. The fatal effects of such an advance, without properly securing the
means of retreat, is exemplified by his own campaign of 1812, in Russia. If, after
the fall of Smolensk, he had fortified that place and Vitepsk, which by their
position closed the narrow passage comprised between the Dnieper and the
Dwina, he might in all probability, on the following spring, have been able to
seize upon Moscow and St. Petersburg. But leaving the hostile army of
Tschkokoff in his rear, he pushed on to Moscow, and when the conflagration of
that city cut off his hopes of winter quarters there, and the premature rigor of the
season destroyed the horses of his artillery and provision-trains, retreat became
impossible, and the awful fate of his immense army was closed by scenes of
horror to which there is scarcely a parallel in history. This point might be still
further illustrated by the Russian campaign of Charles XII., in 1708-9, the fatal
advance of the French army on Lisbon, in the Peninsular war, and other
examples of the same character.
Even single works sometimes effect the object of lines of fortifications, and
frustrate the operations of an entire army. Thus, Lille suspended for a whole year
the operations of Prince Eugene and Marlborough; the siege of Landrecies gave
Villars an opportunity of changing the fortunes of the war; Pavia, in 1525, lost
France her monarch, the flower of her nobility, and her Italian conquests; Metz,
in 1552, arrested the entire power of Charles V., and saved France from
destruction; Prague, in 1757, brought the greatest warrior of his age to the brink
of ruin; St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, stopped the successful career of Napoleon;
Burgos, in 1812, saved the beaten army of Portugal, enabled them to collect their
scattered forces, and regain the ascendancy; Strasburg has often been, the
bulwark of the French against Germany, saving France from invasion, and
perhaps subjugation.
In nearly the language of Napoleon, (Memoirs, vol. IX.,) If Vienna had been
fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the fate of the war.
Again, in 1809, if this capital had been fortified, it would have enabled the
Archduke Charles, after the disaster of Eckmuhl, by a forced retreat on the left of
the Danube, to form a junction with the forces of General Hiller and the
Archduke John.
If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army routed at Jena would have rallied
there and been joined by the Russians. If Madrid had been strongly fortified in
1808, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and
Sommo-Sierra, would not have marched towards that capital, leaving in rear of
Salamanca and Valladolid, both the English army of General Moore and the
Spanish army of Romana. If Moscow had been fortified in 1812, its
conflagration would have been avoided, for, with strong defensive works, and
the army of Kutusoff encamped on its ramparts, its capture would have been
impossible.
Had not Constantinople been well fortified, the empire of Constantine must have
terminated in the year 700, whereas the standard of the Prophet was not planted
there until 1440. This capital was therefore indebted to its walls for eight
hundred years of existence. During this period it was besieged fifty-three times,
but only one of these sieges was successful. The French and Venetians took it,
but not without a very severe contest.
Paris has often owed its safety to its walls. In 885 the Normans besieged it for
two years without effect. In 1358 the Dauphin besieged it in vain. In 1359
Edward, king of England, encamped at Montrouge, devastated the country to its
walls, but recoiled from before it, and retired to Chartres. In 1429 it repulsed the
attack of Charles VII. In 1464 the Count of Charlerois surrounded the city, but
was unsuccessful in his attacks. In 1472 it repulsed the army of the Duke of
Bourgone, who had already ravaged its precincts. In 1536, when attacked by
Charles V., it again owed its safety to its walls. In 1588 and 1589 it repulsed the
armies of Henry III. and Henry IV. In 1636 and several succeeding years the
inhabitants of Paris owed their safety to its walls. If this capital had been
strongly fortified in 1814 and 1815, the allied armies would not have dared to
attempt its investment.
But it is deemed unnecessary to further specify examples; the whole history of
modern warfare is one continued proof of the importance of fortifications as a
means of national defence, and as an auxiliary in offensive military operations.
Our illustrations have been mostly drawn from European wars, but our own brief
history, as will be shown hereafter, is not without its proofs.
The use and importance of field-fortifications, intrenched camps, &c., as well as
the class of military works called coast-defences, will be discussed hereafter.[6]
[6]
The use of fortifications in the defence of states is discussed by Ternay, Vauban,
Cormontaigne, Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, Jomini, Fallot, and,
incidentally, by most of the military historians of the wars of the French
Revolution. The names of such standard works as give the detailed arrangements
of fortifications will be mentioned hereafter.
 CHAPTER IV.
LOGISTICS.

III. We have defined logistics to be that branch of the military art which
embraces all the practical details of moving and supplying armies. The term is
derived from the title of a French general officer, (major-général des logis,) who
was formerly charged with directing the marches, encampments, and lodging of
the troops. It has been still further extended by recent military writers, and many
of them now regard logistics as a distinct and important branch of the art.
We shall here consider logistics as including the military duties ordinarily
attributed to the pay, subsistence, clothing, medical, hospital, and transportation
departments; in fine, of all the civil and civico-military corps of the army. We
shall therefore discuss under this head, the preparation of all the necessary
materials for fitting out troops for a campaign and for putting them in motion;
the regulating of marches, convoys, the means of transport for provisions,
hospitals, munitions, and supplies of all kinds; the preparation and protection of
magazines; the laying out of camps and cantonments; in fine, every thing
connected with preparing, moving, and guarding the impedimenta of an army.
The officers connected with this branch of service must consult with the
engineers in every thing relating to the defence of their dépôts, magazines,
camps, cantonments, communications, and the passage of rivers, and in all that
relates to their connection with the attack and defence of places: but in all that
relates to strategy and tactics they must receive instructions directly from the
chief of the staff of the army, who will have the general direction of every thing
connected with logistics. Before commencing the operations of the campaign, or
beginning the execution of the plans decided upon at head-quarters, this officer
should satisfy himself respecting the condition of the various materials
belonging to the different departments of the army;—the horses and horse
equipments, carriages, caissons, ponton and artillery equipages, siege equipages,
moveable hospitals, engineer and artillery utensils, clothing, and munitions of all
kinds; he must supply whatever may be wanting, and provide means for the
transportation of every thing.
Subsistence.—The art of subsisting troops during active operations in a hostile
country, is one of the most difficult subjects connected with war; and it is a
question well worthy of study, both for the statesman and the warrior, how
Darius and Xerxes, Philip and Alexander, in ancient times—and the Greek
emperors and the barbarians—and, later still, the crusaders of the middle ages,
contrived to support the immense masses of men which they led to war.
Cæsar has said that war should be made to support war; and some modern
generals have acted upon this principle to the extreme of supporting their armies
entirely at the expense of the country passed over. Others have adopted either in
part or entirely the principle of regular magazines.
Louis XIV. and Frederick II. fought mostly on their own frontiers, and followed
the system of regular dépôts and supplies. But the revolutionary armies of
France made war without magazines, subsisting, sometimes on the inhabitants,
sometimes by requisitions levied on the country passed over, and at others by
pillage and marauding. Napoleon found little difficulty in supporting an army of
a hundred or a hundred and twenty thousand men in Italy, Suabia, and on the
rich borders of the Rhine and the Danube; but in Spain, Poland, and Russia, the
subject of subsistence became one of extreme embarrassment.
All dépôts of provisions and other supplies for an army are denominated
magazines; these are divided into principal, secondary, and provisional. The first
are usually on the base of operations; the second, on the line of operations; and
the last in the immediate vicinity of the troops, and contain supplies for a few
days only.
The system of magazines is objected to by some, because it fetters the
movements of an army, and makes its military operations subordinate to the
means of supply. Moreover, as the movements of an army must be so arranged as
to cover these magazines, their establishment at given points reveals to the
enemy our plan of campaign.
On the other hand, the system of requisitions, either for immediate supplies or
for secondary magazines, gives far greater velocity and impetuosity to an active
army; and if it be so regulated as to repress pillage, and be levied with
uniformity and moderation, it may be relied on with safety in well-cultivated
countries; but in more barren and less populous districts, an army without
magazines, especially in case of a prolonged stay or a forced retreat, will be
exposed to great suffering and loss, if not to total destruction.
Before commencing a campaign the general should make himself acquainted
with all the resources of the country to be passed over—determine the amount of
supplies which it may be necessary to take with him, and the amount that can be
obtained by requisitions; these requisitions being levied in a uniform and legal
manner, and through the existing local authorities.
In great wars of invasion it is sometimes impracticable, at least for a time, to
provide for the immense forces placed on foot, by any regular system of
magazines or of ordinary requisitions: in such cases their subsistence is entirely
intrusted to the troops themselves, who levy contributions wherever they pass.
The inevitable consequences of this system are universal pillage and a total
relaxation of discipline; the loss of private property and the violation of
individual rights, are followed by the massacre of all straggling parties, and the
ordinary peaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter and
implacable enemies.
In this connection the war in the Spanish peninsula is well worthy of study. At
the beginning of this war Napoleon had to choose between methodical
operations, with provisions carried in the train of his army, or purchased of the
inhabitants and regularly paid for; and irregular warfare, with forced requisitions
—war being made to support war. The question was thoroughly discussed.
On the one hand, by sacrificing three or four millions of francs from the French
treasury, he would have been able to support his troops without requisitions,
would have maintained good order and discipline in his armies, and by the
distribution of this money among a people poor and interested, he would have
made many partisans. He could then have offered them, with a firm and just
hand, the olive or the sword. But then the drafts upon the French treasury, had
the war been a protracted one, would have been enormous for the support of an
army of 200,000 men in Spain. Moreover, the hostile and insurrectionary state of
the local authorities rendered regular and legal requisitions almost impossible;
and the want of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable transport, rendered
problematical the possibility of moving a sufficient quantity of stores in an
insurrectionary country. Besides, no great detachments could have been made to
regulate the administration of the provinces, or to pursue the insurgent corps into
the fastnesses of the mountains. In fine, by this system, he would have effected a
military occupation of Spain without its subjugation.
On the other hand, by marching rapidly against all organized masses, living from
day to day upon the local resources of the country, as he had done in Italy,
sparing his reserves for the occupation and pacification of the conquered
provinces; this mode promised more prompt and decisive results than the other.
Napoleon, therefore, determined to adopt it for his active masses, employing the
system of magazines and regular requisitions so far as practicable. In favorable
parts of the country, Soult and Souchet, with smaller armies, succeeded in
obtaining in this way regular supplies for a considerable length of time, but the
others lived mainly by forced requisitions levied as necessity required. This
sometimes gave place to great excesses, but these were principally the faults of
subordinate officers who tolerated them, rather than of Napoleon, who punished
such breaches of discipline, when they were known to him, with great severity.
He afterwards declared that, "had he succeeded he would have indemnified the
great mass of the Spanish people for their losses, by the sale of the hoarded
wealth of the clergy, which would have rendered the church less powerful, and
caused a more just division of property; thus the evil of the war would have been
forgotten in the happy triumph of public and private interest over the interest of
an ambitious and exclusive clergy."
The following maxims on subsistence have the sanction of the best military
writers:
1st. Regular magazines should be formed, so far as practicable, for the supplies
of an army; the levying of requisitions being resorted to only where the nature of
the war, and the requisite rapidity of marches, render these absolutely necessary
to success.
2d. Dépôts should be formed in places strengthened by nature or art, defended
by small corps, or garrisons, and situated in positions least liable to attack.
3d. All great dépôts should be placed on navigable rivers, canals, railways, or
practical roads, communicating with the line of operations, so that they may be
transported with ease and rapidity, as the army advances on this line.
4th. An army should never be without a supply for ten or fifteen days, otherwise
the best chances of war may be lost, and the army exposed to great
inconveniences. Templehoff says that the great Frederick, in the campaign of
1757, always carried in the Prussian provision-train bread for six, and flour for
nine days, and was therefore never at a loss for means to subsist his forces, in
undertaking any sudden and decisive operation. The Roman soldier usually
carried with him provisions for fifteen days. Napoleon says, "Experience has
proved that an army ought to carry with it a month's provisions, ten days' food
being carried by the men and baggage-horses and a supply for twenty days by
the train of wagons; so that at least four hundred and eighty wagons would be
required for an army of forty thousand men; two hundred and forty being
regularly organized, and two hundred and forty being obtained by requisition.
For this purpose there would be a battalion of three companies for the military
stores of each division, each company having its establishment for forty wagons,
twenty being furnished by the commissariat, and twenty obtained by requisition.
This gives for each division one hundred and twenty wagons, and for each army,
four hundred and eighty. Each battalion for a provision-train should have two
hundred and ten men."
5th. An army, while actually in motion, can find temporary resources, unless in a
sterile country, or one already ravaged by war, or at the season of the year when
the old crops are nearly exhausted and the new ones not ready for harvest; but,
even supposing the army may in this way be partially or wholly supplied, while
in motion, it nevertheless frequently happens that it may remain for some days in
position, (as the French at Austerlitz and Ulm;) a supply of hard bread for some
ten days will therefore be important to subsist the army till a regular
commissariat can be established.
6th. "Supplies of bread and biscuit," says Napoleon, "are no more essential to
modern armies than to the Romans; flour, rice, and pulse, may be substituted in
marches without the troops suffering any harm. It is an error to suppose that the
generals of antiquity did not pay great attention to their magazines; it may be
seen in Cæsar's Commentaries, how much he was occupied with this care in his
several campaigns. The ancients knew how to avoid being slaves to any system
of supplies, or to being obliged to depend on the purveyors; but all the great
captains well understood the art of subsistence."
Forage is a military term applied to food of any kind for horses or cattle,—as
grass, hay, corn, oats, &c.; and also to the operation of collecting such food.
Forage is of two kinds, green and dry; the former being collected directly from
the meadows and harvest-fields, and the latter from the barns and granaries of
the farmers, or the storehouses of the dealers.
The animals connected with an army may be subsisted by regular magazines, by
forced requisitions, or by authorized foraging [7] As has already been remarked,
it is not always politic, or even possible, to provide regular magazines for the
entire supplies of an army during the active operations of a campaign. On
account of the great expense and difficulty of transporting forage, the general of
an army is more frequently under the necessity of resorting to requisitions, or
forced contributions as they are called, and to foraging, for the subsistence of his
animals, than to provide food for his men. Nor are requisitions and foragings for
this object so objectionable as in the other case, being far less likely to produce
general want and distress among the non-combatant inhabitants.
[7]
This term is sometimes, though improperly, applied to the operation of forcibly
collecting food for the troops.

The commanding officer of troops should always use his best endeavors to
obtain his forage by purchase of the inhabitants, or by requisitions on the local
authorities; and even where these means are impracticable, the foraging parties
should be strictly directed to make their levies with uniformity and due
moderation. Accurate accounts should be kept of the kinds and quantities of all
produce and other property taken, so that it may be regularly distributed and
accounted for. Under no circumstances should individuals be permitted to
appropriate to themselves more than their pro rata allowance. Foraging parties
may sometimes attain their object in a peaceful manner, by representing to the
inhabitants the nature of their instructions and the necessity of obtaining
immediate supplies. Even where no recompense is proposed, it may be well to
offer certificates to the effect that such articles have been taken for the use of the
army. These certificates, even when of no value in themselves, frequently tend to
appease excited passions and allay insurrections. In defensive war, carried on in
one's own country, it is often necessary to seize upon private property and
appropriate it to the public service: in all such cases the certificates of the
foraging officers become proofs of individual claims against the government.
No foraging party should ever be sent out till after the country has been properly
reconnoitred. A good military escort and vanguard should always accompany
and precede the foragers, for protection against the enemy's light cavalry and an
insurgent militia. Trustworthy troops must be placed in the villages and hamlets
of the country to be foraged, in order to prevent the foragers from engaging in
irregular and unauthorized pillage. Officers of the staff and administrative corps
are sent with the party to see to the proper execution of the orders, and to report
any irregularities on the part of the troops. In case any corps engage in
unauthorized pillage, due restitution should be made to the inhabitants, and the
expense of such restitution deducted from the pay and allowances of the corps
by whom such excess is committed. A few examples of this kind of justice will
soon restore discipline to the army, and pacify the inhabitants of the country
occupied.
Experience is the best guide in estimating the amount of hay or grain that may be
taken from a given field: the produce of an acre is, of course, very different for
different soils and climates. In distributing the burdens to the several pack-horses
and wagons employed in conveying the forage to the army, it is important for the
foraging officers to know the relative weight and bulk of each article.

per cubic
Ordinary pressed hay in this country will average about 12lbs
foot
per
Wheat weighs 60lbs
bushel
per
Rye weighs 56lbs
bushel
per
Maize or Indian corn weighs 56lbs
bushel
per
Barley weighs 50lbs
bushel
per
Oats weighs 35lbs
bushel
Meal, flour and ground feed of all kinds,are purchased
by the pound.

As it would be exceedingly dangerous to send forward the regular train of the

army for the conveyance of forage collected by these foraging parties, the
country wagons and pack-horses are usually pressed into service for this
purpose.
Troops of horse are sometimes sent into the vicinity of meadows and grain-fields
for temporary subsistence: in such cases the horses and cattle may be farmed in
the neighborhood, and the grass and grain issued in regular rations, immediately
as taken from the field; but in no case should the animals be turned out to
pasture.
In a country like ours, where large bodies of new and irregular forces are to be
suddenly called into the field in case of war, it is important to establish very rigid
rules in relation to forage and subsistence; otherwise the operations of such
troops must be attended with great waste of public and private property, the want
of means of subsistence, the consequent pillage of the inhabitants, and a general
relaxation of discipline. Regular troops are far less liable to such excesses than
inexperienced and undisciplined forces.
Marches.—Marches are of two kinds: 1st. Route marches,—2d. Marches within
reach of the enemy. The former belong to the domain of strategy; the latter to
that of tactics; both, however, are connected with logistics in every thing that
concerns the means of their execution.
When an army is moving on a line of operations, it should be in as many
columns as the facility of subsistence, celerity of movement, the nature of the
roads, &c., may require. Large columns cannot move with the same rapidity as
smaller ones, nor can they be so readily subsisted. But when an army is within
striking distance of the enemy, concentration becomes more important than
celerity, and the forces must be kept in mass, or at least within supporting
distances of each other. We find only two instances in the Seven Years' War, in
which Frederick attempted attacks by several columns at considerable distances
from each other; and in both these instances (at Torgau and at Namiest, against
Laudon, during the siege of Olmutz) he was unsuccessful. His usual mode was
to bring his columns near together as he approached the enemy, and to form his
troops into line at the moment of attack. Such was his order of march at Prague,
Kollin, Rosbach, Leuthen, Zornsdorf, and Kunersdorf. The following is one of
Frederick's orders respecting marches, (October 2d, 1760.)
"The army will, as usual, march in three columns by lines. The first column will
consist of the first line; the second, of the second line; and the third, of the
reserve. The wagons, and hospital wagons, of regiments, will follow their corps.
The batteries of heavy calibre will follow the infantry brigades to which they are
assigned. On passing woods, the regiments of cavalry will march between two
infantry corps."
"Each column will have a vanguard of one light battalion and ten squadrons of
hussars or dragoons. They will be preceded by three wagons carrying plank-
bridges. The rear-guard is charged with taking up these bridges after the army
has defiled over them."
"The parks will be divided among the columns, to avoid the embarrassment
resulting from a great many wagons being together in a body."
"If any thing should happen to the second and third columns, the king will be
instantly apprized of it; he will be found at the head of the first column. Should
any thing occur to the rear-guard, the same will be instantly communicated to
Lieutenant-general Zeithen, who will be with the rear-guard of the first column."
"The officers will take care that the soldiers march with equal step, and that they
do not stray to the right or left, and thus uselessly fatigue themselves and lose
their distances."
"When orders are given to form the line, the wagons will file out of the columns
to the left, and will march to be parked," &c.
The position of the baggage, when near the enemy, will depend on the nature of
the march. If the march be to the front, it will be in rear of the column; if the
march be by the flank, and the enemy be on the outer flank, the baggage will be
on the inner one, most remote from danger; if the march be in retreat, the
baggage will be in advance of the army. In either case it should be strongly
guarded.
It was in direct violation of this rule that General Hull, in the campaign of 1812,
on reaching the Miami of the Lake, (Maumee,) embarked his baggage, stores,
sick, convalescent, and "even the instructions of his government and the returns
of his army," on board the Cuyahoga packet, and dispatched them for Detroit,
while the army, with the same destination, resumed its march by land. The result
of thus sending his baggage, stores, official papers, &c., without a guard, and on
the flank nearest the enemy, was just what might have been anticipated:—in
attempting to pass the British post of Malden the whole detachment was attacked
and captured, "by a subaltern and six men, in a small and open boat."
To prevent a surprise, detachments of light troops should be always thrown out
in front, on the flanks, and in rear of the column, denominated from their
position, Advanced-Guard, Flankers, and Rear-Guard. These scan the country
which is to be passed over by the column, watch the enemy's motions, and give
notice of his approach in time to allow the main force to choose a suitable field
of battle, and to pass from the order of march to that of combat. The strength and
composition of these detachments depend upon the nature of the ground, and the
character and position of the enemy. In case of an attack they retire slowly, and
on joining the main body, take their assigned position in the line of battle.
In an open country the order of march presents but little difficulty; but in a
broken country, and especially in the vicinity of the enemy, a march cannot be
conducted with too many precautions. Before engaging in a defile it should be
thoroughly examined, and sufficient detachments sent out to cover the main
body from attack while effecting the passage. A neglect of these precautions has
sometimes led to the most terrible disasters.
In military operations very much depends upon the rapidity of marches. The
Roman infantry, in Scipio's campaigns in Africa, frequently marched a distance
of twenty miles in five hours, each soldier carrying from fifty to eighty pounds
of baggage. Septimius Severus, Gibbon states, marched from Vienna to Rome, a
distance of eight hundred miles, in forty days. Cæsar marched from Rome to the
Sierra-Morena, in Spain, a distance of four hundred and fifty leagues, in twenty-
three days!
Napoleon excelled all modern generals in the celerity of his movements. Others
have made for a single day as extraordinary marches as the French, but for
general activity during a campaign they have no rivals in modern history. A few
examples of the rapidity of their movements may not be without interest.
In 1797 a part of Napoleon's army left Verona after having fought the battle of
St. Michaels, on the 13th of January, then marched all night upon Rivoli, fought
in the mountains on the 14th, returned to Mantua on the 15th, and defeated the
army of Provera on the morning of the 16th,—thus, in less than four days,
having marched near fifty leagues, fought three battles, and captured more than
twenty thousand prisoners! Well might he write to the Directory that his soldiers
had surpassed the much vaunted rapidity of Cæsar's legions.
In the campaign of 1800, Macdonald, wishing to prevent the escape of Loudon,
in a single day marched forty miles, crossing rivers, and climbing mountains and
glaciers.
In 1805 the grand French army broke up their camp at Boulogne, in the early
part of September, and in two weeks reached their allotted posts on the Rhine,
averaging daily from twenty-five to thirty miles.
During the same campaign the French infantry, pursuing the Archduke
Ferdinand in his retreat from Ulm, marched thirty miles a day in dreadful
weather, and over roads almost impassable for artillery.
Again, in the campaign of 1806, the French infantry pursued the Prussians at the
rate of from twenty-five to thirty miles per day.
In 1808 the advanced posts of Napoleon's army pursued Sir John Moore's army
at the rate of twenty-five miles a day, in the midst of winter. Napoleon
transported an army of fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga with nearly
the same rapidity, marching through deep snows, across high mountains, and
rivers swollen by the winter rains. The activity, perseverance, and endurance of
his troops, during these ten days' march, are scarcely equalled in history.
In 1812, the activity of the French forces under Clausel was truly extraordinary.
After almost unheard-of efforts at the battle of Salamanca, he retreated forty
miles in a little more than twelve hours!
In 1814, Napoleon's army marched at the rate of ten leagues a day, besides
fighting a battle every twenty-four hours. Wishing to form a junction with other
troops, for the succor of Paris, he marched his army the distance of seventy-five
miles in thirty-six hours; the cavalry marching night and day, and the infantry
travelling en poste.
On his return from Elba, in 1815, his guards marched fifty miles the first day
after landing; reached Grenoble through a rough and mountainous country, a
distance of two hundred miles, in six days, and reached-Paris, a distance of six
hundred miles, in less than twenty days!
The marches of the allied powers, during the wars of the French Revolution,
were much less rapid than those of the armies of Napoleon. Nevertheless, for a
single day the English and Spaniards have made some of the most extraordinary
marches on record.
In 1809, on the day of the battle of Talavera, General Crawford, fearing that
Wellington was hard pressed, made a forced march with three thousand men the
distance of sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours!
The Spanish regiment of Romana, in their march from Jutland to Spain, marched
the extraordinary distance of fifty miles in twenty-one hours.
Cavalry, for a single day, will march a greater distance than infantry; but for a
campaign of several months the infantry will march over the most ground. In the
Russian campaign of Napoleon, his cavalry failed to keep pace with the infantry
in his forced march on Moskwa. But in the short campaigns of 1805 and 1806,
the cavalry of Murat displayed the most wonderful activity, and effected more
extraordinary results than any mounted troops of modern ages.
The English cavalry, however, have made one or two short marches with a
rapidity truly extraordinary.
In 1803 Wellington's cavalry in India marched the distance of sixty miles in
thirty-two hours.
But the march of the English cavalry under Lord Lake, before the battle of
Furruckabad, is, if we can trust the English accounts, still more extraordinary
than any thing recorded of the Romans or the French—it is said that he marched
seventy miles in twenty-four hours!!!
As a general rule, troops marching for many days in succession will move at the
rate of from fifteen to twenty miles per day. In forced marches, or in pursuit of a
flying enemy, they will average from twenty to twenty-five miles per day. And
for only two or three days in succession, with favorable roads, thirty miles per
day may be calculated on. Marches beyond this are unusual, and, when they do
occur, are the result of extraordinary circumstances.
Convoy.—A convoy consists of provisions, military munitions, &c., sent from
one point to another, under the charge of a detachment of troops, called an
escort. When regular dépôts and magazines are established, with proper relations
to the line of operations, convoys requiring particular escorts are seldom
necessary, because the position of the army will cover the space over which the
magazines are to be moved. But in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, or in a
country whose inhabitants are hostile or insurrectionary, precautions of this kind
should always be resorted to.
The size and composition of the escort must depend upon the nature of the
country and the imminence of the danger. The ground to be passed over should
be previously reconnoitred, and the line of march be taken up only after the most
satisfactory reports. When once put in motion, the convoy should be thoroughly
hemmed in by flankers, to give warning to the escort of the approach of the
enemy. Small parties of cavalry are detached on all sides, but particularly in
advance. The main body of the escort is concentrated on the most exposed point
of the convoy while the other sides are guarded by subdivisions. In case of an
attack by a large party, the baggage wagons may be formed into a kind of
defensive field-work, which, with one or two pieces of light artillery, can in this
way resist a pretty strong effort to destroy or carry away the convoy.
As a general rule, it is better to supply the wants of an army by small successive
convoys than by periodical and large ones. Even should some of the former be
captured their loss would not be materially felt; but a large periodical convoy
offers so great a temptation to the enterprise of the enemy, and is so difficult to
escort, that he will venture much to destroy it, and its loss may frustrate our
plans of a siege or of an important military operation. If the Prussian army, when
besieging Olmutz, had observed this rule, the capture of a convoy would not
have forced them to raise the siege and to retreat.
Napoleon estimates that an army of 100,000 men in position will require the
daily arrival of from four to five hundred wagon loads of provisions.
The difficulty of moving provisions, baggage, &c., in a retreat, is always very
great, and the very best generals have frequently failed on this point. Indeed, the
best concerted measures will sometimes fail, amid the confusion and disorder
consequent upon a retreat with an able and active enemy in pursuit. In such a
case, the loss of the provision-trains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead
to the most terrible disasters. We will allude to two examples of this kind: the
retreat of the English from Spain in 1809, and that of the French from Russia in
1812.
When Sir John Moore saw that a retreat had become necessary to save his army
from entire destruction, he directed all the baggage and stores to be taken to the
rear, and every possible arrangement to be made for their preservation and for
the regular supplies of the army. But the want of discipline in his troops, and
more especially the want of a proper engineer organization to prepare the
requisite means for facilitating his own marches, and impeding the enemy's
pursuit, prevented his plans from being fully carried into execution. Much
suffering and great losses were consequently inflicted upon his troops; a large
portion of his baggage and military stores was captured, and even the treasure of
his army, amounting to some 200,000 dollars, was abandoned through the
ignorance and carelessness of the escorting officer.
In Napoleon's march into Russia, his plans had been so admirably combined, that
from Mentz to Moscow not a single estafette or convoy, it is said, was carried off
in this campaign; nor was there a day passed without his receiving intelligence
from France. When the retreat was begun, (after the burning of Moscow,) he had
six lines of magazines in his rear; the 1st, at Smolensk, ten days' march from
Moscow; those of the 2d line at Minsk and Wilna, eight marches from Smolensk;
those of the 3d line at Kowno, Grodno, and Bialystok; those of the 4th line at
Elbing, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plock, Modlin, and Warsaw; those of the 5th line
at Dantzic, Bamberg, and Posen; those of the 6th line at Stettin, Custrin, and
Glogau. When the army left Moscow it carried with it provisions sufficient for
twenty days, and an abundance of ammunition, each piece of artillery being
supplied with three hundred and fifty rounds; but the premature cold weather
destroyed thirty thousand horses in less than three days, thus leaving the trains
without the means of transportation or suitable escorts for their protection: the
horrible sufferings of the returning army now surpassed all description.
The officer selected to escort convoys should be a man of great prudence,
activity, and energy, for frequently very much depends upon the safe and timely
arrival of the provisions and military stores which he may have in charge.
Castrametation.—Castrametation is, strictly speaking, the art of laying out and
disposing to advantage the several parts of the camp of an army. The term is
sometimes more extensively used to include all the means for lodging and
sheltering the soldiers during a campaign, and all the arrangements for cooking,
&c., either in the field or in winter quarters. A camp, whether composed of tents
or barracks, or merely places assigned for bivouacking, must be divided and
arranged in such a way that the several divisions shall be disposed as they are
intended to be drawn up in order of battle; so that, on any sudden alarm, the
troops can pass from it promptly, and form their line of battle without confusion.
Suitable places must also be assigned for cooking, for baggage, and for
provisions, military stores, and ammunitions.
The extent of the color front of a camp depends much on the character of the
ground and the means of defence, but as a general rule, it should never exceed
the position which the army would occupy in the line of battle. The different
arms should be encamped in the same order as that of battle; this order of course
depending on the nature of the battle-ground. A corps d'armée is composed of
battalions of infantry, squadrons of cavalry, batteries of artillery, and companies
of engineer troops, and the art of encampments consists in arranging each of
these elements so as to satisfy the prescribed conditions.
The choice of ground for a camp must be governed, 1st, by the general rules
respecting military positions, and, 2d, by other rules peculiar to themselves, for
they may be variously arranged in a manner more or less suitable on the same
position.
That the ground be suitable for defence, is the first and highest consideration.
It should also be commodious and dry: moist ground in the vicinity of swamps
and stagnant waters, would endanger the health of the army: for the same reason
it should not be subject to overflow or to become marshy by heavy rains, and the
melting of snow.
The proximity of good roads, canals, or navigable streams, is important for
furnishing the soldiers with all the necessaries of life.
The proximity of woods is also desirable for furnishing firewood, materials for
huts, for repairs of military equipments, for works of defence, &c.
Good water within a convenient distance, is also an essential element in the
choice of ground for a camp; without this the soldiers' health is soon
undermined. The proximity of running streams is also important for the purposes
of washing and bathing, and for carrying off the filth of the camp.
The camp should not be so placed as to be enfiladed or commanded by any point
within long cannon range; if bordering on a river or smaller stream, there should
be space enough between them to form in order of battle; the communications in
rear should offer the means of retreating in case of necessity, but should not
afford facilities to the enemy to make his attack on that side.
If the camp is to be occupied for a considerable length of time, as for
cantonments or winter-quarters, the greater must be the care in selecting its
position and in the arrangement for the health and comfort of the soldiers. In the
latter case, (of winter-quarters,) the engineer's art should always be called in play
to form intrenchments, lines of abattis, inundations, &c., to render the position as
difficult of access to the enemy as possible.
A bivouac is the most simple kind of camp. It consists merely of lines of fires,
and huts for the officers and soldiers. These huts may be made of straw, of wood
obtained from the forest, or by dismantling houses and other buildings in the
vicinity of the camp, and stripping them of their timbers, doors, floors, &c.
Troops may be kept in bivouac for a few days, when in the vicinity of the enemy,
but the exposure of the soldier in ordinary bivouacs, especially in the rainy
seasons or in a rigorous climate, is exceedingly destructive of human life, and
moreover leads to much distress to the inhabitants of the country occupied, in the
destruction of their dwellings and the most common necessaries of life. If the
position is to be occupied for any length of time, the huts should be arranged like
tents, according to a regular system, and made comfortable for the troops. Such
should always be the system adopted in camps of practice or manœuvre, in
cantonments, winter-quarters, or in intrenched positions.
We have adopted in our service the system of encamping in tents. These may do
very well under the ordinary circumstances; but in the active operations of a
campaign they are exceedingly objectionable, as greatly encumbering the
baggage-trains. It would seem preferable to resort to bivouacs for the temporary
camp of a single night, and to construct a regular system of huts where a position
is to be occupied for any length of time. This may be regarded as a general rule,
but in certain countries and climates, the tent becomes almost indispensable.
Napoleon's views on this subject are certainly interesting, if not decisive of the
question: "Tents," says he, "are not wholesome. It is better for the soldier to
bivouac, because he can sleep with his feet towards the fire; he may shelter
himself from the wind with a few boards or a little straw. The ground upon
which he lies will be rapidly dried in the vicinity of the fire. Tents are necessary
for the superior officers, who have occasion to read and consult maps, and who
ought to be ordered never to sleep in a house—a fatal abuse, which has given
rise to so many disasters. All the European nations have so far followed the
example of the French as to discard their tents; and if they be still used in camps
of mere parade, it is because they are economical, sparing woods, thatched roofs,
and villages. The shade of a tree, against the heat of the sun, and any sorry
shelter whatever, against the rain, are preferable to tents. The carriage of the
tents for each battalion would load five horses, who would be much better
employed in carrying provisions. Tents are a subject of observation for the
enemies' spies and officers of the staff: they give them an insight into your
numbers, and the position that you occupy; and this inconvenience occurs every
day, and every instant in the day. An army ranged in two or three lines of
bivouac is only to be perceived at a distance by the smoke, which the enemy
may mistake for the vapor of the atmosphere. It is impossible to count the
number of fires; it is easy, however, to count the number of tents, and to trace out
the position that they occupy."
The guarding of camps is a very important matter, and requires much attention.
The camp-guard consists of one or two rows of sentinels placed around the
camp, and relieved at regular intervals. The number of rows of sentinels, and the
distance between each man, will depend upon the character of the ground and
the degree of danger apprehended.
Detachments of infantry and cavalry, denominated picquets, are also thrown out
in front and on the flanks, which, in connection with the camp-guards, serve to
keep good order and discipline in and around the camp, to prevent desertions,
intercept reconnoitering parties, and to give timely notice of the enemy's
approach.
Still larger detachments, denominated grand-guards, are posted in the
surrounding villages, farm-houses, or small field-works, which they occupy as
outposts, and from which they can watch the movements of the enemy, and
prevent any attempts to surprise the camp. They detach patrols, videttes, and
sentries, to furnish timely notice of danger. They should never be so far from the
camp as to be beyond succor in case of sudden attack. Outposts, when too far
advanced, are sometimes destroyed without being able to give notice of the
enemy's approach.
In encamping troops in winter-quarters, it is sometimes necessary to scatter them
over a considerable extent of ground, in order to facilitate their subsistence. In
such a case, the arrangement of guards requires the utmost care. A chain of
advanced posts should be placed several miles' distance from the line of camp;
these posts should be supported by other and larger detachments in their rear,
and concentrated on fewer points; and the whole country around should be
continually reconnoitered by patrols of cavalry.
The manner in which Napoleon quartered and wintered his army on the
Passarge, in 1806-7, furnishes a useful lesson to military men, both in the
matters of encampment and subsistence. An immense army of men were here
quartered and subsisted, in a most rigorous climate, with a not over fertile soil, in
the midst of hostile nations, and in the very face of a most powerful enemy.
A Roman army invariably encamped in the same order, its troops being always
drawn up in the same battle array. A Roman staff-officer who marked out an
encampment, performed nothing more than a mechanical operation; he had no
occasion for much genius or experience. The form of the camps was a square. In
later times, they sometimes, in imitation of the Greeks, made them circular, or
adapted them to the ground. The camp was always surrounded with a ditch and
rampart, and divided into two parts by a broad street, and into subdivisions by
cross-streets and alleys. Each tent was calculated to hold ten privates and a petty
officer.
In the middle ages, the form of the camp did not differ very essentially from that
of the Romans, the variation consisting principally in the interior arrangements,
these arrangements being made to correspond to the existing mode of forming a
line of battle. The details of this system may be found in the military work of
Machiavelli.
The art of fixing a camp in modern times is the same as taking up a line of battle
on the same position. Of all the projectile machines must be in play and
favorably placed. The position must neither be commanded, out-fronted, nor
surrounded; but on the contrary ought, as far as possible, to command and out-
front the enemy's position. But even in the same position there are numerous
modes of arranging an encampment, or of forming a line of battle, and to select
the best of these modes requires great experience, coup d'oeil, and genius. In
relation to this point Napoleon makes the following remarks:—
"Ought an army to be confined to one single encampment, or ought it to form as
many as it has corps or divisions? At what distance ought the vanguard and the
flankers to be encamped? What frontage and what depth ought to be given to the
camp? Where should the cavalry, the artillery, and the carriages be distributed?
Should the army be ranged in battle array, in several lines? And if it should, what
space should there be between those lines? Should the cavalry be in reserve
behind the infantry, or should it be placed upon the wings? As every piece has
sufficient ammunition for keeping up its fire twenty-four hours, should all the
artillery be brought into action at the beginning of the engagement, or should
half of it be kept in reserve?"
"The solution of these questions depends on the following circumstances:—1st.
On the number of troops, and the numbers of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, of
which the army is composed. 2d. On the relation subsisting between the two
armies. 3d. On the quality of the troops. 4th. On the end in view. 5th. On the
nature of the field. And 6th. On the position occupied by the enemy, and on the
character of the general who commands them. Nothing absolute either can or
ought to be prescribed on this head. In modern warfare there is no natural order
of battle."
"The duty to be performed by the commander of an army is more difficult in
modern armies, than it was in those of the ancients. It is also certain that his
influence is more efficacious in deciding battles. In the ancient armies the
general-in-chief, at a distance of eighty or a hundred toises from the enemy, was
in no danger; and yet he was conveniently placed, so as to have an opportunity
of directing to advantage all the movements of his forces. In modern armies, a
general-in-chief, though removed four or five hundred toises, finds himself in
the midst of the fire of the enemy's batteries, and is very much exposed; and still
he is so distant that several movements of the enemy escape him. In every
engagement he is occasionally obliged to approach within reach of small-arms.
The effect of modern arms is much influenced by the situation in which they are
placed. A battery of guns, with a great range and a commanding position that
takes the enemy obliquely, may be decisive of a victory. Modern fields of battle
are much more extended than those of the ancients, whence it becomes
necessary to study operations on a large scale. A much greater degree of
experience and military genius is requisite for the direction of a modern army
than was necessary for an ancient one."
Figure 9 represents a camp (on favorable ground) of a grand-division of an army,
composed of two brigades or twelve battalions of infantry, twelve squadrons of
cavalry, five batteries of artillery, and three companies of engineers.
Figure 10 represents the details of a camp of a battalion of infantry composed of
eight companies.
Figure 11 is the camp of a squadron of cavalry.
Figure 12 is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two companies of foot
engineers.
Figure 13 is the camp of two batteries of mounted artillery, or two companies of
mounted sappers and pontoniers.
On undulating or broken ground the arrangement and order of the general camp,
as well as the details of the encampment of each arm, would admit of much
variation.[8]
[8]
There are many valuable remarks on the various subjects comprised under the
head of logistics, in the works of Jomini, Grimoard, Thiebault, Boutourlin,
Guibert, Laroche Amyon, Bousmard, Ternay, Vauchelle, Odier, Audouin,
Bardin, Chemevrieres, Daznan, Ballyet, Dremaux, Dupre d'Aulnay, Morin, and
in the published regulations and orders of the English army.
 CHAPTER V.
TACTICS.

IV. Tactics.—We have defined tactics to be the art of bringing troops into action,
or of moving them in the presence of the enemy;—that is, within his view, and
within the reach of his artillery. This branch of the military art has usually been
divided into two parts: 1st. Grand Tactics, or the tactics of battles; and 2d.
Elementary Tactics, or tactics of instruction.[9]
[9]
"It does not come within the view of this work to say any thing of the merely
mechanical part of the art; because it must be taken for granted, that every man
who accepts the command of an army knows at least the alphabet of his trade. If
he does not, (unless his enemy be as ignorant as himself,) defeat and infamy
await him. Without understanding perfectly what are called the evolutions, how
is it possible that a general can give to his own army that order of battle which
shall be most provident and skilful in each particular case in which he may be
placed? How know which of these evolutions the enemy employs against him?
and, of course, how decide on a counter-movement which may be necessary to
secure victory or avoid defeat? The man who shall take the command of an army
without perfectly understanding this elementary branch, is no less presumptuous
than he who should pretend to teach Greek without knowing even his letters. If
we have such generals, let them, for their own sakes, if not for their country's,
put themselves immediately to school."

A battle is a general action between armies. If only a small portion of the forces
are engaged it is usually denominated a combat, an affair, an action, a skirmish,
&c., according to the character of the conflict. The art of combining and
conducting battles of all descriptions has been designated by the name of Grand
Tactics.
Battles may be arranged into three classes; 1st. Defensive battles, or those given
in a chosen position by an army waiting the attack of the enemy. 2d. Offensive
battles, or those made by an army which attacks the enemy in position. 3d. The
mixed or unforeseen battles, given by two armies meeting while on the march.
I. When an army awaits the attack, it takes its position and forms its line of battle
according to the nature of the ground and the supposed character and strength of
the enemy's forces. Such is usually the case when an army wishes to cover a
siege, protect a capital, guard dépôts of provisions and military stores, or some
important strategic point. The general relations of positions with strategy and
engineering have already been considered; we will now discuss merely their
relations to battles.
The first condition to be satisfied by a tactical position is, that its debouches
shall be more favorable for falling on the enemy when he has approached to the
desired point, than those which the enemy can have for attacking our line of
battle. 2d. The artillery should have its full effect upon all the avenues of
approach. 3d. We should have good ground for manœuvring our own troops
unseen, if possible, by the enemy. 4th. We should have a full view of the enemy's
manœuvres as he advances to the attack. 5th. We should have the flanks of our
line well protected by natural or artificial obstacles. 6th. We should have some
means of effecting a retreat without exposing our army to destruction.
It is very seldom that all these conditions can be satisfied at the same time; and
sometimes the very means of satisfying one, may be in direct violation of
another. A river, a forest, or a mountain, which secures a flank of a line of battle,
may become an obstacle to a retreat, should the defensive forces be thrown back
upon that wing. Again, the position may be difficult of attack in front or on the
wings, and at the same time unfavorable for retreat. Such was Wellington's
position at Waterloo. The park of Hougomont, the hamlet of Haye Sainte, and
the marshy rivulet of Papelotte, were serious obstacles against the attacking
force; but the marshy forest of Soignies in rear, with but a single road, cut off all
hope of retreat.
II. According to the strategic relations of the contending forces in a campaign,
will it be determined whether we are to await the enemy, or to seek him out and
attack him wherever he may be found. We may sometimes be obliged to make
the attack at all hazards, for the purpose of preventing the junction of two corps,
or to cut off forces that may be separated from the main body by a river, &c. As
a general rule the attacking force has a moral superiority over the defensive, but
this advantage is frequently more than counterbalanced by other conditions.
The main thing in an offensive battle is to seize upon the decisive point of the
field. This point is determined by the configuration of the ground, the position of
the contending forces, the strategic object of the battle; or, by a combination of
these. For example, when one wing of the enemy rests on a height that
commands the remainder of his line, this would seem the decisive point to be
attacked, for its occupation would secure the greatest advantages; but this point
may be so very difficult of access, or be so related to the strategic object as to
render its attack out of the question. Thus it was at the battle of Bautzen: the left
of the allies rested on the mountains of Bohemia, which were difficult of attack,
but favorable for defence; moreover, their only line of retreat was on the right,
which thus became the point of attack for the French, although the topographical
and tactical key of the field was on the left.
III. It frequently happens in modern warfare that battles result from the meeting
of armies in motion, both parties acting on the offensive. Indeed, an army that is
occupying a defensive position may, on the approach of the enemy, advance to
meet him while on the march. Battles of this kind may partake of the mixed
character of offensive and defensive actions, or they may be of the nature of a
surprise to both armies. To this class belong the battles of Rosbach, Eylau,
Lutzen, Luzzara, Abensberg, &c.
Surprises were much more common in ancient than in modern times, for the
noise of musketry and the roar of artillery, belonging to the posts or wings
assailed, will prevent any general surprise of an army. Moreover, the division
into separate masses, or corps d'armée, will necessarily confine the surprise to a
part, at most, of the forces employed. Nevertheless, in the change given to
military terms, a surprise may now mean only an unexpected combination of
manœuvres for an attack, rather than an actual falling upon troops unguarded or
asleep. In this sense Marengo, Lutzen, Eylau, &c. are numbered with surprises.
Benningsen's attack on Murat at Zarantin in 1812 was a true surprise, resulting
from the gross negligence and carelessness of the king of Naples.
An order of battle is the particular disposition given to the troops for a
determined manœuvre on the field of battle. A line of battle is the general name
applied to troops drawn up in their usual order of exercise, without any
determined manœuvre; it may apply to defensive positions, or to offensive
operations, where no definitive object has been decided on. Military writers lay
down twelve orders of battle, viz.: 1st. The simple parallel order; 2d. The
parallel order with a crotchet; 3d. The parallel order reinforced on one or both
wings; 4th. The parallel order reinforced on the centre; 5th. The simple oblique
order; 6th. The oblique order reinforced on the assailing wing; 7th. The
perpendicular order on one or both wings; 8th. The concave order; 9th. The
convex order; 10th. The order by echelon on one or both wings; 11th. The order
by echelon on the centre; 12th. The combined orders of attack on the centre and
one wing at the same time.

(Figure 14.)[10] The simple parallel order is the worst possible disposition for a
battle, for the two parties here fight with equal chances, and the combat must
continue till accident, superior numbers, or mere physical strength decides the
day; skill can have little or no influence in such a contest.
[10]
In the plans, B is the army in position, and A the attacking force arranged
according to the different orders of battle. To simplify the drawings, a single line
represents the position of an army, whereas, in practice, troops are usually drawn
up in three lines. Each figure represents a grand division of twelve battalions.

(Figure 15.) The parallel order with a crotchet on the flank, is sometimes used in
a defensive position, and also in the offensive with the crotchet thrown forward.
Malplaquet, Nordlingen, Prague, and Kolin, are examples of this order.
Wellington, at Waterloo, formed the parallel order with the retired crotchet on
the right flank.
(Figure 16.) A line of battle parallel to the enemy's, if strongly reinforced on one
point, is according to correct principles, and may in certain cases secure the
victory; but it has many inconveniences. The weak part of the line being too near
the enemy, may, notwithstanding its efforts to the contrary, become engaged, and
run the risk of a defeat, and thereby counterbalance the advantages gained by the
strong point. Moreover, the reinforced part of the line will not be able to profit
by its success by taking the enemy's line in flank and rear, without endangering
its connection with the rest of the line.
(Figure 17) represents the parallel order reinforced on the centre. The same
remarks are applicable to this as to the preceding.
These two orders were frequently used by the ancients: as at the battle of Zama,
for example; and sometimes by modern generals. Turenne employed one of them
at Ensheim.
(Figure 18) is the simple oblique order.
(Figure 19) is the oblique order, with the attacking wing reinforced. This last is
better suited for an inferior army in attacking a superior, for it enables it to carry
the mass of its force on a single point of the enemy's line, while the weak wing is
not only out of reach of immediate attack, but also holds the remainder of the
enemy's line in check by acting as a reserve ready to be concentrated on the
favorable point as occasion may require.
The most distinguished examples under this order are the battles of Leuctra and
Mantinea, under the celebrated Epaminondas; Leuthen, under Frederick; the
Pyramids, Marengo, and Jena, under Napoleon.
(Figure 20.) An army may be perpendicular upon a flank at the beginning of a
battle, as was the army of Frederick at Rosbach, and the Russian army at
Kunersdorff; but this order must soon change to the oblique. An attack upon
both wings can only be made when the attacking force is vastly superior. At
Eylau, Napoleon made a perpendicular attack on one wing at the same time that
he sought to pierce the enemy's centre.
(Figure 21.) The concave order may be used with advantage in certain cases, and
in particular localities. Hannibal employed it at the battle of Cannæ, the English
at Crecy and Agincourt, and the Austrians at Essling, in 1809.
(Figure 22.) The convex order is sometimes formed to cover a defile, to attack a
concave line, or to oppose an attack before or after the passage of a river. The
Romans formed this order at the battle of Cosilinum; the French at Ramilies in
1706, at Fleurus in 1794, at Essling in 1809, and at the second and third days of
Leipsic in 1813, and at Brienne in 1814.
(Figure 23.) The order by echelon on one wing may be frequently employed with
advantage; but if the echelon be made on both wings, there is the same objection
to its use as to the perpendicular order on both wings. At Dresden, Napoleon
attacked both wings at the same time; this is the only instance in his whole
history of a similar attack, and this was owing to peculiar circumstances in the
ground and in the position of his troops.
(Figure 24.) The echelon order on the centre alone may be employed with
success against an army formed in a thin or too extended line of battle, for it
would be pretty certain to penetrate and break the line.
The echelon order possesses in general very great advantages. The several corps
composing the army may manœuvre separately, and consequently with greater
ease. Each echelon covers the flank of that which precedes it; and all may be
combined towards a single object, and extended with the necessary ensemble. At
the battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon formed the oblique order in echelon by
squares. Portions of his forces were arranged in echelon in some of his other
battles.
(Figure 25.) The combined order in columns on the centre and one extremity at
the same time, is better suited than either of the preceding for attacking a strong
contiguous line. Napoleon employed this order at Wagram, Ligny, Bautzen,
Borodino, and Waterloo.
It is impossible to lay down, as a general rule, which of these orders of battle
should be employed, or that either should be exclusively followed throughout the
whole battle. The question must be decided by the general himself on the
ground, where all the circumstances may be duly weighed. An order well suited
to one position might be the worst possible in another. Tactics is in this respect
the very reverse of strategy—the latter being subject to more rigid and invariable
rules.
But whatever the plan adopted by the attacking force, it should seek to dislodge
the enemy, either by piercing or turning his line. If it can conceal its real
intentions, and deceive him respecting the true point of attack, success will be
more certain and decisive. A turning manœuvre may frequently be employed
with advantage at the same time with the main attack on the line. The operations
of Davoust at Wagram, and Richepanse at Hohenlinden, are good examples
under this head. The manœuvre is, however, a difficult one, and unless executed
with skill, may lead to disasters like the turning manœuvres of the Austrians at
Rivoli and Austerlitz, and of the French under Jourdan at Stackach, and under
Marmont at Salamanca.
We will now discuss the particular manner of arranging the troops on the line of
battle, or the manner of employing each arm, without entering, however, much
into the detailed tactics of formation and instruction.
We shall begin with infantry, as the most important arm on the battle-field.
There are four different ways of forming infantry for battle: 1st, as tirailleurs, or
light troops; 2d, in deployed lines; 3d, in lines of battalions, ployed on the
central division of each battalion, or formed in squares; 4th, in deep masses.
These different modes of formation are reduced to four separate systems: 1st, the
thin formation of two deployed lines; 2d, a line of battalions in columns of attack
on the centre, or in squares by battalions; 3d, a combination of these two, or the
first line deployed, and the second in columns of attack; and 4th, the deep
formation of heavy columns of several battalions. The tirailleurs are merely
accessories to the main forces, and are employed to fill up intervals, to protect
the march of the columns, to annoy the enemy, and to manœuvre on the flanks.
1st. Formerly the line of battle for infantry was very generally that of two
deployed lines of troops, as shown in Fig. 26. But reason and experience have
demonstrated that infantry in this thin or light order, can only move very slowly;
that in attempting rapid movements it breaks and exhibits great and dangerous
undulations, and would be easily pierced through by troops of a deeper order.
Hence it is that the light formation is only proper when the infantry is to make
use of its fire, and to remain almost stationary.
2d. If the formation of a line of battalions in columns of attack be employed, the
depth and mobility will depend upon the organization or habitual formation of
this arm.
In our service a battalion is supposed to be composed of ten companies, each
formed in three ranks. The two flank companies are designed for tirailleurs. This
would give a column of four divisions, and consequently twelve files deep; and
as only two of these files could employ their fire, there would be much too large
a portion of non-combatants exposed to the enemy's artillery. In practice,
however, we employ the two-rank formation, which, if the flank companies be
detached, would give a column of attack eight files in depth, which is not
objectionable. If however, the flank companies should be present in the battalion,
the depth of the column would still be ten files.
In the French service, each battalion is composed of four divisions, formed in
either two or three ranks. The two-rank formation is the one habitually
employed. If all the companies be present, and the formation in three ranks, the
depth of column will be twelve files; if in two ranks the depth will be eight, files.
If the flank companies be detached, the depth of column will be, for three ranks
nine files, and for two ranks six files. (Figs. 27 and 28.)
In the Russian service each, battalion has four divisions of three ranks each. But
the third rank is employed as tirailleurs, which gives a depth of column of eight
files. The employment of the third rank for tirailleurs is deemed objectionable on
account of the difficulty of rallying them on the column. For this reason, the best
authorities prefer detaching an entire division of two companies.
The formation of squares is exceedingly effective in an open country, and against
an enemy who is superior in cavalry. Formerly very large squares were
employed, but they are now formed either by regiment or by battalion. The
former are deemed best for the defensive, and the latter for offensive
movements. The manner of arranging these is shown in Figure 29.
3d. The mixed system, or the combination of the two preceding, has sometimes
been employed with success. Napoleon used this formation at Tagliamento, and
the Russians at Eylau. Each regiment was composed of three battalions, the first
being deployed in line, and the other two formed in columns of attack by
division in rear of the two extremities, as shown in Fig. 30. It may in some cases
be better to place the second and third battalions in line with the first, and on the
two extremities of this battalion, in order to prolong the line of fire. The centre
of the line of each regiment would be less strong, however, than when the two
battalions by column are placed in rear of the other which is deployed. This
mixed system of formation has many advocates, and in certain situations may be
employed with great advantage.
4th. The deep order of heavy columns of several battalions is objectionable as an
habitual formation for battle, inasmuch as it exposes large masses of men to the
ravages of artillery, and diminishes the mobility and impulsion of an attack
without adding greatly to its force. Macdonald led a column of this kind at the
battle of Wagram with complete success, although he experienced enormous
losses. But Ney's heavy columns of attack at Waterloo failed of success, and
suffered terribly from the concentric fire of the enemy's batteries.
Whenever deep columns are employed, Jomini recommends that the grand-
division of twelve battalions should have one battalion on each flank, (Fig. 31,)
marching by files, in order to protect its flanks from the enemy's attacks. Without
this defence a column of twelve battalions deep becomes an inert mass, greatly
exposed to be thrown into disorder or broken, as was the column of Fontenoy,
and the Macedonian phalanx by Paulus Emillus. A grand-division is sometimes
arranged in two columns by brigade, as is represented in Figure 32. These are
less heavy than a single column of grand-division by battalion, but are subject to
nearly the same objections.
All offensive operations on the field of battle require mobility, solidity, and
impulsion; while, on the other hand, all defensive operations should combine
solidity with the greatest possible amount of fire.
Troops in motion can make but little use of their fire-arms, whatever may be
their formation. If in very large masses, they move slower and are more exposed;
but the moral effect of these large moveable columns is such, that they
frequently carry positions without ever employing their fire. The French
columns usually succeeded against the Austrian and Prussian infantry, but the
English infantry could not so easily be driven from their ground; hey also
employed their fire to greater advantage, as was shown at Talavera, Busaco,
Fuente de Honore, Albuera and Waterloo. The smaller columns and the mixed
formation were always most successful against such troops.
From these remarks we must conclude—1st. That the very thin as well as the
very deep formation is objectionable under ordinary circumstances, and can
seldom be employed with safety.
2d. That the attack by battalions in columns by division is the best for carrying a
position; the column should, however, be diminished in depth as much as
possible, in order both to increase its own fire and to diminish its exposure to the
fire of the enemy; moreover, it should be well covered by tirailleurs and
supported by cavalry.
3d. That the mixed formation of the first line deployed and the second in
columns of battalion by division is the best for defence.
4th. That either of the last two may be employed in the offensive or defensive,
according to the nature of the ground, the character of the general, and the
character and position of the troops. Squares are always good against cavalry.
Troops should be habituated to all these formations, and accustomed to pass
rapidly from one to another in the daytime or at night. None, however, but
disciplined troops can do this: hence the great superiority of regulars on the field
of battle, where skilful manœuvres frequently effect more than the most
undaunted courage.
The arm next in importance on the battle-field is cavalry. The principal merit of
this arm consists in its velocity and mobility. Cavalry has little solidity, and
cannot of itself defend any position against infantry; but in connection with the
other arms, it is indispensable for beginning a battle, for completing a victory,
and for reaping its full advantage by pursuing and destroying the beaten foe.
There are four different modes of forming cavalry, the same as for infantry: 1st
in deployed lines; 2d, a line of regiments in column of attack on the centre; 3d,
the mixed formation; and 4th, the deep formation of several columns.
1st. The thin formation was deemed objectionable for infantry, on account of its
liability to be penetrated by cavalry. The same objection does not hold so
forcibly with respect to this latter arm; but full lines are deemed less
advantageous than lines deployed checker-wise or in echelon. In either case the
distance between the lines should be sufficient to prevent the second line from
coming in contact with the first, in case the latter receives a slight check. This
distance need not be so great in lines deployed checker-wise, as when they are
full, or in echelon.
2d. The second system of formation, that is, a line of columns of attack on the
central division for infantry, is by battalion, but for cavalry, by regiment. If the
regiment is composed of eight squadrons, the column will contain four lines, two
squadrons forming a division; but if composed of only six squadrons, the column
will contain only three lines, and consequently will be six files in depth. In either
case the distance between the lines should be that of a demi-squadron, when the
troops are drawn up in battle array; but when charging, the divisions may close
to a less distance.
3d. In forming a grand division of two brigades, by the third or mixed system,
two regiments may be deployed in the first line, and three formed in columns of
attack in rear of the flanks and centre, as is shown in Fig. 33, the sixth being held
in reserve. This formation is deemed a good one.
4th. The fourth system, of deep columns of cavalry, is entirely unsuited for the
charge, and this formation can only be employed for troops drawn up in reserve.
The flanks of lines or columns of cavalry are always much exposed, and
squadrons should therefore be formed in echelon on the right and left, and a little
in rear of the main body, in order to protect the flanks from the attacks of the
enemy's horse. Irregular cavalry is usually employed for this purpose.
In the formation of a grand division in line of battle, care should be taken not to
give too great an extent to the command of the generals of brigade. If the
formation be in two lines, neither brigade should form an entire line, but each
should form a wing of the division, two regiments of the same brigade being
placed in rear of each other. This rule is an important one, and should never be
neglected.
It may also be laid down as a maxim, in the formation of cavalry on the battle-
field, that the first line after the charge, even if most successful, may require
reforming in rear of the second line, and that this last should be prepared to act
in the front line after the first onset. The success of the battle frequently depends
upon the charge of the final reserve of cavalry on the flanks of lines already
engaged.
It is on account of this frequent manœuvring of the cavalry on the battle-field, its
reforming for repeated charges, that great bodies deployed in full lines are
principally objected to. They cannot be handled with the facility and rapidity of
columns of regiments by divisions. The attack of Nansouty's cavalry, formed in
this way, on the Prussian cavalry, deployed in advance of Chateau-Thierry, in
1814, is a good proof of this.
Cavalry may be brought to a charge—1st, in columns; 2d, in line; and 3d, in
route, or at random, (à la déban-dade.) These may also be varied by charging
either at a trot or a gallop. All these modes have been employed with success. In
a regular charge in line the lance offers great advantages; in the mêlée the sabre
is the best weapon; hence some military writers have proposed arming the front
rank with lances, and the second with sabres, The pistol and the carabine are
useless in the charge, but may sometimes be employed with advantage against
convoys, outposts, and light cavalry; to fire the carabine with any effect, the
troop must be at a halt. In all charges in line, especially against cavalry, the fast
trot is deemed preferable to the gallop, on account of the difficulty of keeping up
the alignment when the speed is increased. Lances are utterly useless in a mêée,
and in employing troops armed in this way, it is of the greatest importance to
keep them in order and in line. In charging with the sabre against artillery the
gallop may sometimes be employed, for velocity here may be more important
than force.
We will now consider the formation and use of artillery on the field of battle. It
may be laid down as a fundamental principle, that the fire of artillery should be
directed on that part of the enemy's line which we design to pierce; for this fire
will not only weaken this point, but will also aid the attack of the cavalry and
infantry when the principal efforts are directed towards the intended point.
In the defence, the artillery is usually distributed throughout the whole line, on
ground favorable for its fire; but the reserve should be so placed that it can easily
be brought to bear on the point where the enemy will be most likely to direct his
principal attack.
Artillery placed on a plain, or with ground slightly inclined in front, and using
the point-blank or ricochet fire, is the most effective; very high points are
unfavorable If possible, the concentric fire should be employed against the
enemy's columns of attack. The position of the English artillery on the field of
Waterloo, and the use of the concentric fire, furnishes one of the best examples
for the disposition of this arm to be found in modern military history.
The proper use of artillery on the battle-field is against the enemy's infantry and
cavalry, consequently only a small part of it should be employed to respond to
the fire of the enemy's batteries; not more than one third at most can be spared
for this object.
If possible, batteries should be established so as to take the enemy's line in flank,
either by an oblique or enfilading fire. A direct fire against columns of attack,
with a few light pieces thrown out to take it in flank at the same time, will
always be advantageous. A direct and flank fire was employed with success by
Kleist against the column of Ney at the battle of Bautzen; the French marshal
was forced to change his direction.
Batteries should always be well secured on the flanks, and constantly sustained
by infantry or cavalry. If attacked by cavalry, the artillery should keep up its fire
as long as possible, first with ball, and then with grape when the enemy arrives
within a suitable distance. The same rule will apply to attacks of infantry, except
that the fire of solid shot at a great distance is much less effective than against
mounted troops.
The engineer troops are employed on the field of battle principally by
detachments, acting as auxiliaries to the other arms. Each regiment of infantry
should have a detachment of sappers armed with axes to act as pioneers, for the
removal of obstacles that may impede its advance. These sappers are of the
utmost importance, for without them an entire column might be checked and
thrown into confusion by impediments which a few sappers with their axes
would remove in a very short time. Detachments of engineer troops must also act
in concert with the cavalry and artillery for the same purpose as above. In
establishing the batteries of artillery, in opening roads for their manœuvres, and
in arranging material obstacles for their defence, the axes, picks, and shovels of
the sappers are of infinite value. Field-works, bridges, and bridge-defences,
frequently have a decisive influence upon the result of a battle, but as these are
usually arranged previous to the action, they will be discussed in another place.
In the attack and defence of these field-works, the engineer troops play a
distinguished part. The consideration of this part of the subject, though perhaps
properly belonging to the tactics of battles, will also be postponed to another
occasion.
We will now discuss the employment of the combined arms on the field of battle.
Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed by regiments and
brigades, was united in a single body and drawn up in two lines. The cavalry was
placed on the two flanks, and the artillery distributed along the entire line. In
moving by wings, they formed four columns, two of cavalry and two of infantry:
in moving by a flank, they formed only two very long columns; the cavalry,
however, sometimes formed a third and separate column in flank movements,
but this disposition was rarely made.
The French Revolution introduced the system of grand divisions composed of
the four arms combined; each division moved separately and independently of
the other. In the wars of the Empire, Napoleon united two or more of these
divisions into a corps d'armée, which formed a wing, the centre, or reserve of his
grand army. In addition to these divisions and corps d'armée, he had large
reserves of cavalry and artillery, which were employed as distinct and separate
arms.
If the forces be sufficiently numerous to fight by corps d'armée, each corps
should have its own reserve, independent of the general reserve of the army.
Again, if the forces be so small as to act by grand divisions only, each division
should then have its separate reserve.
An army, whether composed of separate corps or of grand divisions, usually
forms, on the field of battle, a centre, two wings, and a reserve. Each corps or
division acts by itself, with its infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineer troops.
The reserve of cavalry may be formed in rear of the centre or one of the wings.
In small forces of fifty or sixty thousand men, the cavalry may act with
advantage on the wings, in the manner of the ancients. If the reserve of this arm
be large enough to form three separate bodies, it may itself very properly be
formed into a centre and wings. If it be formed into two columns only, they may
be placed in rear of the openings between the centre and the wings of the main
force. The reserve of artillery is employed either to reinforce the centre or a
wing, and in the defensive is frequently distributed throughout the whole line of
battle. In offensive operations, it may be well to concentrate as much fire as
possible on the intended point of attack. The mounted artillery either acts in
concert with the cavalry, of is used to reinforce that arm; the light-foot acts with
the infantry, and the batteries of heavy calibre are distributed along the line, or
concentrated on some important point where their fire may be most effectual.
They reach the enemy's forces at a distance, and arrest the impulsion of his
attack. They may also be employed to draw the fire of his artillery; but their
movements are too slow and difficult for a reserve.
The order of succession in which the different arms are engaged in a battle,
depends upon the nature of the ground and other accidental circumstances, and
cannot be determined by any fixed rules. The following, however, is most
frequently employed, and in ordinary cases may be deemed good.
The attack is first opened by a cannonade; light troops are sent forward to annoy
the enemy, and, if possible, to pick off his artillerists. The main body then
advances in two lines: the first displays itself in line as it arrives nearly within
the range of grape-shot; the second line remains in columns of attack formed of
battalions by division, at a distance from the first sufficient to be beyond the
reach of the enemy's musketry, but near enough to support the first line, or to
cover it, if driven back. The artillery, in the mean time, concentrates its fire on
some weak point to open a way for the reserve, which rushes into the opening
and takes the enemy in flank and rear. The cavalry charges at the opportune
moment on the flank of the enemy's columns or penetrates an opening in his line,
and cutting to pieces his staggered troops, forces them into retreat, and
completes the victory. During this time the whole line of the enemy should be
kept occupied, so as to prevent fresh troops from being concentrated on the
threatened point.
The following maxims on battles may be studied with advantage:—1st. General
battles are not to be fought but under the occurrence of one of the following
circumstances: when you are, from any cause, decidedly superior to the enemy;
when he is on the point of receiving reinforcements, which will materially effect
your relative strength; when, if not beaten or checked, he will deprive you of
supplies or reinforcements, necessary to the continuance or success of your
operations; and, generally, when the advantage of winning the battle will be
greater than the disadvantage of losing it.
2d. Whatever may be your reason for risking a general battle, you ought to
regard as indispensable preliminaries,—a thorough knowledge of the ground on
which you are to act; an ample supply of ammunition; the most perfect order in
your fire-arms; hospital dépôts regularly established, with surgeons, nurses,
dressings, &c., sufficient for the accommodation of the wounded; points of
rendezvous established and known to the commanders of corps; and an entire
possession of the passes in your own rear.
3d. The battle being fought and won, the victory must be followed up with as
much alacrity and vigor, as though nothing had been gained,—a maxim very
difficult of observance, (from the momentary disobedience which pervades all
troops flushed with conquest,) but with which an able general will never
dispense. No one knew better the use of this maxim than Napoleon, and no one
was a more strict and habitual observer of it.
4th. The battle being fought and lost, it is your first duty to do away the moral
effect of defeat,—the want of that self-respect and self-confidence, which are its
immediate followers, and which, so long as they last, are the most powerful
auxiliaries of your enemy. It is scarcely necessary to remark that, to effect this
object,—to reinspire a beaten army with hope, and to reassure it of victory,—we
must not turn our backs on an enemy, without sometimes presenting to him our
front also;—we must not confide our safety to mere flight, but adopt such
measures as shall convince him that though wounded and overpowered, we are
neither disabled nor dismayed; and that we still possess enough both of strength
and spirit to punish his faults, should he commit any. Do you operate in a
covered or mountainous country?—avail yourself of its ridges and woods; for by
doing so you will best evade the pressure of his cavalry. Have you defiles or
villages to pass?—seize the heads of these, defend them obstinately, and make a
show of fighting another battle. In a word, let no error of your enemy, nor any
favorable incident of the ground, escape your notice or your use. It is by these
means that your enemy is checked, and your troops inspirited; and it was by
these that Frederick balanced his surprise at Hohenkirchen, and the defeat of his
plans before Olmutz. The movement of our own Washington, after losing the
battle of Brandywine, was of this character. He hastily recrossed the Schuylkill
with the professed intention of seeking the enemy and renewing the combat,
which was apparently prevented only by a heavy and incessant fall of rain. A
rumor was now raised that the enemy, while refusing his left wing, was rapidly
advancing upon his right, to intercept our passage of the river, and thus gain
possession of Philadelphia. This report justified a retreat, which drew from the
General repeated assurances, that in quitting his present position and giving to
his march a retrograde direction, it was not his object to avoid, but to follow and
to fight the enemy. This movement, though no battle ensued, had the effect of
restoring the confidence as well of the people as of the army.[11]
[11]
There are innumerable works in almost every language on elementary tactics;
very few persons, however, care to read any thing further than the manuals used
in our own service. Our system of infantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics is
generally taken from the French; and also the course of engineer instruction, so
far as matured, for sappers, miners, and pontoniers, is based on the French
manuals for the varied duties of this arm.
On Grand Tactics, or Tactics of Battles, the military and historical writings of
General Jomini abound in most valuable instructions. Napoleon's memoirs, and
the writings of Rocquancourt, Hoyer, Decker, Okouneff, Roguiat, Jocquinot-de-
Presle, Guibert, Duhesme, Gassendi, Warnery, Baron Bohan, Lindneau,
Maiseroy, Miller, and Ternay, are considered as being among the best authorities.
 CHAPTER VI.
MILITARY POLITY AND THE MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.

Military Polity.—In deciding upon a resort to arms, statesmen are guided by

certain general rules which have been tacitly adopted in the intercourse of
nations: so also both statesmen and generals are bound by rules similarly
adopted for the conduct of hostile forces while actually engaged in military
operations.
In all differences between nations, each state has a right to decide for itself upon
the nature of its means of redress for injuries received. Previous to declaring
open and public war, it may resort to some other forcible means of redress, short
of actual war. These are:—
1st. Laying an embargo upon the property of the offending nation.
2d. Taking forcible possession of the territory or property in dispute.
3d. Resorting to some direct measure of retaliation.
4th. Making reprisals upon the persons and things of the offending nation.
It is not the present purpose to discuss these several means of redress, nor even
to enter into any examination of the rights and laws of public war, when actually
declared; it is intended to consider here merely such military combinations as are
resorted to by the state in preparation for defence, or in carrying on the actual
operations of a war.
In commencing hostilities against any other power, we must evidently take into
consideration all the political and physical circumstances of the people with
whom we are to contend: we must regard their general character for courage and
love of country; their attachment to their government and political institutions;
the character of their rulers and their generals; the numbers, organization, and
discipline of their armies; and particularly the relations between the civil and
military authorities in the state, for if the latter be made entirely subordinate, we
may very safely calculate on erroneous combinations. We must also regard their
passive means of resistance, such as their system of fortifications, their military
materials and munitions, their statistics of agriculture, commerce, and
manufactures, and especially the geographical position and physical features of
their country. No government can neglect, with impunity, these considerations in
its preparations for war, or in its manner of conducting military operations.
Napoleon's system of carrying on war against the weak, effeminate, and
disorganized Italians required many modifications when directed against the
great military power of Russia. Moreover, the combinations of Eylau and
Friedland were inapplicable to the contest with the maddened guerrillas of
Minos, animated by the combined passions of hatred, patriotism, and religious
enthusiasm.
Military power may be regarded either as absolute or relative: the absolute force
of a state depending on the number of its inhabitants and the extent of its
revenues; the relative force, on its geographical and political position, the
character of its people, and the nature of its government. Its military preparations
should evidently be in proportion to its resources. Wealth constitutes both the
apprehension and the incentive to invasion. Where two or more states have equal
means of war, with incentives very unequal, an equilibrium cannot exist; for
danger and temptation are no longer opposed to each other. The preparation of
states may, therefore, be equal without being equivalent, and the smaller of the
two may be most liable to be drawn into a war without the means of sustaining
it.
The numerical relation between the entire population of a state, and the armed
forces which it can maintain, must evidently vary with the wealth and pursuits of
the people. Adam Smith thinks that a country purely agricultural may, at certain
seasons, furnish for war one-fifth, or even in case of necessity one-fourth, of its
entire population. A commercial or manufacturing country would be unable to
furnish any thing like so numerous a military force. On this account small
agricultural states are sometimes able to bring into the field much larger armies
than their more powerful neighbors. During the Seven Years' War, Frederick
supported an army equal to one-twentieth of the entire Prussian population, and
at the close of this memorable contest one-sixth of the males capable of bearing
arms had actually perished on the field of battle.
But the number of troops that may be brought into the field in times of great
emergency is, of course, much greater than can be supported during a long war,
or as a part of a permanent military establishment. Montesquieu estimates that
modern nations are capable of supporting, without endangering their power, a
permanent military force of about one-hundredth part of their population. This
ratio differs but little from that of the present military establishments of the great
European powers.
Great Britain, with a population of about twenty-five millions, and a general
budget of $250,000,000, supports a military and naval force of about 150,000
effective and 100,000 non-effective men, 250,000 in all, at an annual expense of
from seventy to eighty millions of dollars.
Russia, with a population of about seventy millions, supports an active army of
632,000 men, with an immense reserve, at an expense of about $65,000,000, out
of a general budget of $90,000,000; that is, the expense of her military
establishment is to her whole budget as 7 to 10.
Austria, with a population of thirty-five millions, has an organized peace
establishment of 370,000, (about 250,000 in active service,) and a reserve of
260,000, at an expense of $36,000,000, out of a general budget of $100,000,000.
Prussia, with a population of about fifteen millions, has from 100,000 to 120,000
men in arms, with a reserve of 200,000, at an annual expense of more than
$18,000,000, out of a general budget of about $38,000,000.
France, with a population of near thirty-five millions, supports a permanent
establishment of about 350,000 men, at an expense of seventy or eighty millions
of dollars, out of a total budget of $280,000,000. France has long supported a
permanent military force of from one-hundredth to one hundred-and-tenth of her
population, at an expense of from one-fourth to one-fifth of her whole budget.
The following table, copied from the "Spectateur Militaire," shows the state of
the army at six different periods between 1788 and 1842. It omits, of course, the
extraordinary levies of the wars of the Revolution and of the Empire.
Table.

Army, Peace Army, War

Budget of Budget of
Dates. Population. Establisment. establishment. Remarks
State. Army.
Men Men
livres livres
1788 24,000,000 180,000 300,000
500,000,000 100,000,000
francs francs Ordinance
1814 28,000,000 255,000 340,000
 800,000,000 180,000,000 of 1814
Report of
1823 31,000,000 900,000,000 200,000,000 280,000 390,000 Minister
of War
Report of
1830 32,000,000 1,000,000,000 220,000,000 312,000 500,000 Minister
of War
Budget of
1840 34,000,000 1,170,000,000 242,000,000 312,000 not shown
1840.
Estimated
1842 35,000,000 1,200,000,000 285,000,000 370,000 520,000 expences
of 1842

From these data we see that the great European powers at the present day
maintain, in time of peace, military establishments equal to about one-hundredth
part of their entire population.
The geographical position of a country also greatly influences the degree and
character of its military preparation. It may be bordered on one or more sides by
mountains and other obstacles calculated to diminish the probability of invasion;
or the whole frontier may be wide open to an attack: the interior may be of such
a nature as to furnish security to its own army, and yet be fatal to the enemy
should he occupy it; or it may furnish him advantages far superior to his own
country. It may be an island in the sea, and consequently exposed only to
maritime descents—events of rare occurrence in modern times.
Again, a nation may be placed between others who are interested in its security,
their mutual jealousy preventing the molestation of the weaker neighbor. On the
other hand, its political institutions may be such as to compel the others to unite
in attacking it in order to secure themselves. The republics of Switzerland could
remain unmolested in the midst of powerful monarchies; but revolutionary
France brought upon herself the armies of all Europe.
Climate has also some influence upon military character, but this influence is far
less than that of education and discipline. Northern nations are said to be
naturally more phlegmatic and sluggish than those of warmer climates; and yet
the armies of Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII., and Suwarrow, have shown
themselves sufficiently active and impetuous, while the Greeks, Romans, and
Spaniards, in the times of their glory, were patient, disciplined, and
indefatigable, notwithstanding the reputed fickleness of ardent temperaments.
For any nation to postpone the making of military preparations till such time as
they are actually required in defence, is to waste the public money, and endanger
the public safety. The closing of an avenue of approach, the security of a single
road or river, or even the strategic movement of a small body of troops, often
effects, in the beginning, what afterwards cannot be accomplished by large
fortifications, and the most formidable armies. Had a small army in 1812, with a
well-fortified dépôt on Lake Champlain, penetrated into Canada, and cut off all
reinforcements and supplies by way of Quebec, that country would inevitably
have fallen into our possession. In the winter of 1806-7, Napoleon crossed the
Vistula, and advanced even to the walls of Königsberg, with the Austrians in his
rear, and the whole power of Russia before him. If Austria had pushed forward
one hundred thousand men from Bohemia, on the Oder, she would, in all
probability, says the best of military judges, Jomini, have struck a fatal blow to
the operations of Napoleon, and his army must have been exceedingly fortunate
even to regain the Rhine. But Austria preferred remaining neutral till she could
increase her army to four hundred thousand men. She then took the offensive,
and was beaten; whereas, with one hundred thousand men brought into action at
the favorable moment, she might, most probably, have decided the fate of
Europe.
"Defensive war," says Napoleon, "does not preclude attack, any more than
offensive war is exclusive of defence," for frequently the best way to counteract
the enemy's operations, and prevent his conquests, is, at the very outset of the
war, to invade and cripple him. But this can never be attempted with raw troops,
ill supplied with the munitions of war, and unsupported by fortifications. Such
invasions must necessarily fail. Experience in the wars of the French revolution
has demonstrated this; and even our own short history is not without its proof. In
1812, the conquest of Canada was determined on some time before the
declaration of war; an undisciplined army, without preparation or apparent plan,
was actually put in motion, eighteen days previous to this declaration, for the
Canadian peninsula. With a disciplined army of the same numbers, with an
efficient and skilful leader, directed against the vital point of the British
possessions at a time when the whole military force of the provinces did not
exceed three thousand men, how different had been the result!
While, therefore, the permanent defences of a nation must be subordinate to its
resources, position, and character, they can in no case be dispensed with. No
matter how extensive or important the temporary means that may be developed
as necessity requires, there must be some force kept in a constant state of
efficiency, in order to impart life and stability to the system. The one can never
properly replace the other; for while the former constitutes the basis, the latter
must form the main body of the military edifice, which, by its strength and
durability, will offer shelter and protection to the nation; or, if the architecture
and materials be defective, crush and destroy it in its fall.
The permanent means of military defence employed by modern nations, are—
1st. An army; 2d. A navy; 3d. Fortifications.
The first two of these could hardly be called permanent, if we were, to regard
their personnel; but looking upon them as institutions or organizations, they
present all the characteristics of durability. They are sometimes subjected to very
great and radical changes; by the hot-house nursing of designing ambition or
rash legislation, they may become overgrown and dangerous, or the storms of
popular delusion may overthrow and apparently sweep them away. But they will
immediately spring up again in some form or other, so deeply are they rooted in
the organization of political institutions.
Its army and navy should always be kept within the limits of a nation's wants;
but pity for the country which reduces them in number or support so as to
degrade their character or endanger their organization. "A government," says one
of the best historians of the age, "which neglects its army, under whatever
pretext, is a government culpable in the eyes of posterity, for it is preparing
humiliations for its flag and its country, instead of laying the foundation for its
glory."
One of our own distinguished cabinet ministers remarks, that the history of our
relations with the Indian tribes from the beginning to the present hour, is one
continued proof of the necessity of maintaining an efficient military force in time
of peace, and that the treatment we received for a long series of years from
European powers, was a most humiliating illustration of the folly of attempting
to dispense with these means of defence.
"Twice," says he, "we were compelled to maintain, by open war, our quarrel with
the principal aggressors. After many years of forbearance and negotiation, our
claims in other cases were at length amicably settled; but in one of the most
noted of these cases, it was not without much delay and imminent hazard of war
that the execution of the treaty was finally enforced. No one acquainted with
these portions of our history, can hesitate to ascribe much of the wantonness and
duration of the wrongs we endured, to a knowledge on the part of our assailants
of the scantiness and inefficiency of our military and naval force."
"If," said Mr. Calhoun, "disregarding the sound dictates of reason and
experience, we, in peace, neglect our military establishment, we must, with a
powerful and skilful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing calamities."
These remarks were made in opposition to the reduction of our military
establishment, in 1821, below the standard of thirteen thousand. Nevertheless,
the force was reduced to about six or seven thousand; and we were soon made to
feel the consequences. It is stated, in a report of high authority, that if there had
been two regiments available near St. Louis, in 1832, the war with Black Hawk
would have been easily avoided; and that it cannot be doubted that the scenes of
devastation and savage warfare which overspread the Floridas for nearly seven
years would also have been avoided, and some thirty millions have been saved
the country, if two regiments had been available at the beginning of that conflict.
[12]

[12]
We may now add to these remarks, that if our government had occupied the
country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande with a well-organized army of
twelve thousand men, war with Mexico might have been avoided; but to push
forward upon Matamoras a small force of only two thousand, in the very face of
a large Mexican army was holding out to them the strongest inducements to
attack us. The temporary economy of a few thousands in reducing our military
establishment to a mere handful of men, again results in a necessary expenditure
of many millions of dollars and a large sacrifice of human life.

We must, in this country, if we heed either the dictates of reason or experience,

maintain in time of peace a skeleton military and naval force, capable of being
greatly expanded, in the event of danger, by the addition of new troops.
Much energy and enterprise will always be imparted to an army or navy by the
addition of new forces. The strength thus acquired is sometimes in even a far
greater ratio than the increase of numbers. But it must be remembered that these
new elements are, of themselves, far inferior to the old ones in discipline, steady
courage, and perseverance. No general can rely on the accuracy of their
movements in the operations of a campaign, and they are exceedingly apt to fail
him at the critical moment on the field of battle. The same holds true with
respect to sailors inexperienced in the discipline and duties of a man-of-war.
There is this difference, however: an army usually obtains its recruits from men
totally unacquainted with military life, while a navy, in case of sudden increase,
is mainly supplied from the merchant marine with professional sailors, who,
though unacquainted with the use of artillery, &c., on ship-board, are familiar
with all the other duties of sea life, and not unused to discipline. Moreover, raw
seamen and marines, from being under the immediate eye of their officers in
time of action, and without the possibility of escape, fight much better than
troops of the same character on land. If years are requisite to make a good sailor,
surely an equal length of time is necessary to perfect the soldier; and no less
skill, practice, and professional study are required for the proper direction of
armies than for the management of fleets.
But some have said that even these skeletons of military and naval forces are
entirely superfluous, and that a brave and patriotic people will make as good a
defence against invasion as the most disciplined and experienced. Such views
are frequently urged in the halls of congress, and some have even attempted to
confirm them by historical examples.
There are instances, it is true, where disorganized and frantic masses, animated
by patriotic enthusiasm, have gained the most brilliant victories. Here, however,
extraordinary circumstances supplied the place of order, and produced an
equilibrium between forces that otherwise would have been very unequal; but in
almost every instance of this kind, the loss of the undisciplined army has been
unnecessarily great, human life being substituted for skill and order. But victory,
even with such a drawback, cannot often attend the banners of newly raised and
disorderly forces. If the captain and crew of a steamship knew nothing of
navigation, and had never been at sea, and the engineer was totally unacquainted
with his profession, could we expect the ship to cross the Atlantic in safety, and
reach her destined port? Would we trust our lives and the honor of our country to
their care? Would we not say to them, "First make yourselves acquainted with
the principles of your profession, the use of the compass, and the means of
determining whether you direct your course upon a ledge of rocks or into a safe
harbor?" War is not, as some seem to suppose, a mere game of chance. Its
principles constitute one of the most intricate of modern sciences; and the
general who understands the art of rightly applying its rules, and possesses the
means of carrying out its precepts, may be morally certain of success.
History furnishes abundant proofs of the impolicy of relying upon undisciplined
forces in the open field. Almost every page of Napier's classic History of the
Peninsular War contains striking examples of the useless waste of human life
and property by the Spanish militia; while, with one quarter as many regulars, at
a small fractional part of the actual expense, the French might have been
expelled at the outset, or have been driven, at any time afterwards, from the
Peninsula.
At the beginning of the French Revolution the regular army was abolished, and
the citizen-soldiery, who were established on the 14th of July, 1789, relied on
exclusively for the national defence. "But these three millions of national
guards," says Jomini, "though good supporters of the decrees of the assembly,
were nevertheless useless for reinforcing the army beyond the frontiers, and
utterly incapable of defending their own firesides." Yet no one can question their
individual bravery and patriotism; for, when reorganized, disciplined, and
properly directed, they put to flight the best troops in Europe. At the first
outbreak of this revolution, the privileged classes of other countries, upholding
crumbling institutions and rotten dynasties, rushed forth against the maddened
hordes of French democracy. The popular power, springing upward by its own
elasticity when the weight of political oppression was removed, soon became too
wild and reckless to establish itself on any sure basis, or even to provide for its
own protection. If the attacks of the enervated enemies of France were weak, so
also were her own efforts feeble to resist these attacks. The republican armies
repelled the ill-planned and ill-conducted invasion by the Duke of Brunswick;
but it was by the substitution of human life for preparation, system, and skill;
enthusiasm supplied the place of discipline; robbery produced military stores;
and the dead bodies of her citizens formed épaulements against the enemy. Yet
this was but the strength of weakness; the aimless struggle of a broken and
disjointed government; and the new revolutionary power was fast sinking away
before the combined opposition of Europe, when the great genius of Napoleon,
with a strong arm and iron rule, seizing upon the scattered fragments, and
binding them together into one consolidated mass, made France victorious, and
seated himself on the throne of empire.
No people in the world ever exhibited a more general and enthusiastic patriotism
than the Americans during the war of our own Revolution. And yet our army
received, even at that time, but little support from irregular and militia forces in
the open field. Washington's opinions on this subject furnish so striking a
contrast to the congressional speeches of modern political demagogues, who,
with boastful swaggers, would fain persuade us that we require no organization
or discipline to meet the veteran troops of Europe in the open field, and who
would hurry us, without preparation, into war with the strongest military powers
of the world—so striking is the contrast between the assertions of these men and
the letters and reports of Washington, that it may be well for the cool and
dispassionate lover of truth to occasionally refresh his memory by reference to
the writings of Washington. The following brief extracts are from his letters to
the President of Congress, December, 1776:
"The saving in the article of clothing, provisions, and a thousand other things, by
having nothing to do with the militia, unless in cases of extraordinary exigency,
and such as could not be expected in the common course of events, would amply
support a large army, which, well officered, would be daily improving, instead of
continuing a destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob. In my opinion, if any
dependence is placed on the militia another year, Congress will be deceived.
When danger is a little removed from them they will not turn out at all. When it
comes home to them, the well-affected, instead of flying to arms to defend
themselves, are busily employed in removing their families and effects; while
the disaffected are concerting measures to make their submission, and spread
terror and dismay all around, to induce others to follow their example. Daily
experience and abundant proofs warrant this information. Short enlistments, and
a mistaken dependence upon our militia, have been the origin of all our
misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt. The militia come in, you
cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where;
consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last, at a critical
moment."
These remarks of Washington will not be found too severe if we remember the
conduct of our militia in the open field at Princeton, Savannah River, Camden,
Guilford Court-House, &c., in the war of the Revolution; the great cost of the
war of 1812 as compared with its military results; the refusal of the New
England militia to march beyond the lines of their own states, and of the New-
York militia to cross the Niagara and secure a victory already won; or the
disgraceful flight of the Southern militia from the field of Bladensburg.
But there is another side to this picture. If our militia have frequently failed to
maintain their ground when drawn up in the open field, we can point with pride
to their brave and successful defence of Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Fort
McHenry, Stonington, Niagara, Plattsburg, in proof of what may be
accomplished by militia in connection with fortifications.
These examples from our history must fully demonstrate the great value of a
militia when properly employed as a defence against invasion, and ought to
silence the sneers of those who would abolish this arm of defence as utterly
useless. In the open field militia cannot in general be manœuvred to advantage;
whereas, in the defence of fortified places their superior intelligence and activity
not unfrequently render them even more valuable than regulars. And in reading
the severe strictures of Washington, Greene, Morgan, and others, upon our
militia, it must be remembered that they were at that time entirely destitute of
important works of defence; and the experience of all other nations, as well as
our own, has abundantly shown that a newly-raised force cannot cope, in the
open field, with one subordinate and disciplined. Here science must determine
the contest. Habits of strict obedience, and of simultaneous and united action, are
indispensable to carry out what the higher principles of the military profession
require. New and undisciplined forces are often confounded at the evolutions,
and strategic and tactical combinations of a regular army, and lose all confidence
in their leaders and in themselves. But, when placed behind a breastwork, they
even overrate their security. They can then coolly look upon the approaching
columns, and, unmoved by glittering armor and bristling bayonets, will exert all
their skill in the use of their weapons. The superior accuracy of aim which the
American has obtained by practice from his early youth, has enabled our militia
to gain, under the protection of military works, victories as brilliant as the most
veteran troops. The moral courage necessary to await an attack behind a parapet,
is at least equal to that exerted in the open field, where movements generally
determine the victory. To watch the approach of an enemy, to see him move up
and display his massive columns, his long array of military equipments, his
fascines and scaling-ladders, his instruments of attack, and the professional skill
with which he wields them, to hear the thunder of his batteries, spreading death
all around, and to repel, hand to hand, those tremendous assaults, which stand
out in all their horrible relief upon the canvass of modern warfare, requires a
heart at least as brave as the professional warrior exhibits in the pitched battle.
But we must not forget that to call this force into the open field,—to take the
mechanic from his shop, the merchant from his counter, the farmer from his
plough,—will necessarily be attended with an immense sacrifice of human life.
The lives lost on the battle-field are not the only ones; militia, being
unaccustomed to exposure, and unable to supply their own wants with certainty
and regularity, contract diseases which occasion in every campaign a most
frightful mortality.
There is also a vast difference in the cost of supporting regulars and militia
forces. The cost of a regular army of twenty thousand men for a campaign of six
months, in this country, has been estimated, from data in the War-office, at a
hundred and fifty dollars per man; while the cost of a militia force, under the
same circumstances, making allowance for the difference in the expenses from
sickness, waste of camp-furniture, equipments, &c., will be two hundred and
fifty dollars per man. But in short campaigns, and in irregular warfare, like the
expedition against Black Hawk and his Indians in the Northwest, and during the
hostilities in Florida, "the expenses of the militia," says Mr. Secretary Spencer, in
a report to congress in 1842, "invariably exceed those of regulars by at least
three hundred per cent." It is further stated that "fifty-five thousand militia were
called into service during the Black Hawk and Florida wars, and that thirty
millions of dollars have been expended in these conflicts!" When it is
remembered that during these border wars our whole regular army did not
exceed twelve or thirteen thousand men, it will not be difficult to perceive why
our military establishment was so enormously expensive. Large sums were paid
to sedentary militia who never rendered the slightest service. Again, during our
late war with Great Britain, of less than three years' duration, two hundred and
eighty thousand muskets were lost,—the average cost of which is stated at twelve
dollars,—making an aggregate loss, in muskets alone, of three millions and three
hundred and sixty thousand dollars, during a service of about two years and a
half;—resulting mainly from that neglect and waste of public property which
almost invariably attends the movements of newly-raised and inexperienced
forces. Facts like these should awaken us to the necessity of reorganizing and
disciplining our militia. General Knox, when Secretary of War, General Harrison
while in the senate, and Mr. Poinsett in 1841, each furnished plans for effecting
this purpose, but the whole subject has been passed by with neglect.
Permanent fortifications differ in many of their features from either of the two
preceding elements of national defence. They are passive in their nature, yet
possess all the conservative properties of an army or navy, and through these two
contribute largely to the active operations of a campaign. When once constructed
they require but very little expenditure for their support. In time of peace they
withdraw no valuable citizens from the useful occupations of life. Of themselves
they can never exert an influence corrupting to public morals, or dangerous to
public liberty; but as the means of preserving peace, and as obstacles to an
invader, their influence and power are immense. While contributing to the
economical support of a peace establishment, by furnishing drill-grounds,
parades, quarters, &c.; and to its efficiency still more, by affording facilities both
to the regulars and militia for that species of artillery practice so necessary in the
defence of water frontiers; they also serve as safe dépôts of arms and the
immense quantity of materials and military munitions so indispensable in
modern warfare. These munitions usually require much time, skill, and expense
in their construction, and it is of vast importance that they should be preserved
with the utmost care.
Maritime arsenals and dépôts of naval and military stores on the sea-coast are
more particularly exposed to capture and destruction. Here an enemy can
approach by stealth, striking some sudden and fatal blow before any effectual
resistance can be organized. But in addition to the security afforded by harbor
fortifications to public property of the highest military value, they also serve to
protect the merchant shipping, and the vast amount of private wealth which a
commercial people always collect at these points. They furnish safe retreats, and
the means of repair for public vessels injured in battle, or by storms, and to
merchantmen a refuge from the dangers of sea, or the threats of hostile fleets.
Moreover, they greatly facilitate our naval attacks upon the enemy's shipping;
and if he attempt a descent, their well-directed fire will repel his squadrons from
our harbors, and force his troops to land at some distant and unfavorable
position.
The three means of permanent defence which have been mentioned, are, of
course, intended to accomplish the same general object; but each has its distinct
and proper sphere of action, and neither can be regarded as antagonistical to the
others. Any undue increase of one, at the expense of the other two, must
necessarily be followed by a corresponding diminution of national strength. We
must not infer, however, that all must be maintained upon the same footing. The
position of the country and the character of the people must determine this.
England, from her insular position and the extent of her commerce, must
maintain a large navy; a large army is also necessary for the defence of her own
coasts and the protection of her colonial possessions. Her men-of-war secure a
safe passage for her merchant-vessels, and transport her troops in safety through
all seas, and thus contribute much to the acquisition and security of colonial
territory. The military forces of the British empire amount to about one hundred
and fifty thousand men, and the naval forces to about seven hundred vessels of
war,[13] carrying in all some fifteen thousand guns and forty thousand men.
France has less commerce, and but few colonial possessions. She has a great
extent of sea-coast, but her fortifications secure it from maritime descents; her
only accessible points are on the land frontiers. Her army and navy, therefore,
constitute her principal means of defence. Her army numbers some three
hundred and fifty thousand men, and her navy about three hundred and fifty
vessels,[13] carrying about nine thousand guns and thirty thousand men. Russia,
Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and other continental powers, have but little commerce
to be protected, while their extensive frontiers are greatly exposed to land
attacks: their fortifications and armies, therefore, constitute their principal means
of defence. But for the protection of their own seas from the inroads of their
powerful maritime neighbor, Russia and Austria support naval establishments of
a limited extent. Russia has, in all, some one hundred and eighty vessels of war,
and Austria not quite half that number.[13]
[13]
These numbers include all vessels of war, whether in commission, building, or in
ordinary.

The United States possess no colonies; but they have a sea-coast of more than
three thousand miles, with numerous bays, estuaries, and navigable rivers, which
expose our most populous cities to maritime attacks. The northern land frontier
is two thousand miles in extent, and in the west our territory borders upon the
British and Mexican possessions for many thousand miles more. Within these
limits there are numerous tribes of Indians, who require the watchful care of
armed forces to keep them at peace among themselves as well as with us. Our
authorized military establishment amounts to 7,590 men, and our naval
establishment consists of seventy-seven vessels of all classes, carrying 2,345
guns, and 8,724 men.[14] This is certainly a very small military and naval force
for the defence of so extended and populous a country, especially one whose
political institutions and rapidly-increasing power expose it to the distrust and
jealousy of most other nations.
[14]
Since these pages were put in the hands of the printer, the above numbers have
been nearly doubled, this increase having been made with special reference to
the present war with Mexico.

The fortifications for the defence of our sea-coast and land frontiers will be
discussed hereafter.[15]
[15]
Jomini's work on the Military Art contains many valuable remarks on this
subject of Military Polity: also the writings of Clausewitz, Dupin, Lloyd,
Chambray, Tranchant de Laverne, and Rudtorfer. Several of these questions are
also discussed in Rocquancourt, Carion-Nisas, De Vernon, and other writers on
military history. The several European Annuaires Militaires, or Army Registers,
and the French and German military periodicals, contain much valuable matter
connected with military statistics.
 CHAPTER VII.
SEA-COAST DEFENCES.

The principal attacks which we have had to sustain, either as colonies or states,
from civilized foes, have come from Canada. As colonies we were continually
encountering difficulties and dangers from the French possessions. In the war of
the Revolution, it being one of national emancipation, the military operations
were more general throughout the several states; but in the war of 1812 the
attacks were confined to the northern frontier and a few exposed points along the
coast. In these two contests with Great Britain, Boston, New York, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, Washington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans, being
within reach of the British naval power, and offering the dazzling attraction of
rich booty, have each been subjected to powerful assaults.
Similar attacks will undoubtedly be made in any future war with England. An
attempt at permanent lodgment would be based either on Canada or a servile
insurrection in the southern states. The former project, in a military point of
view, offers the greatest advantages, but most probably the latter would also be
resorted to for effecting a diversion, if nothing more. But for inflicting upon us a
sudden and severe injury by the destruction of large amounts of public and
private property, our seaport towns offer inducements not likely to be
disregarded. This mode of warfare, barbarous though it be, will certainly attend a
conflict with any great maritime power. How can we best prepare in time of
peace to repel these attacks?
Immediately after the war of 1812 a joint commission of our most distinguished
military and naval officers was formed, to devise a system of defensive works, to
be erected in time of peace for the security of the most important and the most
exposed points on our sea-coast. It may be well here to point out, in very general
terms, the positions and character of these works, mentioning only such as have
been completed, or are now in course of construction, and such as are intended
to be built as soon as Congress shall grant the requisite funds. There are other
works projected for some future period, but as they do not belong to the class
required for immediate, use, they will not be referred to.
MAINE.
Beginning at the northeastern extremity of our coast, we have, for Eastport and
Wiscasset, projected works estimated to carry about fifty guns. Nothing has yet
been done to these works.
Next Portland, with works carrying about forty or fifty guns, and Fort Penobscot
and batteries, carrying about one hundred and fifty guns. These are only partly
built.
NEW HAMPSHIRE.
Defences of Portsmouth and the vicinity, about two hundred guns. These works
are also only partly built.
MASSACHUSETTS.
Projected works east of Boston, carrying about sixty guns. These are not yet
commenced.
Works for defence of Boston Harbor carry about five hundred guns. These are
nearly three-quarters completed. Those of New Bedford harbor carry fifty guns:
not yet begun.
RHODE ISLAND.
Newport harbor,—works carry about five hundred guns, nearly completed.
CONNECTICUT.
New London harbor, New Haven, and the Connecticut river. The first of these
nearly completed; the two latter not yet begun.
NEW YORK.
The works projected for the defence of New York harbor are estimated to carry
about one thousand guns. These works are not yet one-half constructed.
PENNSYLVANIA.
The works projected for the defence of the Delaware Bay and Philadelphia will
carry about one hundred and fifty guns. They are not one-quarter built.
MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA.
Baltimore and Annapolis—these works will carry some two hundred and fifty
guns. The works for the Chesapeake Bay will carry about six hundred guns; and
those for the Potomac river about eighty guns. These are more than one-half
completed.
NORTH CAROLINA.
The works at Beaufort and Smithville carry about one hundred and fifty guns.
They are essentially completed.
SOUTH CAROLINA.
The works for the defence of Charleston carry some two hundred guns. They are
one-half constructed.
GEORGIA.
The defences of Savannah carry about two hundred guns and are nearly three-
quarters finished.
FLORIDA.
The works projected for the defence of St. Augustine, Key West, Tortugas, and
Pensacola will carry some eight or nine hundred guns. Those at St. Augustine
and Pensacola are essentially completed, but those at Key West and Tortugas are
barely begun.
ALABAMA.
The works for the defence of Mobile will carry about one hundred and sixty
guns. These are nearly constructed.
LOUISIANA.
The works for the defence of New Orleans will carry some two hundred and fifty
or three hundred guns; they are nearly completed.
The works north of the Chesapeake cost about three thousand dollars per gun;
those south of that point about six thousand dollars per gun. This difference in
cost is due in part to the character of the soil on which the fortifications are built,
and in part to the high prices paid in the south for materials and workmanship.
Having pointed out the character and condition of our system of sea-coast
defences, let us briefly examine how far these works may be relied on as a
means of security against a maritime descent.
To come to a proper conclusion on this subject, let us first examine the three or
four great maritime descents attempted by the English during the wars of the
French Revolution; a period at which the great naval superiority of England over
other nations, gave her the title of mistress of the seas. Let us notice what have
been the results of the several attempts made by this power at maritime
invasions, and the means by which such attacks have been repelled.
In 1795, a maritime expedition was fitted out against Quiberon, at an expense of
eight millions of dollars. This port of the French coast had then a naval defence
of near thirty sail, carrying about sixteen hundred guns. Lord Bridport attacked it
with fourteen sail of the line, five frigates, and some smaller vessels, about
fifteen hundred guns in all, captured a portion of the fleet, and forced the
remainder to take shelter under the guns of the fortifications of L'Orient. The
French naval defence being destroyed, the British now entered Quiberon without
opposition. This bay is said by Brenton, in his British Naval History, to be "the
finest on the coast of France, or perhaps in the world, for landing an army."
Besides these natural advantages in favor of the English, the inhabitants of the
surrounding country were in open insurrection, ready to receive the invaders
with open arms. A body of ten thousand troops were landed, and clothing, arms,
&c., furnished to as many more royalist troops; but the combined forces failed in
their attack upon St. Barbe, and General Hoche, from his intrenchments, with
seven thousand men, held in check a body of eighteen thousand, penned up,
without defences, in the narrow peninsula. Reinforced by a new debarkation, the
allies again attempted to advance, but were soon defeated, and ultimately almost
entirely destroyed.
In 1799, the English and Russians made a descent upon Holland with fourteen
ships of the line and ten frigates, carrying about eleven hundred guns and a great
number of transports, with an army of thirty-six thousand men. The Dutch naval
defences consisted of eight ships of the line, three fifty-four gun ships, eight
forty-eight gun ships and eight smaller frigates, carrying in all about twelve
hundred guns; but this force contributed little or nothing to the defence, and was
soon forced to hoist the hostile flag. The defensive army was at first only twelve
thousand, but the Republicans afterwards increased it to twenty-two thousand,
and finally to twenty-eight thousand men. But notwithstanding this immense
naval and military superiority, and the co-operation of the Orange party in
assisting the landing of their troops, the allies failed to get possession of a single
strong place; and after a loss of six thousand men, were compelled to capitulate.
"Such," says Alison, "was the disastrous issue of the greatest expedition which
had yet sailed from the British harbors during the war."
In 1801, Nelson, with three ships of the line, two frigates, and thirty-five smaller
vessels, made a desperate attack upon the harbor of Boulogne, but was repulsed
with severe loss.
Passing over some unimportant attacks, we come to the descent upon the
Scheldt, or as it is commonly called, the Walcheren expedition, in 1809. This
expedition, though a failure, has often been referred to as proving the expediency
of maritime descents. The following is a brief narrative of this expedition:—
Napoleon had projected vast fortifications, dock-yards, and naval arsenals at
Flushing and Antwerp for the protection of a maritime force in the Scheldt. But
no sooner was the execution of this project begun, than the English fitted out an
expedition to seize upon the defences of the Scheldt, and capture or destroy the
naval force. Flushing, at the mouth of the river, was but ill-secured, and
Antwerp, some sixty or seventy miles further up the river, was entirely
defenceless; the rampart was unarmed with cannon, dilapidated, and tottering,
and its garrison consisted of only about two hundred invalids and recruits.
Napoleon's regular army was employed on the Danube and in the Peninsula. The
British attacking force consisted of thirty-seven ships of the line, twenty-three
frigates, thirty-three sloops of war, twenty-eight gun, mortar, and bomb vessels,
thirty-six smaller vessels, eighty-two gunboats, innumerable transports, with
over forty thousand troops, and an immense artillery train; making in all, says
the English historian, "an hundred thousand combatants." A landing was made
upon the island of Walcheren, and siege laid to Flushing, which place was not
reduced till eighteen days after the landing; the attack upon the water was made
by seven or eight ships of the line, and a large flotilla of bomb vessels, but
produced no effect. The channel at the mouth of the river was too broad to be
defended by the works of Flushing, and the main portion of the fleet passed out
of reach of the guns, and ascended the Scheldt part way up to Antwerp. But in
the mean time, the fortifications of that place had been repaired, and, after a
fruitless operation of a whole month in the river, the English were gradually
forced to retreat to Walcheren, and finally to evacuate their entire conquest.
The cost of the expedition was immense, both in treasure and in life. It was
certainly very poorly managed. But we cannot help noticing the superior value
of fortifications as a defence against such descents. They did much to retard the
operations of the enemy till a defensive army could be raised. The works of
Flushing were never intended to close up the Scheldt, and of course could not
intercept the passage of shipping; but they were not reduced by the English naval
force, as has sometimes been alleged. Col. Mitchel, of the English service, says
that the fleet "kept up so tremendous a fire upon the batteries, that the French
officers who had been present at Austerlitz and Jena declared that the cannonade
in these battles had been a mere jeu d'enfans in comparison. Yet what was the
effect produced on the defences of the place by this fire, so formidable, to judge
by the sound alone? The writer can answer the question with some accuracy, for
he went along the entire sea-line the very day after the capitulation, and found no
part of the parapet injured so as to be of the slightest consequence, and only one
solitary gun dismounted, evidently by the bursting of a shell, and which could
not, of course, have been thrown from the line of battle ships, but must have
been thrown from the land batteries."[16]
[16]
The batteries constructed in the siege of this place were armed with fifty-two
heavy guns and mortars.

But it may be said that although great naval descents on a hostile coast are
almost always unsuccessful, nevertheless a direct naval attack upon a single
fortified position will be attended with more favorable results; and that our
seaport towns, however fortified, will be exposed to bombardment and
destruction by the enemy's fleets. In other words, that in a direct contest between
ships and forts the former will have at least an equal chance of success.
Let us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength. The fort is to be properly
constructed and in good repair; its guns in a position to be used with effect; its
garrison skilful and efficient; its commander capable and brave. The ship is of
the very best character, and in perfect order; the crew disciplined and
courageous; its commander skilful and adroit; the wind, and tide, and sea—all as
could be desired.[17] The numbers of the garrison and crew are to be no more
than requisite, with no unnecessary exposure of human life to swell the lists of
the slain. The issue of this contest, unless attended with extraordinary and easily
distinguishable circumstances, would be a fair test of their relative strength.
[17]
These conditions for a battery are easily satisfied, but for the ship, are partly
dependent on the elements, and seldom to be wholly attained.

What result should we anticipate from the nature of the contending forces? The
ship, under the circumstances we have supposed, can choose her point of attack,
selecting the one she may deem the most vulnerable; but she herself is
everywhere vulnerable; her men and guns are much concentrated, and
consequently much exposed. But in the fort the guns and men are more
distributed, a fort with an interior area of several acres not having a garrison as
large as the crew of a seventy-four-gun ship. All parts of the vessel are liable to
injury; while the fort offers but a small mark,—the opening of the embrasures, a
small part of the carriage, and now and then a head or arm raised above the
parapet,—the ratio of exposed surfaces being not less than twenty to one. In the
vessel the guns are fired from an oscillating deck, and the balls go at random; in
the fort the guns are fired from an immoveable platform, and the balls reach their
object with unerring aim. There is always more or less motion in the water, so
that the ship's guns, though accurately pointed at one moment, at the next will be
thrown entirely away from the object, even when the motion is too slight to be
otherwise noticed; whereas in the battery the guns will be fired just as they are
pointed; and the motion of the vessel will merely vary to the extent of a few
inches the spot in which the shot is received. In the fort the men and guns are
behind impenetrable walls of stone and earth; in the vessel they are behind frail
bulwarks, whose splinters are equally destructive with the shot. The fort is
incombustible; while the ship may readily be set on fire by incendiary
projectiles. The ship has many points exposed that may be called vital points. By
losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her spars, she may become
unmanageable, and unable to use her strength; she may receive shots under
water, and be liable to sink; she may receive hot shot, and be set on fire: these
damages are in addition to those of having her guns dismounted and her people
killed by shots that pierce her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers; while
the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned above—namely, the risk
that the gun, the carriage, or the men may be struck.
The opinions of military writers, and the facts of history, fully accord with these
deductions of theory. Some few individuals mistaking, or misstating, the facts of
a few recent trials, assert that modern improvements in the naval service have so
far outstripped the progress in the art of land defence, that a floating force is now
abundantly able to cope, upon equal terms, with a land battery. Ignorant and
superficial persons, hearing merely that certain forts had recently yielded to a
naval force, and taking no trouble to learn the real facts of the case, have paraded
them before the public as proofs positive of a new era in military science. This
conclusion, however groundless and absurd, has received credit merely from its
novelty. Let us examine the several trials of strength which have taken place
between ships and forts within the last fifty years, and see what have been the
results.
In 1792 a considerable French squadron attacked Cagliari, whose fortifications
were at that time so dilapidated and weak, as scarcely to deserve the name of
defences. Nevertheless, the French fleet, after a bombardment of three days, was
most signally defeated and obliged to retire.
In 1794 two British ships, "the Fortitude of seventy-four, and the Juno frigate of
thirty-two guns," attacked a small town in the bay of Martello, Corsica, which
was armed with one gun in barbette, and a garrison of thirty men. After a
bombardment of two and a half hours, these ships were forced to haul off with
considerable damage and loss of life. The little tower had received no injury, and
its garrison were unharmed. Here were one hundred and six guns afloat against
one on shore; and yet the latter was successful.
In 1797 Nelson attacked the little inefficient batteries of Santa Crux, in Teneriffe,
with eight vessels carrying four hundred guns. But notwithstanding his great
superiority in numbers, skill, and bravery, he was repelled with the loss of two
hundred and fifty men, while the garrison received little or no damage. A single
ball from the land battery, striking the side of one of his vessels, instantly sunk
her with near a hundred seamen and marines!
In 1798, a French flotilla of fifty-two brigs and gunboats, manned with near
seven thousand men, attacked a little English redoubt on the island of Marcou,
which was armed with two thirty-two-pounders, two six-pounders, four four-
pounders, and two carronades, and garrisoned with two hundred and fifty men.
Notwithstanding this great disparity of numbers, the little redoubt sunk seven of
the enemy's brigs and gunboats, captured another, and forced the remainder to
retreat with great loss; while the garrison had but one man killed and three
wounded.
In 1801, the French, with three frigates and six thousand men, attacked the
poorly-constructed works of Porto Ferrairo, whose defensive force was a motley
garrison of fifteen hundred Corsicans, Tuscans, and English. Here the attacking
force was four times as great as that of the garrison; nevertheless they were
unsuccessful after several bombardments and a siege of five months.
In July of the same year, 1801, Admiral Saumarez, with an English fleet of six
ships of the line and two smaller vessels, carrying in all five hundred and two
guns, attacked the Spanish and French defences of Algesiras. Supposing the
floating forces of the contending parties to be equal, gun for gun, (which is
certainly a very fair estimate for the attacking force, considering the
circumstances of the case,) we have a French land-battery of only twelve guns
opposed by an English floating force of one hundred and ninety-six guns.
Notwithstanding this inequality of nearly seventeen to one, the little battery
compelled the superior naval force to retreat with great loss.
Shortly after this, the French and Spanish fleets attacked the same English
squadron with a force of nearly three to one, but met with a most signal defeat;
whereas with a land-battery of only one to seventeen, the same party had been
victorious. What proof can be more decisive of the superiority of guns on shore
over those afloat!
In 1803 the English garrison of Diamond Rock, near Port Royal Bay, with only
one hundred men and some fifteen guns, repelled a French squadron of two
seventy-four-gun ships, a frigate, and a brig, assisted by a land attack of two
hundred troops. There was not a single man killed or wounded in the redoubt,
while the French lost fifty men! The place was afterwards reduced by famine.
In 1806 a French battery on Cape Licosa, of only two guns and a garrison of
twenty-five men, resisted the attacks of a British eighty-gun ship and two
frigates. The carriage of one of the land-guns failed on the second shot, so that,
in fact, only one of them was available during the action. Here was a single
piece of ordnance and a garrison of twenty-five men, opposed to a naval force of
over one hundred and fifty guns and about thirteen hundred men. And what
effects were produced by this strange combat? The attacking force lost thirty-
seven men killed and wounded, the eighty-gun ship was much disabled, while
the fort and garrison escaped entirely unharmed! What could not be effected by
force was afterwards obtained by negotiation.
In 1808 a French land-battery of only three guns, near Fort Trinidad, drove off
an English seventy-four-gun ship, and a bomb-vessel.
In 1813 Leghorn, whose defences were of a very mediocre character, and whose
garrison at that time was exceedingly weak, was attacked by an English
squadron of six ships, carrying over three hundred guns, and a land force of one
thousand troops. The whole attempt was a perfect failure.
"In 1814, when the English advanced against Antwerp," says Colonel Mitchell,
an English historian, "Fort Frederick, a small work of only two guns, was
established in a bend of the Polder Dyke, at some distance below Lillo. The
armament was a long eighteen-pounder and a five and a half inch howitzer. From
this post the French determined to dislodge the English, and an eighty-gun ship
dropped down with the tide and anchored near the Flanders shore, about six
hundred yards from the British battery. By her position she was secured from the
fire of the eighteen-pounder, and exposed to that of the howitzer only. As soon as
every thing was made tight her broadside was opened; and if noise and smoke
were alone sufficient to ensure success in war, as so many of the moderns seem
to think, the result of this strange contest would not have been long doubtful, for
the thunder of the French artillery actually made the earth to shake again; but
though the earth shook, the single British howitzer was neither dismounted nor
silenced; and though the artillery-men could not, perfectly exposed as they were,
stand to their gun while the iron hail was striking thick and fast around, yet no
sooner did the enemy's fire slacken for a moment than they sprang to their post,
ready to return at least one shot for eighty. This extraordinary combat lasted
from seven o'clock in the morning till near twelve at noon, when the French ship,
having had forty-one men killed and wounded, her commander being in the list
of the latter, and having besides sustained serious damage in her hull and
rigging, returned to Antwerp without effecting any thing whatever. The howitzer
was not dismounted, the fort was not injured,—there being in fact nothing to
injure,—and the British had only one man killed and two wounded."
It is unnecessary to further specify examples from the wars of the French
Revolution; the whole history of these wars is one continued proof of the
superiority of fortifications as a maritime frontier defence. The sea-coast of
France is almost within stone's throw[18] of the principal British naval dépôts;
here were large towns and harbors, filled with the rich commerce of the world,
offering the dazzling attraction of rich booty. The French navy was at this time
utterly incompetent to their defence; while England supported a maritime force
at an annual expense of near ninety millions of dollars. Her largest fleets were
continually cruising within sight of these seaports, and not unfrequently
attempting to cut out their shipping. "At this period," says one of her naval
historians, "the naval force of Britain, so multiplied and so expert from long
practice, had acquired an intimate knowledge of their (the French) harbors, their
bays and creeks; her officers knew the depth of water, and the resistance likely to
be met with in every situation." On the other hand, these harbors and towns were
frequently stripped of their garrisons by the necessities of distant wars, being left
with no other defence than their fortifications and militia. And yet,
notwithstanding all this, they escaped unharmed during the entire contest. They
were frequently attacked, and in some instances the most desperate efforts were
made to effect a permanent lodgment; but in no case was the success at all
commensurate with the expense of life and treasure sacrificed, and no permanent
hold was made on either the maritime frontiers of France or her allies. This
certainly was owing to no inferiority of skill and bravery on the part of the
British navy, as the battles of Aboukir and Trafalgar, and the almost total
annihilation of the French marine, have but too plainly proven. Why then did
these places, escape? We know of no other reason, than that they were fortified;
and that the French knew how to defend their fortifications. The British maritime
expeditions to Quiberon, Holland, Boulogne, the Scheldt, Constantinople,
Buenos Ayres, &c., sufficiently prove the ill-success, and the waste of life and
treasure with which they must always be attended. But when her naval power
was applied to the destruction of the enemy's marine, and in transporting her
land forces to solid bases of operations on the soil of her allies, in Portugal and
Belgium, the fall of Napoleon crowned the glory of their achievements.
[18]
Only eighteen and a half miles across the Channel at the narrowest place.

Let us now examine the several British naval attacks on our own forts, in the
wars of the Revolution and of 1812.
In 1776 Sir Peter Parker, with a British fleet of nine vessels, carrying about two
hundred and seventy[19] guns, attacked Fort Moultrie, in Charleston harbor,
which was then armed with only twenty-six guns, and garrisoned by only three
hundred and seventy-five regulars and a few militia. In this contest the British
were entirely defeated, and lost, in killed and wounded, two hundred and five
men, while their whole two hundred and seventy guns killed and wounded only
thirty-two men in the fort. Of this trial of strength, which was certainly a fair
one, Cooper in his Naval History, says:—"It goes fully to prove the important
military position that ships cannot withstand forts, when the latter are properly
armed, constructed, and garrisoned. General Moultrie says only thirty rounds
from the battery were fired, and was of opinion that the want of powder alone
prevented the Americans from destroying the men-of-war."
[19]
These vessels rated two hundred and fifty-four guns, but the number actually
carried is stated to have been two hundred and seventy.

In 1814 a British fleet of four vessels, carrying ninety-two guns, attacked Fort
Boyer, a small redoubt, located on a point of land commanding the passage from
the Gulf into the bay of Mobile. This redoubt was garrisoned by only one
hundred and twenty combatants, officers included; and its armament was but
twenty small pieces of cannon, some of which were almost entirely useless, and
most of them poorly mounted "in batteries hastily thrown up, and leaving the
gunners uncovered from the knee upward," while the enemy's land force, acting
in concert with the ships, consisted of twenty artillerists with a battery of two
guns, and seven hundred and thirty marines, Indians, and negroes. His ships
carried five hundred and ninety men in all. This immense disparity of numbers
and strength did not allow to the British military and naval commanders the
slightest apprehension "that four British ships, carrying ninety-two guns, and a
land force somewhat exceeding seven hundred combatants, could fail in
reducing a small work mounting only twenty short carronades, and defended by
a little more than a hundred men, unprovided alike with furnaces for heating
shot, or casements to cover themselves from rockets and shells." Nevertheless,
the enemy was completely repulsed; one of his largest ships was entirely
destroyed, and 85 men were killed and wounded on board the other; while our
loss was only eight or nine. Here a naval force of five to one was repelled by the
land-battery.
Again, in 1814, a barbette battery of one four-pounder and two eighteen-pounder
guns at Stonington, repelled a British fleet of one hundred and thirty-four guns.
During the engagement the Americans exhausted their ammunition, and spiked
their eighteen-pounders, and only one of them was afterwards used. Two of the
enemy's ships, carrying one hundred and twelve guns, were engaged during the
whole time of attack, and during much of this time bombarded the town from a
position beyond reach of the land-battery. They were entirely too far off for the
four-pounder gun to be of any use. Supposing the two eighteen-pounders to have
been employed during the whole action, and also all the guns of the fleet, one
eighteen-pounder on land must have been more than equivalent to sixty-seven
guns afloat, for the ships were so much injured as to render it necessary for them
to withdraw. The British loss was twenty killed, and more than fifty wounded.
Ours was only two killed and six wounded.[20]
[20]
Perkins says two killed and six wounded. Holmes says six wounded, but makes
no mention of any killed.

The fleet sent to the attack of Baltimore, in 1814, consisted of forty sail, the
largest of which were ships of the line, carrying an army of over six thousand
combatants. The troops were landed at North Point, while sixteen of the bomb-
vessels and frigates approached within reach of Fort McHenry, and commenced
a bombardment which lasted twenty-five hours. During this attack, the enemy
threw "fifteen hundred shells, four hundred of which exploded within the walls
of the fort, but without making any impression on either the strength of the work
or the garrison," and the British were compelled to retire with much loss.
In 1815, a squadron of British ships, stationed off the mouths of the Mississippi,
for the purpose of a blockade, ascended the river as high as Fort St. Philip, which
is a small work capable of an armament of only twenty guns in all. A heavy fire
of shot and shells was continued with but few and short pauses for nine days and
nights, but making no impression either on the fort or garrison, they retreated to
their former position at the mouth of the river.
There is but a single instance in the war of 1812, where the enemy's vessels
succeeded in reducing a fort; and this has sometimes been alluded to, by persons
ignorant of the real facts of the case, as a proof against the ability of our
fortifications to resist naval attacks. Even if it were a case of decided failure,
would this single exception be sufficient to overthrow the weight of evidence on
the other side? We allude to the reduction of the so-called Fort Washington by
the British fleet that ascended the Potomac in 1814, to assist in the disgraceful
and barbarous operation of burning the capitol and destroying the archives of the
nation. Fort Washington was a very small and inefficient work, incorrectly
planned by an incompetent French engineer; only a small part of the fort was
then built, and it has not yet been completed. The portion constructed was never,
until very recently, properly prepared for receiving its armament, and at the time
of attack could not possibly have held out a long time. But no defence whatever
was made. Capt. Gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carrying one hundred
and seventy-three guns, under orders "to ascend the river as high as Fort
Washington, and try upon it the experiment of a bombardment," approached that
fort, and, upon firing a single shell, which did no injury to either the fort or the
garrison, the latter deserted the works, and rapidly retreated. The commanding
officer was immediately dismissed for his cowardice. An English naval officer,
who was one of the expedition, in speaking of the retreat of the garrison, says:
"We were at loss to account for such an extraordinary step. The position was
good and the capture would have cost us at least fifty men, and more, had it been
properly defended; besides, an unfavorable wind and many other chances were
in their favor," &c. The fleet ascended the river to Alexandria, but learning soon
afterwards that batteries were preparing at White House and Indian Head to cut
off its retreat, it retired, in much haste, but not without injury.
Some have also pretended to find in modern European history a few examples
contradictory of the relative power which we have here assigned to ships and
forts. Overlooking the numerous and well-authenticated examples, where forts
of small dimensions and of small armament have repelled large fleets, they
would draw their conclusions from the four or five instances where fleets have
gained (as was at first supposed) a somewhat doubtful victory over forts. But a
careful and critical examination of the facts in these cases, will show that even
these are no exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of guns ashore over
guns afloat.
The only instances where it has ever been pretended by writers of any note, that
ships have gained advantage, are those of the attack on Copenhagen in 1801; the
passage of the Dardanelles, in 1807; the attack on Algiers, in 1816; the attack on
San Juan d'Ulloa, in 1838; and the attack on St. Jean d'Acre, in 1840.
Let us examine these examples a little in detail:—
Copenhagen.—The British fleet sent to attack Copenhagen, in 1801, consisted of
fifty-two sail, eighteen of them being line-of-battle ships, four frigates, &c. They
sailed from Yarmouth roads on the 12th of March, passed the Sound on the 30th,
and attacked and defeated the Danish line on the 2d of April.
The Sound between Cronenberg and the Swedish coast is about two and a half
miles wide, (vide Fig. 34.) The batteries of Cronenberg and Elsinore were lined
with one hundred pieces of cannon and mortars; but the Swedish battery had
been much neglected, and then mounted only six guns. Nevertheless, the British
admiral, to avoid the damage his squadron would have to sustain in the passage
of this wide channel, defended by a force scarcely superior to a single one of his
ships, preferred to attempt the difficult passage of the Belt; but after a few of his
light vessels, acting as scouts, had run on rocks, he returned to the Sound.
He then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage, threatening, however, a declaration
of war if his vessels should be fired upon. It must be remembered that at this
time England was at peace with both Denmark and Sweden, and that no just
cause of war existed. Hence, the admiral inferred that the commanders of these
batteries would be loath to involve their countries in a war with so formidable a
power as England, by commencing hostilities, when only a free passage was
asked. The Danish commander replied, that he should not permit a fleet to pass
his post, whose object and destination were unknown to him. He fired upon
them, as he was bound to do by long-existing commercial regulations, and not as
an act of hostility against the English. The Swedes, on the contrary, remained
neutral, and allowed the British vessels to lie near by for several days without
firing upon them. Seeing this friendly disposition of the Swedes, the fleet neared
their coast, and passed out of the reach of the Danish batteries, which opened a
fire of balls and shells; but all of them fell more than two hundred yards short of
the fleet, which escaped without the loss of a single man.
The Swedes excused their treachery by the plea that it would have been
impossible to construct batteries at that season, and that, even had it been
possible, Denmark would not have consented to their doing so, for fear that
Sweden would renew her old claim to one half of the rich duties levied by
Denmark on all ships passing the strait. There may have been some grounds for
the last excuse; but the true reason for their conduct was the fear of getting
involved in a war with England. Napoleon says that, even at that season, a few
days would have been sufficient for placing a hundred guns in battery, and that
Sweden had much more time than was requisite. And with a hundred guns on
each side of the channel, served with skill and energy, the fleet must necessarily
have sustained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack Copenhagen.
On this passage, we remark:—
1st. The whole number of guns and mortars in the forts of the Sound amounted
to only one hundred and six, while the fleet carried over seventeen hundred
guns; and yet, with this immense superiority of more than sixteen to one, the
British admiral preferred the dangerous passage of the Belt to encountering the
fire of these land-batteries.
2d. By negotiations, and threatening the vengeance of England, he persuaded the
small Swedish battery to remain silent and allow the fleet to pass near that shore,
out of reach of Cronenberg and Elsinore.
3d. It is the opinion of Napoleon and the best English writers, that if the Swedish
battery had been put in order, and acted in concert with the Danish works, they
might have so damaged the fleet as to render it incapable of any serious attempt
on Copenhagen.
We now proceed to consider the circumstances attending the attack and defence
of Copenhagen itself. The only side of the town exposed to the attack of heavy
shipping is the northern, where there lies a shoal extending out a considerable
distance, leaving only a very narrow approach to the heart of the city, (Fig. 35)
On the most advanced part of this shoal are the Crown-batteries, carrying in all
eighty-eight guns.[21] The entrance into the Baltic between Copenhagen and
Salthorn, is divided into two channels by a bank, called the Middle Ground,
which is situated directly opposite Copenhagen. To defend the entrance on the
left of the Crown-batteries, they placed near the mouth of the channel four ships
of the line, one frigate, and two sloops, carrying in all three hundred and fifty-
eight guns. To secure the port and city from bombardment from the King's
Channel, (that between the Middle Ground and town,) a line of floating defences
were moored near the edge of the shoal, and manned principally by volunteers.
This line consisted of old hulls of vessels, block-ships, prames, rafts, &c.,
carrying in all six hundred and twenty-eight guns—a force strong enough to
prevent the approach of bomb-vessels and gunboats, (the purpose for which it
was intended,) but utterly incapable of contending with first-rate ships of war;
but these the Danes thought would be deterred from approaching by the
difficulties of navigation. These difficulties were certainly very great; and
Nelson said, beforehand, that "the wind which might carry him in would most
probably not bring out a crippled ship." Had the Danes supposed it possible for
Nelson to approach with his large vessels, the line of floating defences would
have been formed nearer Copenhagen, the right supported by batteries raised on
the isle of Amack. "In that case," says Napoleon, "it is probable that Nelson
would have failed in his attack; for it would have been impossible for him to
pass between the line and shore thus lined with cannon." As it was, the line was
too extended for strength, and its right too far advanced to receive assistance
from the battery of Amack. A part of the fleet remained as a reserve, under
Admiral Parker, while the others, under Nelson, advanced to the King's Channel.
This attacking force consisted of eight ships of the line and thirty-six smaller
vessels, carrying in all eleven hundred guns, (without including those in the six
gun-brigs, whose armament is not given.) One of the seventy-four-gun ships
could not be brought into action, and two others grounded; but, Lord Nelson
says, "although not in the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to
be of great service." This force was concentrated upon a part of the Danish line
of floating defences, the whole of which was not only inferior to it by three
hundred and eighty-two guns, but so situated as to be beyond the reach of succor,
and without a chance of escape. The result was what might have been expected.
Every vessel of the right and centre of this outer Danish line was taken or
destroyed, except one or two small ones, which cut and run under protection of
the fortifications. The left of the line, being supported by the Crown-battery,
remained unbroken. A division of frigates, in hopes of providing an adequate
substitute for the ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to engage them,
but "it suffered considerable loss, and, in spite of all its efforts, was obliged to
relinquish this enterprise, and sheer off."
[21]
Some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy; but the English writers generally
say eighty-eight. A few, (apparently to increase the brilliancy of the victory,)
make this number still greater.

The Danish vessels lying in the entrance of the channel which leads to the city,
were not attacked, and took no material part in the contest. They are to be
reckoned in the defence on the same grounds that the British ships of the reserve
should be included in the attacking force. Nor was any use made of the guns on
shore, for the enemy did not advance far enough to be within their range.
The Crown-battery was behind the Danish line, and mainly masked by it. A part
only of its guns could be used in support of the left of this line, and in repelling
the direct attacks of the frigates, which it did most effectually. But we now come
to a new feature in this battle. As the Danish line of floating defences fell into
the hands of the English, the range of the Crown-battery enlarged, and its power
was felt. Nelson saw the danger to which his fleet was exposed, and, being at last
convinced of the prudence of the admiral's signal for retreat, "made up his mind
to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement." To retreat, however, from his
present position, was exceedingly difficult and dangerous. He therefore
determined to endeavor to effect an armistice, and dispatched the following letter
to the prince-regent:
"Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when no longer resisting; but if
the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord Nelson must be obliged to
set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without the power to save the
brave Danes who have defended them."
This produced an armistice, and hostilities had hardly ceased, when three of the
English ships, including that in which Nelson himself was, struck upon the bank.
"They were in the jaws of destruction, and would never have escaped if the
batteries had continued their fire. They therefore owed their safety to this
armistice." A convention was soon signed, by which every thing was left in statu
quo, and the fleet of Admiral Parker allowed to proceed into the Baltic. Edward
Baines, the able English historian of the wars of the French Revolution, in
speaking of Nelson's request for an armistice, says: "This letter, which exhibited
a happy union of policy and courage, was written at a moment when Lord
Nelson perceived that, in consequence of the unfavorable state of the wind, the
admiral was not likely to get up to aid the enterprise; that the principal batteries
of the enemy, and the ships at the mouth of the harbor, were yet untouched; that
two of his own division had grounded, and others were likely to share the same
fate." Campbell says these batteries and ships "were still unconquered. Two of
his [Nelson's] own vessels were grounded and exposed to a heavy fire; others, if
the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate, while he found it would
be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes under the fire of the batteries."
With respect to the fortifications of the town, a chronicler of the times says they
were of no service while the action lasted. "They began to fire when the enemy
took possession of the abandoned ships, but it was at the same time the parley
appeared." The Danish commander, speaking of the general contest between the
two lines, says: "The Crown-battery did not come at all into action." An English
writer says distinctly: "The works (fortifications) of Copenhagen were absolutely
untouched at the close of the action." Colonel Mitchel, the English historian,
says: "Lord Nelson never fired a shot at the town or fortifications of
Copenhagen; he destroyed a line of block-ships, prames, and floating batteries
that defended the sea approach to the town; and the Crown Prince, seeing his
capital exposed, was willing to finish by armistice a war, the object of which was
neither very popular nor well understood. What the result of the action between
Copenhagen and the British fleet might ultimately have been, is therefore
altogether uncertain. THE BOMBARDMENT OF COPENHAGEN BY
NELSON, as it is generally styled, is therefore, like most other oracular phrases
of the day, a mere combination of words, without the slightest meaning."
The British lost in killed and wounded nine hundred and forty-three men; and
the loss of the Danes, according to their own account, which is confirmed by the
French, was but very little higher. The English, however, say it amounted to
sixteen or eighteen hundred; but let the loss be what it may, it was almost
exclusively confined to the floating defences, and can in no way determine the
relative accuracy of aim of the guns ashore and guns afloat.
The facts and testimony we have adduced, prove incontestably—
1st. That of the fleet of fifty-two sail and seventeen hundred guns sent by the
English to the attack upon Copenhagen, two ships carrying one hundred and
forty-eight guns were grounded or wrecked; seven ships of the line, and thirty-
six smaller vessels, carrying over one thousand guns, were actually brought into
the action; while the remainder were held as a reserve to act upon the first
favorable opportunity.
2d. That the Danish line of floating defences, consisting mostly of hulls, sloops,
rafts, &c., carried only six hundred and twenty-eight guns of all descriptions;
that the fixed batteries supporting this line did not carry over eighty or ninety
guns at most; and that both these land and floating batteries were mostly manned
and the guns served by volunteers.
3d. That the fixed batteries in the system of defence were either so completely
masked, or so far distant, as to be useless during the contest between the fleet
and floating force.
4th. That the few guns of these batteries which were rendered available by the
position of the floating defences, repelled, with little or no loss to themselves,
and some injury to the enemy, a vastly superior force of frigates which attacked
them.
5th. That the line of floating defences was conquered and mostly destroyed,
while the fixed batteries were uninjured.
6th. That the fortifications of the city and of Amack island were not attacked,
and had no part in the contest.
7th. That, as soon as the Crown-batteries were unmasked and began to act,
Nelson prepared to retreat, but, on account of the difficulty of doing so, he
opened a parley, threatening, with a cruelty unworthy of the most barbarous
ages, that, unless the batteries ceased their fire upon his ships, he would burn all
the floating defences with the Danish prisoners in his possession; and that this
armistice was concluded just in time to save his own ships from destruction.
8th. That, consequently, the battle of Copenhagen cannot be regarded as a
contest between ships and forts, or a triumph of ships over forts: that, so far as
the guns on shore were engaged, they showed a vast superiority over those afloat
—a superiority known and confessed by the English themselves.
Constantinople.—The channel of the Dardanelles is about twelve leagues long,
three miles wide at its entrance, and about three-quarters of a mile at its
narrowest point. Its principal defences are the outer and inner castles of Europe
and Asia, and the castles of Sestos and Abydos. Constantinople stands about one
hundred miles from its entrance into the Sea of Marmora, and at nearly the
opposite extremity of this sea. The defences of the channel had been allowed to
go to decay; but few guns were mounted, and the forts were but partially
garrisoned. In Constantinople not a gun was mounted, and no preparations for
defence were made; indeed, previous to the approach of the fleet, the Turks had
not determined whether to side with the English or the French, and even then the
French ambassador had the greatest difficulty in persuading them to resist the
demands of Duckforth.
The British fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two frigates, two sloops, and
several bomb-vessels, carrying eight hundred and eighteen guns, (besides those
in the bomb-ships.) Admiral Duckforth sailed through the Dardanelles on the
19th of February, 1807, with little or no opposition. This being a Turkish festival
day, the soldiers of the scanty garrison were enjoying the festivities of the
occasion, and none were left to serve the few guns of the forts which had been
prepared for defence. But while the admiral was waiting on the Sea of Marmora
for the result of negotiations, or for a favorable wind to make the attack upon
Constantinople, the fortifications of this city were put in order, and the Turks
actively employed, under French engineers and artillery officers, in repairing the
defences of the Straits. Campbell, in his Naval History, says:—"Admiral
Duckforth now fully perceived the critical situation in which he was placed. He
might, indeed, succeed, should the weather become favorable, in bombarding
Constantinople; but unless the bombardment should prove completely successful
in forcing the Turks to pacific terms, the injury he might do to the city would not
compensate for the damage which his fleet must necessarily sustain. With this
damaged and crippled fleet, he must repass the Dardanelles, now rendered
infinitely stronger than they were when he came through them."
Under these circumstances the admiral determined to retreat; and on the 3d of
April escaped through the Dardanelles, steering midway of the channel, with a
favorable and strong current. "This escape, however," says Baines, "was only
from destruction, but by no means from serious loss and injury. * * * * In what
instance in the whole course of our naval warfare, have ships received equal
damage in so short a time as in this extraordinary enterprise?" In detailing the
extent of this damage, we will take the ships in the order they descended. The
first had her wheel carried away, and her hull much damaged, but escaped with
the loss of only three men. A stone shot penetrated the second, between the poop
and quarter deck, badly injured the mizzen-mast, carried away the wheel, and
did other serious damage, killing and wounding twenty men. Two shot struck the
third, carrying away her shrouds and injuring her masts; loss in killed and
wounded, thirty. The fourth had her mainmast destroyed, with a loss of sixteen.
The fifth had a large shot, six feet eight inches in circumference, enter her lower
deck; loss fifty-five. The sixth, not injured. The seventh, a good deal damaged,
with a loss of seventeen. The eighth had no loss. The ninth was so much injured
that, "had there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the opposite tack, she
must have gone down:" her loss was eight. The tenth lost twelve. The eleventh
was much injured, with a loss of eight—making a total loss in repassing the
Dardanelles, of one hundred and sixty-seven; and in the whole expedition two
hundred and eighty-one, exclusive of two hundred and fifty men who perished in
the burning of the Ajax.
Such was the effect produced on the British fleet, sailing with a favorable wind
and strong current past the half-armed and half-manned forts of the Dardanelles.
Duckforth himself says, that "had he remained before Constantinople much
longer—till the forts had been completely put in order—no return would have
been open to him, and the unavoidable sacrifice of the squadron must have been
the consequence." Scarcely had the fleet cleared the Straits, before it (the fleet)
was reinforced with eight sail of the line; but, even with this vast increase of
strength, the English did not venture to renew the contest. They had effected a
most fortunate escape. General Jomini says that if the defence had been
conducted by a more enterprising and experienced people, the expedition would
have cost the English their whole squadron.
Great as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts themselves were uninjured.
The English say their own fire did no execution, the shot in all probability not
even striking their objects—"the rapid change of position, occasioned by a fair
wind and current, preventing the certainty of aim." The state of the batteries
when the fleet first passed, is thus described in James's Naval History: "Some of
them were dilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly manned."
And Alison says: "They had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The castles of
Europe and Asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert the dominion of
the Crescent at the narrowest part of the passage, but their ramparts were
antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as remained, though of
enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision of an
English broadside."
Much has been said because the fortifications of the Dardanelles did not
hermetically seal that channel, (an object they were never expected to
accomplish, even had they been well armed and well served;) but it is forgotten,
or entirely overlooked, that twelve Turkish line-of-battle -ships, two of them
three-deckers, with nine frigates, were with their sails bent and in apparent
readiness, filled with troops, and lying within the line of fortifications; and yet
this naval force effected little or nothing against the invaders. It is scarcely ever
mentioned, being regarded of little consequence as a means of defence; and yet
the number of its guns and the expense of its construction and support, could
hardly have fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed forts, some of which
were as ancient as the reign of Amurath!
Algiers.—The following narrative of the attack on Algiers, in 1816, is drawn
from the reports of the English and Dutch admirals, and other official and
authentic English papers.
The attack was made by the combined fleets, consisting of five sail of the line,
eighteen or twenty frigates and smaller vessels, besides five bomb-vessels and
several rocket-boats, carrying in all about one thousand guns. The armament of
some of the smaller vessels is not given, but the guns of those whose armaments
are known, amount to over nine hundred. The harbor and defences of Algiers
had been previously surveyed by Captain Warde, royal navy, under Lord
Exmouth's direction; and the number of the combined fleet was arranged
according to the information given in this survey—just so many ships, and no
more, being taken, as could be employed to advantage against the city, without
being needlessly exposed. Moreover, the men and officers had been selected and
exercised with reference to this particular attack.
From the survey of Captain Warde, and the accompanying map, it appears that
the armament of all the fortifications of Algiers and the vicinity, counting the
water fronts and the parts that could flank the shore, was only two hundred and
eighty-four guns of various sizes and descriptions, including mortars. But not
near all of these could act upon the fleet as it lay. Other English accounts state
the number of guns actually opposed to the fleet at from two hundred and twenty
to two hundred and thirty. Some of these were in small and distant batteries,
whereas nearly all the fleet was concentrated on the mole-head works. (Fig. 36.)
Supposing only one broadside of the ships to have been engaged, the ratio of the
forces, as expressed by the number of guns, must have been about as 5 to 2. This
is a favorable supposition for the ships; for we know that several of them, from
their position and a change of anchorage, brought both broadsides to bear;
moreover, at no one time could all the guns of the water fronts of the batteries
bear on the attacking ships. The Algerine shipping in the harbor was
considerable, including several vessels of war, but no use was made of them in
defence, and nearly all were burnt. The attacking ships commanded some of the
batteries, and almost immediately dismounted their guns. The walls of the
casemated works were so thin as to be very soon battered down. Most of the
Algerine guns were badly mounted, and many of them were useless after the first
fire. They had no furnaces for heating shot, and, as "they loaded their guns with
loose powder, put in with a ladle," they could not possibly have used hot shot,
even had they constructed furnaces. The ships approached the forts, and many of
them anchored in their intended position, without a shot being fired from the
batteries. The action commenced at a quarter before three, and did not entirely
cease till half-past eleven. The ships then took advantage of the land breeze, and,
by warping and towing off, were able to get under sail and come to anchor
beyond reach of the land-batteries. Negotiations were again opened, and the Dey
surrendered the Christian slaves and yielded to the terms of the treaty.
During the contest, the fleet "fired nearly one hundred and eighteen tons of
powder, and fifty thousand shot, (weighing more than five hundred tons of iron,)
besides nine hundred and sixty thirteen and ten-inch shells, (thrown by the
bomb-vessels,) and the shells and rockets from the flotilla." The vessels were
considerably crippled, and their loss in killed and wounded amounted to eight
hundred and eighty-three. The land batteries were much injured, and a large part
of their guns dismounted. Their loss is not known; the English confess they
could obtain no account of it, but suppose it to have been very great. This seems
more than probable; for, besides those actually employed in the defence, large
numbers of people crowded into the forts to witness the contest. So great was
this curiosity, that, when the action commenced, the parapets were covered with
the multitude gazing at the manœuvres of the ships. To avoid so unnecessary and
indiscriminate a slaughter, Lord Exmouth (showing a humanity that does him
great credit) motioned with his hand to the ignorant wretches to retire to some
place of safety. This loss of life in the batteries, the burning of the buildings
within the town and about the mole, the entire destruction of their fleet and
merchant vessels anchored within the mole and in the harbor, had a depressing
effect upon the inhabitants, and probably did more than the injuries received by
the batteries in securing an honorable conclusion to the treaty. We know very
well that these batteries, though much injured, were not silenced when Lord
Exmouth took advantage of the land breeze and sailed beyond their reach. The
ships retired—1st, because they had become much injured, and their ammunition
nearly exhausted; 2d, in order to escape from a position so hazardous in case of a
storm; and 3d, to get beyond the reach of the Algerine batteries. Lord Exmouth
himself gives these as his reasons for the retreat, and says, "the land wind saved
me many a gallant fellow." And Vice-admiral Von de Capellan, in his report of
the battle, gives the same opinion: "in this retreat" says he, "which, from want of
wind and the damage suffered in the rigging, was very slow, the ships had still to
suffer much from the new-opened and redoubled fire of the enemy's batteries; at
last, the land breeze springing up," &c. An English officer, who took part in this
affair, says: "It was well for us that the land wind came off, or we should never
have got out; and God knows what would have been our fate, had we remained
all night."
The motives of the retreat cannot, therefore, be doubted. Had the Arabs set
themselves zealously at work, during the night, to prepare for a new contest, by
remounting their guns, and placing others behind the ruins of those batteries
which had fallen,—in other words, had the works now been placed in hands as
skilful and experienced as the English, the contest would have been far from
ended. But (to use the words of the Board of Defence) Lord Exmouth relied on
the effects produced on the people by his dreadful cannonade; and the result
proves that he was right. His anxiety to clear the vessels from the contest shows
that there was a power still unconquered, which he thought it better to leave to
be restrained by the suffering population of the city, than to keep in a state of
exasperation and activity by his presence. What was this power but an
unsubdued energy in the batteries?
The true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of injury done
on the one side or the other—particularly as there was on one side a city to suffer
as well as the batteries—as the relative efficiency of the parties when the battle
closed. All political agitation and popular clamor aside, what would have been
the result had the fight been continued, or even had Lord Exmouth renewed it
next morning? These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture; but
the manner the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, had
the subsequent demands of Lord Exmouth been rejected, he had it in his power
to enforce them by his ships; whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he
would not have been signally defeated. On the whole, we do not think that this
battle, although it stands pre-eminent as an example of naval success over
batteries, presents an argument to shake the confidence which fortifications, well
situated, well planned, and well fought, deserve, as the defences of a seaboard.
We cannot help regarding these conclusions as just, when we reflect upon all the
circumstances of the case. The high character, skill, and bravery of the attacking
force; their immense superiority in number of guns, with no surplus human life
to be exposed; the antiquated and ill-managed works of defence, the entire want
of skill of the Algerine artillerists, and the neglect of the ordinary means of
preparation; the severe execution which these ill-served guns did upon the
enemy's ships,—an execution far more dreadful than that effected by the French
or Dutch fleets in their best-contested naval battles with the ships of the same
foe,—from these facts, we must think that those who are so ready to draw from
this case conclusions unfavorable to the use of land-batteries as a means of
defence against shipping, know but little of the nature of the contest.
An English historian of some note, in speaking of this attack, says:—"It is but
little to the purpose, unless to prove what may be accomplished by fleets against
towns exactly so circumstanced, placed, and governed. Algiers is situated on an
amphitheatre of hills, sloping down towards the sea, and presenting therefore the
fairest mark to the fire of hostile ships. But where is the capital exactly so
situated that we are ever likely to attack? And as to the destruction of a few
second-rate towns, even when practicable, it is a mean, unworthy species of
warfare, by which nothing was ever gained. The severe loss sustained before
Algiers must also be taken into account, because it was inflicted by mere
Algerine artillery, and was much inferior to what may be expected from a contest
maintained against batteries manned with soldiers instructed by officers of skill
and science, not only in working the guns, but in the endless duty of detail
necessary for keeping the whole of an artillery material in a proper state of
formidable efficiency."
San Juan d'Ulloa.—The following facts, relative to the attack on San Juan
d'Ulloa by the French, in 1838, are drawn principally from the report of a French
engineer officer who was one of the expedition.
The French fleet consisted of four ships, carrying one hundred and eighty-eight
guns, two armed steamboats, and two bomb-ketches with four large mortars. The
whole number of guns, of whatever description, found in the fort was one
hundred and eighty-seven; a large portion of these, however, were for land
defence. (Fig. 37.)
When the French vessels were towed into the position selected for the attack, "it
was lucky for us," says the French officer in his report, "that the Mexicans did
not disturb this operation, which lasted nearly two hours, and that they permitted
us to commence the fire." "We were exposed to the fire of one twenty-four-
pounder, five sixteen-pounders, seven twelve-pounders, one eight-pounder, and
five eighteen-pounder carronades—in all nineteen pieces only." If these be
converted into equivalent twenty-four-pounders, in proportion to the weight of
the balls, the whole nineteen guns will be less than twelve twenty-four pounders.
This estimate is much too great, for it allows three eight-pounders to be equal to
one twenty-four-pounder, and each of the eighteen-pounder carronades to be
three quarters the power of a long twenty-four-pounder; whereas, at the distance
at which the parties were engaged, these small pieces were nearly harmless. Two
of the powder magazines, from not being bomb-proof, were blown up during the
engagement, by which three of the nineteen guns on the water front of the castle
were dismounted; thus reducing the land force to an equivalent of ten twenty-
four-pounders. The other sixteen guns were still effective when abandoned by
the Mexicans. The cannonade and bombardment continued about six hours, eight
thousand two hundred and fifty shot and shells being fired at the fort by the
French. The principal injury received by the work was from the explosion of the
powder magazine. But very few guns were dismounted by the fire of the French
ships, and only three of these on the water front. The details of the condition of
the ships and fort are given in the report of the French officer,[22] but it is
unnecessary to repeat them here.
[22]
Vide also House Doc. No. 206, twenty-sixth Congress, first session

In general terms, it appears from the above-mentioned report, that the number of
guns actually brought into action by the floating force, (counting only one
broadside of the ship,) amounted to ninety-four guns, besides four heavy sea-
mortars; that the whole number so employed in the fort was only nineteen,
including the smallest calibres; that these guns were generally so small and
inefficient, that their balls would not enter the sides of the ordinary attacking
frigates; the principal injury sustained by the castle was produced by the
explosion of powder magazines injudiciously placed and improperly secured;
that the castle, though built of poor materials, was but slightly injured by the
French fire; that the Mexicans proved themselves ignorant of the ordinary means
of defence, and abandoned their works when only a few of their guns had been
dismounted; that notwithstanding all the circumstances in favor of the French,
their killed and wounded, in proportion to the guns acting against them, was
upwards of four times as great as the loss of the English at the battle of
Trafalgar!
St. Jean d'Acre.—The narratives of the day contained most exaggerated accounts
of the English attack on St. Jean d'Acre; now, however, the principal facts
connected with this attack are fully authenticated. For the amount of the fleet we
quote from the British official papers, and for that of the fort, from the pamphlet
of Lieutenant-colonel Matuszewiez. These statements are mainly confirmed by
the narratives, more recently published, of several English and French eye-
witnesses.
The fortifications were built of poor materials, antiquated in their plans, and
much decayed. Their entire armament amounted to only two hundred guns, some
of which were merely field-pieces. The water fronts were armed with one
hundred cannon and sixteen mortars, those of the smaller calibre included. (Fig.
38.) When approached by the British fleet, the works were undergoing repairs,
and, says Commodore Napier, "were fast getting into a state of preparation
against attack."
The British fleet consisted of eight ships of the line, carrying six hundred and
forty-six guns; six frigates, carrying two hundred and thirty-six guns; four
steamers, carrying eighteen guns; and two or three other vessels, whose force is
not given. "Only a few guns," says Napier, "defended the approach from the
northward," and most of the ships came in from that direction. The western front
was armed with about forty cannon; but opposed to this were six ships and two
steamers, carrying about five hundred guns. Their fire was tremendous during
the engagement, but no breach was made in the walls. The south front was
armed in part by heavy artillery and in part by field-pieces. This front was
attacked by six ships and two steamers, carrying over two hundred guns. The
eastern front was armed only with light artillery; against this was concentrated
the remainder of the fleet, carrying about two hundred and forty guns. The guns
of the works were so poorly mounted, that but few could be used at all; and
these, on account of the construction of the fort, could not reach the ships,
though anchored close by the walls. "Only five of their guns," says Napier,
"placed in a flanking battery, were well served, and never missed; but they were
pointed too high, and damaged our spars and rigging only." The stone was of so
poor a quality, says the narrative of Colonel Matuszewiez, that the walls fired
upon presented on the exterior a shattered appearance, but they were nowhere
seriously injured. In the words of Napier, "they were not breached, and a
determined enemy might have remained secure under the breastworks, or in the
numerous casemates, without suffering much loss." The accidental explosion of a
magazine within the fort, containing six thousand casks of powder, laid in ruins a
space of sixty thousand square yards, opened a large breach in the walls of the
fortifications, partially destroyed the prisons, and killed and wounded a thousand
men of the garrison. This frightful disaster, says the French account, hastened the
triumph of the fleet. The prisoners and malefactors, thus released from
confinement, rushed upon the garrison at the same time with the mountaineers,
who had besieged the place on the land side. The uselessness of the artillery, the
breaches of the fort, the attacks of the English, all combined to force the retreat
of the garrison, "in the midst of scenes of blood and atrocious murders."
We will close this account with the following extract of a speech of the Duke of
Wellington, in the House of Lords, Feb. 4, 1841: "He had had," he said, "a little
experience in services of this nature; and he thought it his duty to warn their
lordships, on this occasion, that they must not always expect that ships, however
well commanded, or however gallant their seamen might be, were capable of
commonly engaging successfully with stone walls. He had no recollection, in all
his experience, except the recent instance on the coast of Syria, of any fort being
taken by ships, excepting two or three years ago, when the fort of San Juan
d'Ulloa was captured by the French fleet. This was, he thought, the single
instance that he recollected, though he believed that something of the sort had
occurred at the siege of Havana, in 1763. The present achievement he considered
one of the greatest of modern times. This was his opinion, and he gave the
highest credit to those who had performed such a service. It was, altogether, a
most skilful proceeding. He was greatly surprised at the small number of men
that was lost on board the fleet; and, on inquiring how it happened, he
discovered that it was because the vessels were moored within one-third of the
ordinary distance. The guns of the fortress were intended to strike objects at a
greater distance; and the consequence was, that the shot went over the ships that
were anchored at one-third the usual distance. By that means, they sustained not
more than one-tenth of the loss which they would otherwise have experienced.
Not less than five hundred pieces of ordnance were directed against the walls,
and the precision with which the fire was kept up, the position of the vessels,
and, lastly, the blowing up of the large magazine—all aided in achieving this
great victory in so short a time. He had thought it right to say thus much, because
he wished to warn the public against supposing that such deeds as this could be
effected every day. He would repeat that this was a singular instance, in the
achievement of which undoubtedly great skill was manifested, but which was
also connected with peculiar circumstances, which they could not hope always to
occur. It must not therefore be expected, as a matter of course, that all such
attempts must necessarily succeed."
Having completed our examination of the ability of land batteries to cope, gun
for gun, with a naval force, let us consider, for a few moments, the objection
which is sometimes made to the use of fortifications for the defence of the sea-
coast, viz.: that our maritime cities and arsenals can be better and more
economically secured by a home squadron.
We have already alluded to the impossibility of substituting one means of
defence for another. The efficiency of the bayonet can in no way enable us to
dispense with artillery, nor the value of engineer troops in the passage of rivers,
and the attack and defence of forts, render cavalry the less necessary in other
operations of a campaign. To the navy alone must we look for the defence of our
shipping upon the high seas; but it cannot replace fortifications in the protection
of our harbors, bays, rivers, arsenals, and commercial towns.
Let us take a case in point. For the defence of New York city, it is deemed highly
important that the East River should be closed to the approach of a hostile fleet
at least fifteen or twenty miles from the city, so that an army landed there would
have to cross the Westchester creek, the Bronx, Harlem river, and the defiles of
Harlem heights—obstacles of great importance in a judicious defence. Throg's
Neck is the position selected for this purpose; cannon placed there not only
command the channel, but, from the windings of the river, sweep it for a great
distance above and below. No other position, even in the channel itself,
possesses equal advantages. Hence, if we had only naval means of defence, it
would be best, were such a thing possible, to place the floating defences
themselves on this point. Leaving entirely out of consideration the question of
relative power, position alone would give the superior efficiency to the fort. But
there are other considerations no less important than that of position. Fort
Schuyler can be garrisoned and defended in part by the same militia force which
will be employed to prevent the march of the enemy's army on the city. On the
other hand, the crews of the floating defences must be seamen; they will
consequently be of less value in the subsequent land operations. Moreover, forts,
situated as this is, can be so planned as to bring to bear upon any part of the
channel a greater number of guns than can be presented by any hostile squadron
against the corresponding portion of the fort. This result can be obtained with
little difficulty in narrow channels, as is done in most of the other works for the
defence of New York, the works for Boston, Newport, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, &c., and an approximation to it is not
incompatible with the defence of the broader estuaries, like the Chesapeake.
But we will suppose that there are no such points of land, in the inlets to our
harbors, and that we rely for defence upon a naval force exclusively. Let us leave
out of consideration the security of all our other harbors and our commerce on
the high seas, and also the importance of having at command the means of
attacking the enemy's coast, in the absence of his fleet. We take the single case of
the attack being made on New York harbor, and that our whole fleet is assembled
there. Now, if this fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of success
may be regarded as equal; if inferior, the chances are against us—for an
attacking force would probably be of picked men and of the best materials. But
here the consequences of victory are very unequal: the enemy can lose his
squadron only, while we put in peril both our squadron and the objects it is
intended to defend. If we suppose our own naval force superior to that of the
enemy, the defence of this harbor would in all respects be complete, provided
this force never left the harbor. But, then, all the commerce of the country upon
the ocean must be left to its fate; and no attempt can be made to react offensively
upon the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's fleets
within his ports, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there; the
escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor.
These remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but the single harbor
of New York; whereas Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, the Delaware,
the Chesapeake, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, and
numerous other places, are equally open to attack, and therefore must be equally
defended, for we know not to which the enemy will direct his assaults. If he
come to one of these in the absence of our fleet, his object is attained without
resistance; or, if his whole force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended,
we involve both fleet and harbor in inevitable ruin. Could our fleet be so
arranged as to meet these enterprises?
"As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack out of the
whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the spot? And if
it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that shall always place
our fleet in the path of the advancing foe? Suppose we attempt to cover the coast
by cruising in front of it, shall we sweep its whole length—a distance scarcely
less than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast to ours?
Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept, as well as the Atlantic; or shall we give up
the Gulf to the enemy? Shall we cover the southern cities, or give them up also?
We must unquestionably do one of two things—either relinquish a great extent
of coast, confining our cruisers to a small portion only, or include so much that
the chances of intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question."
"On the practicability of covering a small extent of coast by cruising in front of it
—or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an enemy's operations,
discovering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse and hear no
tidings, and seeing the impress of his footsteps on the surface of the ocean—it
may be well to consult experience."
The naval power of Spain under Philip II. was almost unlimited. With the
treasures of India and America at his command, the fitting out of a fleet of one
hundred and fifty or two hundred sail, to invade another country, was no very
gigantic operation. Nevertheless, this naval force was of but little avail as a coast
defence. Its efficiency for this purpose was well tested in 1596. England and
Holland attacked Cadiz with a combined fleet of one hundred and seventy ships,
which entered the Bay of Cadiz without, on its approach to their coast, being
once seen by the Spanish navy. This same squadron, on its return to England,
passed along a great portion of the Spanish coast without ever meeting with the
slightest opposition from the innumerable Spanish floating defences.
In 1744, a French fleet of twenty ships, and a land force of twenty-two thousand
men, sailed from Brest to the English coast, without meeting with any opposition
from the superior British fleet which had been sent out, under Sir John Norris, on
purpose to intercept them. The landing of the troops was prevented by a storm,
which drove the fleet back upon the coast of France to seek shelter.
In 1755, a French fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, and many smaller vessels,
sailed from Brest for America. Nine of these soon afterwards returned to France,
and the others proceeded to the gulf of St. Lawrence. An English fleet of
seventeen sail of the line and some frigates had been sent out to intercept them;
but the two fleets passed each other in a thick fog, and all the French vessels
except two reached Quebec in safety.
In 1759, a French fleet, blockaded in the port of Dunkirk by a British force under
Commodore Bogs, seizing upon a favorable opportunity, escaped from the
enemy, attacked the coast of Scotland, made a descent upon Carrickfergus, and
cruised about till February, 1760, without meeting a single British vessel,
although sixty-one ships of the line were then stationed upon the coasts of
England and France, and several of these were actually in pursuit.
In 1796, when the French attempted to throw the army of Hoche into Ireland, the
most strenuous efforts were made by the British navy to intercept the French
fleet in its passage. The Channel fleet, of near thirty sail of the line, under Lord
Bridport, was stationed at Spithead; Sir Roger Curtis, with a smaller force, was
cruising to the westward; Vice-admiral Colpoys was stationed off Brest, with
thirteen sail of the line; and Sir Edward Pellew (afterwards Lord Exmouth)
watched the harbor, with a small squadron of frigates. Notwithstanding this triple
floating bulwark, as it was called—one fleet on the enemy's coast, a second in
the Downs, and a third close on their own shores—the French fleet of forty-four
vessels, carrying a land force of twenty-five thousand men, reached Bantry Bay
in safety! This fleet was eight days on the passage, and three more in landing the
troops; and most of the vessels might have returned to Brest in safety, had it not
been for disasters by storms, for only one of their whole number was intercepted
by the vast naval force which England had assembled for that express object.
"The result of this expedition," says Alison, "was pregnant with important
instructions to the rulers of both countries. To the French, as demonstrating the
extraordinary risks which attend a maritime expedition, in comparison with a
land campaign; the small number of forces which can be embarked on board
even a great fleet; and the unforeseen disasters which frequently, on that
element, defeat the best concerted enterprises. To the English, as showing that
the empire of the seas does not always afford security against invasion; that, in
the face of superior maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen days at the
mercy of the enemy; and that neither the skill of her sailors nor the valor of her
armies, but the fury of the elements, saved them from danger in the most
vulnerable part of their dominions. While these considerations are fitted to abate
the confidence in invasion, they are calculated, at the same time, to weaken an
overweening confidence in naval superiority, and to demonstrate that the only
base upon which certain reliance can be placed, even by an insular power, is a
well-disciplined army and the patriotism of its own subjects."
Subsequent events still further demonstrated the truth of these remarks. In the
following year, a French squadron of two frigates and two sloops, passed the
British fleets with perfect impunity, destroyed the shipping in the port of
Ilfracombe, and safely landed their troops on the coast of Wales. Again, in 1798,
the immense British naval force failed to prevent the landing of General
Humbert's army in the bay of Killala; and, in the latter part of the same year, a
French squadron of nine vessels and three thousand men escaped Sir J.B.
Warren's squadron, and safely reached the coast of Ireland. As a further
illustration, we quote from the report of the Board of National Defence in 1839.
The Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of the line and twenty
smaller vessels of war, and numerous transports, making in all, three hundred
sail and forty thousand troops, slipped out of port and sailed to Malta. "It was
followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly that they were bound for Egypt,
shaped his course direct for Alexandria. The French, steering towards Candia,
took the more circuitous passage; so that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before
them, and, not finding them there, returned, by way of Caramania and Candia, to
Sicily, missing his adversary in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he
found the French fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there,
achieved the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider the narrowness
of the sea; the numerous vessels in the French fleet; the actual crossing of the
two fleets on a certain night; and that Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing
of the enemy himself, and hear nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may
judge of the probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic."
"The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them in the
Mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the West Indies; their
evasion of him among the islands; the return to Europe; his vain efforts
subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the bay of Biscay, and off the
English channel; and the meeting at last at Trafalgar, brought about only because
the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the accession of several
reinforcements had given, were willing to try the issue of a battle—these are
instances, of the many that might be cited, to show how small is the probability
of encountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting, and
how little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most exalted
professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse chances. For more
than a year Nelson most closely watched his enemy, who seems to have got out
of port as soon as he was prepared to do so, and without attracting the notice of
any of the blockading squadron. When out, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to
the course Villeneuve had taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt.
Scattered by tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon; whence it
again put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz."
"On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to belong
in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country, this system of
defence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of importance
so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the result is admissible. It demands of
the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that which, to do at all, seems
impossible. The navy is required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in
spite of distance, and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these
purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the
purpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport of storms, the
navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in spite
of weather and seasons; to see him in spite of fogs and darkness."
"Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily
accomplished, and all the difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single
battle, on equal terms, the fate of the war, having no hope or reserve beyond."
"The proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river defence; it has a more glorious
sphere—that of the offensive. In our last war, instead of lying in harbor, and
contenting themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch
over them than their own number—instead of leaving the enemy's commerce in
undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and our commerce without countenance or
aid, they scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to
the most remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against
the enemy's navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of the
enemy's property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered,
and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels, ships
evaded if superior, and beaten if equal—they rendered benefits a thousand-fold
greater, to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the nation, and the character
they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted from a state of passiveness
within the harbors. Confident that this is the true policy as regards the
employment of the navy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted
on, as it has been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and
advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement. In
order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active and
energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the same time so
consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit, we have shown
that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence."
A few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, and the economy of their
support, and we will close this discussion. We do not regard this question,
however, as a matter of any great importance, for it can seldom be decisive in the
choice of these two means of defence. No matter what their relative cost may be,
the one cannot often be substituted for the other. There are some few cases,
however, where this might be taken into consideration, and would be decisive.
Let us endeavor to illustrate our meaning. For the defence of New York city, the
Narrows and East River must be secured by forts; ships cannot, in this case, be
substituted. But let us suppose that the outer harbor of New York furnishes no
favorable place for the debarkation of troops, or that the place of debarkation is
so far distant that the troops cannot reach the city before the defensive forces can
be prepared to repel them. This outer harbor would be of great importance to the
enemy as a shelter from storms, and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous
preparatory to a forcible passage of the Narrows; while to us its possession
would not be absolutely essential, though very important. Strong fortifications
on Sandy Hook, and one of the shoals, might probably be so constructed as to
furnish a pretty sure barrier to the entrance of this outer harbor; on the other
hand, a naval force stationed within the inner harbor, and acting under the
protection of forts at the Narrows, might also furnish a good, though perhaps less
certain protection for this outer roadstead. Here, then, we might well consider
the question of relative cost and economy of support of the proposed
fortifications, and of a home squadron large enough to effect the same object,
and to be kept continually at home for that special purpose. If we were to allow
it to go to sea for the protection of our commerce, its character and efficiency as
a harbor defence would be lost. We can therefore regard it only as a local force
—fixed within the limits of the defence of this particular place—and our
estimates must be made accordingly.
The average durability of ships of war in the British navy, has been variously
stated at seven and eight years in time of war, and from ten to twelve and
fourteen years in time of peace. Mr. Perring, in his "Brief Inquiry," published in
1812, estimates the average durability at about eight years. His calculations seem
based upon authentic information. A distinguished English writer has more
recently arrived at the same result, from estimates based upon the returns of the
Board of Admiralty during the period of the wars of the French Revolution. The
data in our own possession are less complete; the appropriations for building and
repairing having been so expended as to render it impossible to draw any
accurate line of distinction. But, in the returns now before us, there are generally
separate and distinct amounts of the timbers used for these two purposes; and
consequently, so far as this (the main item of expense) is concerned, we may
form pretty accurate comparisons.
According to Edge, (pp. 20, 21,) the average cost of timber, for hulls, masts, and
yards, in building an English 74 gun ship, is £61,382. Let us now compare this
cost of timber for building, with that of the same item for repairs, for the
following fifteen ships, between 1800 and 1820. The list would have been still
further enlarged, but the returns for other ships during some portion of the above
period are imperfect:

Name of Ship No. of guns When built Repaired from Cost.

Vengeance 74 1800 to 1807 £84,720
Ildefonso 74 1807 to 1808 85,195
Scipio 74 1807 to 1809 60,785
Tremendous 74 1807 to 1810 135,397
Elephant 74 1808 to 1811 67,007
Spencer 74 1800 1809 to 1813 124,186
Romulus 74 1810 to 1812 73,141
Albion 74 1802 1810 to 1813 102,295
Donegal 74 1812 to 1815 101,367
Implacable 74 1813 to 1815 59,865
Illustrious 74 1803 1813 to 1816 74,184
Northumberland 74 1814 to 1815 59,795
Kent 74 1814 to 1818 88,357
Sultan 74 1807 1816 to 1818 61,518
Sterling Castle 74 1816 to 1818 65,280

This table, although incomplete, gives for the above fifteen ships, during a
period of less than twenty years, the cost of timber alone used in their repair, an
average of about $400,000 each. More timber than this was used, in all
probability, upon the same vessels, and paid for out of the funds appropriated
"for such as may be ordered in course of the year to be repaired." But the amount
specifically appropriated for timber for these fifteen ships, would, in every
twelve or fifteen years, equal the entire first cost of the same items. If we add to
this amount, the cost of labor required in the application of timber to the
operations of repair, and take into consideration the expense of other materials
and labor, and the decayed condition of many of the ships at the end of this
period, we should not be surprised to find the whole sum expended under these
heads to equal the first cost, even within the minimum estimate of seven years.
The whole cost of timber used for hulls, masts, and yards, in building between
1800 and 1820, was £18,727,551; in repairs and "ordinary wear and tear,"
£17,449,780; making an annual average of $4,560,158 for building timber, and
$4,273,371 for that used in repairs. A large portion of the vessels built were
intended to replace others which had been lost, or were so decayed as to be
broken up.
But it may be well to add here, the actual supplies voted for the sea-service, and
for wear and tear, and the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing of
ships from 1800 to 1815.

For the wear and tear Extra Expences for building, For entire sea
Year.
of ships. repairing etc. service.
1800 £4,350,000 £772,140 £13,619,079
1801 5,850,000 933,900 16,577,037
1802 3,684,000 773,500 11,833,571
1803 3,120,000 901,140 10,211,378
1804 3,900,000 948,520 12,350,606
1805 4,680,000 1,553,690 15,035,630
1806 4,680,000 1,980,830 18,864,341
1807 5,070,000 2,134,903 17,400,337
1808 5,070,000 2,351,188 18,087,544
1809 3,295,500 2,296,030 19,578,467
1810 3,295,500 1,841,107 18,975,120
1811 3,675,750 2,046,200 19,822,000
1812 3,675,750 1,696,621 19,305,759
1813 3,549,000 2,822,031 20,096,709
1814 3,268,000 2,086,274 19,312,070
1815 2,386,500 2,116,710 19,032,700

It appears from this table that the appropriations for the service, during the first
fifteen years of the present century, amounted to a little less than ninety millions
of dollars per annum; and for the wear and tear of ships, and "the extraordinary
expenses in building and repairing ships, &c.," the annual appropriations
amounted to near thirty millions.
Our own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is impossible to form any
very accurate estimate of the relative cost of construction and repairs of our
men-of-war. The following table, compiled from a report of the Secretary of the
Navy, in 1841, (Senate Doc. No. 223, 26th Congress,) will afford data for an
approximate calculation:—

No. Total cost of building, Cost of repairs,

Name of When Repaired
of exclusive of exclusive of
Ship completed. between
guns armaments, stores, etc. ordnance, etc.
1827
Delaware 74 $543,368.00 1820 $354,132.56 and
1838
1824
N. Carolina 74 431,852.00 1825 317,628.92 and
1836
1833
Constitution 44 302,718.84 1797 266,878.34 and
 1839
1821
United
44 299,336.56 1797 571,972.77 and
States
1841
1826
Brandywine 44 [23]299,218.12 1825 [23]377,665.95 and
1838
1829
Potomac 44 [23]231,013.02 1822 [23] 82,597.03 and
1835
1832
Concord 20 115,325.80 1828 72,796.22 and
1840
1828
Falmouth 20 94,093.27 1827 130,015.43 and
1837
1834
John
20 110,670.69 1829 119,641.93 and
Adams
1837
1826
Boston 20 91,973.19 1825 189,264.37 and
1840
1834
St. Louis 20 102,461.95 1828 135,458.75 and
1839
1830
Vincennes 20 111,512.79 1826 178,094.81 and
1838
1832
Vandalia 20 90,977.88 1828 59,181.34 and
1834
1827
Lexington 20? 114,622.35 1826 83,386.52 and
1837
1830
Warren 20? 99,410.01 1826 152,596.03 and
 1838

1831
Fairfield 20 100,490.35 1826 65,918.26 and
1837
1829
Natches[24] 20? 106,232.19 1827 129,969.80 and
1836
1834
Boxer 10 30,697.88 1831 28,780.48 and
1840
1834
Enterprise 10 27,938.63 1831 20,716.59 and
1840
1825
Grampus 10 23,627.42 1821 96,086.36 and
1840
1839
Dolphin 10 38,522.62 1836 15,013.35 and
1840
1824
Shark 10 23,627.42 1821 93,395.84 and
1839
[23]
Returns incomplete.

[24]
Broken up in 1840.

It appears from the above table, that the cost of constructing ships of the line is
about $6,600 per gun; of frigates, $6,500 per gun; of smaller vessels of war, a
little less than $5,000 per gun: making an average cost of vessels of war to be
more than six thousand dollars per gun. And the expense of repairs for these
vessels is more than seven per cent. per annum on their first cost.
We have as yet had but little experience in the use of war-steamers. The Fulton,
four guns, built in 1838-'39, cost three hundred and thirty-three thousand seven
hundred and seventy dollars and seventy-seven cents; the Mississippi and
Missouri, ten guns each, built in 1841, cost about six hundred thousand dollars a
piece; making an average cost for war-steamers of over sixty thousand dollars
per gun. The cost of repairs of steam ships will be much greater than those for
vessels of war; but we have not yet had sufficient experience to determine the
exact amount. It has been estimated, however, by competent judges, that when
kept, the expense of repairs will at least equal twelve per cent. of the first cost.
The expense of keeping them in commission is enormously great. "Their
engines," says the Secretary of the Navy, in his annual report in 1842, "consume
so much fuel as to add enormously to their expenses; and the necessity that they
should return to port, after short intervals of time, for fresh supplies, renders it
impossible to send them on any distant service. They cannot be relied on as
cruisers, and are altogether too expensive for service in time of peace. I have
therefore determined to take them out of commission, and substitute for them
other and less expensive vessels."
The average cost of permanent fortifications is but little more than three
thousand dollars per gun. And it must be obvious, from the nature of the
materials of which they are constructed, that the expense of their support must be
inconsiderable. It is true that for some years past a large item of annual
expenditure for fortifications has been under the head of "repairs;" but much of
this sum is for alterations and enlargements of temporary and inefficient works,
erected anterior to the war of 1812. Some of it, however, has been for actual
repairs of decayed or injured portions of the forts; these injuries resulting from
the nature of the climate, the foundations, the use of poor materials and poor
workmanship, and from neglect and abandonment. But if we include the risk of
abandonment at times, it is estimated, upon data drawn from past experience,
that one-third of one per cent. per annum, of the first cost, will keep in perfect
repair any of our forts that have been constructed since the last war.
But it is unnecessary to further discuss this question We repeat what has already
been said, no matter what may be the relative cost of ships and forts, the one, as
a general thing, cannot be substituted for the other. Each has its own sphere of
action, and each will contribute, in its own way, to the national defence; and any
undue increase of one, at the expense of the other, will be attended by a
corresponding diminution of national power.[25]
[25]
For further information concerning our system of sea-coast defences, the reader
is referred to House Doc. 206, twenty-sixth Congress, second session; Senate
Doc. 85, twenty-eighth Congress, second session; and to the annual reports of
the Chief Engineer.
 CHAPTER VIII.
OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.

In discussing engineering as a branch of the military art, we spoke of the use of

fortifications on land frontiers, and their influence on the strategic operations of
a campaign. A brief notice was also given of the different systems that have been
proposed for arranging these defensive works. Let us now apply this discussion
to our northern frontier.
The principle laid down by Napoleon and Jomini, "that fortifications should
always be constructed on important strategic points," is undoubtedly the correct
one: but how to determine these points is a question that will often perplex the
patience and try the skill of the engineer; yet determine them he must, or his
fortifications will be worse than useless; for a fort improperly located, like a
cannon with its fire reversed on its own artillerists, will be sure to effect the
destruction of the very forces it was designed to protect.
The selection of positions for fortifications on our northern frontier must have
reference to three distinct classes of objects, viz.: the security, first, of the large
frontier towns, where much public and private property is exposed to sudden
dashing expeditions of the foe, made either on land or by water; second, of lake
harbors, important as places of refuge and security to our own ships, or to the
enemy's fleets while engaged in landing troops or furnishing supplies to an
invading army; third, of all strategic points on the probable lines of offensive or
defensive operations. These objects are distinct in their nature, and would seem
to require separate and distinct means for their accomplishment; nevertheless, it
will generally be found that positions selected with reference to one of these
objects equally fulfil the others, so intimately are they all connected. To
determine the strategic points of a probable line of military operations is
therefore the main thing to be attended to in locating fortifications. That such
points of maximum importance are actually marked out by the peaceful or
hostile intercourse of nations cannot be doubted.
The relative importance of cities and towns is less varied by the fluctuations of
commerce on a land frontier than on the sea-coast. The ever-changing system of
"internal improvements," by furnishing new highways and thoroughfares for the
transportation of the products of manufacturers and agriculture, either
continually varies the relative standing of the seaports already opened, or opens
new ones for the exportation of these products, and the importation of foreign
articles received in exchange. But these "internal improvements" are seldom
carried so far as to connect together two separate and distinct countries, and
consequently the principal places on the dividing line usually retain their relative
importance, no matter how often they may have declined during times of
hostility, or again flourished with the increased commercial intercourse which
results from peace. The principal European places of traffic near the frontiers
have remained the same for ages, and in all probability ages hence the great
frontier marts will be nearly the same as at present. This stability of rank among
border towns is not confined to commercial influence; the same holds true with
respect to that established by intercourse of a hostile character. Military history
teaches us that lines of hostile operations, and the fields upon which the principal
battles between any two countries have been fought, are nearly the same, no
matter how remote the periods of comparison. These points and lines, so
important in commerce as well as in war, result from the natural features of the
ground, and we ought therefore to expect that they would be as little liable to
sudden changes as the character of the earth itself.
From these remarks it will readily be perceived that there are three distinct
methods of determining the strategic points between this country and Canada:
1st, by an examination of the topography of the two countries; 2d, by tracing out
the main channels of commercial intercourse; 3d, by reviewing the lines of their
military operations. The last method is the least liable to error, and perhaps is the
most easily understood, inasmuch as it is sometimes difficult to point out the
precise degree of connection between prospective military lines and the channels
of commerce, or to show why these two have a fixed relation to the physical
features of the country. In the present instance, moreover, this method furnishes
ample data for the formation of our decision, inasmuch as the campaigns
between this country and Canada have been neither few in number nor
unimportant in their character and results.
In tracing out the main features of the early wars upon our northern frontier, it
must be borne in mind that nearly the same portion of country which is now
possessed by the English, was then occupied by the French, and that the English
possessions in North America included the present Middle and Northern States.
At the period of the American revolution the French and English had completely
changed ground, the armies of the former operating in the "States," while the
English were in possession of Canada.
The first expedition to be noticed against that portion of the country, was
conducted by Samuel Argall, who sailed from Virginia in 1613, with a fleet of
eleven vessels, attacked the French on the Penobscot, and afterwards the St.
Croix.
In 1654, Sedgwick, at the head of a small New England army, attacked the
French on the Penobscot, and overrun all Arcadia.
In 1666, during the contest between Charles II. and Louis XIV., it was proposed
to march the New England troops across the country by the Kennebec or
Penobscot, and attack Quebec; but the terrors and difficulties of crossing "over
rocky mountains and howling deserts" were such as to deter them from
undertaking the campaign.
In 1689, Count Frontenac, governor of Canada, made a descent into New York to
assist the French fleet in reducing that province. His line of march was by the
river Sorrel and Lake Champlain. An attack upon Montreal by the Iroquois soon
forced him to return; but in the following January a party of French and Indians
left Montreal in the depth of a Canadian winter, and after wading for two and
twenty days, with provisions on their backs, through snows and swamps and
across a wide wilderness, reached the unguarded village of Schenectady. Here a
midnight war-whoop was raised, and the inhabitants either massacred or driven
half-clad through the snow to seek protection in the neighboring towns.
In 1690, a congress of the colonies, called to provide means for the general
defence, assembled at New York, and resolved to carry war into Canada: an
army was to attack Montreal by way of Lake Champlain, and a fleet to attempt
Quebec by the St. Lawrence. The former advanced as far as the lake, when the
quarrels of the commanding officers defeated the objects of the expedition. The
Massachusetts fleet of thirty-four vessels, (the largest carrying forty-four guns
each,) and two thousand men, failed to reduce Quebec, though the defences of
that place were then of the slightest character, and armed with only twenty-three
guns.
In 1704, and again in 1707, Port Royal was attacked by costly expeditions fitted
out by the eastern colonies; and again, in 1709, a land force of fifteen hundred
men advanced against Montreal by Lake Champlain; but nothing of importance
was effected by either expedition.
In 1711, Lord Bolingbroke planned the conquest of Canada. The land forces,
numbering five thousand men in all, were separated into two distinct armies, the
one sent against Detroit, and the other against Montreal by Lake Champlain;
while a fleet of fifteen ships of war, forty transports, and six store-ships, carrying
a land force of six thousand five hundred men, was to attack Quebec. The
maritime expedition failed to reach its destination, and after losing a part of the
fleet and more than a thousand men in the St. Lawrence, this part of the project
was abandoned. Nor was any thing important accomplished by either division of
the land forces.
The same plan of campaign was followed in 1712. An army of four thousand
men marched against Montreal by Lake Champlain, but on hearing of the failure
of the naval expedition and of the concentration of the French forces on the river
Sorel, they retired towards Albany.
The next expedition of any importance was the naval one of 1745 against
Louisburg. For the attack of this place the colonies raised about four thousand
men, and one hundred small vessels and transports, carrying between one
hundred and sixty and two hundred guns. They were afterwards joined by ten
other vessels carrying near five hundred guns. This attacking force now,
according to some of the English writers, consisted of six thousand provincials,
and eight hundred seamen, and a combined naval force of near seven hundred
guns. The troops landed, and laid siege to the town. The garrison of the
fortifications of Louisburg consisted of six hundred regulars and one thousand
Breton militia, or, according to some writers, of only twelve hundred men in all.
The armament of these works was one hundred and one cannon, seventy-six
swivels, and six mortars. Auxiliary to the main works were an island-battery of
thirty twenty-two-pounders, and a battery on the main land armed with thirty
large cannon. Frequent attempts were made to storm the place, but the most
persevering efforts were of no avail, many of the New Englanders being killed
and wounded, and their boats destroyed, while the garrison remained unharmed.
At length, after a siege of forty-nine days, want of provisions and the general
dissatisfaction of the inhabitants, caused the garrison to surrender. When the
New Englanders saw the strength of the works, and the slight impression which
their efforts had produced, they were not only elated but greatly astonished at
their success. It should be noticed, that in the above attack the number of guns in
the fleet was almost three times as great as that of all the forts combined; and yet
the naval part of the attack was unsuccessful. The besieging army was more than
four times as great as all the garrisons combined; and yet the place held out
forty-nine days, and at last was surrendered through the want of provisions and
the disaffection of the citizens. This place was soon afterwards restored to the
French.
We see that, thus far in these wars, the English were vastly superior in strength
and numbers, yet the result of the several campaigns was decidedly in favor of
the French, who not only retained their possessions in the North, but extended
their jurisdiction to the mouth of the Mississippi, and laid claim to the whole
country west of the Alleghany mountains. This success must be attributed, not to
any superiority of the Canadians in bravery, but to the higher military character
of their governors, and more especially to their fortifications, which were
constructed in situations most judiciously selected, to influence the Indians and
facilitate incursions into the English colonies. The French pursued interior and
central lines, while the English followed exterior and divergent lines. The
disparity of numbers was always very great. At the beginning of the eighteenth
century, the whole population of the colonies amounted to upwards of one
million of souls, while that of both Canada and Louisiana did not exceed fifty-
two thousand. But the French possessions, though situated at the extremities of a
continent and separated by an almost boundless wilderness, were nevertheless
connected by a line of military posts, strong enough to resist the small arms that
could then be brought against them. This fort-building propensity of the French
became a matter of serious alarm to the colonies, and in 1710 the legislature of
New York especially protested against it in an address to the crown. While the
military art was stationary in England, France had produced her four great
engineers—Errard, Pagan, Vauban, and Cormontaigne; and nowhere has the
influence of their system of military defence been more strikingly exhibited than
in the security it afforded to the Canadian colony, when assailed by such vastly
superior British forces. Still further accessions were now made to these English
forces by large reinforcements from the mother country, while the Canadians
received little or no assistance from France; nevertheless they prolonged the war
till 1760, forcing the English to adopt at last the slow and expensive process of
reducing all their fortifications. This will be shown in the following outline of
the several campaigns.
Very early in 1755, a considerable body of men was sent from Great Britain to
reinforce their troops in this country. These troops were again separated into four
distinct armies. The first, consisting of near two thousand men, marched to the
attack of Fort Du Quesne, but was met and totally defeated by one-half that
number of French and Indians. The second division, of fifteen hundred,
proceeded to attack Fort Niagara by way of Oswego, but returned without
success. The third, of three thousand seven hundred men, met and defeated
Dieskau's army of twelve hundred regulars and six hundred Canadians and
Indians, in the open field, but did not attempt to drive him from his works at
Ticonderoga and Crown Point. The fourth, consisting of three thousand three
hundred men and forty-one vessels, laid waste a portion of Nova Scotia; thus
ending the campaign without a single important result. It was commenced under
favorable auspices, with ample preparations, and a vast superiority of force; but
this superiority was again more than counterbalanced by the faulty plans of the
English, and by the fortifications which the French had erected, in such positions
as to give them a decided advantage in their military operations. Washington
early recommended the same system of defence for the English on the Ohio;
and, after Braddock's defeat, advised "the erection of small fortresses at
convenient places to deposit provisions in, by which means the country will be
eased of an immense expense in the carriage, and it will also be a means of
securing a retreat if we should be put to the rout again."
But this advice of Washington was unheeded, and the campaign of 1756 was
based upon the same erroneous principles as the preceding one. The first
division, of three thousand men, was to operate against Fort Du Quesne; the
second, of six thousand men, against Niagara; the third, of ten thousand men,
against Crown Point; and a fourth, of two thousand men, was to ascend the
Kennebec river, destroy the settlements on the Chaudiere, and, by alarming the
country about Quebec, produce a diversion in favor of the third division, which
was regarded as the main army, and was directed along the principal line of
operations. The entire French forces at this time consisted of only three thousand
regulars and a body of Canadian militia. Nevertheless, the English, with forces
nearly six times as numerous, closed the campaign without gaining a single
advantage.
We here see that the French, with very inferior forces, still continued successful
in every campaign, uniformly gaining advantage over their enemy, and gaining
ground upon his colonies. By the possession of Forts William Henry,
Ticonderoga, and Crown Point, they completely commanded Lake George and
Lake Champlain, which afforded the shortest and easiest line of communication
between the British colonies and Canada. By means of their forts at Montreal,
Frontenac, Detroit, &c., they had entire dominion of the lakes connecting the St.
Lawrence with the Mississippi, and Canada with Louisiana; moreover, by means
of Fort Du Quesne and a line of auxiliary works, their ascendency over the
Indians on the Ohio was well secured. But experience had at length taught the
English wherein lay the great strength of their opponents, and a powerful effort
was now to be made to displace the French from their fortresses, or at least to
counterbalance these works by a vast and overwhelming superiority of troops.
In 1757, a British fleet of fifteen ships of the line, eighteen frigates, and many
smaller vessels, and a land force of twelve thousand effective men, were sent to
attempt the reduction of the fortifications of Louisburg; but they failed to effect
their object.
In 1758 the forces sent against this place consisted of twenty ships of the line
and eighteen frigates, with an army of fourteen thousand men. The harbor was
defended by only five ships of the line, one fifty-gun ship, and five frigates,
three of which were sunk across the mouth of the basin. The fortifications of the
town had been much neglected, and in general had fallen into ruins. The garrison
consisted of only two thousand five hundred regulars, and six hundred militia.
Notwithstanding that the number of guns of the British fleet exceeded both the
armaments of the French ships and of all the forts, these British ships did not risk
an attack, but merely acted as transports and as a blockading squadron. Even the
French naval defence, and the outer works commanding the harbor, were
reduced by the temporary land-batteries which Wolfe erected; and the main
work, although besieged by an inequality of forces of nearly five to one, held out
for two months, and even then surrendered through the fears and petitions of the
non-combatant inhabitants, and not because it had received any material injury
from the besiegers. The defence, however, had been continued long enough to
prevent, for that campaign, any further operations against Canada. The whole
number of the English land forces in this campaign was computed at fifty
thousand men, of which more than forty thousand were in the field. The first
division, of nine thousand men, was directed against Fort Du Quesne, whose
garrison did not exceed as many hundred. The second division, of sixteen
thousand effective troops, proceeded against Ticonderoga and Crown Point;
while a detachment of three thousand men captured Fort Frontenac, then
garrisoned by only one hundred and ten men. The whole force of the French
amounted to only five thousand; the English attempted to drive them from their
works by storm, but were repulsed with a loss of near two thousand men, while
their opponents were scarcely injured. The third division acted, as has just been
stated, in concert with the naval force against Louisburg.
In 1759, the western division of the English army, consisting of a strong body of
Indians, and five thousand troops, wasted the whole season in reducing Fort
Niagara, which was garrisoned by only six hundred men. The central column of
thirteen thousand men was sufficiently successful to enable it to winter at Crown
Point. The eastern division of eight thousand men under Wolfe ascended the St.
Lawrence with a fleet of twenty-two ships, thirteen frigates, and fourteen sloops,
and smaller vessels, carrying one thousand nine hundred and ninety guns, and
five thousand five hundred and ninety seamen. The naval defence of Quebec
consisted of eight frigates, carrying two hundred and ten guns; the land forces
numbered about nine thousand, and the fortifications were armed with ninety-
four guns and five mortars, only a part of which could be brought to bear upon
the anchorage ground. Several attempts were made by the combined forces to
carry these works, but they proved equally unsuccessful. Although the English
fleet carried twenty times as many guns as the forts, their inability to reduce
these works was acknowledged. The siege had continued for two months, and
still the fortifications were uninjured. General Wolfe himself distinctly stated,
that, in any further attempt to carry the place, the "guns of the shipping could not
be of much use;" and the chief engineer of the expedition gave it as his opinion,
that "the ships would receive great damage from the shot and bombs of the upper
batteries, without making the least impression upon them." Under these
circumstances it was finally determined to endeavor to decoy Montcalm from his
works, and make him risk a battle in the open field. In an evil hour, the French
consented to forego the advantages of their fortifications, and the contest was
finally decided on the plains of Abraham, with forces nearly equal in number.
Both Wolfe and Montcalm fell in this battle, but the former on the field of
victory; and five days afterwards the inhabitants of Quebec, weakened and
dispirited by their losses, surrendered the town, although its fortifications were
still unharmed.
The French, in this campaign, had relinquished all idea of opposing the enemy in
the open field, and confined their efforts to retard the advance of the English till
France could send troops to their relief; but no such relief came, and when the
campaign of 1760 opened, the little French army was concentrated at Montreal.
As the English divisions advanced, one by Oswego, one by Lake Champlain,
and the third by Quebec, they afforded to the French a fine opportunity for the
strategic movement from a centre against converging lines; but the garrison was
too weak to hope for success in either direction, and therefore awaited the enemy
within their works. Montreal, being but slightly fortified, was soon reduced, and
with it fell the French empire erected in this country at infinite labor and
expense.
At the first outbreak of the American Revolution, it was so obviously important
to get possession of the military works commanding the line of Lake Champlain,
that expeditions for this purpose were simultaneously fitted out by
Massachusetts and Connecticut. The garrisons of these works were taken by
surprise. This conquest, says Botta, the able and elegant historian of the
Revolution, "was no doubt of high importance, but it would have had a much
greater influence upon the course of the whole war, if these fortresses, which are
the bulwarks of the colonies, had been defended in times following, with the
same prudence and valor with which they had been acquired."
In the campaign of 1775, an army of two thousand seven hundred and eighty-
four effective men, with a reserve of one thousand at Albany, crossed the lake
and approached the fortress of St. John's about the 1st of September. The work
was garrisoned by only about five or six hundred regulars, and some two
hundred militia. This was the only obstacle to prevent the advance of our army
into the very heart of Canada; to leave it unreduced in rear would cut off all hope
of retreat. Allen had already made the rash and foolish attempt, and his whole
army had been destroyed, and he himself made prisoner. The reduction of this
place was therefore deemed absolutely necessary, but was not effected till the 3d
of November, and after a long and tedious siege. This delay decided the fate of
the campaign; for, although Montreal fell immediately afterwards, the season
was so far advanced that a large portion of our troops, wearied with their
sufferings from cold and want of clothing, now demanded their discharge. The
eastern division, of one thousand men under Arnold, crossing the country by the
Kennebeck and Chaudiere, through difficulties and suffering almost
unparalleled, arrived opposite Quebec on the 9th of November. The place was at
this time almost without defence, and, had Arnold possessed a suitable pontoon
equipage, it might easily have been taken by surprise. But by the time that the
means for effecting a passage could be prepared, and a junction could be effected
between the two American armies, Quebec was prepared to sustain their attack.
The result of that attack is too well known to require a repetition here.
Early the next season it was deemed necessary to withdraw the American army
from Canada. This retreat of undisciplined troops, in the presence of vastly
superior numbers of the enemy, would have been extremely hazardous had it not
been effected on a line of forts which were held by our own troops. As it was we
sustained no considerable loss.
Carleton pursued on rapidly, to co-operate with General Howe, who was now
lying at New York with over one hundred ships and about thirty-five thousand
troops; but he received a decided check from the guns of Ticonderoga, and
retired again to Canada.
By the British plan of campaign in 1777, the entire force of their northern army
was to concentrate at Albany. One division of fifteen hundred men, including
Indians, advanced by Oswego, Wood Creek, and the Mohawk; but Fort Stanwix,
with a garrison of only six hundred men, arrested their progress and forced them
to return. Another, leaving New York, ascended the Hudson as far as Esopus; but
its progress was so much retarded by the small forts and water-batteries along
that river, that it would have been too late to assist Burgoyne, even if it could
possibly have reached Albany. The principal division of the enemy's army,
numbering about nine thousand men, advanced by the Champlain route. Little or
no preparations were made to arrest its progress. The works of Ticonderoga were
so out of repair as to be indefensible on the flanks. Its garrison consisted of only
fifteen hundred continental troops, and about as many militia, over whom the
general had no control. Their supply of provisions was exhausted, and only one
man in ten of the militia had bayonets to their guns. Under these circumstances it
was deemed best to withdraw the garrison six days after the investment.
Burgoyne now advanced rapidly, but with so little precaution as to leave his
communications in rear entirely unprotected. Being repulsed by the American
forces collected at Saratoga, his line of supplies cut off by our detached forts, his
provisions exhausted, his troops dispirited, and his Indian allies having deserted
him, retreat became impossible, and his whole army was forced to capitulate.
This campaign closed the military operations on our northern frontier during the
war of the Revolution.
We now come to the war of 1812. In the beginning of this war the number of
British regulars in the Canadas did not exceed three thousand men, who were
scattered along a frontier of more than nine hundred miles in extent. In the whole
of Upper Canada there were but seven hundred and twenty men, and at
Montreal, Three Rivers, and on the whole line of the Sorel the whole defensive
force amounted to only thirteen hundred and thirty men, and the garrison of
Quebec was so small, that no detachment could be made without great
inconvenience and danger. The fortifications of Isle aux Noix, then emphatically
the key of central Canada, was without a garrison during nearly the whole of the
first campaign. Under these circumstances an American force of fifteen hundred
or two thousand men marching rapidly from Albany, might readily have broken
the enemy's line of defence, and cut off all Upper Canada from supplies and
reinforcements from England by way of Quebec. Let us see what course was
pursued.
On the 1st of June an army of two thousand men was collected at Dayton, in
Ohio, placed under the command of an imbecile old officer of the Revolution,
and directed by Detroit against the Canadian Peninsula. The dilatory march,
absurd movements, and traitorous surrender of Hull's army to a British force of
three hundred regulars and four hundred militia, are but too well known. Another
American army of about ten thousand men was afterwards raised in the west; the
main division of this army under Harrison marched by three separate routes to
invade Canada by way of Malden; but they failed to reach their destination, and
wintered behind the river Portage. The Eastern army was collected at Albany in
the early part of the summer and placed under the command of General
Dearborn, another old officer of the Revolution. Instead of pushing this force
rapidly forward upon the strategic line of Lake Champlain, the general was
directed to divide it into three parts, and to send one division against the Niagara
frontier, a second against Kingston, and a third against Montreal. These orders
were dispatched from Washington the 26th of June, nearly a month after Hull
had begun his march from Dayton. Dearborn's army, on the first of September,
consisted of six thousand five hundred regulars and seven thousand militia—
thirteen thousand five hundred in all: six thousand three hundred for the Niagara
frontier, two thousand two hundred at Sacketts Harbor, and five thousand for
Lake Champlain. Even with this absurd plan of campaign and faulty division of
the forces, we might have succeeded if the general had acted with energy, so
exceedingly weak were the Canadian means of defence; but instead of taking
advantage of his superiority in numbers and the favorable circumstances of the
time, he entered into an armistice with the British general, and his whole army of
thirteen thousand five hundred men lay inactive till the 13th of October, when
the absurd project of crossing the Niagara at Lewiston failed, because the New-
York militia had constitutional scruples against crossing a river so long as the
enemy were on the other side. The Lake Champlain column, consisting of three
thousand regulars and two thousand militia, a considerable portion of which had
been collected as early as the first of August, had in four months advanced as far
as La Cole river, a distance of about two hundred miles from Albany. The
unimportant action at this place terminated the campaign, and the army of the
North returned to winter-quarters.
All the early part of the campaign of 1813, on the northern frontier, was spent in
a war of detachments, in which our troops captured Fort George and York, and
repelled the predatory excursions of the enemy. In these operations our troops
exhibited much courage and energy, and the young officers who led them, no
little skill and military talent. But nothing could have been more absurd than for
a general, with superior forces in the vicinity of an enemy, to act only by
detachments at a time when his opponents were daily increasing in number. This
useless war of outposts and detachments was continued till July, when General
Dearborn was recalled, and General Wilkinson, another old officer of the
Revolution, put in his place. It was now determined to make a push for
Montreal, with the combined forces of the Northern army. Wilkinson, with 8,000
men, descended the St. Lawrence, but did not reach Prescott till the 6th of
November, thus affording to the English plenty of leisure to prepare for his
reception. Hampton, another old officer of the Revolution, ascended Lake
Champlain with another column of 4,000 men, but refused to form any co-
operation with Wilkinson, and after the unimportant combat of Chrystler's Field,
the whole army again retired to winter-quarters.
In the mean time the army of the West, under Harrison, who was assisted by the
military skill and science of McCrea and Wood, and the bravery of Croghan and
Johnson, held in check the British and Indians; and the battle of the Thames and
the victory of Lake Erie formed a brilliant termination to the campaign in that
quarter. Had such victories been gained on the Montreal or eastern portion of the
frontier, they would have led to the most important results.
The plan of operations for the campaign of 1814 was of the same diverse and
discordant character as before. But the command of the troops had now fallen
into the hands of young and energetic officers, and Brown, assisted by such men
as Wood, McCrea, Scott, Ripley, Miller, soon gained the victories of Fort Erie,
Chippewa, and Lundy's Lane; while McComb and McDonough drove back the
enemy from the line of Lake Champlain. With these operations terminated the
Northern campaign of 1814, the last which has been conducted on that frontier.
Let us now turn to the system of works projected for the defence of this line.
The first works are at the Falls of St. Mary, on the western extremity of the line.
The second works are at Mackinaw.
The third works are at the foot of Lake Huron.
The fourth works are near Detroit.
The fifth works are near Buffalo.
The sixth works are at the mouth of the Niagara river.
The seventh works are at Oswego.
The eighth works are at Sacketts Harbor.
The ninth works are below Ogdensburg.
The tenth works are at Rouse's Point.
The eleventh works are near the head-waters of the Kennebec or the Penobscot.
The twelfth works are at Calais, on the St. Croix.
All these works are small, and simple in their character, well calculated to assist
the operations of armed forces in the field, but incapable of resisting a protracted
siege. They are entirely different in their character from those on the coast, the
latter being intended principally for the use of our citizen-soldiery, in the defence
of our seaport towns, while the former are intended merely as auxiliaries to the
operations of more disciplined troops.
This system of defence for our Northern frontier has been much commented on
by men professing some knowledge of the military art, and various opinions
have been advanced respecting its merits. Some have thought that more and
larger works should be placed on the western extremity of this line; others attach
by far the greatest importance to the central or Montreal portion of the frontier;
while others, again, attach a higher value to the eastern extremity of the line.
These last would have us concentrate our main forces on the head-waters of the
Kennebec and the Penobscot, and then advance upon Quebec, a distance of some
250 miles, along the isolated carriage-road, through the valley of the Chaudiere.
Here is only a single road, but little travelled, and penetrating a wide and almost
uninhabited wilderness. General Jomini says emphatically, that a line of
operations should always offer two or three roads for the movement of an army
in the sphere of its enterprises,—an insuperable objection to the Kennebec route,
except as a diversion to the main attack. But there are still stronger objections to
this route, than its want of feasibility for the transportation of the main army; for
even should that army succeed in reaching Quebec in safety, the expedition
would be entirely without military results, unless that fortress could be
immediately reduced,—a contingency which would be extremely doubtful under
the most favorable circumstances; and even should we be ever so fortunate in
our operations, the siege of such a place would occupy a considerable length of
time. It would be throwing our forces along the most difficult line of operations,
against the strongest point in the enemy's line of defence, and making the
success of the whole plan depend upon the contingency of a reduction, in a few
days, of one of the strongest fortresses in the world. What principle in military
science would justify such a plan of campaign? We are fully aware of the great
advantages to be derived from the reduction of Quebec; and we are also aware of
the great difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to accomplish that object.
It may, and probably will ere long, be made to surrender to our arms; but it
would be utter folly to base our military operations on the contingency of a short
and successful siege. By advancing upon Montreal by the Lake Champlain route,
we could cut off the Canadian forces in the West from all reinforcements; and
then, as circumstances might direct, could besiege Quebec, or attack the enemy
in the field, or perhaps, manœuvring as the French did at the siege of Mantua,
accomplish both objects at the same time.
We have seen that it was one of Napoleon's maxims that an army should choose
the shortest and most direct line of operations, which should either pierce the
enemy's line of defence, or cut off his communications with his base. It is the
opinion of men of the best military talent in our army that the Lake Champlain
line satisfies all these conditions at the same time;—that it is the most direct,
most feasible, and most decisive line which can be pursued in case of operations
against Canada; and that it is indispensable to success in war that this line be
well fortified in time of peace. All agree that the St. Lawrence above Quebec
constitutes the key point of the enemy's defence, and the objective point towards
which all our operations should be directed. To reach this point, all our Boards of
Engineers have deemed it best to collect our troops at Albany and advance by
Lake Champlain, a distance of only two hundred miles. Besides the advantages
of a good water communication the whole distance for the transportation of
military stores, there are several roads on each side, all concentrating on this line
within our own territory. It has already been shown by the brief sketch of our
northern wars, that this line has been the field of strife and blood for fifteen
campaigns. Nature has marked it out as our shortest and easiest line of
intercourse with Canada, both in peace and war. Military diversions will always
be made on the eastern and western extremities of this frontier, and important
secondary or auxiliary operations be carried on by the eastern and western
routes; but until we overthrow the whole system of military science as
established by the Romans, revived by Frederick and practised and improved by
Napoleon, the central and interior line, under all ordinary circumstances, will
furnish the greatest probabilities of success.
If the line of Lake Champlain is, as we have endeavored to show, the most
important line in the north; its security by fortifications is a matter of the greatest
interest. The works recommended by the Board, consist of a single fort, costing
$600,000, at Rouse's Point, on the extreme frontier, and unfortified dépôts at
Plattsburg and Albany. But is this sufficient to accomplish the object? If the
hostile army should pass the extreme frontier barrier, what is to retard his
advance,—what defensive works are to protect the débouché of the Northern
canal, or even to save the great central dépôt? We know of no foreign engineer
who has recommended less than three lines of fortifications for the security of a
land frontier; and Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and General Jomini, agree in
recommending at least this number of lines. There may be circumstances that
render it unnecessary to resort to a three-fold defence throughout the whole
extent of our northern frontier; but upon our main line of communication with
Canada,—a line of maximum importance both to us and to the enemy, we know
of no reason for violating the positive rules of the art,—rules which have been
established for ages; and sanctioned by the best engineers and greatest generals
of modern times.
Ticonderoga has more than once stayed the waves of northern invasion; and we
know of no change in the art of war, or in the condition of the country, that
renders less important than formerly the advantages of an intermediate point of
support between Albany and the Canadian lines. Indeed it would seem that the
connection of the Hudson with the lake by the northern canal had even increased
the value of such a point.
It would seem, moreover, that the great value of a central dépôt near Albany
would warrant a resort to the best means of security which can be afforded by
defensive works. Here we already have one of our largest arsenals of
construction; here are to be located magazines for the collection and deposit, in
time of peace, of gunpowder; here, in time of war, is to be formed the grand
military dépôt for our whole northern armies; and here is the point of junction of
the lines of communication of our northern and eastern states, and the great
central rallying point where troops are to be collected for the defence of our
northern frontier, or for offensive operations against Canada. Such a place
should never be exposed to the coup-de-main of an enemy. The chance
operations of a defensive army are never sufficient for the security of so
important a position. We do not here pretend to say what its defences should be.
Perhaps strong têtes-de-pont on the Mohawk and Hudson rivers, and detached
works on the several lines of communication, may accomplish the desired
object; perhaps more central and compact works may be found necessary. But
we insist on the importance of securing this position by some efficient means.
The remarks of Napoleon, (which have already been given,) on the advantages to
be derived from fortifying such a central place, where the military wealth of a
nation can be secured, are strikingly applicable to this case.
But let us look for a moment at what is called the western plan of defence for our
northern frontier.
Certain writers and orators of the western states, in their plans of military
defence, would have the principal fortifications of the northern frontier
established on Lake Erie, the Detroit river, the St. Clair, and Lake Huron; and the
money proposed for the other frontier and coast works, expended in establishing
military and naval dépôts at Memphis and Pittsburg, and in the construction of a
ship-canal from the lower Illinois to Lake Michigan,—for the purpose of
obtaining the naval control of the northern lakes.
It is said that British military and steam naval forces will ascend the St.
Lawrence to Lake Ontario; that to counteract these operations we must build an
opposition steam-navy at Pittsburg and Memphis, and collect out troops on the
Ohio and Mississippi, ascend the Mississippi and Illinois, Lake Michigan, Lake
Huron, and the Georgian Bay, cross over to the Ottawa by French river and Lake
Nipissing, or Moon river and the Muskago, then descend the Ottawa river to
Montreal. But as there might be some difficulty in conveying their war-steamers
over some twelve or fifteen portages between the Georgian Bay and the Ottawa,
and as the upper waters of that river are not navigable by such craft, it has, by
some of the military writers before alluded to, been deemed preferable to
descend Lake Huron, St. Clair river and lake, run the gauntlet past the British
forts on the Detroit, descend Lake Erie and the Niagara[26] into Lake Ontario, so
as to meet the English as they come steaming up the St. Lawrence!
[26]
How they are to pass the Falls was not determined either by Harry Bluff or the
Memphis Convention.

It is agreed upon all sides that the British must first collect their forces at
Quebec, and then pass along the line of the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario to
reach the Niagara and Detroit frontiers. Our boards of engineers have deemed it
best to collect troops on the Champlain line, and, by penetrating between
Montreal and Quebec, separate the enemy's forces and cut off all the remainder
of Canada from supplies and reinforcements from England. But it has been
discovered by certain western men that to cut the trunk of a tree is not the proper
method of felling it: we must climb to the top and pinch the buds, or, at most, cut
off a few of the smaller limbs. To blow up a house, we should not place the mine
under the foundation, but attach it to one of the shingles of the roof! We have
already shown that troops collected at Albany may reach the great strategic point
on the St. Lawrence by an easy and direct route of two hundred miles; but forces
collected at Pittsburg and Memphis must pass over a difficult and unfrequented
route of two thousand miles.
Our merchant marine on the lakes secures to us a naval superiority in that quarter
at the beginning of a war; and our facilities for ship-building are there equal if
not superior to any possessed by the enemy. The only way, therefore, in which
our ascendency on the lakes can be lost, is by the introduction of steam craft
from the Atlantic. The canals and locks constructed for this object will pass
vessels of small dimensions and drawing not over eight and a half feet water.
How are we to prevent the introduction of these Atlantic steamers into our lakes?
Shall we, at the first opening of hostilities, march with armed forces upon the
enemy's line of artificial communication and blow up the locks of their ship-
canals, thus meeting the enemy's marine at the very threshold of its introduction
into the interior seas; or shall we build opposition steam-navies at Pittsburg and
Memphis, some two thousand miles distant, and then expend some forty or fifty
millions[27] in opening an artificial channel to enable them to reach Lake
Ontario, after its borders have been laid waste by the hostile forces? Very few
disinterested judges would hesitate in forming their opinion on this question.[28]
[27]
The construction of the Illinois ship-canal, for vessels of eight and a half feet
draught, is estimated at fifteen millions; to give the same draught to the
Mississippi and lower Illinois, would require at least ten millions more; a ship
canal of the corresponding draught around Niagara Falls, will cost, say, ten
millions; the navy yard at Memphis, with docks, storehouses, &c., will cost
about two millions, and steamers sent thence to the lakes will cost about fifty
thousand dollars per gun. On the other hand, the military defences which it is
deemed necessary to erect in time of peace for the security of the Champlain
frontier, will cost only about two thousand dollars per gun; the whole
expenditure not exceeding, at most, two millions of dollars!
It is not to be denied that a water communication between the Mississippi and
the northern lakes will have great commercial advantages, and that, in case of a
protracted war, auxiliary troops and military stores may be drawn from the
valley of the Mississippi to assist the North and East in preventing any great
accessions to the British military forces in the Canadas. We speak only of the
policy of expending vast sums of money on this military (?) project, to the
neglect of matters of more immediate and pressing want. We have nothing to say
of its character as a commercial project, or of the ultimate military advantages
that might accrue from such a work. We speak only of the present condition and
wants of the country, and not of what that condition and those wants may be
generations hence!

[28]
There are no books devoted exclusively to the subjects embraced in this chapter;
but the reader will find many remarks on the northern frontier defences in the
histories of the war of 1812, in congressional reports, (vide House Doc. 206,
XXVIth Congress, 2d session; and Senate Doc., No. 85, XXVIIIth Congress, 2d
session,) and in numerous pamphlets and essays that have appeared from the
press within the last few years.
 CHAPTER IX.
ARMY ORGANIZATION—STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS.

By the law of the 12th of December, 1790, on the organization of the public
force of France, the Army was defined, "A standing force drawn from the public
force, and designed to act against external enemies." [Une force habituelle
extraite de la force publique, et destinée essentiellement à agir contre les
ennemis du dehors.]
In time of peace, the whole organized military force of the State is intended
when we speak of the army; but in time of war this force is broken up into two or
more fractions, each of which is called an army. These armies are usually named
from the particular duty which may be assigned to them—as, army of invasion,
army of occupation, army of observation, army of reserve, &c.; or from the
country or direction in which they operate—as, army of the North, of the South,
of Mexico, of Canada, of the Rhine, &c.; or from the general who commands it
—as, the army of Soult, army of Wellington, army of Blücher, &c.
All modern armies are organized on the same basis. They are made up of a Staff
and Administrative departments, and four distinct arms—Infantry, Cavalry,
Artillery, and Engineers; each having distinct duties, but all combining to form
one and the same military body. In the actual operations of a campaign, these
forces are formed into corps d'armée, each corps d'armée being composed of
two or more grand-divisions; each grand-division, of two or more brigades; and
each brigade, of several companies, squadrons, or batteries.
In speaking of an army in the field, it is sometimes supposed to be divided into
two classes of men—the Staff and the line. We here include in the first class—
All officers, of whatever arm, above the rank of colonel;
All officers of the staff corps of whatever grade, and
All officers attached to the staff as aides, &c.;
All officers of the administrative departments;
All officers of artillery and engineer staffs;
The corps of geographical or topographical engineers, and
The guards.
In the second class are included all troops, of whatever arm, which belong to the
active army, in infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers. All troops on detached
service, such as recruiting, guarding posts and dépôts, escorting convoys, &c., as
well as all sedentary corps, garrisons of fortified places, &c., are not regarded in
this classification as composing any part of the line of the army.
Troops of the line is a term applied only to such troops as form the principal line
on the battle-field, viz:—The heavy infantry and heavy cavalry. These are
technically called infantry of the line, and cavalry of the line. In this sense of the
term, light infantry, light cavalry or dragoons, artillery, and engineers, are not
classed as troops of the line. But this distinction is now pretty much fallen into
disuse, and the division of an army into Staff and Administrative departments,
and four arms of service—Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers—is now
regarded as the most convenient, from being precise and definite in its meaning.
The general staff of an army includes all general officers of the army, and such
officers of lower grades as are attached to this general duty, instead of serving
with troops, or on special administrative duty. The general officers are—1st, the
generalissimo, or commander-in -chief; 2d, generals, or marshals, as they are
called in France, or field-marshals and generals of infantry and cavalry, as they
are called in England and the northern states of Europe; 3d, lieutenant-generals;
4th, generals of division, or major-generals, as they are called in England; 5th,
generals of brigade, or brigadier-generals, as they are sometimes called;—
colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, ensigns, and cornets or cadets, are also
either attached to the staff, or form a part of the staff corps. The titles of
"adjutant-general," and of "inspector-general," are given to staff officers selected
for these special services, either in the general staff or in the several corps
d'armée. No special rank is attached to these offices themselves, and the grade of
those who hold them is fixed by some special rule, or by their general rank in the
army.
In the war of the Revolution, Washington held the rank of General, and in 1798
the rank of Lieutenant-general. In the war of 1812, the highest grade held by any
of our officers was that of General of Division, or Major-general, as it was
called. The highest grade in our army at the present time is called Major-general
—a title that properly belongs, not to the general of an army, but to the chief of
staff. Hamilton had this title when chief of Washington's staff; Berthier and Soult
when chief of Napoleon's staff, the former till the close of the campaign of 1814,
and the latter in the Waterloo campaign. General Jomini first greatly
distinguished himself as chief of Ney's staff, and afterwards on the staff of the
Emperor of Russia. Other generals have owed much of their success to the chiefs
of their staff:—Pichegru to Regnier, Moreau to Dessoles, Kutusof to Toll,
Barclay to Diebitsch, and Blücher to Sharnharst and Gneisenau.
The generalissimo or commander-in-chief of an army is the person designated
by the law of the land to take charge of the organized military forces of the state.
In this country the President, through his Secretary of War, exercises this general
command. In England, Wellington acts in the capacity of commander-in-chief of
all the British military forces. In France, the Minister of War, under the king, has
this general direction. In other European services, some prince of the blood, or
distinguished general, exercises the functions of generalissimo.
An active army in the field should be commanded by a general, or, as is done in
some European countries, by a marshal. These may be regarded as of assimilated
rank.
A corps d'armée should, be commanded by a Lieutenant-general. This rule is
almost universal in Europe. The number of marshals in France under Napoleon
was so great, that officers of this grade were often assigned to corps d'armée.
A grand division of an army should be commanded by a General of Division. In
England, the assimilated grade is that of major-general, and in France at the
present time, the younger lieutenant-generals, or the maréchaux-de-camp,
command divisions.
A brigade should be commanded by a Brigadier-general. At the present time in
the French service, maréchaux-de-camp act as commanders of brigades.
The several corps d'armée are designated by numbers, 1st, 2d, 3d, &c., and in
the same way the several divisions in each corps d'armée, and the several
brigades in each division.
When the number of troops are placed on a war footing, each corps d'armée
ordinarily contains from twenty to thirty thousand men.
The command of these several corps d'armée, divisions, and brigades, is taken
by the officers of the corresponding grades according to seniority of rank, and
without reference to arms, unless otherwise directed by the generalissimo, who
should always have the power to designate officers for special commands.
The chief of staff of an army is usually selected from the grade next below that of
the general commanding, and receives the title, for the time being, which is used
to designate this special rank. In some European armies, and formerly in our
own service, this officer was called major-general. In France, if the
generalissimo commands in person, a marshal is made chief of staff with the
temporary title of major-général; but if a marshal commands the army, a
lieutenant -general or maréchal-de-camp becomes chief of staff with the title of
aide-major-général. The chiefs of staff of corps d'armée and of divisions, are
selected in precisely the same way.
The position assigned by the commanding general for the residence of his staff,
is denominated the General Head-Quarter of the army; that of a corps d'armée
staff, the Head-Quarters of [1st or 2d, &c.] corps d'armée; that of a division, the
Head-Quarters of [1st or 2d, &c.] division, [1st or 2d, &c.] corps d'armée.
The petty staffs of regiments, squadrons, &c., consisting of an adjutant, sergeant-
major, &c., are especially organized by the commandants of the regiments, &c.,
and have no connection whatever with the general staff of an army. Of course,
then, they are not embraced in the present discussion.
The subordinate officers of the staff of an army, in time of war, are charged with
important and responsible duties connected with the execution of the orders of
their respective chiefs. But in time of peace, they are too apt to degenerate into
fourth-rate clerks of the Adjutant-general's department, and mere military
dandies, employing their time in discussing the most unimportant and really
contemptible points of military etiquette, or criticising the letters and dispatches
of superior officers, to see whether the wording of the report or the folding of the
letter exactly corresponds to the particular regulation applicable to the case. Such
was the character given to the first staff of Wellington, and a similar class of men
composed the staff of the army of Italy when it was abolished by Napoleon and a
new one formed in its place. There are also some officers of this stamp in our
own service, but they are regarded by the army with universal contempt. The
staff of our army requires a new and different organization, and should be
considerably enlarged.
The following is the composition of a regularly organized general staff in the
French service, for an army of forty or fifty thousand men divided into two corps
d'armée and a reserve.
1st. The marshal (or general) commanding-in-chief; and one colonel or
lieutenant-colonel, one major, three captains and three subalterns, as aides-de-
camp.
2d. A lieutenant-general as chief-of-staff, with the title of major-general, assisted
by one colonel or lieutenant-colonel, three majors, five captains, and one
subaltern, as aides-de-camp.
3d. Three lieutenant-generals, commanding the corps d'armée and reserve. Each
of these will be assisted by aides in the same way as the major-general, and each
will also have his regularly-organized staff of corps d'armée, with a general of
division or general of brigade as chief.
4th. Six or nine generals commanding divisions, each having his own distinct
and separately organized staff. In the French army, the staff of an officer
commanding a division is composed of one colonel, two majors, three captains,
and six subalterns.
5th. Twelve or more generals of brigade, each having one captain, and one
subaltern for aides.
6th. There is also attached to the staff of the general-in-chief of the army, the
commandants of artillery and engineers, with several subordinates, inspector-
generals, and the ranking officers of each of the administrative departments, with
their assistants.
The generals select their aides and assistants from the staff corps, or from either
of the four arms of service.
The troops of these arms may be distributed as follows:

52 battalions of infantry, 35,000 men.

42 squadrons of horse 6,500
13 batteries of artillery, (4 mounted and 9 foot,) 2,500
5 companies of sappers, 2 of pontoniers,[29] and 1 of artificers 1,500
45,500
[29]
One bridge-equipage is required for each corps d'armée.

If we add to these the staff, and the several officers and employés of the
administrative departments, we have an army of nearly fifty thousand men.
This, it will be remembered, is the organization of an army in the field; in the
entire military organization of a state, the number of staff officers will be still
higher.
In 1788, France, with a military organization for about three hundred and twenty
thousand men, had eighteen marshals, two hundred and twenty-five lieutenant-
generals, five hundred and thirty-eight maréchaux-de-camp, and four hundred
and eighty-three brigadiers. A similar organization of the general staff was
maintained by Napoleon. At present the general staff of the French army consists
of nine marshals, (twelve in time of war;) eighty lieutenant-generals in active
service, fifty-two in reserve, and sixty two en retraite—one hundred and ninety-
four in all; one hundred and sixty maréchaux-de-camp in active service, eighty-
six in reserve, and one hundred and ninety en retraite—four hundred and thirty-
six in all. The officers of the staff-corps are: thirty colonels, thirty lieutenant-
colonels, one hundred majors, three hundred captains, and one hundred
lieutenants. Those of other European armies are organized on the same basis.
It will be seen from these remarks that the organization of our own general staff
is exceedingly defective, and entirely unsuited to the object for which it is
created. We have two brigadier-generals for the command of two brigades, and
one general of division, with the title of major-general, who acts in the fourfold
capacity of general commanding the army, lieutenant-general, general of
division, and chief of staff of the army. But as it is impossible with this number
to maintain a proper organization, the President (with the advice and consent of
the Senate) has, from time to time, increased this number to three major-
generals, and nine brigadier-generals, and numerous officers of staff with lower
grades. Nearly all these officers are detached from their several regiments and
corps, thus injuring the efficiency of regiments and companies; and we have in
our service, by this absurd mode of supplying the defects of our system of
organization by brevet rank, the anomaly of officers being generals, and at the
same time not generals; of holding certain ranks and grades, and yet not holding
these ranks and grades! Let Congress do away this absurd and ridiculous
system, and establish a proper and efficient organization of the general staff, and
restore the grades of general and lieutenant-general. In the war of 1812, instead
of resorting to a proper organization when an increase of the general staff was
required, we merely multiplied the number of major-generals and generals of
brigade by direct appointment, or by conferring brevet rank. It is now conceded
that there never was a more inefficient general staff than that with which our
army was cursed during the war; and the claims of brevet rank have ever since
been a source of endless turmoils and dissatisfaction, driving from the army
many of its noblest ornaments.
In the event of another war, it is to be hoped that Congress will not again resort
to the ruinous system of 1812. Possibly it may by some be objected to the
creation of generals, lieutenant-generals, &c., that it increases the expense of the
army and the number of its officers. This need not be. The number, pay, &c.,
may remain the same, or nearly the same, as at present. But by increasing the
grades you avoid in a considerable measure the difficulties of seniority claims
and brevet rank—the principal curses of our present system. If we merely
increase the number of each existing grade, giving a part of these rank above
their name and office, we merely multiply evils. But we will leave this subject
for the present, and recur to the general discussion of staff duties.
The following remarks of Jomini on the importance of the staff of an army are
worthy of attention. "A good staff," says he, "is, more than all, indispensable to
the constitution of an army; for it must be regarded as the nursery where the
commanding general can raise his principal supports—as a body of officers
whose intelligence can aid his own. When harmony is wanting between the
genius that commands, and the talents of those who apply his conceptions,
success cannot be sure; for the most skilful combinations are destroyed by faults
in execution. Moreover, a good staff has the advantage of being more durable
than the genius of any single man; it not only remedies many evils, but it may
safely be affirmed that it constitutes for the army the best of all safeguards. The
petty interests of coteries, narrow views, and misplaced egotism, oppose this last
position: nevertheless, every military man of reflection, and every enlightened
statesman, will regard its truth as beyond all dispute; for a well-appointed staff is
to an army what a skilful minister is to a monarchy—it seconds the views of the
chief, even though it be in condition to direct all things of itself; it prevents the
commission of faults, even though the commanding general be wanting in
experience, by furnishing him good councils. How many mediocre men of both
ancient and modern times, have been rendered illustrious by achievements which
were mainly due to their associates! Reynier was the chief cause of the victories
of Pichegru, in 1794; and Dessoles, in like manner, contributed to the glory of
Moreau. Is not General Toll associated with the successes of Kutusof? Diebitsch
with those of Barclay and Witgenstein? Gneisenau and Muffling with those of
Blücher? Numerous other instances might be cited in support of these
assertions."
"A well-established staff does not always result from a good system of education
for the young aspirants; for a man may be a good mathematician and a fine
scholar, without being a good warrior. The staff should always possess sufficient
consideration and prerogative to be sought for by the officers of the several
arms, and to draw together, in this way, men who are already known by their
aptitude for war. Engineer and artillery officers will no longer oppose the staff, if
they reflect that it will open to them a more extensive field for immediate
distinction, and that it will eventually be made up exclusively of the officers of
those two corps who may be placed at the disposal of the commanding general,
and who are the most capable of directing the operations of war."
"At the beginning of the wars of the Revolution," says this able historian
elsewhere, "in the French army the general staff, which is essential for directing
the operations of war, had neither instruction nor experience." The several
adjutant-generals attached to the army of Italy were so utterly incompetent, that
Napoleon became prejudiced against the existing staff-corps, and virtually
destroyed it, drawing his staff-officers from the other corps of the army. In his
earlier wars, a large portion of staff duties were assigned to the engineers; but in
his later campaigns the officers of this corps were particularly required for the
sieges carried on in Germany and Spain, and considerable difficulty was
encountered in finding suitable officers for staff duty. Some of the defects of the
first French staff-corps were remedied in the latter part of Napoleon's career, and
in 1818 it was reorganized by Marshal Saint-Cyr, and a special school
established for its instruction.
Some European nations have established regular staff-corps, from which the
vacancies in the general staff are filled; others draw all their staff-officers from
the corps of the army. A combination of the two systems is preferred by the best
judges. Jomini recommends a regular staff-corps, with special schools for its
instruction; but thinks that its officers should be drawn, at least in part, from the
other corps of the army: the officers of engineers and artillery he deems, from
their instruction, to be peculiarly qualified for staff duty. The policy of holding
double rank at the same time in the staff and in the corps of the army, as is done
in our service, is pronounced by all competent judges as ruinous to an army,
destroying at the same time the character of the staff and injuring the efficiency
of the line.
The following remarks on the character and duties of general-officers of an
army, made at the beginning of the war of 1812, are from the pen of one of the
ablest military writers this country has yet produced:—
"Generals have been divided into three classes,—Theorists, who by study and
reflection have made themselves acquainted with all the rules or maxims of the
art they profess; Martinets, who have confined their attention merely to the
mechanical part of the trade; and Practical men, who have no other or better
guide than their own experience, in either branch of it. This last description is in
all services, excepting our own, the most numerous, but with us gives place to a
fourth class, viz., men destitute alike of theory and of experience."

"Self-respect is one thing, and presumption another. Without the former, no man
ever became a good officer; under the influence of the latter, generals have
committed great faults. The former is the necessary result of knowledge; the
latter of ignorance. A man acquainted with his duty can rarely be placed in
circumstances new, surprising, or embarrassing; a man ignorant of his duty will
always find himself constrained to guess, and not knowing how to be right by
system, will often be wrong by chance."
"These remarks are neither made nor offered as applying exclusively to the
science of war. They apply to all other sciences; but in these, errors are
comparatively harmless. A naturalist may amuse himself and the public with
false and fanciful theories of the earth; and a metaphysician may reason very
badly on the relations and forms of matter and spirit, without any ill effect but to
make themselves ridiculous. Their blunders but make us merry; they neither pick
pockets, nor break legs, nor destroy lives; while those of a general bring after
them evils the most compounded and mischievous,—the slaughter of an army—
the devastation of a state—the ruin of an empire!"
"In proportion as ignorance may be calamitous, the reasons for acquiring
instruction are multiplied and strengthened. Are you an honest man? You will
spare neither labor nor sacrifice to gain a competent knowledge of your duty.
Are you a man of honor? You will be careful to avoid self-reproach. Does your
bosom glow with the holy fervor of patriotism? You will so accomplish yourself
as to avoid bringing down upon your country either insult or injury."
"Nor are the more selfish impulses without a similar tendency. Has hunger made
you a soldier? Will you not take care of your bread! Is vanity your principle of
action? Will you not guard those mighty blessings, your epaulets and feathers!
Are you impelled by a love of glory or a love of power? And can you forget that
these coy mistresses are only to be won by intelligence and good conduct?"
"But the means of instruction, say you, where are they to be found? Our standing
army is but a bad and ill-organized militia, and our militia not better than a mob.
Nor have the defects in these been supplied by Lycées, Prytanées, and
Polytechnic schools. The morbid patriotism of some, and the false economy of
others, have nearly obliterated every thing like military knowledge among us."
"This, reader, is but one motive the more for reinstating it. Thanks to the noble
art of printing! you still have books which, if studied, will teach the art of war."
"Books! And what are they but the dreams of pedants? They may make a Mack,
but have they ever made a Xenophon, a Cæsar, a Saxe, a Frederick, or a
Bonaparte? Who would not laugh to hear the cobbler of Athens lecturing
Hannibal on the art of war?"
"True; but as you are not Hannibal, listen to the cobbler. Xenophon, Cæsar, Saxe,
Frederick, and Napoleon, have all thought well of books, and have even
composed them. Nor is this extraordinary, since they are but the depositories of
maxims which genius has suggested, and experience confirmed; since they both
enlighten and shorten the road of the traveller, and render the labor and genius of
past ages tributary to our own. These teach most emphatically, that the secret of
successful war is not to be found in mere legs and arms, but in the head that
shall direct them. If this be either ungifted by nature, or uninstructed by study
and reflection, the best plans of manœuvre and campaign avail nothing. The two
last centuries have presented many revolutions in military character, all of which
have turned on this principle. It would be useless to enumerate these. We shall
quote only the greatest and the last—The troops of Frederick! How illustrious
under him! How contemptible under his successors! Yet his system was there;
his double lines of march at full distance; his oblique order of battle; his simple
lines of manœuvre in the presence of an enemy; his wise conformation of an
état-major;—all, in short, that distinguished his practice from that of ordinary
men, survived him; but the head that truly comprehended and knew how to apply
these, died with Frederick. What an admonition does this fact present for self-
instruction,—for unwearied diligence,—for study and reflection! Nor should the
force of this be lessened by the consideration that, after all, unless nature should
have done her part of the work,—unless to a soul not to be shaken by any
changes of fortune—cool, collected, and strenuous—she adds a head fertile in
expedients, prompt in its decisions, and sound in its judgments, no man can ever
merit the title of a general."
The celebrated Marshal Saxe has made the following remarks on the necessary
qualifications to form a good general. The most indispensable one, according to
his idea, is valor, without which all the rest will prove nugatory. The next is a
sound understanding with some genius: for he must not only be courageous, but
be extremely fertile in expedients. The third is health and a robust constitution.
"His mind must be capable of prompt and vigorous resources; he must have an
aptitude, and a talent at discovering the designs of others, without betraying the
slightest trace of his own intentions; he must be, seemingly, communicative, in
order to encourage others to unbosom, but remain tenaciously reserved in
matters that concern his own army; he must, in a word, possess activity with
judgment, be able to make a proper choice of his officers, and never deviate
from the strictest line of military justice. Old soldiers must not be rendered
wretched and unhappy by unwarrantable promotions, nor must extraordinary
talents be kept back to the detriment of the service on account of mere rules and
regulations. Great abilities will justify exceptions; but ignorance and inactivity
will not make up for years spent in the profession."
"In his deportment he must be affable, and always superior to peevishness or ill-
humor; he must not know, or at least seem not to know, what a spirit of
resentment is; and when he is under the necessity of inflicting military
chastisement, he must see the guilty punished without compromise or foolish
humanity; and if the delinquent be from among the number of his most intimate
friends, he must be doubly severe towards the unfortunate man. For it is better,
in instances of correction, that one individual should be treated with rigor (by
orders of the person over whom he may be supposed to hold some influence)
than that an idea should go forth in the army of public justice being sacrificed to
private sentiments."
"A modern general should always have before him the example of Manlius; he
must divest himself of personal sensations, and not only be convinced himself,
but convince others, that he is the organ of military justice, and that what he does
is irrevocably prescribed. With these qualifications, and by this line of conduct,
he will secure the affections of his followers, instill into their minds all the
impulses of deference and respect; he will be feared, and consequently obeyed."
"The resources of a general's mind are as various as the occasions for the
exercise of them are multiplied and checkered: he must be perfectly master of
the art of knowing how to support an army in all circumstances and situations;
how to apply its strength, or be sparing of its energy and confidence; how to post
all its different component parts, so as not to be forced to give or receive battle in
opposition to settled plans. When once engaged, he must have presence of mind
enough to grasp all the relative points of disposition and arrangement, to seize
favorable moments for impression, and to be thoroughly conversant in the
infinite vicissitudes that occur during the heat of a battle; on a ready possession
of which its ultimate success depends. These requisites are unquestionably
manifold, and grow out of the diversity of situations and the chance medley of
events that produce their necessity."
"A general to be in perfect possession of them, must on the day of battle be
divested of every thought, and be inaccessible to every feeling, but what
immediately regards the business of the day; he must reconnoitre with the
promptitude of a skilful geographer, whose eye collects instantaneously all the
relative portions of locality, and feels his ground as it were by instinct; and in the
disposition of his troops he must discover a perfect knowledge of his profession,
and make all his arrangements with accuracy and dispatch. His order of battle
must be simple and unconfused, and the execution of his plan be as quick as if it
merely consisted in uttering some few words of command; as, the first line will
attack! the second will support it! or, such a battalion will advance and support
the line."
"The general officers who act under such a general must be ignorant of their
business indeed, if, upon the receipt of these orders, they should be deficient in
the immediate means of answering them, by a prompt and ready co-operation.
So that the general has only to issue out directions according to the growth of
circumstances, and to rest satisfied that every division will act in conformity to
his intentions; but if, on the contrary, he should so far forget his situation as to
become a drill-sergeant in the heat of action, he must find himself in the case of
the fly in the fable, which perched upon a wheel, and foolishly imagined that the
motion of the carriage was influenced by its situation. A general, therefore,
ought on the day of battle to be thoroughly master of himself, and to have both
his mind and his eye riveted to the immediate scene of action. He will by these
means be enabled to see every thing; his judgment will be unembarrassed, and
he will instantly discover all the vulnerable points of the enemy. The instant a
favorable opening offers, by which the contest may be decided, it becomes his
duty to head the nearest body of troops, and, without any regard to personal
safety, to advance against the enemy's line. [By a ready conception of this sort,
joined to a great courage, General Dessaix determined the issue of the battle of
Marengo.] It is, however, impossible for any man to lay down rules, or to specify
with accuracy all the different ways by which a victory may be obtained. Every
thing depends upon a variety of situations, casualties of events, and intermediate
occurrences, which no human foresight can positively ascertain, but which may
be converted to good purposes by a quick eye, a ready conception, and prompt
execution."
"Prince Eugene was singularly gifted with these qualifications, particularly with
that sublime possession of the mind, which constitutes the essence of a military
character."
"Many commanders-in-chief have been so limited in their ideas of warfare, that
when events have brought the contest to issue, and two rival armies have been
drawn out for action, their whole attention has devolved upon a straight
alignment, an equality of step, or a regular distance in intervals of columns. They
have considered it sufficient to give answers to questions proposed by their
aides-de-camp, to send orders in various directions, and to gallop themselves
from one quarter to another, without steadily adhering to the fluctuations of the
day, or calmly watching for an opportunity to strike a decisive blow. They
endeavor, in fact, to do every thing, and thereby do nothing. They appear like
men whose presence of mind deserts them the instant they are taken out of the
beaten track, or reduced to supply unexpected calls by uncommon exertions; and
from whence, continues the same sensible writer, do these contradictions arise?
from an ignorance of those high qualifications without which the mere routine of
duty, methodical arrangement, and studied discipline must fall to the ground, and
defeat themselves. Many officers spend their whole lives in putting a few
regiments through a regular set of manœuvres; and having done so, they vainly
imagine that all the science of a real military man consists in that acquirement.
When, in process of time, the command of a large army falls to their lot, they are
manifestly lost in the magnitude of the undertaking, and, from not knowing how
to act as they ought, they remain satisfied with doing what they have partially
learned."
"Military knowledge, as far as it regards a general or commander-in-chief, may
be divided into two parts, one comprehending mere discipline and settled
systems for putting a certain number of rules into practice; and the other
originating a sublimity of conception that method may assist, but cannot give."
"If a man be born with faculties that are naturally adapted to the situation of a
general, and if his talents do not fit the extraordinary casualties of war, he will
never rise beyond mediocrity."
"It is, in fact, in war as it is in painting, or in music. Perfection in either art grows
out of innate talent, but it never can be acquired without them. Study and
perseverance may correct ideas, but no application, no assiduity will give the life
and energy of action; these are the works of nature."
"It has been my fate (observes the Marshal) to see several very excellent
colonels become indifferent generals. I have known others, who have
distinguished themselves at sieges, and in the different evolutions of an army,
lose their presence of mind and appear ignorant of their profession, the instant
they were taken from that particular line, and be incapable of commanding a few
squadrons of horse. Should a man of this cast be put at the head of an army, he
will confine himself to mere dispositions and manœuvres; to them he will look
for safety; and if once thwarted, his defeat will be inevitable, because his mind is
not capable of other resources."
"In order to obviate, in the best possible manner, the innumerable disasters
which must arise from the uncertainty of war, and the greater uncertainty of the
means that are adopted to carry it on, some general rules ought to be laid down,
not only for the government of the troops, but for the instruction of those who
have the command of them. The principles to be observed are: that when the line
or the columns advance, their distances should be scrupulously observed; that
whenever a body of troops is ordered to charge, every proportion of the line
should rush forward with intrepidity and vigor; that if openings are made in the
first line, it becomes the duty of the second instantly to fill up the chasms."
"These instructions issue from the dictates of plain nature, and do not require the
least elucidation in writing They constitute the A, B, C of soldiers. Nothing can
be more simple, or more intelligible; so much so, that it would be ridiculous in a
general to sacrifice essential objects in order to attend to such minutiæ. His
functions in the day of battle are confined to those occupations of the mind, by
which he is enabled to watch the countenance of the enemy; to observe his
movements, and to see with an eagle's or a king of Prussia's eye, all the relative
directions that his opponents take. It must be his business to create alarms and
suspicions among the enemy's line in one quarter, while his real intention is to
act against another; to puzzle and disconcert him in his plans; to take advantage
of the manifold openings which his feints have produced, and when the contest
is brought to issue, to be capable of plunging with effect upon the weakest part,
and carrying the sword of death where its blow is certain of being mortal. But to
accomplish these important and indispensable points, his judgment must be
clear, his mind collected, his heart firm, and his eyes incapable of being diverted,
even for a moment, by the trifling occurrences of the day."
The administrative service of an army is usually divided into several distinct
departments, as—

Pay department.
Subsistence department
Clothing department
Medical department These in our service are united.
Hospital Department ditto
These in our service are combined in one called
Barracks
the quartermaster's department
Fuel
Transportation
Recruiting
Military Justice, or Court
Martial department.

It was intended to enter into the history, organization, and use of each of these
civico-military departments of an army; but our limits are such as to preclude
any thing like so detailed a discussion as would be necessary for a proper
understanding of the subject. We therefore pass from the staff directly to the line
or rather the four principal arms of an army organization.[30]
[30]
Of works that treat directly of staff organization and duties, those of Grimoard,
Thiébault, Boutourlin, Labaume, are esteemed among the best. The writings of
Jomini, Napoleon, Rocquancourt, Vauchelle, Odier, Scharnhorst, also contain
much valuable information on this subject. The following list of books may be
referred to for further information on the subjects alluded to in this chapter:
Aide-Mémoire des officiers généraux et supérieurs et des capitaines.
Précis de l'art de la guerre. Jomini.
Mémoires de Napoléon. Montholon et Gourgaud.
Cours élémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaires. Rocquancourt.
Cours élémentaire d'administration militaire. Vauchelle.
Droite élémentaire d'art militaire, &c. Gay de Vernon.
Annuaire militaire historique, &c. Sicard.
Cours abrégé d'administration militaire. Bernier.
Cours d'administration militaire, &c. Odier.
De l'administration de l'armée d'Espagne. Odier.
De l'organization de la force armée en France. Carion-Nisas.
Elémens de l'art militaire, &c. Cugnot.
Mémoires sur la guerre. Feuquiéres.
Cours d'art militaire et d'histoire. Jacquinot de Presle.
Cours d'art militaire. Fallot.
Théorie de l'officier supérieur. Léorier.
Histoire de l'administration de la guerre. Audouin.
Instructions diverses a l'usage de l'école d'application du corps royal d'état-
major.
Handbuch für offiziere, &c. Scharnhorst.
Having omitted all discussion of the several departments of the administrative
service of an army organization, it is not deemed necessary to give the names of
books of reference on the subjects of pay, courts-martial, medicinal and hospital
departments, &c., &c.
 CHAPTER X
ARMY ORGANIZATION.[31]—INFANTRY AND CAVALRY

Infantry.—Infantry constitutes, in active service, by far the most numerous

portion of an army; in time of peace its duties are simple, and, in most countries,
of little comparative importance; but in our country the continually recurring
difficulties on the Indian frontiers, render this arm peculiarly necessary and
important, even in time of general peace. From the nature of infantry service—
no peculiar technical knowledge (we speak of the privates and officers of the
lower grades) being so absolutely indispensable as in the other arms—the soldier
may in a short time be trained and instructed in his duties. For this reason the
ratio of infantry in a peace establishment is ordinarily much less than in active
service, this arm being always capable of great expansion when occasion
requires.
[31]
In discussing our own organization, it may be well to compare it with the armies
of some of the principal nations of Europe. Our limits will not allow us to go
very much into details, nor to make a comparison with more than a single
European power. We shall select France, inasmuch as her army organization has
served as a model for the rest of Europe, and is still, in some respects, superior to
most others.

In the early periods of society, and in countries where horses abounded, men
have usually preferred fighting on horseback; but civilization and a more
thorough acquaintance with war has always increased the importance of infantry.
The Hebrews, and also the Egyptians, employed this arm almost exclusively.
The Asiatics generally employed both infantry and cavalry, but with the Greeks
the infantry was the favorite arm. Even their kings and generals usually fought
on foot. The Romans conquered the world mainly with their infantry. This arm
was also considered of the greatest importance by the ancient Germans and
Gauls; but the migration of the Huns and other Mongolic tribes mounted on
small and fleet horses, and the acquaintance formed by the Franks of northern
Spain with the Moors, who were mounted on beautiful horses from Arabia and
the plateau of Asia, introduced a taste for cavalry in western Europe. This taste
was still further cultivated under the feudal system, for the knights preferred
fighting on horseback to serving on foot. During the crusades the infantry fell
into disrepute. But the invention of gunpowder changed the whole system of
warfare, and restored to infantry its former importance.
"The Romans," says Napoleon in his Memoirs, "had two infantries; the first,
lightly armed, was provided with a missile weapon; the second, heavily armed,
bore a short sword. After the invention of powder two species of infantry were
still continued: the arquebusiers, who were lightly armed, and intended to
observe and harass the enemy; and the pikemen, who supplied the place of the
heavy-armed infantry. During the hundred and fifty years which have elapsed
since Vauban banished lances and pikes from all the infantry of Europe,
substituting for them the firelock and bayonet, all the infantry has been lightly
armed...... There has been since that time, properly speaking, only one kind of
infantry: if there was a company of chasseurs in every battalion, it was by way of
counterpoise to the company of grenadiers; the battalion being composed of nine
companies, one picked company did not appear sufficient. If the Emperor
Napoleon created companies of voltigeurs armed like dragoons, it was to
substitute them for those companies of chasseurs. He composed them of men
under five feet in height, in order to bring into use that class of the conscription
which measured from four feet ten inches to five feet; and having been until that
time exempt, made the burden of conscription fall more heavily on the other
classes. This arrangement served to reward a great number of old soldiers, who,
being under five feet in height, could not enter into the companies of grenadiers,
who on account of their bravery, deserved to enter into a picked company: it was
a powerful incentive to emulation to bring the giants and pigmies into
competition. Had there been men of different colors in the armies of the
emperor, he would have composed companies of blacks and companies of
whites: in a country where there were cyclops or hunchbacks, a good use might
be made of companies of cyclops, and others of hunchbacks."
"In 1789, the French army as composed of regiments of the line and battalions of
chasseurs; the chasseurs of the Cevennes, the Vivarais, the Alps, of Corsica, and
the Pyrenees, who at the Revolution formed half brigades of light infantry; but
the object was not to have two different sorts of infantry, for they were raised
alike, instructed alike, drilled alike; only the battalions of chasseurs were
recruited by the men of the mountainous districts, or by the sons of the garde-
chasse; whence they were more fit to be employed on the frontiers of the Alps
and Pyrenees; and when they were in the armies of the North, they were always
detached, in preference, for climbing heights or scouring a forest; when these
men were placed in line, in a battle, they served very well as a battalion of the
line, because they had received the same instructions, and were armed and
disciplined in the same manner. Every power occasionally raises, in war-time,
irregular corps, under the title of free or legionary battalions, consisting of
foreign deserters, or formed of individuals of a particular party or faction; but
that does not constitute two sorts of infantry. There is and can be but one. If the
apes of antiquity must needs imitate the Romans, it is not light-armed troops that
they ought to introduce, but heavy-armed soldiers, or battalions armed with
swords; for all the infantry of Europe serve at times as light troops."
Most European nations, for reasons probably similar to those of Napoleon, keep
up this nominal division of infantry of the line and light infantry; but both are
usually armed and equipped alike, and both receive the same organization and
instruction. The light infantry are usually made up from the class of men, or
district of country, which furnishes the greatest number of riflemen and
sharpshooters. In France, the light infantry is best supplied by the hunters of the
Ardennes, the Vosges, and the Jura districts; in Austria, by the Croates and
Tyrolese; in Prussia, by the "försters," or woodsmen; and in Russia, by the
Cossacks. Our own western hunters, with proper discipline, make the best
tirailleurs in the world.
Light infantry is usually employed to protect the flanks of the main army, to
secure outposts, to reconnoitre the ground, secure avenues of approach, deceive
the enemy by demonstrations, and secure the repose of the other troops by
patrolling parties. They usually begin a battle, and afterwards take their places in
the line, either on the flanks, or in the intervals between the larger bodies. The
battle of Jena furnishes a good example of the use of French light infantry; and
at the battle of Waterloo, the Prussian tirailleurs were exceedingly effective in
clearing the ground for the advance of Blücher's heavy columns. The attack of
Floh-hug by Augereau, of Vierzehn Heilegen by Suchet, of Iserstaedt by
Desjardins, are models well worthy of study.
The infantry of the line acts in masses, and, on the field of battle, constitutes the
principal fighting force. Its formations and the manner of engaging it have
already been discussed under the head of tactics.
The importance of infantry is due, in considerable part, to the fact that it can be
used everywhere—in mountains or on plains, in woody or open countries, in
cities or in fields, on rivers or at sea, in the redoubt or in the attack of the breach;
the infantry depends only on itself, whereas the other arms must depend in a
considerable degree on the efficiency of their materials and the will and strength
of brute force; and when the snows of Russia or the deserts of Egypt deprive
their animals of the means of sustenance, they become perfectly useless.
Foot-soldiers, in olden times, were armed with a spear and sometimes with a
sword, arrows, lance, and sling. At present they are armed with a gun and
bayonet, and sometimes with a sword. In some European services, a few of the
foot-soldiers are armed with a pike. Some of the light troops used as
sharpshooters carry the rifle, but this weapon is useless for the great body of
infantry. The short-sword is more useful as an instrument for cutting branches,
wood, &c., than for actual fighting. The infantry have no defensive covering, or
at least very little. The helmet or cap serves to protect the head, and the
shoulders are somewhat defended by epaulets. It has often been proposed in
modern times to restore the ancient defensive armor of the foot-soldier; but this
would be worse than useless against fire-arms, and moreover would destroy the
efficiency of these troops by impeding their movements. The strength of this arm
depends greatly upon its discipline; for if calm and firm, a mass of infantry in
column or in square is almost impenetrable.
The bayonet was introduced by Vauban in the wars of Louis XIV., and after the
years 1703 and '4, the pike was totally suppressed in the French army. This
measure was warmly opposed by Marshal Montesquieu, and the question was
discussed by him and Marshal Vauban with an ability and learning worthy of
these great men. The arguments of Vauban were deemed most conclusive, and
his project was adopted by the king.
This question has been agitated by military writers in more recent times,
Puységur advocating the musket, and Folard and Lloyd contending in favor of
restoring the pike. Even in our own service, so late as the war of 1812, a
distinguished general of the army strongly urged the use of the pike, and the
fifteenth (and perhaps another regiment) was armed and equipped in part as
pikemen; but experience soon proved the absurdity of the project.
Napoleon calls the infantry the arm of battles and the sinews of the army. But if
it be acknowledged, that, next to the talent of the general-in-chief, the infantry is
the first instrument of victory, it must also be confessed that it finds a powerful
support in the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and that without these it would
often be compromised, and could gain but a half success.
The French infantry is divided into one hundred regiments of three battalions
each, a battalion being composed of seven companies. There are also several
other battalions of chasseurs, zuaves, &c., being organized especially for service
in Africa, and composed in part of native troops.
In our own army we have eight regiments of infantry, each regiment forming a
single battalion of ten companies. The flank companies are intended for light
infantry.
In all properly organized armies the infantry constitutes from three-fourths to
four-fifths of the entire active force in the field, and from two-thirds to three-
fourths, say about seven-tenths of the entire military establishment. In time of
peace this proportion may be slightly diminished.
Cavalry.—The use of cavalry is probably nearly as old as war itself. The
Egyptians had cavalry before the time of Moses, and the Israelites often
encountered cavalry in their wars with their neighbors, though they made no use
of this arm themselves until the time of Solomon.
The Greeks borrowed their cavalry from the Asiatics, and especially from the
Persians, who, according to Xenophon, held this arm in great consideration.
After the battle of Platea, it was agreed by assembled Greece that each power
should furnish one horseman to every ten foot-soldiers. In Sparta the poorest
were selected for this arm, and the cavalry marched to combat without any
previous training. At Athens the cavalry service was more popular, and they
formed a well-organized corps of twelve hundred horsemen. At Thebes also this
arm had consideration in the time of Epaminondas. But the cavalry of Thessaly
was the most renowned, and both Philip and Alexander drew their mounted
troops from that country.
The Romans had made but little progress in this arm when they encountered the
Thessalians, who fought in the army of Pyrrhus. They then increased their
cavalry, but it was not numerous till after their wars with the Carthaginians.
Scipio organized and disciplined the Roman cavalry like that of the Numidians.
This arm was supplied from the ranks of the richest citizens, and afterwards
formed an order intermediary between the Senate and the people, under the
name of knights.
At a later period, the cavalry of the Gauls was particularly good. The Franks
were without cavalry when they made their first irruption into Gaul. Under the
reign of Childeric I. we see for the first time the "cavaliers francs" figure as a
part of the national forces. At the battle of Tours the cavalry and infantry were in
the proportion of one to five, and under Pepin and Charlemagne their numbers
were nearly equal. Under Charles the Bald armies were composed entirely of
cavalry, and during the middle ages the knights disdained the foot service, and
fought only on horseback.
After the introduction of artillery, cavalry was still employed, though to little
advantage. Gustavus Adolphus was the first to perceive the real importance of
this arm in modern warfare, and he used it with great success. But it was left for
Seidlitz to perfect it under the direction of Frederick the Great.
Marshal Saxe very justly remarked, that cavalry is the "arme du moment," for in
almost every battle there are moments when a decisive charge of cavalry will
gain the victory, but if not made at the instant it may be too late. The efficiency
of cavalry depends upon the moral impression which it makes on the enemy, and
is greater in proportion to the size of the mass, and the rapidity of its motion.
This last quality enables a commander to avail himself immediately of a decisive
moment, when the enemy exposes a weak point, or when disorder appears in his
ranks. But this requires a bold and active spirit, which shrinks not from
responsibility, and is able to avail itself with quickness and decision of every
opportunity. If it be remembered that it is essential that this coup d'oeil, so rare
and so difficult to acquire, be accompanied by a courage and vigor of execution
which nothing can shake, we shall not be astonished that history furnishes so few
good cavalry generals, and that this arm so seldom does such execution as it did
under Frederick and Napoleon, with Seidlitz and Murat as commanders.
The soldier gains great velocity by the use of the horse in war; but in other
respects he is the loser. The great expense and care required of the cavalier to
support his horse; the difficulty experienced in surmounting ordinary obstacles,
and in using his fire-arms to advantage, are all prejudicial to success.
The unequal size of the horse, and the great diversity in his strength and breed,
have rendered it necessary to divide this arm into light and heavy cavalry, and a
mixed class called dragoons. The heavy cavalry is commonly used in masses
where force is mainly requisite; the lighter troops are used singly and in small
detachments, where rapidity of movement is most desired.
The heavy cavalry are divided into carabiniers, cuirassiers, and sometimes
lancers. The two latter are frequently united, the cuirassiers being armed with the
lance. These troops are seldom used for scouts, vanguards, and convoys; but are
frequently employed to sustain the light cavalry. Their main duty is "to appear
on the field of battle and make the decisive charges."
The light cavalry is composed of chasseurs, or troopers, hussars, and lancers.
The latter, when composed of large men and mounted on heavy horses, are
attached to the heavy cavalry.
The dragoons were formerly a mixed body of horse and foot, but it being found
impossible to unite these two distinct arms in one, and the attempt having
destroyed the usefulness of the body to act in either capacity, the term was
applied to a mixed kind of cavalry between the heavy and the light horse. In
more recent wars they have also been instructed as infantry and employed as
foot-soldiers, till horses could be found in the enemy's country with which to
mount them. But we believe there is no instance in more modern wars in which
they have been employed at the same time in both capacities.
This term is, very improperly, applied to all our cavalry; and some of the
congressional wiseacres have recently experimented on one of our so-called
regiments of dragoons, by dismounting it one year, selling its horses at auction,
and changing its arms and equipments, and again, the next year, purchasing new
horses, arms, and equipments for remounting it; and all this for economy!
The Roman cavalry at first wore a round shield and helmet, the rest of their body
being nearly uncovered. Their arms were a sword and long thin javelin, or lance,
with an iron head. They afterwards reduced the shield to a much smaller size,
and made square, and their lance was greatly increased in size and length, and
armed at both ends. In other respects they were armed in the same way as
infantry. The use of the lance and the shield at the same time, of course rendered
both nearly worthless. The Roman cavalry was superior to that of their enemies,
except, perhaps, the light cavalry of the Parthians.
The heavy armor which was sometimes worn by the ancients, like the gens
d'armes of the middle ages, rendered them greatly inferior to infantry in a close
engagement. Tigranes, king of Armenia, brought an army of one hundred and
fifty thousand horse into the field, against the Roman general Lucullus, who had
only about six thousand horse and fifteen thousand foot. But the Armenian
cavalry, called cataphratti were so overburdened with armor, that when they fell
from their horses they could scarcely move or make any use of their arms. They
were routed by a mere handful of Roman infantry.
The modern cavalry is much lighter, and, by dispensing with armor, shields, &c.,
it can move with much greater rapidity. A modern cavalry horse carries a weight
of from two hundred and fifty to three hundred pounds, viz.:

Heavy Cavalry Light Cavalry

The rider 160 140 lbs.
His arms and equipments 55 40
His horse equipments 60 45
Two days' rations of provisions and grain 25 25
300 250

The horse moves per minute—

At a walk, from 110 yards to 120
At a trot, 220 240
At a gallop, 330 360

But on a march over the ordinary average of good and bad roads, cavalry will
walk about one hundred yards per minute, and at an easy trot, two hundred.
An ordinary day's march for cavalry is about thirty miles, but on a forced march
this arm can march fifty miles within the twenty-four hours. A single horseman,
or a small detachment, can easily exceed this distance.
"Light cavalry," says Napoleon, in his Memoirs, "ought to reconnoitre and watch
the motions of the enemy, considerably in advance of the army; it is not an
appendage to the infantry: it should be sustained and protected especially by the
cavalry of the line. Rivalry and emulation have always existed between the
infantry and cavalry: light cavalry is indispensable to the vanguard, the
rearguard, and the wings of the army; it, therefore, cannot properly be attached
to, and forced to follow the movements of any particular corps of infantry. It
would be more natural to attach it to the cavalry of the line, than to leave it in
dependence upon the infantry, with which it has no connection; but it should be
independent of both."
"If the light cavalry is to form vanguards, it must be organized into squadrons,
brigades, and divisions, for the purpose of manœuvring; for that is all vanguards
and rearguards do: they pursue or retreat by platoons, form themselves into
several lines, or wheel into column, or change their position with rapidity for the
purpose of outfronting a whole wing. By a combination of such evolutions, a
vanguard, of inferior numbers, avoids brisk actions and general engagements,
and yet delays the enemy long enough to give time for the main army to come
up, for the infantry to deploy, for the general-in-chief to make his dispositions,
and for the baggage and parks to file into their stations. The art of a general of
the vanguard, or of the rear-guard, is, without hazarding a defeat, to hold the
enemy in check, to impede him, to compel him to spend three or four hours in
moving a single league: tactics point out the methods of effecting these
important objects, and are more necessary for cavalry than for infantry, and in
the vanguard, or the rear-guard, than in any other position. The Hungarian
Insurgents, whom we saw in 1797, 1805, and 1809, were pitiful troops. If the
light troops of Maria Theresa's times became formidable, it was by their
excellent organization, and, above every thing, by their numbers. To imagine that
such troops could be superior to Wurmser's hussars, or to the dragoons of Latour,
or to the Archduke John, would be entertaining strange ideas of things; but
neither the Hungarian Insurgents, nor the Cossacks, ever formed the vanguards
of the Austrian and Russian armies; because to speak of a vanguard or a rear-
guard, is to speak of troops which manœuvre. The Russians considered a
regiment of Cossacks who had been trained worth three regiments untrained.
Every thing about these troops is despicable, except the Cossack himself, who is
a man of fine person, powerful, adroit, subtle, a good horseman, and
indefatigable; he is born on horseback, and bred among civil wars; he is in the
field, what the Bedouin is in the desert, or the Barbet in the Alps; he never enters
a house, never lies in a bed; and he always changes his bivouac at sunset, that he
may not pass a night in a place where the enemy may possibly have observed
him."
"Two Mamelukes kept three Frenchmen at bay, because they were better armed,
better mounted, and better exercised; they had two pairs of pistols, a tromblon, a
carbine, a helmet with a visor, a coat of mail, several horses, and several men on
foot to attend them. But a hundred French did not fear a hundred Mamelukes;
three hundred were more than a match for an equal number; and one thousand
would beat fifteen hundred: so powerful is the influence of tactics, order, and
evolutions! Murat, Leclerc, and Lasalle, cavalry generals, presented themselves
to the Mamelukes in several lines: when the latter were upon the point of
outfronting the first line, the second came to its assistance on the right and left;
the Mamelukes then stopped, and wheeled, to turn the wings of this new line:
this was the moment seized for charging them; they were always broken."
"The duty of a vanguard, or a rear-guard, does not consist in advancing or
retiring, but in manœuvring. It should be composed of a good light cavalry,
supported by a good reserve of cavalry of the line, by excellent battalions of
foot, and strong batteries of artillery: the troops must be well trained; and the
generals, officers, and soldiers, should all be equally well acquainted with their
tactics, each according to his station. An undisciplined troop would only
embarrass the advanced guard."
"It is admitted that for facility in manœuvring, the squadron should consist of
one hundred men, and that every three or four squadrons should have a superior
officer."
"It is not advisable for all the cavalry of the line to wear cuirasses: dragoons,
mounted upon horses of four feet nine inches in height, armed with straight
sabres, and without cuirasses, should form a part of the heavy cavalry; they
should be furnished with infantry-muskets, with bayonets: should have the
shakot of the infantry, pantaloons covering the half-boot-buskin, cloaks with
sleeves, and portmanteaus small enough to be carried slung across the back
when the men are on foot. Cavalry of all descriptions should be furnished with
fire-arms, and should know how to manœuvre on foot. Three thousand light
cavalry, or three thousand cuirassiers, should not suffer themselves to be stopped
by a thousand infantry posted in a wood, or on ground impracticable to cavalry;
and three thousand dragoons ought not to hesitate to attack two thousand
infantry, should the latter, favored by their position, attempt to stop them.
"Turenne, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and Vendome, attached great importance to
dragoons, and used them successfully. The dragoons gained great glory in Italy,
in 1796 and 1797. In Egypt and in Spain, during the campaigns of 1806 and
1807, a degree of prejudice sprung up against them. The divisions of dragoons
had been mustered at Compiegne and Amiens, to be embarked without horses
for the expedition of England, in order to serve on foot until they should be
mounted in that country. General Baraguay d'Hilliers, their first inspector,
commanded them; he had them equipped with gaiters, and incorporated with
them a considerable number of recruits, whom he exercised in infantry
manœuvres alone. These were no longer cavalry regiments: they served in the
campaign of 1806 on foot, until after the battle of Jena, when they were mounted
on horses taken from the Prussian cavalry, three-fourths of which were
unserviceable. These combined circumstances injured the dragoons; but in 1813
and 1814 their divisions acquired honor in rivalling the cuirassiers. Dragoons are
necessary for the support of light cavalry in the vanguard, the rear-guard, and the
wings of an army; cuirassiers are little adapted for van and rearguards: they
should never be employed in this service but when it is requisite to keep them in
practice and accustom them to war."
Napoleon further recommends that light cavalry be divided into two kinds,
chasseurs or troopers, and light horse; and the heavy to be composed of dragoons
and cuirassiers; the troopers to be mounted on horses of 4 ft 6 in.; light cavalry
on horses of 4 ft. 7 or 8 in.; dragoons on horses of 4 ft. 9 in.; and cuirassiers on
horses of 4 ft. 10 or 11 in.; which employ horses of all kinds for mounting the
troops.
All cavalry must receive the same instruction; and all should be capable, in case
of need, of performing any of the duties of mounted troops. The shock is the
principal effect produced by this arm; therefore, the greater the velocity the
greater must be this effect, provided the troops can be kept in mass. But it is
found, by experience, that it is impossible to preserve them in line when put to
the height of their speed. The best authorities therefore prefer, as we have said
elsewhere, the charge at the trot, or at any rate the gallop should not be taken up
till within a very short distance of the enemy. The charge of a compact mass at a
trot is much greater than that of a wavering one at a gallop.
On the field of battle the cavalry of the line is considered as the arm of the
shock, to break through any corps that may be in opposition; but it is unable of
itself to resist a shock, and therefore should on no account wait to receive the
charge of another body of mounted troops. It was on this account that Frederick
directed his cavalry officers, under the severest penalties, never to receive a
charge, but always to meet the attacking force half way. This is the only mode of
preventing defeat.
A good infantry can always sustain itself against the charges of cavalry. At the
battle of Auerstedt, in 1806, Davoust ordered the divisions of Gudin to form
squares to resist the Prussian cavalry, which, by means of a fog, had gained a
most advantageous position. Blücher led his cavalry in repeated and impetuous
charges, but all was in vain; the French infantry presented a front of iron. At the
combat of Krasnoi, in 1812, the cavalry of Grouchy, Nansonty, and Bordesoult,
attacked and overthrew the dragoons of Clarkof, but the Russian infantry under
Neveroffskoi sustained itself against the repeated charges of vastly superior
numbers of these French horse. At the battle of Molwitz, the grenadiers
sustained the charges of the enemy's cavalry, although the cavalry of the great
Frederick had already been completely overthrown.
But when the infantry is engaged with the infantry of the enemy, the charges of
cavalry are generally successful, and sometimes decide the fate of the battle, as
was the case at Rosbach, Zornsdorf, Wurtsburg, Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, &c.
Cavalry may also be very efficacious against infantry in wet weather, when the
rain or snow renders it impossible for the foot soldiers to use their fire-arms to
advantage, as was the case with the corps of Augereau, at Eylau, and with the
Austrian left, at the battle of Dresden. Again, if the infantry be previously
weakened, or thrown into disorder by the fire of batteries. The charge of the
Russian cavalry at Hohenfriedberg, in 1745, is a remarkable example of this
kind.
Cavalry should always be immediately sustained in its efforts either by infantry
or other bodies of horse; for as soon as the charge is made, the strength of this
arm is for a time exhausted, and, if immediately attacked, defeat becomes
inevitable. The charge of the cavalry of Ney on Prince Hohenlohe at the battle of
Jena, and of the French horse on Gossa at Leipsic, are fine examples of the
successful charges of cavalry when properly sustained. Kunnersdorf and
Waterloo are examples of the disastrous consequences of leaving such charges
without support.
The choice of the field of battle is sometimes such as to render cavalry almost
useless. Such was the case at the battle of Cassano, between the Duke of
Vendome and the Prince Eugene. The field was so cut up by the Adda and the
canals of Rittorto and Pendina, that Prince Eugene could make no use of his
horse. If, when master of the bridge of Rittorto, he had been able to charge the
French with a body of cavalry, there had been no doubt of his complete success.
After a battle, and in the pursuit of a flying enemy, cavalry is invaluable. If
Napoleon had possessed a suitable number of mounted troops, with an able
commander, at the battles of Lutzen and Ligny, the results of these victories had
been decisive; whereas they were really without consequence. On the other
hand, the Prussian army in 1806, after the battle of Jena, and Napoleon's army in
1815 at Waterloo, were completely cut to pieces by the skilful use of cavalry in
the pursuit of a defeated and dispirited foe.
The want of good cavalry was severely felt in the war of the American
Revolution. Had Washington possessed a few good squadrons of horse, his
surprise and defeat in the lines of Brooklyn, and the consequent loss of New
York, had never taken place. The efficient employment of a few good squadrons
of cavalry might readily have prevented the defeat at Bladensburg, and the loss
of the capitol, in 1814.
In a well-organized army, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth of
the infantry, according to the nature of the war.[32]
[32]
To gain a competent knowledge of the duties connected with the two arms of
service mentioned in this chapter, the officer should make himself thoroughly
acquainted with Scott's System of Infantry Tactics, for the United States'
Infantry, or at least with Major Cooper's abridged edition of Infantry Tactics, and
with the system of Cavalry Tactics, adopted in our army; also with the directions
for the use of these two arms in a campaign, and their employment on the battle-
field, given in the writings of Jomini, Decker, Okouneff, Rocquancourt, and
Jacquinot de Presle.

The following books may be referred to for further information respecting the
history, organization, use, and instruction of infantry and cavalry:—
Essai général de tactique. Guibert.
Considérations générales sur l'infanterie française, par un général en rétraite. A
work of merit.
De l'infanterie, par l'auteur de l'histoire de l'expédition de Russie.
Histoire de la guerre de la peninsule. Foy. This work contains many interesting
and valuable remarks on the French and English systems of tactics, and
particularly on the tactics of Infantry.
Cours d'art et d'histoire militaires. Jacquinot de Presle.
Art de la guerre. Rogniat.
Instruction destinée aux troupes légères, &c., redigée sur une instruction de
Frederick II. à ses officiers.
English Infantry Regulations.
Ordonnance (French) pour l'exercice et les manœuvres de l'infanterie, par le
commission de manœuvres.
Aide-mémoires des officiers généraux et supérieurs, et des capitaines.
Essai sur l'histoire générale de l'art militaire. Carion-Nisas.
Histoire de la milice française. Daniel.
Cours élémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaires. Rocquancourt.
Traité élémentaire d'art militaire, &c. Gay de Vernon.
Introduction à l'étude de l'art de la guerre. La Roche-Amyou.
Tactique des trois armes. Decker.
Examen raisonné des trois armes, &c. Okouneff.
The last two are works of great merit. The writings of Okouneff, however, are
very diffuse.
Instruction pour le service de l'infanterie légère. Guyard.
Instruction de l'infanterie, &c. Schauenbourg.
Traité de tactique. Ternay et Koch.
Mécanism des manœuvres de guerre de l'infanterie polonaise. Vroniecki.
Traité sur l'infanterie légère. Beurmann.
English Cavalry Regulations.
Ordonnance (French) sur l'exercice et les évolutions de la cavalerie.
Les troupes à cheval de France, &c. De Bourge.
Avant-postes de cavalerie légère. Brack. The author served with distinction
under Lassale, Colbert, Maison, Pujol, and Excelmans.
Réflexions sur l'emploi de la cavalerie, &c. Caraman.
Observations sur l'ordonnance, &c., de la cavalerie. Dejean.
Tactique de la cavalerie. Itier.
Eléments de tactique pour la cavalerie, par Mottin de la Balme. A work of rare
merit.
De l'emploi de la cavalerie à la guerre. Schauenbourg.
Rémarques sur la cavalerie. Warnery. This work has long enjoyed a high
reputation among the cavalry officers of the European services. The Paris edition
is enriched with notes by a French general officer.
Nachrichten und Betrachtungen über die Thaten und Schicksale der Reiterei,
&c. This work discusses the operations of cavalry in the campaigns of Frederick
the Great and of Napoleon, down to the battle of Lutzen in 1813.
Examen du livret provisoire, &c. Marbot.
Le Spectateur Militaire, contains many essays by cavalry officers on the various
questions connected with the organization and use of this arm.
Die Gefechtslehre der beiden verbundenen Waffen-Kavallerie und reitenden
Artillerie. Decker.
Manuel de l'officier. Ruhle de Lilienstern.
Aide-mémoire, à l'usage des officiers de cavalerie.
Journal de l'infanterie et de la cavalerie.
Traité de tactique pour les officiers d'infanterie et de cavalerie.
Histoire des exploits et des vicissitudes de la cavalerie prussienne. Coutz.
 CHAPTER XI.
ARMY ORGANIZATION.—ARTILLERY.

Artillery.—Previous to the invention of gunpowder in the thirteenth century, the

machines of war were divided between two classes of military men, the
engineers (engignours, as they were called in the middle ages) and the artillery,
(artilliers, as they were formerly called,) the latter being particularly charged
with the management of the lighter and more portable projectile machines, such
as the balistas and arco-balistas, which were used for throwing different kinds of
arrows—flêches, viretons, carreaux, matras, &c., while the former managed the
battering-rams, cranes, helipoles, &c. And, indeed, for a long time after the
discovery of gunpowder, this distinction was kept up, and the artillery retained
all the more ordinary projectile machines, while the engineers constructed and
managed the more ponderous weapons of attack and defence. But the new
artillery was gradually introduced, without, however, immediately displacing the
old, and there were for a time, if we may be allowed the expression, two
artilleries, the one employing the old projectile machines, and the other those of
the new invention. The latter were called canoniers, to distinguish them from the
former, who still retained the name of artilliers.
The first cannon were invented in the early part of the fourteenth century, or,
perhaps, among the Arabs as early as the middle of the thirteenth century, but
they were not much known in Europe till about 1350. Cannon are said to have
been employed by the Moors as early as 1249, and by the French in 1338. The
English used artillery at the battle of Crecy in 1346. Both cannon and the ancient
projectile machines were employed at the siege of Aiguillon in 1339, at Zara in
1345, at Rennes in 1357, and at Naples in 1380. At this last siege the ancient
balista was employed to throw into the castle of Naples barrels of infectious
matter and mutilated limbs of prisoners of war. We read of the same thing being
done in Spain at a later period.
Cannon in France were at first called bombards and couleuverines, but were
afterwards named from certain figures marked on them, such as serpentines,
basilisks, scorpions,&c. In the infancy of the art they were made small, weighing
only from twenty to fifty pounds, and were mounted on small moveable
carriages. This species of fire-arms became quite numerous about the beginning
of the fifteenth century. They were followed by heavier pieces, used in the attack
and defence of towns. This siege artillery continued to be increased in
dimensions till, towards the latter part of the fifteenth century, they reached such
an enormous size as to be almost useless as a military machine. Louis XI. had an
immense piece constructed at Tours, in 1770, which, it was said, carried a ball
from the Bastille to Charenton, (about six miles!) Its caliber was that of five
hundred pounds. It was intended for experiment, and burst on the second
discharge. The famous culverin of Bolduc was said to carry a ball from that city
to Bommel. The culverin of Nancy, made in 1598, was more than twenty-three
feet in length. There is now an ancient cannon in the arsenal at Metz of about
this length, which carries a ball of one hundred and forty pounds. Cannon balls
were found at Paris as late as 1712, weighing near two hundred pounds, and
from twelve to sixteen inches in diameter. At the siege of Constantinople in
1453, there was a famous metallic bombard which threw stone balls of an
incredible size; at the siege of Bourges in 1412, a cannon was used which, it was
said, threw stone balls "of the size of mill-stones." The Gantois, under Arteville,
made a bombard fifty feet in length, whose report was heard at a distance of ten
leagues!
The first cannon were made of wood, and covered with sheet-iron, or embraced
by iron rings: longitudinal bars of iron were afterwards substituted for the
wooden form. Towards the end of the fourteenth century, brass, tin, copper,
wrought and cast iron, were successively used for this purpose. The bores of the
pieces were first made in a conical shape, and it was not until a much later
period that the cylindrical form was introduced.
In the wars between the Spaniards and Moors in the latter part of the fifteenth
century, very great use was made of artillery in sieges and battles. Ferdinand the
Catholic had at this time, probably, a larger artillery train than any other
European power. The Spanish cannon, generally very large, were composed of
iron bars about two inches in breadth, held together by bolts and rings of the
same metal. The pieces were firmly attached to their carriages, and incapable of
either horizontal or vertical movement. The balls thrown by them were usually
of marble, though sometimes of iron. Many of the pieces used at the siege of
Baza, in 1486, are still to be seen in that city, and also the cannon balls then in
use. Some of the latter are fourteen inches in diameter, and weigh one hundred
and seventy-five pounds. The length of the cannon was about twelve feet. These
dimensions are a proof of a slight improvement in this branch of military
science, which was, nevertheless, still in its infancy. The awkwardness of
artillery at this period may be judged of by its slowness of fire. At the siege of
Zeteuel, in 1407, five "bombards," as the heavy pieces of ordnance were then
called, were able to discharge only forty shot in the course of a day; and it is
noticed as a remarkable circumstance at the siege of Albahar, that two batteries
discharged one hundred and forty balls in the course of the twenty-four hours!
In the Italian wars between France and Spain, in the beginning of the sixteenth
century, the difficulty of moving the heavy cannon then in use was so great that
only a very small number of pieces were brought upon the battle-field. At the
battle of Cerignola, in 1503, the number of cannon in the French army was only
thirteen. Indeed, during the greater part of this century, four or five pieces were
considered sufficient for an ordinary army in the field, and many agreed to the
doctrine of Machiavelli, that the only legitimate use of artillery was in the attack
and defence of places. But in the wars of Henry IV. of France, this arm of service
was again increased, and the troops which this king destined against the house of
Austria had an artillery train of fifty pieces. Great improvements were also made
about this period in the manufacture of powder, and all kinds of fire-arms. Sully
gave greater development to this arm of service, improving its materials, and
increasing its efficiency. Then, as at most other periods, the French were in
advance of most other nations in artillery.
It was near the close of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century,
that the heavy and ill-shaped artillery began to give place to more wieldy and
useful pieces. A certain M. de Linar demonstrated, in the latter part of the
sixteenth century, that cannon twelve feet in length would give a greater range
than those seventeen feet in length, the calibre being the same; but some years
elapsed before advantage was taken of this discovery. In 1624, Gustavus
Adolphus caused experiments to be made to verify this point, and, on being
convinced of its truth, caused his batteries to be furnished with shorter and
lighter pieces. This great king introduced, about the same time, a new and lighter
kind of artillery, made of sheet iron and leather. Each piece had its chamber
formed of thin metal and embraced by strong iron rings; over these was placed a
form of hardened leather, which was again encircled with rings and held
compactly together. These pieces were mounted on light carriages, so that two
men could easily manœuvre them. It was said that they would fire from eight to
ten rounds without requiring repairs. Gustavus made use of them in all his
military operations from 1628 to the time of his death. They did him excellent
service on numerous occasions; being so very light they could be easily
transported, and, on the field of battle, their movements could be made to
conform to the movements of his troops.
As cannon and small arms were gradually introduced into general use, various
inventions and improvements were proposed and introduced from time to time.
Cannon were constructed with two or more barrels; some were arranged for
being loaded in the breech, and others at the mouth of the piece; two pieces were
sometimes connected by horizontal timbers, which revolved about a vertical
axis, so that the recoil of one piece would bring the other into battery; and
various other arrangements of this description, which have recently been revived
and some of them patented as new inventions. The small arms employed at this
period were much the same as those used at the present day, except the
matchlock, which afterwards gave place to flint-locks. Arms of this description
were sometimes made to be loaded at the breach, and guns with two, three, and
even as many as eight barrels, were at one time in fashion. In the Musée de
l'Artillerie at Paris may be found many arms of this kind, which have been
reproduced in this country and England as new inventions. In this Museum are
two ancient pieces, invented near the end of the sixteenth or the beginning of the
seventeenth century, which very nearly correspond with Colt's patent, with the
single exception of the lock![33]
[33]
It is not to be inferred that the modern improvements (as they are called) are
copied from the more ancient inventions. Two men of different ages, or even of
the same age, sometimes fall upon the same identical discovery, without either's
borrowing from the other.

The materiel of artillery employed in modern warfare is divided into two general
classes: 1st. Siege Artillery, or such as is employed in the attack and defence of
places. 2d. Field Artillery, or such as is used in battle, or in the field-operations
of an army.
1. Siege Artillery is composed of mortars, large howitzers, Paixhan guns or
Columbiads,[34] and all cannon of a large calibre. In our service this class of
ordnance includes the twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty-two, and forty-two-
pounder guns, the eight, ten, and thirteen-inch mortars, the sixteen-inch stone
mortar, the twenty-four-pounder coehorn mortar, the twenty-four-pounder
carronade, and the eight, ten, and twelve-inch howitzers.
[34]
These pieces were first invented by Colonel Bomford, of the U.S. army, and used
in the war of 1812. The dimensions of these guns were first taken to Europe by a
young French officer, and thus fell into the hands of General Paixhan, who
immediately introduced them into the French service. They were by this means
first made known to the rest of Europe, and received the name of the person who
introduced them into the European services, rather than that of the original
inventor. All these facts are so fully susceptible of proof, that Europeans now
acknowledge themselves indebted to us for the invention; even General Paixhan
gives up all claim to originality in his gun, and limits himself to certain
improvements which he introduced. The original gun, which was invented by
Colonel Bomford, and whose dimensions were carried to General Paixhan in
France, is now lying at the ordnance dépôt, in New York harbor.

All these, except the smaller mortars, are made of cast iron. This substance is
less tenacious than wrought iron or bronze, and the cannon made of it are, on
this account, much heavier than of the other materials; but for the naval service,
and the attack and defence of fortifications, the weight required to secure the
necessary strength is not very objectionable. Wrought iron and bronze are much
more expensive and less durable. Moreover, the difficulty of forging wrought
iron in masses of sufficient size has been such as to prevent its being brought
into general use for artillery. Numerous attempts have been made, at different
periods, to construct large guns of this material, but none have yet been
successful. Improvements which are now making in the manufacture of wrought
iron, may render this the preferable material for the smaller pieces of artillery;
but the best informed military men deem it objectionable for the heavier cannon,
both on account of its cost and the imperfection of its manufacture. Even should
the latter objection be removed, its cost must prevent its general application to
the construction of siege artillery. Charlatans in military science, both in this
country and in Europe, bring this subject up every fifteen or twenty years as a
new invention, and flaming notices of the improvement, and predictions of the
revolution it is to effect in the art of war, are circulated in the newspapers to
"gull" a credulous public; and after some fifty or one hundred thousand dollars
have been squandered on some court-favorite, the whole matter ends in the
explosion of the "improvement," and probably the destruction of the "inventor,"
and perhaps also of his spectators. Let us be distinctly understood on this
subject. There may be inventions and improvements in the manufacture of
wrought iron, but there is nothing new in its application to the construction of
cannon, for it has been used for this purpose as long ago as the first invention of
the art.
2. Field Artillery is composed of the smaller guns and howitzers. In our service
this class of cannon includes the six and twelve-pounder guns, and the twelve
and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. All these are now made of bronze. This
material is more expensive than cast-iron, but its superior tenacity renders it
more useful where great weight is objectionable. Improvements in the
manufacture of cast iron may render it safe to employ this metal in the
construction of field-pieces. It is also possible the wrought iron may be forged in
masses large enough, and the cost be so reduced as to bring it into use for field-
pieces. It is here important to combine strength with lightness, and additional
expense may very properly be incurred to secure this important object.
The projectiles now in use are solid shot, shells, strap-shot, case or canister-shot,
grape-shot, light and fire-balls, carcasses, grenades, and rockets.

Solid shot are now almost invariably made of cast iron,[35] formed in moulds of
sand or iron. This projectile is used under almost every circumstance, whether in
the battle-field or in the attack and defence of places, and is the only one that is
effectual against the stone walls of forts. Hot shot are used against shipping and
wooden structures of every description. Red-hot balls were first employed by the
king of Poland, in 1575, but, on account of the difficulty of heating them with
rapidity, and the danger of loading the piece with them, this kind of projectile
was not in general use till a much later period. It was at first supposed that the
expansion of the metal would be so great, when heated to a red or white heat, as
to prevent the ball from entering the piece; it is found, however, that the windage
is still sufficient for loading with facility. These red-hot balls are principally used
to fire wooden buildings, ships, and other combustible matter. They are therefore
much used as a projectile for coast defence, and all fortifications on the seaboard
should be provided with furnaces and grates, arranged so as to heat them with
facility and rapidity.
[35]
In Mexico, where iron is scarce, copper is used for shot and shells; but it is a
poor substitute.

There are several kinds of hollow-shot and shells, called bombs, howitzes,
grenades, &c. They are made of cast iron, and usually in a spherical shape, the
cavity being concentric with the exterior surface. The cavity was formerly made
eccentric with the exterior, under the belief that the heavier side would always
strike first. The rotary motion of the shell during its flight rendered this
precaution of no use. Fire is communicated to the combustible matter within the
shell by means of a fuse, which is so regulated that the explosion shall take place
at the desired moment. Hollow-shot are used with advantage to destroy ordinary
buildings, ships, earthwork, and thin walls of masonry; they, however, are of
little avail in breaking the massive walls of well-constructed forts. Howitzes and
grenades are particularly effective against cavalry and columns of infantry, and
are much employed on the battle-field; they are also much used in the attack and
defence of places.
We find that as early as 1486 the Spaniards made use of a projectile similar to
the modern bomb. "They threw from their engines large globular masses,
composed of certain inflammable ingredients mixed with gunpowder, which,
scattering long trains of light," says an eye-witness, "in their passage through the
air, filled the beholders with dismay, and descending on the roofs of edifices,
frequently occasioned extensive conflagration." In the siege of Constantinople
by Mahomet II., shells were used, and also mortars of enormous size. In 1572
Valturus proposed to throw, with a kind of mortar, "globes of copper filled with
powder." In 1588, an artificer of Venloo burned Wachtendeck by throwing
bombs into the place. A similar attempt had just been made at Berg-op-Zoom.
The use of this projectile became quite common in France under Louis XIII.
Howitzes were not much used till the seventeenth century. They are of German
origin, and the howitzer first bore the name of hausmitz.
The strap-shot consists of a round ball attached to a sabot of the same calibre, by
means of two strips of tin passing over the shot at right angles, and fastened to a
third, which is soldered around the sabot. One end of the sabot is arranged for
attaching it to the cartridge, the other being hollowed out to receive the shot. The
supposed advantages of this arrangement are, 1st, a diminution of the windage;
2d, the gun may be loaded with greater rapidity; and, 3d, the cartridge is
transported with greater safety.
The case or canister-shot is prepared by filling a tin canister with grape-shot or
musket-balls, and attaching it to the cartridge by means of a sabot. There being
two sizes of grape-shot, and one of musket-balls, we have three kinds of
canister-shot calculated to reach at different distances. The three sizes of shot are
frequently mixed in the same canister. This projectile is particularly effective
against lines of infantry and cavalry, when the distance is short.
The grape-shot is composed of small balls arranged round an upright pin
attached to a plate of wood or iron. The concave cast-iron plate is preferable, as
it increases the range of the shot. The balls are covered with canvass, and
thoroughly confined by a quilting of strong twine. This shot is used for the same
purposes as the canister.
Light and fire-balls are formed of an oval case of sacking, filled with
combustible matter, and attached to a culot of cast-iron. The whole is covered
with a net of spun-yarn. Light-balls are used to light up our own works, and are
not armed; fire-balls being employed to light up the works or approaches of an
enemy, it is necessary to arm them with pistol-barrels, in order to prevent, any
one from extinguishing them. When made of very combustible materials, and
used for setting fire to wooden structures, they are denominated incendiary balls.
Carcasses are employed for the same purpose as incendiary balls; they are of
two kinds: 1st, the shell-carcass; and, 2d, the ribbed-carcass. The first is
composed of a spherical shell, cast with five fuse-holes, one being at the top, and
the other four in a plane perpendicular to this and at right angles with each other;
the shell is filled with matter highly combustible. The second is formed of iron
ribs connected by iron straps, and attached at the ends to culots of the same
material, the whole being filled with combustible composition. This is more
expensive than the shell carcass, and cannot be fired with as great accuracy; it is
now seldom used. Carcasses may be armed in the same manner as fire-balls.
Smoke and suffocating balls are used to drive an enemy from galleries and
mines. They are thrown by hand.
The personnel of the French artillery was for a long time retained, together with
the engineers, under the general direction of the "Grand Master of Cross-bows."
In 1420 the master-general of artillery was made independent of the grand-
master of cross-bows; but previous to the reign of Louis XIV., the artillery troops
had no organization as a separate corps. In 1668 six companies of canoniers
were created, and soon after two companies of bombardiers. In 1693 the first
regiment of fusiliers was changed into a royal regiment of artillery, and both the
canoniers and bombardiers were eventually incorporated with it. The staff of
artillery, towards the close of this reign, was composed of one grand-master,
sixty lieutenants, sixty commissaries, and eighty officiers-pointeurs. In 1721 the
artillery was divided into five battalions and stationed at Metz, Strasbourg,
Grenoble, Perpignan, and La Fère, where they established schools of theory and
practice. In 1756 the artillery was organized into seven regiments, each regiment
having its own separate school. This organization continued without any
remarkable change till the Revolution.
During the earlier campaigns of the French Revolution it is impossible to trace
out the changes that took place in army organization, every thing was then so
irregular and confused, the troops of different arms being frequently united
together. In the campaign of 1792 there were some six or seven regiments of foot
artillery, and ten companies of horse. This arm was greatly increased during the
subsequent campaigns, and its organization was completely remodelled by
Napoleon on his elevation to the head of the government. The personnel of the
artillery was then composed of a general staff, nine regiments of foot and six of
horse. In 1815 it was reduced to eight regiments of foot and four of horse.
The personnel of artillery in modern army organization is divided into four
classes: the staff, guards, artificers, and troops.
I. The Staff, or Ordnance, as it is called in our service, is charged with the
construction of all the materials of artillery, and the collection of powder and
military stores. As the lives of persons using these materials, and, in a
considerable degree, the success of war, depend upon the nature and quality of
the stores thus manufactured and collected, it is obvious that the members of this
branch of the artillery service should possess high and peculiar qualifications. In
the French army the artillery staff is composed of two hundred and eighty-three
officers of different grades: also twenty-four officers of the general staff are
attached to this service. In our army the ordnance is composed of twenty-eight
officers of different grades.
II. Artillery-guards.—These in our service are divided into two classes: 1st.
Military Store-keepers. 2d. Ordnance Sergeants. Both are alike charged with the
care and preservation of the artillery property and stores at the several garrisons,
arsenals, and magazines. In our army we have fifty-eight of these guards, viz:
fifteen commissioned military store-keepers, and forty-three ordnance sergeants.
We seldom have more than this number of permanent posts; each one can
therefore be supplied with an artillery guard for the care of the artillery stores. In
the French service there are three hundred and fifteen of these artillery guards;
they are divided into three classes.
III. Artificers.—This class of men are employed in the construction and repairs
of military materials. In most of our arsenals and armories it is thought to be best
to employ unenlisted workmen, by the piece or contract. Nevertheless a limited
number of enlisted men of this description are found to be both useful and
necessary. We have three hundred and thirty of these in our army, viz: two
hundred and fifty enlisted "ordnance men," and eighty "artificers" attached to the
regiments. In the French army they have for the service of the arsenals and
establishments, one hundred and forty-nine "ouvriers," and twelve "artificers;"
there are also three hundred and sixty "ouvriers" and seventeen "armuriers"
attached to the corps of artillery, making in all five hundred and thirty-eight.
IV. Artillery Troops.—Artillery, as an arm of service, is divided in the same
manner as its materiel; the field-artillery being intended for field service, and the
garrison or siege-artillery, for the attack and defence of places. The troops of the
artillery corps of a modern army usually do duty either in the field, or in sieges,
or garrison, as occasion may require. When employed in the service of a
campaign, artillery is usually divided into two classes: 1st. Foot Artillery; and
2d. Horse Artillery.
In the early history of artillery, as has already been shown, but few pieces were
ever brought upon the battle-field. Charles VIII. crossed the Alps with a pretty
large train; but a part of these were hand-guns, and but very few of the larger
pieces were ever brought into battle; indeed, it was then thought that this arm
would be of little use except in sieges. At the battle of Gravelines the army of
Philip II. had only seventeen pieces of artillery; and at the battle of Ivry the
French had only four pieces of cannon, and two culverins: the army of the
League had also only four pieces. At the battle of Moncontour the opposing
armies had but eight pieces each.
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden not only improved the character of artillery, but
also gave to it great development as an arm of service. At the battle of
Bréetenfield he had one hundred pieces of artillery, great and small, and at the
camp of Nuremberg he numbered about three hundred. This king also made a
more skilful use of his cannon by uniting them more in mass than had been done
by his predecessors; his system was nevertheless very imperfect. In the
disposition of this arm on the field of battle, a vast improvement was made by
Condé, Turenne, and Prince Eugene of Savoy. Frederick the Great also made
great use of this arm, and was the first to introduce horse artillery. This mode of
using field-pieces has peculiar properties which in many circumstances render it
an invaluable arm. The promptness and rapidity of its movements enable it to act
with other troops without embarrassing them. The French soon introduced into
their army the improvements made by the king of Prussia, and in 1763 the
celebrated Gribeauval appeared. He improved the form of the cannon and greatly
diminished the weight of field artillery, giving it an organization which has been
but slightly changed since his time.
The successive improvements in artillery have for a long time constituted a
prominent feature in war. The power of this arm to throw projectiles to a great
distance, and to overturn and destroy opposing obstacles, renders it a necessary
arm on the battle-field, and a strong barrier and safeguard of states. It is an
essential element in all army organization.
In our army we have four regiments of artillery, forming the basis of forty
batteries. In the French service there are fourteen regiments, forming the basis of
two hundred and six field batteries.
The term battery, when applied to artillery as an arm of service, refers to a
permanent organization of a certain number of cannon, with the men and other
accessaries required to serve them. This is the unit of force in this arm. The
regimental organization is a mere nominal arrangement, for in actual service
artillery acts by batteries, and never by regiments. Its strength is therefore
invariably estimated by the number of its batteries.
A battery is ordinarily composed of six pieces, two of them being howitzers. The
lighter batteries would, in our service, be formed of six-pounder guns and
twelve-pounder howitzers; and the heavier of twelve-pounder guns and twenty-
four-pounder howitzers. These heavy batteries would usually form the reserve.
Each piece being attended by its caisson, this formation would give twelve
carriages to each battery, six for the guns and six for the caissons. The extra
caissons form a part of the reserve, and move with the train. In some foreign
services a battery is composed of eight pieces with their caissons.
This arm admits of three formations—in column, in battle, and in battery. In
column it ordinarily moves by sections of two pieces, each piece being followed
or preceded by its caisson. Columns of half-batteries are sometimes formed, and
also columns of single pieces; but the latter ought never to be employed except
in cases of necessity in passing a narrow defile, and at a distance from the
enemy.
In order of battle, the pieces are drawn up in line, their caissons forming a
second line, at the distance of a few paces.
When in order of battery, the pieces are formed in the same way as for battle,
except that the guns are directed towards the enemy and prepared for firing.
The movements and manœuvres of foot artillery correspond with those of
infantry, and of mounted artillery with those of cavalry, a battery being regarded
as a battalion or squadron, of which the pieces form the platoons. Mounted
batteries can seldom move with greater rapidity than the trot, except in cases of
emergency, and even then the gallop can be kept up only for a very short time;
but this is of no great importance, as the batteries never accompany cavalry in
the charge.
The French and German writers discuss artillery as employed in battle, under
two distinct heads—1st, as an arm of preparation, and 2d, as an arm of succor.
I. As an arm of preparation it serves, 1st, to protect the deploying of the other
troops; 2d, to disorganize the enemy's masses, and to facilitate the action of
infantry and cavalry, by weakening the intended points of attack; 3d, to force an
enemy to evacuate a position by overthrowing obstacles with which he has
covered himself; 4th, to keep up the action till the other troops can be prepared
to strike the decisive blow.
The force of this arm depends upon the rapidity and accuracy of its fire; rash
valor is therefore far less desirable in artillery than skill, patience, and cool
courage. Artillery always acts at a distance, and in mass; single pieces are
seldom employed, except to cover reconnoitring parties, or to sustain the light
infantry in a skirmish. Mounted batteries sometimes approach within two or
three hundred yards of the enemy's infantry; but this is only done with a strong
support of other troops, and to prepare the way for a charge of cavalry. The
batteries do not accompany the charge, but they should always follow up and
complete the success; mounted batteries are particularly useful in pursuit. If
Murat, in 1812, had accompanied his attacks upon Neveroffskoi's retreating
columns of sixty thousand infantry by two or three batteries of mounted artillery,
the whole column must have been captured or destroyed.
Artillery, on the field of battle, is very liable to allow its fire to be drawn, and its
projectiles wasted, while the enemy is at too great a distance to be reached. It is a
very common thing in a battle, to employ two or three pieces of heavy calibre at
the beginning of the fight, in order to provoke the opposing batteries to open
their fire before the proper time. The waste of material is not the only loss
attending this error; the troops are fatigued and disheartened, while the courage
and confidence of their opponents are always revived by a weak and inaccurate
fire. To avoid such an error the commanding officer of a battery of artillery
should be perfectly familiar with the effective ranges of his pieces, and
accustomed to form a correct estimate of distances. For this purpose the eye
should be frequently practised in time of peace in estimating the ranges for
different calibres.

The effective range of a 12-pounder field-piece is about 1000 yds.

The effective range of a 6-pounder field piece 800
The effective range of a 24-pounder howitzer 600 yds.
The effective range of a 12-pounder howitzer 500 yds.
The effective range of grape and case shot is from 500 to 600 yds.

Even at these distances the aim is usually so inaccurate that a large portion of the
projectiles are lost. In the attack on Spires, a whole column of artillery expended
its fire while at a distance of 900 yards from the enemy, who, of course, received
little or no injury. In firing from fortifications, the aim is far more accurate, and
the artillery may therefore be employed to advantage as soon as the enemy
comes within the longest range.
II. As an arm of succor, the artillery serves, 1st, to give impulsive force to the
attacking columns; 2d, to assist in arresting, or at least in retarding, the offensive
movements of an enemy; 3d, to protect the avenues of approach, and to defend
obstacles that cover a position; and, 4th, to cover a retrograde movement.
Mounted artillery is, like cavalry, much the most effective in attack; but batteries
of foot are better calculated for defence. The cannoniers are so armed as to be
capable of defending their pieces to the last extremity; they therefore cannot be
easily captured by opposing columns of infantry. "As to pretending to rush upon
the guns," says Napoleon, "and carry them by the bayonet, or to pick off the
gunners by musketry, these are chimerical ideas. Such things do sometimes
happen; but have we not examples of still more extraordinary captures by a coup
de main? As a general rule, there is no infantry, however intrepid it may be, that
can, without artillery, march with impunity the distance of five or six hundred
toises, against two well-placed batteries (16 pieces) of cannon, served by good
gunners; before they could pass over two-thirds of the way, the men would be
killed, wounded, or dispersed. * * * * A good infantry forms, no doubt, the
sinews of an army; but if it were required to fight for a long time against a very
superior artillery, its good quality would be exhausted, and its efficiency
destroyed. In the first campaigns of the wars of the Revolution, what France had
in the greatest perfection was artillery; we know not a single instance in which
twenty pieces of cannon, judiciously placed, and in battery, were ever carried by
the bayonet. In the affair at Valmy, at the battles of Jemmapes, Nordlingen, and
Fleurus, the French had an artillery superior to that of the enemy, although they
had often only two guns to one thousand men; but that was because their armies
were very numerous. It may happen that a general, more skilful in manœuvring,
more expert than his adversary, and commanding a better infantry, may obtain
successes during a part of a campaign, although his artillery may be far inferior
to that of his opponent; but on the critical day of a general engagement, his
inferiority in point of metal will be severely felt."
History furnishes us numerous examples of the use of artillery in protecting
avenues of approach:—such as the defile of Köesen at the battle of Auerstedt;
the avenues between the redoubts of Pultowa, &c., &c.
When an army is forced to retreat, it covers its rear by that portion of its cavalry
and mounted artillery which has suffered least during the battle. By placing the
squadrons of horse and the light batteries in echelon, the retiring column may be
well protected. The artillery, by using the prolonge, may also continue its retreat
while in battery and firing. It was in this way that at the battle of Albuera, in
1811, the French artillery on the left wing held in check the right and centre of
the Anglo-Spaniards till the army effected its retreat; the artillery then retired in
echelons, by batteries and fractions of batteries, under the protection of the
cavalry.
We have already discussed, under the general head of tactics, the position and
use of artillery on the battle-field a few additional remarks must suffice.
As a general rule, batteries should be placed in positions from which they can
employ their fire to advantage, and also be free to move in any direction that the
progress of the battle may require. Advantage should always be taken of natural
or artificial obstacles, such as hedges, clumps of trees, logs, mounds of earth,
&c., to cover and conceal the guns till the moment they open their fire. Elevated
positions are, contrary to the common opinion, generally unfavorable, for
artillery cannot fire to advantage at any considerable angle of depression. The
slopes in front should be of considerable length, otherwise the balls would do
very little execution upon that portion of the column of attack which occupied
the valley. The ground should also be smooth, for if rough the balls will either
bury themselves in the earth, or ricochet at a high angle of deflection, thus
destroying a considerable part of the effect of the fire. The counterforts or spurs
of hills are favorable for artillery, as they enable it to see, with an enfilading fire,
the slopes of the principal range. Batteries should seldom be placed so as to fire
over other troops, for they will not only be intimidated by this fire, but also
exposed to the opposing fire of the enemy's artillery. A large number of pieces
should never be crowded into the same place, but an interval should be left
between the guns of forty or fifty feet, according to the locality. The most
favorable position for this arm in ordinary ground, is in the intervals between the
regiments or brigades of the line, and far enough in advance of this line not to
draw upon the other troops the fire of the enemy's artillery. The flanks of the line
are also favorable for the action of this arm.
Sometimes artillery has been employed to form a part of the line of battle; but
such instances are exceptions, and can never be comprised in general rules.
Whenever this disposition has been made, it has resulted from the defective
character of the other arms, or from some peculiar circumstance in the battle
which enabled a bold and skilful commander to deviate from the ordinary rules
of tactics. Such was the case with Napoleon at Wagram. In Saxony, in 1813, he
was several times obliged to substitute his artillery to supply the want of other
arms.
In the defence and attack of field-works, and in the passage of rivers, artillery
plays an important and indispensable part; but it here becomes an auxiliary to the
dispositions of the engineers, or at least acts in concert with that arm.
The troops of artillery, in all well-regulated army organizations, should equal
about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the infantry.[36]
[36]
To qualify himself for the duties connected with his arm of service, the artillery
officer must make himself thoroughly acquainted with—.
The Instruction for United States Field Artillery, horse and foot;
Capt. Anderson's Instruction for Garrison Artillery;
Kinsley's Notes on Pyrotechny;
Knowlton's Notes on Gunpowder,&c.; and
The writings of Thiroux and Piobert on theoretical and practical instruction, and
the writings of Jomini, Decker, and Okotmeff, on the use of this arm on the field
of battle.
The following list of books of reference may be of use to those who wish to
make themselves perfectly familiar with all the branches of artillery.
Histoire général de l'artillerie. Brunet.
L'artillerie à cheval dans les combats de cavalerie. Par un officier de l'artillerie
Prussienne.
Considérations et experiences sur le tir des obus à bulles. Bormann. Essai sur
les obusiers. Dusaert.
Essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie. Le Bourg.
Traité sur l'artillerie, (traduit de l'Allemand.) Rouvroy.
Bombardier Français. Bélidor.
Mémoires d'artillerie. St. Rémy.
Essai sur l'usage de l'artillerie dans la guerre de campagne et celle de siége.
Dupuget.
Mémoires sur les nouveaux systèmes d'artillerie. St. Aubin.
Treatise on Artillery. Müller.
Artificial Fire-Works. Jones.
Table de tir les canons et obusiers. Lombard.
On Gunpowder. Antoni.
Recherches sur l'artillerie en général. Texier de Norbec.
Déscription de l'art de fabriquer les canons. Monge.
Procédés de la fabrication des armes blanches. Vandermonde.
Manuel de l'artilleur. Durtubie.
Traité du mouvement des projectiles. Lombard.
Treatise on Artillery. Scheel. (Translated from the German.)
Traité pratique des feux d'artifice. Morel.
Manuel du canonnier marin. Cornibert.
New Principles of Gunnery. Robins.
Mémoires sur la fabrication des armes portatives. Cotty.
Recherches sur la poudre. Cossigny.
Supplement. Cossigny.
Fabrication de la poudre. Renaud.
American Artillerist's Companion. Toussard.
Tables des portées des canons et canonades de la marine. Cornilwert.
Traité d'artifices de guerre. Bigot.
Traité élémentaire de la fabrication des bouches à feu. Dartein.
Traité de l'art de fabriquer la poudre à canon. Bottée et Riffault.
L'art du salpétrier. Bottée et Riffault.
Dictionary of Artillery. Hoyer. (German.)
New Experiments on Gunnery. Hutton—(Hutton's Tracts.)
Des bois propres au service des Arsenaux. Herbin de Halles.
Instruction sur le service de l'artillerie. Hulot.
Manœuvres de force. Bigot.
Balistique. Obenheim.
Treatise on Artillery. German. Scharnhorst. (Translated into French, 1840.)
Essai sur l'art de pointer. Poumet.
Réflexions sur la fabrication des bouches à feu. Lamartillière.
Mémoire sur la planchette du canonnier. Obenheim.
Aide-Mémoire. Gassendi.
Observations on the use of Artillery at the sieges of Badajos, St. Sebastian, etc..
Treatise on Artillery. Lallemand.
Elémens de pyrotechnie. Ruggieri.
Nouvelle force maritime. Paixhans.
Dictionnaire d'artillerie. Cotty.
Recherches balistiques. Coste.
Poudres fulminantes. Vergnaud.
Manuel de la métallurgie du fer. Culman.
Pyrotechnic militaire, (traduit de l'Allemand, par R. de Peretsdorff.)
Journal des Sciences Militaires.
Pyrotechny. Cutbush.
Traité élémentaire d'artillerie. Decker.
Fusées de guerre. Montgery.
Documens sur la matière à canons. Hervé.
Observations sur le nouveau système d'artillerie. Allix.
Système d'artillerie de campagne. Allix.
Pocket Gunner. Adye.
On the Rocket System. Congreve.
Essai sur l'art des fontes. Serres.
Receuil de Mémoires sur la poudre à canon. Proust.
Mémorial de l'artilleur marin. Michel.
Observations sur le nouveau système de l'artillerie. Poumet.
Mémorial d'artillerie.
British Gunner. Spearman.
Régles de pointage à bord des vaisseaux. Montgery.
Manuel du maître de forges. Landrin.
Naval Gunnery. Douglass.
Métallurgie du fer (traduit de l'Allemand, par Culman.) Karsten.
Aide-Mémoire à l'usage des officers d'artillerie. (Strasbourg.)
Traité de l'organisation et de la tactique de l'artillerie, (traduit de l'Allemand par
Peretsdorff.) Grewenitz.
Supplement au dictionnaire d'artillerie. Cotty.
Memoir on Gunpowder. Braddock.
Manuel de l'armurier. Paulin-Desormeaux.
Journal des armes spéciales.
Cours sur le service des officiers dans les fonderies. Serres.
Expériences sur la fabrication et la durée des bouches à feu en fer et bronze,
(traduit de l'Allemand par Peretsdorff.) Meyer.
Applications du fer aux constructions de l'artillerie. Thierry.
Aide-Mémoire d'art militaire. Lebas.
Mémorial à l'usage de l'armée Belge.
Instructions and Regulations for the service and management of heavy ordnance
in the British service.
Experiences sur les principes du tir, faites à Metz, en 1834.
Traité d'artillerie théorique et pratique. Piobert.
Aide-Mémoire à l'usage des officiers d'artillerie, (avec approbation du comité
d'artillerie.)
Manuel d'artillerie à l'usage des officiers de la République Helvétique.
Bonaparte, (Napoleon Louis.)
Expériences comparatives entre des bouches à feu en fonte de fer, d'origine
Franzaise, Anglaise et Suédoise, faites à Gavres, en 1836.
Expériences faites à Brest en 1831, sur les canons. Paixhans.
Essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie. Le Bourg.
Expériences sur des projectiles creux, faites en 1829, '30, '31.
Instruction pratique sur l'emploi des projectiles, (traduit de l'Allemand par
Peretsdorff.) Decker.
Effects of heavy ordnance as applied to ships of war. Simmons.
Expériences sur les poudres de guerre, faites à Esquerdes, en 1832, '33, '34, and
'35. Maguin.
Cours d'artillerie à l'usage des sous-officiers. De Crépy.
Instruction théorique et pratique d'artillerie, à l'usage des élèves de St. Cyr.
Thiroux.
Cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les forges.
Manuel historique de la technologie des armes à feu, (traduit de l'Allemand par
M. Rieffel.) Meyer.
Formules rélatives aux effets du tir sur affût. Poisson.
Manuel de l'artificer. Vergnaud.
Etat actuel de l'artillerie de campagne de toutes les puissances de l'Europe,
(traduit par Mazé; Ire partie, Artillerie Anglaise.) Jacobi. (Six other parts have
been published in German, containing descriptions of the French, Belgian,
Hessian, Wirtemburg, Nassau, and Swedish systems.)
Introduction à l'étude de l'artillerie. Madelaine.
Cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les fonderies. Description de
la fabrication des bouches ù feu à la fonderie royale de Liège. Huguenin.
Poudre ù canon. Timmerhans.
Procédés de fabrication dans les forges, (extrait du cours sur le service des
officiers dans les forges.)
Renseignements sur le matériel de l'artillerie navale de la Grande Bretagne.
Zeni et des Hays.
Théorie des affûts et des voitures de l'artillerie. Migout et Bergery
Artillerist's Manual. Griffith.
Handbuch für die K.K. Oesterreichische Artillerie Offiziere, (manual for the
Austrian artillery officers.)
Sammlung von Steindruckzeichnungen der Preussischen Artillerie, mit
Erläuterungen, (collection of plates of the Prussian artillery, with explanatory
text.)
Histoire des fusées de guerre.
Ordnance Manual, for the use of the officers of the United States Army.
Experiments on Gunpowder. Capt. Mordecai.
Pyrotechny, for the use of the Cadets at the United States Military Academy.
Kinsley.
Notes on Gunpowder, Percussion Powder, Cannon, and Projectiles. Lt.
Knowlton.
 CHAPTER XII.
ARMY ORGANIZATION—ENGINEERS.

Engineers.—The term engineer is derived from the unclassical Latin word

ingenium, which was applied both to a machine and the mind or skill of the
person who devised or constructed it.
It was Philip Augustus, say the French writers, who first introduced engineers
(engigneurs, or engignours, as they were called) into France, and restored the art
of sieges. The engineers of that age were seldom charged with the construction
of works of military defence, but, like Archimedes at Syracuse, and Longinus at
Palmyra, they directed their attention principally to devising implements of war
and the most effective manner of using them. Engines of war were at that time
divided between the engigneurs and the artilliers; the former being charged with
the heavier machines, and the latter with the smaller weapons used for throwing
projectiles. After the invention of gunpowder, the old battering-rams, cranes,
helipoles, &c., disappeared, and with them the engigneurs, or masters of
engines. The new inventions were united with the few old projectile machines
that remained in the artillery, and the engineers were for a time left almost
without employment. The revival of the art of fortification was very slow, and
the modern system scarcely began to be developed till near the sixteenth century.
We must omit for the present giving even an outline of the history of military
engineering, and pass to the troops of this arm, as constituting an essential
element of an army organization. The subject of fortification, and the history of
its various changes, will be examined in the next chapter.
The engineers, in modern army organization, constitute the fourth arm of
service, as, compared with artillery, their relative numbers are about as two to
three. They are divided in the same manner as the artillery, viz.:—1st, the staff;
2d, guards, or fort-keepers; 3d, artificers; and 4th, the troops.
I. The officers constituting the staff of this corps are charged in time of peace
with planning, constructing, and repairing all fortifications and other defensive
works; the construction and preparation of all military materials, and stores
connected with this arm; and (in our service) with the disbursements of money
connected with these operations: in time of war they are charged with the attack
and defence of military works, the laying out and construction of field defences,
redoubts, intrenchments, roads, &c.; in the attack they form a part of the
vanguard, to remove obstructions; and in retreat they form a part of the rear-
guard, to erect obstacles, destroy roads, bridges, &c., so as to retard an enemy's
pursuit.
From the important character of these duties as connected with the means
essential to a national defence, and the vast amount of money expended in these
operations, it is evident that a high order of acquirements should be deemed
necessary to qualify one to perform the duties of a military engineer. This officer
requires a knowledge of chemistry, to guide his choice of materials for mortars,
cements, and mastics; of mineralogy and geology, for selecting stone; of botany,
for timber and the means of preventing its decay; of mathematics, in laying out
his work and calculating the thickness and stability of his walls, embankments,
&c.; of mechanical philosophy, in constructing his machinery; of military
engineering, in his plans of fortifications; and of all the higher branches of
military science, in selecting positions for these works, such that they shall have
the proper relations to the means of national defence, and to the grand operations
of armies in the field. The avenues to appointment to this corps are guarded, in
most European armies, with special care, to prevent the influence of money,
politics, or family connections; and in our own army it is now specified by law
of Congress, that the vacancies shall be filled only from the most distinguished
graduates of the military academy. Formerly our service suffered most severely
from the employment of incompetent persons, introduced through political
influence from civil life, and foreign charlatans, the refuse of European armies.
Many of our earlier military works (as will be mentioned hereafter) were
modelled upon systems for a long time discarded by the profession in Europe,
and even some of those which have been constructed within the last thirty years
are made of such wretched materials and workmanship, that they are already
crumbling into ruins. While the existing laws and regulations seem well
calculated to prevent the recurrence of similar abuses and errors, it nevertheless
can be shown that the organization of this arm of our service requires
modifications and extensions to give it the requisite degree of efficiency, and to
economize the public expenditures.
The wars of Louis XIV. first led to a regular military organization, and a regular
system of defence. In these wars the engineers received great development, and
have ever since occupied a prominent position as parts of an army organization.
We therefore find in all the great sieges and battles of this era a large and
continually increasing number of engineers and engineer troops, this force being
gradually augmented as the true principles of war became better understood, and
as the wants of the service required. Even in the earliest of these battles we find
the engineers taking a prominent and distinguished part. In the war of 1688,
twenty-four engineers were killed and wounded at the siege of Philipsbourg,
eighteen at Namur, eight at Huy, ten at Charleroi, eight at Ath, thirty at
Barcelona, &c. Such losses were good proofs of the usefulness of these officers,
and before this war was closed, their number was increased to six hundred; and
in 1706 the army contained eight brigades of engineers and four companies of
miners.
The engineer corps being partially disbanded in the early part of the French
Revolution, great difficulty was experienced in reorganizing it and in finding
competent men to supply the places of those who had been driven into exile or
sacrificed during the reign of terror. Energy and activity, combined with
republican zeal, could supply the place of skill in the other arms, but the science
of the engineer could not be acquired in a day.
In 1799, the staff of the engineer corps consisted of four hundred and forty-nine
officers, without including the general officers, commanding departments, or
those connected with the engineer troops. The same organization was continued
in 1804. The engineer staff of the French army now numbers four hundred and
thirty-two officers. We have in our service forty-three engineer officers, for staff
duty, who are now engaged in the construction and repairs of some sixty or
seventy fortifications, and other works of a civil and military character.
II. Engineer Guards, or Fort-Keepers, are a class of men charged with the
general care of forts, and all public property deposited in the several engineer
dépôts and garrisons, and in the public works during their construction.
There are five hundred and fifty of these "gardes du Genie" in the French army,
who rank next the sub-lieutenants of engineers, and are assimilated with the sub-
lieutenants of infantry in the hospitals, marches, &c. In our service we have no
engineer guards or fort-keepers.
This defect in our organization has been the cause of serious inconvenience, and
the consequent waste of public property. The expense of hiring civil agents for
this purpose has more than trebled the cost of supporting a suitable number of
non-commissioned guards to maintain the good order and efficiency of our forts,
in the absence of engineer officers, and to preserve and keep in repair the
military implements and stores connected with this department of the army. It
has already been shown that we have fifty-eight of these guards for the artillery
service, and it really seems somewhat singular that the engineers, with a much
greater amount of public property in their charge, are allowed no assistants of
this kind.
III. Engineer artificers are a class of men employed in the practical operations of
constructing forts and other military defences, and in making and repairing all
the implements used by the engineer troops in the operations of sapping and
mining, in crossing rivers, in constructing field-defences, and in the attack and
defence of field-works.
As very few new fortifications are now required in France, the services of
engineer artificers are less necessary and important than in our service, where
large sums of money are annually expended upon military defences, There are,
however, in the French army a corps of engineer artificers, consisting of eight
officers and a cadre of fifty-four non-commissioned officers, with a variable
number of privates, organized into two companies. But in our army we have no
regular engineer artificers! In our artillery service we have three hundred and
thirty enlisted artillery artificers. If these are useful and necessary to the artillery
service, which no one doubts, for still stronger reasons would it be advantageous
to the public service to employ at least an equal number of enlisted engineer
artificers on our fortifications; for the annual expenditure of public money is
here much greater than in the corresponding branch of the artillery service.
IV. Engineer troops are divided into three classes—1st, sappers and pioneers;
2d, miners; and 3d, pontoniers.
In the French army of 1799, there were four battalions of sappers, consisting of
120 officers and 7,092 men. In 1804, Napoleon organized five battalions of these
troops, consisting of 165 officers and 8,865 men. Even this number was found
insufficient in his campaigns in Germany and Spain, and he was obliged to
organize an additional number of sappers from the Italian and French auxiliaries.
The pioneers were then partly attached to other branches of the service. There is,
at present, in the French army a considerable number of sappers or pioneers
detached for the service of the infantry regiments, three companies of sapeurs-
conducteurs, and forty-two companies of sapeurs. In the French army of 1799,
there were six companies of miners, consisting of 24 officers and 576 men. In
1804, Napoleon increased these troops to nine companies, containing 36 officers
and 864 men. The present French peace establishment contains six companies of
miners, organized much the same as under Napoleon. In the French army of
1799 there were two regiments of pontoniers, of 38 officers and 960 men. But
this number was found too small in the remaining campaigns, and the deficiency
was temporarily supplied by organizing sailors for these duties. In the present
French army organization, there are eleven companies of pontoniers, forming a
regiment of sixty-three officers.
We have in our service no sappers, miners, or pontoniers, and, in case of war,
would be found without the means of executing any military works, or
performing any military operation which would require engineer troops.
In the preliminary stages of army organization under Louis XIV., infantry troops
were detailed as sappers, and instructed in these duties by the engineers. This
irregularity of service soon caused difficulties and losses, and the evils springing
from it were so great, that Vauban urged the propriety of a separate organization.
In 1670 he officially recommended to the king to establish a regiment of twelve
hundred sappers and ouvriers, and in a subsequent report on the value of these
troops, used the following language: "They would be useful in peace as well as
in war, and would be the means of saving much in all fortifications where they
should be employed. In fact, I have not the least doubt that they would save
annually to the king much more than their pay. I assert all I have said on this
subject with as much confidence as if I had seen the result; and I can, with the
same certainty, add, that this small troop will be the means of saving large
numbers of good engineers and brave officers and soldiers, from the stern
necessity to which we are reduced of exposing, almost always, the laborers and
those who support them; which necessity would not arise had we at command a
sufficient number of this kind of workmen well instructed. To such a degree
have I felt the necessity of sappers, at every siege at which I have been present,
that I have always had reason to repent of not having more urgently solicited the
creation of this company."
Such are the views of the greatest of military engineers, a man who fought one
hundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or repaired
three hundred fortifications. His anticipations of the usefulness of engineer
troops were fully realized, and they have ever since received the most careful
attention, and now form, as has just been shown, one of the most important and
efficient arms in the French service. The fortifications constructed by the
engineers, as organized by Vauban, have ever since constituted one of the
principal elements of the French military power.
In the wars of Napoleon there are innumerable instances in illustration of the
delays and disasters attending the operations of armies not supplied with
engineer troops; and, on the other hand, the advantages resulting from their
services when properly organized and instructed. We have already pointed out
the influence which the fortifications in the hands of the French exerted on the
results of these wars, and the fatal consequences to the Allies of neglecting these
works of national defence. Every student of military history will immediately
call to mind the influence of Savona, Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Govi, Alessandria,
Tortona, Pizzighitone, Peschiera, Mantua, Palma-Nuova, Osopo, Klagenfurth,
&c., in the campaigns of 1796-7; of Genoa, Port Bard, the fortifications of the
Var, Ulm, Ingoldstadt, &c., in 1800; of Milan, Turin, Mantua, Roco d'Aufo,
Genoa, Alessandria, &c., in 1805; the importance of Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, &c., to
the French in 1806, and the fatal consequences to the Prussians in that campaign,
of their total and culpable neglect of their own fortifications.
All military historians speak of the influence of fortifications in the Peninsular
campaigns: those which had been given up to Napoleon previous to the opening
of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of his arms, while those
which were retained by Spain and her allies, contributed in an equal degree to
hamper and embarrass his operations. Some of these, like Saragossa and
Tarragona, with their broken walls and defective armaments, kept the enemy in
check some sixty days each, and did much to weaken the French power in the
Peninsula.
Temporary or field-fortifications also had an important influence here. The lines
of Torres-Vedras, the field-works of Ronda, the intrenched camps of the
Pyrenees, Bayonne, Toulouse, &c., are examples under this head. In fact, field-
works played a most important part in all of Napoleon's wars. We might mention
the redoubt of Montenotte, the intrenchments at Milesimo, the batteries of
Lobau, the field-defences of Hougomont, La Haye-Sainte, and Papelotte at
Waterloo, and numerous other cases equally striking. Just before the battle of
Waterloo, Wellington employed some eighteen thousand peasants and two
thousand horses, under the direction of British officers of engineers. In speaking
of these defences, Colonel Pasley says: "It may be easily conceived that to have
directed such a great body of workmen to proper advantage, by means of a few
officers of engineers, would have been impossible, but for the system adopted of
subdividing the various works among the non-commissioned officers and
privates of the engineer troops, each of whom was made responsible for laying
out the details of his own portion, and for the direction of a party of from twenty
to one hundred men, or even more, according to circumstances."
But to return to the Peninsular war. These campaigns exhibit in strong colors the
advantages derived, on the one side, from a well-organized engineer corps, and
the losses, delays, and defects suffered on the other, until the defects of the
organization were remedied. Napoleon entered Spain with a well-appointed
army, and soon, through strategy and well-directed force, gained possession of
the important fortresses of the Peninsula; seizing in this way the strategic routes
and important geographical points, he was enabled to retain possession of the
country for eight years, in spite of the numerous forces arrayed against him, the
absence of himself and his best generals in Germany, and the great inefficiency
of Joseph and of many of his generals. These fortifications were old, and of
strength inferior to modern works of defence, but it required years and the
expenditure of millions in blood and treasure to expel from the country those
who had possession of them.
For the first five years of this war the English struggled with a most imperfect
army organization.[37] When "the first serious siege," says Napier, was
undertaken by the British army, "to the discredit of the English government, no
army was ever so ill provided with the means of prosecuting such an enterprise.
The engineer officers were exceedingly zealous; and many of them were well
versed in the theory of their business. But the ablest trembled when reflecting on
their utter destitution of all that belonged to real service. Without a corps of
sappers and miners, without a single private who knew how to carry on an
approach under fire, they were compelled to attack fortresses defended by the
most warlike, practised, and scientific troops of the age."
[37]
In a letter dated February 11th, 1812, Wellington wrote to the Secretary of State
as follows:—"I would beg leave to suggest to your lordship the expediency of
adding to the engineer establishment a corps of sappers and miners. It is
inconceivable with what disadvantages we undertake any thing like a siege for
want of assistance of this description. There is no French corps d'armée which
has not a battalion of sappers and a company of miners; but we are obliged to
depend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the line; and
although the men are brave and willing, they want the knowledge and training
which are necessary. Many casualties among them consequently occur, and
much valuable time is lost at the most critical period of the siege."

"The best officers and finest soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a
lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a
government, always ready to plunge the nation into war, without the slightest
care of what was necessary to obtain success. The sieges carried on by the
British in Spain were a succession of butcheries; because the commonest
materials, and the means necessary to their art, were denied the engineers."
Colonel J.T. Jones writes in nearly the same terms of the early sieges in the
Peninsula, and with respect to the siege of Badajos, adds in express terms, that "a
body of sappers and miners, and the necessary fascines and gabions, would have
rendered the reduction of the work certain."[38] Soon after this siege a body of
engineer troops arrived from England, but their number was insufficient, and
Wellington, having learned by sad experience the importance of engineer troops,
ordered a body of two hundred volunteers to be detached from the line, "and
daily instructed in the practice of sapping, making and laying fascines and
gabions, and the construction of batteries, &c." The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo,
which immediately followed this organization, was conducted with greater skill
and success than any other till nearly the close of the war; and all military
writers have attributed this result to the greater efficiency of the engineer force
engaged in the siege. This arm was now gradually increased, and the last year of
the war the engineer force with the English army in the field consisted of
seventy-seven officers, seven assistant-engineers and surveyors, four surgeons
and assistants, one thousand six hundred and forty-six sappers, miners, artificers,
&c., one thousand three hundred and forty horses and one hundred and sixty
carriages.
[38]
Colonel Pasley states that only one and a half yards of excavation, per man, was
executed in a whole night, by the untrained troops in the Peninsular war;
whereas an instructed sapper can easily accomplish this in twenty minutes, and
that it has been done by one of his most skilful sappers, at Chatham, in seven
minutes!

During all this time the French furnished their armies in Spain with well-
organized engineer forces. We have endeavored to form a comparison of the
number of French engineers and artillerists employed on these peninsular sieges.
But from the loose manner in which these details are usually given by historians,
it is almost impossible to distinguish between the two. Both are not unfrequently
given under the same head, and when a distinction is apparently kept up, only
the engineer staff is mentioned under the head of engineers—the sappers,
miners, artificers, the train, &c., all being put down as artillery. In the following
table we have endeavored to arrange them as is done in our own army. The trains
of both arms are left out, for frequently that of one arm performed the duties of
the other. Moreover, in our service a portion of these duties of engineer and
artillery trains is performed by the quartermaster's department. For those who
wish to know the exact organization of the French engineer train, we give it as it
existed in 1811, viz.:—seven troops, each troop consisting of three officers, one
hundred and forty-one non-commissioned officers and privates, two hundred and
fifty horses, and fifty wagons, conveying five thousand two hundred and seventy
intrenching tools, one thousand seven hundred cutting tools, one thousand eight
hundred and two artificers' tools, two hundred and fifty-three miners' tools, and
eight thousand three hundred and eighteen kilogrammes' weight of machinery
and stores, each article being made to a particular pattern. The pioneers in Spain
acted sometimes with one arm and sometimes with the other, and we have
assigned them accordingly in the table. The pontoniers, however, in our service
are included with the engineers; we have therefore put them, in our table, in the
same column with the engineers.

Engineer staff, Artillery staff, Total of

sappers, horse and foot Total of artillery
engineers,
miners, artillery, staff, horse and
Name of sappers,
pontoniers and ouvriers and foot artillery,
Siege. miners,
pioneers. pioneers ouvriers and
pontoniers and
pioneers
Officers Men Officer Men pioneers
Saragossa 86 1180 90 1276 1275 1360
Rosas 21 211 - - 232 461
Girona 54 603 62 1299 637 1361
Astorga 7 91 17 427 98 444
Lerida 15 316 11 208 331 219
Meguinenza 34 278 - - 312 136
1st. Cuidad
34 441 - - 475 1019
Rodrigo
Almeida 34 489 - - 523 1019
Tortosa 43 429 32 381 472 413
Tarragona 50 681 46 701 731 747
Olivensa 10 106 - - 116 186
1st. Badajos 25 707 41 699 732 740
Tarifa 12 235 17 148 247 165
Peniscola 13 138 9 183 151 192
2nd. Cuidad
3 12 8 160 15 168
Rodrigo
2nd.
9 256 - - 265 268
Badajos
Burgos 4 124 3 126 128 129
Castio
5 68 8 197 73 205
Udiales
St Sebastian 13 248 7 166 261 173

From this table it appears that the ratio of the two arms at these sieges, making
the comparison on the basis of our own organization, is about the same as for the
present French army in Algeria, or a little more than five of engineers to six of
artillery.
Thus far we have spoken of the field-operations of engineer troops in connection
with fortifications, alluding only incidentally to the use of military bridges and
the passage of rivers. In the early wars of the French Revolution the want of
pontoniers was severely felt, and from the deficiency of this branch of service,
the operations of the French generals were on several occasions very much
restricted. The evil was afterwards remedied in a great degree by the
introduction of several battalions of ponioniers in the regular army organization.
On many occasions, during his wars, did Napoleon feel and acknowledge the
importance of these troops; but on none, perhaps, was this importance more
clearly shown than in the passage of the Beresina during his retreat from
Moscow with the wreck of his army. The Russians had cut the bridge of Borisow
and taken position in great strength on the right bank of the river, both at this
point and below; the French, wearied with long and difficult marches, destitute
of artillery, provisions, and military stores, with a wide and deep river in front,
and a powerful enemy on their flank and rear, benumbed by the rigors of a
merciless climate, and dispirited by defeat—every thing seemed to promise their
total destruction. "General Eblé," says an English general officer, in his remarks
on this retreat, "who, from the beginning of the campaign, had made all the
arrangements for the equipment and construction of military bridges, was
specially charged with the important duty of providing for the passage of this
river; and he discharged that duty with a degree of forecast and ability to which
certainly Napoleon owed his escape and the wreck of his army its safety. General
Eblé had begun to prepare, at Smolensko, for the difficulties which he foresaw in
this operation. He formed, with every care, a train sufficient for the transport of
all the tools and stores that might be required; and, further to provide against
casualties and accidents, every man belonging to the companies of pontoniers
was obliged to carry from Smolensko a tool or implement of some kind, and a
proportion of nails: and fortunate was it for the army that he did so; for such was
the difficulty in getting through the carriages containing stores, that only two
forge-wagons and six caissons of tools and nails could be preserved. To these the
general added a quantity of iron-work taken from the wheels of carriages that
were abandoned on the march. Much was sacrificed to bring off these valuable
materials for making clamps and fastenings, but, as Segur observes, that exertion
'sauva l'armée.'"
But it is not always in the possession of a thing that we are most likely to
appreciate its utility; the evils and inconveniences resulting from the want of it
not unfrequently impress us most powerfully with its importance and the
advantages to be derived from its possession. A few examples of this nature,
drawn from military history, may be instructive. We need not go back to the
disastrous passage of the Vistula by Charles XII., the failure of Marlborough to
pass the Dyle, and Eugene to cross the Adda in 1705, nor of the three
unsuccessful attempts of Charles of Lorraine to cross the Rhine in 1743. The
wars following the French Revolution are sufficiently replete with useful
instruction on this subject.[39]
[39]
Before recurring to these, it might be useful to give one example, as it is often
referred to, in the campaign of 1702. It was deemed important for the success of
the campaign to attack the Prince of Baden in his camp at Friedlingen.
Accordingly, a bridge was thrown across the Rhine at Huningen, the passage
effected, and the victory gained. But Villars was several times on the point of
losing all for want of a sufficient ponton equipage. Having but a single bridge,
the passage was necessarily slow; the artillery and stores were frequently
interrupted by the infantry hurrying to the field of battle; disorder ensued, and
the whole movement was retarded; Villars could bring only a small part of his
artillery into action, and towards the close of the battle the infantry were in want
of ammunition: moreover, the whole operation had nearly failed from the
attempt of the enemy to destroy this bridge, but the skill of the French pontoniers
saved it. We here remark, 1st, the passage secured to Villars an important
victory; 2d, from having an inefficient bridge-equipage his whole army was
placed in great peril, and the operation had nearly failed; 3d, if the Prince of
Baden had possessed a skilful corps to oppose that of Villars, this single bridge
would have been destroyed, and the army cut to pieces; 4th, the skill of the little
corps of French pontoniers saved the bridge, and of consequence, the army.

In 1794 so great was the disorder in the direction of affairs, that the boats of the
bridges across the Wahal and the Rhine were disposed of for commercial
purposes; and in the beginning of 1795, says Jomini, "the conquerors of Belgium
and Holland had not even a bridge equipage, at a time too when the success of
the campaign depended solely on the means of crossing a river." A few boats
were procured from the Wahal and the Meuse, and others manufactured in the
forests of the Moselle; but "these operations consumed precious time, and four
months thus passed away in preparations." Even after other things were all ready,
the army was obliged to wait thirty days for the arrival of boats for ponton
bridges; during this delay the Austrians strengthened their position, and with
very little exertion they might easily have prevented the passage.
In 1796, profiting by the errors of the former campaigns, the French collected
more suitable bridge equipages, and the two armies passed the Rhine at Neuweid
and Kehl without loss or delay. The latter of these passages has often been
referred to as a model for such operations, and certainly does credit to the
general who directed it. But Moreau's bridge equipage having been destroyed
during this disastrous campaign, his operations the following year were
considerably delayed in preparing a new one, and even then he was under the
necessity of seizing all private boats that could be found within reach; but the
difficulty of collecting and using boats of all sizes and descriptions was so great
as entirely to defeat his plan of surprising the enemy on the opposite bank of the
river. The necessity of co-operating with Hoche admitted of no further delay, and
he was now obliged to force his passage in the open day, and in face of the
enemy. Undertaken under such circumstances, "the enterprise was extremely
sanguinary, and at one time very doubtful;" and had it failed, "Moreau's army
would have been ruined for the campaign."
Napoleon's celebrated passage of the Po, at Placentia, shows plainly how
important it is for a general to possess the means of crossing rivers. "I felt the
importance of hastening the enterprise in order not to allow the enemy time to
prevent it. But the Po, which is a river as wide and deep as the Rhine, is a barrier
difficult to be overcome. We had no means of constructing a bridge, and were
obliged to content ourselves with the means of embarkation found at Placentia
and its environs. Lannes, chief of brigade, crossed in the first boats, with the
advanced guard. The Austrians had only ten squadrons on the other side, and
these were easily overcome. The passage was now continued without
interruption, but very slowly. If I had had a good ponton-equipage, the fate of
the enemy's army had been sealed; but the necessity of passing the river by
successive embarkations saved it."
In the campaign of 1799, the Archduke attempted to pass the Aar, and attacked
the French on the opposite side, but for want of suitable equipage his operation
was delayed till the enemy had collected sufficient forces to intercept the
passage; he was now obliged to enter into a stipulation for a suspension of
hostilities, and to withdraw his bridges.
The operations of the French in the campaign of 1800, led to the most glorious
results, but their execution was attended with the greatest difficulties. The
passage of the Alps was greatly facilitated by the ability of the chief engineer,
Marescot, and the skill of the troops under his command; and the facility of
passing rivers afforded Napoleon by his pontoniers, had an important influence
upon the success of the campaign. "The army of the reserve had many
companies of pontoniers and sappers; the pontons of course could not be taken
across the St. Bernard, but the pontoniers soon found materials on the Po and
Tesin for constructing bridge equipages." Moreau's army in the same year
profited well by his pontoniers, in the passages of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun,
the Alza, &c., and in the pursuit of the Austrian army—a pursuit that has but a
single parallel example in modern history.
The facility with which Napoleon crossed rivers, made forced marches,
constructed redoubts, fortified dépôts, and grasped the great strategic points of
the enemy in the campaign of 1805, resulted from the skilful organization of his
army, and the efficiency given to the forces employed in these important
operations. The engineer staff of the French army at this period, consisted of four
hundred and forty-nine officers, and there were four battalions of sappers, of one
hundred and twenty officers and seven thousand and ninety-two men; six
companies of miners, of twenty-four officers and five hundred and seventy-six
men; and two regiments of pontoniers, of thirty-eight officers and nine hundred
and sixty men. On the contrary, the enemy's neglect of these things is one of the
most striking of the many faults of the war, and his ill-directed efforts to destroy
the great wooden bridge across the Danube, and the successful operations of the
French sappers in securing it, formed one of the principal turning points in the
campaign.
The same organization enabled the French to perform their wonderfully rapid
and decisive movements in the Prussian campaign of 1806, and the northern
operations of 1807.
In 1809, Napoleon's army crossed, with the most wonderful rapidity, the Inn, the
Salza, the Traun, and other rivers emptying into the Danube, and reached Vienna
before the wonder-stricken Austrians could prepare for its defence. It was then
necessary for the French to effect a passage of the Danube, which was much
swollen by recent rains and the melting snow of the mountains. Considering the
depth and width of the river, the positions of the enemy, and his preparations to
oppose a passage, with the disastrous consequences that would result to the
French from any failure in its execution; taking all these things into
consideration, Jomini pronounced it "one of the most hazardous and difficult of
all the operations of War." Here the fate of the army depended, apparently, upon
the skill and efficiency of the engineers and pontoniers, and nobly did they
discharge the trust reposed in them. When the pontons failed, tressel-bridges
were substituted, and even fifty-four enormous boats were put in requisition. So
skilfully were these operations conducted, that Napoleon's immense army
crossed over in safety, directly in the face of a superior enemy, and the same day
fought the memorable battle of Esling. Forced to retire before numbers vastly
superior to his own, Napoleon concentrated his forces on the island of Lobau,
and intrenched his position. Surrounded by the broad and deep channel of the
Danube, and watched by numerous and skilful enemies, it required the most
constant activity and the greatest good fortune to effect a passage. Here the skill
and efficiency of the engineers shone conspicuously; a number of bridges were
thrown across the river in the face of the Austrians, and against obstacles almost
insurmountable; the whole French army passed in safety, and soon put the
finishing stroke to that brilliant campaign. So high an estimate did Napoleon
attach to the construction of these bridges, that, when the passage was
completed, he offered to place Bertrand, the constructing engineer, though of
comparatively low rank, at the head of the French corps du genie.
On many occasions during the retreat in 1812-13, from the Beresina to the left of
the Rhine, across the Niemen, the Vistula, the Oder, the Elbe, and the numerous
other rivers which divide that immense country, the French derived vast
advantages from the experience and skill of their engineers and pontoniers,
several times whole corps escaping through their means from the grasp of their
pursuers. When, however, the disasters of this retreat had absorbed most of the
material of the army, and had sadly thinned the ranks of men of skill and
experience, they sustained many severe, and, in other circumstances,
unnecessary losses. Of this character we may mention the passage of the Elster
by the bridge of Lindnau, where, through the ignorance and carelessness of those
charged with the mines, and through the want of suitable bridge arrangements,
thousands of brave men were buried in the muddy waters of this small river. So
sensibly did Napoleon feel this want of bridge equipages, in the winter of 1813-
14, that he addressed to his minister of war, on this subject, the following
remarkable words: "If I had had pontons, I should have already annihilated the
army of Schwartzenberg, and closed the war; I should have taken from him eight
or ten thousand wagons, and his entire army in detail; but for want of the proper
means I could not pass the Seine." Again, on the 2d of March he wrote: "If I had
had a bridge equipage this morning, Blücher's army had been lost." Whoever
will examine the details of the operations of this campaign, will be convinced of
the full force of these remarks.
In Spain in 1808, Sir John Moore, in order to assist the native forces, had
penetrated so near the army of Napoleon, that retreat became exceedingly
difficult, and he was several times on the point of being lost. The English army
was at this time very deficient in engineer troops, and Moore suffered much for
want of miners to destroy bridges, and pontoniers to construct new ones. In order
to cover his retreat and impede the advance of the French, the commander-in-
chief, says Napier, "directed several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers
[for want of miners and miner's tools] failed of success in every attempt."
In Soult's retreat, in 1809, he crossed the Duero at Oporto, and destroyed the
bridges so as to cut off the pursuit of Wellington. But while Soult, deceived by
treachery in his own corps, neglected to guard the river with proper vigilance,
Wellington collected boats at different points, crossed over his army, surprised
the French, and, had it not been for the singular delay and indecision of General
Murray, would most certainly have forced the entire army to capitulate; as it was,
his operation produced a decided influence on the campaign, and effected the
safety of Beresford's corps. Soult destroyed his artillery and baggage, and hastily
retreated through the mountain passes; but his army was again arrested at the
river Cavado, and placed on the very brink of destruction, when the brave and
skilful Dulong succeeded in effecting a passage at the Ponte Nova; the same
daring officer opened, on the same day, a way for the further escape of the
French across the Misarella by the Saltador.
In the pursuit of Massena, in 1810, it was important to the English to cross the
Guadiana, and attack the French before Badajos could be put in a state of
defence. Beresford was directed by Wellington to pass this river at Jerumina,
where the Portuguese had promised to furnish pontons; but they neglected to
fulfil their engagement, and the army had to wait till Capt. Squire, an able and
efficient officer of engineers, could construct other means for effecting a
passage. Every thing was done that genius could devise and industry execute;
nevertheless, the operations of the army were greatly delayed—"a delay," says
the historian, "that may be considered as the principal cause of those long and
bloody operations which afterwards detained Lord Wellington more than a year
on the frontiers of Portugal."
We might prolong these remarks by discussing the passages of the Ceira and
Alva, and their influence on the pursuit of Massena; Wellington's passage of the
Tagus, and his retreat from Burgos in 1812; the passage of the Adour and
Garonne in 1814; and the failure of the mines to blow up the bridges of Saltador,
Alcantara, &c.; but a sufficient number of examples, it is believed, has already
been adduced to show the advantage of maintaining a properly organized and
instructed body of sappers, miners, and pontoniers, and the fatal results attending
the want of such troops, as a component part of an army organization.
It has already been remarked that the infantry of an army must always form the
basis of the apportionment; and by the general rule laid down by military writers,
the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry, according to
the character of the war; the artillery about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-
seventh of the infantry; and the engineers from one-half to three-fourths of the
artillery,—say about two-thirds. The staff and administrative corps must vary
according to the nature of the organization, and the character of the theatre of
war. The former ought to be from two to five in a thousand, and the latter from
twenty-five to seventy-five,[40] as a general rule. These ratios would give for a
good army organization;

Staff 5
Administrative service—pay, medical, commissary, quarter-master,
65
etc.
Infantry 650
Cavalry 130
Artillery 90
Engineers 60
========
Total 1,000

In a broken country, and against savage and undisciplined foes, like the Indians
in this country, the natives opposed to the English in India, to the French in
Algeria, or to the Russians in Circassia, the cavalry, artillery, and engineers
would be diminished, and the infantry and administrative corps proportionably
increased; the former because light troops are always preferable against an
undisciplined foe, and the latter because of the difficulty of moving and
procuring supplies in new and uncultivated countries. The French forces in
Algeria, in 1844, amounted to about sixty thousand men, in the following
proportion:—

Staff 4.7
Administrative,etc. 112.3
Infantry 687.3
Cavalry, 86.6
Artillery 61.2
Engineers 47.9
==========
 1000 men.

[40]
This supposes the teamsters, wagon-masters, hospital-servants, &c., to be
enlisted men, and not persons hired for the occasion as is done in our army.

In small peace establishments the relative proportion of infantry and cavalry

should be much less than when prepared for the field, because troops for these
two arms can be much more readily formed in case of emergency, than for those
which require more scientific information, and technical skill and instruction.
The staff and engineers are evidently the most difficult to be formed in case of
war, and next to these the artillery and administrative corps.
In this country we can maintain, in time of peace, only the framework of an
army, looking to our citizen soldiery to form, in case of need, the great mass of
our military force. This is the starting point in our military system, and the basis
of our army organization. Let us see whether this principle is carried out in
practice.

For every thousand men in our present organization[41] we have,

For the staff 2

Administrative 20[42]
Infantry 513
Cavalry 150
Artillery 310
Engineers 5
=======
1000 men

[41]
These numbers are the real rather than the nominal proportions, many of our
officers being called staff, who properly belong to one of the other classes.
[42]
Much of the administrative duty in our army is done by unenlisted men, or by
soldiers detached from their companies. Where such is the case, the ratio of this
branch of the service ought to be no higher than is represented above.

We see from this table, that while our artillery is nearly six times as numerous as
in ordinary armies, our staff is less by one-half, and our engineers not more than
one-half what ought to be their proportion in a war establishment. To this excess
of artillery over infantry and cavalry in our army in time of peace there is no
objection, inasmuch as the latter could be more easily expanded in case of war
than the artillery. But for a still stronger reason our staff and engineers should
also be proportionally increased, instead of being vastly diminished, as is
actually the case.
Experience in the first campaigns of the American Revolution strongly
impressed on the mind of Washington the absolute necessity of forming a regular
and systematic army organization. But so difficult was it to obtain properly
instructed engineers, that he was obliged to seek his engineer officers in the
ranks of foreign adventurers, and to make drafts from the other arms of service,
and have them regularly instructed in the duties of engineer troops, and
commanded by the officers of this corps. An order, in his own handwriting,
giving the details of this temporary arrangement, is dated March 30th, 1779.
Until men are enlisted for the purpose, companies of sappers and miners shall be
formed by drafts from the line. "The duties of the companies of sappers and
miners," he continues, "shall be under the direction of the engineers, to construct
field-works of every kind, and all works necessary for the attack or defence of
places, as circumstances may require. On a march in the vicinity of an enemy, a
detachment of the companies of sappers and miners shall be stationed at the head
of the column, directly after the vanguard, for the purpose of opening and
mending the roads, and removing obstructions," &c. &c.
The great difficulties encountered by Washington in instructing his
inexperienced forces in the more difficult branches of the art, made him the more
earnest, in after years, to impress on us how important it was for us In peace to
prepare for war. The preparation here meant is not the keeping up, in time of
peace, of a large standing army, ever ready to take the field; but rather the
formation of a small body, educated and practised in all the scientific and
difficult parts of the profession; a body which shall serve as the cadre or
framework of a large army, capable of imparting to the new and inexperienced
soldiers of the republic that skill and efficiency which has been acquired by
practice. How far have we accomplished this object, and what will be the
probable operations in case of another contest with a European power? New and
inexperienced troops will be called into the field to oppose a veteran and
disciplined army. From these troops we shall expect all the bravery and energy
resulting from ardent patriotism and an enthusiastic love of liberty. But we
cannot here expect much discipline, military skill, or knowledge of the several
branches of the military art. The peaceful habits of our citizens tend but little to
the cultivation of the military character. How, then, are we to oppose the hostile
force? Must human blood be substituted for skill and preparation, and dead
bodies of our citizens serve as epaulements against the inroads of the enemy? To
some extent, we fear it must be the case; but not entirely so, for government has
not altogether neglected to make preparation for such an event. Fortifications
have been planned or erected on the most important and exposed positions;
military materials and munitions have been collected in the public arsenals; a
military school has been organized to instruct in the military sciences; there are
regularly kept up small bodies of infantry and cavalry, weak in numbers, but
capable of soon making good soldiers of a population so well versed as ours is in
the use of the musket and the horse; an artillery force, proportionally much
larger, is also regularly maintained, with a sufficient number of men and officers
to organize and make good artillery-men of citizens already partially acquainted
with the use of the cannon. But an acquaintance with infantry, cavalry, and
artillery duties is not the only practical knowledge requisite in war. In the
practical operations of an army in the field, rivers are to be crossed, bridges
suddenly erected and suddenly destroyed, field-works constructed and defended,
batteries captured and destroyed; fortifications are to be put in order and
defended, or to be besieged and recaptured; trenches must be opened, mines
sprung, batteries established, breaches made and stormed; trous-de-loup, abattis,
palisades, gabions, fascines, and numerous other military implements and
machinery are to be constructed. Have our citizens a knowledge of these things,
or have we provided in our military establishment for a body of men instructed
and practised in this branch of the military art, and capable of imparting to an
army the necessary efficiency for this service? Unfortunately this question must
be answered in the negative; and it is greatly to be feared that the future historian
will have to say of us, as Napier has said of the English:—"The best officers and
soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to
compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government always ready to
plunge the nation into a war, without the slightest care of what was necessary to
obtain success. Their sieges were a succession of butcheries; because the
commonest materials, and the means necessary to their art, were denied the
engineers."[43]
[43]
The subjects discussed in this chapter are also treated by most authors on
Military Organization and Military History, and by the several writers on
Military Engineering. Allent, Vauban, Cormontaigne, Rocquancourt, Pasley,
Douglas, Jones, Belmas, Napier, Gay de Vernon, may be referred to with
advantage. Pasley, Douglas, Jones, and Napier, speak in the strongest terms of
the importance of engineer troops in the active operations of a war, and of the
absolute necessity of organizing this force in time of peace. A list of books of
reference on Military Engineering will be given at the close of the following
chapters.
While these pages are passing through the press, Congress has authorized the
President to raise one company of engineer troops! This number is altogether too
small to be of any use in time of war.
 CHAPTER XIII.
PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.

Fortification is defined,—the art of disposing the ground in such a manner as to

enable a small number of troops to resist a larger army the longest time possible.
If the work be placed in a position of much importance, and its materials be of a
durable character, it is called permanent; if otherwise, it receives the appellation
of field, or temporary. Field-works are properly confined to operations of a
single campaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied
only for a short period. Generally these works are of earth, thrown up by the
troops in a single day. They are intimately connected with a system of permanent
fortifications, but from the facility of their construction, no provision need be
made for them before the actual breaking out of war. Indeed, they could not well
be built before hostilities commenced, as their locality in each case must be
determined by the position of the hostile forces.
Having already described the general influence of permanent fortifications as a
means of national defence, we shall here speak merely of the principles of their
construction. It is not proposed to enter into any technical discussion of matters
that especially belong to the instruction of the engineer, but merely to give the
nomenclature and use of the more important parts of a military work; in a word,
such general information as should belong to officers of every grade and corps of
an army.
The first species of fortification among the ancients was of course very simple,
consisting merely of an earthen mound, or palisades. A wall was afterwards
used, and a ditch was then added to the wall. It was found that a straight wall
could be easily breached by the enemy's battering-rams; to remedy this evil,
towers were built at short intervals from each other, forming a broken line of
salient and re-entering parts. These towers or salient points gradually assumed a
shape approximating to the modern bastion.
After the invention of gunpowder and the application of cannon to the attack and
defence of places, it became necessary to arrange earthen ramparts behind the
thin walls of the ancient works, for the reception of the new artillery. Moreover
these walls were soon found inadequate to resist the missiles of the besiegers,
and it became necessary to replace them by parapets of earth. In order to cover
the retaining walls of these parapets from the besieging batteries, it was also
found to be necessary to lower these walls as much as possible, and to raise the
counterscarps. The traces or plans of the works, however, received no material
change till about the close of the fifteenth century.
It is not known who first changed the ancient towers into bastions. Some
attribute it to an Italian, and with considerable show of reason, for a bastion was
built at Turin as early as 1461. Achmet Pacha, it is said, fortified Otranto in this
way, in 1480, but whether the system was previously known among the Turks
cannot be determined. Others attribute the invention to Ziska, the celebrated
leader of the Hussites. It is most probable that the transition from the tower to
the bastion was a very gradual one, and that the change was perfected in several
countries at about the same time.
Fortifications, like other arts and sciences, greatly flourished in Italy under the
Medicis, and that country furnished Europe with its most skilful engineers.
Catharine of Medicis introduced into France many of her countrymen,
distinguished in this profession; among these may be named Bellamat, Bephano,
Costritio, Relogio, Vorganno, the two Marini, Campi, and Hieronimo, who built
several important places and directed the sieges of others. These able foreigners
were rivalled by some distinguished French engineers, who laid the foundation
of the "corps du Genie" which has since become a school of military instruction
for the world. Among the early French engineers may be distinguished
Lafontaine De Serré, Feuquières, and St. Remy. Pedro Navarro had been
appointed a member of this corps, but his attention was more specially directed
to mining, and we do not learn that he distinguished himself in the construction
of any fortification.
In Germany, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, Albert Durer
distinguished himself as a writer on fortification; his book is remarkable as
containing the germs of many of the improvements which were made by those
who followed him. This is the more to be wondered at as he was not a professed
engineer. After him followed Spekel, a native of Strasburg, who died in 1589.
His writings are valuable as showing the state of the art at that time, and the
changes which he himself introduced. He was an engineer of much practical
knowledge and experience, having assisted at the sieges of Malta, Golletta,
Vienna, Jula, Nicosia, Famagusta, &c.
The first French engineer who wrote on fortification was Errard de Bar-le-Duc,
who published near the close of the sixteenth century. As an engineer, he was
rivalled by Chatillon, a man of distinguished merit. Errard fortified Amiens, built
a part of the castle of Sedan, and a portion of the defences of Calais. Under the
reign of Louis XIII., Desnoyers, Deville, Pagan, and Fabre were greatly
distinguished. Deville published in 1628. He was a man of much learning and
experience; but he is said to have adopted, both in his theory and practice, the
principles of the Italian school, with most of its errors. Pagan began his military
career while young, and became maréchal de champ at the age of 38, when,
having the misfortune to become blind, he was compelled to relinquish his
brilliant hopes. He was the ablest engineer of his age, and was also greatly
distinguished in other branches of science. In his plans he inclined to the Dutch
rather than the Italian school of fortification. He published in 1645.
At the close of the sixteenth century, the Dutch had been forced to resort to
military defences to protect themselves against the aggressions of the Spaniards.
As the Dutch were inferior in other military means, fortification became one of
the vital resources of the country. Their works, however, thrown up in much
haste, were in many respects defective, although well adapted to the exigencies
of the time. Freytag, their principal engineer, wrote in 1630. Some of his
improvements were introduced into France by Pagan. He was preceded by
Marolois, (a cotemporary of Pagan,) who published in 1613.
In Germany, Rimpler, a Saxon, wrote on fortification in 1671. He was a man of
great experience, having served at the sieges of Candia, Phillipsburg, Bonn,
Riga, Bremen, Dansburg, Bommeln, &c. He fell at the siege of Vienna in 1683.
His writings are said to contain the groundwork of Montalembert's system.
In Italy, after the time of Tartaglia, Marchi, Campi, &c., we find no great
improvement in this art. Several Italians, however, distinguished themselves as
engineers under the Spaniards. The fortifications of Badajos are a good example
of the state of the art in Italy and Spain a that epoch. The citadel of Antwerp,
built by two Italian engineers, Pacciotti and Cerbelloni, in 1568, has become
celebrated for the siege it sustained in 1832.
The age of Louis XIV. effected a great revolution in the art of fortification, and
carried it to such a degree of perfection, that it has since received but slight
improvement. The years 1633 and 1634 are interesting dates in the history of this
art, as having given birth respectively to Vauban and Coehorn. The former was
chief engineer of France under Louis XIV., and the latter held a corresponding
position under the Dutch republic. Coehorn's ideas upon fortification are
conceived with an especial view to the marshy soil of his own country, and,
although well suited to the object in view, are consequently of less general
application than those of his more distinguished cotemporary and rival. The best
specimens of his mode of construction that exist at the present day, are the
fortresses of Manheim, Bergen-op-Zoom, Nimiguen, and Breda.
Coehorn was followed in Holland by Landsberg, an able and practical engineer,
who to much reading added extensive experience, having himself served at
sixteen sieges. His system was in many respects peculiar, both in trace and relief;
it dispensed with the glacis, and all revertments of masonry. His plans could be
applied only to marshy soils. The first edition of his work was published in 1685.
But the career of Vauban forms the most marked and prominent era in the history
of fortification; it constitutes the connecting link between the rude sketches of
the earlier engineers, and the well-established form which the art has since
assumed. In his earlier works we find many of the errors of his predecessors; but
a gradual change seems to have been wrought in his mind by reflection and
experience, and these faults were soon remedied and a new and distinct system
developed. Vauban has left no treatise upon his favorite art, and his ideas upon
fortification have been deduced from his constructions, and from detached
memoirs left among his papers. The nature of his labors, and the extent of his
activity and industry, may be imagined from the fact that he fought one hundred
and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or repaired three
hundred fortifications. His memoirs, found among his manuscript papers, on
various military and political subjects, are numerous, and highly praised even at
the present day. But his beautiful and numerous constructions, both of a civil and
military character, are real monuments to his genius. The best illustrations of his
principles of fortification occur at Lille, Strasbourg, Landau, Givet, and Neuf-
Brisack. His writings on mines, and the attack and defence of places, are, by the
profession, regarded as classic. His improvements in the existing method of
attack gave great superiority to the arms of his countrymen, and even enabled
him to besiege and capture his rival Coehorn, in his own works. He died in 1707,
and was soon succeeded by Cormontaigne.
The latter did not attempt the introduction of any new system, but limited
himself to improving and perfecting the plans of his illustrious predecessors. His
improvements, however, were both extensive and judicious, and are sufficient to
entitle him to the place he holds as one of the ablest military engineers the world
has ever produced. His works on the subject of fortification, besides being
elegantly written, contain the most valuable information of any works we have.
His most admired constructions are to be found at Metz, Thionville, and Bitche.
The beautiful crown works of Billecroix, at Metz, are perfect models of their
kind. Cormontaigne died in 1750.
Cotemporary with him were Sturin and Glasser. The former deviated but slightly
from the systems of his predecessors, but the latter invented several ingenious
improvements which gave him great reputation.
Next follows Rosard, a Bavarian engineer; and Frederick Augustus, king of
Poland, who devoted himself particularly to this art. The former casemated only
the flanks of his works, but the latter introduced casemate fire more extensively
than any one who had preceded him.
In France, Belidor and De Filey published about the middle of the last century.
They were both able engineers but their systems were inferior to that of
Cormontaigne.
In 1767 De la Chiche introduced a system of fortification in many respects
original. He raised his covered-ways so as to conceal all his masonry, and
casemated a great portion of his enceinte. For exterior defence, he employed
direct fire from his barbettes, and curvated fire from his casemates; the direct fire
of the latter secured his ditches.
Next to De la Chiche follows Montalembert, who published in 1776. He was a
man of much experience and considerable originality, but of no great ability as
an engineer. Most of his ideas were derived from De la Chiche and the German
school of Rimpler. His plans have generally been rejected by his own
countrymen, but they still have advocates among the Germans.
General Virgin, a distinguished Swedish engineer, wrote in 1781. His idea of
strongly fortifying the smaller towns to the comparative neglect of the larger
cities, constitutes one of the principal novelties in his system.
In 1794, Reveroni devised a system in which the casemates of Montalembert
were employed, but his guns were so arranged as to be employed in barbette
while the besiegers were at a distance, and afterwards to be used for casemated
fire. The casemate gun-carriage, which formed a part of his invention, was
ingenious, but never much employed in practice.
Bousmard, a French emigrant, published in 1790. He adopted the general trace
of Vauban, but introduced modifications in the details essentially different from
those of Cormontaigne. Some of these modifications are very valuable
improvements, while others are of a more doubtful character. Bousmard is, on
the whole, a very able writer, and his works should be found in the library of
every military engineer.
Carnot's celebrated treatise was published in 1810. He was evidently a man of
genius, and during his career at the head of the War Department of France,
numerous and very important improvements were made in the several branches
of the military art, and especially in strategy. His work on fortification exhibits
much originality and genius, but it is doubtful whether it has very much
contributed to the improvement of this art. His ideas have been very severely,
and rather unfairly criticised by the English, and particularly by Sir Howard
Douglas.
Chasseloup de Laubat early distinguished himself as an engineer of much
capacity and talent. He followed Napoleon in nearly all his campaigns, and
conducted many of his sieges. He remodelled the fortifications of Northern Italy
and of the Lower Rhine. He published in 1811. The improvements which he
introduced are numerous and valuable, and he probably contributed more to
advance his art, and to restore the equilibrium between attack and defence, than
any other engineer since Cormontaigne. After the fall of Napoleon and the
partition of his empire, the allies mutilated or destroyed the constructions of
Chasseloup, so that, it is believed, no perfect specimen of his system remains.
The cotemporaries of Chasseloup were mostly engaged in active field service
and sieges, and few had either leisure or opportunity to devote themselves to
improvements in permanent fortification.
Choumara published in 1827. His system contains much originality, and his
writings give proof of talent and genius. He has very evidently more originality
than judgment, and it is hardly probable that his system will ever be generally
adopted in practice.
The Metz system, as arranged by Noizet, as a theoretical study, is undoubtedly
the very best that is now known. It, however, requires great modifications to suit
it to different localities. For a horizontal site, it is probably the most perfect
system ever devised. It is based on the system of Vauban as improved by
Cormontaigne, and contains several of the modifications suggested by modern
engineers. It is applied in a modified form to the new fortifications of Paris.
Baron Rohault de Fleury has introduced many modifications of the ordinary
French system in his new defences of Lyons. We have seen no written account of
these works, but from a hasty examination in 1844, they struck us as being too
complicated and expensive.
The new fortifications of Western Germany are modifications of Rempler's
system, as improved by De la Chiche and Montalembert. It is said that General
Aster, the directing engineer, has also introduced some of the leading principles
of Chasseloup and Carnot.
The English engineers have satisfied themselves with following in the track of
their continental neighbors, and can offer no claims to originality.
Of the system of fortification now followed in our service we must decline
expressing any opinion; the time has not yet arrived for subjecting it to a severe
and judicious criticism. But of the system pursued previous to 1820, we may say,
without much fear of contradiction, that a worse one could scarcely have been
devised. Instead of men of talent and attainments in military science, most of our
engineers were then either foreigners, or civilians who owed their commissions
to mere political influence. The qualifications of the former were probably
limited to their recollection of some casual visit to two or three of the old
European fortresses; and the latter probably derived all their military science
from some old military book, which, having become useless in Europe, had
found its way into this country, and which they had read without understanding,
and probably without even looking at its date. The result was what might have
been anticipated—a total waste of the public money. We might illustrate this by
numerous examples. A single one, however, must suffice. About the period of
the last war, eight new forts were constructed for the defence of New York
harbor, at an expense of some two millions of dollars. Six of these were circular,
and the other two were star forts—systems which had been discarded in Europe
for nearly two thousand years! Three of these works are now entirely abandoned,
two others are useless, and large sums of money have recently been expended on
the other three in an attempt to remedy their faults, and render them susceptible
of a good defence. Moreover, a number of the works which were constructed by
our engineers before that corps was made to feel the influence of the scientific
education introduced through the medium of the Military Academy—we say, a
considerable number of our fortifications, constructed by engineers who owed
their appointment to political influence, are not only wrong in their plans, but
have been made of such wretched materials and workmanship that they are
already crumbling into ruins.
A fortification, in its most simple form, consists of a mound of earth, termed, the
rampart, which encloses the space fortified; a parapet, surmounting the rampart
and covering the men and guns from the enemy's projectiles; a scarp wall, which
sustains the pressure of the earth of the rampart and parapet, and presents an
insurmountable obstacle to an assault by storm; a wide and deep ditch, which
prevents the enemy from approaching near the body of the place; a counterscarp
wall, which sustains the earth on the exterior of the ditch; a covered way, which
occupies the space between the counterscarp and a mound of earth called a
glacis, thrown up a few yards in front of the ditch for the purpose of covering the
scarp of the main work.
The work by which the space fortified is immediately enveloped, is called the
enceinte, or body of the place. Other works are usually added to the enceinte to
strengthen the weak points of the fortification, or to lengthen the siege by forcing
the enemy to gain possession of them before he can breach the body of the place:
these are termed outworks, when enveloped by the covered way, and advanced
works, when placed exterior to the covered way, but in some way connected with
the main work; but if entirely beyond the glacis, and not within supporting
distance of the fortress, they are called detached works.
In a bastioned front the principal outwork is the demi-lune, which is placed in
front of the curtain; it serves to cover the main entrance to the work, and to place
the adjacent bastions in strong re-enterings.
The tenaille is a small low work placed in the ditch, to cover the scarp wall of
the curtain and flanks from the fire of the besieger's batteries erected along the
crest of the glacis.
The places of arms, are points where troops are assembled in order to act on the
exterior of the work. The re-entering places of arms, are small redans arranged
at the points of junction of the covered ways of the bastion and demi-lune. The
salient places of arms are the parts of the covered way in front of the salients of
the bastion and demi-lune.
Small permanent works, termed redoubts, are placed within the demi-lune and
re-entering places of arms for strengthening those works. Works of this character
constructed within the bastion are termed interior retrenchments; when
sufficiently elevated to command the exterior ground, they are called cavaliers.
Caponniers are works constructed to cover the passage of the ditch from the
tenaille to the gorge of the demi-lune, and also from the demi-lune to the covered
way, by which communication may be maintained between the enceinte and
outworks.
Posterns are underground communications made through the body of the place
or some of the outworks.
Sortie-passages are narrow openings made through the crest of the glacis, which
usually rise in the form of a ramp from the covered way, by means of which
communication may be kept up with the exterior. These passages are so arranged
that they cannot be swept by the fire of the enemy. The other communications
above ground are called ramps, stairs, &c.
Traverses are small works erected on the covered way to intercept the fire of the
besieger's batteries.
Scarp and counterscarp galleries are sometimes constructed for the defence of
the ditch. They are arranged with loop-holes, through which the troops of the
garrison fire on the besiegers when they have entered the ditch, without being
themselves exposed to the batteries of the enemy.
In sea-coast defences, and sometimes in a land front for the defence of the ditch,
embrasures are made in the scarp wall for the fire of artillery; the whole being
protected from shells by a bomb-proof covering over head: this arrangement is
termed a casemate.
Sometimes double ramparts and parapets are formed, so that the interior one
shall fire over the more advanced; the latter in this case is called a faussebraie.

If the inner work be separated from the other it is called a retrenchment[44] and if
in addition it has a commanding fire, it is termed, as was just remarked, a
cavalier.
[44]
The term retrenchment implies an interior work, which is constructed within or
in rear of another, for the purpose of strengthening it; the term intrenchment, on
the contrary, implies an independent work, constructed in the open field, without
reference to any other adjoining work.

The capital of a bastion is a line bisecting its salient angle. All the works
comprehended between the capitals of two adjacent bastions is termed a front: it
is taken as the unit in permanent fortification.
Fig. 39 represents the ground plan of a modern bastioned front, of a regular and
simple form, on a horizontal site.

A, A, A—Is the enceinte, or body of the place.

B—The bastions.
C—The main ditch.
D—The covered ways.
E—The re-entering places of arms.
F—The salient places of arms.
G—The demi-lune.
H—The demi-lune ditch.
J—The demi-lune redoubt.
L—The ditch of the demi-lune
redoubt.
M—The redoubt of the re-entering
places of arms.
N—The ditches of the redoubts.
O—The tenaille.
P—The double caponier.
a—The traverses.
b—The sortie-passages.
c—Stairs.
d—Cut in the demi-lune to flank
the redoubt of the re-entering
place of arms.

Fig. 40 represents a section through the line mn' of the preceding figure.
A—Is the rampart.
B—The parapet.
C—The ditch.
D—The scarp wall.
E—The counterscarp wall.
F—The glacis.
G—The covered way.
H—The terre-plain.
J—The parade.

Sometimes half embrasures are cut in the earthen parapet of a fort, so as to sink
the gun below the crest, and thus more effectually cover the men from the
enemy's fire.
But guns in embrasure have a far less extended field of fire than when mounted
in barbette; moreover, the embrasures present openings through which an enemy
may penetrate in an assault. Owing to these objections, they are employed only
for the protection of particular points; that is, where it is important to cover the
artillerists from the enemy's fire, or where the guns are to be used merely to
protect a ditch, or to enfilade a road, &c. The bottom of the embrasure is called
the sole, the sides are called cheeks, and the mass of earth between two
embrasures, the merlon. Embrasures may be made either direct or oblique,
according as the fire is required to be perpendicular or oblique to the parapet.
A coverport is a small outwork of any convenient form, erected immediately in
front of a gateway, to screen it from the enemy's fire.
A counterguard is a more extensive work, constructed in front of a part of the
fortress itself, or of some other outwork of greater importance, which it is
intended to cover. These are sometimes called coverfaces, from their situation
and object; but the former term is most commonly used.
Sometimes outworks, called tenaillons, consisting of one long and one short
face, are placed on each side of the demi-lune of a front of fortification, for the
purpose of prolonging the siege. (Fig. 41.)
Small, or demi-tenaillons, are frequently so arranged as to cover only one-half of
the demi-lune, and then a bonnet constructed in front of the salient of the demi-
lune. (Fig.42.) In this case the bonnet is flanked by the short faces of the demi-
tenaillons; these short faces are themselves flanked by the demi-lune, while the
bastions flank the long faces.
A horn-work consists of a front of fortification, and two wings resting on the
faces of bastions of a front of the fortress. It sometimes has also a demi-lune or
bonnet, as in the case of demi-tenaillons. (Fig. 43.)
A crown-work consists of two fronts of fortification, and two wings. (Fig. 44.) It
is sometimes made double, and even triple.
These works are also employed as advanced works, and placed entirely in front
of the glacis. They have generally been added to a fortress for the purpose of
occupying some important piece of ground not included within the limits of the
main work. They may be constructed with covered ways, and sometimes it may
be found advantageous to secure them by retrenchments.
A detached work may be made in any form deemed best suited to the site. Being
but remotely connected with the fortress, the latter will exercise but slight
influence on the character of its plan or construction. They are usually of limited
extent and slight relief, partaking much of the nature of field-works.[45]
[45]
The general principles of permanent fortification may be best learned from the
writings of Cormontaigne, St. Paul de Noizet, and Laurillard-Fallot. A list of
valuable books of reference on the several branches of military engineering will
be given at the close of the next chapter.
 CHAPTER XIV.
FIELD-ENGINEERING.

Field-Engineering includes the making of military reconnaissances, temporary

fortifications, and military roads; the planning and construction of military
bridges; the attack and defence of military works;—in fine, all the various duties
of engineer troops, either in the operations of a campaign, or in the dispositions
on the battle-field.
Military reconnaissance.—By this term is meant an examination of a portion of
the theatre of war, to ascertain its military character and resources. If the
examination be made of a large district of country, and for an entire campaign,
the reconnaissance is general; if made for collecting detailed information
respecting a proposed line of march, the passage of a river, the position of an
enemy, &c., it is termed special.
In making a general reconnaissance, great care should be taken to collect
accurate information respecting the general topography of the country; the
character of the mountains, forests, and water-courses; the nature of the roads,
canals, and railways; the quality of the soil, and the amount of provisions and
forage it produces; the population and character of the cities, towns, and villages,
the commercial and manufacturing resources of every part of the country, and
the means of transportation to be found in each district. The plan of military
operations will be based on the information thus obtained, and any serious error
in the reconnaissance may involve the results of the campaign, and even the fate
of the war.
In a special reconnaissance, not only accurate but minute information will be
required: the character of the roads must be given in detail; the nature of the
water-courses, their depth and velocity; the position and character of bridges,
and fords;—in fine, a full description of all obstacles to be encountered, and the
means that can be made available for overcoming these obstacles.
A reconnoitring officer may usually derive much valuable information from the
published maps and descriptions of the country to be examined; additional
matters of detail may be obtained from woodsmen, hunters, and fishermen; and
also from the innkeepers and local authorities of the district. But the officer
should always verify this information, so far as practical, by personal
examination. In making a reconnaissance in the vicinity of an enemy, he must be
supported by a strong escort of mounted troops, and in all his operations the
greatest precaution will be requisite to ensure success.
Some simple instrument, such as a pocket sextant, or compass, will be sufficient
to enable the reconnoitring officer to measure, with considerable accuracy, the
height of mountains, the width of streams, &c., and an ordinary scale and
dividers will enable him to make a suitable military sketch.
Temporary Fortification.—It has been stated in the preceding chapter that
temporary fortifications are properly confined to the operations of a single
campaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied only for
a short period; and that they are usually made of earth, thrown up by the troops
in a single day. Temporary fortifications, as a part of field-engineering, may
therefore be regarded rather as an arm than an art. The principles of their
construction are derived, of course, from the theory of permanent fortification,
but in applying these principles to practice in the field, much greater latitude is
allowed than in the exact scientific arrangement of permanent works.
The purpose of field-works (or intrenchments, as they are commonly called) is to
arrest, or at least to impede, the march of the attacking foe; to shelter the
defensive troops from the missive weapons of the assailants, and to detain them
in a position where they will be exposed to the fire of the defensive force. The
numerical and positive strength of the assailed may be much less than that of the
assailant, and yet an equilibrium exist; the material obstacles compensating for
the difference in numbers. Intrenchments, though inert masses, must therefore be
regarded as most valuable and important accessaries in the defence of a position.
Intrenchments consist either of lines of works made to cover extended positions,
or of detached works designed simply to defend the ground they occupy. The
former generally present a front against the enemy in but one direction, while the
latter are usually closed on all their sides.
The following figures have been employed for the plan of simple intrenchments,
viz.: the polygon, redan, lunette, mitre, star-fort, and bastion.
Square or polygonal redoubts are the most common forms given to field-works,
on account of the ease of their construction. But they have many defects. There
is a sector without fire in front of each salient, and the ditches are without
protection. The latter objection also holds good against all circular works.
The redan (Fig. 45) is frequently used to cover a point in rear, as a bridge, a ford,
or a defile. When used alone, its gorge should be closed by palisades. Its ditches
are unprotected.
The lunette (Fig. 46) has nearly the same defects as the redan.
The mitre, or priest-cap, (Fig. 47,) may be employed with advantage when a
cross-fire is required on the capital of the work. The star-fort has all the defects,
without the merit of simplicity, which belong to the polygonal redoubt.
The bastion-fort (Fig. 48) more fully satisfies the conditions of a good defence
than any other plan; but it is less simple and easy of execution. It is usually
composed of four or five fronts, but it may be applied to a polygon of any
number of sides.
For the details of the construction of these several works, we must refer to the
special treatises on field-fortification.
Lines of intrenchments may be made either continuous or with intervals. In
adopting either plan, the engineer should avail himself of all the natural
obstacles presented by the position, so as to diminish the labor of erecting
artificial means of defence.
The simplest arrangement for a continuous intrenchment is the cremaillière or
indented line. When applied to an irregular site, or used to connect together
distant and detached works, the indented line may be regarded as a good
disposition. Mitres and redans, connected by straight curtains, are sometimes
employed, as also a combination of large and small redans, forming alternate
salient and re-entering angles. A continuous line of bastions is preferable to any
other arrangement, when there is plenty of time for their construction.
Lines with intervals are frequently formed of alternate lunettes and square
redoubts. Other detached works may be employed in the same way. This manner
of intrenching a position has several advantages, with disciplined troops. The
first shock of the assailant is sustained by the detached works, and when he
attempts to penetrate in the intervals, his flanks become exposed to a deadly
cross fire. These intervals also allow the assailed to act on the offensive, by
charging the enemy at the opportune moment. But with raw and militia forces it
will be safer to resort to continuous lines. If cavalry form any part of the
defensive force, it will be absolutely necessary to leave intervals through which
these troops may charge.
A vertical section of all intrenchments is of the same general form; the
dimensions will, of course, vary with the nature of the soil, and the time and
means employed in their construction. The minimum dimensions that can be
used with any considerable advantage are given in Fig. 49.
In laying out field-works advantage should be taken of all available artificial
obstacles, such as hedges, walls, houses, outbuildings, &c. A thickset hedge may
be rendered defensible by throwing up against it a slight parapet of earth. Stone
fences may be employed in the same way. Walls of masonry may be pierced with
loop-holes and arranged for one or two tiers of fire. The walls of houses are
pierced in the same manner, and a projecting wooden structure, termed a
machicoulis gallery, is sometimes made from the floor of the second story, to
enable the assailed to fire down upon their opponents. This arrangement is
frequently employed to advantage in wooden blockhouses against a savage foe;
but it is of little avail when exposed to the fire of artillery. Some have proposed
galleries of this description in permanent works of masonry, but the project is too
obviously absurd to merit discussion.
In addition to the parapet of an intrenchment, a good engineer will always find
time and means for constructing other artificial obstacles, such as trous-de-loup,
abattis, palisades, stockades, fraises, chevaux-de-frise, crows'-feet, mines, &c.
Trous-de-loup are pits dug in the earth in the form of an inverted truncated cone,
some six feet in diameter, and about the same number of feet in depth. They are
usually placed a few yards in front of the ditch, and concealed by some slight
covering.
Abattis are tops and large limbs of trees arranged along the glacis of a work; the
ends of the branches are lopped off and sharpened.
Palisades are stakes some eight or ten feet long, with one end fastened in the
ground and the other made sharp. They are placed in juxtaposition and
connected together by horizontal riband-pieces. This arrangement is frequently
placed at the foot of the counterscarp. When the timbers are large and the work
is intended as a part of a primary defence, it is called a stockade; when the stakes
are placed at the foot of the scarp, either horizontally or inclined, they receive
the name of fraises.
A cheval-de-frise consists of a horizontal piece of timber armed with wooden or
iron lances, which project some eight or ten feet. It is much employed against
cavalry, and on rocky soils serves as a substitute for palisades.
Crows'-feet are small wooden or iron forms filled with sharp spikes. They are
thrown, with their points upward, on ground which is to be passed over by
cavalry.
Mines are sometimes used in connection with intrenchments, but more
commonly in the attack and defence of permanent works. They will be noticed
further on.
Field-works which are to be occupied for a considerable length of time will
usually have their steeper slopes revetted, and be arranged with scarp and
counterscarp, galleries, traverses, blindages, &c. Such works hold an
intermediary rank between temporary and permanent fortification.
As examples of the importance of field fortifications and of the manner of
organizing them, the reader is referred to the celebrated battle of Fontenoy, in
1745, where the carefully-arranged intrenchments of Marshal Saxe enabled the
French to repel, with immense destruction, the attacks of greatly superior
numbers; to the battle of Fleurus, in 1690, where the Prince of Waldeck exposed
himself to a most disastrous defeat "by neglecting the resources of fortification
and other indispensable precautions;" to the battle of Malplaquet, in 1709, where
Marshal Villars, by neglecting to occupy and intrench the farm that closed the
passage between the woods of Sars and Lanière, exposed himself to a disastrous
defeat; to the operations of 1792, where General Custine, by neglecting to
intrench the heights that covered Bingen, as the engineers had recommended,
exposed himself to those terrible disasters which forced him to a precipitate
retreat; to the works of Wervike, which, by a vigorous resistance on the 10th of
September, 1793, saved the Dutch army from total destruction; to the intrenched
camp of Ulm, in 1800, which for six weeks held in check the victorious army of
Moreau; to the intrenched lines of Torres Vedras, in 1810, which saved from
destruction the English army of Wellington; to the field-defences of Hougomont,
which contributed so much to the victory of Waterloo, &c.
Military communications.—The movements of armies are always much
embarrassed by forests, marshes, and water-courses, and nothing contributes
more to the dispatch of military operations than the means of opening practical
and easy communication through these various obstacles.
It is not necessary here to enter into any detailed discussion of the manner of
constructing military communications through forests or marshes. In a new
country like ours, where almost every one has had some experience in road-
making, no very great technical knowledge is required for the construction of
temporary works of this character; but much professional skill and experience
will be requisite for the engineers who make the preliminary reconnaissances,
and fix the location of these roads.
Water-courses may be crossed by means of fords, on the ice, or by ferries and
bridges. When temporary bridges or ferries are constructed by the army in the
field, they are classed under the general head of military bridges, or more
properly, pontoniering.
Where the depth of the stream is not great, the current slight, and the bottom
smooth and hard, the passage may be effected by fording. If the bottom be of
mud, or large stones, the passage will be difficult and dangerous, even where the
depth and current are favorable. Under favorable circumstances infantry can ford
a stream where the depth is not greater than four feet; cavalry to a depth of four
or five feet; but artillery, and engineer trains, cannot go to a depth of more than
two and a half feet, without greatly exposing their ammunition and military
stores The fords should be accurately staked out before the passage is attempted,
and ropes ought to be stretched across the stream, or cavalry and small boats
stationed below, to prevent the loss of life.
Ice may be crossed by infantry, in small detachments. Its strength may be
increased by covering it with boards, or straw, so as to distribute the weight over
a greater surface. By sprinkling water over the straw, and allowing it to freeze,
the mass may be made still more compact. But large bodies of cavalry, and
heavy artillery, cannot venture on the ice unless it be of great thickness and
strength. An army can never trust, for any length of time, to either fords or ice; if
it did a freshet or a thaw would place it in a most critical state. Military bridges
will, therefore, become its only safe reliance for keeping open its
communications.
Military bridges are made with trestles, rafts, boats, and other floating bodies.
Rope bridges are also sometimes resorted to by troops for passing rivers.
Trestle bridges are principally used for crossing small streams not more than
seven or eight feet in depth: they also serve to connect floating bridges with the
shore, in shallow water. The form of the trestle is much the same as that of an
ordinary carpenter's horse, i.e., a horizontal beam supported by four inclined
legs. These trestles are placed in the stream, from twelve to twenty feet apart,
and connected by string-pieces, (or balks as they are termed in technical
language,) which are covered over with plank. The action of the current against
the bridge may be counteracted by anchors and cables, or by means of boxes or
baskets attached to the legs of the trestles, and filled with stones. A more
substantial form may be given to the bridge by substituting for the trestles, piles,
or the ordinary framed supports so much used in the newer parts of our country.
For examples of the use of bridges of this description we would refer to Cæsar's
celebrated bridge across the Rhine; the passage of the Scheldt in 1588 by the
Spaniards; the passage of the Lech in 1631 by Gustavus Adolphus; the passage
of the Danube in 1740 by Marshal Saxe; the great bridge across the Var during
Napoleon's Italian campaigns; the passage of the Lech in 1800 by Lecourbe; the
bridges across the Piava, the Isonso, &c., in the subsequent operations of the
army in Italy; the celebrated passage of the Danube at the island of Lobau in
1809; the passage of the Agueda in 1811 by the English; the passages of the
Dwina, the Moscowa, the Dneiper, the Beresina, &c., in the campaign of 1812;
the repairing of the bridge near Dresden, and the passage of the Elbe in 1813,
&c.
Rafts formed of timbers, casks, barrels, &c., are frequently used as military
bridges. They may be made to bear almost any weight, and will answer for the
passage of rivers of any depth and width, provided the current be not rapid.
Where the bridge is to be supported by rafts made of solid timbers, these timbers
should be first placed in the water, to ascertain their natural position of stability,
and then the larger ends cut away on the under side, so as to present the least
possible resistance to the action of the current. They are afterwards lashed
together by strong rope or withe lashing, or fastened by cross-pieces let into the
timbers, and held firm by bolts, or wooden pins. These rafts are kept in place by
anchors and cables placed up and down stream. The roadway is formed in nearly
the same manner as for a bridge supported on trestles. Empty casks, and other
floating bodies, may be substituted in place of logs in the construction of rafts.
For examples of the use of rafts in the construction of military bridges, we would
refer to the passage of the Seine in 1465 by Count Charolais; the passage of the
Meuse in 1579, by Alexander Farnése; the passage of the Vistula in 1704, the
Borysthenese in 1709, and the Sound in 1718, by Charles XII.; the passage of
the Adige in 1796; the passage of the Po in 1807; and the subsequent military
operations in the Spanish Peninsula.
Military bridges are frequently made of boats, and the ordinary river-craft found
in the vicinity of the intended passage. Flat-bottomed boats are the most suitable
for this purpose, but if these cannot be obtained, keel boats will serve as a
substitute. When these water-craft are of very unequal sizes, (as is frequently the
case,) two smaller ones may be lashed together to form a single support; they
can be brought to the same level by means of stone ballast. The gunwales must
be suitably arranged for supporting the balks, or else frameworks should be
erected for this purpose from the centre of the boat. The arrangement of the
roadway, anchors, &c., is the same as before.
A bridge-equipage made to follow an army in its movements in the field, is
generally composed of light skiffs or batteaux, and the necessary timbers,
planks, anchors, &c., for forming the roadway, and keeping the bridge in its
position. All these articles are constructed especially for this purpose. All the
wood-work should be of tough and well-seasoned timber, so as to impose no
unnecessary weight on the wagon trains. The bateaux should also be made of
strong and light materials. For convenience in transportation, these boats are
sometimes made with hinges so as to fold up. The ribs are usually of oak, and
the sides and bottom of pine. Instead of plank, a covering of tin, copper, India-
rubber, &c., has sometimes been substituted. Floating supports of this character
are often made in compartments, so as to prevent their sinking when injured by
the enemy's projectiles. Indian-rubber pontons may be folded up into a small
space, and their slight weight renders them convenient for transportation.
On navigable streams a part of the bridge resting on one or two bateaux should
be so arranged that it can be shipped out of its place, forming a draw for the
passage of river-craft. Indeed, it would be well, even where the river is not
navigable, to form a draw for the passage of trees, and other floating bodies, sent
down by the enemy against the bridge.
An ordinary bridge-equipage of bateaux, or light pontons, for crossing a river of
from three to four hundred yards in width, and of moderate current, will require
a train of from sixty to eighty wagons.[46] Under favorable circumstances, and
with a well-instructed corps of pontoniers, the bridge may be thrown across the
river, and prepared for the passage of an army in a few hours at most.[47] After
the troops have passed over, the bridge may be taken up, and replaced on the
wagons in from a quarter to half an hour.
[46]
The number of wagons in a ponton train will be greatly diminished if it be found
that Indian-rubber boats may be used as supports for the bridge. The engineer
department of our army are making experiments to determine this point.

[47]
In 1746, three bridges of bateaux were thrown across the Po, near Placentia, each
fifteen hundred feet in length, and entirely completed in eight hours. In 1757,
two bridges of bateaux were thrown across the Rhine, at Wesel, in half an hour;
again, in the same year, a third bridge was thrown across this river near
Dusseldorf, in six hours. In 1841, Col. Birago, of the Austrian army, arrived on
the bank of the Weisgerben arm of the Danube, with his bridge-equipage, at a
round trot, and immediately began the construction of his bridge, without any
previous preparation or examination. In less than three-quarters of an hour the
bridge was completed, and three loaded four-horse wagons passed over on a trot,
followed by a column of infantry.

The following examples will serve to illustrate the use of different kinds of boat-
bridges in military operations:—the passage of the Rhine, in 1702, by Villars;
the passage of the Dnieper and the Bog, in 1739, by the Russians; the passage of
the Danube, in 1740, by Marshal Saxe; the passage of the Rhine, near Cologne,
in 1758, by the Prince of Clermont; the passage of the Rhine, in 1795, by
Jourdan; the passage of the Rhine, at Kehl, in 1796, by Moreau; and again the
same year, at Weissenthurn, and at Neuwied, by Jourdan; the bridges across the
Rhine, at the sieges of Kehl and Huninguen, in 1797; the passage of the Limmat,
in 1799, by Massena; the passages of the Mincio, the Adige, the Brenta, the
Piava, &c., in 1800; the passages of these rivers again in 1805; the passages of
the Narew, in 1807, by the Russians; the several passages of the Danube, in
1809, by the French and Austrian armies; the passages of the Tagus and Douro,
in 1810, by the English; the passages of the Niemen, the Dwina, the Moskwa,
and the Beresina, in 1812, by the French; and of the great rivers of Germany and
France, in 1813 and 1814.
A floating body, propelled from one bank to the other by the current of the
stream, is termed a flying-bridge. The usual mode of establishing a ferry of this
kind, is to attach the head of the boat by means of a cable and anchor to some
point near the middle of the stream. By steering obliquely to the current, the boat
may be made to cross and recross at the same point. A single passage may be
made in the same way, by the action of the current without the cable and anchor,
but the boat in this case will be carried some distance down the stream.
Rowboats are employed for crossing over infantry by successive debarkations;
but this process is too slow for the passage of a large force; it may very well be
resorted to as auxiliary to other means.
Steam craft are so common at the present day on all navigable streams, that an
army in the field will frequently be able to avail itself of this means of passing
the larger rivers. But, in a hostile country, or in one already passed over by the
enemy, it will not be safe to rely with confidence upon obtaining craft of this
character. A well-organized army will always carry in its train the means of
effecting a certain and speedy passage of all water-courses that may intercept its
line of march.
Flying-bridges or rowboats were employed in the passage of the Dwina, in 1701,
by the Swedes; the passage of the Po, in 1701, by Prince Eugene; the passage of
the Rhine, at Huninguen, in 1704; Jourdan's passage of the Rhine in 1795;
Moreau's passage in 1796; the sieges of Kehl and Huninguen in 1797; Massena's
passage of the Limmat, and Soult's passage of the Linth, in 1799; the passage of
the Rhine, at Lucisteig in 1800; the passage of the Po, by the French, just before
the battle of Marengo; and others in Italy, Germany, and Spain, in the subsequent
campaigns of Napoleon.
Military bridges have sometimes been formed of ropes, cables stretched across
the stream, and firmly attached at each end to trees, or posts let into the earth. If
the shore is of rock, rings with staples let into the stone form the best means for
securing the ends of the main ropes. Plank are laid on these cables to form the
roadway. The ropes forming the "side-rail" of the bridge are passed over trestles
at each shore, and then fastened as before. Short vertical ropes attach the main
supports to these side ropes, in order that they may sustain a part of the weight
passing over the bridge. Constructions of this character are fully described in
Douglas's Essay on Military Bridges. For example, see the passage of the Po,
near Casal, in 1515, by the Swiss; the bridge thrown over the Clain by Admiral
Coligni, at the siege of Poitiers, in 1569; the operations of the Prince of Orange
against Ghent and Bruges, in 1631; the passage of the Tagus, at Alcantara, in
1810, by the English; the bridge constructed across the Zezere, by the French, in
1810; the bridge thrown across the Scarpe, near Douai, in 1820; the experiments
made at Fêre in 1823, &c.
The passage of a river in the presence of an enemy, whether acting offensively or
in retreat, is an operation of great delicacy and danger. In either case the army is
called upon to show the coolest and most determined courage, for its success
will depend on its maintaining the strictest discipline and good order.
In the case of a retreat the bridge should be covered by field intrenchments,
called a tête de pont, and defended by a strong guard. If the river be of moderate
width, the enemy may be kept at a distance by heavy batteries on the opposite
shore. As soon as the passage is effected by the main body, the bridge, if
permanent, will be blown up, or otherwise destroyed by the miners, and if
floating, will be swung round to the other shore. The rear-guard will pass over in
rowboats, or the end pontons detached for that purpose. An army retreating in
the face of an enemy should never rely upon one single bridge, no matter what
may be its character: for the slightest accident happening to it might expose the
whole army to inevitable destruction.
The passage of a river by main force, against an enterprising and active enemy
on the opposite shore, is always an operation of the greatest difficulty, and not
unfrequently accompanied with the most bloody results.
The most effectual method of accomplishing this object is by stratagem.
Demonstrations are made at several points at the same time: bodies of troops are
thrown across, after nightfall, in rowboats or by flying-bridges, to get possession
of the opposite bank. The vanguard of light cavalry may cross by swimming.
The pontoniers should have their bridge equipage in readiness near the intended
point of passage, so that it can be thrown across with the greatest possible
rapidity, while the advanced guards are still able to keep the enemy at a distance.
Under favorable circumstances the pontoniers will have the bridge in readiness
for the passage of the army before the enemy can collect his troops upon the
threatened point.
Cannon-balls and hollow shot are the most effectual means for destroying an
enemy's bridge when our batteries can be planted within reach. When this cannot
be done, we must resort to fire-boats, floating rafts, &c., to accomplish our
object. Operations of this kind carried on in the night, are most likely to succeed.
To protect bridges from the action of these floating bodies, stockades, or floating
chevaux-de-frise are constructed across the stream at some distance above the
bridge; strong cables, or chains stretched directly across the river, or with an
angle up stream, may be used in place of stockades, or in conjunction with them.
Guards should be stationed above the bridge, with boats, ropes, grapnels, &c.,
for the purpose of arresting all floating bodies and drawing thorn ashore, or
directing them safely through the draw in the bridge arrangement.
The troops especially charged with the construction and management of the
various kinds of military bridges, are denominated pontoniers. The duties of
these troops are arduous and important, and, in a country like ours, intersected
by numerous water-courses, the success of a campaign will often depend upon
their skill and efficiency.
Sapping.—This is a general term applied to the operations of forming trenches,
along which troops may approach a work without being exposed to the fire of
the besieged.
In addition to the ordinary sapping-tools, such as shovels, picks, gabion-forks,
&c., used in constructing trenches, there will also be required a considerable
amount of sapping materials, such as gabions, fascines, sap-fagots, sandbags,
&c.
The gabion is a cylindrical basket of twigs, about two feet in diameter, and some
three feet in length, and without a bottom. It is made by driving into the ground,
in a circular form, a number of small pickets about an inch in diameter, and of
the length required for the gabion. Twigs are wattled between the pickets like
ordinary basket-work, and fastened at the ends by withs or packthread. Gabions
are used in forming saps, batteries, blindages, powder-magazines, and in
revetting the steep slopes of field-works.
The fascine is a bundle of twigs closely bound up, from nine to twelve inches in
diameter, and from ten to fifteen or twenty feet in length. The largest are
sometimes called saucissons. In making a fascine, straight twigs about the
thickness of a man's finger are laid side by side, and firmly compressed together
by a strong rope or chain attached to the extremities of two levers. While held in
this position the twigs are firmly bound together by withs or cords. Fascines are
used in constructing trenches, batteries, &c., and for filling up wet ditches.
The sap-fagot is a strong fascine about ten inches in diameter and two feet in
length, with a picket inserted through the middle. It is used in the double sap in
connection with gabions.
Sand-bags are usually made of coarse canvass. When filled with earth they are
some six or eight inches in diameter, and from eighteen inches to two feet in
length. From their perishable nature, they are used only when other materials
cannot be procured, and where it is important to place the troops speedily under
cover from the enemy's fire.
Bales of wool, cotton, hay, straw, &c., may be employed in sapping for the same
purposes as the above materials, when they can be procured in sufficient
quantity. Pork and flour barrels, which are usually in abundance in a camp, are
frequently filled with sand and used for forming magazines, blindages, &c., in
field-works.
A trench constructed in ordinary soil beyond the range of the enemy's grape, is
called a simple sap, or ordinary trench. The earth is thrown up on the side
towards the place besieged, so as to form a kind of parapet to cover the men in
the trench. The labor is here executed under the supervision of engineer soldiers,
by working parties detached from the other arms. Fig. 50 represents a vertical
section of a simple sap.
When within range of the enemy's grape, the flying sap is resorted to in order to
place the workmen speedily under cover. In this operation, gabions are placed in
juxtaposition on the side towards the besieged work, and filled with all possible
speed by the workmen. Three rows of fascines are usually placed on the top of
the gabions to increase the height. The most difficult part of the flying sap is
executed by engineer troops, and the trench is completed by the ordinary
working parties. Fig. 51 represents a section of this sap.
The full-sap is employed when the works of the besiegers are within range of
musketry, or when the grape fire of the besieged is so deadly that the flying sap
can no longer be used. This is a difficult operation, and unless executed with
great care and by well-instructed engineer troops, the construction of the trench
will be attended with an immense loss of life. The work must be executed under
cover of a sap-roller, which is a cylindrical mass of fascines, wool, or cotton,
some two feet in diameter. On very smooth ground a ball-proof shelter on wheels
might be used as a substitute. The sap-roller being placed along the line of the
trench so as to cover the sapper in front, who is armed with a musket-proof
headpiece and cuirass, this sapper commences the sap by placing a gabion on the
line of the proposed trench and fills it with earth, working on his hands and
knees. Having filled the first gabion, he pushes forward the sap-roller and places
a second one next the first, stopping the open joint between the two with a stop-
fagot. The second gabion being filled in the same manner as the first, others are
successively established. When the first sapper has advanced a few feet, he is
followed by a second, also in defensive armor, who increases the excavation and
embankment; this sapper is then followed in the same way by a third and a
fourth, after which the trench will be sufficiently advanced to be turned over to
the ordinary workmen. The sap-fagots may be removed when the embankment
becomes thick enough to resist grape. Fig. 52 represents a plan and section of a
full-sap.
When the direction of the trench is such that the men are exposed on both sides,
it will be necessary to throw up an embankment both to the right and left. This
operation is called the double sap, and is executed by two parties of sappers,
working side by side. In this sap it will be necessary to frequently change the
direction of the trench, or to throw up traverses, in order to cover the men at a
distance from the sap-roller. Wing-traverses, on the side of the trench which is
least exposed, some times serve the same purpose as a double sap.
Mines.—By mining, as a military term, we understand the operations resorted to
for the demolition, with powder, of a military structure of any description. The
term mine is applied both to the excavation charged with powder for the purpose
of producing an explosion, and to the communications which lead to this
excavation.
The place in which the charge of powder is lodged is called the chamber, the
communication by which this place is reached the gallery, and the excavation
made by the explosion is termed the crater.
The form of the crater caused by an explosion in ordinary soils is assumed to be
a truncated cone, the diameter, c d, (Fig. 53,) of the lower circle being one-half
the diameter, a b, of the upper circle. This form has never been ascertained to be
exactly correct, but the theoretical results deduced from a mathematical
discussion of this figure have been fully verified in practice. The radius, p b, of
the upper circle is termed the crater radius; the line o p, drawn from the centre
of the charge perpendicular to the surface where the explosion takes place, is
termed the line of least resistance; the line o b, drawn from the centre of the
powder to any point in the circumference of the upper circle, is termed the
radius of explosion.
When the crater radius is equal to the line of least resistance, the mine is termed
common; when this radius is greater than the line of least resistance, the mine is
termed overcharged; and when the radius is less, undercharged. A mine of small
dimensions, formed by sinking a shaft in the ground, is termed a fougasse. The
term camouflet is applied to a mine used to suffocate the enemy's miner, without
producing an explosion. Small mines made in rock or masonry, merely for the
purpose of excavation, without any considerable external explosion, are called
blasts.
From experiments made on common mines, whose line of least resistance did
not exceed fifteen feet, it has been ascertained that the tenacity of the earth is
completely destroyed around the crater to a distance equal to the crater radius,
and that empty galleries would be broken in at once and a half that distance. It
has also been proved by experiment, that the crater radius in overcharged mines
may be increased to six times the line of least resistance, but not much beyond
this; that within this limit the diameter of the crater increases nearly in the ratio
of the square roots of the charge; and that empty galleries may be destroyed by
overcharged mines at the distance of four times the line of least resistance.
By means of the deductions of physico-mathematical theory, and the results of
experiments, rules have been determined by which the miner can calculate, with
much accuracy, the charge necessary to produce a required result in any given
soil.
In the earlier stages of the history of this art, mines were only used to open
breaches and demolish masses of masonry; but in later times they have been
employed as important elements in the attack and defence of places.
An isolated wall, only two or three feet thick, may readily be demolished by
exploding one or two casks of powder placed in contact with its base. If the wall
be five or six feet thick, the charges should be placed under the foundation. For
walls of still greater thickness it will be best to open a gallery to the centre of the
wall, a foot or two above its base, and place the powder in chambers thus
excavated. Revetment walls may be overturned by placing the charges at the
back of the wall, about one-third or one-quarter of the way up from the base. If
placed too near the base, a breach will be made in the wall without overturning
it.
To demolish a bridge of masonry the powder should be lodged in chambers
excavated in the centre of the piers. When there is not time for excavating these
chambers in the piers, a trench may be cut over the key of the arch, in which the
powder is placed and exploded; or, the casks of powder may be suspended
immediately under the arch, with the same results. Where a saving of powder is
of consequence, small chambers may be excavated in the haunches of the arch,
and the mine carefully tamped before firing it.
Bridges of wood may be destroyed by suspending casks of powder under the
principal timbers, or attaching them to the supports.
Palisading, gates, doors, &c., may be destroyed in the same way, by suspending
casks or bags of powder against their sides; or still more effectually, by burying
the charges just beneath their base.
To demolish a tower, magazine, or house, of masonry, place charges of powder
under the piers and principal walls of the building. In wooden structures the
powder should be placed under, or attached to the principal supports. Where time
is wanting to effect these arrangements, a building may be blown down by
placing a large mass of powder in the interior. The powder may be economized,
in this case, by putting it in a strong case, which should be connected with the
walls of the building on all sides by wooden props.
Special treatises on military mining contain full instructions for regulating the
size and position of the charge for the various cases that may be met with in the
practical operations of field-engineering.
As applied to the attack and defence of a fortified place, mines are divided into
two general classes—offensive and defensive mines. The former are employed
by the besiegers to overthrow the scarps and counterscarps of the place, to
demolish barriers, palisades, walls, and other temporary means of defence, and
to destroy the mines of the besieged. The latter are employed by the opposite
party to blow up the besiegers' works of attack, and to defend the passage of
ditches against an assault. Small mines called fougasses may be employed for
the last named object. The shell-fougasse is composed of a wooden box filled
with one or more tiers of shells, and buried just below the surface of the earth.
Sometimes a quantity of powder is placed under the shells, so as to project them
into the air previous to their explosion. The stone fougasse is formed by making
a funnel-shaped excavation, some five or six feet deep, and placing at the bottom
a charge of powder enclosed in a box, and covered with a strong wooden shield;
several cubic yards of pebbles, broken stone, or brickbats, are placed against the
shield, and earth well rammed round, to prevent the explosion from taking place
in the wrong direction. These mines are fired by means of powder hose, or by
wires connected with a galvanic battery.
The defensive mines employed to blow up the besiegers' works, are generally
common mines with the lines of least resistance seldom greater than fifteen feet.
All the main galleries and principal branches of mines for a permanent
fortification are constructed at the same time with the other portions of the work,
leaving only the secondary branches, chambers, &c., to be made during the
siege. For the general arrangement of these galleries, and the precautions
necessary for their protection from the operations of the besiegers, reference
must be made to treatises specially devoted to the discussion of this subject.
Mines can seldom be employed with advantage in works of slight relief, and
liable to an assault. But if judiciously arranged in the plan of their construction,
and well managed during the operations of the siege, they contribute very
materially to the length of the defence.
Attack and defence.—This subject admits of two natural divisions: 1st, of
intrenchments, and 2d, of permanent works.
I. Intrenchments maybe attacked either by surprise, or by open force. In either
case the operations should be based on exact information of the strength of the
works and the number and character of the garrison—information that can be
obtained from spies, deserters, and prisoners, and confirmed by examinations or
reconnaissances made by officers of engineers. By these means a pretty accurate
knowledge may be obtained of the natural features of the ground exterior to the
works; their weak and strong points; and their interior arrangements for defence.
In an attack by surprise, the troops should consist of a storming party and a
reserve of picked men. The attacking column is preceded by a company of
sappers armed with axes, shovels, picks, crowbars, &c.; bags of powder are also
used for blowing down gates, palisades, &c. All the operations must be carried
on with the utmost dispatch. The time most favorable for a surprise is an hour or
two before day, as at this moment the sentinels are generally less vigilant, and
the garrison in a profound sleep; moreover, the subsequent operations, after the
first surprise, will be facilitated by the approach of day. Under certain
circumstances, it may be advisable to make false attacks at the same time with
the true one, in order to distract the attention of the garrison from the true point
of danger. But false attacks have, in general, the objection of dividing the forces
of the assailants as well as of the assailed. In all attacks by surprise, secrecy is
the soul of the enterprise.
In an open assault, if artillery be employed, the troops should be drawn up in a
sheltered position, until the fire of the works is silenced, and breaches effected in
the parapet. But if the bayonet alone be resorted to, the troops are immediately
brought forward at the beginning of the assault. The attack is begun by a
storming party of picked men: they are preceded, as before, by a body of
sappers, provided with necessary means for removing obstacles, and followed by
a second detachment of engineers, who will widen the passages, and render them
more accessible to the main body of troops who now advance to the assistance of
the storming party. If the assailants should be arrested at the counterscarp by
obstacles which must be removed before any farther progress can be made, the
infantry troops of the detachment display and open a fire upon the assailed, in
order to divert their fire from the sappers. A few pieces of light artillery, on the
flanks of the column, may sometimes be employed for this purpose with great
advantage.
The storming party should always be provided with scaling-ladders, planks,
fascines, &c., for crossing the ditch, and mounting the scarp. If the counterscarp
be revetted with masonry, the troops must either descend by ladders, or fill up
the ditch with fascines, bales of straw, bundles of wool, &c.: if not revetted, a
passage for the troops into the ditch will soon be formed by the shovels of the
sappers. When the ditch is gained, shelter is sought in a dead angle till the means
are prepared for mounting the scarp, and storming the work. If the scarp be of
earth only, the sappers will soon prepare a passage for the escalade; but if
revetted with masonry, the walls must be breached with hollow shot, or scaled by
means of ladders.
In the defence, the strictest vigilance should be at all times exerted to guard
against a surprise: sentinels are posted on all the most commanding points of the
work; all the avenues of approach are most thoroughly guarded; and patroles are
constantly scouring the ground in all directions. At night all these precautions
are redoubled. Light and fire-balls are thrown out in front of the work to light up
the ground, and discover the movements and approach of the enemy. Each man
should have his particular post assigned to him, and be thoroughly instructed in
the duties he will have to perform. All auxiliary arrangements, such as palisades,
abattis, &c., should be defended with the utmost obstinacy; the longer the enemy
is held in check by these obstacles, the longer will he be exposed to the grape
and musketry of the main work. When he assaults the parapet, he will be
opposed by the bayonet in front and a well-aimed fire in flank. While in the
ditch, or as he mounts the scarp, hollow projectiles, incendiary preparations,
stones, logs, &c., will be rolled down upon his head. But when the assaulting
column has gained the top of the scarp, the bayonet forms the most effective
means of resistance.
The measures resorted to in the attack and defence of the larger class of field-
works, will necessarily partake much of the nature of the operations employed in
the attack and defence of permanent fortifications.
II. The attack and defence of a fortress may be carried on either by a regular
siege, or by irregular operations and an assault. The latter plan has sometimes
been adopted when the works of the place were weak and improperly defended;
where the time and means were wanting for conducting a regular siege; or where
the assailants were ignorant of the means proper to be resorted to for the
reduction of the fortress. Such operations, however, are usually attended by an
immense sacrifice of human life, and the general who neglects to employ all the
resources of the engineer's art in carrying on a siege, is justly chargeable with the
lives of his men. In the siege of Cambrai, Louis XIV., on the solicitation of Du
Metz, but contrary to the advice of Vauban, ordered the demi-lune to be taken by
assault, instead of waiting for the result of a regular siege. The assault was made,
but it was unsuccessful, and the French sustained great losses. The king now
directed Vauban to take the demi-lune by regular approaches, which was done in
a very short time, and with a loss of only five men! Again, at the siege of Ypres,
the generals advised an assault before the breaches were ready. "You will gain a
day by the assault," said Vauban, "but you will lose a thousand men." The king
directed the regular works to be continued, and the next day the place was taken
with but little loss to the besiegers.
But a work may be of such a character as to render it unnecessary to resort to all
the works of attack which would be required for the reduction of a regular
bastioned fort, on a horizontal site. For example: the nature of the ground may be
such as to enable the troops to approach to the foot of the glacis, without erecting
any works whatever; of course, all the works up to the third parallel may in this
case be dispensed with without any violation of the rules of a siege. Again, the
point of attack may be such that the other parts of the place will not flank the
works of approach; here a single line of boyaux and short parallels may be all-
sufficient.
But for the purpose of discussion, we will here suppose the place besieged to be
a regular bastioned work on a horizontal site, (Fig.54.)
The operations of the siege may be divided into three distinct periods.
1st. The preliminary operations of the attack and defence previous to the opening
of the trenches.
2d. The operations of the two parties from the opening of the trenches to the
establishment of the third parallel.
3d. From the completion of the third parallel to the reduction of the place.
First period. The object of the investment of the place is to cut off all
communication between the work and the exterior, thus preventing it from
receiving succors, provisions, and military munitions, and also to facilitate a
close reconnoissance of the place by the engineers, who should always
accompany the investing corps, and pursue their labors under its protection. This
corps should be composed chiefly of light troops—cavalry, light infantry, horse
artillery, "brigades of engineers and mounted sappers,"—who march in advance
of the besieging army, and, by a sudden movement, surround the work, seize
upon all the avenues of approach, and carry off every thing without the work that
can be of service either to the garrison or to the besiegers. To effect this object,
the enterprise must be conducted with secrecy and dispatch.
The investing corps is now distributed around the work in the most favorable
positions for cutting off all access to it, and also to prevent any communication
with the exterior by detachments from the garrison, and even single individuals
are sent out to give intelligence to a succoring army or to reconnoitre the
operations of the besieging corps. These posts and sentinels, called the daily
cordon, are placed some mile or mile and a half from the work, and beyond the
reach of the guns. But in the night-time these posts are insufficient to accomplish
their object, and consequently as soon as it is dark the troops move up as close to
the work as possible without being exposed to the fire of musketry. This
arrangement constitutes the nightly cordon.
By the time the main army arrives the reconnoissance will be sufficiently
complete to enable the chief engineer to lay before the general the outline of his
plan of attack, so as to establish the position of his dépôts and camp. These will
be placed some two miles from the work, according to the nature of the ground.
As they occupy a considerable extent of ground around the work, it will
generally be necessary to form intrenchments strong enough to prevent succors
of troops, provisions, &c., from being thrown into the place, and also to restrain
the excursions of the garrison. The works thrown up between the camp and
besieged place are termed the line of countervallation, and those on the exterior
side of the camp form the line of circumvallation. These lines are generally about
six hundred yards apart. It is not unusual in modern warfare to dispense with
lines of circumvallation, (except a few detached works for covering the parks of
the engineers and artillery,) and to hold the succoring army in check by means of
an opposing force, called the army of observation.
The measures of defence resorted to by the garrison will, of course, be
subordinate, in some degree, to those of attack. As soon as any danger of an
investment is apprehended, the commanding general should collect into the
place all the necessary provisions, forage, military munitions, &c., to be found in
the surrounding country; all useless persons should be expelled from the
garrison; a supply of timber for the works of the engineers and artillery, fascines,
gabions, palisades, &c., prepared; all ground within cannon range around the
work levelled; hedges and trees cut down; holes filled up; temporary buildings
demolished or burnt; and all obstacles capable of covering an enemy and
interrupting the fire of the work, removed.
During this period the engineer troops and working parties detached from the
other arms will be most actively employed. As soon as the investing corps makes
its appearance, bodies of light troops are thrown out to cut off reconnoitring
parties, and, if possible, to draw the enemy into ambush. To facilitate these
exterior operations, and to prevent a surprise, several guns of long range are
placed on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes, and others, loaded with
grape, in the embrasures of the flanks, so as to sweep the ditches. About one-
third of the garrison may be employed in exterior operations, and the other two-
thirds in arranging the means of defence in the interior.
Second period.—As soon as the engineers have completed their reconnaissances
and determined on the front of attack, and all the other preparations are made,
the general will direct the opening of the trenches. The ground being previously
marked out, battalions of light troops, termed guards of the trenches, as soon as
it is dark, are placed about thirty yards in front of the first parallel, (A. Fig. 54,)
with smaller sections, and sentinels about the same distance further in advance.
These guards lie down, or otherwise conceal themselves from the fire of the
work. The engineer troops and detachments of workmen being first marched to
the dépôts and supplied with all the necessary tools for carrying on the work,
now commence their labors under the protection of these guards. By daybreak
the construction of the first parallel, and the trenches connecting it with the
dépôts, will be sufficiently advanced to cover the men from the fire of the place;
the guards will therefore be withdrawn, and the workmen continue their labors
during the day to give the trenches the proper size and form.
The parallels are the long lines of trench which envelop the besieged work, and
serve both as covered ways for the circulation of the besiegers, and as means of
defence against sorties from the garrison; they are therefore arranged with
banquettes for musketry fire. The boyaux are trenches run in a zigzag direction
along the capitals of the front of attack, and are intended exclusively for the
circulation of the troops; they have no banquettes. The first parallel is about six
hundred yards from the place, and consequently beyond the reach of grape. It is
constructed by the simple sap. After the first night, the guards, instead of
advancing in front of the work, are placed in the trenches.
The second parallel (B) is made some three hundred or three hundred and fifty
yards from the place, and being much exposed to grape, the flying-sap is
employed in its construction. Batteries (H) are established between the first and
second parallels to silence the fire of the demi-lunes of the collateral bastions,
and others (I) near the second parallel, to enfilade the faces of the front of attack.
These are armed in part with mortars and in part with heavy siege-pieces.
The works are now gradually pushed forward to the third parallel, (C), which is
constructed about sixty yards from the salients of the place. As the operations of
the besiegers are here greatly exposed to musketry fire, the trenches are
constructed by the full-sap. The third parallel, having to contain the guards of the
trenches, and being of less development than the two preceding, is made much
wider. The second parallel now contains the reserve, and the first parallel
becomes the dépôt of materials. Demi-parallels (G) are frequently established
between the second and third, to be occupied by detachments of guards.
The operations of defence during this period are so directed as to harass the
workmen in the trenches and retard the advance of the works of attack. Garrison
pieces of long range and large howitzers are brought forward on the salients of
the bastions and demi-lunes of attack, so as to fire in ricochet along the capitals
on which the boyaux must be pushed: light and fire-balls are thrown out as soon
as it becomes dark, to light up the ground occupied by the besiegers, thus
exposing them to the fire of the work and to the attacks of the sortie parties.
These parties are composed of light troops who charge the guards and compel
the workmen to abandon their sapping tools and stand upon the defence. They
are most effective when the besiegers commence the second parallel, as the
guards in the first parallel are not so immediately at hand to protect the
workmen. When the sortie detachment has driven these workmen from the
trenches, instead of pursuing them into the first parallel, it will display itself in
battle order to cover the engineer troops, (who should always accompany the
detachment in this enterprise,) while they fill up the trenches and destroy the
implements of the besiegers. When the guards of the trenches appear in force,
the detachment will retire in such a way, if possible, as to draw the enemy within
range of the grape and musketry of the collateral works. These sorties, if
successful, may be frequently repeated, for they tend very much to prolong the
siege. The best time for making them is an hour or two before day, when the
workmen and guards are fatigued with the labors of the night. While the
besiegers are establishing their enfilading batteries, a strong fire of solid shot and
shells will be concentrated on the points selected for their construction. The
garrison will also labor during this period to put the work into a complete state
of defence: constructing all necessary palisadings, traverses, blindages, barriers;
and strengthening, if necessary, the covering of the magazines.
Third period.—After the completion of the third parallel, the crowning of the
covered way may be effected by storm, by regular approaches, or (if the work is
secured by defensive mines) by a subterranean warfare.
In the first case stone mortar-batteries are established in front of the third
parallel, which, on a given signal, will open their fire in concert with all the
enfilading and mortar batteries. When this fire has produced its effect in clearing
the outworks, picked troops will sally forth and carry the covered way with the
bayonet, sheltering themselves behind the traverses until the sappers throw up a
trench some four or five yards from the crest of the glacis, high enough to
protect the troops from the fire of the besieged. It may afterwards be connected
with the third parallel by boyaux.
When the covered way is to be crowned by regular approaches, a double sap is
pushed forward from the third parallel to within thirty yards of the salient of the
covered way; the trench is then extended some fifteen or twenty yards to the
right or left, and the earth thrown up high enough to enable the besiegers to
obtain a plunging fire into the covered way, and thus prevent the enemy from
occupying it. This mound of earth is termed a trench cavalier, (O). Boyaux are
now pushed forward to the crowning of the covered way and the establishing of
breach batteries, (J). Descents are then constructed into the ditches, and as soon
as these batteries have made a breach into the walls of the bastions and
outworks, the boyaux are pushed across the ditches and lodgments effected in
the breaches. The demi-lune is first carried; next the demi-lune redoubt and
bastion; and lastly, the interior retrenchments and citadel. In some cases the
breaches are carried by assault, but the same objection is applicable here as in
the storming of the covered way; time is gained, but at an immense expense of
human life.
If the place is defended by mines it will be necessary for the besiegers to
counteract the effects of these works by resorting to the slow and tedious
operations of a subterranean warfare. In this case a fourth trench is formed in
front of the third parallel; shafts are sunk in this, about six yards apart, for
establishing overcharged mines; as soon as the galleries of the besieged are
destroyed by the explosion of these mines, the covered way is attacked by storm;
other mines are established on the terre-plain of the covered way to destroy the
entrance to the galleries, and thus deprive the besieged of the use of their entire
system of mines.
The measures of defence during this period must embrace every thing calculated
to retard the works of the besiegers. This may be most effectually accomplished
by maintaining a constant fire of grape and musketry on the heads of the sap, and
throwing grenades, shells, &c., into the trenches, to harass and destroy the
workmen. As the musketry fire of the besiegers now becomes very destructive to
the artillerists at the guns, strong musket-proof blinds are arranged to mask the
mouths of the embrasures when the guns are not in battery, and also sloping
blindages to cover the men when serving at the pieces. The possession of the
outworks should be disputed inch by inch, and when the besiegers have reached
the ditch of the body of the place, sorties, and every species of projectile, should
be employed to drive off the sappers, and to retard the construction of their
works. In fine, all the resources of the engineer's art should be put in requisition
for the defence of the breach, and the final assault should be vigorously resisted
by the bayonet, and by a well-sustained fire from all the collateral works.
With respect to the relative strength of the opposing forces it may be well to
remark, that if the fortress is properly constructed the garrison will be able to
resist a besieging army six times as numerous as itself. Such is the estimate of
the best engineers.[48]
[48]
A good knowledge of the several subjects discussed in this chapter may be
derived from the writings of Vauban, Cormontaigne, and Noizet de St. Paul, on
the attack and defence of places and field fortification ; the several manuels used
in the French service on sapping, mining, and pontoniering; Col. Pasley's
experiments on the operations of a siege, sapping, mining, &c.; Douglas's work
on military bridges; Macauley's work on field fortification; and Professor
Mahan's Treatise on Field Fortification. This last is undoubtedly the very best
work that has ever been written on field fortification, and every officer going
into the field should supply himself with a copy.
The following are recommended as books of reference on subjects discussed in
the three preceding chapters.
Mémorial pour la fortification permanente et passagère. Cormontaigne.
Défense des places. Cormontaigne.
Attaque des places. Cormontaigne.
Attaque des places. Vauban.
Traité des mines. Vauban.
Mémorial pour la castrametation et la fortification passagère. Lafitte-Clavé.
Exercice sur les fortifications. Davigneau.
Mémorial de l'officier du genie. A periodical of rare merit, containing most
valuable military and scientific matter. It is conducted by officers of the French
corps of engineers. It has already reached its fourteenth number, each number
forming a volume.
Traité complet de fortification. Noizet de St. Paul.
Traité d'art militaire et de la fortification. Gay de Vernon.
Art de la guerre. Rogniat.
Essai général de fortification, &c. Bousmard.
Aide-mémoire portatif à l'usage des officiers du génie. Laisné. A very valuable
and useful book.
Aide-mémoire de l'ingénieur militaire. Grivet.
Cours d'art militaire. Laurillard Fallot.
Cours de fortification, &c. Lavart.
Le livre de la guerre. Perrot.
Journaux des siéges dans la péninsule. Belmas.
Journal of Sieges in Spain. John Jones.
Both of the above are works of great value.
Cours d'art militaire et de fortification militaire. François.
Architettura militare. Marchi.
Essai sur la fortification. Baltard.
La fortification. Bar-le-Duc.
Elémens de fortification. Bellaire.
La science des ingénieurs. Bélidor.
L'art universel des fortifications. Bitainvieu.
Nouvelle manière de fortifier les places. Blondel.
Les sept siéges de Lille. Brun Lavaine.
Défense des places fortes. Carnot.
Mémoire sur la fortification. Carnot.
Défense de Saragosse. Cavallero.
Mémoires sur la fortification. Choumara.
Nouvelle fortification. Coehorn.
Théorie de la fortification. Cugnot.
Des fortifications, &c. &c. Darçon.
Rélation de la défense de Dantzik. D'Artois.
Les fortifications. Deville.
Péribologie. Dilich.
De la fortification permanente. Dufour. A work of merit.
Essai sur la défense des états par les fortifications. Duviviet.
Attaque et défense des places du camp de St. Omer.
L'école de la fortification. Fallois.
Introduction à la fortification. De Fer.
Précis de la défense de Valenciennes. Ferrand.
Traité théorique, &c. Foissac-Latour.
Examen detaillé, &c. Foissac-Latour.
Les ouvrages militaires de Fosse.
Instruction sur la fortification, &c. Gaillard.
Mémoires pour l'attaque et défense d'une place. Goulon.
Siége of Peschiera. Henin.
Journal du siége de Philisbourg.
Précis du siége de Dantzick. Kirgener.
Deuxième défense de Badajos. Lamare.
Fortification, et l'attaque et défense des places. Lebloud.
Œuvres de Lefebvre.
L'architecture des forteresses. Mandar.
Traité sur l'art des siéges. Mazeroy.
La sûreté des états par le moyen des forteresses. Maigret.
Défense d'Ancone. Mangourit.
Fortification. Marolois.
Siege de Turin. Mengin.
Recherches sur l'art défensif, &c. Michaloz.
La fortification de campagne, &c. Miller.
L'art défensif, &c. Montalembert.
Journaux des siéges de Flandre.
Relations des siéges en Europe, &c. Musset-Fathay. A very valuable and
interesting work.
Relation du siége de Metz.
Relation du siége d'Anvers.
Les siéges de Jaffa et de St. Jean d'Acre.
Les siéges de Saragosse et de Tortose. Rogniat.
Siége de Dantzick. Sainte-Susanne.
Mémoire sur la fortification permanente.—Séa.
Le siége de Constantine.
Elémens de fortification. Trincano.
Des places fortes. Valazé.
Essay on Military Bridges.Douglas. A valuable work.
Guide du pontonier. Drieu.
Mémoire sur la guerre souterraine. Contèle.
Traité des mines. Etienne.
Traité de l'art du mineur. Geuss.
Traité de fortification souterraine. Gillot.
Traité pratique et théorique des mines. Lebrun.
Nouveau traité des mines, &c. Prudhomme.
Manuel du sapeur. Used in the French service.
Manuel du mineur. " ""
Manuel du pontonier. " ""
Essay on Field Fortifications. Pleydell.
Elements of Field Fortifications. Lochee.
Rélation du siége de Grave et Mayence.
Siéges de Génes. Thiébault.
Traité de fortification souterraine. Mouze.
Militairische Mittheilungen. Xilander.
Die Befestigung der Statten. Hauser.
Abhandlung über die Befestigungskunst,&c. Hauser
Versuch über die Verschanzungskunst. Muller.
Course of Elementary Fortification. Pasley. This is a work of much detail—
useful, no doubt, to an uneducated engineer soldier, but to an officer at all
acquainted with his profession, it must seem ridiculously minute.
To the above list might be added a long list of books on that branch of the
engineer's art called constructions; but as this part of the profession is, in some
degree, common both to the civil and military engineer, it is not deemed
necessary to include works of this character in a list of books strictly military.
 CHAPTER XV
MILITARY EDUCATION APPOINTMENT AND PROMOTION.

With the Romans, six years' instruction was required to make a soldier; and so
great importance did these ancient conquerors of the world attach to military
education and discipline, that the very name of their army was derived from the
verb to practise.
Modern nations, learning from experience that military success depends more
upon skill and discipline than upon numbers, have generally adopted the same
rule as the Romans; and nearly all of the European powers have established
military schools for the education of their officers and the instruction of their
soldiers.
France, which has long taken the lead in military science, has six military
schools for the instruction of officers, containing in all more than one thousand
pupils, and numerous division and regimental schools for the sub-officers and
soldiers.
Prussia maintains some twelve general schools for military education, which
contain about three thousand pupils, and also numerous division, brigade,
garrison, and company schools for practical instruction.
Austria has some fifty military schools, which contain in all about four thousand
pupils.
Russia has thirty-five engineer and artillery technical schools, with about two
thousand pupils; twenty-five military schools for the noblesse, containing eight
thousand seven hundred pupils; corps d'armeeschools, with several thousand
pupils; regimental schools, with eleven thousand pupils; and brigade-schools,
with upwards of one hundred and fifty-six thousand scholars;—making in all
about two hundred thousand pupils in her military schools!
England has five military schools of instruction for officers, number of pupils
not known; a military orphan school, with about twelve thousand pupils; and
numerous dépôt and regimental schools of practice.
The smaller European powers—Belgium, Sardinia, Naples, Spain, Portugal,
Denmark, Sweden, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Baden, have each several military
schools, with a large number of pupils.
It is seen from these statistics, that the European powers are not so negligent in
educating their officers, and in instructing and disciplining their soldiers, as
some in this country would have us believe.
Washington, Hamilton, Knox, Pickering, and others, learning, by their own
experience in the war of the American revolution, the great necessity of military
education, urged upon our government, as early as 1783, the importance of
establishing a military academy in this country, but the subject continued to be
postponed from year to year till 1802. In 1794, the subaltern grade of cadet was
created by an act of Congress, the officers of this grade being attached to their
regiments, and "furnished at the public expense with the necessary books,
instruments, and apparatus" for their instruction. But this plan of educating
young officers at their posts was found impracticable, and in his last annual
message, Dec. 7th, 1796, Washington urged again, in strong language, the
establishment of a military academy, where a regular course of military
instruction could be given. "Whatever argument," said he, "may be drawn from
particular examples, superficially viewed, a thorough examination of the subject
will evince that the art of war is both comprehensive and complicated; that it
demands much previous study; and that the possession of it in its most improved
and perfect state is always of great moment to the security of a nation."
The subject was however postponed from time to time, till March, 1802, when a
bill was passed establishing the Military Academy. It was at first on a small
scale, and its course of instruction meager and deficient. It gradually became
enlarged, but lingered along, with no great improvement, till 1817, when Capt.
Patridge was dismissed from the superintendency, and Col. Thayer put in charge.
From this period we date the commencement of the success and reputation
which the Military Academy has since enjoyed.
This institution, as now organized, consists of one cadet from each congressional
district, and a few at large, making an average of two hundred and thirty-seven.
The course of instruction is four years, after which time the cadet is sent to his
regiment or corps, with higher rank if there are vacancies, but if there are no
vacancies, he goes as a cadet, with the brevet rank of the next higher grade.
The examination for admission to the institution is a very limited one, being
confined to the elementary branches of an English education.
The annual course at the academy is divided into two distinct periods, the first
extending from June till September, and the second from September to the
following June. During the first period, the cadets leave their barracks and
encamp in tents, and are made subject to the police and discipline of an army in
time of war. In addition to the thorough and severe course of practical exercises
and drills in the different arms during these three summer months of each year,
they are made to perform the same tours of guard-duty, night and day, as is
required of the common soldier in time of actual war. This continues till the first
of September of each year, when the cadets return to their barracks, and for the
remaining nine months devote themselves to the prescribed course of scientific
and military studies, intermixed with military exercises and practical operations
in the laboratory and on the field.
To test the progress of the cadets in their studies, there are held semi-annual
public examinations. These examinations are strict and severe, and all who fail
to come up to the fixed standard are obliged to withdraw from the institution, to
allow some one else from the same district to make the trial.
During their course of studies the cadets, as warrant-officers of the army, draw
pay barely sufficient to defray their necessary expenses. The allowance to each is
twenty-six dollars per month, but none of this is paid to the cadet, but is applied
to the purchase of books, fuel, lights, clothing, board, &c.
This institution furnishes each year to the army about forty subaltern officers,
thoroughly instructed in all the theoretical and practical duties of their
profession. After completing this course, the cadet is usually promoted from the
grade of warrant-officer to that of a commissioned officer, and is immediately
put on duty with his regiment or corps.
This system of appointment to the army has produced the most satisfactory
results, and has received the commendation of our best military men, and the
approbation of all our presidents and most able statesmen. Nevertheless, it has
occasionally met with strong opposition; this opposition springing in part from a
want of proper information respecting the character and working of the system,
and in part from the combined efforts of those who from negligence or
incapacity have failed to pass their examinations for promotion, and of those
who, from a conscious want of qualifications or merit, feel assured that they
cannot obtain commissions in the army so long as this system of merit, as fixed
by examination, shall exist. Hence the effort to destroy the Military Academy
and to throw the army entirely open to political appointment.
Several legislative bodies, acting under these combined influences, have passed
resolutions, giving various objections to the Military Academy, and
recommending that it be abolished. The objections made by the legislatures of
Tennessee, Ohio, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Maine, are mostly founded
on false information, and may be readily answered by reference to the official
records of the War-office. But it is not the present object to enter into a general
discussion of the charges against that institution, except so far as they are
connected with the importance of military education, and the rules of military
appointment and promotion.
It has been alleged by many of the opponents of the West Point Academy, that
military instruction is of little or no advantage to a general;—that in the wars of
Napoleon, and in the American Revolution, and the American war of 1812,
armies were generally led to victory by men without a military education, and
unacquainted with military science;—and that in the event of another war in this
country, we must seek our generals in the ranks of civil life, rather than among
the graduates of our Military Academy.
The objection here made to military education will hold with equal force against
education in any other profession. We sometimes find men who have become
eminent in the pulpit and at the bar, or in medicine and the sciences, without ever
having enjoyed the advantages of an education in academic or collegiate halls,
and perhaps even without that preliminary instruction usually deemed necessary
for professional pursuits. Shall we therefore abolish all our colleges, theological
seminaries, schools of law and medicine, our academies and primary schools,
and seek for our professional men among the uneducated and the ignorant? If
professional ignorance be a recommendation in our generals, why not also in our
lawyers and our surgeons? If we deem professional instruction requisite for the
care of our individual property and health, shall we require less for guarding the
honor and safety of our country, the reputation of our arms, and the lives of
thousands of our citizens?
But in reality, were not these men to whom we have alluded eminent in their
several professions in spite of, rather than by means of their want of a
professional education? And have not such men, feeling the disadvantages under
which they were forced to labor, been almost without exception the advocates of
education in others?
But is it true that most of the generals of distinction in the more recent wars were
men destitute of military education,—men who rose from the ranks to the
pinnacle of military glory, through the combined influence of ignorance of
military science and contempt for military instruction? Let us glance at the lives
of the most distinguished of the generals of the French Revolution, for these are
the men to whom reference is continually made to prove that the Military
Academy is an unnecessary and useless institution, the best generals being
invariably found in the ranks of an army, and not in the ranks of military schools.
Facts may serve to convince, where reasoning is of no avail.
Napoleon himself was a pupil of the military schools of Brienne and Paris, and
had all the advantages of the best military and scientific instruction given in
France.
Dessaix was a pupil of the military school of Effiat, with all the advantages
which wealth and nobility could procure. Davoust was a pupil of the military
school of Auxerre, and a fellow-pupil with Napoleon in the military school of
Paris. Kleber was educated at the military school of Bavaria. Eugene
Beauharnais was a pupil of St. Germain-en-Loye, and had for his military
instructor the great captain of the age. His whole life was devoted to the military
art. Berthier and Marmont were both sons of officers, and, being early intended
for the army, they received military educations. Lecourbe had also the
advantages of a military education before entering the army. Pichegru and Duroc
were pupils of the military school of Brienne. Drouet was a pupil of the artillery
school. Foy was first educated in the college of Soissons, and afterwards in the
military schools of La Fère and Chalons. Carnot, called the "Organizer of French
victory," received a good early education, and was also a pupil of the engineer
school of Mézières.
Several of the distinguished French generals at first received good scientific and
literary educations in the colleges of France, and then acquired their military
instruction in the subordinate grades of the army; and by this means, before their
promotion to responsible offices, acquired a thorough practical instruction,
founded on a basis of a thorough preliminary education. Such was Suchet, a
pupil of the college of Lisle-Barbe; Lannes, a pupil of the college of Lectoure;
and Mortier, who was most carefully educated at Cambrai; Lefebvré and Murat
were both educated for the church, though the latter profited but little by his
instruction; Moreau and Joubert were educated for the bar; Massena was not a
college graduate, but he received a good preliminary education, and for several
years before he entered the army as an officer, he had enjoyed all the advantages
afforded by leisure and affluent circumstances; Ney, though poor, received a
good preliminary education, and entered a notary's office to study a profession.
Hoche was destitute of the advantages of early education, but, anxious to supply
this deficiency, he early distinguished himself by his efforts to procure books,
and by his extraordinary devotion to military studies. By several years devoted
in this way to professional studies and the practical duties of a subordinate grade
in the army, Hoche acquired a military knowledge which early distinguished him
among the generals of the French Revolution. Soult and Gouvion-Saint-Cyr,
being of parents in limited circumstances, had not the advantages of extensive
education, but close and diligent application, an ardent ambition, and strong and
powerful intellect, combined with long years of service in the practical
operations of the field, at length enabled these men to overcome all obstacles,
and force their way to the higher walks of their professions. But both knew from
experience the advantages of military instruction, and the importance of
professional education in the army, and they have consequently both been the
warmest friends and strongest advocates of the military schools of France.
The Polytechnic School was established too late to furnish officers for any of the
earlier wars of Napoleon; but in his last campaigns he began to reap the
advantages of an institution which had been under his fostering care, and
Bertrand, Dode, Duponthon, Haxo, Rogniat, Fleury, Valazé, Gourgaud,
Chamberry, and a host of other distinguished young generals, fully justified the
praises which the emperor lavished on his "poulet aux œufs d'or"—the hen that
laid him golden eggs!
In our own revolutionary war, Generals Washington, Hamilton, Gates, Schuyler,
Knox, Alexander, (Lord Stirling,) the two Clintons, the Lees, and others, were
men of fine education, and a part of them of high literary and scientific
attainments; Washington, Gates, Charles Lee, the Clintons, and some others, had
considerable military experience even before the war: nevertheless, so destitute
was the army, generally, of military science, that the government was under the
necessity of seeking it in foreigners—in the La Fayettes, the Kosciuskos, the
Steubens, the De Kalbs, the Pulaskis, the Duportails—who were immediately
promoted to the highest ranks in our army. In fact the officers of our scientific
corps were then nearly all foreigners.
But, say the opponents of the Academy, military knowledge and education are
not the only requisites for military success; youthful enterprise and efficiency are
far more important than a mere acquaintance with military science and the
military art: long service in garrison, combined with the indolent habits acquired
by officers of a peace-establishment, so deadens the enterprise of the older
officers of the army, that it must inevitably result, in case of war, that military
energy and efficiency will be derived from the ranks of civil life.
We are not disposed to question the importance of youthful energy in the
commander of an army, and we readily admit that while seeking to secure to our
service a due degree of military knowledge, we should also be very careful not
to destroy its influence by loading it down with the dead weights of effete
seniority. But we do question the wisdom of the means proposed for supplying
our army with this desired efficiency. Minds stored with vast funds of
professional knowledge, and the rich lore of past history; judgments ripened by
long study and experience; with passions extinguished, or at least softened by
the mellowing influence of age—these may be best suited for judges and
statesmen, for here there is time for deliberation, for the slow and mature
judgment of years. But for a general in the field, other qualities are also required.
Not only is military knowledge requisite for directing the blow, but he must also
have the military energy necessary for striking that blow, and the military
activity necessary for parrying the attacks of the enemy. A rapid coup d'oeil
prompt decision, active movements, are as indispensable as sound judgment; for
the general must see, and decide, and act, all in the same instant. Accordingly we
find that most great generals of ancient and modern times have gained their
laurels while still young.
Philip of Macedon ascended the throne at the age of twenty-two, and soon
distinguished himself in his wars with the neighboring states. At the age of forty-
five he had conquered all Greece. He died at forty-seven.
Alexander the Great had defeated the celebrated Theban band at the battle of
Cheronea, and gained a military reputation at the age of eighteen. He ascended
the throne of his father Philip before twenty, and at twenty-five had reached the
zenith of his military glory, having already conquered the world. He died before
the age of thirty-two.
Julius Cæsar commanded the fleet sent to blockade Mitylene, where he greatly
distinguished himself before the age of twenty-two. He soon after held the
important offices of tribune, quæstor, and edile. He had completed his first war
in Spain, and was made consul at Rome before the age of forty. He twice crossed
the Rhine, and conquered all Gaul, and had twice passed over to Britain, before
the age of forty-five; at fifty-two he had won the field of Pharsalia, and attained
the supreme power. He died in the fifty-sixth year of his age, the victor of five
hundred battles, and the conqueror of a thousand cities.
Hannibal joined the Carthaginian army in Spain at twenty-two, and was made
commander-in-chief at twenty-six. Victorious in Spain and France, he crossed
the Alps and won the battle of Cannæ before the age of thirty-one.
Scipio Africanus, (the elder,) at the age of sixteen distinguished himself at the
battle of Ticinus; at twenty was made edile, and soon after pro-consul in Spain;
at twenty-nine he won the great battle of Zama, and closed his military career.
Scipio Africanus (the younger) also distinguished himself in early life; at the age
of thirty six he had conquered the Carthaginian armies and completed the
destruction of Carthage.
Gengis-Khan succeeded to the domain of his father at the age of thirteen, and
almost immediately raised an army of thirty thousand men, with which he
defeated a numerous force of rebels, who had thought to take advantage of his
extreme youth to withdraw from his dominion. He soon acquired a military
reputation by numerous conquests, and before the age of forty had made himself
emperor of Mogul.
Charlemagne was crowned king at twenty-six, conquered Aquitania at twenty-
eight, made himself master of France and the greater part of Germany at twenty-
nine, placed on his brows the iron crown of Italy at thirty-two, and conquered
Spain at thirty-six.
Gonsalvo de Cordova, the "great captain," entered the army at fifteen, and before
the age of seventeen had acquired a brilliant military reputation, and was
knighted by the king himself on the field of battle; at forty-one he was promoted
over the heads of older veterans and made commander-in-chief of the army in
Italy.
Henry IV. of France was placed at the head of the Huguenot army at the age of
sixteen, at nineteen he became king of Navarre; at forty he had overthrown all
his enemies, placed himself on the throne of France, and become the founder of
a new dynasty.
Montecuculi, at the age of thirty-one, with two thousand horse, attacked ten
thousand Swedes and captured all their baggage and artillery; at thirty-two he
gained the victory of Triebel, at forty-nine defeated the Swedes and saved
Denmark, and at fifty-three defeated the Turks at the great battle of St. Gothard.
In his campaigns against the French at a later age, he made it his chief merit,
"not that he conquered, but that he was not conquered."
Saxe entered the army at the early age of twelve, and soon obtained the
command of a regiment of horse; at twenty-four he became maréchal-de-camp,
at forty-four marshal of France, and at forty-nine gained the celebrated victory of
Fontenoy. He died at the age of fifty-four.
Vauban entered the army of Condé as a cadet at the age of seventeen, at twenty
was made a lieutenant, at twenty-four he commanded two companies, at forty-
one was a brigadier, at forty-three a maréchal-de-camp, and at forty-five
commissaire-général of all the fortifications of France. At the age of twenty-five
he had himself conducted several sieges, and had assisted at many others.
Turenne entered the army before the age of fourteen; he served one year as a
volunteer, four years as a captain, four years as a colonel, three years as a major-
general, five years as a lieutenant-general, and became a marshal of France at
thirty-two. He had won all his military reputation by the age of forty.
Prince Maurice commanded an army at the age of sixteen, and acquired his
military reputation in very early life. He died at fifty-eight.
The great Condé immortalized his name at the battle of Rocroi, in which, at the
age of twenty-two, he defeated the Spaniards. He had won all his great military
fame before the age of twenty-five.
Prince Eugene of Savoy was a colonel at twenty-one, a lieutenant-field-marshal
at twenty-four, and soon after, a general-field-marshal. He gained the battle of
Zenta at thirty-four, and of Blenheim at forty-one. At the opening of the war of
1733, he again appeared at the head of the army at the advanced age of sixty-
nine, but having lost the vigor and fire of youth, he effected nothing of
importance.
Peter the Great of Russia was proclaimed czar at ten years of age; at twenty he
organized a large army and built several ships; at twenty-four he fought the
Turks and captured Asoph; at twenty-eight he made war with Sweden; at thirty
he entered Moscow in triumph after the victory of Embach, and the capture of
Noteburg and Marienburg; at thirty-one he began the city of St. Petersburg; at
thirty-nine he was defeated by the Turks and forced to ransom himself and army.
His latter years were mostly devoted to civil and maritime affairs. He died at the
age of fifty-five.
Charles the XII. of Sweden ascended the throne at the age of fifteen, completed
his first successful campaign against Denmark at eighteen, overthrew eighty
thousand Russians at Narva before nineteen, conquered Poland and Saxony at
twenty-four, and died at thirty-six.
Frederick the Great of Prussia ascended the throne at twenty-eight, and almost
immediately entered on that career of military glory which has immortalized his
name. He established his reputation in the first Silesian war, which he terminated
at the age of thirty. The second Silesian war was terminated at thirty-three; and at
forty-three, with a population of five millions, he successfully opposed a league
of more than one hundred millions of people.
Prince Henry of Prussia served his first campaign as colonel of a regiment at
sixteen; at the age of thirty-one he decided the victory of Prague, and the same
year was promoted to the command of a separate army. The military reputation
he acquired in the Seven Years' War was second only to that of Frederick.
Cortes had effected the conquest of Mexico, and completed his military career, at
the age of thirty-six.
Sandoval, the most eminent of his great captains, died at the age of thirty-one.
He had earned his great renown, and closed his military achievements, before the
age of twenty-five.
Pizarro completed the conquest of Peru at thirty-five, and died about forty.
Lord Clive began his military career at twenty-two, and had reached the zenith
of his military fame at thirty-five; he was raised to the peerage at thirty-six, and
died at fifty.
Hastings began his military service at about twenty-five, and became governor
of Bengal at forty.
Napoleon was made a lieutenant at seventeen, a captain at twenty, chef-de-
bataillon at twenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five, and commander-in-
chief of the army of Italy at twenty-six. All his most distinguished generals were,
like him, young men, and they seconded him in his several campaigns with all
the energy and activity of youthful valor and enthusiasm.
Dessaix entered the army at fifteen; at the opening of the war he quickly passed
through the lower grades, and became a general of brigade before the age of
twenty-five, and a general of division at twenty-six; he died before the age of
thirty-two, with a reputation second only to that of Napoleon.
Kleber did not enter the army till later in life, but he quickly passed through the
subordinate grades, and was made a general of brigade at thirty-eight, a general
of division at forty, and general-in-chief of an army at forty-one: he died at forty-
six. On his death, and in Napoleon's absence, Ménau, aged and inefficient,
succeeded by right of seniority to the command of the army of Egypt. Its utter
ruin was the almost immediate consequence.
Massena first entered the army at seventeen, but soon married a rich wife, and
retired to civil life. He returned to the army at the opening of the revolution, and
in two years, before the age of thirty-five, was promoted to the rank of general of
division. He immediately acquired that high reputation which he sustained
through a long career of military glory.
Soult became a sub-lieutenant at twenty-two, a captain at twenty-four; the
following year he passed through the several grades of chef-de-bataillon,
colonel, and general of brigade, and became general of division at twenty-nine.
Davoust was a sub-lieutenant at seventeen, a general of brigade at twenty-three,
and general of division at twenty-five.
Eugene Beauharnais entered the army at a very early age. He became chef-de-
bataillon at nineteen, colonel at twenty-one, general of brigade at twenty-three,
and Viceroy of Italy at twenty-five. He soon proved himself one of Napoleon's
ablest generals. At twenty-eight he commanded the army of Italy, and at thirty-
one gained great glory in the Russian campaign, at the head of the fourth corps
d'armée.
Gouvion-Saint-Cyr enured the army at the beginning of the Revolution, and
passing rapidly through the lower grades, became a general of brigade at twenty-
nine, and a general of division at thirty.
Suchet became a chef-de-bataillon at twenty, general of brigade at twenty-five,
major-general of Brune's army at twenty-seven, and general of division and of a
corps d'armée at twenty-eight.
Oudinot became a captain at twenty-three, chef-de-bataillon at twenty-four,
general of brigade at twenty-five, and general of division at twenty-eight.
Ney was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-six, general of
brigade at twenty-seven, and general of division at twenty-nine.
Lannes was a colonel at twenty-seven, general of brigade at twenty-eight, and
very soon after general of division.
Joubert became adjutant-general at twenty-five, general of brigade at twenty-six,
general of division at twenty-eight, and general-in-chief of the army of Italy at
twenty-nine. He died at thirty.
Victor was a chef-de-bataillon at twenty-seven, general of brigade at twenty-
nine, and general of division at thirty-two.
Murat was a lieutenant at twenty, and passing rapidly through the lower grades,
he became a general of brigade at twenty-five, and a general of division at
twenty-seven.
Mortier was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-five, general of
brigade at thirty, and general of division at thirty-one.
Macdonald was a colonel at twenty-seven, a general of brigade at twenty-seven,
and a general of division at thirty.
Marmont was a captain at twenty-one, chef-de-bataillon at twenty-two, general
of brigade at twenty-four, inspector general at twenty-seven, and general-in-chief
of an army at thirty-two.
Bernadotte was a colonel at twenty-eight, general of brigade at twenty-nine, and
general of division at thirty.
Lefebvre was made a captain at the organization of the army in 1793; he became
a general of brigade at thirty-eight, and general of division at thirty-nine.
Bessières entered the army at twenty-six, became a colonel at thirty, general of
brigade at thirty-two, and general of division at thirty-four. He died at forty-
seven.
Duroc was a captain at twenty-three, chef-de-bataillon at twenty-six, colonel and
chef-de-brigade at twenty-seven, and general of division at thirty. He died at
forty-one.
This list might be still further extended with the same results, but names enough
have been given to show that the generals who assisted Napoleon in his
immortal campaigns were all, with scarcely an exception, young men, still
burning with the fires of youthful ardor and enthusiasm. The grade of marshal
was not created till after Napoleon became emperor. On ascending the throne of
the empire, he nominated to this rank eighteen of the most distinguished generals
of France. Some of these were generals of the earlier wars of the Revolution, and
had never served under him. Others were younger men, several being only
thirty-four, thirty-five, and thirty-six years of age. The mean age of all was forty-
four. He afterwards made seven more marshals, whose mean age was forty-three.
These appointments, however, were regarded as rewards for past services, rather
than as a grade from which service was expected, for several of the older
marshals were never called into the field after their promotion.
Having noticed the ages of the principal generals who commanded in the armies
of Napoleon, let us look for a moment at those who opposed him. In the
campaign of 1796 the enemy's forces were directed by Beaulieu, then nearly
eighty years of age; Wurmser, also an octogenarian, and Alvinzi, then over
seventy: these had all three distinguished themselves in earlier life, but had now
lost that youthful energy and activity so essential for a military commander.
In the campaign of 1800 the general-in-chief of the Austrian forces was Melas,
an old general, who had served some fifty years in the army; he had
distinguished himself so long ago as the Seven Years' War, but he had now
become timid and inefficient, age having destroyed his energy.
In the campaign of 1805 the French were opposed by Kutusof, then sixty, and
Mack, then fifty-three; the plan of operations was drawn up by still more aged
generals of the Aulic council.
In the campaign of 1806 the French were opposed by the Duke of Brunswick,
then seventy-one, Hohenlohe, then sixty, and Mollendorf, Kleist, and
Massenbach, old generals, who had served under the great Frederick,—men,
says Jomini, "exhumed from the Seven Years' War,"—"whose faculties were
frozen by age,"—"who had been buried for the last ten years in a lethargic
sleep."
In the campaign of 1807 the French were opposed by Kamenski, then eighty
years of age, Benningsen, then sixty, and Buxhowden, then fifty-six. The Allies
now began to profit by their experience, and in 1809 the Austrian army was led
by the young, active, skilful, and energetic Archduke Charles; and this
campaign, although the commander-in-chief was somewhat fettered by the
foolish projects of the old generals of the Aulic council, and thwarted by the
disobedience of his brother, was nevertheless the most glorious in the Austrian
annals of the wars of the Revolution.
At the opening of the campaign of 1812 the Emperor Alexander, young, (only
thirty-five,) active, intelligent, and ambitious, had remodelled his army, and
infused into it his own energy and enthusiastic love of glory. He was himself at
its head, and directed its operations. Kutusof was for a short time the nominal
commander-in-chief, and exhibited an activity unusual at his age, but he was
surrounded by younger generals—Barclay-de-Tolley, and Miloradowich, then
forty-nine, Wintzengerode, then forty-three, Schouvalof, then thirty-five, and the
Archduke Constantine, then thirty-three,—generals who, at the heads of their
corps, and under the young emperor and his able staff of young officers, in the
two succeeding campaigns, rolled back the waves of French conquest, and
finally overthrew the French empire. Wellington, who led the English in these
campaigns, was of the same age as Napoleon, and had been educated at the same
time with him in the military schools of France. The Austrians were led by
Schwartzenburg, then only about thirty, and the Prussians by Yorck, Bulow, and
Blücher. The last of these was then well advanced in life, but all his movements
being directed by younger men,—Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,—his operations
partook of the energy of his able chiefs of staff.
In the campaign of 1815, Napoleon was opposed by the combinations of
Wellington and Gneisenau, both younger men than most of his own generals,
who, it is well known, exhibited, in this campaign, less than in former ones, the
ardent energy and restless activity which had characterized their younger days.
Never were Napoleon's, plans better conceived, never did his troops fight with
greater bravery; but the dilatory movements of his generals enabled his active
enemies to parry the blow intended for their destruction.
In the American war of 1812, we pursued the same course as Austria, Prussia,
and Russia, in their earlier contests with Napoleon, i.e., to supply our armies
with generals, we dug up the Beaulieus, the Wurmsers, the Alvinzis, the
Melases, the Macks, the Brunswicks, and the Kamenskis of our revolutionary
war; but after we had suffered sufficiently from the Hulls, the Armstrongs, the
Winchesters, the Dearborns, the Wilkinsons, the Hamptons, and other veterans
of the Revolution, we also changed our policy, and permitted younger men—the
Jacksons, the Harrisons, the Browns, the McReas, the Scotts,[49] the Ripleys, the
Woods, the McCombs, the Wools, and the Millers—to lead our forces to victory
and to glory. In the event of another war, with any nation capable of opposing to
us any thing like a powerful resistance, shall we again exhume the veterans of
former days, and again place at the head of our armies respectable and aged
inefficiency; or shall we seek out youthful enterprise and activity combined with
military science and instruction? The results of the war, the honor of the country,
the glory of our arms, depend, in a great measure, upon the answer that will be
given to this question.
[49]
Scott had acquired his military reputation, and attained the rank of major-general
at twenty-eight.

But it may be asked, how are we to secure this combination of military

instruction and military energy; how are we to fill the higher grades of our army
with young and active men possessing due military instruction and talent? The
question is not a difficult one, and our government can easily attain the desired
object, if it will only set at work honestly, disregarding all party prejudices and
the mercenary and selfish interests of its own members and advisers. Other
governments have pointed out to us the way. It is this: let merit be the main test
for all appointments and promotions in the army. Let one or more of the
subordinate grades be thrown open to the youth of the whole country, without
distinction as to birth, or wealth, or politics; let them be kept on probation in this
subordinate grade, and be thoroughly instructed in all that relates to the military
profession; after strict examination let them be promoted to the vacancies in the
higher grades as rapidly as they shall show themselves qualified for the duties of
those grades, merit and services being here as elsewhere the only tests.
The first part of this rule is already accomplished by the Military Academy. One
young man is selected from each congressional district, on an average, once in
about two years, the selection being made by the representative of the district;
these young men are made warrant officers in the army, and sent to a military
post for instruction; frequent and strict examinations are instituted to determine
their capacity and fitness for military service; after a probation of a certain length
of time, the best are selected for commission in the army, relative rank and
appointments to corps being made strictly with reference to merit; birth, wealth,
influence of political friends—all extraneous circumstances being excluded from
consideration. What can be more truly and thoroughly democratic than this?
What scheme can be better devised to supply our army with good officers, and to
exclude from the military establishment the corrupting influence of party
politics, and to prevent commissions in the army from being given to "the sons
of wealthy and influential men, to the almost total exclusion of the sons of the
poor and less influential men, regardless alike of qualifications and of merit?"
Unfortunately for the army and for the country this system ends here, and all
further advancement is made by mere seniority, or by executive favoritism, the
claims of merit having but little or no further influence. Indeed, executive
patronage is not infrequently permitted to encroach even upon these salutary
rules of appointment, and to place relatives and political friends into the higher
ranks of commissioned officers directly from civil life, "regardless alike of
qualifications and of merit," while numbers "of sons of the poor and less
influential men," who have served a probation of four or five years in military
studies and exercises, and have proved themselves, in some thirty examinations
made by competent boards of military officers, to be most eminently qualified
for commissions, are passed by in utter neglect! Our army is much more open to
this kind of favoritism and political partiality, than that of almost any of the
governments of Europe, which we have been accustomed to regard as
aristocratic and wholly unfriendly to real merit.
In the Prussian service, in time of peace, the government can appoint no one,
even to the subordinate grade of ensign, till he has followed the courses of
instruction of the division or brigade-school of his arm, and has passed a
satisfactory examination. And, "no ensign can be promoted to a higher grade till
after his promotion has been agreed to by the superior board or commission of
examiners at Berlin, and his name has been placed on the list of those whose
knowledge and acquirements (connaissances) render them qualified (aptes) for
the responsible duties of their profession. The nomination to the grade of
second-lieutenant is not, even after all these conditions are fulfilled, left to the
choice of the government. When a vacancy occurs in this grade, the subaltern
officers present to the commandant of the regiment a list of three ensigns who
have completed their course of study; the commandant, after taking the advice of
the superior officers of the regiment, nominates the most meritorious of these
three to the king, who makes the appointment." The government can appoint to
the engineers and artillery only those who have been instructed as élèves in the
Berlin school of cadets and the school of artillery and engineers, and these
appointments must be made in the order in which the pupils have passed their
final examination. In these corps the lieutenants and second captains can be
promoted to a higher grade only after they have passed a satisfactory
examination. No political influence, nor even royal partiality, can interfere with
this rule.
Even in the arbitrary monarchies of Austria and Russia it is deemed necessary to
subject all military appointments and promotions, in the peace establishments, to
certain fixed rules. In the Austrian army all sub-lieutenants must be taken from
the military schools, or the specially-instructed corps of cadets and imperial
guards; from this grade to that of captain all promotions are made by the
commandants of regiments and corps on the advice of the other superior officers.
Above the grade of captain all nominations for promotion are made to the
emperor by the Aulic Council, in the order of seniority of rank, except the claims
of superior merit interfere. "In the Russian army," says Haillot, "no one, not even
a prince of the imperial family, can reach the grade of officer till he has
satisfactorily passed his several examinations, or finished the severe novitiate to
which the cadets in the corps are subjected." Promotion below the grade of
colonel is made partly by seniority, and partly by merit; above that grade, by
selection alone.
In the British service, rank in the line of the army is obtained by purchase, and
the higher grades are in this way filled with young men of energy and enterprise;
but this efficiency is gained by injustice to the poor man, who is without the
means of purchasing rank. In some respects it is preferable to our ruinous system
of exclusive seniority and executive favoritism, but far more objectionable than
that based on merit. Wellington has recently said that the system of exclusive
seniority would soon utterly destroy the efficiency of the army, by preventing
young men from reaching the higher grades. "At first," says an officer of some
distinction in the British navy, in speaking of promotions in that arm of service,
"it certainly looks very hard to see old stagers grumbling away their existence in
disappointed hopes; yet there can be little doubt that the navy, and, of course, the
country at large, are essentially better served by the present system of employing
active, young, and cheerful-minded officers, than they ever could be by any
imaginable system by seniority. It must not be forgotten, indeed, that at a certain
stage of the profession, the arrangement by which officers are promoted in turn
is already made the rule, and has long been so: but, by a wise regulation, it does
not come into operation before the rank of post-captain be attained. Antecedent
to this point, there must occur ample opportunities of weeding out those persons,
who, if the rule of mere seniority were adopted, would exceedingly embarrass
the navy list." We fully agree with this writer respecting the evils of a system of
exclusive seniority, but not respecting the best means of remedying these evils.
In England, where the wealthy and aristocratic classes govern the state, they may
very well prefer a system of military appointment and promotion based
exclusively on wealth and political influence; but in this country we are taught to
consider merit as a claim much higher than wealth, or rank, or privilege.
The various changes in the rules of appointment and promotion in the French
service, and the various results of these changes, both on the character of the
army and the welfare of the state, are so instructive that we regret that our limits
will not allow us to enter into a full discussion of them. We can give only a very
brief outline.
Previous to the Revolution, military appointment and promotion were wholly
subject to the rules of nobility, certain grades in the army belonging of right to
certain grades of the noblesse; merit and service being excluded from
consideration. But the constituent assembly changed this order of things, and
established the rule that three-fourths of the sub-lieutenants be appointed by
selection, after a concours, and the other quarter be appointed from the sub-
officers, alternately by seniority and selection, without concours; the captains
and lieutenants by seniority; the colonels and lieutenant-colonels two-thirds by
seniority and one-third by selection; maréchaux-de-camp and lieutenant-generals
one-half by seniority and one-half by selection. In 1793 the grades were still
further opened to selection, and in the turbulent times that followed, a part of
them were even thrown open to election by the soldiers. But in 1795 the
combined system of merit and seniority, with certain improvements, was
restored. In 1796 and the wars that followed, merit was the only qualification
required, and Bonaparte, Moreau, and other young generals were actually placed
in command of their seniors in rank. Military talent and military services, not
rank, were the recognised claims for promotion, the baptism of blood, as it was
called, having equalized all grades. Bonaparte, in leaving Egypt, paid no
attention to seniority of rank, but gave the command to Kleber, who was then
only a general of brigade, while Menou was a general of division. Everybody
knows that on the death of Kleber, General Menou succeeded in the command;
and that Egypt, saved by the selection of Kleber, was lost by the seniority of
Menou.
Napoleon formed rules for promotion, both for peace and war, based on merit.
His peace regulations were much the same as the system of 1795; his field
regulations, however, from the circumstances of the times, were almost the only
ones used. The following extract from the Reglement de Campagneof 1809, (title
XX.,) gives the spirit of this system:—"The next day after an action the generals
of brigade will present to the generals of division the names of all such as have
distinguished themselves in a particular manner; the generals of division will
immediately report these to the commander-in-chief, and also the names of the
generals and superior officers whose conduct has contributed most to secure
success, so that the general-in-chief may immediately inform his majesty."
On the restoration of the Bourbons there were also restored many of the ancient
privileges and claims of rank by the officers of the maison militaire du roi, and
court favoritism was substituted for merit and service. But the revolution of 1830
produced a different order of things. "The laws now regulate military promotion;
the king can appoint or promote only in conformity to legal prescriptions; and
even in the exercise of this prerogative, he is wise enough to restrain himself by
certain fixed rules, which protect him from intrigues, and from the obsessions of
persons of influence, and of party politicians." Would that the same could always
be said of the executive of this country in making appointments and promotions
in the army.
The existing laws and regulations of the French service differ slightly for
different corps, but the general rule is as follows: No one can be appointed to the
grade of officer in the army who has not graduated at one of the military schools,
or has not served at least two years as a sub-officer in a corps d'armée. In time of
peace, no one can be promoted to the rank of lieutenant, captain, or major, (chef-
d'escadron and chef-de-bataillon,) till he has served two years in the next lower
grade; no one can be made lieutenant-colonel till he has served four years, nor be
made colonel till he has served three years, in the next lower grade; no one can
be made maréchal-de-camp, lieutenant-general, or marshal of France, till he has
served two years in the next lower grade. These numbers are all diminished one
half in time of war. For the grades of first-lieutenant and captain, two-thirds of
the promotions are by seniority, and one-third by selection; for the chef-de-
bataillon and chef-d'escadron, one-half by seniority and one-half by selection;
for all the other grades by selection only. In time of war, one-half of the
promotions to the grades of first-lieutenant and captain are filled by selection,
and all the promotions to other grades in this way. For promotion by selection, a
list of the authorized candidates for each grade is made out every year by
inspectors, and boards of examiners appointed ad hoc, and the name,
qualifications, and particular claim are given of each officer admitted to the
concours. The recommendations of these inspectors and examiners are almost
invariably followed by the government in its selections. This combined system
of seniority and merit secures a gradual promotion to all, and at the same time
enables officers of great talents and acquirements to attain the higher grades
while still young and efficient. Merit need not, therefore, always linger in the
subaltern grades, and be held subordinate to ignorance and stupidity, merely
because they happen to be endowed with the privileges of seniority. Moreover,
government is precluded from thrusting its own favorites into the higher grades,
and placing them over the heads of abler and better men.
If such a system of appointment were introduced into our army, and fixed by
legal enactments, and no one were allowed to receive a commission till he had
either distinguished himself in the field, or had passed an examination before a
board of competent officers, we are confident that better selections would be
made in the appointments from civil life than have been within the last ten years
by the present system of political influence. It would scarcely be possible to
make worse selections.[50] And if the combined system of seniority and
examination were pursued in promoting the subalterns already in service, it
certainly would produce less injustice, and give greater efficiency to the army,
than the present one of exclusive seniority and brevet rank, obtained through
intrigue and political influence, or high military appointments bestowed as a
reward for dirty and corrupt party services. As a military maxim, secure
efficiency, by limiting the privileges of rank; exclude favoritism, by giving the
power of selection to boards of competent officers, totally independent of party
politics. Such a system has been for some time pursued in the medical
department of our army; it has produced the most satisfactory results; stupidity,
ignorance, and aged inefficiency have been overslaughed, and will soon entirely
disappear from that corps; they have been replaced by young men of activity,
talent, character, intelligence, and great professional skill. Is it less important to
have competent military officers to command where the lives of thousands, the
honor of our flag, the safety of the country depend upon their judgment and
conduct, than it is to have competent surgeons to attend the sick and the
wounded?
[50]
To show the working of this system of political appointments, we would call
attention to a single fact. On the formation of an additional regiment of dragoons
in 1836, thirty of its officers were appointed from civil life, and only four from
the graduates of the Military Academy. Of those appointed to that regiment from
civil life, twenty-two have already been dismissed or resigned, (most of the latter
to save themselves from being dismissed,) and only eight of the whole thirty
political appointments are now left, their places having been mainly supplied by
graduates of the Military Academy.
In case of another increase of our military establishment, what course will our
government pursue? Will it again pass by the meritorious young officers of our
army,—graduates of the Military Academy,—who have spent ten or twelve of
the best years of their life in qualifying themselves for the higher duties of their
profession, and place over their heads civilians of less education and inferior
character—men totally ignorant of military duties, mere pothouse politicians,
and the base hirelings of party,—those who screech the loudest in favor of party
measures, and degrade themselves the most in order to serve party ends?—and
by thus devoting the army, like the custom-house and post-office, to political
purposes, will it seek to increase that vast patronage of the executive which is
already debasing individual morality, and destroying the national character?
Should any administration of the government be so unmindful of the interests
and honor of the country as to again pursue such a course, it is to be hoped that
the sword of political justice will not long slumber in its scabbard.

We wish to call particular attention to this subject. It deserves attention at all

times, but at the present moment it more especially demands a close and candid
consideration. The higher grades of our peace establishment are now filled with
men so far advanced in life that, in case of an increase of the army, many of them
must undoubtedly be either passed over, or put on a retired list. Sooner or later
some change of this kind will undoubtedly be made. It is demanded by the good
of service, even in time of peace; and in time of war, it will be absolutely
necessary to the success of our arms.[51] But the great danger is that the change
may be made for the worse—that all the appointments and promotions to the
higher grades will be made through political influence, thus converting the army
and navy into political engines. Let proper measures be taken to prevent so
dangerous a result; let executive patronage in the army be limited by wholesome
laws, like those in France and Prussia; and let military merit and services, as
determined by boards of competent military officers, be the only recognised
claims to appointment and promotion, thus giving to the poor and meritorious at
least an equal chance with the man of wealth and the base hireling of party. In
actual service the system of exclusive seniority cannot exist; it would deaden and
paralyze all our energies. Taking advantage of this, politicians will drive us to
the opposite extreme, unless the executive authority be limited by wholesome
laws, based on the just principles of merit and service.
[51]
Even at the present moment, in ordering troops to Texas, where immediate and
active service is anticipated, it is found necessary to break up regiments and send
only the young and efficient officers into the field, leaving most of the higher
officers behind with mere nominal commands. Very many of the officers now in
Texas are acting in capacities far above their nominal grades, but without
receiving the rank, pay, and emoluments due to their services.

But the importance of maintaining in our military organization a suitable system

of military instruction is not confined to the exigencies of our actual condition. It
mainly rests upon the absolute necessity of having in the country a body of men
who shall devote themselves to the cultivation of military science, so as to be
able to compete with the military science of the transatlantic powers. It is not to
be expected that our citizen soldiery, however intelligent, patriotic, and brave
they may be, can make any very great progress in military studies. They have
neither the time nor opportunities for such pursuits, and if they can acquire a
practical acquaintance with elementary tactics—the mere alphabet of the military
art—it is as much as can reasonably be expected of them. As a general rule, the
militia are individually more capable and intelligent than the men who compose
a regular army. But they must of necessity be inferior in practical professional
knowledge.
Technical education is necessary in every pursuit of life. It is possible that the
lawyer may succeed in some particular cases without a knowledge of law, but he
will probably have few clients if he remain ignorant of the laws and precedents
that govern the courts. The unlearned chemist may succeed in performing some
single experiment, but his progress will be slow and uncertain if he neglect to
make himself familiar with the experiments and discoveries of his predecessors.
Learning, when applied to agriculture, raises it from a mere mechanical drudgery
to the dignity of a science. By analyzing the composition of the soil we cultivate,
we learn its capacity for improvement, and gain the power to stimulate the earth
to the most bountiful production. How different the results attending the labors
of the intelligent agriculturist, guided by the lamp of learning, from those of the
ignorant drudge who follows the barren formula of traditional precepts! As
applied to manufactures and the mechanical arts, learning develops new powers
of labor, and new facilities for subsistence and enjoyment. Personal comforts of
every kind are greatly increased, and placed within the reach of the humbler
classes; while at the same time the "appliances of art are made to minister to the
demands of elegant taste, and a higher moral culture." As applied to commerce,
it not only greatly increases the facilities for the more general diffusion of
civilization and knowledge, but is also vastly influential in harmonizing the
conflicting interests of nations.
Nor is learning less humanizing and pacific in its influence when applied to the
military art. "During the dark ages which followed the wreck of the Roman
power, the military science by which that power had been reared, was lost with
other branches of learning. When learning revived, the military art revived with
it, and contributed not a little to the restoration of the empire of mind over that of
brute force. Then, too, every great discovery in the art of war has a life-saving
and peace-promoting influence. The effects of the invention of gunpowder are a
familiar proof of this remark; and the same principle applies to the discoveries of
modern times. By perfecting ourselves in military science, paradoxical as it may
seem, we are therefore assisting in the diffusion of peace, and hastening on the
approach of that period when swords shall be beaten into ploughshares and
spears into pruning-hooks."
 APPENDIX.

Since the first edition of this work was published, two important wars have been
commenced and terminated—that between the United States and the Republic of
Mexico, and that between Russia and the Western Powers of Europe—and
another is now being waged between France and Austria, upon the old battle
fields of Northern Italy. In issuing a new edition of these Elements of Military
Art and Science, it is deemed proper to refer to these wars, and to apply the
principles here discussed to the military operations carried on in Mexico and in
the Crimea. It is proposed to do this in the form of Notes to the several Chapters.
The war in Italy being still undetermined, and the details of the several battles
which have already been fought being but imperfectly known, it is obviously
improper to attempt to criticize their strategic character or tactical arrangement.
H.W.H.
NEW YORK, July, 1859.

NOTE TO CHAPTER II.—STRATEGY.

In the invasion of Mexico, the United States formed four separate armies,
moving on four distinct lines of operation: 1st. The "Army of the West," under
General Kearny, moving from St. Louis on New Mexico and California; 2d. The
"Army of the Centre," under General Wool, moving from San Antonio de Bexar
on Chihuahua; 3d. The "Army of Occupation," on the Rio Grande, under
General Taylor, moving from Corpus Christi on Matamoras, Monterey, and
Saltillo; and 4th. The "Main Army," under General Scott, moving from Vera
Cruz on the capital of Mexico.
The Army of the West, under General Kearny, moved upon a separate and
distinct line of operations, having no strategic relations to the other three; its
objects were the conquest and occupation of New Mexico and Upper California.
The first was readily accomplished; but the general then detached so large a
force to operate on Chihuahua after the diversion of Wool's column, that his
expedition to California must have utterly failed without the assistance of the
naval forces in the Pacific.
The lines of Taylor and Wool were evidently ill chosen, being so distant as to
afford the enemy an opportunity to take a central position between them.
Fortunately Wool proceeded no further than Monclova, and then turned off to
occupy Parras, thus coming under the immediate command of General Taylor.
The latter fought the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, and sustained
the siege of Fort Brown; then crossing the Rio Grande at Matamoras, he
captured Monterey, and, forming a junction with Wool, defeated the army of
Santa Anna at Buena Vista. This battle ended the campaign, which, however
brilliantly conducted, was entirely without strategic results.
Scott landed his army near the Island of Sacrificios without opposition, and
immediately invested Vera Cruz, which surrendered after a short siege and
bombardment. Having thus secured his base, he immediately advanced to the
city of Puebla, meeting and defeating the army of Santa Anna at Cerro Gordo.
Remaining some time at Puebla to reinforce his army, he advanced into the
valley of Mexico, and after the brilliant victories of Contreras, Churubusco,
Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec, captured the city and terminated the war.
With respect to the double line of operations of Taylor and Scott it may be
sufficient to remark, that Santa Anna, from his central position, fought, with the
same troops, the battles of Buena Vista and Cerro Gordo. It should also be
remarked, that the line of operations of the army of the Rio Grande was not
approved by either Scott or Taylor, nor, it is believed, by any other officer of our
army. Scott's line of operations, however, was truly strategic, and in turning the
Mexican flank by Lake Chalco and the Pedregal, he exhibited the skill of a great
general.
The war in the Crimea, from the limited extent of the theatre of operations,
afforded but little opportunity for the display of strategic skill on either side.
Nevertheless, the movements of both parties, prior to the investment and siege of
Sebastopol, are fair subjects for military criticism with respect to the plans of
operation.
When the allies landed their troops at the Old Fort, three plans were open for the
consideration of the Russian general: 1st. To destroy or close the harbors of
Balaklava, Kamiesch, Kazatch and Strelitzka, and, garrisoning Sebastopol with a
strong force, to occupy with the rest of his army the strong plateau south of the
city, and thus force the allies to besiege the strong works on the north. 2d.
Having closed the harbors on the south, and secured Sebastopol from being
carried by the assault of any detachment of the allies, to operate on their left
flank, annoying and harassing them with his Cossacks, and thus delay them
many days in the difficult and precarious position which they would have
occupied. 3d. To advance with his whole force and offer them battle at the Alma.
The last and least advantageous of these plans was adopted, and as the garrison
of Sebastopol, during the battle, consisted of only four battalions and the sailors
of the fleet, it might, considering the weakness of its works, have been easily
carried by a detachment of the allied forces.
For the allies at the Alma two plans presented themselves: 1st. To turn the
Russian left, cut him off from Sebastopol, and occupy that city in force. 2d. To
turn the Russian right, and, throwing him back upon Sebastopol, cut him off
from all external succor. Neither plan was fully carried out. The column of
General Bosquet turned the Russian left and decided his retreat; but no strategic
advantage was taken of the victory. The battle was fought on the 20th of
September, and by noon of the 26th the allies had only advanced to the Balbeck,
a distance of a little more than ten miles in six days! On the 27th they regained
their communication with the fleet at Balaklava, without attempting to occupy
Sebastopol, and having exposed themselves to destruction by an ill-conducted
flank march. Fortunately for the allies, the Russians failed to avail themselves of
the advantages which the enemy had thus gratuitously afforded. The fleet having
entered the open harbor of Balaklava, the allies now commenced the labor of
landing and moving up their siege material and of opening their trenches, while
the Russians prepared their fortifications on the south of Sebastopol for resisting
the operations of that gigantic siege which stands without a parallel in history.

NOTE TO CHAPTER III.—FORTIFICATIONS.

In the war between the United States and Mexico, the latter had no fortifications
on her land frontiers, and, with the single exception of Vera Cruz, her harbors
were entirely destitute of defensive works. The Americans, therefore, had no
obstacles of this kind to overcome on three of their lines of operation; and, when
Scott had reduced Vera Cruz, his line of march was open to the capital.
Moreover, nearly every seaport on the Gulf and Pacific coast fell into our hands
without a blow. Had the landing of Scott been properly opposed, and Vera Cruz
been strongly fortified and well defended, it would have been taken only after a
long and difficult siege. Moreover, had the invading army encountered strong
and well-defended fortifications on the line of march to Mexico, the war would,
necessarily, have been prolonged, and possibly with a different result.
The Russian fortifications in the Baltic prevented the allies from attempting any
serious operations in that quarter, and those in the Black Sea confined the war to
a single point of the Heracleidan Chersonese. Had Russia relied exclusively
upon her fleet to prevent a maritime descent, and left Sebastopol entirely
undefended by fortifications, how different had been the result of the Crimean
war.
This subject will be alluded to again in the Notes on Sea-coast Defences, and
Permanent Fortifications.

NOTE TO CHAPTER IV.—LOGISTICS.

The war in Mexico exhibited, in a striking manner, our superiority over the
enemy in this branch of the military art. No army was better supplied than ours
in all matters of subsistence, clothing, medical and hospital stores, and in means
of transportation. Two points, however, are worthy of remark in this connection:
1st. The great waste of material, which resulted from the employment of raw
troops under short enlistments, and commanded by officers appointed from civil
life, who were without experience and destitute of military instruction; and, 2d.
The immense expense of transportation, which was due in part to the above
cause and in part to the employment, in the administrative departments, of
civilians who were utterly ignorant of the rules and routine of military service.
This war was conducted on the system of magazines and provisions carried in
the train of the army, or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for,
forced requisitions being seldom resorted to, and then in very moderate
quantities. The wisdom of this plan was proved by the general good order and
discipline of our troops, and the general good-will of the non-combatant
inhabitants of the country which was passed over or occupied by the army.
The war in the Crimea proved most conclusively the vast superiority of the
French administrative system over that of the English—of the military over a
civil organization of the administrative corps of an army. The French troops
before Sebastopol were regularly, cheaply, and abundantly supplied with every
requisite of provisions, clothing, munitions, medical stores, military utensils, and
hospital and camp equipages; while the English army, notwithstanding an
immense expenditure of money, was often paralyzed in its operations by the
want of proper military material, and not unfrequently was destitute of even the
necessaries of life.
Instead of profiting by this lesson, the recent tendency of our own government
has been (especially in supplying the army in Utah) to imitate the sad example of
the English, and to convert the supplying of our armies into a system of political
patronage to be used for party purposes. If fully carried out, it must necessarily
result in the ruin of the army, the robbery of the treasury, and the utter corruption
of the government.

NOTE TO CHAPTER V.—TACTICS.

The war in Mexico, from the small number of troops engaged, and the peculiar
character of the ground in most cases, afforded but few opportunities for the
display of that skill in the tactics of battle which has so often determined the
victory upon the great fields of Europe. Nevertheless, the history of that war is
not without useful lessons in the use which may be made of the several arms in
the attack and defence of positions. The limit assigned to these Notes will admit
of only a few brief remarks upon these battles.
The affairs of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma properly constitute only a single
battle. In the first, which was virtually a cannonade, the lines were nearly
parallel, and Arista's change of front to an oblique position during the
engagement, was followed by a corresponding movement on the part of General
Taylor. Being made sensible of the superiority of the American artillery, the
Mexican general fell back upon the Ravine of Resaca de la Palma, drawing up
his troops in a concave line to suit the physical character of the ground. The
Americans attacked the whole line with skirmishers, and with dragoons
supported by light artillery, and the charge of a heavy column of infantry decided
the victory. General Taylor's operations at Monterey partook more of the nature
of an attack upon an intrenched position than of a regular battle upon the field.
No doubt Worth's movement to the right had an important influence in deciding
the contest, but the separation of his column from the main body, by a distance
of some five miles, was, to say the least, a most hazardous operation. The
Mexicans, however, took no advantage of the opening to operate between the
separate masses into which the American army was divided. The loss which the
Mexicans inflicted upon us resulted more from the strength of their position than
from any skilful use of their defensive works. In the battle of Buena Vista, the
efforts of Santa Anna were principally directed to turning the American left. If
he had concentrated his masses more upon the centre at the plateau, the success
gained in the early part of the contest would probably have been decisive. The
American right at La Angostura was made almost inaccessible by the deep
ravines in its front, and the skilful use made of the artillery from this point
enabled General Taylor to gain the victory, even after his left had been
completely turned, and a portion of the volunteers had actually fled from the
field.
The manner in which Scott handled his troops in the various battles on his line of
march from Vera Cruz to the capital, proved him to be one of the best generals of
the age. At Cerro Gordo he so completely turned Santa Anna's left as to cut off
his line of retreat, and nearly destroyed his army, the general himself barely
escaping capture. The turning of Valencia's position by the village of San
Geronimo, at the battle of Contreras, and the charge by Riley's columns of
infantry, were movements well planned and admirably executed, as were also the
rapid pursuit of Santa Anna to Churubusco, and the flank and rear attacks by the
brigades of Pierce and Shields. The victory of Molino del Rey was mostly won
with the musket, without very material assistance from heavy artillery, and was
one of the most brilliant but dearly bought achievements of the war. The assault
upon Chapultepec was preceded by a long and heavy cannonade, which
produced a decided moral effect upon the enemy and greatly facilitated the
assault.
With respect to the battles of the Crimean war, only that of the Alma is subject to
the tactical criticism of ordinary battles; those of Balaklava, Inkerman, and the
Tchernaya, were of the nature of sorties made to prevent an assault of the
unfinished works of defence, and to prolong the operations of the siege. They
must therefore be judged as such, and not according to the ordinary rules
applicable to contests in the open field. At the battle of the Alma the Russians
were attacked in position, the two lines of battle being nearly parallel. According
to the original plan of attack, the Turks and Bosquet's division was to turn the
Russian left, while the main attack was made upon the centre. But, on account of
the division of command in the allied army, there was no concert of action. The
heavy column of Bosquet probably decided the victory, although the battle was
general throughout the whole line. The English army advanced in columns of
brigades at deploying distances, its right connected with the French, and its left
protected by a line of skirmishers, of cavalry and horse artillery. With respect to
the formation and use of troops in the other battles, it may be remarked that the
charge of the English light cavalry at Balaklava was apparently without necessity
or object, and led to its inevitable destruction. In the battle of Inkerman the
Russians directed their main attack upon the English right and centre, with false
attacks upon the French left and towards Balaklava. But these false attacks, as is
usual in such cases, were not conducted with sufficient energy and decision, and
Bosquet was thus enabled to perceive the real intentions of the enemy upon the
English portion of the line and move to its assistance. Moreover, the main body
of the Russians moved in too heavy and unwieldy masses, which exposed them
to terrible losses, and rendered impossible a rapid and effective deployment of
their numerical force. The same criticism is applicable to their formation at the
battle of the Tehernaya.

NOTE TO CHAPTER VI.—MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.

On the invasion of Mexico by the United States, the former republic had a large
army of tolerably good troops, though badly officered, still worse equipped, and
almost destitute of proper military stores; but she was entirely wanting in two
important elements of national defence—fortifications and a navy. Her weakness
was shown by the rapid and easy conquest of almost the entire country.
We have already remarked that the fortifications of Russia confined the theatre
of war to a single point of the Crimea, and limited the military operations of the
allies to the prolonged and only partially successful siege of Sebastopol.

NOTE TO CHAPTER VII.—SEA-COAST DEFENCES.

Allusion has already been made to the weakness of Mexico, resulting from her
want of sea-coast defences, as shown by the war between that republic and the
United States. This would have been still more manifest had she possessed any
thing like a commercial marine, exposed to capture by our naval forces. As it
was, the Mexican war afforded not a single contest between ships and forts, no
opposition being made to the occupation of Mexican ports by our naval force.
The only coast defence, the castle of San Juan d'Ulica was not attacked, but after
the bombardment and capture of Vera Cruz, it surrendered without a blow.
The Crimean war, on the contrary, exhibited in a most marked degree the
importance of a well-fortified sea-coast. Notwithstanding the immense force of
the combined fleets of England and France, no naval attack was made upon
either Cronstadt or Sebastopol, and the large naval force of Russia proved utterly
useless as a defence against a maritime descent. There was, indeed, a simulachre
of a "naval cannonade" on the latter place on the 17th of October, 1854, intended
as a diversion of the attention and strength of the garrison from the land side,
where the real struggle for predominance was going on between the besieged
and the besiegers. The inutility of this attempt was so manifest that no serious
naval attack was undertaken, notwithstanding that the allies were ready to bring
to bear upon the antiquated and ill-armed Russian works the most powerful
naval armaments the world had ever seen.
The results of this "simulachre of a naval cannonade," as it has been called, is
worthy of note. The details are taken from Major Barnard's able pamphlet on
"The Dangers and Defences of New York," and Commander Dahlgren's
interesting and valuable work on "Shells and Shell Guns."
"The allied fleet consisted of 14 French, 10 British, and 2 Turkish ships-of-the-
line (some few of which had auxiliary steam power), and a number of side-wheel
steamers to tow these; and carried in all about 2,500 guns. It was opposed by
about 280 guns from the works. The fleet kept itself (in general) at a respectable
distance (from 1500 to 2000 yards); too far to inflict any material injury with its
armament (32-pounders, with a moderate proportion of 8-inch shell-guns) upon
the works;—too far to receive much from the inefficient armament of the
Russian works."
"The only exception to this remark applies to the detached English squadron
under Sir Edmund Lyons, consisting of the Agamemnon, Sanspareil, London,
Arethusa, and Albion, the first-named of which vessels took a position at 750 or
800 yards from Fort Constantine, while the others stretched along at about the
same distance from Fort Constantine, the 'Wasp Tower,' and 'Telegraph Battery.'
Dahlgren describes the result as follows:—"
"The Agamemnon was very seriously maltreated, though not to such an extent as
to impair her power of battery or engine. She was on fire several times; was
struck by 240 shot or shells; and, singular to say, only lost 29, while her second,
just by, lost 70 men. The Albion suffered still more, and in an hour was towed
out crippled, and on fire in more than one place, with a loss of 81 men. The
crews of the London and Arethusa, fared rather better, but the ships nearly as ill;
and they too remained in station but a little time after the Albion. The Queen was
driven off soon after she got into her new position, in great danger; and the
Rodney had the bare satisfaction of getting aground and afloat after experiencing
some damage."
"The value of the small works on the cape and bluffs, was clearly defined in
these results; being above the dense cloud of smoke that enveloped the ships and
the lower forts, their aim was not embarrassed, while the seamen labored under
the difficulty of firing, with an inconvenient elevation, at objects that they saw
but seldom, and then but dimly and briefly. As a consequence, three line-of-
battle ships and a frigate were driven off very shortly and in great peril, and a
fourth badly cut up; while the Agamemnon lay opposed to one of the heaviest
sea-forts with two tiers of casemates, and at the end of five-hours came off with
comparatively little loss."
"Whatever superiority of effect the batteries on the heights may have had (and
we have so few details about these works that we can draw no sure conclusion
from this mere naked statement of damages received by the vessels), it evidently
was not for want of being hit often enough (smoke or no smoke), that the
Agamemnon escaped with so little injury. She 'was struck by 240 shot and
shells;' and it is only due to the inefficiency of the projectiles by which she was
struck, that she was not destroyed."
"With respect to the damages received by Fort Constantine, Dahlgren says:—"
"' The distance of the Agamemnon and Sanspareil from Fort Constantine (17th
October, 1854), was assumed to be about 800 yards; Lord Raglan states it to
have been rather less. These two ships could bring to bear about 87 guns, and the
firing from them probably lasted some four hours. There can be no doubt that it
inflicted much damage, for the Russian Commander-in-chief-admits it in his
official report; but not sufficient to impair the strength of the masonry, and far
short of effecting a breach in it."
"'At Bomarsund, the results were rather different:—Three 32-pounders of 42
cwt. (guns of inferior weight), were landed from a ship's spar deck, and placed in
battery at 950 yards from the North Tower—the masonry of good quality and 6-
1/2 feet thick. In eight hours, the wall between two embrasures was cut through
from top to bottom, offering a practicable breach, to effect which 487 shot and
45 shells were fired, being at the rate of one round from the battery in rather less
than a minute; or, from each gun, one in 2-3/4 minutes. The Tower surrendered."
"'It seems almost incredible that three pieces should be able to accomplish fully
that which eighty-seven pieces utterly failed to do, the distances from the object
being alike—particularly when it is considered that many of the latter were of
greater calibre, and most of them employed much heavier charges where the
calibres were similar. The guns of the ship, if fired at the same rate as those of
the battery, which was not unusually rapid (one round in two and three-fourth
minutes), would have discharged some seven thousand seven hundred shot and
shells in the course of the four hours, supposing no interruption; a number
which, if properly applied, would appear, from the results of three guns, to have
been sufficient to breach the wall of the fort in fourteen places; whereas they did
not effect a single breach, which is abundant proof of the lack of accuracy. They
must either have been dispersed over the surface of the fort, or else missed it
altogether, and this could have been due only to a want of the precision which
was attained by the battery. The constantly preferred complaint of motion in the
ships was not to be urged, because on the day of cannonading Sebastopol, there
was scarcely a breath of wind, and the ships were too large to be easily moved
by the swell, unless very considerable. That the fort did no greater damage to the
ships than it received from them, proves no more than that its fire was quite as
illy directed, and the calibres too low. It is said that the Agamemnon was struck
in the hull by two hundred and forty shot and shells, which must have been but a
small portion of what was fired, though sufficient to be decisive, if, as already
observed, the calibre had been heavier.'"
Here, then, a number of projectiles thrown from the ships, which were sufficient,
had they been thrown from a land battery, according to the result at Bomarsund,
to produce fourteen practicable breaches, failed not only to produce a single
breach, but even "to impair the strength of the masonry."
The reason of this is obvious. That degree of precision of fire by which a breach
is effected by a land battery is utterly unattainable from a floating structure, for
the motion of the water, even in the calmest days, is quite sufficient to prevent
accuracy of aim at an object at a distance, as in this case, of seven and eight
hundred yards.
With respect to the action of the shot and shells upon the Agamemnon, it is to be
remarked that we have as yet had no fair trial of the power of the fire of modern
shell-guns of large calibre from land batteries against ships of war. The Russians
had some of them in their fleet, and at Sinope, with their shell-guns, they blew
up two Turkish frigates in fifteen minutes. It does not appear that in the Crimean
war they had yet provided their fortifications with the modern armaments, for
where shells were thrown from their sea-coast batteries, they were in every
instance of inferior calibre.
With respect to the naval attack upon Kinburn, which has been referred to as
showing the importance of floating batteries as an auxiliary to ships in reducing
harbor defences, we have no official reports of the Russians from which to
derive accurate information of the strength of the works attacked. Dahlgren,
drawing his information from the official accounts of the "English and French
admirals," describes the works and their location is follows:—
"The Boug and the Dnieper issue into a large basin, formed partly by the
projection of the main shore, partly by a long narrow strip of Sand-beach, which
continues from it and takes a north-westerly direction until it passes the
promontory of Otchakov, where it terminates, and from which it is separated by
the channel, whereby the waters of the estuary empty into the Black Sea."
"The distance between the spit or extremity of this tongue and the Point of
Otchakov, or the main shore opposite, is about two miles; but the water is too
shoal to admit of the passage of large vessels of war, except in the narrow
channel that runs nearest to the spit and its northern shore. Here, therefore, are
placed the works designed to command the entrance. They are three in number.
Near the extreme point of the spit is a covered battery built of logs, which are
filled in and overlaid with sand,—pierced for eighteen guns, but mounting only
ten."
"Advancing further along the beach is a circular redoubt, connected with the spit
battery by a covered way. This work, built of stone, and riveted with turf, is
open, and said to be the most substantial of the three; it has eleven cannon, and
within is a furnace for heating shot."
"Further on, and where the beach has widened considerably, is Fort Kinburn, a
square bastioned work, extending to the sea on the south, and to the waters of the
estuary on the north. It is casemated in part, though but few of these embrasures
were armed,—its chief force being in the pieces en barbette, and some nine or
ten mortars. The masonry, though solid, is represented by an eye-witness not to
be bomb-proof, and so dilapidated by age that the mortar was falling out from
the interstices, leaving the stone to disintegrate. The interior space was occupied
by ranges of wooden buildings, slightly constructed and plastered over."
"This fort is said to be armed with sixty pieces. The English admiral states, that
all three of the works mounted eighty-one guns and mortars. The calibres are not
given officially, but stated in private letters to be 18-pounders and 32-pounders.'"
"The above description will quite justify the further remark as to these works:—"
"They were inferior in every respect, and manifestly incapable of withstanding
any serious operation by sea or land. The main fort was particularly weak in
design, and dilapidated; all of them were indifferently armed and garrisoned.'"
"So much for the works. As to the character of the armament brought to the
assault, the same authority says:—
"The allied force was admirably adapted to the operation, embracing every
description of vessel, from the largest to the smallest, and all propelled by steam.
There were screw-liners, and like vessels of inferior class, side-wheel steamers,
screw gunboats, floating-batteries, mortar-vessels, etc., each armed in what was
considered the most approved manner. And this truly formidable naval force
carried besides some thousand troops' on board, all designed to attack these
dilapidated' works of Kinburn."
"Without going into the particulars, we simply give Dahlgren's account of the
affair:—"
"The French floating-batteries (Devastation, Lave, and Tonnante) steamed in to
make their first essay, anchoring some six or seven hundred yards off the S.E.
bastion of Fort Kinburn, and at 9.20 opened fire, supported by the mortar-
vessels, of which six were English, by the gunboats, five French and six English,
and by the steamer Odin, 16."
"The heavy metal of the floating-batteries (said to be twelve 50-pounders on the
broadside of each) soon told on the walls of the fort; and the vertical fire was so
good that the French admiral attributed to it, in great part, the speedy surrender
of the place. The gunboats also made good ricochet practice, which was noticed
to be severe on the barbette batteries."
"The Russian gunners, in nowise daunted by this varied fire, plied their guns
rapidly in return, directing their attention chiefly to the floating-batteries, which
were nearest."
"Exactly at noon, the admirals steamed in with the Royal Albert 121, Algiers, 91,
Agamemnon, 90, and Princess Royal, 90, with the four French liners in close
order, taking position in line, ranging N.W. and S.E., about one mile from the
fort, in twenty-eight feet water."
"At the same time, a squadron of steam-frigates, under Rear-Admirals Stewart
and Pellion, dashed in through the passage to the basin, opening fire on the spit
and central batteries in passing, and anchoring well inside of Fort Nicholaiev and
Otchakov. The attack seaward was completed by the Acre, 100, Curaçoa, 30,
Tribune, 30, and Sphynx, 6, opening on the central battery; while the Hannibal,
91, Dauntless, 24, and Terrible, 21, assailed that on the spit. To this storm of shot
and shells, the Russians could not reply long. In the spit battery, the sand falling
through between the logs, displaced by shot and shells, choked the embrasures,
and blocked up the guns. In the fort, the light wooden buildings were in flames
at an early hour; then the walls began to crumble before the balls which came
from every quarter, front, flank, and rear; and as the guns were disabled
successively, the return became feeble, until few were in condition to be fired,
the central redoubt alone discharging single guns at long intervals. The Russian
commander, however, made no sign of surrender; but the admirals, seeing that
his fire had ceased, and further defence was unavailing, hoisted the white flag at
1.35 P.M., upon which the works were given up on honorable terms."
"The garrison consisted of about fourteen hundred men; their loss is differently
stated,—the French admiral says eighty wounded,—another, forty-three killed
and one hundred and fourteen wounded."
"The English suffered the least, having but two men wounded; besides two killed
and two wounded in the Arrow, by the bursting of her two 68-pounder Lancaster
guns."
"The superiority of the allied vessels in number and calibre of ordnance was very
decided; they must have had at least six hundred and fifty pieces in play, chiefly
32-pounders, and 8-inch shell guns, with a fair proportion of 68-pounders and
mortars, besides the 50-pounders of the French floating batteries. To which the
Russians could only reply with eighty-one cannon and mortars, and no guns of
heavier calibre than 32-pounders, while many were lower. The great disparity in
offensive power was not compensated to the works by the advantage of
commanding position, the Russian fort and redoubt being upon nearly the same
level with the ships' batteries, and also very deficient in proper strength. On the
other hand, the depth of water did not allow the liners to approach nearer than
one mile; and thus their fire was by no means so intense as it would have been at
shorter range."
"This was the sole occasion in which the floating batteries had an opportunity of
proving their endurance; which was the question of most importance, as no one
could doubt the effect of long 50-pounders, or 68-pounders, when brought within
a few hundred yards of masonry, and able to retain the steadiness indispensable
to a breaching fire."
"No siege operation had ever embraced batteries of such power, for though the
English had employed long 68-pounders at Sebastopol, yet the distance from the
objects exceeded a thousand yards; and the concentration of fire, so far as any
opinion can be formed from the published statements, was far inferior to that of
the thirty-six 50-pounders, in the broadsides of the three batteries anchored in
close order."
"They were hulled repeatedly by shot; one of them (the Devastation), it is said,
sixty-seven times, without any other effect on the stout iron plates than to dint
them, at the most, one and a half inches,—still, there were ten men killed and
wounded in this battery by shot and shell which entered the ports,—and the
majority of damage to the French personnel (twenty-seven men) occurred in the
three floating-batteries."
Major Barnard, in commenting upon this affair, says that it "proves nothing,
unless it be, that dilapidated, and ill-designed, and ill-constructed works, armed
with inferior calibres, cannot contend against such an overwhelming array of
force as was here displayed. * * * The Fort of Kinburn surrendered, not because
it was breached—not because the defenders were so far diminished by their
losses as to be unable to protract the contest,—but simply because the guns and
gunners, exposed in all possible ways, were put hors-du-combat, and the calibres
(of the guns in Kinburn) were incapable of doing any great damage to the
vessels, at the distance they were stationed."

The guns in the low open batteries were exposed to a ricochet and vertical fire,
to which latter the French admiral attributed, in good part, the surrender of the
place. The buildings behind the batteries, built of wood, "slightly constructed
and plastered over," were set on fire, and the heat and smoke must have rendered
the service of the guns almost impracticable. Nevertheless, out of a garrison of
1,400, only 157 were killed and wounded—a very small loss under all the
circumstances. If the works had been well-constructed casemates, covering the
men from the ricochet and vertical fires and the sharpshooters of the troops who
invested the land fronts, the loss of the garrison would have been still less; and if
they had been armed with heavier projectiles, much greater damage would have
been inflicted upon the attacking force.
With respect to the use of floating-batteries in this case, Commander Dahlgren
very judiciously remarks:—
"The use that can be made of floating-batteries, as auxiliaries in
attacking shore-works, must depend on further confirmation of their
asserted invulnerability. It may be that the performance at Kinburn
answered the expectation of the French emperor as regards offensive
power, for that is a mere question of the battering capacity of the
heaviest calibres, which is undoubted; but the main issue, which
concerns their endurance, cannot be settled by the impact of 32-pounder
shot, fired at 600 and 700 yards. Far heavier projectiles will in future
be found on all seaboard fortifications; and the ingenuity of the
artillerist may also be exerted more successfully than at Kinburn.
Still, it is not to be doubted that the floating-battery is a formidable
element in assailing forts, even if its endurance falls short of
absolute invulnerability; and the defence will do well to provide
against its employment."
The works at Bomarsund were taken by means of land-batteries, which breached
the exposed walls of the towers and main works. An auxiliary fire was opened
upon the water front by the fleet, but it produced very little effect. But after the
work had been reduced, an experimental firing was made by the Edinburgh,
armed with the largest and most powerful guns in the British navy.
In speaking of the effects of the siege batteries upon the walls of Bomarsund,
and the experimental fire of the Edinburgh, Sir Howard Douglas remarks:—
"This successful operation (of the land batteries) is very generally,
but erroneously, stated to have been effected by the fire of the ships,
and it is even strongly held up as a proof of what ships can do, and
ought to attempt elsewhere."

"But the results of the experimental firing at the remnant of the

fort, which, unless the previous firing of the ships during the attack
was absolutely harmless, must have been somewhat damaged, and moreover
shaken by the blowing-up of the contiguous portions, do not warrant
this conclusion, even should the attacking ships be permitted, like
the Edinburgh, to take up, quietly and coolly, positions within 500
yards, and then deliberately commence and continue their firing, without
being fired at! The firing of the Edinburgh, at 1,060 yards, was
unsatisfactory. 390 shot and shells were fired, from the largest and
 most powerful guns in the British navy (viz., from the Lancaster gun
of 95 cwt., with an elongated shell of 100 lbs.;—from 68-pounders of 95
cwt., and 32-pounders of 56 cwt., solid shot guns;—from 10-inch shell
guns of 84 cwt., with hollow shot of 84 lbs.;—from 8-inch shell guns of
65 and 60 cwt., with hollow shot of 56 lbs.), and did but little injury
to the work. At 480 yards, 250 shot, shells, and hollow shot were fired.
A small breach was formed in the facing of the outer wall, of extremely
bad masonry, and considerable damage done to the embrasures and
other portions of the wall; but no decisive result was obtained—no
practicable breach formed, by which the work might be assaulted,
taken, and effectually destroyed, although 640 shot and shells (40,000
lbs. of metal) were fired into the place, first at 1,060, and then at
480 yards."
Surely, this "naval attack," taken in connection with the true facts of the capture
of Kinburn, the abortive attempt of the British fleet in the Pacific upon the
Russian works of Petropauloski, is not calculated to affect the well established
opinion of the ability of forts to resist maritime attacks.
Few are now disposed to dispute the general superiority of guns ashore over
guns afloat; but some think that works of masonry are incapable of resisting the
heavy and continuous fire which may now be brought against it by fleets and
floating-batteries, and would therefore extend the area of the works and rely
mainly upon earthen parapets, with guns in barbette. This conclusion they form
from the results of the maritime attack on Kinburn, and of the land-batteries on
Bomarsund.
Major Barnard, in his valuable work on "The Dangers and Defences of New
York," draws a very different conclusion from these attacks, and contends that
they abundantly prove the capability of well-constructed stone masonry to resist
the fire of ships and floating-batteries, if the latter are opposed by proper
armaments in the forts; moreover, that they proved the superiority of casemated
forts over low open batteries, with guns in barbette, in covering the garrison
from the effects of a vertical and ricochet fire. Unquestionably the masonry at
Bomarsund was poorly constructed; nevertheless, the fire of the shipping
produced very little effect upon it. It is also equally certain that Kinburn Was
taken, not by a breaching fire, but mainly by the effects of vertical and ricochet
fires.
With respect to our own system of sea-coast defences, it may be remarked, that,
since this chapter was written, the works mentioned therein as having been
commenced, have been gradually advanced towards completion, and that the
acquisition of Texas and California, and the settlement of Oregon and
Washington Territory, by greatly extending our line of maritime defence, have
rendered necessary the fortification of other points. It should also be noted that
while the value and necessity of these works are generally admitted, and while
the general outline of the system is almost universally approved, many are of the
opinion that the increased facilities for naval attacks, and the immense power of
modern maritime expeditions, like that upon Sebastopol, render it necessary to
more strongly fortify the great naval and commercial ports of New York and San
Francisco—one the key point of the Atlantic, and the other of the Pacific coast.
Perhaps the system adopted by our Boards of Engineers may be open to the
objection that they have adopted too many points of defence, without giving
sufficient prominence to our great seaports, which are necessarily the strategic
points of coast defence. However this may have been at the time the system was
adopted, there can be no question that the relative strength of the works designed
for the different points of our coast does not correspond to the present relative
importance of the places to be defended, and the relative temptations they offer
to an enemy capable of organizing the means of maritime attack. On this subject
we quote from the work of Major Barnard:—
"While the means of maritime attack have of late years assumed
a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed of when our defensive
system was planned, and our country has so increased in population,
wealth and military resources, that no enemy can hope to make any
impression by an invasion of our territory,—our great maritime places
like New York, have, on the other hand, increased in even greater
proportion, in every thing that could make them objects of attack."

"The works deemed adequate in former years for the defence of

New York could not, therefore, in the nature of things, be adequate at
the present day."

"The recent war of England and France against Russia may illustrate
my meaning; for it has taught us what to expect were either of
these nations to wage war against the United States."

"No invasion of territory, no attempt at territorial conquest was

made, or thought of; for it was well foreseen that no decisive results
 would flow from such means. The war consisted exclusively in attacks
upon maritime places—great seaports—seats of commercial and naval
power. Such places, by their vast importance to the well-being and
prosperity of a nation—by the large populations and immense amount
of wealth concentrated in them, and by their exposure to maritime
attack, offer themselves at once as points at which the most decisive
results may be produced. Cronstadt, Sebastopol, Sweaborg, Kinburn,
Odessa, Kertch, Petropauloski, and other places of less note, were in
succession or simultaneously objects of attack; while such as the first
named became, indeed, the true seats of war."

"Around Sebastopol assailed and assailant gathered their resources,

and on the result of the arduous struggle may be said to have
turned the issue of the war. Had it not been so decided there, Cronstadt
would have been the next field of combat,—for which, indeed, the
allies had made the most enormous preparations."

"Is it not certain that in future all war of maritime powers against
the United States, will take a similar course? All territorial invasion
being out of the question, it is against our great seaports and
strategic points of coast defence—such as New York, New Orleans, and
San Francisco—pre-eminently New York,—that an enemy will concentrate
his efforts. Against these he will prepare such immense armaments,
—against these he will call into existence special agencies of attack,
which (unless met by an inexpugnable defensive system) shall insure
success."

"The mere defense of the city against ordinary fleets, is no longer

the question; but through the defensive works to be here erected, the
nation is to measure its strength against the most lavish use of the
resources of a great maritime power, aided by all that modern science
and mechanical ingenuity in creating or inventing means of attack, can
bring against them; in short, in fortifying New York, we are really
preparing the battle-field on which the issue of future momentous
contests is to be decided."
A few, however, object to the system at present adopted, on the ground that
casemated works do not offer sufficient resistance to ships and floating-batteries,
and that earthen works, covering a greater area, will accomplish that object much
more effectually, while their longer land fronts will be more difficult of
reduction by siege.
It cannot be doubted that earthen batteries, with guns in barbette, can, as a
general rule, be more easily taken by assault, that they are more exposed to
vertical and ricochet firing, and more expose their gunners to be picked off by
sharpshooters. Moreover, they give but a very limited fire upon the most
desirable point, as the entrance to a harbor. On the other hand, it has not been
proved that masonry-casemated works, when properly constructed and properly
armed, will not effectually resist a naval cannonade, whether from ships or
floating-batteries. The results of recent wars, and of the West Point experiments
by General Totten, would seem to prove them abundantly capable of doing this.
Against such proofs the mere ad captandum assertion of their incapacity can
have but little weight—certainly not enough to justify the abandonment of a
system approved by the best military authorities of this country and Europe, and
sanctioned by long experience.
Major Barnard, in speaking of the capacity of masonry casemated forts to resist
the fire of a hostile armament, and of the propriety of abandoning them for
earthen batteries in our system of Coast Defences, uses the following forcible
language:—"When we bear in mind that the hostile 'floating batteries,' of
whatever description, will themselves be exposed to the most formidable
projectiles that can be thrown from shore batteries,—that when they choose to
come to 'close quarters,' to attempt to breach, their 'embrasures' present openings
through which deluges of grape, canister, and musket balls can be poured upon
the gunners; and consider what experience has so far shown, and reason has
taught us, with regard to the casemate,—we need not be under apprehension that
our casemated works will be battered down; nor doubt that they will, as they did
in Russia, answer the important purposes for which they were designed."
"It only remains to show the necessity of such works. It, in general, costs much
less to place a gun behind an earthen parapet, than to build a masonry structure
covered with bomb-proof arches, in which to mount it. All authorities agree that
an open barbette battery (Grivel's very forcible admission has been quoted), on a
low site, and to which vessels can approach within 300 or 400 yards, is utterly
inadmissible. It may safely be said, that in nine cases out of ten, the sites which
furnish the efficient raking and cross fires upon the channels, are exactly of this
character; and indeed it very often happens that there are no others."
"When such sites are found, it rarely happens that they afford room for sufficient
number of guns in open batteries. Hence the necessity of putting them tier above
tier, which involves, of course, the casemated structure. Such works, furnishing
from their lower tier a low, raking fire, and (if of several tiers) a plunging fire
from their barbettes, offer as favorable emplacements for guns as can be
contrived, and afford to their gunners a degree of security quite as great as can
be given to men thus engaged."
"On subjects which have a mere speculative importance, there is no danger in
giving rein to speculation; but on those of such real and intense practical
importance as the security against hostile aggression of the great city and port of
New York, it is not admissible to set aside the experience of the past, or the
opinions of the best minds who have devoted themselves to such subjects. A
means of defence, sanctioned by its being confided in to protect the great ports
of Europe—which has protected the great ports of Russia against the most
formidable naval armament that ever floated on the ocean, has a claim upon our
confidence which mere criticism cannot diminish; and a claim to be adhered to
in place of all new 'systems,' until time and trial shall have necessitated (not
merely justified) the change."
"If, then, we refer to the practice of other nations, to find what has been judged
necessary for the defence of important ports,—to experience, to find how such
defensive systems have stood the test of actual trial,—we may draw useful
conclusions with regard to what is now required to defend New York. We shall
find at Sebastopol—a narrow harbor, which owed its importance to its being the
great naval dépôt of Russia on the Black Sea—an array of 700 guns, about 500
of which were placed in five 'masonry-casemated' works (several of them of
great size), and the remainder in open batteries. These defensive works fulfilled
their object, and sustained the attack of the allied fleet, on the 17th of October,
1854, without sensible damage."
"The facility with which seaports are attacked by fleets—the enormous
preparations required—the great risks encountered in landing a besieging army
on the coast of a formidable enemy (while, for protection against the former
species of attack, costly works are necessary, and against the latter, field works
and men can, in emergency, afford protection), naturally caused the Russians to
make these water defences their first object. Yet, though almost unprotected on
the land side, Sebastopol resisted, for a whole year, an attack on that quarter; and
illustrated how, with plenty of men and material, an energetic and effectual land
defence may be improvised, where the sea defence is provided for, as thoroughly
as it was at that place."
"Let Cronstadt be another example. Great as was the importance of its defence to
Russia, it was not greater,—it was by no means as great, as that of New York to
our own country. This port, and military and naval dépôt, was defended (in its
main approach) by upwards of 600 guns, 500 of which were mounted in five
'masonry-casemated' works; the remainder in an open barbette battery, which
enfiladed the main channel. This number is formidable in itself; yet the same
number mounted in New York harbor would not afford anything like such a
formidable defence as was found at Cronstadt, owing to its great area, and long
line of approach, compared with the latter."
"These works fulfilled their object. They protected the great port and dépôt of
Cronstadt and the capital of the empire from invasion. For two successive years
did the mighty armaments of France and England threaten; but they were
overawed by the frowning array of 'casemated castles' which presented itself,
and declined the contest."
"Let us turn our eyes now to the great naval dépôt of France. After the almost
incredible expenditure lavished here, in creating a harbor facing the shores of her
great rival, England, and an equally profuse expenditure in providing all that
constitutes a great naval dépôt, we may suppose that the best means, without
regard to cost, which the science of man could devise, would be employed here
to make this great seat of naval power secure against the formidable means of
attack possessed by the great maritime power most likely to be the assailant. The
means there employed are (so far as regards mere harbor defence) precisely the
same (viz., casemated works in several tiers, combined with open batteries
where the locations are favorable); and the application of means is the same as
we have found so successful in Russia,—the same which constitute the system
of harbor defence of New York."
Captain McClelland, in his official report to the War Department, on the siege of
Sebastopol, uses language equally strong and pertinent:—
"The permanent defences of Sebastopol against an attack by water,
although inferior in material and the details of construction to our own
most recent works, proved fully equal to the purpose for which they
were intended. Indeed, the occurrences on the Pacific, the Baltic, and
the Black Sea, all seem to establish beyond controversy, the soundness
of the view so long entertained by all intelligent military men, that
well constructed fortifications must always prove more than a match for
the strongest fleet."
"It is deemed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and
imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced
persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points:"

"1st. That our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and

proper one, which ought to be completed and armed with the least
possible delay."

"2d. That mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the

forces that would be brought against us, were we involved in an European
war, but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline, and
directed by that consummate and mechanical skill which can only be
acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose,
and by long habit."

"In the day of sailing-vessels the successful siege of Sebastopol

would have been impossible. It is evident that the Russians did not
appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were unprepared
to sustain a siege."

"This same power of steam would enable European nations to disembark

upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally encamped
around Sebastopol. To resist such an attack, should it ever be
made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those fortifications
must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists.
To repel the advance of such an army into the interior, it is not enough
to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can
bring to bear against it. An invading army of 15,000 or 20,000 men
could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers;
but when it comes to the case of more than 100,000 disciplined
veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its
own destruction; because, if without discipline and instruction, they
cannot be handled, and are in their own way. We cannot afford a Moscow
campaign."

"Our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be, large
enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it
should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the
 frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned
officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase;
and the greatest possible care should be bestowed upon the instruction
of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops. The militia
and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and effective
basis; instructors furnished them from the regular army, and all
possible means taken to spread sound military information among them.
In the vicinity of our sea-coast fortifications, it would be well to
provide a sufficient number of volunteer companies with the means of
instruction in heavy artillery, detailing officers of the regular
artillery for instructors."
On this subject of instructing our volunteers and militia in the use of sea-coast
batteries, we add the following quotation from Major Barnard's pamphlet:—
"One of the main causes of inefficiency in coast batteries, which
has given color to the idea that they may be passed, or even attacked
with impunity, I conceive to be the want of skill and care in the use of
the guns. The result is a prodigious smoke, and a prodigious throwing
away of balls, and very little damage done. This has been, however,
by no means a peculiarity of coast defences. The same system of random
firing has hitherto prevailed, both in the use of small arms in land
and of heavy ordnance in sea battles; nor has it occurred apparently to
even the greatest masters of the art of war, to ask why, for one man
wounded, or for one effective shot in a vessel's hull, so many thousands
of shot should be thrown uselessly into the air."

"But this question is now asked, both in the use of the soldier's
rifled musket, and in the management of ships' guns, as well as of
artillery of all kinds."

"It is at last discovered that it is of more importance to teach the

soldier to direct his piece with accuracy of aim, than to perform
certain motions on parade with the precision of an automaton. The same
idea is now infused into all the departments of military and naval
science, and is a necessary result of the recent great
improvements in the construction of arms. In short, the truth has at
last become apparent that the old-fashioned system of random firing,
though perhaps like the 'charge of the six hundred' at Balaklava, 'bien
 magnifique, n'est pas la guerre.'"

"It is of the utmost importance that we should apply this principle

to the management of our sea-coast batteries, and give it a practical
effect. The volunteers of our cities will constitute mainly, in time of
war, the gunners of our forts and manipulators of our sea-coast guns.
In time of war, they will probably be exercised in these duties. But it
is most desirable that we should have at all times a body of gunners,
practised in these exercises. The result would be, not only to give to
our citizens, as well as citizen-soldiers, confidence in the defences
provided for their security, but it would disseminate military
knowledge, and an intelligent idea of the bearing and objects of the
different defensive works. To carry out this idea, it would be
desirable that there should be at each considerable seaport town, a
sufficient garrison of artillery troops to aid in the instruction
of the volunteers. In the present condition of the army this cannot
be hoped; but perhaps it might, at least, be found practicable to detail
an artillery officer or two for the purpose."

NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.—OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.

The author has seen nothing since this chapter was written to induce him to
change the views therein expressed with respect to the superior strategic
importance of the line of Lake Champlain, both as a line of military operations,
and as a line of defence. The mutual commercial interests of the United States
and the Canadas render a war between the two countries less probable than
formerly; nevertheless, such an event is by no means impossible, and common
prudence should induce us to prepare in the best possible manner for such a
contingency.

NOTE TO CHAPTERS IX., X., XI. AND XII.—ARMY ORGANIZATION.

Since these chapters were written, several important changes have been made in
our army organization. The rank of Lieutenant-General (at least, by brevet) has
been revived, the staff, administrative corps, infantry and cavalry have been
increased, and a company of engineer troops organized. But this company is
mainly employed at West Point for instruction of the cadets in the several
branches of military engineering, and thus serves to supply a deficiency long felt
in the system of education at the Military Academy. The want, however, of
troops of this arm for the construction, care, and preservation of our permanent
fortifications, and for the general duties of field engineering, still remains to be
supplied. Of all the arms of military organization, this one most requires
instruction in time of peace; it cannot be supplied at the moment a war is
declared.
In speaking of our present army organization, as compared with those of the
different European powers which he was sent to examine and report upon,
Captain McClelland says:—
"Our force of artillery is large in proportion to the other arms of
service, while the number of our engineer troops is ridiculously and
shamefully small; it is, therefore, more than probable that in any
future siege it will be easy for the artillery to construct their own
batteries, while the engineers will be sufficiently burdened by the
construction of the other works of attack; we have now, at last, the
germ of an artillery school of practice; I would then suggest, for the
consideration of the Secretary, the propriety of causing the artillery
to construct their own batteries. The position and armament of siege
batteries should be determined by consultation between the engineers and
the artillery, the former having the preponderating voice, in order to
secure the necessary harmony and connection between all parts of the
works of attack. This change," he says, "will require to be introduced
into the artillery manual and course of instruction everything in
relation to the preparation of the fascines, gabions, platforms, and
magazines, the dimensions of batteries, manner of arranging, working
parties, etc."
With regard to the suggestion of Captain McClellan, it is sufficient to remark,
that it seeks to remedy one evil by introducing another equally as great and
equally as objectionable. The defect in our present army organization is that one
of its arms is too small for the duties which, from the very nature of military
service, naturally and properly belong to it; and it surely is no remedy for this
defect to permanently transfer a part of these duties to another arm. As well
might it be said, if our artillery force were "ridiculously and shamefully small" in
proportion to the infantry and cavalry, that the field batteries should be
permanently transferred to those arms, and that light artillery tactics should be
comprised in our infantry and cavalry manuals.
There are certain duties which the military experience of ages has shown to
properly and almost necessarily belong to each particular arm of an army
organization, and every attempt to make one branch perform the appropriate
duties of another has invariably destroyed its efficiency for either service.
Suppose our medical corps were "ridiculously and shamefully small" in
proportion to our pay department, shall our paymasters perform the duties of
surgery, and be instructed in the use of the scalpel and amputating instruments!
This is, perhaps, an extreme case, but it serves to illustrate the principle.
The defect referred to by Captain McClelland, and which has so often been
pointed out by our best military men, cannot be obviated by any transfer or
assignment, whether temporary or permanent, of the appropriate duties of one
corps to another. Indeed, such a measure would only tend to make this defect
permanent, and to convert a temporary into a lasting evil. It can readily be
remedied by legislative action, but in no other way. The executive action
suggested would be deprecated by all. Moreover, the evil is now so obvious and
so generally admitted, that there can be little doubt that Congress will soon
perceive the importance of applying the only proper and effective remedy.

NOTE TO CHAPTER XIII.—PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.

Although the general principles of the plan and arrangement of a permanent
fortification, as established by the great masters of this branch of military
science, remain the same; nevertheless, the vast improvements which have,
within the last few years, been made in projectiles, require some changes in the
details of defensive works of this character. These changes consist mainly in an
increased thickness of stone and earthen parapets and of the covering of
magazines, in the arrangement of embrasures, and in protecting the garrison
from an enemy's sharpshooters. The introduction of heavier siege guns, and of
heavier ordnance on ships of war, and especially on those propelled by steam,
require much larger ordnance in forts designed for the defence of harbors. In the
Russian war, Sweaborg was made to suffer from a distant bombardment which
left her fortifications intact. These modifications in the arrangements and
armaments of forts are absolutely necessary in order to restore the relative power
of defence against the improvements made in the means of attack. They can very
easily be introduced without changing the form or general character of the
works, and they are really so very essential that, without them, a fort constructed
25 or 30 years ago, and well suited to the then existing state of the military art,
will be likely to offer no very considerable resistance to modern siege batteries
or well organized maritime attacks.
Some have gone much further in their estimate of the effect produced by the
increased size and force of military projectiles, and boldly assert that masonry
works of strong relief can no longer be used, and that the increased range of
small arms requires an entire change of the bastioned front, with lines more
extended.
With respect to the effect of the increased range of small arms, it is very natural
that a superficial observer should adopt the opinion that this improvement must
be followed by an extension of the lines of a defensive military work; but a close
study of the subject will probably lead to a different conclusion. Such at least is
the opinion of the ablest military engineers of Europe. The lines of the bastioned
front now generally in use, were really too long for a good defence with the arms
in use at the time it was adopted; and, in theory, the "rampart gun" was to be
relied upon for the defence of certain exposed points. But this weapon is no
longer in use; its place, however, is better supplied by the increased range of the
musket and rifle. The latter weapon is almost invaluable for defending the
approaches to a permanent work.
With respect to the breaching of stone masonry by siege batteries, it has long
been an established principle that all masonry exposed to the fire of land
batteries should be masked by earthen works. The neglect of this rule caused the
fall of Bomarsund. Those who so readily draw, from the results of that siege, the
inference that the present mode of fortifying land fronts must be abandoned,
exhibit their ignorance of military engineering. The facts do not justify their
conclusions.
With respect to sea fronts, which can be reached only by guns afloat, the case is
very different. They are usually casemates of masonry, not masked by earthen
works. Whether the increased efficiency of projectiles thrown by ships and
floating batteries now require a resort to this mode of protecting masonry on the
water fronts of fortifications, is a question well worthy of discussion. This
subject has already been alluded to in the Note on Sea-coast Defences, and it is
there shown that no facts have yet been developed which require or authorize
any change in our present system.
NOTE TO CHAPTER XIV.—FIELD ENGINEERING.
As Mexico had no permanent fortifications to be besieged, the war in that
country afforded very little practice in that branch of engineering which is
connected with the attack and defence of permanent works, particularly sapping
and mining. The only operation resembling a siege was the investment and
bombardment of Vera Cruz, and it is worthy of remark that if General Scott had
stormed that place, weak as it was, he must have lost a large number of his men,
while from his trenches and batteries he reduced it with scarcely the sacrifice of
a single life.
Nor did either party in this war make much use of field works in the attack and
defence of positions. Nevertheless, no one can read the history of the war
without appreciating the important influence which Fort Brown had upon
General Taylor's defence of the left bank of the Rio Grande. Again if we
compare our loss in other Mexican battles with that which the Americans
sustained in their attacks upon Monterey, Churubusco, Molino del Key, and
Chapultepec,—places partially secured by field works—we shall be still more
convinced of the value of temporary fortifications for the defence of military
positions, although it was manifest that the Mexicans neither knew how to
construct nor how to defend them.
Nor was there much practice in this war in the use of military bridges, for, with
the exception of the Rio Grande, our armies had no important rivers to cross. We
must not, however, omit to note the important fact that General Taylor was
unable to take advantage of the victories of Palo Alto and Resacade La Palma to
pursue and destroy the army of Arista, because he had no pontoon equipage to
enable him to follow them across the Rio Grande. It should also be remarked
that even a very small bridge equipage would have been of very great use in
crossing other streams and ravines during the operations of this war. One of our
cavalry officers writes:—
"On our march from Matamaras to Victoria and Tampico, in 1846
and 1847, we had infinite difficulty in bridging boggy streams (there
being no suitable timber), and in crossing ravines with vertical banks;
a few ways of the Birago trestles would have saved us many days and
a vast amount of labor. In the operations in the valley of Mexico, our
movements, checked as they so often were by impassable wet ditches
and sometimes by dry ravines, would have been rendered so much more
free and rapid by the use of the Birago trestles, that our successes
 could have been gained at far less cost, and probably with more rapidity
than they were."
With regard to military reconnaissance, the splendid achievements of Lee and
others connected with the operations of General Scott, proved the value and
importance of this particular branch of field engineering.
But field engineering, as a branch or arm of the military service, received its
greatest development and most brilliant application in the Crimean war,
particularly in the siege of Sebastopol, and the measures resorted to by General
Todtleben to defend that place against the attack of superior forces.
A brief sketch of these defensive works may be of interest to the reader:—
When the allies reached Balaklava, Sebastopol was defended on the south side
only by a loop-holed wall about four feet and a half thick, and from eighteen to
twenty feet high, and a semicircular redoubt with two stories of loop-holes, and
five guns in barbette. These works would have afforded some protection against
a coup-de-main by infantry and cavalry, but could have offered no very
considerable obstacle to a combined attack of these arms with artillery.
The Russian engineer commenced his operations for strengthening this position
by occupying the most important points in his line of defence with detached field
works of sufficient relief to resist an assault, and generally closed at the gorge.
These works were afterwards connected by re-entering lines of a weaker profile,
which served to enfilade the ravines and to flank the advanced works. The old
wall was strengthened with earth, and rifle-pits for sharpshooters were
constructed at a considerable distance in front.
The most important points of the main line of defence were: 1st. The Flag-staff
Bastion. 2d. The Central Bastion. 3d. The Malakoff. 4th. The Redan. 5th. The
little Redan. The command of the first was about fifteen feet, its ditch thirty feet
wide and from twelve to fifteen feet deep. A portion of the scarp was provided
with palisades some ten feet high. The construction of the Central Bastion was
similar to that of the Flag-staff, but weaker in profile. The relief of the other
works was still less. The command of the Malakoff was about fourteen feet, its
ditch eighteen feet wide and twelve feet deep. The thickness of parapet in these
works was generally about eighteen feet, and the bombproofs were covered with
timber eighteen inches thick and six feet of earth. The loop-holed walls
connecting these works were covered by a rampart and parapet, or entirely
replaced by a simple parapet. Many of the embrasures were revetted with the
common boiler iron ships' water-tanks filled with earth. The same material was
sometimes used for traverses. Rope mantelets were used to protect the artillerists
at the pieces from rifle balls and small grape. Great attention was given to the
construction of bombproofs to cover the men from vertical firing. These were
sometimes under the rampart and the second line of defence (where there was
one), often under special traverses, or entirely under ground, and occasionally
excavated in the solid rock. Some had fireplaces and chimneys, and were well
ventilated. Interior slopes were revetted with gabions, crowned by fascines and
sand bags. Gabions were also employed to repair the damage caused by the
enemy's artillery. Abattis, military pits, caltrops and spikes, stuck through
planks, and explosive machines were employed in front of different parts of the
defences. Mines were resorted to in front of the Flag-staff Bastion to retard the
French approaches. They were made in rocky soil with craters from twelve to
fifteen feet deep. The Russian counter-approaches generally consisted of flêches,
united by a simple trench.
Captain McClelland, one of our officers sent to the Crimea, from whose valuable
Report most of the foregoing details are gathered, adds the following remarks
upon these works of defence:—
"From the preceding hasty and imperfect account of the defences
of Sebastopol, it will appear how little foundation there was for
the generally-received accounts of the stupendous dimensions of the
works, and of new systems of fortifications brought into play. The
plain truth is, that these defences were simple temporary fortifications
of rather greater dimensions than usual, and that not a single new
principle of engineering was developed. It is true, that there were
several novel minor details, such as the rope mantelets, the use of
iron tanks, etc., but the whole merit consisted in the admirable
adaptation of well-known principles to the peculiar locality and
circumstances of the case. Neither can it be asserted that the plans
of the various works were perfect. On the contrary, there is no
impropriety in believing that if Todtleben were called upon to do
the same work over again, he would probably introduce better close
flanking arrangements."

"These remarks are not intended to, nor can they, detract from the
reputation of the Russian engineer. His labors and their results will
be handed down in history as the most triumphant and enduring monument
 of the value of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed in the
first rank of military engineers. But, in our admiration of the
talent and energy of the engineer, it must not be forgotten that the
inert masses which he raised would have been useless without the skilful
artillery and heroic infantry who defended them. Much stronger places
than Sebastopol have often fallen under far less obstinate and
well-combined attacks than that to which it was subjected. There can be
no danger in expressing the conviction that the siege of Sebastopol
called forth the most magnificent defence of fortifications that has
ever yet occurred."
We will now pass to the works of attack. When the allies decided that the works
of Sebastopol could not be carried by a simple cannonade and assault, but must
be reduced by a regular siege, the first thing to be considered was to secure the
forces covering the siege works from lateral sorties and the efforts of a relieving
army. The field works planned for this purpose were not of any great strength,
and many of them "were only undertaken when a narrow escape from some
imminent danger had demonstrated their necessity." The French line of defence
consisted of eight pentagonal redoubts, connected by an infantry parapet. The
English seemed to attach but little importance to field works for the defence of
their position; the terrible slaughter at Inkerman was the natural consequence of
this neglect.
In describing the engineering operations of the allies at this siege. Captain
McClelland says:—
"In regard to the detailed execution of the French attacks, little or
nothing novel is to be observed. Even when coolly examining the
direction of their trenches, after the close of the siege, it was very
rare that a faulty direction could be detected; they always afforded
excellent cover, and were well defiladed; in some cases the excavation
of the double direct sap was carried to the depth of six and a half feet
in the solid rock! The execution of many of the saps and batteries was
worthy of a school of practice. In the parallels, bombproofs were
provided as temporary hospitals, offices for the generals on duty, etc.
They did not use the sapper armor. The use of the sap-roller was
often attempted, but it could be employed only during the latter part of
the attack upon the Malakoff, when the fire of the Russian artillery was
nearly extinguished by the mortars; before that, as soon as a sap-roller
was placed in position—some thirty guns would be brought to bear
 upon it, the result being its immediate destruction. It may justly be
said of the French approaches, that they admirably carried into practice
their system of sapping. The technical skill and patient courage
evinced by their officers and men in pushing forward such excellent
approaches, under a most deadly fire, is worthy of all commendation, and
is such as might have been expected from the antecedents of their
corps of engineers."

"With regard to the English, the case was different; it seemed as

if they systematically abandoned the excellent system taught and
perfected with so much care at Chatham. Whenever the ground was
difficult, their trenches generally ceased to afford shelter; a
shallow excavation in the rock, and a few stones thrown up in front,
appeared to be all that was considered necessary in such cases. They
were often faulty in direction as well as in profile, being not
unfrequently badly defiladed, or not gaining ground enough and
entirely too cramped; nor were they pushed as close to the Redan as
they ought to have been before giving the assault. In too many
cases the expression 'tâtonnement of the French would seem
to convey the best idea of their operations. Their batteries, however,
were very well constructed. The magazines, platforms, etc., were
usually similar to those adopted at Chatham, although
unnecessary deviations were sometimes complained of. They
employed neither armor nor the full sap, sometimes the half-full, but
generally the flying-sap were employed."
It may also be added, that, at the time of the assault, the French approaches had
been pushed to the distance of thirty-two paces of the counterscarp of the
Malakoff, while the English had scarcely reached within two hundred and
twenty-five yards of the ditch of the Redan.
This description of the operations of the English at the siege of Sebastopol
carries the professional reader directly back to their sieges in the Spanish
Peninsula. It certainly is very strange that a great nation leading the van of
civilization should, after such experience, have neglected to provide its army
with a proper number of engineer officers and engineer troops, well instructed in
the peculiar and difficult duties of that arm. What excuse can ever be offered for
substituting human life for professional skill in the operations of a siege, when
that skill may so readily be acquired in time of peace, and is always so necessary
an element of a good military organization!
While every one admits that the siege of Sebastopol proved the immense
importance of field-works against land attacks, some would conclude from the
operations of that siege that good earthen works of a large development are
better suited for the defence of a large city than permanent fortifications with
masonry revetments, and which will necessarily have a less extended line of fire
and less capacity for men and military stores. We quote the remarks of Captain
McClelland on this point, and also make a short extract from the recently
published Journal of the siege of Sebastopol by General Niel.
Captain McClelland says:—
"This would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy,
which, for a time at least, gained extensive credence. It was, that the
siege of Sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary (earthen)
fortifications over those of a permanent nature. It is easy to show that
it proved nothing of the kind; but that it only proved that temporary
works in the hands of a brave and skillful garrison are susceptible of a
longer defence than was generally supposed. They were attacked as
field works never were before, and were defended as field works never
had been defended. The main difference between properly constructed
permanent fortifications (intended to resist a siege) and temporary
works, is that the latter seldom present an insuperable obstacle against
assault, while the former always do. In addition, permanent works
have a better command over the adjacent country, and are more carefully
and perfectly planned. The masonry walls, which render an assault
impossible, cannot be seen from the distance, and can be destroyed
only by establishing batteries on the crest of the glacis, or the
edge of the ditch; the earthen parapet alone being visible beyond that
point, they may, until the besiegers arrive there, be regarded in the
same light as field works, with the difference that the garrison are not
harassed by the necessity of being constantly prepared to repel an
assault."

"Now, in the siege of Sebastopol, the trenches of the besiegers

never reached the edge of the ditch; so that, had the fortification been
a permanent one, the most difficult, slow, and dangerous part of the
siege remained to be undertaken, viz., the crowning of the covered
way, the establishment of the breach batteries, the descent and passage
 of the ditch, and the assault of the breach; in other words, at the
moment when the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and
fatal, the true strength of the permanent defences would have commenced
coming into play."

"Assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was

under existing circumstances, the besiegers, on the 8th of September,
would not yet have been in a condition to crown the covered way, the
siege would certainly have extended into the winter; and it may even
be doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen, until the
allies were in sufficient force to invest the north as well as the
southside."
General Neil remarks:—
"Struck by the length of the siege of Sebastopol, certain foreign
officers have expressed the opinion that masonry-revetted scarps are not
of incontestable utility in fortified places."

"Sebastopol, a vast retrenched camp, defended by field fortifications

of strong profile, derived its principal strength from an armament
such as could only exist in an extensive maritime arsenal, and from a
large army which always preserved its free communications with the
interior of Russia."

"If the enceinte had been provided with good revetted scarps;
if it had been necessary to breach these, and subsequently have been
compelled to penetrate through difficult passages, in rear of which the
heads of our columns would have met an army, Sebastopol would have
been an impregnable fortress."

"When we compare, in effect, the works of attack at Sebastopol

with those of an ordinary siege, we will see that on the 8th of
September, 1855, the day of the last assault, we had only executed,
after the greatest effort, the besieging works which precede the
crowning of the covered way; we had not then, as yet, entered upon that
period of the works of a siege which is the most difficult and the most
murderous; and there was no occasion to engage ourselves in them, since
the ditches and parapets of the enceinte were not insurmountable, as the
 sequel has proved."

"The difficulty consisted in conquering the Russian army upon a

position prepared long beforehand for its defence, quite as much as in
surmounting the material obstacle of the fortification."

"Our places of arms being established at thirty metres from the

besieged works, we were able to choose our own time for action, and to
throw ourselves unexpectedly upon the enemy when the fire of our
artillery had forced him to shelter himself, up to the last minute,
behind his numerous blindages; to have gone further would have been
inviting the initiative in the attack on the part of the Russian army."

"The absence of scarp walls, which would have secured the place
from escalade, did not exercise a less influence upon the defence;
for the besieged were compelled to keep permanently at the gorges
of the works, strong reserves, in readiness to repulse the assault,
which they saw themselves menaced with from the commencement of
the siege."

"Finally, it can be remarked, that these reserves, which were decimated

night and day by the concentric fire of our batteries, were able
to issue out from the enceinte through wide debouches, without having
to pass through the narrow defiles which are formed by the drawbridges
of revetted places; they were, then, a permanent threat for the
besiegers, who were exposed to seeing their trenches unexpectedly
invaded by the greater part of the Russian army."

"Neither side, consequently, was in a position analogous to that

which is presented in the siege of a fortified place, protected from
insult by good masonry scarps.'" (Note to page 443.)
And again, page 423, the same authority remarks:
"Now, it (the Russian army) is no longer able to escape from the
concentric fires of our batteries; for, not being protected by masonry
scarps, it is obliged constantly to keep united strong reserves, in
order to repulse the assault with which it is at every instant menaced"
NOTE TO CHAPTER XV.—MILITARY EDUCATION, &C.
With regard to the subjects discussed in this chapter it will, perhaps, be sufficient
to remark that the Mexican war incontestably proved the value of the West Point
Military Academy; for the superior efficiency of properly-educated officers over
those who had been appointed from civil life without any knowledge of the
profession they were called upon to practice, fully satisfied the country of the
importance of that institution, and even silenced the clamors of the few who
refused to be convinced.
The recent abortive attempt to give efficiency to our navy by means of a retired
list, has, it is feared, destroyed for a time all hopes of introducing this very
necessary measure into our military service; although it is very certain that
without this we can never have our system of promotion placed upon an
effective and satisfactory basis, which shall give efficiency to the army by
rewarding merit, while it prevents injustice by closing the avenues of political
favoritism.
The Mexican war also most abundantly proved that our objections to the system
of military appointment were well founded, and it is hoped that the more recent
abuses of that system will call public attention to the necessity of a change; for if
military office continue to be conferred for partisan services, it will soon destroy
the integrity as well as the efficiency of our army.
 EXPLANATION OF PLATES
Figs. 1, 2, 3.—Used to illustrate the strategic relations of the armies A and B.
Fig. 4.—Line of operations directed against the extremity of the enemy's line of
defence, as was done by Napoleon in the Marengo campaign.
Fig. 5.—Napoleon's plan of campaign in 1800, for the army of the Rhine, and
the army of reserve.
Fig. 6 shows the plan adopted by Napoleon in the campaign of 1800, to preserve
his communications.
Fig. 7 illustrates the same thing in the campaign of 1806.
Fig. 8.—Interior and central line of operations.
Fig. 9 represents a camp of a grand division of an army. The distance from the
front row of tents to the line of camp-guards should be from 350 to 400 feet;
thence to the line of posts, from 150 to 200 feet; thence to the line of sentinels,
from 100 to 200 feet. In many cases, the line of posts between the camp-guards
and sentinels may be dispensed with. The distance between battalions will be
from 50 to 100 feet; and the same between squadrons and batteries.
Fig. 10.—Details of encampment for a battalion of infantry. The width of
company streets will depend upon the strength of a company, and will be so
arranged that the front of the camp shall not exceed the length of the battalion,
when drawn up in line of battle. This width will be from 50 to 100 feet. The
distance between the tents of each row will be 2 or 3 feet; the distance between
the tents of one company and those of another, from 4 to 6 feet.
Fig. 11 is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. A single company encamping
alone, would be arranged in the same way as an entire squadron. The horses are
picketed in two lines parallel to the tents, and at a distance from them of about
12 feet. The forage is placed between the tents. A squadron of two companies
will occupy a front of about 180 feet. The fires, or company kitchens, should be
50 or 60 feet in rear of the non-commissioned officers' tents.
Fig 12 is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two companies of foot
engineers.
[The plan of encampment for artillery, as given in the "Instruction of U.S. Field
Artillery, horse and foot," may be employed where a single battery encamps by
itself, or where only the skeleton of companies is maintained; but it will be
found exceedingly inconvenient, where a full battery, with a large train, encamps
on the same line with other troops. The plan we have given is that which is
employed in most European services.]
Fig. 13.—In this plan for mounted artillery and engineers, the fires are so
arranged as to expose the ammunition as little as possible to the sparks from the
kitchens.
Fig. 14.—Simple parallel order of battle.
15.—Parallel order, with a crochet on the flank.
16.—Parallel order, reinforced on a wing.
17.—Parallel order, reinforced on the centre.
18.—Simple oblique order.
19.—Oblique order, reinforced on the assailing wing.
20.—Perpendicular order.
21.—Concave order.
22.—Convex order.
23.—Order by echelon on a wing.
24.—Order by echelon on the centre.
25.—Combined order of attack.
26.—Formation of infantry by two deployed lines.
27, 28.--- Arrangements corresponding to depth of column.
29.—Formation by squares.
30.—Mixed formation of three battalions.
31.—Deep formation of heavy columns.
32.—Formation in columns by brigade.
33.—Formation of two brigades of cavalry, by the mixed system.
34.—Passage of the Sound by the British fleet, in 1807.
35.—Attack on Copenhagen.
36.—Attack on Algiers.
37.—Attack on San Juan d'Ulloa.
38.—Attack on St. Jean d'Acre.
39.—Plan of a regular bastioned front of a fortification.
40.—Section of do. do.
41.—Tenaillons.
Fig. 42.—Demi-tenaillons, with a bonnet.
43.—A horn-work.
44.—A crown-work.
45.—A redan.
46.—A lunette.
47.—A mitre or priest-cap.
48.—A bastioned fort.
49.—Vertical section of a field intrenchment.
50.—Simple sap.
51.—Flying sap.
52.—Full sap.
53.—Crater of a military mine.
54.—Plan of the attack of a regular bastioned work.
Figs.1,2,3,4,5,8 Figs.6,7,14,15 Figs.9,16,17,18,19,20,21 Figs.22,23,24,25,41
Figs.26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33 Figs.34,35 Figs.37,38 Figs.39 Figs.10,12,13
Figs.36,41,42,43,44,45,46,47 Figs.40,48,49,50,51,52,53 Figs.54

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