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Operations FM100 5

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Operations FM100 5

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*FM 100-5 No. 100-¢ HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington, OC, 20 August 1982 OPERATIONS Preface THE FUNDAMENTAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY ISTO DETER WAR, Should conflict occur, FM 100-5 is the Army's keystone How to Fight manual. It is consistent with NATO doctrine and strategy. The manual emphasizes the application of conventional weapons; however, the United States Army must be capable of operating in any environment including the nuclear and chemical battlefield. Nuclear and chemical weapons can be used only after authorization has been granted by the national command authority. FM 100-5 provides operational guidance for vse by commanders and trainers at all echelons. It forma the foundation of Army service achool curricula and serves as the basis for developing Army doctrine, training, and materiel systems and organizations. FM 100-5 explains how the Army must conduct campaigns and battles in order to win. It describes US Army operational doctrine involving maneuver, firepower, and movement; combined arma warfare; and coopera- tive actions with sister aervices and allies. It emphasizes tactical flexibility and speed aa well as mission orders, initiative among subordinates, and the spirit of the offense. Specific operational details appear in ather field manuals and regulations. FM 100-5 is based on the purpose, organization, responsibilities, and goals of the US Army asset forth in FM 100-1. The principles of war, thecon- ditions of modern battle, and the fundamentals of military professionalism ed in this manual also come from FM 100-1, The terms and ry to understand this manual arecontained in FM 101-5-1. Both FM 100-1 and FM 101-51 are required references. Users of this publication are encouraged to recommend changes and submit commenta for ite improvement. Key comments to the specific page and paragraph in which the change is recommended. Provide a reason for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation, To send changes or comments, prepare DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward it to Commandant, USACGSC, ATTN: ATZL-SWT, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027. When used in this publication, “he,” “him,” “his,” and “men” represent both the masculine and feminine genders unless otherwise stated. *This publication supersedes FM 100-6, 1 July 18976. —FM 100-5 Table of Contents PART ONE - THE ARMY AND HOW IT FIGHTS PAGE Chapter 1. Challenges for the US Army se Vd Identifying the Chellenges 14 Meeting the Challenges 14 Chapter 2. Combat Fundamentals .........6csceeeeeeee ees eeee 24 Operational Concepts . 227 Levels of War 123 Dynamics of Battie 124 Chapter 3. Weather and Terrain .34 Weather 31 Terrain Pierce ieteeees BS Urbanized Terrain. .....ccciistei cies OB Special Environments ...........0cecceeceeeeeeseeee 3-10 Chapter 4. Battlefield Environments Nuclear and Chemicat Weapons .......... Electronic Warfare .. Smoke and Obscurants. Chapter §. Combat Service Support ............2...0. Modern Logistics ... CSS Organization Chapter 6. Tactical Intelligence ........... 64 Scope of intelligence Intelligence Catiectian.. secteeeeeeeeeeees OR The inteltigence System Imtettigance Operations . Tactical Counterintelligence .... Chapter 7, Conduct of Operations Airtand Battle Fundamentals . Baitie Command and Control . Battie Planning and Coordination «6... .ssseesecseveee BT PART TWO - OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS Chapter 8. Fundamentals of the Offense... Historical Perspective . Purposes of the Offense... Operational Concepts for the Attack. Forms of Maneuver Chapter 9. Offensive Operations. ...... Types of Offensive Operations . Movement to Contact Attacks 60.000. Exploitation and Pursuit cee rseese PART THREE - DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS Chapter 10. Fundamentals of the Detans Historical Perspective Purposes of Defensive Operations .. Operational Concepts for the Defense Typas of Defensive Operations Chapter 11. The Defen: Scope... tee Defensive Framework Defensive Techniques... Defensive Preparations .......6. 605 Chapter 12. Retrograde Operations Types of Retrograde Operations Delaying Operations ... Withdrawal Operations . Retirement Operations . Chapter 13. Defense and Breakout of Encircled Forces ........... 13-1 Options 6.64. FM 100-5 — FM 100-5 PAGE wee THT 14-1 14.2 Chapter 14. Rear Area Protection...........5 Fundamentals Command and Control . Planning and Executing Rear Area Combat Operstions ... 143 14-4 14.6 Area Damage Control Responsibilities . PART FOUR - JOINT, CONTINGENCY, AND COMBINED OPERATIONS Chapter 15. Joint Operations ..... o ++ 15-1 Organization and Command and Control 16-1 Chapter 16. Contingency Operations - 18-1 Considerations 16-1 16-2 Command and Control . Strategic Depfoyment .... 16-2 Employment ++ 16-2 Chapter 17. Combined Operations 17-41 NATO. 17-1 The Pacific COMMAND viersicinreerearene ree rss eres TPB Combined Operations in Other Contingency Areas ..17-13 APPENDICES A. References .... Aol B. The Principles of War . a1 GLOSSARY « Glossary-1 INDEX... semeretterreriacrer sae es Minden t iv PART ONE THE ARMY AND HOW IT FIGHTS CHAPTER 1 Challenges for the US Army THERE IS NO SIMPLE FORMULA for winning wars. Defeating enemy forces in battle will not always insure victory. Other national instruments of power and persua- sion will influence or even deter- mine the results of wars. Wars cannot be won, however, without a national will and military forces equal to the task. Although success- ful military operations do not guarantee victory, they are an indispensable part of winning. Winning campaigns and battles is the focus of this manual. IDENTIFYING THE CHALLENGES The US Army must meet a variety of situations and challenges. In the 1980s it can expect to be committed in either of two environments, It may fight on a sophisticated battlefield with an existing infrastructure of communications, air defense, logistic facilities, and ports. Or,ona relatively unsophisticated battlefield, it may have to create an infrastructure or choose to fight without one. It must be ready to fight light, well-equipped forces such as Soviet- supported insurgents or sophisticated terrorist groups. It must be prepared to fight highly mechanized forces typical of Warsaw Pact or Soviet surrogates in southwest or northeast Asia. In the areas of greatest strategic concern, it must expect battles of greater scope and intensity than ever fought before. It must anticipate battles fought with nuclear and chemical weapons. Such battles are likely tobe intense, deadly, and costly. To win, we must, coordinate all available military’ forces in pursuit of CONTENTS ‘i PAGE IDENTIFYING THE CHALLENGES | dt The Next Battlefield . 1 Nonlineer Meneuver Battles. Lethal Systerms 6... Me ‘Sensors and Communications wz ‘Muclear and Chemical Warfore . en © Command and Controt 18 : oe THE CHALLENGES: common objectives, We must retain the initiative and disrupt our opponent's fighting capability in depth with deep attack, effective firepower, and decisive maneuver. Soldiers. and units must prepare for such battles, and ‘the Army's operational concept must enable it to win. AirLand Battle is the doctrine that deals with these worldwide challenges. This manual provides that doctrine. The four basic challenges to the Army will be the battlefield, leadership, readiness, and training. THE NEXT BATTLEFIELD Nonlinear Maneuver Battles. In modern battle, the US Army will face an enemy who expects tosustain rapid movement during the offense and who will probably use every weapon at his disposal, Breaking or I-1 FM 100-5: BATTLE LINES WILL BE INDISTINCT restraining the enemy's initial ground attacks will not end the hostilities. We must be prepared to fight campaigns of con- siderable movement, complemented by intense volumes of fire and complicated by increasingly sophisticated and lethal weapons used over large areas. Opposing forces will rarely fight along orderly, distinct lines. Massive troop concen- trations or immensely destructive fires will make some penetrations by both combatants nearly inevitable. Thia means that linear warfare will most often be a temporary condition at best and that distinctions between rear and forward areas will be blurred. Air and ground maneuver forces; conventional, nuclear, and chemical fires; unconventional warfare: active reconnais- sance, surveillance, and target-acquisition efforts; and electronic warfare will be directed against the forward and rear areas of both combatants. Lethal Systems. Potential enemies of the United States will probably field large quantities of high-quality weapon systems whose range and lethality equal or exceed our own. Potent ground and air systems, comple- mented by closely-coordinated, precision guided munitions, will concentrate enormous combat power, especially at the points of decision. Sensors and Communications. Wide- ranging surveillance, target-acquisition sensors, and communications that provide intelligence almost immediately will affect the range and scope of battle, Sensors offer the commander more than just timely information on deep enemy locations and activity. They also serve as the basis for attacking enemy follow-on forces with artillery, Air Force attack aircraft, attack helicopters, irregular forces, and nonlethal weapons such as jamming and deception. These attacks have but one purpose—to support the ground commander's overall acheme. Therefore, the sensors and communi- cations that make them possible are particularly valuable. Nuelear and Chemical Warfare. A growing number of nations can employ chemical and nuclear weapons and are apparently willing to use them. US forces must plan to fight in an environment where nuclear and chemical weapons pose a clear and present danger. Accordingly, they must be organized, equipped, and trained to meet the unique challenges to be faced on the integrated battlefield. Tactical nuclear weapons will drastically change the traditional balance between fire and maneuver. On the modern battlefield, nuclear fires may become the predominant expression of combat power, and small tactical forces will exploit their effects. The destructive effecta of nuclear weapons will increase the tempo of decisive combat. Engagements will be short and violent. Decisive battles may last hours instead of days or weeks. Command and Control. At the very time when battle demands better and more effec- tive command and control, modern electronie countermeasures may make that task more difficult than ever before. Commanders will find it difficult to determine what is happening. Small units will often have to fight without sure knowledge about their force as a whole. Electronic warfare, vulnerability of command and control facilities, and mobile combat will demand initiative in subordinate commanders. The commander who continues to exercise effective command and control will enjoy a decisive edge over his opponent. Air Systems. Air mobility and air power will extend the battle to new depths for all combatants. Effective air defenses or air superiority by one combatant could represent a significant advantage in the conduct of operations. Austere Support. Our Army must be prepared to fight its battles at the end of long, vulnerable lines of logistical support, It may have to fight outnumbered against an enemy with significantly shorter supply lines. FM 100-5: Rear Area Combat. Support projected forward from rear areas will be subject to attack by subversion; terrorism; large airmobile, amphibious, ‘or airborne forces, and long-range conventional, chemical, or nuclear fires. Urban Combat. Combat in built-up areas will be unavoidable, especially in Europe. Attack and defense in urban areas and the fluid battle beyond them will require that corps and divisions apply coherent plans for urban warfare. Desert Combat. Combat in vast arid regions over extended frontages will require imagination and skillful adaptation. LEADERSHIP The fluid nature of modern war will place a premium on leadership, unit cohesion, and effective, independent operations. The conditions of combat on the next battlefield will be less forgiving of mistakes and more demanding of leader skill, imagination, and flexibility than any in’ history. General 8. L. A. Marshall's studies of the US Army teach that American soldiera will fight reso- lutely when they know and respect. their leaders and feel they are part of a good unit. READINESS Forward deployed forces may have to fight on a few hours’ notice. Other components of the force may have only days or weeks to make final preparations for wart Commanders must have effective plans for those important days or weeks, and they must train for the specific missions they anticipate, They must insure that each officer, NCO, and soldier is individually prepared for battle and is able to perform his job as part of the unit. Unit readiness cannot be a reality without logistical readiness—the availability and proper functioning of materiel, resources, and systems to maintain and sustain operations on a fluid, destructive, and resource-hungry battlefield. The training of support unitsisas. 1-3 -FM 100-5: “The whole of military activity must . relate directly ov indirectly to the angagement. The and for which a sotdier is recruited, clathed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his steeping, esting, arinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time.” Karl von Clausewitz 14 important as the training of tactical units. Support units should be rigorously trained under conditions similar to those anticipated in combat. TRAINING Soldiers must be prepared for combat. both professionally and psychologically. Training is the cornerstone of success, Training is a full-time job for all commanders in peacetime, and it continues in wartime combat zones regardless of other operations or missions. On the day of battle, soldiers and units will fight as well or as poorly as they were trained before battle. Soldiers receive most of their training in their units. There they can best train as individuals and as members of teams under conditions that approximate battle. Unit training aims at developing maximum effectiveness with combined and supporting arms. Once units meet basic standards, commanders should review the same tasks under more difficult conditions. Unit training must simulate as closely as possible the modern baitlefield’s tempo and scope. Unit training should include combined and supporting arms teamwork, whichis farmore effective than separate training. The complexities of modern combat makeit increasingly important to concentrate on unit training programs for leaders and teams. Those who direct weapon systems and small units must be as competent as those who operate them. Commanders must strike a balance between training soldiers and subordinate leaders. They must take time to train subordinate leaders, building their con- fidence and teaching them to exercise initiative before attempting complex collective tasks. Such a practice will insure soldier and unit morale, confidence, and effectiveness. MEETING THE CHALLENGES The US Army can meet these challenges. Armies win by generating superior combat power in battles and throughout campaigns. Superior combat power depends on three fundamentals, First and foremost, it deponda on good people—soldiers with character and resolve who will win because they simply will not accept losing. Next, it depends on armaments sufficient for the task at hand. Finally, it depends on sound, well- understood, and practical concepts for fighting. The character of modern battle and the geographical range of US national interests make it imperative that the Army fight as part of a team with the tactical forces of the US Air Force, the US Marine Corps, and the US Navy. It is also critical that commanders prepare themselves to fight alongside the forces af one or more of our nation’s allies. As ithas been throughout the twentieth century, teamwork in joint and combined operations will be an essential ingredient of any battles the Army will have to fight. The AirLand Battle doctrine presented in the following chapters outlines an approach to fighting intended to develop the full potential of US forces. Operations based on FM 100-5— this doctrine are nonlinear battles which attack enemy forces throughout their depth with fire and maneuver. They require the coordinated action of all available military forces in pursuit of a single objective. Air and ground maneuver forces; conventional, nuclear and chemical fires; unconventional warfare; active recon- naiasance, surveillance, and target+ acquisition efforts; and electronic warfare will be directed against the forward and rear areas of both combatants. The AirLand Battle will be dominated by the force that retains the initiative and, with deep attack and decisive maneuver, destroys its opponent's abilities to fight and to organize in depth. By extending the battlefield and integrating conventional, nuclear, chemical, and electronic means, forces can exploit enemy vulnerabilities anywhere, The battle extends from the point of close combat to the forces approaching from deep in the enemy rear. Fighting this way, the US Army can quickly begin offensive action by air and land forces to conclude the battle on its terms. 1-6 CHAPTER 2 Combat Fundamentals AN ARMY’S OPERATIONAL CON- CEPT is the core of its doctrine. It is the way the Army fights its battles and campaigns, including tactics, procedures, organizations, support, equipment, and training. The concept must be broad enough to describe operations in all antici- pated circumstances. Yet it must allow sufficient freedom for tactical variations in any situation. It must also be uniformly known and understood. OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS The object of all operations is to destroy the opposing force. At the foundation of the US Army's operations are the principles of war and their application to classical and modern theories. The Army's basic operational concept is called AirLand Battle doctrine. This doctrine is based on securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively todefeat the enemy. Destruction of the opposing force is achieved by throwing the enemy off balance with powerful initial blows from unexpected directions and then following up rapidly to prevent his recovery. The best results are obtained when initial blows are struck against critical units and areas whose loss will degrade the coherence of enemy operations, rather than merely against the enemy's leading formations. Army units will fight in all types of opera- tions to preserve and to exploit the initiative. They will attack the enemy in depth with fire and maneuver and synchronize all efforts to attain the objective, They will maintain the agility necessary to shift forces and fires to the points of enemy weakness. Our operations must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorienting to the enemy. The pace must be fast enough to prevent him from taking effective counteractions. Operational planning must be precise enough to preserve combined arms cooperation throughout the CONTENTS OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS. Depth... +22 Agility... +22 Synchronization 28 LEVELS OF WAR. 23 a ae 23 DYNAMICS OF BATTLE 24 ‘Combat Power . 2b Manewver .. 24 Firepower. 2 2h Protection 14 beadersthio. ese .ese cece 25 Combat imperatives ee battle. It must also be sufficiently flexible to respond to changes or to capitalize on fleeting opportunities to damage the enemy. This requires that the entire force thoroughly understand the commander's intent. Subordinate leaders must align their operations with the overall mission. They must develop opportunities that the force asa whole can exploit. Large unit commanders must encourage initiative in their subordinates. They must also be able to shift their main effort. quickly to take advantage of enemy weaknesses that their subordinates discover or create, Success on the modern battlefield will depend on the basic tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine: initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization. idity is the of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots. Sun Teu —FM 100-5- INITIATIVE Initiative implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. The underlying purpose of every encounter with the enemy is to seize orto retain independence of action. To do this we must make decisions and act more quickly than the enemy to disorganize hie forces and to keep him off balance. To preserve the initiative, subordinates must act independently within the context of an overall plan, They must exploit successes boldly and take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. They must deviate from the expected course of battle without hesitation when opportunities arise to expedite the overall mission of the higher force. They will take risks, and the command must support them, Improvisation, initiative, and aggres- siveness—the traite that have historically distinguished the American soldier—must be particularly strong in our leaders. DEPTH Depth, important to all US Army opera- tions, refers to time, distance, and resources. Momentum in the attack and elasticity in the defense derive from depth, Knowing the time required to move forees—enemy and friendly—ie eesential to knowing how to employ fire and maneuver to destroy, to disrupt, or to delay the enemy. Commanders need touse the entire depth of the batilefield to etrike the enemy and to prevent him from concentrating his fire- power of maneuvering his forces to a point of his choice. Commanders also need adequate space for disposition of their forces, for maneuver, and for dispersion. Depth of resources refera to the number of men, weapon systems, and materiel that provide the commander with flexibility and extend his influence over great areas. Commanders need depth of time, space, and resources to execute appropriate counter- moves, to battle the forces in contact, and to attack enemy rear forces. ‘The baitle in depth should delay, disrupt, or destroy the enemy's uncommitted forces and 2-2 isolate his committed forces so that they may be destroyed. The deep battle is closely linked with the close-in fight. All involved weapons, unite, and surveillance assets must con- tribute to the commander's overall objective. When we fight an echeloned enemy, such operations may be vital to success. Reserves play a key role in achieving depth and flexibility. Important in any battle is the commander's decision on the size, composition, and positioning of his reserves. They are best used to strike a decisive blow once the enemy has committed himeelf to a course of action or revealed a vulnerability. Finally, commanders must be prepared to engage enemy airborne or airmobile forces that attack our rear areas. They must insure that combat service support units can survive nuclear and chemical strikes and still support the fast-paced battle. These are other aspects of the in-depth battle. AGILITY Agility requires flexible organizations and quick-minded, flexible leaders who ean act faster than the enemy, They must know of critical events as they occur and act to avoid enemy strengths and attack enemy vulnera- bilities. This must be done repeatedly, so that every time the enemy begins to counter one action, another immediately upsets his plan. This will lead to ineffective, uncoordinated, and piecemeal enemy responses and eventually to his defeat An organization's flexibility is determined by its basie structure, equipment, and systems. Units should have an appropriate mix of soldiers and equipment to complete their tasks. Mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METTT) should control any permanent or temporary reorganization. The mental flexibility necessary to fighton a dynamic battlefield is more difficult to describe but easier to achieve. Our Army has traditionally taken pride in our soldiers’ ability to “think on their feet”—to see and to react rapidly to changing circumstances. Mental flexibility must be developed during the soldier's military education and maintained through individual and unit ‘training. SYNCHRONIZATION Synchronized operations achieve maxi- mum combat power. However, synchroni zation means more than coordinated action. Tt results from an all-prevading unity of effort throughout the force, There can be no waste. Every action of every element must flow from understanding the higher commander's concept. Synchronized, violent execution is the essence of decisive combat. Synchronized FM 100-5- combined arms complement and reinforce each other, greatly magnifying their individual ‘effects. In AirLand Battle doctrine, synchronization applies both to our conventional forces and, when authorized, to nuclear and chemical weapons. It also characterizes our operations with other services and allies. Forceful and rapid operations achieve at least local surprise and shock effect. Commanders must look beyond these immediate effects when they plan operations. They must make specific provisions in advance to exploit the opportunities that tactical success will create, LEVELS OF WAR War is a national undertaking which must be coordinated from the highest levels of policymaking to the basic levels of execution. Strategic, operational, and tactical levels are the broad divisions of activity in preparing for and conducting war, While the principles of war are appropriate to all levels, applying them involves a different perspective for each. STRATEGIC Military strategy employs the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives ofnational policy by applying force or the threat of force. Military strategy seta the fundamental conditions for operations, [ts formulation is beyond the scope of this manual. OPERATIONAL The operational level of war uses available military resources to attain atrategic goals within a theater of war. Most simply, itis the theory of larger unit operations. It also involves planning and conducting campaigns. Campaigns are sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified space and time with simultaneous and sequential battles. The disposition of forces, selection of objectives, and actions taken to weaken or to out- maneuver the enemy all set the terms of the next battle and exploit tactical gains. They are all part of the operational level of war. In AirLand Battle doctrine, this level includes the marshalling of forces and logistical support, providing direction to ground and air maneuver, applying conventional and nuclear fires in depth, and employing uncon- ventional and psychological warfare. TACTICAL Tactics are the specific techniques smaller units use to win battles and engagements which support operational objectives, Tactics employ allavailable combat, combat support, and combat service support, Tactice involve the movement and positioning of forces on the battlefield in relation to the enemy, the provision of fire support, and the logistical support of forces prior to, during, and following engagements with the enemy. At corps and division, operational and tactical levels are not clearly separable. They are guided by the same principles, and this manual applies to both. An_ operation designed to defeat an enemy force in an extended area does so through operational maneuver and a series of tactical actions. 2-3 FM 100- 5- DYNAMICS OF BATTLE Dynamics of battle refers to the interaction of factors that decide battle. Force ratios and the effects of fire and maneuver are significant in deciding battles; however, number of intangible factors often predominate, Among theseintangible factors are state of training, troop motivation, leader skill, firmness of purpose, and boldness—the abilities to perceive opportunities, to think rapidly, to communicate clearly, and to act decisively. The effects of these factors create tangible and reversible relationships. To understand the dynamics of battle, it is important to understand combat power and the role of its component elements— maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. COMBAT POWER Combat power is relative, never an absolute, and has meaning only as it compares to that of the enemy. The appropriate combination of maneuver, fire- power, and protection by a skillful leader within a sound operational plan will tum combat potential into actual combat power, Superior combat power applied at the decisive place and time decides the battle. Maneuver. Maneuver is the dynamic element of combat, the means of concen: trating forces in critical areas to gain and to use the advantages of surprise, psychological shock, position, and momentum which enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones. More specifically, it is the employment of forces through movement supported by fire to achieve a position. of advantage from which to destroy or to threaten destruction of the enemy. The object of manenver at the operational level is to focus maximum strength against the enemy's weakest point, thereby gaining strategic advantage. At this level, successful maneuver is achieved through skillful coordination of fire in depth with movement of large units. At the tactical level, maneuver contributes significantly to sustaining the initiative, to exploiting success, to preserving freedom of action, and 2-4 to reducing vulnerability. Successful maneuver at this level depends upon skillful movement along indirect approaches supported by direct and indirect fires. ‘The effect created by maneuver is the first element of combat power. Effective maneuver demands battlefield mobility; knowledge of the enemy and terrain generated by recon- naissance and other intelligence activities; effective command and control; flexible operational practices; sound organization; and reliable logistical support. It requires imaginative, bold, competent, and independent leaders; discipline, coordination, and speed; well-trained troops; and logistically ready units. Effective maneuver protects the force and keeps the enemy off balance. It continually poses new problems for him, renders his reactions ineffective, and eventually leads to his defeat. Firepower. Firepower provides the enabling, violent, destructive force essential to successful maneuver. It is the means of suppressing the enemy's fires, neutralizing his tactical forces, and destraying his ability to fight. This is done by killing, wounding, or paralyzing the enemy’s soldiers and by damaging the materiel and installations necessary for his continued combat effec- tiveness. Firepower is delivered by personal arms, crew-served direct fire weapons, mortars, artillery, cannons and missiles, air defense guns and missiles, attack helicopters, Air Force and Navy aircraft, and Naval gunfire bombardment. The effect of firepower on the enemy and not ita unapplied or misused potential makes a vital contribution to combat power, It is the accuracy and effectiveness of munitions which ultimately contribute tocombat power. Therefore, efficient target-acquisition systems, viable command and control, a steady supply of ammunition, and the tactical mobility necessary to place weapona within range of critical targets are necessary ingredients of this element of combat power. Proteetion. Protection is the shielding of the fighting potential of the force so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place, Protec- tion has two components. The first includes all actions to counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver by making soldiers, systems, and units difficult to locate, to atrike, or to destroy. Among these actions are security, dispersion, cover, camouflage, deception, suppression, and’ mobility, These actions routinely include the reinforcement and concealment of fighting positions, command posts, and support facilities. The second component includes actions to keep soldiers healthy, to maintain their fighting morale, and to diminish the impact of severe weather, It also means keeping equipment in repair and supplies from becoming lost. As in the other elements of combat power, the effects of protection contribute to combat power, These effects are measured by the fighting potential available at the moment of decisive combat. It is in this way that the activities listed above contribute to combat power. Leadership. Leadership provides purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. Leaders function through personal interaction with their men and through command and control systems and facilities. While leadership requirements differ from equad to echelons above corps, leaders must be men of character; they must know and understand soldiers and the physical tools of battle; and they must act with courage and conviction. The primary function of leadership is to inspire and io motivate soldiers to do difficult things in trying circumstances. Leaders must also understand how to control and to integrate fire and maneuver and how to use terrain, They must know how to combine direct and indirect fires, how to use air and naval fires, and how to substitute massed fires for massed troopa. This is the component upon which all others depend. Again, it is the effect the leader creates through proper application of his potential maneuver, firepower, and pro- tection capabilities which generates combat power, Throughout the history of war, victory LEADERSHIP 1S THE CRUCIAL ELEMENT OF COMBAT POWER FM 100-5— FM 100-5- has gone to the leader who understood and used the means at his disposal to the best advantage. Therefore, leaders ave the crucial element of combat power. It is up to them to turn the potential of men, weapons, and resources available into superior combat power. Leaders must set the preconditions for winning on the battlefield; therefore, superior combat power has its toate in proper preparation. Preparation includes many matters of long-term concern to the Army at the highest levela—force design, equipment design, and procurement, to name only a few. The tactical commander has a more immediate perspective. To him, preparation involves logistic readiness and motivation, It means continuous planning and training to the moment of, and even during, battle. It means training throughout campaigns because every endeavor causes the unit to learn either good or bad habits. Continuous training under all conditions insures positive skills that will contribute to success in battle. Commanders must demand excellence under all conditions and muet strive to make it habitual. Tn the final analysis and once the force is engaged, superior combat power derives from the courage of soldiers, the excellence of their training, and the quality of their leadership. COMBAT IMPERATIVES Success in battle—achieving superior combat power—also depends on using tactics appropriate to mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available. The effectiveness of maneuver, firepower, and protection depends on how the commander combines operational procedures, battle drills, or other measures from an established repertoire to solve a particular problem. Doctrine establishes common techniques of fighting throughout the force, The euccessful tactician depende on proven techniques and on troops who are well-versed in employing them, Standardized practices actually enhance flexibility; but they must be more than just a 2-6 series of routine approaches to solving types of operational probleme. As he plans and fighta the battle, the tactician muet under- stand the seven imperatives of combat: Insure unity of effort. Direct friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses. Designate and sustain the main effort. Sustain the fight. Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly. Une terrain and weather. Protect the force. Ensure Unity of Effort The principles of war that provide the basis for this imperative are objective, unity of command, and simplicity. Its fundamental requirements are effective leadership and an effective command and contre] system through which the commander— © Learns what ia going on. © Decides what to do about it. * Issues the necessary orders, © Keeps track of how the battle is going. This process ie dynamic. Its primary measure of effectiveness is whether it functions efficiently and more quickly than the enemy's. At its heart are the commander and his system for command and control. The commander must insure a unified, aggrea- sive, quick, precise, agile, and synchronized effort throughout the force. Unity of effort depends on motivation— getting all involved to work quickly and well. Important to motivation in a high-risk environment are mutual trust, confidence, loyalty, and pride—the notiona that describe relationships between leader and led. Leaders must convince subordinates that objectives are possible and thus deserve total dedication. Unity of effort requires that the commander and his staff see the battlefield Tealistically. To do this, they must con- tinuously study their resources, the enemy, SF @6@ 60 and the terrain from a perspective that extends from the unit's rear boundary to the forward edge of its area of interest. Because he can never know everything, the commander will make decisions based on imperfect information. He must, therefore, make realistic demands for intelligence in a clear order of priority. Commanders must avoid the temptation to gather more detail than they need and thus clog the flow of timely, vital information. Unity of effort also requires continuous sensing of the battle conditions, both enemy and friendly, as the basis for sound decisions and firm directions for the force as a whole Modern forces have decentralized and institutionalized much of the decision process, especially that involved with supporting arms and services. As decision making decentralizes, the need for unity of effort grows. Commanders who are flexible rather than mechanical will win decisive victories. Aplan which promotes unity of effort must have a well-defined, comprehensive mission statement. The commander identifies his goals through mission orders that leave his subordinates the greatest possible freedom. Because plans must be implemented by units under stress, simple plans are best. Ifa planis necessarily complex, it must incorporate simple control measures and insure that subordinates’ individual tasks remain simple. Since commanders cannot foresee, plan, or communicate instructions for every potential event, they should not attempt to control every action of their subordinates. The chaos of battle will not allow absolute control. As battle Becomes more complex and unpredictable, decision making must become mare decentralized, Thus, all echelons of command will have to iseue mission orders, Doing 0 will require leaders to exercise initiative, resourcefulness, and imagination— and to take risks, Risk-taking in combat has two dimensions, One has to do with the danger to men and materiel involved in the mission; the other with accomplishing the mission. All leaders FM 100-5- must take risks of both types independently, based on a prudent assessment of the situation. An informed risk, however, should not be confused with a gamble. A gamble is a tesort to chance in the absence of either information or conérol. Although a gamble may be necessary in a desperate situation, a subordinate should have his commander's approval. Mission orders require commanders to determine intent—what they want to happen to the enemy. Their intent must be consistent with their superiors’ and must be com- municated clearly to their subordinates. During battle, commanders must support and develop the local successes of their subordinates, They must commit reserves where there is the greatest chance of success. They must concentrate fires wherever the enemy is vulnerable. While detailed orders may be necessary at times, commanders must trust their subordinates to make correct on-the-spot decisions within the mission framework. Such decentralization converts initiative into agility, allowing rapid reaction to capture fleeting opportunities, Mission orders need to cover only three important points: * They should clearly state the com- mander’s objective, what he wants done, and why he wants it done. © They should establish limits or controls necessary for coordina tion. * They should delineate the available resources and support from outside sources. The subordinate commander must fully understand his commander's intent and the overall mission of the force. If the battle develops so that previously issued orders no longer fit the new circumstances, the subordinate must inform hiscommander and propose appropriate alternatives. If this is not possible, he must act as he knows his commander would and make a report as soon, as possible. To insure that his concept is driving the operation to completion, the commander must follow up. He must have an overall view 2-7 —FM 100-5 of the battle based on reporte from subor- dinates, information from surveillance systems, and hie own personal observtions He must compare enemy and friendly situations, assess progress, and if necessary, issue fragmentary orders (FRAGO) to adjust assigned tasks. This process of follow-up and reassessment is one of the commander's critical responsibilities. (ZH Direct Friendly Strengths Against Enemy Weaknesses The principles of war that provide the basis for this imperative are maneuver and surprise. To determine what tactics to use, commanders must study the enemy. They must know enemy organization, equipment, and tactics—how the enemy fights. More apecifically, they must understand the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy force they are about to fight, Techniques that work in one instance against one enemy may not work against another enemy or even the same enemy at a different time and place. Commanders should determine and take into account the capabilities, limitations, and idiosyncrasies of particular enemy units. The good tactician looks for an approach that focuses his own strengths against the enemy's weaknesses, Weaknesses may result from gaps in the enemy's dispositions, his predictability, or the character of his soldiers or units. Commanders must strive to attack the enemy where his operational, technical, or human weaknesses make him most vulnerable, Meeting the enemy where he is strongest is sometimes unavoidable, but doing so deliberate/y is extremely hazardous, However, it may be necessary to support an indirect effort eleewhere with a direct approach. Sometimes an immediate, violent, quickly executed, direct frontal assault can capitalize on enemy unreadiness. Our tactica must appear formless to the enemy until the last possible moment. They must deceive him about our true intentions They must confuse him by threatening 2-8 multiple objectives, each of which he must be prepared to defend. They must surprise him whenever possible, simply by doing what he least expects. All such efforts must be fully integrated into operational plans. @esignate and Sustain Or ‘the Main Effort The principles of war that provide the basis for this imperative are mass and economy of force. The commander identifies the main effort when he states his intent. Designating the main effort links each subordinate commander's actions to those around him. Such a link maintains cohesion and insures synchronization. Yet it also permits initiative, Whether in an attack, a defense, or any other operation, the main effort is assigned to only one unit, All other elements support and sustain the effort of that unit. If that unit encounters unexpected difficulties, or if a secondary effurt meets with unexpected success, the commander may shift his focus by designating a new unit to make the main effort, In this way he can shift the concen- tration of forces, fires, and required logistics in the direction required to best achieve his aim. To succeed against superior numbers, the commander must not limit his attack or defense to the vicinity of the forward line of own troaps (FLOT). He supports the main effort by fixe or maneuver that reaches deeply into the enemy's zone of action. Hestrikes the enemy's vulnerable high-value targets or engages his still undeplayed follow-on forces. ‘Thus, the commander seeks to set the terms of battle throughout the depth of the battlefield. The purpose of concentrating effort is to shock, paralyze, and overwhelm theenemy at the chosen time and place. To achieve thie effect, the tactician designates the objective and plans the employment of combat, combat support, and logistics means, using each to the greatest advantage in the overall scheme. By proper integration he achieves an effect that is greater than the sum of its parts. The increased need for dispersion on the nuclear-chemical-conventional battlefield compounds the problem of concentration. To move units rapidly and efficiently over pre- selected and coordinated routes, tacticians must plan and prepare extensively. They must also select and coordinate alternate routes in case primary ones are blocked. $Sustain the Fight Battles or campaigns have often gone to the side that has been most successful in pressing the main effort to conclusion. To sustain the momentum that early successes generate, leaders must do two things. First, they must deploy forces in adequate depth and arrange for timely and continuous combat and combat service support at the outset of operations. Then, they must take risks and tenaciously press soldiers and systems to the limits of endurance for as long as necessary. Commanders deploy forces and logistic resources in depth to insure continuous, flexible operations and to protect the force. In the attack, they echelon forces and logistic Tesources in depth to maintain momentum. and to exploit success. In the defense, depth insures continuity and flexibility for maneuver, It provides options for the defender if forward positions are penetrated. In both attack and defense, deploying in depth increases dispersion and decreases the vulnerability of the total force to nuclear and chemical fires, To gage the risks involved in pressing soldiers to the limits of their endurance, commanders must understand the human dimension. Ardant Du Picq, a nineteenth. century student of the human dimension of battle, appropriately stated that we can “reach into the well of courage only so many times before the well runs dry.” The confusion, extreme stress, and lethality ofthe modern battlefield place a heavy burden on courage and endurance. Commanders must assess human abilities and limitations as they plan and fight their battles. They must accurately gage which units should lead, FM 100-5: which should be replaced, and which should be reinforced, They must also be aware of the traditional concerns of weather, training, and leadership. ‘6. Move Fast, Strike Hard, and Finish Rapidly The principles of war that provide the basis for this imperative are maneuver and mass. Speed has also always been important, but it will be even more important on the next battlefield because of sophisticated sensors and the possibility of conventional, nuclear, or chemical counterstrikes. To avoid detection, our concentrations must be disguised. To avoid effective counterstrikes, they must be short, Speed allows the commander to seizeand to hold the initiative, and thereby to maintain freedom of action. Quick, decisive action also makes the enemy react and deprives him of the initiative. When this happens, units should have well-conceived plans for exploiting their successes. @2)Use Terrain and Weather Terrain and weather affect combat more significantly than any other physical factors. The ground has an immense influence on how the battle will be fought. It provides opportunities and imposes limitations, giving a decisive edge to the commander who uses it best. Most battles have been won or lost by the way in which combatants used the terrain to protect their own forces and to destroy those of the enemy. One of the best investments of the commander's time before battle is an intensive personal reconnais- sance of the terrain. Weather affects equipment and terrain, but its greatest impact is on the men. The commander must understand how weather and visibility affect his operations as well as the enemy’s. He anticipates changes in the weather, capitalizing on them when possible, and uses smoke to alter visibility when it suits his purposes. The impact of terrain, weather, and visibility is developed in chapter 3. 2-3 FM 100-5: Protect the Force Successful commanders preserve the strength of the force. They do so by assuring security, keeping troops healthy and equipment ready, and sustaining discipline and morale. Tacticians assure security by taking pre- cautions against surprise. They must use aggressive reconnaissance, set out security forces, maintain operational security, avoid operational patterns, and practice deception. When time permits, they must build protective field fortifications. They must also disperse troops, especially on the nuclear battlefield. The degree of dispersion depends on the value of their force as a target, on whether it is mobile or static, and on the probability of its being detected. Leaders must habitually think about troop health and equipment readiness. In the past, disease and the elements have weakened entire formations. Likewise, equipment that is not properly maintained can fail, leaving forces at a serious disadvantage, Com- manders must insist on proper maintenance m both before and during battle. They must anticipate needs, conserve resources, and be ready for emergencies. In battle, unit cohesion is important. to protection. Poor morale can weaken any unit, Enemy psychological warfare, an unsuccessful operation, or a surprising and violent display of enemy strength can degrade morale. Peacetime preparation, however, will contribute directly to a unit's strength and durability in combat, Soldiers who are always required to do it right in training will instinctively do so in combat. Marshall de Saxe wrote that “the soldier's courage must be reborn daily.” A leader, he said, will insure this “by his dispositions, his positions, and those traits of genius that characterize great captains, ,. Tt is of all the elements of war the one that is most necessary to study.” Leaders create cohesion and maintain discipline. Soldiers who serve in disciplined, cohesive units will be on hand with functioning equipment when the decisive moment arrives CHAPTER 3 Weather and Terrain WEATHER AND TERRAIN have more impact on battle than any other physical factor, including weapons, equipment, or supplies. The terrain on which battles are fought present opportunities to both sides. In some cases the advantages are unmistakably clear. Control of Little Round Top at Gettysburg, for example, was decisive to the outcome. Indeed, most battles have been won by the side that used terrain to protect itself and to reinforce fires to destroy the enemy. To be effectual, commanders must understand the nature, uses, and reinforcement of terrain. They must also understand how weather affects troops and equipment. To retain the initiative, they must be able to operate in adverse conditions and during periods of limited visibility. WEATHER Weather affects equipment and terrain, but its greatest impact is on the soldiers, Cloud cover, rain, snow, dust, light conditions, and temperature extremes will combine in various ways to affect troop efficiency. Control becomes difficult. Troops tend to seek. shelter and to neglect chores which expose them to the elements. Security is difficult to insure in stationary positions. Perhaps the most important effect of weather is on the soldier's ability to function effectively in battle. Inclement weather generally favors an attacker because defending troops will be less alert. Successful defense under limited-visibility conditions (night, fog, or smoke) depends on thorough planning. Necessary movement must be thoroughly rehearsed. At night, appre- hension rises among troops waiting to defend. While a successful defense under ih el 4 “Observation and Fire .. 36 Reinforcing Terrain ........ 37 Acquiring Terrain Intelligence 37 URBANIZED TERRAI 38 SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS .._ 2 BO Mountains. 310 Miles

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