Inbound 3430761265735713603
Inbound 3430761265735713603
SECOND DIVISION
MARIA LEA JANE I. GESOLGON AND MARIE STEPHANIE N. SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS.
CYBERONE PH., INC., MACIEJ MIKRUT, AND BENJAMIN JUSON, RESPONDENTS.
Background
- Gesolgon and Santos were initially hired as part-time remote Customer Service Representatives
for CyberOne AU, an Australian company.
- Later promoted to full-time employees and Supervisors in CyberOne AU.
- Asked by Maciej Mikrut, CEO of CyberOne AU and CyberOne PH, to become dummy directors
of CyberOne PH, with promotions to Managers and salary increases.
Conflict
- Disputes arose when salaries were reduced and options given in 2011: indefinite furlough, entry-
level position, or resignation.
- Filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries, and other claims against
CyberOne PH, Mikrut, and Juson.
- Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents, stating petitioners were shareholders, not regular
employees.
- NLRC reversed, declaring petitioners were employees of both CyberOne AU and CyberOne PH.
- CA overturned NLRC, stating no employer-employee relationship with CyberOne PH.
Decision
- Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming CA's decision.
- No evidence proved an employer-employee relationship with CyberOne PH.
- Piercing the corporate veil deemed unwarranted; no jurisdiction over CyberOne AU.
- Petitioners considered stockholders, not employees.
4. Maciej Mikrut:
- Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of both CyberOne AU and CyberOne PH.
- Asked Gesolgon and Santos to become dummy directors of CyberOne PH.
- Central figure in the case, accused of orchestrating the alleged illegal dismissal and salary
issues.
5. Benjamin Juson:
- Respondent in the case involving the alleged illegal dismissal.
- Possibly associated with CyberOne PH and implicated in the decisions made regarding the
employment status of Gesolgon and Santos.
Date of Decision:
- The decision was made on an unspecified date but referred to a September 2, 2013, CA decision
and a January 10, 2014, resolution.
In the case of Gesolgon and Santos against CyberOne PH, the Doctrine of Separate Juridical
Personality is relevant in determining the nature of their relationship with the company. The key
points related to this doctrine in the case are as follows:
In summary, the case highlights the application of the Doctrine of Separate Juridical Personality
in determining the legal relationship between employees and corporations. The courts, in this
instance, emphasized the lack of evidence establishing an employer-employee relationship with
CyberOne PH, ultimately upholding the separate legal entity status of the corporation.
FIRST DIVISION
SUSAN R. ROQUEL, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK AND PNB GLOBAL
REMITTANCE AND FINANCIAL CO. (HK) LTD., RESPONDENTS.
Facts
- Susan R. Roquel was hired by PNB International Finance Ltd. (PNB-IFL), a subsidiary of the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), in 1990.
- Roquel underwent multiple transfers within the PNB Hong Kong Group, including assignments
at PNB's Hong Kong Branch (PNB-HK) and PNB's Remittance Center Limited (PNB-RCL).
- PNB-RCL later merged with PNB Global Remittance and Finance Co. (HK) Ltd. (PNB Global),
with Roquel absorbed by PNB Global.
- Roquel was terminated by PNB Global in December 2011, leading to her filing a complaint for
illegal dismissal.
People Involved
- Susan R. Roquel: Employee who filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
- Philippine National Bank (PNB): Respondent and employer of Roquel.
- PNB-IFL, PNB-HK, PNB-RCL, and PNB Global: Entities within the PNB Hong Kong Group
involved in Roquel's transfers.
Background
- Roquel's employment spanned 21 years, involving transfers among various entities within the
PNB Hong Kong Group.
- Dispute arose over Roquel's termination by PNB Global in 2011.
Conflict
- Roquel asserted an employer-employee relationship with PNB, while PNB claimed she was an
employee of PNB Global.
- Jurisdictional issues and the application of the alter ego doctrine were central to the dispute.
Decision
- The Labor Arbiter initially ruled in favor of Roquel, finding her illegally dismissed and awarding
monetary compensation.
- The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision, asserting no
jurisdiction over the case.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC's decision, stating PNB Global was Roquel's sole
employer.
- The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, applying the alter ego theory to pierce the corporate
veil, concluding that PNB was Roquel's employer.
- The decision reinstated the Labor Arbiter's ruling, declaring Roquel illegally dismissed and
entitled to backwages, separation pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts, determining that PNB was Roquel's
employer. The alter ego theory was applied, emphasizing the interconnectedness of entities within
the PNB Hong Kong Group, and Roquel was deemed illegally dismissed, entitled to various
compensations.
The case of Susan R. Roquel and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) involves the application of
the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, particularly through the use of the alter ego theory.
The Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil allows the courts to disregard the separate legal
personality of a corporation and hold its shareholders or parent company personally liable for the
company's actions. Here's how the case relates to this doctrine:
5. Remedies Granted:
- The Supreme Court's decision resulted in the reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter's ruling,
declaring Roquel illegally dismissed. Roquel was then entitled to various compensations, including
backwages, separation pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
In summary, the case illustrates the application of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil,
specifically through the alter ego theory, to establish the true employer of an individual within a
complex corporate structure. The interconnectedness of entities and the unity of interest played a
pivotal role in piercing the corporate veil and holding the parent company (PNB) liable for the
actions concerning the termination of the employee (Roquel).
SECOND DIVISION
Parties Involved:
- Petitioner: The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima, also known as the Peach Sisters of
Laguna.
- Respondents: Legal heirs of Purificacion Y. Alzona.
Background
- The petitioner is a religious and charitable group established in 1989 with a primary mission to
care for abandoned and neglected elderly persons.
- Purificacion Y. Alzona, a spinster and owner of certain properties, became a benefactor of the
petitioner in 1996, supporting their community and works.
- In 1999, Purificacion decided to donate her house and lot to the petitioner, formalized through
a handwritten letter in October 1999 and a Deed of Donation in August 2001.
- The petitioner, not yet registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) at the
time of the donation, filed its registration application in August 2001.
Conflict
- After Purificacion's death in October 2001, her brother, Amando Y. Alzona, filed a complaint
seeking to annul the Deed of Donation, arguing that the petitioner, being unregistered with the
SEC at the time, had no legal capacity to accept the donation.
Decision
1. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially dismissed the complaint on August 14, 2013, ruling
that the essential elements of a donation were present, and the petitioner's capacity as a de facto
corporation was valid.
2. The Court of Appeals (CA), on January 7, 2016, partially granted the respondents' appeal,
declaring the Deed of Donation void on the grounds that the petitioner was not considered a de
facto corporation, lacking a bona fide attempt to incorporate at the time of the donation.
3. The Supreme Court (SC) reversed the CA's decision. The SC ruled that the petitioner, although
not a de facto corporation at the time, could be considered a corporation by estoppel. Purificacion's
intent to donate was clear, and her subsequent actions ratified the donation. The SC emphasized
the importance of promoting charitable works and upheld the validity of the donation.
Key Points
- The SC recognized the doctrine of corporation by estoppel, holding that parties dealing with a
non-existent corporation are estopped from denying its legal existence when enforcing a contract.
- The genuine intent of Purificacion to donate was upheld, and subsequent acts ratified the
donation, rendering it valid.
- The SC emphasized the promotion of charitable works and recognized benevolent giving as an
essential social fabric.
The case described involves the recognition and application of the doctrine of "Corporation by
Estoppel." To understand how it connects to the concepts of De Facto Corporations vs.
Corporations by Estoppel, let's delve into the key points and legal principles highlighted in the
case:
De Facto Corporations
1. Definition: A de facto corporation is an entity that, despite not having completed all the statutory
requirements for incorporation, is treated as if it were a validly formed corporation due to a good
faith attempt to comply with the law.
2. Key Requirement: To be considered a de facto corporation, there should be a bona fide attempt
to comply with the incorporation requirements, and the entity should act in good faith as if it were
a valid corporation.
Corporations by Estoppel
1. Definition: Corporations by Estoppel is a legal doctrine that prevents a party from denying the
existence of a corporation when they have treated it as such, entered into contracts with it, or
otherwise relied on its representation as a legal entity.
2. Key Requirement: The crucial element is the reliance or actions of third parties who, despite
knowing that the entity is not validly incorporated, treat it as a corporation and are then estopped
from challenging its legal existence.
- While the case initially involves a lack of de facto corporation status, the SC's decision introduces
the concept of Corporation by Estoppel to validate the donation.
- The recognition of the doctrine of Corporation by Estoppel is essential in situations where the
formal requirements for incorporation are not fully met, but parties have treated the entity as a
valid corporation, preventing them from denying its legal existence later on.
In summary, the case illustrates the shift from focusing solely on de facto corporation status to
embracing the concept of Corporation by Estoppel, emphasizing the importance of parties' actions
and intent in determining the legal status of an entity.
THIRD DIVISION
- Respondents:
- Teresita Tobias: Meat vendor at Baliuag Public Market
- Shellidie Valdez: Daughter of Teresita Tobias, co-depositor
- Conflict:
- Robles persuaded Tobias to open an account and invest in a high-interest back-to-back scheme.
- Robles misappropriated the invested funds for personal use, failing to remit promised interest.
-Doctrine of Apparent Authority: The Doctrine of Apparent Authority is a legal principle that deals
with the authority of an agent as perceived by third parties based on the actions and representations
of the principal (the person or entity the agent represents). In essence, this doctrine holds that if a
principal creates the appearance or gives the impression that an agent has the authority to act on
its behalf, the principal is bound by the agent's actions even if the agent exceeds their actual
authority.
- Application in the Case:
- The Supreme Court (SC) applied the doctrine of apparent authority in holding the petitioner
(Citystate Savings Bank) solidarily liable for the actions of its branch manager, Rolando Robles.
- Despite the petitioner's argument that Robles acted in his personal capacity, the SC ruled that
the bank was estopped from denying apparent authority.
- The doctrine holds that if a principal (in this case, the bank) allows an agent (Robles) to
perform acts that lead a third party (Tobias and Valdez) to believe the agent has authority, the
principal is bound by the agent's actions within the scope of that apparent authority.
In summary, the case illustrates the connection to the Doctrine of Apparent Authority by
highlighting how the bank, through its actions and representations, created an appearance of
authority for its branch manager. The bank's subsequent estoppel from denying this apparent
authority resulted in solidary liability for damages caused by the agent's actions. The doctrine
reinforces the principle that banks must exercise due diligence in overseeing their employees and
must be accountable for actions undertaken within the scope of apparent authority.
THIRD DIVISION
Facts
1. Respondent Ricarcen Development Corporation (Ricarcen) is a domestic corporation engaged
in renting out real estate.
2. Marilyn R. Soliman was the president of Ricarcen from 2001 to August 2003.
3. On October 15, 2001, Marilyn, acting as Ricarcen's president, took out a P4,000,000.00 loan
from petitioner Arturo C. Calubad, secured by a real estate mortgage.
4. The loan terms included compounded interest and a penalty for delay in payment.
5. Marilyn, through subsequent amendments, increased the loan to P5,000,000.00 and later
obtained an additional P2,000,000.00 loan from Calubad.
6. To prove her authority, Marilyn presented a Board Resolution and Secretary's Certificates dated
October 15, 2001, December 6, 2001, and May 8, 2002.
7. After Ricarcen failed to pay the loan, Calubad initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings,
becoming the highest bidder and obtaining a Certificate of Sale on March 27, 2003.
8. Ricarcen claimed it learned of Marilyn's transactions in July 2003 and filed a complaint for
annulment of mortgage and damages.
People Involved
- **Arturo C. Calubad:** Petitioner and lender.
- **Ricarcen Development Corporation:** Respondent and borrower.
- **Marilyn R. Soliman:** Former president of Ricarcen, acting on its behalf in loan transactions.
Summary of Background:
Ricarcen, represented by Marilyn R. Soliman, borrowed money from Arturo C. Calubad and
secured the loan with a real estate mortgage. After Ricarcen failed to repay, Calubad initiated
foreclosure proceedings, leading to a legal conflict over the validity of the mortgage contracts and
foreclosure.
Conflict:
Ricarcen denied authorizing Marilyn to obtain loans and mortgage its property. It argued that
documents presented as proof of Marilyn's authority were fabricated. Calubad asserted that
Ricarcen, through its officers, clothed Marilyn with apparent authority, and it was estopped from
denying the contracts.
Decision
The Regional Trial Court granted Ricarcen's complaint, annulling the mortgage contracts and
foreclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, dismissing Calubad's appeal. The courts
held that the documents presented by Marilyn were fabricated, and Ricarcen was not estopped
from denying her authority. Calubad appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that Ricarcen was
estopped and had benefited from the loans. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Calubad, stating
that Marilyn had apparent authority, and Ricarcen was estopped from denying it. Damages were
not awarded.
In summary, the case's connection to the Doctrine of Apparent Authority lies in Marilyn's
representation of Ricarcen, the authenticity of documents proving her authority, and the
application of estoppel. The conflicting decisions from different courts highlight the complexity
of establishing and challenging apparent authority in the context of corporate transactions.