G.R. No. 258456 Aggabao v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 258456 Aggabao v. COMELEC
DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J : p
[original signed]
PANFILO "PING LACSON"
Senator
Chairman, Partido Para sa Demokratikong
Reporma 18
ISABELA-CITY OF SANTIAGO Â
MAYOR Â Â Â
ISABELA-CITY OF SANTIAGO Â Â
VICE-MAYOR Â Â
The COMELEC further averred that the tedious processes involving the
various preparatory activities and printing of the official machine-readable
ballots compelled it to adopt a cut-off date within which to comply with the
TROs issued by the Court. This meant that beyond this cut-off date, the act
or acts sought to be restrained would have already become fait accompli. 46
The COMELEC then claimed that it received the subject TRO only on
January 25, 2022 far beyond its cut-off date of January 9, 2022. Hence, the
matters sought to be restrained — the declaration of petitioner Navarro as
an independent candidate and denial of due course to petitioner Aggabao's
candidacy for Mayor of Isabela City as a substitute for petitioner Navarro —
had themselves become fait accompli. This meant that the final ballot face
templates were already generated, and the machine-readable official ballots
were already being printed. It gave notice that any adjustment,
postponement, or suspension of these activities would prejudice the timely
conduct of its constitutional duties. 47
Our Ruling
Mootness of the Petition
The conclusion of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections and the
subsequent proclamation of one Sheena Tan as the Mayor-elect of Santiago
City, Isabela 48 have undoubtedly rendered the petition moot insofar as it
seeks to nullify the denial of Aggabao's COC as substitute of Navarro, the
non-inclusion of Aggabao's name as a mayoralty candidate, and Navarro's
declaration as an independent candidate. A case is moot when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an
adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no
practical value or use. 49
Here, the election of Tan to the contested mayoralty post has put an
end to the dispute, and none of the complained actions by COMELEC (i.e.,
the denial of Aggabao's COC as substitute of Navarro, the non-inclusion of
Aggabao's name as a mayoralty candidate, and Navarro's declaration as an
independent candidate) even if wrong will not undo the outcome of the
election to this office.
Despite the mootness of a case, however, the Court may still render a
decision if it finds that: (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b)
the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount
public interest; (c) the issues raised require the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public;
and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 50
As eruditely explained by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh
during the deliberation, the third exception applies here. Left unchecked, the
COMELEC may repeat the underlying questionable acts or omissions which
resulted in the assailed dispositions, albeit not necessarily against
petitioners themselves again but against some other individuals in
elections to come. These underlying questionable acts or omissions
include: (a) ignoring the clear and repeated certifications and letters
of a particular political party about the identity of the candidate it seeks to
endorse and the falsity of a candidate's claim of endorsement by that
particular political party; (b) failing to conduct a summary hearing on
the candidates' conflicting claims pertaining to their party membership
and endorsement; and (c) emasculating the TRO issued by the Court by
perpetuating the erroneous COC cancellation and improperly denying one's
right to be substituted as a candidate.
As the final guardian and arbiter of the Constitution, the Court deems it
necessary to lay down principles on the observance of the right to due
process, particularly the right to hearing of candidates to whom conflicting
CONAs have been issued, in view of the seeming vacuum in the COMELEC's
rules. 51acEHCD
Separate Opinions
CAGUIOA, J., concurring:
The ponencia resolves to partly grant the instant Petition for Certiorari
1 (Petition) thereby nullifying the assailed Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) issuances 2 but declaring moot the prayer to admit the
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) of petitioner Giorgidi B. Aggabao 3
Per the ponencia's narration of facts, the COMELEC received two (2)
Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance (CONAs) from the Partido para sa
Demokratikong Reporma (Partido Reporma) issued in favor of petitioner
Amelita Navarro 4 (Ayson), respectively, who were both running for Mayor of
Santiago City. In view of the multiple nominations made by the Partido
Reporma, Navarro and Ayson were declared as independent candidates,
pursuant to Section 15 5 of COMELEC Resolution (Com Res) No. 10717. 6 As
such, when Navarro withdrew her CoC for the position of Mayor and Aggabao
filed his CoC as Navarro's substitute, the COMELEC denied due course to
Aggabao's CoC in accordance with Section 40 7 of the same Com Res which
disallows substitution for independent candidates. Prior to the cancellation of
Aggabao's CoC, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Sen. Lacson), the Chairman of
Partido Reporma, sent letters dated November 6, 2021 and December 2,
2021, to the COMELEC disowning Ayson's CONA, maintaining that Navarro is
the official candidate of Partido Reporma for Mayor of Santiago City, and
stating that Ayson is not even a member of the party; hence, it was absurd
for Partido Reporma to have issued a CONA in his favor. However, the
COMELEC failed to act on these letters. 8
Hence, the present Petition which charges respondents COMELEC En
Banc and its Law Department with grave abuse of discretion in declaring
Navarro as an independent candidate and in denying Aggabao's substitution
of Navarro's candidacy as Mayor of Santiago City, Isabela. TCAScE
pertinently ruled:
[T]he term 'administrative' connotes, or pertains, to
'administration, especially management, as by managing or
conducting, directing or superintending, the execution,
application, or conduct of persons or things.['] It does not
entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and
weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon.
While a 'quasi-judicial function' is a terms which applies to the
action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature. x x x 20 (Additional emphasis
supplied; underscoring in the original)
From the foregoing, there is an exercise of quasi-judicial powers when
investigation and ascertainment of facts, as well as judgment or discretion,
are crucial. More specifically, when the body is required to ascertain facts to
which the law shall apply so that discretion of judicial character is necessary,
adjudicatory powers are in play. On the other hand, where what is involved
is the mere application of policies and enforcement of orders as determined
by proper governmental organs, there is a mere exercise of administrative
powers. The latter does not entail the production and weighing of evidence,
hence, an opportunity to be heard is not necessary.
The COMELEC, in the exercise of its
administrative powers, properly applied
its rules in receiving both Navarro's and
Ayson's CONAs and declaring them
independent candidates. However, it
gravely abused its discretion in failing to
accord notice and hearing to the parties
when a legal controversy arose after
Sen. Lacson sent his letters thereby
requiring the COMELEC to exercise its
quasi-judicial powers.
Under Section 76 21 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, 22 otherwise known
as the "Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines" (OEC) and Section 32 23 of
Com Res No. 10717, it is the ministerial duty of the COMELEC to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the CoCs and CONAs filed before it, provided that
these were filed in due form and in conformity with the rules and regulations,
respectively. Conversely, the Court, in several occasions, has ruled that the
COMELEC, may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due
course to or cancel a CoC filed in due form. 24 In Cipriano, citing Sanchez v.
Del Rosario , 25 the Court held that the duty of the COMELEC to give due
course to a CoC filed in due form is ministerial in character and that while it
may look into patent defects therein, it may not go into matters not
appearing on its face. 26cSaATC
In the present case, the COMELEC received the CoCs of both Navarro
and Ayson, pursuant to its ministerial duty to receive and give due course to
CoCs filed in due form. The CONAs attached to both CoCs, likewise being
regular on their faces and compliant with the COMELEC rules, were likewise
received and given due course, again, pursuant to the COMELEC's ministerial
duty. Finally, there being two (2) CONAs issued by the same political party in
favor of two (2) nominees for the same position, the COMELEC treated these
nominees as independent candidates and disallowed both nominations,
pursuant to Section 15 of Com Res No. 10717, which mandates that in case
of such excessive nominations, "all of the nominations shall be denied due
course by the Commission, and the aspirants shall be declared independent
candidates." 27 To emphasize, these actions by the COMELEC were done
pursuant to its administrative functions, there being no need to admit
evidence, ascertain facts and render conclusions thereon.
Nevertheless, when Sen. Lacson sent letters to the COMELEC
challenging the validity or authenticity of the CONA of Ayson issued by
Partido Reporma, there arose a legal controversy which required the
COMELEC to look beyond the face of the certificates. At this point, the
COMELEC was already required to investigate, receive evidence and
examine and weigh the same to arrive at factual conclusions to which the
law shall apply. Specifically, it was called upon to ascertain whether Ayson's
CONA was not authentic, as claimed by Sen. Lacson, so that Section 15 of
Com Res No. 10717 on multiple nominations would be inapplicable, leaving
Navarro as the lone nominee of Partido Reporma. If so found, then the
substitution of Navarro by Aggabao should be valid under Section 40 of the
same Com Res.
To stress, where only an application of the law is required without
having to investigate and ascertain facts beyond the face of the certificates
and other uncontroverted documents, administrative functions are
exercised. This is thus involved when the COMELEC examines, upon filing of
the CoC, the attached CONA, and ascertain, on its face, whether it was filed
in due form and within the filing period, properly and completely filled-out,
signed by the authorized signatories (by simple comparison of such
signatures to those in the pertinent list submitted by the party to the
COMELEC ahead of the filing of CoCs) and compliant with the requirements
under the rules. 28 Once found that the CONA is filed in conformity with the
rules and regulations, it becomes the ministerial duty of the COMELEC to
receive and acknowledge receipt of the CONAs filed with them, in
accordance with Section 76 of the OEC and Section 32 of Com Res No.
10717.
However, when there arises an issue or controversy with the
certificates not appearing on their faces, such as when extrinsic evidence is
offered to prove an allegedly fraudulent CONA, the COMELEC cannot merely
ignore the same — as what it apparently did with respect to Sen. Lacson's
letters — especially where, as in this case, such non-action inevitably led to
the cancellation of the CoC of the substitute candidate, Aggabao.
The cancellation of a CoC on the
ground of invalidity of the candidate's
substitution requires notice and
hearing.
On this note, the Court has held that both denial of due course to and
cancellation of CoCs are adjudicatory proceedings which need to be first
heard by the COMELEC division, as a matter of jurisdiction. The COMELEC En
Banc can only act on the same upon a motion for reconsideration of its
division's decision. 29
In Luna v. COMELEC, 30 the Court voided the COMELEC's disallowance
of a substitution of an underaged candidate and the consequent cancellation
of the CoC of his substitute. The Court even went further as to suggest that a
petition to deny due course to or cancel the CoC of the substituted candidate
was necessary because ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the
usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC outside of a petition under
Section 78 31 of the OEC, owing to its ministerial duty to give due course to
CoCs filed in due form.
In Cipriano, the Court categorically held that the denial of due course or
cancellation of a CoC "is not within the administrative powers of the
[COMELEC], but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions." 32
Hence, the Court annulled the COMELEC's Resolution, adopting the
recommendation of its Law Department and cancelling or denying due
course to CoCs of several candidates, including petitioners, for not being
registered voters. It ruled that outside of patent defects, the COMELEC may
only deny due course to or cancel a CoC in accordance with the procedure
laid down in Section 78, which affords all parties notice and an opportunity
to present evidence, albeit through a summary procedure. 33
In Bautista v. COMELEC, 34 the Court held that the COMELEC denied a
candidate of his due process rights when its en banc, upon its Law
Department's recommendation, cancelled the candidate's CoC for the
latter's failure to register as a voter. The Court ruled that a division of the
COMELEC should have first heard the case, so that the COMELEC En Banc
acted without jurisdiction when it ordered such cancellation of the CoC. 35
The COMELEC contended that there was no need for presentation and
evaluation of evidence because the issue of whether Bautista was a
registered voter is easily resolved by looking at the COMELEC registrations
records. The Court nevertheless ruled that such reasoning fails to consider
instances where a voter may be excluded through inadvertence or
registered with an erroneous or misspelled name. Indeed, a COMELEC rule
allows candidates who are not registered voters to be included in the
certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs otherwise. The Court
declared that the COMELEC should have observed the summary proceeding
outlined in Rule 23 36 of its Rules of Procedures 37 in relation to petitions to
deny due course to or cancel CoCs. 38
In Engle v. COMELEC En Banc 39 (Engle), while the Court ruled that the
matter of validity of petitioner's substitution is not a proper subject of a Rule
78 petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC as it does not relate to a
qualification of the candidate, it nonetheless held that the denial of due
course to the CoCs of both the substituted candidate and his substitute calls
for the exercise of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions, and therefore,
must first be heard and decided by the COMELEC's divisions, thus:
First, the COMELEC Law Department's "ruling" was issued only
after the filing of petitioner's COC. Second, with respect to the denial
of due course to James L. Engle's COC as a nominee of Lakas-CMD
and to petitioner's COC as his substitute, the COMELEC Law
Department's letter is not binding and at most, recommendatory. It is
settled in jurisprudence that the denial of due course [to] or
cancellation of one's COC is not within the administrative powers of
the COMELEC, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. We have also previously held that the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, is mandated by
the Constitution to hear and decide such cases first by Division and,
upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc. In resolving cases to
deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, the COMELEC
cannot merely rely on the recommendations of its Law Department
but must conduct due proceedings through one of its divisions.
Returning to the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division only
formally ruled on the status of James L. Engle as an independent
candidate and the invalidity of petitioner's substitution on July 5,
2013, months after the May 13, 2013 Elections. 40
Hence, it appears that although Engle held against the propriety of a
Section 78 petition to adjudicate the issue of validity of substitution because
the same does not relate to the qualifications of a candidate, it still held the
stance that cancellation of CoC's on the ground of invalidity of substitution
demands the exercise of quasi-judicial powers of the COMELEC, hence, must
first be heard and decided by its division. Engle merely failed to specify the
remedy therefor under the COMELEC Rules or any statute. EATCcI
Footnotes
1. Rollo , p. 51.
2. Id. at 38.
3. Id. at 41.
4. Id. at 42.
5. Id. at 43.
6. Id. at 44.
7. Id. at 45-46.
8. Id. at 15-16.
9. Emphases supplied.
10. Id.
35 Id. at 129-130.
36. Id. at 128.
53. Id.
54. Id.
56. Id.
57. 1987 Constitution, Article IX-C, Section 2 (1); See Cipriano v. COMELEC , 479
Phil. 677, 688 (2004).
59. Department of Education v. Rizal Teachers Kilusang Bayan for Credit, Inc., G.R.
No. 202097, July 3, 2019, citing Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, 814 Phil.
253, 293-294 (2017).
60. Omnibus Election Code, Section 76; COMELEC Resolution No. 10717, Section
32.
61. See Department of Education v. Rizal Teachers Kilusang Bayan for Credit, Inc.,
G.R. No. 202097, July 3, 2019, citing Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra
at 294; Sps. Espiridion v. Court of Appeals , 523 Phil. 664, 668 (2006).
67. Emmanuel Tipon and Artemio Tipon, Election Laws, (2010), p. 95.
72. 1987 Constitution, Article IX-C, SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may
sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by
the Commission En Banc.
74. Id.
82. See Cacho v. Manahan , 823 Phil. 1011, 1021 (2018), citing Maglana Rice and
Corn Mill, Inc. v. Tan, 673 Phil. 532, 539 (2011).
87. Id.
88. See Marquez v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 258435, June 28, 2022.
2. Ponencia , pp. 1-2. These issuances are: (a) Document No. 21-3973 dated
November 10, 2021, declaring Navarro as an independent candidate; (b)
Document No. 21-7467 dated December 22, 2021, denying Aggabao's CoC
as substitute candidate for Navarro; and (c) Document No. 22-0176 dated
January 5, 2022, denying Aggabao's motion for reconsideration.
3. Id. at 20.
9. Id. at 8.
21. SEC. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. — The
Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer
designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the
succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
24. See Luna v. COMELEC , 550 Phil. 284, 292 (2007) and Cipriano v. COMELEC ,
supra note 13, at 689.
31. SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. —
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.
SECTION 2. Period to File Petition. — The petition must be filed within five (5)
days following the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy.
44. E.g., Sunga v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 310, 324 (1998) wherein a letter-complaint
for disqualification was referred by the COMELEC En Banc to its second
Division for hearing.
46. SEC. 70. Guest candidacy . — A political party may nominate and/or support
candidates not belonging to it.