Fitch Ratings - Global Economic Outlook March 2024
Fitch Ratings - Global Economic Outlook March 2024
Economics
Global
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024F
0.8
The eurozone economy continues to stagnate and we have lowered
0.6
the 2024 forecast by 0.1pp to 0.6%, after growth of just 0.4% in
0.4 2023. Germany is in recession and is not expected to recover until
0.2
2Q24. We have cut its 2024 growth forecast by 0.3pp to just 0.1%.
We have cut France’s growth forecast by 0.2pp to 0.8% as weakness
0.0 in Germany spills over. But Italy and Spain are faring better and we
-0.2 have lifted our forecasts slightly.
-0.4 We have cut the UK forecast by 0.1pp to 0.2% and this follows a
United Kingdom
EM ex China
Eurozone
Spain
France
China
Brazil
Poland
Russia
Turkiye
DM
Germany
United States
Mexico
Indonesia
India (FY)
Switzerland
Canada
Australia
Italy
World
South Africa
South Korea
Brazil
France
Spain
China
Poland
Mexico
Turkiye
Germany
Eurozone
Korea
South Africa
Japan
Italy
Australia
Canada
Switzerland
Source: Fitch Ratings, national statistical offices, Haver Analytics The 5pp-of-GDP deterioration in the deficit in one year was eye-
catching in its own right. This has occurred only on two occasions
since the 1960s – 2009 and 2020. But it was even more dramatic
given that growth increased in 2023 – to a rate materially above
US Fiscal Balance and the Output Gap estimates of potential – while the unemployment rate remained
General government balance (LHS) (% potential
close to historical lows.
(% GDP) Output gap GDP)
A buoyant economy typically generates more fiscal revenues and
2 8
reduces pressure on government spending, for example on
0 6 unemployment benefits and social welfare outlays. For this reason,
-2 4
fiscal policy analysis adjusts headline government deficits for the
influence of the economic cycle to gauge the structural deficit.
-4 2 While precise estimates of the structural deficit are uncertain, it is
-6 0
reasonable to think there was even larger widening in the
underlying deficit in 2023, given the improvement in the economy.
-8 -2
This is captured in the chart plotting the fiscal balance since the
-10 -4 early 1960s against the output gap (using Congressional Budget
-12 -6 Office (CBO) estimates of the latter until 2018 and Fitch estimates
thereafter). Virtually all the previous periods of sharp widening in
-14 -8
the deficit have been accompanied by economic downturns, as
1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2013 2023
captured in the output gap turning negative as GDP falls below
Source: Fitch Ratings, CBO, IMF potential. The one exception is the late 1960s when there was a
sharp fiscal deterioration – despite a strong economy – related to a
rise in Vietnam War defence spending. But even by those standards,
US Nominal Personal Sector Disposable Income the jump in the deficit in 2023 – coinciding with the output gap
Compensation Interest & dividends becoming more positive – looks dramatic.
Net transfers Taxes
(%, yoy, pp) Other Disposable income (%, yoy) Fiscal largesse clearly supported domestic demand in 2023.
16
Government consumption and investment in the national accounts
14
– which only includes spending on goods and services – grew by 4%
12
in 2023 in real terms. This was the fastest growth rate for more than
10 20 years and a sharp turnaround after the decline in 2022. It
8 directly added 0.7pp to annual GDP growth, a quarter of the total.
6 The impact was also evident in payrolls data, where state and local
4 government employment grew faster than private sector
2 employment.
0
Moreover, a fall in household sector tax payments added 2pp to
-2
disposable income growth in 2023. Household income was the main
-4
driver of consumer spending growth in 2023. The savings ratio rose
-6
slightly in annual average terms last year, although it remained well
-8
below pre-Covid-19 pandemic norms.
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Source: Fitch Ratings, BEA
Germany’s Economic Malaise
Real GDP Level in US, UK, Eurozone and Germany Germany’s economy has been in the doldrums. GDP fell by 0.3% in
US UK 2023 leaving the economy at the end of the year no larger than it
(Index, 4Q19=100) Eurozone Germany was pre-pandemic, the weakest post-Covid-19 growth
110
performance amongst the Fitch 20 countries. This malaise has given
105
voice to commentary on Germany’s ‘broken business model’.
Demographics and relatively weak investment are structural
100
constraints on growth. And the large imbalance between national
95 saving and investment leaves GDP growth highly reliant on external
demand, though this served Germany well in 2010-2019.
90
But it is also important to recognise that Germany has suffered from
85 a succession of major shocks - the gas crisis, the fall in world trade
and ECB monetary tightening – which are unlikely to be repeated.
80 There are signs that world trade is bottoming out, gas prices have
fallen sharply and the ECB is expected to cut rates soon.
75
4Q19 2Q20 4Q20 2Q21 4Q21 2Q22 4Q22 2Q23 4Q23 Notably, Germany experienced a sizeable property boom in 2015-
Source: Fitch Ratings 2021 which has unwound rapidly as the ECB has raised rates.
Pressures in the real estate sector should ease as the ECB starts to
loosen policy, while falling headline inflation and gas prices should
boost household real income and consumption, particularly in the
Eurozone Real Wage Growth context of still-robust labour market conditions. The recovery will
not be rapid – and we have cut our forecasts for German growth in
(%, yoy) 2024 and 2025 – but we anticipate a period of catch-up, above-
3
trend growth in Germany in the medium term.
2
1
Deflationary Pressures Are Rising in China
China’s economy is showing increasing signs of deflationary
0 pressures as the property collapse continues. Many indicators of
-1 the economy-wide price level are falling. The GDP deflator – the
price of domestic value-added – fell by 1% year on year (yoy) in
-2 4Q23. It has been falling in yoy terms for four out of the last five
-3 quarters, the longest episode of deflation since the Asia crisis.
Source: Fitch Ratings, BLS, Eurostat, ONS, Haver Analytics Inflation Persisting in US and Europe
Disinflation progress in 2H23 sparked market exuberance about
the prospects for rapid Fed and ECB monetary easing. But inflation
data in recent months have provided a sobering reminder of the
Nominal Wage Growth Measures tendency for inflation to perpetuate itself. US core inflation
momentum (three-month on three-month annualised) has climbed,
US (Atlanta Fed)
UK reflecting a rise in services inflation and we have revised up our end-
(%, yoy, 3mma) Eurozone (Indeed estimates) 2024 CPI forecast by 0.3pp to 2.9%.
10
Better progress has been made in the eurozone, where core
8 inflation has fallen to 3.1% yoy, but, like the US, services inflation
remains far above rates prevailing when overall inflation was close
6 to target. The downtrend in nominal wage growth has stalled in
both economies in recent months amid continued tight labour
4 markets. Moreover, the jump in shipping freight costs following
disruptions to Red Sea trade routes adds potential for upward
2
pressure on core goods inflation.
0
Fed Holding Out; ECB to Blink First on Rates
-2 The Fed, ECB and Bank of England (BOE) all continue to signal that
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 interest rates have likely peaked and will be cut later this year. At
Source: Fitch Ratings, Atlanta Fed, ONS, Indeed Hiring Lab, Haver Analytics the same time, they have been pushing back against earlier market
expectations that policy easing would start imminently and proceed
rapidly. Their messaging has emphasised the risk of moving to a
Shipping Cost Indices less-restrictive stance too early and, in the process, jeopardising
(Index, Dec Harper Petersen Freightos - Global progress in reducing inflation sustainably to targets.
'23=100) Drewry
900
A common refrain is the need to ‘gain more confidence’ that recent
disinflation progress is lasting. This does not necessarily mean that
800 (Index, 4Q19=100) inflation has to fall much further – a succession of further prints
700 similar to recent data outturns would probably be sufficient to
600 unlock cuts. But continued high readings for services and wage
inflation are adding to caution and the desire to wait for more data
500
to confirm disinflation progress.
400
Against this backdrop, we now believe the Fed will wait until its 30-
300 31 July meeting before cutting rates. This is later than our previous
200 expectation of June. We have also pushed back our expectation of
100 the first ECB rate cut to June from April. Recent ECB commentary
emphasised the bank’s concern about the latest wage and unit
0
labour cost growth data and flagged that “significantly more
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
information” will be available by June.
Source: Fitch Ratings, HP, Drewry, Freightos, Haver Analytics
The BOE faces an even bigger challenge with still-high CPI services
and wage inflation data, and we do not expect UK rate cuts until
Policy Interest Rates Outlook - US, UK & Eurozone August. But for all three central banks we continue to expect a total
of three interest rate cuts – totalling 75bp – by year-end.
(%) Fed BoE ECB
6 Just as the Fed, ECB and BOE prepare to start cutting rates, we now
believe conditions are ripe for the Bank of Japan to exit its negative
5 interest rate regime. Reflationary forces in Japan are becoming
more entrenched as wage inflation picks up.
4
US ‘No Landing’ Scenario Creeps into View
3
Recent surprising US growth resilience in the presence of falling
inflation is often characterised as a ‘soft landing’. Supply-side
2
improvements – namely rising immigration and easing supply-chain
bottlenecks – did help improve the US output inflation trade-off in
1
2023. But the sharp deterioration in domestic imbalances – as the
fiscal deficit widened rapidly – warrants caution here.
0
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 Moreover, the risk of a ‘no landing’ scenario – in which sequential
Source: Fitch Ratings, Fed, ECB, BoE, Haver Analytics
GDP growth remains above trend and the labour market sees
renewed tightening in 2024 – has increased. Under such a scenario
there could be renewed upward pressure on wage and services
inflation and this could prevent the Fed from cutting rates in 2024.
Annual average growth in 2023 was 2.5% and growth through the
10
year to 4Q23 was 3.1% yoy, both well in excess of our estimate of
potential growth of 1.7%. Monthly indicators including payrolls
5
point to another solid expansion in 1Q24.
We expect growth to slow to a significantly below-trend rate later 0
this year, reflecting a fading fiscal impulse, falling household income
-5
growth, a weakening contribution from net trade and lagged effects
from last year’s monetary tightening, as real interest rates rise.
-10
Pro-cyclical fiscal easing in 2023 was dramatic, as the general
government fiscal deficit (federal plus state and local) widened by -15
1974 1982 1990 1998 2006 2014 2022
5pp of GDP in a year of robust growth. The impact was felt directly
in the fastest growth in real government spending on goods and Source: Fitch Ratings, BEA, Fed, Haver Analytics
services for more than 20 years and in falling household tax
payments. Fitch expects the deficit to narrow slightly this year.
US - Core CPI and Wage Momentum
Tax cuts in 2023 boosted household sector disposable income (%, 3m/3m, Average hourly wages Core CPI
growth, but from now on income will be driven by wage annualised)
compensation. Full-time equivalent employment has already 8
slowed – partly reflecting a deceleration in average weekly hours –
and we assume that wage growth will slow as the year progresses. 7
Savings buffers could dampen the impact on consumption but these
are smaller now, and incentives to save will increase as real interest 6
rates rise. We also expect the household debt service ratio to rise
further. 5
2004
2010
2016
2022
2000
2002
2006
2008
2012
2014
2018
2020
2024F
constrain economic growth in 1H24. Property sales in December
were 23% lower than a year earlier. House prices have so far
adjusted by less than transactions, but recorded a sharper annual Source: Fitch Ratings, CEIC
fall in prices in January (4.6% from 3% in December). Fitch now
expects property sales to decline by 5%-10% this year. The China - Housing Market
authorities have implemented further support measures. In Price Index of Existing Residential Buildings (70 cities)
January, the PBOC reduced banks’ reserve requirement ratio by (Volume, %, Starts (LHS)
yoy, 3mma) New housing sales (LHS) (%, yoy)
50bp, and then in February it cut the five-year loan prime rate (a 75 15
benchmark interest rate for mortgage loans) by 25bp.
60 12
The National People’s Congress in early March laid out growth 45 9
targets and policy priorities. The GDP growth target for this year
30 6
remained at “around 5.0%”, while further stimulus will come mainly
via the issuance of CNY1 trillion (about 0.8% of GDP) of long-term 15 3
central government bonds, likely to be focused on infrastructure 0 0
projects. We assess that the announced measures are consistent -15 -3
with the consolidated budget deficit widening to just over 7.0% of
-30 -6
GDP this year from 5.8% in 2023, implying a degree of fiscal policy
loosening. -45 -9
-60 -12
Policy support (we expect the PBOC to trim its main policy rate in 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
the coming months) will contribute to a recovery in economic
growth in 2H24, but we think that real GDP growth this year will be Source: Fitch Ratings, NBS, Haver Analytics
Consumers are likely to soon start to feel the benefits of real wage
increases as the disinflation trend continues and nominal wage Japan - Non-Financial Companies' Operating Profits
growth accelerates. Early indications suggest that this year’s Large firms Medium firms Small firms
(JPY trn, SA)
Shunto wage negotiations will result in another significant uplift in 14
pay, cementing the upward trend in earnings growth.
12
Headline inflation subsided to 2.1% in January from its multi-
decade high of 4.4% a year earlier. But services inflation, which is 10
more reflective of domestic price pressures, has been stickier at a
little over 2% for around six months. Companies are also more 8
confident about passing on increases in labour input costs to their
6
customers and both workers’ and employers’ inflation expectations
remain high. 4
As a result, we expect the BOJ to raise the main policy rate to zero,
2
from –0.1%, in April. This is consistent with the improvement in the
wage and inflation data and recent signals from BOJ policymakers. 0
Having patiently cultivated second-round effects, we doubt the 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023
BOJ will embark on an aggressive tightening cycle that risks pushing
Source: Fitch Ratings, Ministry of Finance, Haver Analytics
Japan back into deflation. Instead, we expect a very gradual
increase in interest rates, to just 0.25% by end-2025.
The BOE has indicated that the peak in interest rates has been
reached. But we think persistent services inflation and elevated
wage growth will mean it is cautious about starting to cut rates too
soon. We think that it will wait until August and expect 75bp of cuts
this year, and a further 100bp in 2025.
Core inflation is lower in Italy than in the rest of the eurozone (in 60
February it was 2.6% versus 3.1%). Overall inflation was unchanged
at 0.9% in February, and below 1% for a fourth month. Energy prices 40
fell 17% as the previous steep increase in household energy prices 20
was unwound. We expect inflation to increase from these low levels 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
in 2024 as the negative contribution from energy fades, while core
inflation declines. Source: Fitch Ratings, Eurostat, Haver Analytics
depreciation would help them. We have kept our forecast for the
franc to depreciate slightly from current levels to USDCHF0.90 at
end-2024 and end-2025.
However, the RBA has continued to sound hawkish, emphasising Source: Fitch Ratings, ABS, Haver Analytics
the stickiness of services inflation and the impact of unit labour
costs growth, as well as the risk of inflation expectations drifting
higher. We expect the first rate cut to come only in September with
another cut in 4Q23 taking the cash rate to 4% by end-2024 and
then a further loosening in 2025 to 3% by end-year. This should
provide renewed impetus to growth from 2H24, allowing for GDP
growth to recover to 2.2% in 2025.
weak short-term outlook for the household sector. Export volumes -20
in the three months to January were 11.5% higher than a year -30
earlier, with IT exports increasing by more than 19%, and within 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
these, semiconductors up by about 40%. The strength of external
Source: Fitch Ratings, Korea Customs Service, Haver Analytics
demand is offsetting the weakness in demand from China (the value
of exports in US dollar terms to China has been falling in yoy terms
since June 2022, but in the most recent months has shown signs of South Korea - Inflation and Wage Growth
stabilising). We expect real GDP growth to pick up to 2.1%, Consumer prices Average wages
unchanged from the December GEO. (%, yoy)
9
For 2025, we expect some of the constraints on consumer spending 8
to ease, and along with a still-robust outlook for exports and 7
investment, this will translate into a rise in qoq GDP growth rates,
6
and an annual GDP growth rate of 2.7%.
5
Consumer price inflation edged down to 2.8% in January from highs
4
in September and October, although it then rose to 3.1% in
3
February due to temporary factors. Easing food price inflation has
contributed to the moderating pressures, while core inflation is 2
falling more steadily. We expect headline inflation to ease further 1
to 2.3% by year-end, before falling to 1.7% by end-2025. 0
Stronger US growth this year will be a boon for the Mexican Source: Fitch Ratings, INEGI, Haver Analytics
economy but high policy rates are likely to weigh on credit growth.
Looser fiscal policy will be supportive of growth this year. Growth is
Mexico - GDP and Components
expected to slow to 2.0% in 2025 as the US economy slows and
Agriculture Mining
fiscal policy turns less supportive. Electricity Construction
Manufacturing Services
Headline CPI ended last year at 4.7%, roughly in line with our (%, qoq, pp)
Taxes GDP
2.0
December forecasts, and has drifted lower to 4.3% in the second
half of February according to the semi-monthly inflation measure.
1.5
The CPI breakdown also showed that core inflation has stagnated
since the start of the year, with the decline in core goods inflation 1.0
not matched by core services inflation. The latter remains at 5.3%,
underpinned by rapid wage growth. Non-core inflation had 0.5
increased noticeably in 4Q23, given sharp rises in the prices of fruit
and vegetables, but is now beginning to moderate. 0.0
the 21 March, followed by a similar cut in May and further easing in Source: Fitch Ratings, INEGI, Haver Analytics
to end this year at 9.25%.
Growth in 4Q23 was in line with our December forecast of just 0.1% 8
qoq, driven by declines in investment and government spending and
a large increase in imports, the latter only partly reversing a 6
substantial decline in 3Q23. The industry breakdown showed an
increase in electricity production in the quarter, which facilitated 4
the rise in manufacturing and mining sector output, with value-
added rising by 0.2% and 2.4%, respectively. 2
Appendix 1
Japan -0.2 0.4 1.0 1.0 -0.8 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
UK -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4
Germany 0.4 -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
France 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4
Italy 0.3 0.0 0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
Spain 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5
Switzerland 0.3 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6
Australia 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6
Canada 0.5 -0.2 0.6 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Brazil 0.9 0.2 1.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
Russia 0.7 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2
India 1.5 1.9 1.5 3.5 1.0 2.0 -0.3 2.6 2.3 2.0
Korea 0.2 -0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6
Mexico 1.1 1.0 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
Indonesia 0.9 1.5 1.5 1.3 0.7 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.3
Turkiye 0.5 1.1 -0.2 3.6 0.3 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.6
Poland 0.4 -1.5 0.7 -0.1 1.1 0.0 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.9
South Africa 1.8 -1.1 0.3 0.7 -0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Developed a 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Emerging b 2.7 0.7 1.6 1.0 1.2 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.1
Emerging ex China 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.6 0.7 0.9 0.3 1.0 0.9 0.9
World c 1.3 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
a
US, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, Canada, Australia and Switzerland
b
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Korea, Mexico, Indonesia, Poland and Turkiye
c
‘Fitch 20’ countries weighted by nominal GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates (three-year average)
Source: Fitch Ratings
Appendix 2
Japan 1.5 0.7 2.4 2.3 1.6 1.3 0.6 -0.2 1.0 1.2
UK 2.1 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.3 1.0
Germany 1.2 0.8 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 0.1 0.8
France 1.4 0.7 0.9 1.2 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.8 1.2
Italy 2.8 2.0 2.3 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.9
Spain 5.3 3.8 4.1 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7
Switzerland 1.1 1.1 1.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.6
Australia 5.8 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.7
Canada 4.0 2.2 1.8 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.0
Brazil 4.3 2.7 4.2 3.5 2.0 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.8 2.3
Russia -3.5 -2.7 -1.8 4.9 5.5 5.0 2.9 2.2 1.6 0.8
India 5.5 4.3 6.2 8.2 8.1 8.4 6.3 5.4 6.7 6.8
Korea 3.2 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.4 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.9
Mexico 4.8 4.5 3.6 3.4 3.5 2.5 2.6 2.4 1.8 2.1
Indonesia 5.7 5.0 5.0 5.2 4.9 5.0 4.6 4.5 5.2 5.1
Turkiye 4.1 3.3 4.0 3.9 6.1 4.0 5.5 2.2 2.1 1.6
Poland 4.1 2.5 -0.3 -0.6 0.5 1.0 1.6 2.5 1.9 2.8
South Africa 4.1 0.8 0.1 1.8 -0.7 1.2 0.9 0.5 1.0 1.3
Developed a 2.0 1.0 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.1
Emerging b 3.7 2.7 3.8 5.5 4.7 4.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0
Emerging ex China 3.4 2.4 2.9 4.3 4.4 4.2 3.6 2.9 3.2 3.2
World c 2.7 1.6 2.5 3.2 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.3
a
US, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, Canada, Australia and Switzerland
b
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Korea, Mexico, Indonesia, Poland and Turkiye
c
‘Fitch 20’ countries weighted by nominal GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates (three-year average)
Source: Fitch Ratings
Contacts
Economics
Brian Coulton Robert Ojeda-Sierra
Chief Economist +44 20 3530 1664
+44 20 3530 1140 robert.ojeda-sierra@fitchratings.com
brian.coulton@fitchratings.com
Olu Sonola Pawel Borowski
+1 212 908 0583 +44 20 3530 1861
olu.sonola@fitchratings.com pawel.borowski@fitchratings.com
Alex Muscatelli
+44 20 3530 1227
alex.muscatelli@fitchratings.com
Sovereign Ratings
Todd Martinez Shelly Shetty
Americas Americas
+1 212 908 0897 +1 212 908 0324
todd.martinez@fitchratings.com shelly.shetty@fitchratings.com
Thomas Rookmaaker Paul Gamble
Asia Emerging Europe
+852 2263 9891 +44 20 3530 1623
thomas.rookmaaker@fitchratings.com paul.gamble@fitchratings.com
Federico Barriga Salazar Jan Friederich
Western Europe Middle East and Africa
+49 69 768 076 145 +852 2263 9910
federico.barrigasalazar@fitchratings.com jan.friederich@fitchratings.com
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