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PSYCHOPATHOLOGY-I

MPS232N

CIA-1: Critical evaluation of Prototype Classificatory Model of Psychopathology

Submitted by

Madhumati Dhumak

22223062

2MPCL A

Submitted to

Ms. Tanuja Bhardwaj

Assistant Professor

Department of Psychology, Christ (Deemed to be University), Delhi- NCR

20 January, 2023
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Introduction

In cognitive psychology, the prototype model has a long history, and prototype theory
was one of the first to challenge the conventional understanding of concepts.

Prototype models presumptively presume that categories are represented by a summary

representation of a category (i.e., a prototype), which may include details on the most prevalent
characteristics, the average feature values, or even the ideal features of a category. The premise
of prototype models is that classification choices are based on how closely an object resembles
a category prototype. All people and animals possess the capacity to acquire and apply
categories, which are important to cognition.

The prototype perspective is a fundamental theoretical explanation of categorisation

(Homa, Cross, Cornell, & Shwartz, 1973; Homa & Cultice, 1984; Minda & Smith, 2001, 2002;
Posner & Keele, 1968; J. D. Smith & Minda, 2001; J. D. Smith, Redford, & Haas, 2008; J. D.
Smith & Minda, 1998, 2000).

The prototype viewpoint presupposes that a prototype can serve as a mental

representation of a category of things in the world (such as objects, creatures, shapes, etc.). In
order to distinguish category members from non-members, a perceiver may use a prototype,
which is a cognitive representation that captures the regularities and commonalities among
category members. The primary tendency of a category, a list of commonly occurring
characteristics, or even an ideal category member are common ways to characterise the
prototype of a category.

The prototype model performs a comparison and a choice before classifying something.
The psychological distance between a to-be-classified item and the stored prototypes—
typically determined as the modal or average feature values—is transformed into a measure of
similarity during the comparison phase. In the judgement phase, the model divides the
similarity of the item to one prototype by the similarity of the item to all the prototypes to
determine the likelihood that the item belongs to the category.

Because linguistic categorization is a cognitive process, much like the other cognitive
capacities of man, it is vital to investigate it in connection to these other cognitive capacities.
The Prototype Model tends to reduce the distinction solely for methodological reasons. The
distinction between an encyclopedic and a semantic level of categorial structure has also been
shown to be problematic through more focused arguments.
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For instance, the distinction between the two categories of information loses its
synchronic relevance given that the flexible extendibility of prototypical concepts is a
synchronic feature of linguistic structure and that these extensions may be based arbitrarily on
allegedly semantic or on allegedly encyclopedic features.

Consider a metaphor: Before the meaning "brave man" is attached to the lion,the feature
"brave" is not structurally distinctive inside the lion's semasiological structure, therefore
structuralist theories require it to be regarded as encyclopedic. However, if it can be agreed
upon—and this is obviously the key point—that the metaphorical extension of the lion to the
concept of "brave man" is not merely a matter of diachronic change but rather merely a result
of the synchronic flexibility of lexical items, then the feature unmistakably gains semantic
status. Let’s take another example about “Cat”:

These extensions can be seen in phonology (Nathan 1986), morphology (Bybee and
Moder 1983; Post 1986), syntax (Van Oosten 1986; Ross 1987), historical linguistics (Winters
1987; Aijmer 1985), markedness theory (Van Langendonck 1986), and theoretical
lexicography, to name a few contemporary examples (Geeraerts 1985c). Prototype theory has
been strengthened by these and other related developments, becoming one of the pillars of
Cognitive Linguistics.
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Critical Analysis

Strengths

It more closely resembles how people naturally categorise and think. People typically
use prominent exemplars of possibly applicable categories or a probabilistic assessment of the
degree of fit to a mental model they have developed (a prototype) to categorise complicated,
novel stimuli. (Van Petten C& Folstein JR, 2004; Medin D.L. 1989) (Rosch E & Mervis CB,
1975). According to cognitive science research, people typically make "good enough"
decisions for their goals when making judgements and decisions in daily life. However, when
more precise decisions are required, they will use explicit decision rules (Gigerenzer G &
Goldstein DG., 1996; Simon HA, 1978).

Clinical utility is the second benefit of prototype diagnosis. Clinicians have rated
prototype diagnosis as significantly more clinically useful than the more well-known DSM IV
system and alternative dimensional systems for a range of disorders on a range of measures,
from usefulness in communicating with other clinicians to ease of use, in numerous studies by
multiple research teams (Westen D, Heim A & Morrison K, 2002; Westen D, Shedler J &
Bradley R.,2010; Rottman B, Ahn W & Sanislow C.,2009; Spitzer R, First M & Shedler J.,
2008).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, a growing body of research demonstrates that prototype

diagnosis, as opposed to diagnosis using strict operational criteria, is extremely reliable in
clinical practise, with correlations typically ranging from.50 to.70 between two clinicians
(DeFife JA, Westen D & Bradley B, 2010; Westen D & Muderrisoglu S., 2003).

It enables them to easily and effectively express what they see with their patients and
convey it to other mental health professionals in both dimensional and categorical ways.
Prototype diagnosis combines the benefits of both, whereby dimensional diagnosis is likely
the most accurate in most situations and category diagnosis is the most familiar and feels the
most "natural."

This enables the development of clinically richer diagnostic descriptions in addition to the
development of empirically valid disorders without the need for committee wrangling over
which disorders or criteria to include, such as culturally relevant or culturally specific disorders
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that may emerge from a factor analysis in one culture but not in another. (Westen D. & Shedler
J., 1999)

The ability of prototype diagnosis to integrate instruction, training, and eventual clinical
experience is its sixth benefit. The purpose of prototype diagnosis is to assist doctors in creating
mental models of various disorders and, more importantly, in standardising those models across
diagnosticians.

The objective is to create mental models of cohesive syndromes, in which indications

and symptoms are functionally associated, rather than trying to memorise symptom lists
(Westen D & Bradley R., 2005; Ortigo KM, Bradley B & Westen D, 2010; Rottman B, Ahn
W & Sanislow C., 2009). This strategy mimics how the brain operates and cooperates with
rather than competes with naturally occurring cognitive processes (Rosch E & Mervis CB.,
1975; Kim NS & Ahn W., 2002; Cantor N & Genero N, 1986; Ahn W., 1999).

Limitations

It is impossible to define prototypical categories with a single set of criterion (required

and sufficient) attributes. Many words contain psychological objects or processes that we have
referred to as prototypes as their meanings rather than a set of necessary and sufficient
characteristics that a thing or event must satisfy in order to be considered a member of the
category designated by the word (Coleman and Kay 1981: 43).

Prototypical categories have a family resemblance structure, or more generally, a

radial set of clustered and overlapping meanings makes up their semantic structure. To explore
one of the major structural principles may govern the formation of the prototype structure of
semantic categories, which was first suggested in philosophy; Wittgenstein (1953) argued that
the referents of a word need not have common elements to be understood and used in the
normal functioning of language. He suggested that, rather, a family resemblance might be
what linked the various referents of a word.

A family resemblance relationship takes the form AB, BC, CD, DE. That is, each item
has at least one, and probably several, elements in common with one or more items, but no, or
few, elements are common to all item (Rosch & Mervis 1975: 574–575).
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Prototypical categories exhibit degrees of category membership- not every member is

equally representative for a category. The clearest cases of category membership, as
operationalized by people's assessments of the merits of category membership, have generally
been considered the prototypes of categories. In the complete absence of knowledge about
boundaries, we can assess how clear a case something is and deal with categories based on clear
cases (Rosch 1978: 36).

The edges of prototypical categories are fuzzy. Some of the most important problems
in conception and learning, whose solutions had been uncontested in prior approaches, have
been investigated and the subject of discussion thanks to new advances in categorization
research. Evidence from experiments shows that category borders are not always fixed (Mervis
& Rosch 198).

Conclusion

A good option for psychiatric diagnosis is prototype matching. Similar to research on

personality disorders, prototypes for mood and anxiety disorders performed better in predicting
psychopathology and overall functioning than DSM-IV decision guidelines. Numerous
benefits of prototype matching include its simplicity in clinical practise, decreased artifactual
comorbidity, compatibility with the cognitive processes that naturally occur in diagnosticians,
and easy translation into categorical and dimensional diagnosis.

The potential for confirmation biases and other heuristics that might cause physicians,
like all humans, to see what they expect to see or to maintain their beliefs about a patient in the
face of contradictory information is perhaps the most significant drawback of prototype
diagnosis. Whether it does so more than the methods in DSM-IV or ICD-10 is a matter of
empirical debate, but there is no doubt that pushing doctors to pair patients with prototypes
may increase their propensity to ignore contradictory information or steadfastly hold onto early
diagnostic ideas.

A comparable corpus of research on how to increase diagnostic reliability, validity,

and clinical value in routine practise, however, has notably been lacking. Although the
methods created for diagnosing patients since the DSM-V have substantially improved
reliability in research protocols, they have not done so in clinical practise, where lengthy
lists of symptoms with complicated coding systems that differ per condition have proven to
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be entirely unworkable. Instead of counting criteria and using cutoffs for categorical
diagnoses, clinicians typically diagnose in daily practise by pattern matching (Jampala VC,
Sierles FS & Taylor MA, 1988; Morey LC & Ochoa ES, 1989; Lipkowitz MH & Idupuganti
S., 1985).

A ranking diagnostic of 4 or 5 indicates that the patient closely resembles the diagnosis
to the point that it can be said that they have the condition (referred to as "caseness"); a
diagnosis of 3 indicates that they have features of the disorder; and a diagnosis of 1 indicates
that they do not. This method combines the benefits of dimensional diagnosis (i.e., patients
can be rated for the degree to which they have the disorder) with the advantages of categorical
diagnosis (e.g., patients can be described as having major depressive disorder ), reflecting the
wealth of evidence suggesting that most psychopathology is better represented as dimensional
than categorical (Widiger TA, Clark LA., 2000).

An alternate strategy that better aligns with how people categorize—including

clinicians—is prototype matching (Ahn W, Kim NS, Lassaline ME & Dennis MJ, 2000; Ahn
W, Kim NS, 2001).
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