a.

Doctrine: The general rule is that, only movable properties which have
physical or material existence and susceptible of occupation by another
are proper objects of theft. Only those movable properties which can be
taken and carried from the place they are found are proper subjects of
theft.

The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft

under the Penal Code is that it be capable of appropriation.

Interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is

capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real
properties.

b. Case Title: Luis Marcos P. Laurel vs. Hon. Zeus C. Abrogar, GR. No.
155076; (J. Ynares-Santiago); January 13, 2009

c. Facts: Luis Laurel (Laurel) was charged willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously take, steal and use the international long distance calls
belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR),
which is a method of routing and completing international long distance
calls using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency which
connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the
country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from
PLDT while using its facilities.

PLDT claimed such the “international phone calls” which are “electric
currents or sets of electric impulses transmitted through a medium, and
 carry a pattern representing the human voice to a receiver,” are personal
properties under Art. 416(3) Forces of nature which are brought under
control by science.

Laurel claims that the telephone conversation is not synonymous to

electric current or impulses hence it is not susceptible of appropriation,
thus cannot be considered a personal property.

d. Issue: Whether or not Laurel is guilty of theft of personal property.

e. Held: The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of

theft under the Penal Code is that it be capable of appropriation. The act
of conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) operations by illegally
connecting various equipment or apparatus to private respondent
Philippine Long Distance Telephone’s (PLDT’s) telephone system,
through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long
distance calls using respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone’s
(PLDT’s) facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction.

Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things which are or may be
the object of appropriation are considered either real property or
personal property. Though Business is likewise not enumerated as
personal property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business,
however, it may be appropriated.

Following the ruling in Strochecker v. Ramirez, 44 Phil.933 (1922),

business should also be classified as personal property. Since the
Business of providing telecommunication service is not included in the
exclusive enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it is therefore
personal property.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated February 27, 2006 is RECONSIDERED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
68841 affirming the Order issued by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150, which denied the
Motion to Quash (With Motion to Defer Arraignment) in Criminal Case
No. 99-2425 for theft, is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial
court and the Public Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby DIRECTED to
amend the Amended Information to show that the property subject of the
theft were services and business of the private offended party.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Both electric lines and communications cables, in the strictest
sense, are not directly adhered to the soil but pass through posts,
relays or landing stations, but both may be classified under the
term“ machinery” as real property under Article 415(5) of the Civil Code
for the simple reason that such pieces of equipment serve the
owner’s business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or works that
are on real estate.

b. Case Title: Capitol Wireless, Inc. vs. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas,

GR. No. 180110; (J. Peralta); May 30, 2016

c. Facts: Petitioner Capitol Wireless Inc. (Capwire) is a Philippine

corporation in the business of providing international
telecommunications services. As such provider, Capwire has signed
agreements with other local and foreign telecommunications companies
covering an international network of submarine cable systems such as
the Asia Pacific Cable Network System (APCN) (which connects
Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea,
Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines) ); the Brunei-Malaysia-Philippines
Cable Network System (BMP-CNS), the Philippines-Italy (SEA-ME-WE-
3 CNS), and the Guam Philippines (GP-CNS) systems. The agreements
provide for co-ownership and other rights among the parties over the
network.

Petitioner Capwire claims that it is a co-owner only of the so-called “Wet

Segment” of the APCN. As a co-owner, Capwire claims that it does not
own any particular physical part of the cable system but, consistent with
 its financial contributions, it owns the right to use a certain capacity of
the said system. Meanwhile, the landing stations or terminals and
Segment E of APCN located in Nasugbu, Batangas are allegedly owned
by the Philippine Long-Distance Telephone Corporation (PLDT).
Moreover, it alleges that the Wet Segment is laid in international, and
not Philippine waters.

In essence, the Provincial Assessor had determined that the submarine

cable systems described are taxable real property, a determination that
was contested by Capwire. Capwire contented that the cable system lies
outside of Philippine territory, i.e., on international waters.

On February 7, 2003 and March 4, 2003, Capwire received a Warrant of

Levy and a Notice of Auction Sale, respectively, from the respondent
Provincial Treasurer of Batangas (Provincial Treasurer). Capwire filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was likewise dismissed by the
RTC. It then filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals and was likewise
dismissed. Hence, this petition.

d. Issue: Whether or not submarine communications cables be classified

as taxable real property by the local governments.

e. Held: The Court held in the affirmative.

Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric

transmission lines which this Court has recently declared in Manila
Electric Company v. City Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, as
“no longer exempted from real property tax” and may qualify as
“machinery” subject to real property tax under the Local Government
Code.

Moreover, both electric lines and communications cables, in the strictest

sense, are not directly adhered to the soil but pass through posts, relays
or landing stations, but both may be classified under the term
“machinery” as real property under Article 415(5)of the Civil Code for the
simple reason that such pieces of equipment serve the owner’s business
or tend to meet the needs of his industry or works that are on real
estate. Even objects in or on a body of water may be classified as such,
as “waters” is classified as an immovable under Article 415(8)of the
Code. A classic example is a boathouse which, by its nature, is a vessel
and, therefore, a personal property but, if it is tied to the shore and used
as a residence, and since it floats on waters which is immovable, is
considered real property.

It is settled in the Local Government Code, “municipal waters” includes

“not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, not
being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the
national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves or fishery
reserves, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn
perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary
lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line
parallel with the general coastline and fifteen (15) kilometers from it.
Although the term “municipal waters” appears in the Code in the context
of the grant of quarrying and fisheries privileges for a fee by local
governments, its inclusion in the Code’s Book II which covers local
taxation means that it may also apply as guide in determining the
territorial extent of the local authorities’ power to levy real property
taxation.

Thus, the jurisdiction or authority over such part of the subject

submarine cable system lying within Philippine jurisdiction includes the
authority to tax the same, for taxation is one of the three basic and
necessary attributes of sovereignty, and such authority has been
delegated by the national legislature to the local governments with
respect to real property taxation.

As earlier stated, a way for Capwire to claim that its cable system is not
covered by such authority is by showing a domestic enactment or even
contract, or an international agreement or treaty exempting the same
from real property taxation. It failed to do so as such had been expressly
withdrawn by the Local Government Code, which took effect on January
1, 1992, Sections 193 and 234 of which provide:

Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. – Unless

otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted
to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local
water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938,
nonstock and nonprofit hospitals and educational institutions, are
hereby withdrawn.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals'
Decision dated May 30, 2007 and Resolution dated October 8, 2007
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The machines although each of them was movable or personal
property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements of petitioner’s
chocolate-making industry.

Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be

considered as personal.

The Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are
to be considered as personal property; Under the circumstances they
are proper subjects of the writ of seizure.

That the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the

Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned.

b. Case Title: Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. GR.
No.137705; (J. Panganiban); August 22, 2000

c. Facts: Respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc, filed with the RTC-QC
a complaint for a sum of money with an application for a writ of replevin.
Respondent Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize
and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI after 5 days and upon
the payment of the necessary expenses.
 In the implementation of the said writ, the sheriff proceeded to
petitioner’s factory, seized one machinery with word that he would return
for the other.

Petitioners filed a motion for special protective order, invoking the power
of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control
its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement
of the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed by PCI Leasing, on the
ground that the properties were still personal and therefore still subject
to seizure and a writ of replevin.

The sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take
possession of the remaining properties. He was able to take two more,
but was prevented by the workers from taking the rest.

d. Issue: Whether or not the machineries became real property by virtue of

immobilization.

e. Held: Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory
were not proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC, because they
were in fact real property.

Writ of Replevin: Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of

replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property only.

Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that machinery, receptacles,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of
Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land.
They were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making
industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal
property on its own, all of them have become “immobilized by
destination because they are essential and principal elements in the
industry.”

However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be

considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of
estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the
truth of any material fact found therein.

Section 12.1 of the Agreement between the parties provides “The

PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property
notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or
hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in,
or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or
attached in any manner to what is permanent.”

The machines are personal property and they are proper subjects of the
Writ of Replevin.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Posting of surety bond may be considered as a substantial
compliance with the requirement of “payment under protest” as a
condition sine qua non before an appeal may be entertained.

It is settled that tax exemptions must be clear and unequivocal. A

taxpayer claiming a tax exemption must point to a specific provision of
law conferring on the taxpayer, in clear and plain terms, exemption from
a common burden. Any doubt whether a tax exemption exists is
resolved against the taxpayer.

For determining whether machinery is real property subject to real

property tax, the definition and requirements under the LGC are
controlling, not the NCC. Sections 199(o) and 232 of the LGC,
respectively, gives an extensive definition of what constitutes
“machinery” and unequivocally subjects such machinery to real property
tax.

b. Case Title: Manila Electric Company vs. The City Assessor, GR. No.
166102; (J. Leonardo-De Castro); August 5, 2015

c. Facts: MERALCO is a private corporation organized and existing under

Philippine laws to operate as a public utility engaged in electric
distribution. MERALCO has been successively granted franchises to
operate in Lucena City beginning 1922 until present time, particularly,
by: (1) Resolution No. 36 dated May 15, 1922 of the Municipal Council
of Lucena; (2) Resolution No. 108 dated July 1, 1957 of the Municipal
Council of Lucena; (3) Resolution No. 2679 dated June 13, 1972 of the
Municipal Board of Lucena City; (4) Certificate of Franchise dated
October 28, 1993 issued by the National Electrification Commission; and
(5) Republic Act No. 9209 approved on June 9, 2003 by Congress.

On February 20, 1989, MERALCO received from the City Assessor of

Lucena a copy of Tax Declaration No. 019-6500 covering the following
electric facilities, classified as capital investment, of the company: (a)
transformer and electric post; (b) transmission line; (c) insulator; and (d)
electric meter, located in Quezon Ave. Ext., Brgy. Gulang-Gulang,
Lucena City. Under Tax Declaration No. 019-6500, these electric
facilities had a market value of P81,811,000.00 and an assessed value
of P65,448,800.00, and were subjected to real property tax as of 1985.

MERALCO appealed Tax Declaration No. 019-6500 before the LBAA of

Lucena City, which was docketed as LBAA-89-2. MERALCO claimed
that its capital investment consisted only of its substation facilities, the
true and correct value of which was only P9,454,400.00; and that
MERALCO was exempted from payment of real property tax on said
substation facilities.

The LBAA rendered a Decision in LBAA-89-2 on July 5, 1989, finding

that under its franchise, MERALCO was required to pay the City
Government of Lucena a tax equal to 5% of its gross earnings, and
 “[s]aid tax shall be due and payable quarterly and shall be in lieu of any
and all taxes of any kind, nature, or description levied, established, or
collected, on its poles, wires, insulators, transformers and structures,
installations, conductors, and accessories, from which taxes the grantee
(MERALCO) is hereby expressly exempted.” As regards the issue of
whether or not the poles, wires, insulators, transformers, and electric
meters of MERALCO were real properties, the LBAA cited the 1964
case of Board of Assessment Appeals v. Manila Electric Company (1964
MERALCO case) in which the Court held that: (1) the steel towers fell
within the term “poles” expressly exempted from taxes under the
franchise of MERALCO; and (2) the steel towers were personal
properties under the provisions of the Civil Code and, hence, not subject
to real property tax. The LBAA lastly ordered that Tax Declaration No.
019-6500 would remain and the poles, wires, insulators, transformers,
and electric meters of MERALCO would be continuously assessed, but
the City Assessor would stamp on the said Tax Declaration the word
“exempt.

d. Issue: Whether or not Meralco is subject to real property tax.

e. Held: Yes. The last paragraph of Section 234 had unequivocally

withdrawn, upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code,
exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or
juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except as provided in the same section.
MERALCO, a private corporation engaged in electric distribution, and its
transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and electric
meters used commercially do not qualify under any of the ownership,
character, and usage exemptions enumerated in Section 234 of the
Local Government Code. MERALCO's exemption from real property tax
granted under its franchise was among the exemptions withdrawn upon
the effectivity of the local government code on January 1, 1998.
MERALCO has failed to produce any legal and binding express grant of
real property tax exemption for its transformers, electric poles,
transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters, even under the Local
Government Code.

It is well established that tax exemptions must be explicit and

unambiguous. A taxpayer claiming a tax exemption must cite a specific
statute that grants the exemption.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court PARTLY GRANTS the

instant Petition and AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision dated
May 13, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67027,
affirming in toto the Decision dated May 3, 2001 of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals in CBAA Case No. L-20-98. The Court
DECLARES that the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines,
insulators, and electric meters of Manila Electric Company are NOT
EXEMPTED from real property tax under the Local Government Code.
However, the Court also DECLARES the appraisal and assessment of
the said properties under Tax Declaration Nos. 019-6500 and 019-7394
as NULL and VOID for not complying with the requirements of the Local
Government Code and violating the right to due process of Manila
Electric Company, and ORDERS the CANCELLATION of the collection
letter dated October 16, 1997 of the City Treasurer of Lucena and the
Notice of Assessment dated October 20, 1997 of the City Assessor of
Lucena, but WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the conduct of a new appraisal
and assessment of the same properties by the City Assessor of Lucena
in accord with the provisions of the Local Government Code and
guidelines issued by the Bureau of Local Government Financing.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The exemption from real property taxes given to cooperatives
applies regardless of whether or not the land owned is leased. This
exemption benefits the cooperative’s lessee. The characterization of
machinery as real property is governed by the Local Government Code
and not the Civil Code.

b. Case Title: Provincial Assessor of Agusan del Sur vs. Filipinas Palm Oil
Plantation, Inc. GR. No. 183416; (J. Leonen); October 5, 2016

c. Facts: Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation Inc. (Filipinas) is a private

organization engaged in palm oil plantation. Its plantation is situated in
National Development Company (NDC) lands in Agusan Del Sur. With
the plantation, there are also three (3) plantation roads and a number of
residential homes constructed by Filipinas for its employees.

After the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was passed,

NDC lands were transferred to CARL beneficiaries who formed
themselves as the merged NDC-Guthrie Plantations, Inc.- NDC-Guthrie
Estates, Inc. (NGPI-NGEI) Cooperatives. Filipinas entered into a lease
contract agreement with NGPI-NGEI as lessee of the lands where its
plantation is operated.
 The Provincial-Assessor of Agusan del Sur (Provincial Assessor)
assessed Filipinas’ properties found within the plantation area which
Filipinas assailed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
(LBAA) on the ground that the Provincial Assessor erred in imposing
real property taxes against Filipinas for the roads, bridges, culverts,
pipes and canals as these belonged to the cooperatives.

The LBAA found that roads of any kind, as well as all their
improvements, should not be taxed since these roads were intermittently
used by the public. On appeal, the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals (CBAA) affirmed such ruling. The CBAA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Provincial Assessor. The Court of Appeals
held that the land owned by NGPI-NGEI, which Filipinas has been
leasing, cannot be subjected to real property tax since these are owned
by cooperatives that are tax-exempt.

d. Issue: Whether or not NGPI-NGEI be held liable for real property tax for
the roads that permanently became part of the land being leased by
Filipinas.

e. Held: No. NGPI-NGEI is not liable for real property tax for the roads that
permanently became part of the land being lease by Filipinas. Section
234 of the Local Government Code exempts all real property owned by
cooperatives without distinction. Nothing in the law suggests that the
real property tax exemption only applies when the property is used by
the cooperative itself. Similarly, the instance that the real property is
leased to either an individual or corporation is not a ground for
withdrawal of tax exemption. NGPI-NGEI, as the owner of the land being
leased by Filipinas, falls within the purview of the law.

The roads that Filipinas constructed became permanent improvements

on the land owned by the NGPI-NGEI by right of accession under the
Civil Code. Despite the land being leased by Filipinas when the roads
were constructed, the ownership of the improvement still belongs to
NGPI-NGEI.

As provided under Article 440 and 445 of the Civil Code, the land is
owned by the cooperatives at the time Filipinas built the roads. Hence,
whatever is incorporated in the land, either naturally or artificially,
belongs to the NGPI-NGEI as the landowner. Although the roads were
primarily built for respondent's benefit, the roads were also being used
by the members of NGPI and the public. Therefore, the land owned by
NGPI-NGEI being leased by Filipinas is exempt from real property tax
including the roads built by the latter on it.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated September 26, 2007 and the Resolution dated
May 26, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74060 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, in that the road equipment and the mini haulers should
be assessed with real property taxes.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Regalian Doctrine the fact that they acquired the same by sale
and their transferor by succession is not incontrovertible proof that it is of
private dominion or ownership. In the absence of such incontrovertible
proof of private ownership, the well-entrenched presumption arising from
the Regalian doctrine that the subject land is of public domain or
dominion must be overcome.

b. Case Title: Republic vs. Spouses Ildefonso Alejandre and Zenaida

Ferrer Alejandre, GR. No. 217336; (J. Caguoia); October 17, 2018

c. Facts: The Republic filed its Opposition to the application based on the
following grounds: (1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945
or earlier. (2) that applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title
and/or the tax declarations with the petition to evidence bona fide
acquisition of. the land applied for or of its fair market value; and (3) that
the subject property applied for is a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

RTC granted the application for registration of title. It is undisputed that

applicants acquired the land in question by virtue of Deed of
Saleexecuted year 1990 from Taleon who acquired the land from her
mother by inheritance. Thus, the applicant spouses acquired ownership
 over Lot 6487 through a contract of sale which is well within the purview
of section 14 of P.D No. 1529.

d. Issue: Whether or not the granting of the application for registration of

land was valid.

e. Held: No. The granting of the application for registration of land was not
valid because the applicants failed to prove private ownership of the
subject land. Respondent failed to prove the nature or classification of
the land subject of their application for registration by virtue of tradition,
as consequence of the contract of sale and by succession in so far as
their predecessors-in-interest are concerned. In the absence of such
incontrovertible proof of private ownership, the well-entrenched
presumption arising from the Regalian Doctrine that the subject land is
of public domain or dominion, must be overcome, he writes.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated

February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101259
and the Amended Decision dated June 12, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2 in LRC Case No. N-20 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents' application for registration
in LRC Case No. N-20 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man
and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the
subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription
against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4)
cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.

Article 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession.

b. Case Title: Teofilo C. Villarico vs. Vivencio Sarmiento, GR. No. 136438;
(J. Sandoval-Gutierrez); November 11, 2004

c. Facts: Spouses Villarico sought for the confirmation of title over a parcel
of land to which they allege that they absolutely own the land. This was
opposed to by a person who posed himself also to be the rightful owner
of the land, as well as by the Director of Forestry who said that the
subject land is part of forest land and may not be appropriated. Trial and
appellate court dismissed application of petitioners.

d. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellant has acquired a right of way

over the land of the government which is between his property and the
Ninoy Aquino Avenue.
e. Held: There has been no showing that a declassification has been made
of the land in question as disposable or alienable. And the record indeed
disclosed that applicants have not introduced any evidence which would
have led the court a quo to rule otherwise. Forest lands cannot be
owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long
doesn’t ripen to a registrable title. The adverse possession which may
be the basis of a grant or title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers
only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated December 7, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54883 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that neither petitioner nor
respondents have a right of possession over the disputed lot where the
stairways were built as it is a property of public dominion. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Two things must be shown to enable registration under
Section 14(1). First is the object of the application, i.e., land that is "part
of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain." Second is
possession. This possession, in turn, must be: first, "open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious"; second, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership; and third, has taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

b. Case Title: Kawayan Hills Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 203090;
(J. Leonen); September 5, 2018

c. Facts: Kawayan Hills is a domestic corporation dealing with real estate.

It is in possession of a 1,461-square-meter parcel of land identified as
Cad. Lot No. 2512 located in Barangay No. 22, Nagbacalan, Paoay,
Ilocos Norte. All other lots surrounding Lot No. 2512 have been titled in
Kawayan Hills' name. On August 7, 2001, Kawayan Hills, through its
President, Pastor Laya, filed an application for confirmation and
registration of Lot No. 2512's title in its name before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Paoay-Currimao. Kawayan Hills claimed to have acquired
Lot No. 2512 on December 27, 1995 through a Deed of Adjudication
with Sale executed by Servando Teofilo and Maria Dafun, the
successors-in-interest of Andres Dafun. Andres had been Lot No. 2512's
real property tax declarant since 1931. Andres, with his eight (8)
children, had also allegedly possessed, cultivated, and harvested Lot
No. 2512's fruits.

On September 4, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the

Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Opposition to the application. It
asserted that Kawayan Hills failed to comply with the requirements of
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, for judicial confirmation of imperfect title

Kawayan Hills also presented evidence to the effect that Andres and his
successors-in-interest had been tilling Lot No. 2512. In particular,
Eufemiano Dafun, Andres' grandson, testified that Andres had been in
possession of Lot No. 2512 since World War II, when the latter was
seven (7) years old. He recalled that Andres harvested fruits from Lot
No. 2512.

Municipal Circuit Trial Court ruled in favor of Kawayan Hills, confirmed

its title over Lot No. 2512, and ordered Lot No. 2512's registration in
Kawayan Hills' name.

Court of Appeals reversed the Municipal Circuit Trial Court July 8, 2010
Decision. It maintained that Kawayan Hills failed to establish its or its
predecessors-in-interest's bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier, as to enable confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree. It added that Kawayan Hills could not,
as an alternative, successfully claim title by acquisitive prescription
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. It reasoned
 that Kawayan Hills failed to show that there has been an express
declaration by the State, whether by law or presidential proclamation,
that Lot No. 2512 "is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial use."

d. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Kawayan Hills Corporation is entitled to

have title over Lot No. 2512 confirmed and registered in its favor.

e. Held: Yes. The Court of Appeals' reduction of the resolution of

petitioner's application to the expedient aphorism that tax declarations
do not absolutely establish ownership fails to account for composite and
uncontroverted aspects of petitioner's claim.

In addition to Andres' declaration of Lot No. 2512 for the payment of real
property taxes for almost a decade and a half ahead of the June 12,
1945 threshold, and his and his successors-in-interest's unfailing
diligence in paying real property taxes, there are more details that attest
to possession in the concept of owner. Since the start of Andres'
documented possession in 1931, no one has come forward to contest
his and his successors-in- interest's possession as owners. It was only
on September 4, 2001, about a month after petitioner's filing of its
application, that the Republic came forward to contest the confirmation
and registration of title in his name.

By then, title to every single lot surrounding Lot No. 2512 had been
issued in petitioner's name. Throughout the intervening time, Andres
and his successors-in- interest tilled Lot No. 2512. Andres' grandson,
Eufemiano, testified for petitioner before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court.

He unequivocally declared that Andres had been occupying Lot No.

2512 since World War II. He affirmed that he had witnessed his
grandfather harvesting fruits. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court
categorically stated that Lot No. 2512 had been used by Andres and his
children "for agricultural production since 1942.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed

January 11, 2012 Decision, June 28, 2012 Resolution, July 17, 2012
Resolution, and August 15, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95701 are NULLIFIED. The July 8, 2010 Decision of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Paoay-Currimao, Ilocos Norte in Land
Reg. Case No. N-4 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: In an application for registration of land, the applicant must
prove that the land is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, and that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the land under bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The applicant must also present a
certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO), as well as a copy of the original classification approved
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Secretary.

b. Case Title: Republic vs. Spouses Guillermo Alonso and Inocencia

Britanico-Alonso, GR. No. 210738; (J. Reyes Jr.); August 14, 2019

c. Facts: A petition for registration of Lot 2209 (subject land), situated in

Poblacion, Oton, Iloilo, was filed by spouses Guillermo Alonso and
Inocencia Britanico-Alonso (spouses Alonso). In their petition, spouses
Alonso claimed that the subject land being an alienable and disposable
land of public domain, was previously owned and possessed by spouses
Rafael C. Montalvo and Manuel a Garnica (spouses Montalvo) way back
 in 1945. After the latter's death, their heirs executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement among Heirs with Waiver of Hereditary Shares and sold the
subject land in their favor evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated January
27, 1998. As such, spouses Alonso asserted that tacking their
possession with that of their predecessors-in- interest, they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial,
thereby warranting the registration of the property in their names. The
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 22, dismissed the petition.

The RTC ruled that spouses Alonso failed to prove that their and their
predecessors-in-interest's possession has been open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since time immemorial or earlier than 1945.
Aggrieved, spouses Alonso filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was denied. The CA granted the appeal and approved the registration of
the subject land. The CA found that the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession requirement was met for the registration of the
subject land.

d. Issue: Whether or not the registration of the subject land is proper.

e. Held: NO. Presidential Decree No. 152915 explicitly provides for the
requirements in an application for registration of land. Under Section 14
(1), it is necessary that: (a) the land or property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; (b) the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
(c) it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

On this note, this Court accentuates that in an application for

registration, the foremost consideration is the nature and classification of
the land in question. This is based on the presumption that all lands of
the public domain belong to the State or the Regalian doctrine.
Thus, without the determination of which, all other requirements
necessary for registration are purposeless and futile. Thus, in a land
registration proceeding, the applicant bears the burden of overcoming
the presumption of State ownership.

The records of the case reveal that the only basis for the RTC in
considering the subject lot as alienable and disposable is the testimony
of Henry Belmones as the Chief of Land Evaluation Party of the DENR,
who merely relied on Control Map No. 18, which was not offered and
presented in evidence and a survey plan. Notably, the pieces of
evidence are deficient to prove the nature of the property as alienable
and disposable. Spouses Alonso failed to submit a CENRO or PENRO
certification and an issuance by the DENR Secretary signifying his
approval for the release of the subject land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. Ergo, spouses Alonso fail to discharge the
burden of proof.

As the first element is clearly lacking, the occupation and possession of

the subject land by spouses Alonso, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership. Consequently, a title cannot be issued in their favor.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated May 31, 2013, and the Resolution dated
December 12, 2013 of the Court of Appeals-Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV
No. 03510 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for registration
of Lot 2209, Cadastral No. 24, Iloilo Cadastre, AP-06-005399 filed by
respondent spouses Guillermo Alonso and Inocencia Britanico-Alonso is
hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: An easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable
for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner or for
the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the
encumbered estate does not belong. Continuous and apparent
easements may be acquired by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten
years.

Meanwhile, continuous but non-apparent easements and discontinuous

ones can only be acquired by virtue of a title.

b. Case Title: Teofilo Alolino vs. Fortunato Flores, GR. No. 198774; (J.
Brion); April 4, 2016

c. Facts: Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of

land. Alolino initially constructed a bungalow-type house on the property.
In 1980, he added a second floor to the structure. He also extended his
two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are terraces on
both floors. There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three
(3) on the ground floor and another three (3) on the second floor.
 In 1994, the responded spouses Fotunato and Anastacia Flores
constructed their house/sari-sari store on the vacant municipal road
immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino’s house. The
structure is only about two (2) or three (3) inches away from the back of
Alolino’s house, covering five windows and the exit door. The
respondents’ construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he
had previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to the
municipal road through the read door of his house.

Respondents on their part argued that they had occupied their lot where
they constructed their house in 1955, long before the plaintiff purchased
his lot in the 70s. They further alleged that plaintiff only has himself to
blame because he constructed his house up to the very boundary of his
lot without observing the required setback. Finally, they emphasized that
the wall of their house facing Alolino’s does not violate the latter’s
alleged easement of the light and view because it has no window.

d. Issue: Whether or not Alolino has acquired easement of light and view;
and Whether or not Alolino has acquired an easement of right of way.

e. Held: Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an

easement of right of way over the respondents’ property or the barrio
road it stands on. Articles 649-657 governs legal easements of right of
way. None of these provisions are applicable to Alolino’s property with
respect to the barrio road where the respondents’ house stands on.
On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired
through prescription counting from the time when the owner of the
dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner from block the
view of a window located within the dominant estate. Notably, Alolino
had no made a formal prohibition upon the respondents prior to their
construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement light
and view through prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94524 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 153 in Civil
Case No. 69320 is REINSTATED.

The respondents, and all persons claiming rights under them, are
ORDERED to remove and demolish their illegal structure. The
respondents are also ORDERED to pay the petitioner the sum of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as attorney's fees. Costs
against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The resolution of a boundary dispute - by reason of the issue
therein being whether or not the contested portion pertained to one or
the other of the parties - is not within the province of the summary action
of forcible entry under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It can be taken
proper cognizance of in the context of accion reivindicatoria

b. Case Title: Jessica Lio Martinez vs. Heirs of Remberto F. Lim, GR. No.
234655; (J. Bersamin); September 11, 2019

c. Facts: Respondents are the heirs of Remberto Lim who, during his
lifetime, owned, possessed, and cultivated a parcel of land located in
Sitio Banga, Barangay VI, Coron, Palawan, designated as Assessor's
Lot 065 and covered by Tax Declaration No. 006-0515-A. Adjoining
Remberto's land is the land of his brother - Jose Lim. Jose sold his land
covered by OCT No. E-9487 to a certain Dorothy and Alexander Medalla
who, thereafter, subdivided the same into two (2) smaller lots,
designated as Lots 1 and 2. Lot 2 was further subdivided into nine (9)
smaller lots, this time designated as Lots 2-A to 2-1, inclusive. Lots 2-D,
2-E and 2-F were thereafter sold to herein petitioner Martinez, pursuant
to three (3) separate Deeds of Absolute Sale, and by virtue thereof,
 petitioner Martinez was issued TCT Nos. 065-2010000259, 065-
2010000260, and 065-2010000261 in her favor.

Now then, claiming that petitioner had unlawfully encroached into a

portion of their property, respondents, through counsel, sent a demand
letter to petitioner demanding that she immediately remove the fence
that she built on respondents' land as well as to turn over peaceful
possession of that portion of property that petitioner intruded into.
Unfortunately, the demand was ignored by petitioner, and respondents
were constrained to file the instant complaint for Forcible Entry with
Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioner
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Coron-Busuanga (MCTC).

The MCTC ordered petitioner, among others, to vacate and turn over
peaceful possession of the disputed portion of property. In its ruling, the
MCTC examined petitioner's title as well as those of her predecessors'
and concluded that when the Medalla spouses subdivided Lot 2 into
nine (9) smaller lots, they erroneously included a portion of Socorro
Lim's property. On appeal by petitioner, the Regional Trial Court, Branch
51, Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC) affirmed in toto the
disposition of the MCTC. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof, but to no avail.

d. Issue: Whether or not the contested portion pertained to one or the other
of the parties is within the summary action of forcible entry under Rule
70 of the Rules of Court.
e. Held: No. The resolution of a boundary dispute-by reason of the issue
therein being can be taken proper cognizance in the context of accion
reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion. It is an action whereby the
plaintiff alleges ownership of the parcel of land and seeks recovery of its
full possession. The issue involved in and determined through accion
reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This action
can be filed when the dispossession lasted for more than one year. The
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or only some of the claims asserted therein.
Verily, the body of the complaint, not its title, fixes the nature of an
action.

Based on the allegations of the complaint, the decisive issue is whether

or not the forcible entry under Rule 70 was the proper remedy to resolve
this controversy. The Supreme Court ruled that it is not. A proper
reading of the allegations of the complaint shows that the case revolved
around the actual metes and bounds of the parties’ respective
properties. The complaint was anchored on the theory that the
properties registered in three certificates of title issued in the name of
the petitioner had erroneously included portions of the property covered
by the tax declaration issued in the name of the respondent’s
predecessor in interest. It can be gleaned therefrom that the dispute
essentially concerned the actual metes and bounds of their respective
properties. Under such circumstances, the issue was really whether or
not the petitioner’s titles included the disputed portion. The dispute did
 not primarily concern merely possessory rights, but related to
boundaries, and could not be summarily determined.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;

REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on March 20,
2017 by the Court of Appeals; DISMISSES the complaint for forcible
entry without prejudice to the filing of the proper action; and ORDERS
the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual
or threatened dispossession; Absent in the case at bar. - Both the
Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized
petitioner’s drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of
private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated
in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. Such justification is unavailing
because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the
time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the
case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from
Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, “In no case may possession
be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or
right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of
the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
b. Case Title: German Management & Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
GR. No. 76217; (C.J. Fernan); September 14, 1989

c. Facts: Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

are owners of the land situated in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal. The spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney
authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their
property. They have already acquired the proper permits to do so but
they discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20
other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmer’s Association.)
These farmers have occupied the land for the last twelve to fifteen years
prior to the issuance of the permits and they already have their crops all
over the property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land.

Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and
bulldoze their crops and property. The respondents filed in CFI because
they were deprived of their property without due process of law by
trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property
situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed the
decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in CA but were denied
thus this appeal.

d. Issue: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible

entry case against petitioner.

e. Held: YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private
respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they
were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to
commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or
illegality of possession.

Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible

entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible
entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title
to an estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is
undisputed that private respondents were in possession of the property
and not the petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners
have a valid claim over ownership this does not in any way justify their
act of ―forcible entry. It must be stated that regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has
the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self-help, which the petitioners were
using to justify their actions, are not applicable in the case because it
can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession
which is absent in the case at bar (in fact they are the ones who are
threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article 536
basically tells us that the owner or a person who has a better right over
the land must resort to judicial means to recover the property from
another person who possesses the land.
 WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: The ownership of the land extends to the surface as well as to

the subsoil under it.
Article 437. The owner of a land is the owner of its surface and
of everything under it and he can construct thereon any works
or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem
proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special
laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation.

Right over lands are indivisible and require and definitive and
categorical classification.
The landowner’s right extends to such height or where it is
possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment and is
extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more
interest protected by law.
b. Case Title: National Power Corporation vs. Ibrahim, GR. No. 168732; (J.
Azcuna); June 29, 2007

c. Facts: On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his

personal capacity and in behalf of his co-heirs instituted an action
against petitioner National Power Corporation for recovery of possession
of land and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur.

Petitioners claim ownership of several parcels of land with a total area of

70,000 square meters.
Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without
respondents’ knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the sub-
terrain area of their lands and constructed therein underground tunnels.
The existence of the tunnels was only discovered sometime in July 1992
by respondents and then later confirmed on November 13, 1992 by
NAPOCOR itself through a memorandum. The tunnels were apparently
being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in
the operation of NAPOCOR’s Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, VII projects located in
Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and
Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City.

On October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay

damages and vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter
refused to vacate much less pay damages. Respondents further averred
that the construction of the underground tunnels has endangered their
lives and properties as Marawi City lies in an area of local volcanic and
tectonic activity. Respondents also claimed for moral and exemplary
damages.

NAPOCOR filed an answer with counterclaim denying the material

allegations of the complaint and interposing affirmative and special
defenses, namely that (1) there is a failure to state a cause of
action since respondents seek possession of the sub-terrain portion
when they were never in possession of the same, (2) respondents have
no cause of action because they failed to show proof that they were the
owners of the property, and (3) the tunnels are a government project
for the benefit of all and all private lands are subject to such
easement as may be necessary for the same.

RTC ruled that the NPC pay the respondents the fair market value of the
subject property and pay monthly rental from its occupancy from 1978.
Moral damages and attornery’s fees were also awarded.

On October 4,1996, a Petition for Relief from Judgment was filed by the
respondents asserting that they would not agree to alienation of the
subject property. The payment of the fair market value was considered
as just compensation which would make NPC the owners of the land.

The RTC modified its previous decision. However, upon appeal of both
parties to CA, the modified decision was set aside and reinstated the
original decision but deleting the award of moral damages.
d. Issues: 1. Whether or not the respondents own the sub-terrain portion of
the property.
2. Whether or not the respondents are entitled to just compensation.

e. Held: 1. Yes, respondents own the sub-terrain portion of the property.

The Civil Code provides: “ART. 437.

The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of

everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make
any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances.
He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial
navigation.”

Futher, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court

ruled that rights over lands are indivisible and, consequently, require a
definitive and categorical classification:

“The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of

interest" between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of
the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange doctrine, for it is a well-
known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only
to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace
above it up to a reasonable height. Xxx”

In this case, the trial court found that respondents could have dug upon
their property motorized deep wells but were prevented from doing so by
the authorities precisely because of the construction and existence of the
tunnels underneath the surface of their property. Respondents,
therefore, still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as
they could have excavated the same for the construction of the deep
well. The fact that they could not was appreciated by the RTC as proof
that the tunnels interfered with respondents’ enjoyment of their property
and deprived them of its full use and enjoyment.

2. Yes, respondents are entitled to just compensation.

In the past, the Court has held that if the government takes property
without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many
years, the property owner may demand payment of just compensation in
the event restoration of possession is neither convenient nor feasible.
This is in accordance with the principle that persons shall not be
deprived of their property except by competent authority and for public
use and always upon payment of just compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain

portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full
compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the
easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use.
Respondents, as the owners of the property thus expropriated, are
entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money
equivalent of said property.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 57792 dated June 8, 2005 is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid
by the owner takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical
custody only and does not become vested with legal possession. In
assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of
restoring the thing to its owner.

b. Case Title: Edna Palero-Tan vs. Ciriaco I. Urdaneta, Jr., A.M. No. P-07-
2399; (J. Chico-Nazario); June 18, 2008

c. Facts: Edna Palero-Tan charged Ciriaco I. Urdaneta (court employee)

for stealing her ring and bracelet. Complainant claimed that she kept her
jewelry in the locked drawer of her table because she fears that they
might be lost at the boarding house she is renting. However, she
discovered that her ring and bracelet worth fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) were missing. She maintained that the only person who
 was present and saw her take out the jewelry from her table drawer was
respondent (Ciriaco), whose table is adjacent to hers.

An officemate, Altone, confided to her that he heard from his landlady,

Nable, that respondent and his wife, Milagros, had a quarrel because
the latter discovered a ring and a bracelet in respondents coin purse.
Milagros suspected that respondent bought the jewelry for his mistress.

Respondent denied that he stole complainant’s jewelry. He claimed that

he found a small plastic sachet containing a ring and a bracelet under
his table. When nobody claimed the jewelry, he placed them inside his
coin purse and took them home. However, he threw the pieces of
jewelry when his wife starts nagging.

d. Issues: 1. Whether or not Edna’s bracelet and ring can be considered as

lost or stolen items.

2. Whether or not Ciriaco had a right to keep the jewelry as finder or was
he guilty of theft.

e. Held: 1. It is considered stolen.

The Court agreed with the conclusion of the Investigating Attorney.

Ciriaco admitted finding the small plastic sachet containing complainants
ring and bracelet on 29 June 2005, and keeping the jewelry in his
possession until he purportedly threw them away. Having admitted to
finding the jewelry and keeping it in his possession without informing his
officemates about the same, plus the positive evidence submitted by
complainant, respondent’s bare denial of any personal interest in the
jewelry was not given credence.

It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it

must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise,
such denial is purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value. Like
the defense of alibi, a denial crumbles in the light of positive
declarations.

2. When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the
owner takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only
and does not become vested with legal possession. In assuming such
custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to
its owner. It is thus Ciriaco’s duty to report to his superior or his
officemates that he found something. The Civil Code, in Article 719,
explicitly requires the finder of a lost property to report it to the proper
authorities, thus:

Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must

return it to its previous possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder
shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or municipality
where the finding has taken place.

The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two

consecutive weeks in the way he deems best.
 If the movables cannot be kept without deterioration, or without the
expenses which considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at
public auction eight days after the publication.

Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner
having appeared, the thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to
the finder. The finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the case
may be, to reimburse the expenses.”

Contrary to Ciriaco’s claim, the Court was convinced that Ciriaco had the
intention to appropriate the jewelry to himself had these not been
discovered by his wife. His claim that the ring and bracelet were worthless
“fancy” jewelry is immaterial because the basis for his liability is his act of
taking something which does not belong to him.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Ciriaco I. Urdaneta, Jr.,

GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, and hereby imposes on said respondent a
fine of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00), to be deducted from his
retirement benefits. The Financial Management Office of the Office of the
Court Administrator is directed to release the remaining amount of the
retirement benefits to respondent.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: In exceptional cases, the Court has applied Article 448 to
instances where a builder, planter, or sower introduces improvements
on titled land if with the knowledge and consent of the owner.

b. Case Title: Spouses Julian Belvis vs. Conrado Erola, GR. No. 239727;
(J. Caguioa); July 24, 2019

c. Facts: On July 2, 2012, Spouses Erolas sent Spouses Belvis a letter

requiring the latter to vacate the property within 30 days from receipt of
the letter. The Belvis, however, refused to comply. After unsuccessful
barangay conciliation proceedings, Erolas filed the instant
complaint.

On the other hand, Belvis claimed that in 1979, the subject property was
purchased by the late Rosario V. Erola (Rosario), the mother of Cecilia
Belvis and Conrado Erola. Conrado, however, allegedly succeeded in
registering the property solely in his name. Hence, an implied trust was
 allegedly created over the undivided hereditary share of Cecilia Belvis.
For over 34 years, Belvis alleged that they possessed and cultivated the
lot in the concept of an owner, believing in good faith that they were co-
owners of the subject lot. In the course of their possession, Belvis
allegedly introduced various improvements thereon by planting
bamboos, nipa palms and coconut trees, and by constructing fishponds.
In their Answer, Belvis further claimed that Erola failed to personally
appear during the barangay conciliation proceedings and that their
representative, Maureen, had no authority to appear on their behalf.

d. Issue: Whether or not Belvis are builders in good faith under Article 448
and thus have a right to retain the subject lot until payment of necessary
useful and luxurious expenses.

e. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Spouses Belvis have the right to
retain the subject lot under Article 448 as the improvements were built
with the knowledge and consent of respondents.

While Belvis cannot be deemed to be builders in good faith, it being

undisputed that the land in question is titled land in the name of
respondents, the CA and the lower courts overlooked the fact that Belvis
constructed improvements on the subject lot with the knowledge and
consent of respondents. In exceptional cases, the Court has applied
Article 448 to instances where a builder, planter, or sower introduces
improvements on titled land if with the knowledge and consent of the
owner as held in the case of Department of Education v. Casibang,
 In the instant case, Spouses Erola judicially admitted in their Complaint
that "being close relatives of the plaintiffs, Belvis sought the permission
and consent of the Erola to possess lot597 as they do not have any
property or house to stay'' and that Erola agreed that Belvis possess lot
597 but with a condition that in case Erola will be needing the property,
[the] Belvis will vacate the lot in question upon notice to vacate coming
from the plaintiffs. While Erola may have merely tolerated Belvis'
possession, Erola never denied having knowledge of the fact that Belvis
possessed, cultivated and constructed various permanent improvements
on the subject lot for over 34 years.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 7, 2017 Decision

and the April 16, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CEB-SP No. 10632 are REVERSED. The instant case is REMANDED to
the court of origin for a determination of the facts essential to the proper
application of Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code and thereafter, a
determination of which between the parties is entitled to the physical
possession of the subject lot.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The Civil Code provisions on builders in good faith presuppose
that the owner of the land and the builder are two distinct persons who
are not bound either by specific legislation on the subject property or by
contract. Properties recorded in accordance with Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 4726 (otherwise known as the Condominium Act) are governed
by said Act; while the Master Deed and the By Laws of the condominium
corporation establish the contractual relations between said
condominium corporation and the unit owners.

b. Case Title: Leviste Management System Inc. vs. Legazpi Towers 200,
Inc. GR. No.199353; (J. Leonardo-De Castro); April 4, 2018

c. Facts: Legaspi Towers is a condominium building located at Paseo de

Roxas, Makati City. Lemans bought Concession 3 and decided to build
another unit ("Concession 4") on the roof deck of Concession 3. Despite
Legaspi Corporation's notice that the construction of Concession 4 was
illegal, Lemans refused to stop its construction.

When Legaspi Corporation forbade the entry of Lemans' construction

materials to be used in Concession 4 in the condominium, Lemans filed
a Complaint with the RTC, praying that a writ of mandatory injunction be
issued to allow the completion of the construction of Concession 4. RTC
issued the writ prayed for by Lemans.

RTC, in its Order, then found the application of Article 448 of the Civil
Code and the ruling in the Depra vs. Dumlao to be proper. Afterwards,
RTC rendered the Assailed Decision, ordering Legaspi Towers

to exercise its option to appropriate the additional structure constructed

on top of the penthouse within sixty [60] days from the time the Decision
becomes final and executory. Should defendant Legaspi Towers 200,
Inc. choose not to appropriate after proper indemnity, the parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
Court shall fix the terms thereof.

When the case was elevated, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC of
Makati City. CA held that while Concession 4 is indeed a nuisance,
Lemans has been declared a builder in good faith, and noted that
Legaspi Towers failed to contest this declaration. Since Concession 4
was built in good faith, it cannot be demolished. Hence, LEMANS and
Legaspi Towers filed separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari with the
Court.
d. Issue: Whether Article 448 of the Civil Code and the Court’s ruling in
Depra v. Dumlao are applicable to the parties' situation?

e. Held: No. Significantly, the parties are no longer questioning the past
rulings regarding Legaspi Towers' ownership of the air space above
Concession 3 which is the air space above the condominium building
itself.

The ruling of this Court in Depra v. Dumlao extensively cited by both

parties pertains to the application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code.

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he
shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties
shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.
 Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor;
but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has
been reimbursed therefor. Useful expenses shall be refunded only to
the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of
refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in
value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.

Firstly, it is recognized in jurisprudence that, as a general rule, Article 448

on builders in good faith does not apply where there is a contractual
relation between the parties. Morever, in several cases, the Court has
explained that the raison d'etre for Article 448 of the Civil Code is to
prevent the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership. In
accord with the principle of accession, the landowner cannot refuse to
exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to
remove it from the land.

In the case at bar, however, the land belongs to a condominium

corporation, wherein the builder, as a unit owner, is already in a co-
ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders of the
condominium corporation, whose legal relationship is governed by a
special law, the Condominium Act.

Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are
therefore inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act where
the owner of the land and the builder are already bound by specific
legislation on the subject property (the Condominium Act), and by
contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium
corporation).

In accordance therefore with the Master Deed, the By-Laws of Legaspi

Towers, and the Condominium Act, Legaspi Towers is correct that it has
the right to demolish Concession 4 at the expense of Lemans. Indeed,
the application of Article 448 to the present situation is highly iniquitous,
in that an owner, also found to be in good faith, will be forced to either
appropriate the illegal structure and impliedly be burdened with the cost
of its demolition) or to allow the continuance of such an illegal structure
that violates the law and the Master Deed, and threatens the structural
integrity of the condominium building upon the payment of rent. The
Court cannot countenance such an unjust result from an erroneous
application of the law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 199353 is hereby DENIED for

lack of merit. The Petition in G.R. No. 199389 is GRANTED. The
Decision dated May 26, 2011 and Resolution dated November 17, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88082 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Leviste Management System, Inc. is ORDERED to remove
Concession 4 at its own expense. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is
in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows
the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with
the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead
the owner of the building to remove it from the land

b. Case Title: Spouses Maximo Espinoza vs. Spouses Antonio Mayandoc,

GR. No. 211170; (J. Peralta); July 3, 2017

c. Facts: A parcel of land originally owned by Eusebio Espinoza was

divided among his heirs, Pastora, Domingo and Pablo, after his death.
Pastora executed a Deed of Sale conveying her share to respondents
and Leopoldo Espinoza. On that same date, a fictitious deed of sale was
executed by Domingo Espinoza, conveying the 3/4 share in favor of
respondent Erlinda Cayabyab. Later on, a fictitious deed of sale was
executed by Nemesio Cayabyab, Candida Cruz, Sps. Maximo Espinoza
and Winifreda De Vera and Leopoldo Espinoza over the land in favor of
Sps. Antonio and Erlinda Mayandoc.

As a result, petitioners filed an action for annulment of document in

which RTC rendered a Decision ordering respondent to reconvey the
land in dispute. CA affirmed the decision with modification and has
become final.

Thus, respondents filed a complaint for reimbursement for useful

expenses, pursuant to Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code,
alleging that the house in question was built on the disputed land in
good faith. The respondents believed themselves to be the owners of
the land with a claim of title thereto and were never prevented by the
petitioners in constructing the house. Petitioners argued that
respondents can never be considered as builders in good faith because
the latter were aware that the deeds of sale over the land in question
were fictitious.

Respondents, manifested their option to buy the land where the house
stood, but petitioners expressed that they were not interested to sell the
land or to buy the house in question.
d. Issue: Whether or not respondents were in bad faith in introducing
improvements on the subject land.

e. Held: No. To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a

person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e., that he be a
possessor in the concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

The settled rule is bad faith should be established by clear and

convincing evidence since the law always presumes good faith. In this
particular case, petitioners were not able to prove that respondents were
in bad faith in constructing the house on the subject land. Bad faith does
not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It
means breach of a known duty through some motive, interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud. For anyone who claims that
someone is in bad faith, the former has the duty to prove such. Hence,
petitioners err in their argument that respondents failed to prove that
they are builders in good faith in spite of the findings of the RTC and the
CA that they are.

As such, Article 448 of the Civil Code must be applied. It applies when
the builder believes that he is the owner of the land or that by some title
he has the right to build thereon, or that, at least, he has a claim of title
thereto. In Tuatzs v. Spouses Escol, et al., this Court ruled that the seller
(the owner of the land) has two options under Article 448: (1) he may
appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer
(the builder in good faith) the necessary and useful expenses under
Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or (2) he may sell the land to the
buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that of the
improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent, xxx

The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to
the owner of the land is in accord with the principle of accession, i.e.,
that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.
Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise
either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it
from the land.

The raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the
builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the
owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the
land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-
ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of
the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the
proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land
and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either
option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the
option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
dated March 21, 2014, of petitioners-spouses Maximo Espinoza and
Winifreda De Vera, is DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated
September 17, 2013 and Resolution dated January 28, 2014, both of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: The terms builder, planter, or sower in good faith as used in

reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers to one who, not being
the owner of the land, builds, plants, or sows on that land believing
himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or mode of
acquisition. "The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the
validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another."
 On the other hand, bad faith may only be attributed to a landowner when
the act of building, planting, or sowing was done with his knowledge and
without opposition on his part.

b. Case Title: Erlinda Dinglasan Delos Santos vs. Alberto Abejon, GR. No.
215820; (J. Perlas-Bernabe); March 20, 2017

c. Facts: Erlinda and her late husband Pedro Delos Santos (Pedro)
borrowed the amount of P100,000.00 from the former's sister, Teresita,
as evidenced by a Promissory Note dated April 8, 1998. As security for
the loan, Erlinda and Pedro mortgaged their property situated at 2986
Gen. Del Pilar Street, Bangkal, Makati City.

After Pedro died, Erlinda ended up being unable to pay the loan, and as
such, agreed to sell the subject land to Teresita for P150,000.00, or for
the amount of the loan plus an additional P50,000.00. On July 8, 1992,
they executed a Deed of Sale and a Release of Mortgage. Thereafter,
respondents constructed a three (3)-storey building worth P2,000,000.00
on the subject land. Despite the foregoing, petitioners refused to
acknowledge the sale, pointing out that since Pedro died in 1989, his
signature in the Deed of Sale executed in 1992 was definitely forged. As
such, respondents demanded from petitioners the amounts of
P150,000.00 representing the consideration for the sale of the subject
land and P2,000,000.00 representing the construction cost of the three
(3)-storey building, but to no avail. Thus, respondents filed the instant
case.
 In defense, petitioners denied any participation relative to the spurious
Deed of Sale, and instead, maintained that it was Teresita who
fabricated the same and caused its registration before the Register of
Deeds of Makati City. They likewise asserted that Erlinda and Pedro
never sold the subject land to Teresita.

The RTC: (a) declared the Deed of Sale null and void and ordered
petitioners to pay respondents the following amounts: (1) P100,000.00
plus twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from July 8, 1992 until
fully paid representing the loan obligation plus legal interest; (2)
P2,000,000.00 representing the construction cost of the three (3)-storey
building; and (3) another P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modifications.

d. Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly held that petitioners should be

held liable to respondents.

e. Held: Petitioners admitted the existence of the loan obligation as well as

respondents' right to collect on the same, it does not necessarily follow
that respondents should collect the loan amount from petitioners, as
concluded by both the RTC and the CA.

It must be pointed out that such loan was contracted by Erlinda, who is
only one out of the four herein petitioners, and her deceased husband,
Pedro, during the latter's lifetime and while their marriage was still
subsisting. Both the RTC and the CA erred in holding petitioners liable to
respondents for the loan obligation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision
dated March 19, 2014 and the Resolution dated December 11, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96884 are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS as follows:

a. The Deed of Sale and the Release of Mortgage both dated July 8,
1992 are declared NULL and VOID;

b. The Register of Deeds of Makati City is ordered to CANCEL

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 180286 in the name of Teresita D.
Abejon, married to Alberto S. Abejon, and REINSTATE Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 131753 in the name of Pedro Delos Santos
and Erlinda DinglasanDelos Santos, and restore the same to its
previous state before its cancellation, i.e., with the mortgage
executed by the parties annotated thereon; and

c. The entire fourth paragraph44 of the dispositive portion of the

Decision dated March 19, 2014 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof:

I. The ₱l00,000.00 loan obligation is DECLARED to be the liability of

the conjugal partnership of petitioner Erlinda Dinglasan Delos
Santos and her deceased husband Pedro Delos Santos which
may be recovered by herein respondents in accordance with this
Decision;
 II. Petitioner Erlinda Dinglasan Delos Santos is ORDERED to return
to respondents the amount of ₱50,000.00 representing the
additional consideration Teresita D. Abejon paid for in the sale,
with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
this Decision until fully paid;

III. For the purpose of determining the proper indemnity for the 3-
storey building, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 132 for further proceedings consistent
with the proper application of Articles 448, 453, 546, and 548 of
the Civil Code, as applied in existing jurisprudence; and

IV. The award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount
of ₱l00,000.00 is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property
which is the subject matter of the action. While legal title denotes
registered ownership, equitable title means beneficial ownership. In the
absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to
be prevented or removed.

b. Case Title: Josephine P. Delos Reyes vs. Municipality of Kalibo, Aklan,

GR. No. 214587; (J. Peralta); February 20, 2018
c. Facts: Lot No. 2076 of the Kalibo Cadastre was registered in the name
of Ana O. Peralta. Upon her demise, her property passed on to her
brother, Jose Peralta, who caused registration of the same in his name.
Jose later had the property divided into Lots 2076-A and 2076-B, and
sold the latter portion. Lot 2076-A, on the other hand, remained in Jose’s
name.

In the meantime, allegedly through accretion, land was added to Lot No.
2076. Said area was first occupied by and declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Ambrocio Ignacio in 1945. He was the Peraltas’
tenant, but he later executed a Quitclaim of Real Property in Jose’s
favour. When Jose died, Lot 2076-A, together with the supposed area of
accretion, was transferred to his son, Juanito Peralta. Subsequently,
Juanito likewise died.

On the other hand, the Municipality of Kalibo, through its then Mayor
Diego Luces and the members of its Sangguniang Bayan, sought to
convert more or less four (4) hectares of said area of accretion into a
garbage dumpsite. On November 10, 1992, Juanito, in his capacity as
his siblings’ representative, opposed said project in a letter. For failure to
get a favorable response from the mayor’s office, he wrote a formal
protest to the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.

Despite the Peraltas’ opposition, the Municipality of Kalibo continued the

project under the justification that the contested property is actually part
of the public domain. On January 26, 1998, the Peraltas filed a
 Complaint for quieting of title over the two (2) portions of accretion
declared in their names for taxation purposes. The RTC of Kalibo, ruled
in their favor. The CA reversed the RTC ruling.

d. Issue: Whether or not the CA committed an error when it reversed the

RTC, which declared the subject parcels of land as accretion and not
part of the public domain.

e. Held: No. In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property
which is the subject matter of the action. While legal title denotes
registered ownership, equitable title means beneficial ownership. In the
absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to
be prevented or removed.

It must be noted that the Peraltas, the petitioners in the instant case, are
not even registered owners of the area adjacent to the increment
claimed, much less of the subject parcels of land. Only the late Juanito
became the registered owner of Lot 2076- A, the lot next to the
supposed accretion. Assuming that the petitioners are Juanito’s rightful
successors, they still did not register the subject increment under their
names. It is settled that an accretion does not automatically become
registered land just because the lot that receives such accretion is
covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing;
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not
vest or give title to the land, but merely conBrms and, hereafter, protects
the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by
occupation of third parties.

If at all, whatever rights the Peraltas derived from their predecessors-in-

interest respecting the area in question came only from the quitclaim of
real property executed by Ignacio in Jose’s favor in 1955. There is no
concrete evidence showing any right of title on Ignacio’s part for him to
be able to legally and validly cede the property to Jose.

In order that a plaintiff may draw to himself an equitable title, he must

show that the one from whom he derives his right had himself a right to
transfer. Considering the aforementioned facts, the plaintiffs have
neither legal nor equitable title over the contested property.

Moreover, even the character of the land subject of the quitclaim is

highly questionable. Ignacio, who was purportedly the first occupant of
the area in 1945 and who was also in the best position to describe the
lot, stated that “the said parcel of swampy land is an integral expansion
or continuity of the said Cadastral Lot No. 2076, formed by a change of
the shoreline of the Visayan Sea.
Article 457 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, under which the Peraltas
claim ownership over the disputed parcels of land, provides:

“Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks
of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a)
gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of
the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

Here, Ignacio characterized the land in question as swampy and its

increase in size as the effect of the change of the shoreline of the
Visayan Sea, and not through the gradual deposits of soil coming from
the river or the sea. Also, Baltazar Gerardo, the Officer-in-Charge of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Bureau of
Lands, found upon inspection in 1987 that the subject area was
predominantly composed of sand rather than soil. In addition, the DENR
has remained firm and consistent in classifying the area as land of the
public domain for being part of either the Visayan Sea of the Sooc
Riverbed and is reached by tide water.

The questionable character of the land, which could most probably be

part of the public domain, indeed bars Jose from validly transferring the
increment to any of his successors.
Indubitably, the plaintiffs are merely successors who derived their
alleged right of ownership from tax declarations. Any person who claims
ownership by virtue of tax declarations must also prove that he has been
in actual possession of the property. In the case at bar, the Peraltas
failed to adequately prove their possession and that of their
predecessors-in-interest.
Since the Peraltas must first establish their legal or equitable title to or
interest in the property in order for their action for quieting of title may
prosper, failure to do so would mean lack of cause of action on their part
to pursue said remedy.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DENIES the

petition, and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals Cebu,
Nineteenth (19th) Division, dated September 28, 2012, and Resolution
dated August 28, 2014 in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00700.

SO ORDERED.