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Lim Soo Choi

This document discusses the territorial jurisdiction of Sessions Courts in Malaysia. It summarizes a court case where the plaintiff appealed the transfer of a civil case from the Sessions Court in Shah Alam to the Sessions Court in Butterworth. The court considered whether Sessions Courts have restrictions on jurisdiction or same jurisdiction as High Courts, and which court location was more convenient for the case.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
53 views11 pages

Lim Soo Choi

This document discusses the territorial jurisdiction of Sessions Courts in Malaysia. It summarizes a court case where the plaintiff appealed the transfer of a civil case from the Sessions Court in Shah Alam to the Sessions Court in Butterworth. The court considered whether Sessions Courts have restrictions on jurisdiction or same jurisdiction as High Courts, and which court location was more convenient for the case.

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[2011] 8 MLRH Yee Teck Fah T/a Yee Teck Fah & Co v.

Lim Soo Chooi 225

YEE TECK FAH T/A YEE TECK FAH & CO


v.
LIM SOO CHOOI

High Court Malaya, Shah Alam


Suraya Othman J
[Civil Appeal No: A12-290-2010 (Rs 143/2010) A]
31 May 2011

GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
On 17.3.2008, the defendant filed an application for a transfer of a civil case ("said
case") pending in the Sessions Court, Shah Alam, Selangor to the Sessions Court,
Butterworth, Penang. On 31.3.2010, the learned Sessions Court Judge ("Sessions
Judge") allowed the defendant's application to transfer the said case. The plaintiff,
dissatisfied with the order of the Sessions Judge, appealed to the High Court, it is
from this decision/order that the appeal before me now lies.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
The brief facts are as follows. The plaintiff, who is an advocate and solicitor claims
for legal fees in the sum of RM179,430.22 being professional fees and
disbursements due to him for services rendered to the defendant under bills dated
2.12.2005, 22.6.2006, 1.2.2007 and 1.3.2007. Despite repeated requests and
demands, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed or neglected to pay the
plaintiff the claimed sum and consequently, the plaintiff filed an action against the
defendant ("said case") in the Sessions Court, Shah Alam, Selangor to recover the
amount owed.
PLAINTIFF'S SUBMISSION
Mr Yee Teck Fah, the plaintiff, who is an advocate and solicitor representing
himself in this appeal submitted that the Sessions Courts unlike the High Courts do
not enjoy concurrent territorial jurisdiction of each other. The Sessions Courts only
have local limits of jurisdiction assigned to them and not otherwise which is
expressly stated in section 59(1) of the Subordinate Courts Act, 1948 (Act 92)
("SCA 1948") . The definition of "local limits" is set out in the High Court Practice
Direction No. 4 of 1993("HCP 1993"), where the Chief Justice of Malaya then had
assigned to Shah Alam Sessions Court the territorial jurisdictional area of Petaling
Jaya and Kajang. Therefore according to section 59(1) SCA 1948 and the HCP
1993, only the Shah Alam Sessions Courts has territorial jurisdiction to hear and
determine the plaintiff's claim. Thus the Sessions Judge erred in fact and/or law
when she transferred the said case to Butterworth, Penang Sessions Court since the
226 Yee Teck Fah T/a Yee Teck Fah & Co v. Lim Soo Chooi [2011] 8 MLRH

Butterworth, Penang Sessions Court has no territorial jurisdiction to hear and


determined the plaintiff's claim arising outside its territorial limit. In this light, the
plaintiff refers to the case of Taman Rimba (Mentakab) Sdn Bhd v. Sin Yew Poh Tractor
Works [2002] 1 MLRH 26; [2002] 2 CLJ 112 ; [2002] 5 MLJ 321 in support.
Mr Yee Teck Fah contended that he, as an advocate and solicitor of the High
Court of Malaya, is practicing and has his office at No. 705 Block E, Phileo
Damansara 1, No. 9, Jalan 16/11, 46350 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. He
also lives in the state of Selangor. The cause of action accrues in the state of
Selangor where the breach in the form of payments due to him from the defendant
for legal services rendered occurred.
Mr Yee Teck Fah argued that the defendant's application is baseless and
misconceived as it does not state and/or invoke the relevant law and / or
procedural rule under which the defendant's application is being made for an order
to transfer the said case to Butterworth, Penang Sessions Court. Such failure
according to Low Hop Bing J, (as he then was), in Kilang Papan Pulau Sebang Sdn
Bhd v. Lim Trading & Co [2004] 4 MLRH 484 ; [2005] 1 MLJ 753 renders the
application devoid of any basis whatsoever.
Mr Yee Teck Fah further submitted that the defect in the application is further
compounded by the defendant's defective affidavits filed purportedly in support of
the application. This argument is based on the fact that the defendant after having
filed several affidavits in this action alleges for the first time in his affidavit affirmed
on 12.05.2008 that he is illiterate in Bahasa Malaysia and the English language. If
the defendant's allegation is true than all his affidavits must have jurats that fully
comply with Order 25 rule 22 (1) (7) and (8) of the Subordinate Courts Rules, 1980
which is the equivalent of Order 41 rule 1 (7), (8) and 2(2) of the Rules of the High
Court, 1980 , failing which they are defective and must be rejected. This principle
of law was applied in the case of Metro Kajang Construction Sdn Bhd v. Eka Bahtera
Sdn Bhd [2001] 1 MLRH 771; [2001] 3 CLJ 951 ; [2001] 6 MLJ 129.
DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSION
Replying to the plaintiff's submission, counsel for the defendant, Mr. Tan Kah
Hoo, contended that the plaintiff's authority of T aman Rimba (Mentakab) Sdn Bhd v.
Sin Yew Poh Tractor Works (supra) has recently been distinguished by the High Court
in Public Prosecutor v. Segaram a/l S Mathavan [2009] 3 MLRH 297; [2010] 2 CLJ
121; ; [2009] 9 MLJ 597 where Yeow Wee Siam, JC, held that:
"With utmost respect to James Foong J (as he then was) and the Sessions
Court judge, I am of the humble view that s. 59(2) must be read first of all
with s. 59(1) of the SCA . Under s. 59(1) of the SCA , it is only the Yang
di-Pertuan Agong who may by order constitute the sessions courts as he thinks
fit, and he shall also have the power to assign the local limits of jurisdiction of
the sessions courts. From a search done by my senior assistant registrar, it
appears that so far, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong has not made any order under
[2011] 8 MLRH Yee Teck Fah T/a Yee Teck Fah & Co v. Lim Soo Chooi 227

s. 59(1) of the SCA , that has been gazetted, to assign the local limits of jurisdiction
of each sessions court. That being the case, administratively, the sessions courts
have been guided by the High Court Practice Directions No 2 of 1993 and 4 of
1993 regarding their local limits of jurisdiction. In my opinion, the practice
directions serve very well for the day-to-day registration and hearing of cases in the
various sessions courts listed in the two practice directions. However, when the
vital issue arises, such as in this application before me, as to whether the PJ
Sessions Court, under the Shah Alam Sessions Court, and the KL Sessions already
have local limits of jurisdiction assigned to them by order made by the Yang
di-Pertuan Agong under s. 59(1) of the SCA , then the answer is in the negative."

Mr Tan Kah Hoo submitted that since Taman Rimba (Mentakab) Sdn Bhd's case has
been distinguished, and no local limits of jurisdiction has been assigned to each
Sessions Court by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, then, the Sessions Court has
jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause or matter arising in any part of the
local jurisdiction of the respective High Court, which means that the Sessions
Court has the same local jurisdiction of a High Court. As such the Sessions Court
can sit anywhere, at any branch in Peninsular Malaysia or West Malaysia.
In determining the territorial jurisdiction and powers of a Sessions Court, Mr Tan
Kah Hoo further submitted that this court should, in addition to the considerations
in paras 2 and 3 of the Third Schedule of the SCA 1948, bear in mind the doctrine
of forum conveniens as noted by Pen Swee Chin FCJ, in American Express Bank Ltd.
v. Mohamad Toufic Al-Ozeir & Anor [1994] 1 MLRA 439; [1995] 1 CLJ 273 ; [1995] 1
MLJ 160 and the case of Sova Sdn Bhd v. Kasih Sayang Realty Sdn Bhd [1987] 2
MLRH 453 ; [1988] 2 MLJ 268.
As regard to the procedural issues, Mr Tan Kah Hoo pointed out that the plaintiff
has waived his right to raise procedural objections and is estopped from doing so as
there was no indication by the plaintiff that any procedural objections would be
raised, whether by affidavits, correspondences or even during the hearings in the
court below. Therefore the plaintiff has refused, neglected and/or failed to give the
defendant any notice of any preliminary objection as to the alleged
non-compliance of the defendant's affidavits and/or notice of application. This has
led the defendant to believe and act in the knowledge that the plaintiff had by his
conduct waived his right to raise any preliminary objections.
ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
The issues before the court are:
(1) What is the territorial jurisdiction of the Sessions Courts;
(a) Whether the Sessions Courts have the restriction of local limits of
jurisdiction assigned to them;
(b) If no local limits of jurisdiction have been assigned to them, whether
228 Yee Teck Fah T/a Yee Teck Fah & Co v. Lim Soo Chooi [2011] 8 MLRH

the Sessions Courts have the same local jurisdiction as the High Courts.

(2) What is the "forum convenient" of this case: whether it is the Shah Alam,
Selangor Sessions Court or the Butterworth, Penang Sessions Court;
(3) What is the effect of non-compliance to the procedural rules in making the
application by the defendant.

FINDINGS OF THE COURT


(1) What is the territorial jurisdiction of the Sessions Courts;
(a) Whether the Sessions Courts have the restriction of local limits of
jurisdiction assigned to them;
(b) If no local limits of jurisdiction have been assigned to them,
whether the Sessions Courts have the same local jurisdiction as the
High Courts.

The law applicable in respect of the territorial jurisdiction of the Subordinate


Courts is found in Section 59, Part VI of the Subordinate Courts Act, 1948 ("SCA
1948") . Section 59 states:
"Constitution and territorial jurisdiction of Sessions Courts.
59. (1) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may, by order, constitute so many
Sessions Courts as he may think fit and shall have power, if he think fit, to
assign local limits of jurisdiction thereto.
(2) Subject to this Act or any other written law, a Sessions Court shall have
jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil and criminal cause or matter
arising within the local limits of jurisdiction assigned to it under this
section or, if no such local limits have been assigned, arising in any part of
the local jurisdiction of the respective High Court.
(3) Each Sessions Court shall be presided over by a President appointed by the
Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the recommendation of the Chief Justice.
(4) Sessions Courts shall ordinarily be held at such places as the Chief Justice
may direct, but should necessity arise they may also be held at any other place
within the limits of their jurisdiction".

Therefore section 59 SCA 1948 sets out the constitution and territorial jurisdiction
of the Sessions Courts. In section 59(2) it is stated that the Sessions Courts have
jurisdiction to hear cases within the local limits of jurisdiction assigned to them
and if no such local limits have been so assigned, then their jurisdiction will be the
[2011] 8 MLRH Yee Teck Fah T/a Yee Teck Fah & Co v. Lim Soo Chooi 229

jurisdiction of the respective High Courts.


Another relevant provision in respect of the territorial jurisdiction is found in
section 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964 (Act 91) ("CJA 1964") . Section 3 of
the CJA 1964 define the terms "High Court" and "local jurisdiction" as below:
"High Court" means the High Court in Malaya and the High Court in Sabah and
Sarawak or either of them, as the case may require.
"local jurisdiction" means:
"(a) in the case of the High Court in Malaya, the territory comprised in the States of
Malaya, namely, Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang,
Penang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor and Terengganu and the Federal Territory of Kuala
Lumpur; and
(b) "in the case of the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak, the territory comprised in the
States of Sabah and Sarawak and the Federal Territory of Labuan,
including, in either case, the territorial waters and the air space above those States and
the territorial waters;"

Therefore section 3 of the CJA 1964 , sets out the territorial jurisdiction of the two
High Courts; the High Court in Malaya and the High Court in Sabah and
Sarawak. The High Court in (of) Malaya have territorial jurisdiction in Peninsular
Malaysia or West Malaysia while the High Court in (of) Sabah and Sarawak have
territorial jurisdiction over the two states of Sabah and Sarawak or East Malaysia.
The question then, based on the provisions mentioned above, what is the territorial
jurisdiction of the Sessions Courts?
In deciding what is the territorial jurisdiction of the Sessions Courts, I am in
agreement with the decision of Public Prosecutor v. Segaram a/l S Mathavan (supra)
that under section 59(1) , only the Yang di-Pertuan Agong has the power to assign
local limits of jurisdiction to the Sessions Courts. And since His Royal Highness
has not made any such order under the said section, which order has to be
gazetted, to assign the local limits of jurisdiction of each Sessions Court, then,
section 59(2) comes into play; that is, if no such local limits have been assigned to
the Sessions Courts, then the Sessions Courts have jurisdiction to hear and
determine any cause or matter arising in any part of the local jurisdiction of the
respective High Court. This mean that the Sessions Courts have the same local
jurisdiction as the High Courts as defined under section 3 of the CJA 1964 ; that is
the Sessions Courts in Malaya have jurisdiction which covers all states in
Peninsular Malaysia or West Malaysia and the Sessions Courts in Sabah and
Sarawak have jurisdiction which covers both the states of Sabah and Sarawak or
East Malaysia.
Therefore, the Sessions Courts in (of) Malaya just like the High Courts in (of)
230 Yee Teck Fah T/a Yee Teck Fah & Co v. Lim Soo Chooi [2011] 8 MLRH

Malaya can sit anywhere, at any branch, in Peninsular Malaysia or West Malaysia.
Likewise, the Sessions Courts in (of) Sabah and Sarawak just like the High Courts
in (of) Sabah and Sarawak can sit anywhere, at any branch in Sabah and Sarawak
or East Malaysia. The result is that both the High Courts and the Sessions Courts
have the same territorial (local) jurisdiction and as such the Sessions Courts just
like the High Courts enjoy concurrent and co-ordinate jurisdiction of each other.
Reverting back to our instant case, the position is that the Sessions Judge in
Butterworth just like her counter-part in Shah Alam has territorial jurisdiction to
hear and determine the plaintiff's claim since they enjoy concurrent as well as
co-ordinate jurisdiction of each other.
Therefore the answers to the first issue are:
(a) The Sessions Courts have no restriction of local limits of jurisdiction
assigned to them. This is so since His Royal Highness the Yang di-Pertuan
Agong has not assigned them their local limits of jurisdiction under section 59
(1) of SCA 1948 and;
(b) Since no local limits of jurisdiction have been assigned to the Sessions
Courts by His Royal Highness the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the Sessions
Courts then have the same local (territorial) limits of jurisdiction as the High
Courts which mean the Sessions Courts just like the High Courts enjoy
concurrent and co-ordinate jurisdiction of each other.

2) What is the "forum conveniens" of this case: whether it is the Shah Alam,
Selangor Sessions Court or the Butterworth, Penang Sessions Court.
The defendant contends that the "forum conveniens" to try the said case is the
Butterworth, Penang Sessions Court and not the Shah Alam, Selangor Sessions
Court.
Before delving into this issue, the section that gives jurisdiction to a Sessions Court
to transfer a case to another Sessions Court is found in section 99A, Part X of the
SCR 1946 . Section 99A states:
"Further powers and jurisdiction of courts".
99A. In amplification and not in derogation of the powers conferred by this
Act or inherent in any court, and without prejudice to the generality of any
such powers, every Sessions Courts and Magistrates' Court shall have the
further powers and jurisdiction set out in the Third Schedule.

The Third Schedule which is relevant to this appeal is in paras 2 and 3 which
states:
"Stay of proceeding"
[2011] 8 MLRH Yee Teck Fah T/a Yee Teck Fah & Co v. Lim Soo Chooi 231

2. Power to stay proceedings unless they have been instituted in the District in
which:-
a) the cause of action arose, or
b) the defendant resides or has his place of business, or
c) one of several defendants resides or has his place of business, or
d) the facts on which the proceedings are based exist or are alleged to
have occurred, or
e) for other reasons it is desirable in the interests of justice that the
proceedings should be had.

"Transfer of proceedings"
3.(1) (Repealed)
(2) Power, on application or of its own motion, to transfer any proceedings to
another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction.

Therefore the Sessions Court has the power to transfer the said case to another
Sessions Court which is of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The question is whether from
the facts of the case, it meets the criteria as specified in paras 2 and 3 and the
principle or doctrine of "forum conveniens" .
What is the principle or doctrine of "forum conveniens"?
"Forum conveniens" or also termed as "forum non conveniens" as defined by
Black's Law Dictionary , Seventh Edition by Bryan A.Garner are defined as
below:
"forum conveniens" means [Latin: "a suitable forum"] The court in which an action is
most appropriately brought, considering the best interests and convenience of the parties
and witnesses. Cf. FORUM NON CONVENIENS.
"forum non conveniens" means [Latin: "an unsuitable court"] Civil procedure. The
doctrine that an appropriate forum - even though competent under the law - may divest
itself or jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it appears
that the action should proceed in another forum in which the action might originally
have been brought. Also termed forum inconveniens.
"Forum non conveniens allows a court to exercise its discretion to avoid the
oppression or vexation that might result from automatically honoring plaintiff's
forum choice. However, dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens also
requires that there be an alternative forum in which the suit can be prosecuted. It
must appear that jurisdiction over all parties can be secured and that complete
relief can be obtained in the supposedly more convenient court. Further, in at least
232 Yee Teck Fah T/a Yee Teck Fah & Co v. Lim Soo Chooi [2011] 8 MLRH

some states, it has been held that the doctrine cannot be successfully invoked when the
plaintiff is resident of the forum state since, effectively, on e of the functions of the state courts
is to provide a tribunal in which their residents can obtain an adjudication of their
grievances. But in most instances a balancing of the convenience to all the parties will be
considered and no one factor will preclude a forum non conveniens dismissal, as long as
another forum is available. Jack H. Friedenthal st al., Civil Procedure S 2.17, at 87-88 (2d.
1993)".

Therefore the terms are used interchangeably and it means, in brief, a most suitable
or appropriate forum which take into consideration the best interests and
convenience of the parties and witnesses.
In the case of American Express Bank Ltd v. Mohamed Toufic Al-Ozier & Anor[1994] 1
MLRA 439; [1995] 1 CLJ 273 ; [1995] 1 MLJ 160, the Supreme Court held that
the word "conveniens" in forum non conveniens meant suitability or
appropriateness of the relevant jurisdiction in the interests of all the parties and for
the ends of justice and not one of convenience. The said court also held that the
onus is on the applicant to satisfy the court that some other forum is more
appropriate . The court stated.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens appears to have originated in Scotland
and has finally found full acceptance by the House of Lords in Spiliada
Maritime Corp v. Cansulax Ltd (The Spiliada) [1987] AC 460; [1986] 3 All ER
843; [1986] 3 WLR 972 after a series of decisions, as described and set out so
well in that very interesting and readable joint article by RH Hickling and Wu
Min Aun, 'Stay of Actions and Forum Non Conveniens' [1994] 3 MLJ xcvii.
The main judgment in The Spiliada was delivered by Lord Goff, who adopted
the dictum of Lord Kinnear in Sim v. F Robinow [1892] 19 R (Ct of Sess) 665 at
p 668 being the fundamental principle in regard to this doctrine, ie, that 'there
is some other tribunal, having competent jurisdiction, in which the case may
be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of
justice'. Lord Goff cautioned that the word 'conveniens' in forum non
conveniens meant suitability or appropriateness of the relevant jurisdiction
and not one of convenience . We are in entire agreement with the
fundamental principle so expressed.
In our view, where an application by a defendant for stay of proceedings is
concerned, in applying the said doctrine, the defendant would have to satisfy
the court that 'some other forum is more appropriate' per Lord Templeman in
The Spiliada .

Therefore, has the defendant satisfy this court that the Butterworth, Penang
Sessions Court is more appropriate or suitable in the interests of all the parties and
[2011] 8 MLRH Yee Teck Fah T/a Yee Teck Fah & Co v. Lim Soo Chooi 233

for the ends of justice and not one of convenience than the Shah Alam, Selangor
Sessions Court?
In the case of Bank Utama (M) Bhd v. Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd[2002] 3 MLRH
148; [2003] 1 CLJ 450 ; [2003] 5 MLJ 40, the court held that:
"The doctrine of forum convenience calls for the matter to be heard by a court which is
more accessible and appropriate in the interest of all parties and for the ends of justice,
notwithstanding that other courts also have territorial jurisdiction pursuant to s. 23(1)
of the Act (see Malacca Securities Sdn Bhd v. Loke Yu [1998] 2 MLRH 140; [1998] 3
CLJ 22; [1998] 3 AMR 2501 ; [1999] 6 MLJ 112 at p 120)."

And in the case of Khor Seow Kee v. Boon Hock Sawmill Sdn. Bhd.[1993] 4 CLJ, 365
Abdul Malik, JC, (as he then was), said at page 366:
"The legislature in creating a branch of the High Court in Malaya in each State, must
have thought of bringing the High Court closer to the rakyat. Easy accessibility of the
High Court would lessen the inconvenience of travelling (the amount of costs would not
outweigh the inconvenience caused) and the incurring expense that would flow from it.
This would, in turn, facilitate the disposal of cases and ease the backlog to a certain
extent. This argument would likewise apply, with equal force, to the Sessions Court."

Therefore, is the Butterworth, Penang Sessions Court more accessible and


appropriate for the parties in the circumstances?
In our instant case, the cause of action clearly arose in Petaling Jaya where all the
transactions for the professional services rendered by the plaintiff were done in
Petaling Jaya. The defendant himself had opted to open a case with the plaintiff, a
legal firm situated in Petaling Jaya, to deal with his case. It is therefore
unreasonable if the said case was to be transferred from Shah Alam to Butterworth
since the plaintiff's witnesses, especially the plaintiff's staffs are located in Shah
Alam. Furthermore the expenses incurred for the witnesses and the plaintiff's staffs
to attend the Butterworth Sessions Court would be far higher compared to the
defendant's expenses to attend the Shah Alam Sessions Court. Therefore, I am of
the view that the said case is more suitable and appropriate in the circumstances to
be heard in Shah Alam, Selangor Sessions Court. In this regard, the case of Malacca
Securities Sdn Bhd v. Loke Yu [1998] 2 MLRH 140; [1998] 3 CLJ 22; [1998] 3 AMR
2501 ; [1999] 6 MLJ 112, is of great assistance where it was held by Augustine Paul
J, (as he then was), at p 127 as follows:
"In a contract for the payment of money the breach occurs when there is a failure to pay
the sum promised. This is logical as the meaning of 'cause of action' is the act on the
part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint (see Jackson v.
Spittall [1870] LR 5 CP 542). The failure to pay will be the cause of complaint. That
breach will have to be at the place where the payment is to be made and the cause of
action will therefore accrue in that place. (see Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd v. Melewar
234 Yee Teck Fah T/a Yee Teck Fah & Co v. Lim Soo Chooi [2011] 8 MLRH

Holdings Sdn Bhd & Ors [1990] 1 MLRH 435; [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 654; [1990] 1 CLJ 1246
. Where there is no agreement as to the place where the payment should be made then the
payment should be made at the place where the plaintiff lives."

Therefore, the forum conveniens is the Shah Alam, Selangor Sessions Court for the
following reasons:
(a) the defendant himself had opted to open a case with the plaintiff, a legal
firm situated in Petaling Jaya, to deal with his case.
(b) the plaintiff practice as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of
Malaya at No. 705 Blok E, Phileo Damansara 1, No. 9, Jalan 16/11, 46350
Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan.
(c) the Plaintiff also lives in the State of Selangor;
(d) the witnesses which includes the plaintiff's staffs are from or near Shah
Alam, Selangor.
(e) the cause of action accrued in Selangor. ( Malacca Securities Sdn Bhd v. Loke
Yu (supra) refers.

3) What is the effect of non-compliance to the procedural rules in making the


application for transfer by the defendant.
As to the plaintiff's contention that the defendant's application to transfer the said
case to Butterworth Sessions Court, Penang was defective for non-compliance to
the procedural rules, this court agrees with the defendant's counsel, Mr Tan Kah
Hoo that since the plaintiff has failed to give notice of any preliminary objections
to the defendant, then the plaintiff is deemed to have waived his rights to raise such
preliminary objections. This principle has been decided in the cases of Mohammad
Idres s/o Mohd Sulaiman Shah v. Malayan Banking Bhd[2000] 4 MLRH 294; [2001] 5
CLJ 308 ; [2001] 5 MLJ 111 ; WJ Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export & Import Co,
[1972] 2 All ER 127; and Usman bin Ahmad v. Chin Brothers Construction Co.[2000] 1
MLRH 880; [2000] 4 CLJ 785 ; [2001] 5 MLJ 281 .
CONCLUSION
On examination of sections 59 and 99A SCA 1948 and section 3 CJA 1964 and the
relevant cases, the Sessions Court Butterworth, Penang as well as the Shah Alam,
Selangor Sessions Court; in fact any sessions courts throughout Peninsular
Malaysia or West Malaysia have territorial jurisdiction to hear the said case since
they enjoy concurrent and co-ordinate jurisdiction of each other. This is so since no
local limits of jurisdiction has been assigned to each sessions courts by His
Highness, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. As such the Sessions Courts have
jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause or matter arising in any part of the
local jurisdiction of the respective High Courts which mean the Sessions Courts in
[2011] 8 MLRH Yee Teck Fah T/a Yee Teck Fah & Co v. Lim Soo Chooi 235

(of) Malaya just like the High Courts in (of) Malaya can sit anywhere, at any
branch, in Peninsular Malaysia or West Malaysia since they have the same local
jurisdiction. Be as it may, the deciding factor as to whether which court is more
suitable and appropriate depends on the forum conveniens of the case. In this
appeal the applicant (defendant) has the onus to satisfy this court that the
Butterworth, Penang Sessions Court is the more appropriate forum. This the
applicant has failed to do. Considering that the defendant himself had opted to
open a case with the plaintiff, a legal firm situated in Petaling Jaya to deal with his
case, the plaintiff resides and carries on his business in Petaling Jaya, the witnesses
are mainly from or near Shah Alam and the cause of action accrued in Selangor,
the said case is more suitable and appropriate, in the circumstances, to be heard in
the Sessions Court in Shah Alam, Selangor. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to
proceed on with the said case in the Shah Alam Sessions Court.
To sum up, this court finds that the learned Sessions Judge has erred in allowing
the defendant's application to transfer the said case to the Butterworth, Penang
Sessions Court. The said case should have remained in the Sessions Court Shah
Alam, Selangor. Therefore, the appeal ought to be and is thereby allowed. The
decision of the learned Sessions Judge which was given on 31.3.2010 is hereby set
aside.
Appeal allowed. No order as to costs.

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