MODULE 7 (A-G) | CASE DOCTRINES

ABAD v. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 207422 | March 18, 2015

To successfully protest the issuance of an appointment, the employee next in rank must prove
his or her status as a qualified next-in-rank; otherwise, the protest shall be dismissed. Being
next-in-rank is a legal conclusion that would be the result of inference form evidence properly
alleged and proven. The burden of proof rests with the employee alleging that he is
next-in-rank.

Appointments in the civil service are made fundamentally on the basis of merit. Both the
Constitution and law ensure that those appointed are fit for the position. While those who are
next in rank to a vacant position may be given some preference, no one has a vested right to a
government position. Seniority and salary grades should be given their due weight but should
not trump the public interest.

DIVINAGRACIA, JR. v. STO. TOMAS

G.R. No. 110954 | May 31, 1995

For the rule in Sec. 13 of the Omnibus Rules implementing Book V, EO 292 to apply, the
following must concur: (1) there must be series of promotions; (2) all promotional
appointments are simultaneously submitted to the Commission for approval; and (3) the
Commission disapproves the appointment of a person to a higher position.

A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that

aims to “lure the employee away from his permanent position,” cannot be done without the
employees’ consent, for that would constitute removal from office. Indeed, no permanent
transfer can take place unless the officer or employee is first removed from the position held,
and then appointed to another position.

QUISUMBING v. GUMBAN
G.R. No. 85156 | February 5, 1991

The appointment of private respondent Yap is simply that of a District Supervisor of the
Bureau of Public Schools, which does not indicate a specific station. As such, she could be
assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific station.

VINZONS-CHATO v. NATIVIDAD
G.R. No. 113843 | June 2, 1995
Blas failed to show patent illegality in the action of petitioner Chato constituting violation of
his right to security of tenure. To sustain his contention that his transfer constitutes a demotion
simply because the new assignment is not to his liking would be to subordinate government
projects, along with the great resources and efforts they entail, to the individual preferences
and opinions of civil service employees. Such contention would negate the principle that a
public office is a public trust and that it is not the private preserve of any person.

CAUSING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 86439 | April 13, 1989

The only personnel movements prohibited by Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as “any
personnel movement from one government agency to another or from one department,
division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or without
the issuance of an appointment;” while detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is
the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an
appointment. The physical transfer of the employee’s office area from its old location to the
Office of the Mayor “some little steps” away did not amount to a violation of this provision.
“Transfer” and “detail” must be understood in their technical and legal meanings. The
petitioner’s argument that the prohibition encompassed “any and all kinds of personal
movement,” including the mere change in office location, is unacceptable.

CUEVAS v. BACAL
G.R. No. 139382 | December 6, 2000

Unless an employee is appointed to a particular office or station, he can claim no security of

tenure in respect of any office. The rule that outlaws unconsented transfers applies only to an
officer who is appointed – not merely assigned – to a particular station. Such rule does not
proscribe to a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency
to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the
agency. The use of this method in personnel management to promote optimum public service
cannot be objected to. Career Executive Service personnel can be shifted from one office to
another without violating their right to security of tenure, because their status and salaries are
based on their ranks and not on the positions to which they are assigned.

GLORIA v. DE GUZMAN, JR.

G.R. No. 116183 | October 6, 1995

Mere designation does not confer upon the designee security of tenure to a position held in
acting capacity only.

The fact that private respondent Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service Examination after
the termination of her temporary appointment is no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint
her. Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be
considered by the appointing authority are: performance, degree of education, work
experience, training, seniority, and, more importantly, as in this case, whether or not the
applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the appointing power. As We said earlier, the
position of Board Secretary II, by its nature, is primarily confidential, requiring as it does “not
only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which ensures freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential
matters of state.” Reappointment to such a position is an act which is discretionary on the part
of the appointing power; it cannot be the subject of an application for the writ of mandamus.

Reinstatement is technically the issuance of a new appointment, which is essentially

discretionary; such exercise of the discretionary power cannot be controlled even by the
Courts, as long as it is properly exercised by the appointing authority. Thus, the order of the
lower court for the reinstatement of the private respondent amounts to an undue interference
by the court in the exercise of a discretionary power vested in the PCSA Board of Trustees.

GARCIA v. CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. L-75025 | September 14, 1993

Pardon that is based on the innocence of the accused ipso facto entitles him to reinstatement,
as well as to back wages.

EJERA v. MERTO
G.R. No. 163109 | January 22, 2014

Reassignment has been defined as movement of an employee from one organizational unit to
another in the same department or agency, which does not involve a reduction in rank, status,
or salary. It does not require the issuance of a new appointment, but shall nevertheless require
an office order from a duly authorized officer. Reassignment is recognized as a management
prerogative vested in the CSC and, for that matter, in any department or agency embraced in
the Civil Service; it does not constitute removal without cause. It is presumed to be regular and
made in the interest of the public service unless proven otherwise.

PADOLINA v. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 133511 | October 10, 2000

Under Section 11, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292, demotion is defined as “the movement from one position to another involving the
issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which
may or may not involve reduction in salary.” A diminution in any one of those categories is
sufficient to constitute a demotion, and hence, tantamount to a virtual dismissal. The
reassignment of the respondent was a violation of security of tenure. The lack of specific
duration of the reassignment was tantamount to a floating assignment, thus a diminution in
rank or status. The respondent was also deprived of emoluments, like RATA and other
allowances, thus the movement was deemed a diminution in compensation. Finally, the
reassignment also removed respondent’s power of supervision over 41 employees, thus a
deemed a diminution in status.

PASTOR v. CITY OF PASIG

G.R. No. 146873 | May 9, 2002

Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, §26(7) of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides that “an employee may be reassigned from one
organizational unit to another in the same agency: Provided, That such reassignment shall not
involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary.” It has been held that a reassignment that is
indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status, and salary is in effect a constructive
removal from the service.

CARIÑO v. DAOAS
G.R. No. 144493 | April 9 2002

The rule proscribes transfers without consent of officers appointed - not merely assigned - to a
particular station, such as in the case of herein petitioner who was appointed as Accountant III
in Region I. The CSC Regional Office must be accorded the presumption of regularity in the
performance of its duties. Hence, when it rendered a legal opinion as regards the reassignment
of petitioner, it must be considered in order and should be respected pending appeal by private
respondents. Petitioner is thus justified in not heeding her reassignment order because her basis
was not, as stated by the appellate court, her firm belief that her transfer was illegal, but the
legal opinion of a regional office of the Civil Service Commission. Petitioner could not
therefore be considered AWOL because she was in fact reporting for work in Region I until 29
April 1997 when Bistoyong issued a memorandum ordering her to refrain from reporting for
work therein.

MODULE 8 (A-C) | CASE DOCTRINES

TORRES v. RIBO
G.R. No. L-2051 | May 21, 1948

An officer de facto is one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet
is not a good officer in point of law. He must have acted as an officer for such a length of time,
under color of title and under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence by the public
and public authorities, as to afford a presumption of appointment or election, and induce
people, without inquiry, and relying on the supposition that he is the officer he assumes to be,
to submit to or invoke his action.
MONROY v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-23258 | July 1, 1967

The acts of the de facto officer, insofar as they affect the public, are valid, binding, and with
full legal effect. The doctrine is intended not for the protection of the public officer, but for the
protection of the public and the individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons
discharging the duties of a public office.

The general is that “the rightful incumbent of public office may recover from an officer de
facto, the salary received by the latter during his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into
the office in good faith and under color of title.” The resulting hardship occasioned by the
operation of this rule to de facto office who actually did actual work is recognized. A de facto
officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the
de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful
retention of the public office.

TUANDA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 110544 | October 17, 1995

There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de
facto officer in a de jure office.

TAYKO v. CAPISTRANO
G.R. No. L-30188 | October 2, 1928

A judge who is holding over in good faith and whose successor has not been appointed, is a
judge de facto. A de facto judge is one who exercises the duty of a judicial office under color
of an appointment or election thereto. He differs, on the one hand, from a mere usurper who
undertakes to act officially without any color of right, and on the other hand, from a judge de
jure, who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and who term of office has not
expired.

The title to the office of a judge, whether de jure or de facto, can only be determined in a
proceeding of the nature of quo warranto and cannot be tested by prohibition.

RODRIGUEZ v. TAN
G.R. No. L-3913 | August 7, 1952

Having been thus duly proclaimed as Senator and having assumed office as required by law, it
cannot be disputed that defendant is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances
which our Constitution provides for the position (Article VI, Section 14). This is as it should
be. This is in keeping with the ordinary course of events. This is simple justice. The
emolument must go to the person who rendered service unless the contrary is provided.
LUNA v. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. L-12647 | November 26,1917

It is an essential element to the validity of the acts of de jure judge, that he is actually acting
under some color of title or right. The requisites of a valid de facto officer are:
(1) There must be a valid and legitimate legal office – existence of de jure office;
(2) There must be a color of title or right; and
(3) There must be actual physical possession of the office.

GARCHITORENA v. CRESCINI
G.R. No. L-14514 | December 18, 1918

There cannot be a de facto judge when there is a de jure judge in the actual performance of the
duties of the office. In order to be a de facto judge, he must still be acting under some color of
right. He cannot be actually acting under any color of right when he has ceased to be judge and
has actually vacated office by the acceptance of another office.

SOLIS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. L-29777-83 | March 26, 1971

A judge de facto was defined as one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to
be and yet is not a good officer in point of law because there exists some defect in his
appointment or his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time; but it is “essential
to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge, that he is actually acting under some color of
right.”

TOMALI v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 110598 | December 1, 1994

Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil service position is
essential in order to make it fully effective. Without the favorable certification or approval of
the Commission, in cases when such approval is required, no title to the office can yet be
deemed to be permanently vested in favor of the appointee; the appointment can still be
recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority; and the employee may only be considered
as a de facto officer.

FLORES v. DRILON
G.R. No. 104732 | June 22, 1993

A de facto officer is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public
and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised under color of a known
election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want
of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its
exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public or under color
of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same
is adjudged to be such.

MENZON v. PETILLA
G.R. No. 90762 | May 20, 1991

Where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good faith, has possession of the
office and has discharged the duties thereof, is entitled to salary. Upon the principle of public
policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic consideration of justice, it would be
highly iniquitous to deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as
Acting Vice Governor.

ARROYO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 202860 | April 10, 2019

The de facto officer doctrine applies when a person is in possession of an office and discharges
its duties under a color of authority, even if the appointment or election is irregular or
defective.

The official acts of a de facto officer are deemed valid, but the de facto officer may not retain
the salaries and emoluments of the office if there was no good faith possession.

In this case, Brito's actions as a de facto Regional Director would be deemed valid, but he
would be required to account for any salaries and emoluments received.