Judicial Review in India
Judicial Review in India
F. Sixth Phase
ii. Post-Independence Era
Modern judicial system and hierarchy of Courts
Structure of Judiciary
II. The Supreme Court
Supreme Court Building
Mother and Child
Dharma chakra logo of the Supreme Court
Appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court
What is the Controversy over Consultation and Evolution of Collegium system?
What is Collegium System?
Who Heads the Collegium System?
What is the Working of the Collegium System and The National Judicial Appointments
Commission?
What are the Qualifications Required for the Appointment of Judges?
What are the Oaths or Affirmations?
What is the Tenure of Judges?
How does the Removal of Judges take place?
How are Salaries and Allowances Determined?
Why is it Important for the SC to be Independent?
What are Jurisdiction and Powers of Supreme Court?
- What is Original Jurisdiction?
- What is Writ Jurisdiction?
- What is Appellate Jurisdiction?
- What is Advisory Jurisdiction?
- What is a Court of Record?
- What is the Power of Judicial Review?
- What are the recent issues in Supreme Court?
Master of Roster
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Introduction
Though India has feature of parliamentary form of government, Indian parliament is not a
sovereign law (Absolute) making body like in English law. The ‘doctrine of separation of
powers’ between legislature, executive and judiciary recognized by Indian Constitution
expressively but it is not so rigid and strict senses of implementation how in USA. Because of
written constitution and checks and balance by one organ on other in USA there is a
possibility for judiciary to declare legislative and executive activities as unconstitutional it
given rise to judicial supremacy. However, it is notable to say that present Indian
Constitution is unique blend of American and British Constitution. It is owing to this reason
that our constitutional system “wonderfully adopts the via media between the American
system of judicial supremacy and the English principle of parliamentary supremacy”. India
has written constitution and has a democratic federal constitution, which is the supreme law of
land and all other laws are subject to this supreme law. Judicial Review is one of the cardinal
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features of Indian Constitutional system. India has constitutional and limited democracy
which imposes limitations on the power of the government on majority rule to avoid tyranny
and arbitrariness and to uphold constitutional values like rule of law. It is because of
development of the legal system in India.
The study of legal history or Judicial system consists of the chronological development and
growth of a legal system which, in other words means, an analysis of the system of judicial
administration prevailing in a particular country in its historical perspective. It is well known
that the efficacy of judicial system, by and large, depends upon two major considerations,
namely, the existence of a definite hierarchy of courts which follow a simple procedure and a
well defined system of law which are uniformly applicable throughout the country. Thus
‘Courts’ and ‘Laws’ are the two very important instruments of justice. It is only through the
execution of good laws that impartiality in administration of justice can be maintained.
Therefore, the subject of legal history of Indian Judicial System mainly deals with the process
of gradual evolution and development of “Courts” and “laws” in a chronological order. It has
been rightly said that ‘law’ is a dynamic concept which changes from time to time and place
to place to suit the needs and conditions of a given society which is constantly changing and
developing with the advancement of human knowledge and civilisation. The history of human
society tells us that “the roots of the present, lie in the past.” So, is also the case with the legal
institutions. The Courts and laws which we have today, have taken the present shape after
years of experimentation and planning. Therefore, in order to appreciate the present judicial
system in India, it becomes necessary to probe into the past history of its evolution and
development.
British left us with. As per the needs of the changing times changes and amendments were
made, but the procedure which is followed not has its roots in the era of British-India.
It is evident from ancient literature that the Indian jurisprudence was found on the rule of
law; that the King himself was subject to the law; that arbitrary power was unknown to Indian
political theory and jurisprudence and the kind’s right to govern was subject to the fulfillment
of duties the breach of which resulted in forfeiture of kingship; that the judges were
independent and subject only to the law; that ancient India had the highest standard of any
nation of antiquity as regards the ability, learning, integrity, impartiality, and independence of
the judiciary, and these standards have not been surpassed till today ; that the Indian judiciary
consisted of a hierarchy of judges with the Court of the Chief Justice (Praadvivaka) at the top,
each higher Court being invested with the power to review the decision of the Courts below ;
that disputes were decided essentially in accordance with the same principles of natural justice
which govern the judicial process in the modern State today: that the rules of procedure and
evidence were similar to those followed today ; that supernatural modes of proof like the
ordeal were discourage ; that in criminal trials the accused could not be punished unless his
guilt was proved according to law ; that in civil cases the trial consisted of four stages like any
modern trial – plaint, reply, hearing and decree ; that such doctrines as res judicata (prang
nyaya) were familiar to Indian jurisprudence ; that all trials, civil or criminal, were heard by a
bench of several judges and rarely by a judge sitting singly ; that the decrees of all courts
except the King were subject to appeal or review according to fixed principles ; that the
fundamental duty of the Court was to do justice "without favour or fear”.
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Coming to the historical times of Mauryan Empire, Kautilya describes the duties of a king
in the Arth-shastra thus : "In the happiness of his subjects lies the King’s happiness; in their
welfare his welfare; whatever pleases him he shall not consider as good, but whether pleases
his people he shall consider to good." The Principle enunciated by Kautilya was based on a
very ancient tradition which was already established in the age of the Ramayana. Rama, the
King of Ayodhya, was compelled to banish his queen, whom he loved and in whose chastity
he had comlete faith, simply because his subjects disapproved of his having taken back a wife
who had spent a year in the house of her abductor. The king submitted to the will of people
though it broke his heart.
In the Mahabharata it is related that a common fisherman refused to give his daughter in
marriage to the King of Hastinapur unless he accepted the condition that his daughter’s sons
and not the heir apparent from a former queen would succeed to the throne. The renunciation
of the throne and the vow of life-long celibacy (Bhishma Pratgyan) by Prince Deva Vrata is
one of the most moving episodes in the Mahabharata.6 But its significance for jurists is that
even the sovereign was not above the law. The great King of Hastinapur could not compel the
humblest of his subjects to give his daughter in marriage to him without accepting his terms.
It refutes the view that the kings in ancient India were "Oriental despots" who could do what
they liked regardless of the law or the rights of their subjects.
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others, described in detail the judicial system and legal procedure which prevailed in India
from ancient times till the close of the Middle Ages.
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litigants. He was required to take the oath of impartiality, and decide cases without bias or
attachment.
Says Katyayana: "The king should enter the court-room modestly dressed, take his seat facing
east, and with an attentive mind hear the suits of his litigants. He should act under the
guidance of his Chief Justice (Praadvivaka), judges, ministers and the Brahmana members of
his council. A king who dispenses justice in this manner and according to law resides in
heaven". These provisions are significant. The king was required to be modestly dressed
(vineeta-vesha) so that the litigants were not intimidated. The code of conduct prescribed for
the king when acting as a judge was very strict and he was required to be free from all
"attachment or prejudice".
Says Narada: "If a king disposes of law suits (vyavaharan) in accordance with law and is self-
restrained ( in court), in him the seven virtues meet like seven flames in the fire" Narada
enjoins that when the king occupies the judgment seat (dharmasanam), he must be impartial to
all beings, having taken the oath of the son of Vivasvan. (The oath of Vivasvan is the oath of
impartiality: the son of Vivasvan is Yama, the god of death, who is impartial to all living
beings). The King’s Judges The judges and counselors guiding the king during the trial of a
case were required to be independent and fearless and prevent him from committing any error
or injustice.
Says Katyayana: "If the king wants to inflict upon the litigants (vivadinam) an illegal or
unrighteous decision, it is the duty of the judge (samya) to warn the king and prevent him.”
"The judge guiding the king must give his opinion which he considers to be according to law,
if the king does not listen, the judge at least has done his duty. When the judge realizes that
the king has deviated from equity and justice, his duty is not to please the king for this is no
occasion for soft speech (vaktavyam tat priyam natra); if the judge fails in his duty, he is
guilty." Delegation of Judicial power by the King As civilization advanced, the king’s
functions became more numerous and he had less and less time to hear suits in person, and
was compelled to delegate more and more of his judicial function to professional judges.
Katyayana says: "If due to pressure of work, the king cannot hear suits in person he should
appoint as a judge a Brahmin learned in the Vedas." The qualifications prescribed for a judge
were very high. According to Katyayana; "A judge should be austere and restrained, impartial
in temperament, steadfast, God-fearing, assiduous in his duties, free from anger, leading a
righteous life, and of good family. In course of time, a judicial hierarchy was created which
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relieved the king of much of the judicial work, but leaving untouched his powers as the
highest court of appeal. Under the Maurya Empire a regular judicial service existed as
described above.
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Jurors
The most noteworthy feature of the judicial system was the institution of sabhasada or
councilors who acted as assessors or adviser of the King. They were the equivalent of the
modern jury, with one important difference. Yajanvalkya enjoins: "The Sovereign should
appoint as assessors of his court persons who are well versed in the literature of the law,
truthful, and by temperament capable of complete impartiality between friend and foe."
These assessors or jurors were required to express their opinion without fear, even to the point
of disagreeing with the Sovereign and warning him that his own opinion was contrary to law
and equity. Katyayana says: ‘The assessors should not look on when they perceive the
Sovereign inclined to decide a dispute in violation of the law; if they keep silent they will go
to hell accompanied by the King." The same injunction is repeated in an identical verse in
Shukr-nitisara. The Sovereign-or the presiding judge in his absence-was not expected to
overrule the verdict of the jurors; on the contrary he was to pass a decree (Jaya-patra) in
accordance with their advice. Shukr-nitisara says: " The King after observing that the
assessors have given their verdict should award the successful party a decree (Jaya-patra)."
Their status may be compared to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which "humbly
advise" their Sovereign, but their advice is binding. It may also be compared to the peoples’
assessors under the Soviet judicial system who sit with the professional judge in the Peoples’
Court but are equal in status to him and can overrule him.
But there was one exception. If in a difficult case the jurors were unable to come to a
conclusion, the Sovereign could decide the matter himself. Shukra-nitisara says, "If they (the
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assessors) are unable to decide a dispute because it raises difficult or doubtful issues
(sandigdha-roopinah), in such a case the Sovereign may decide in the exercise of his
Sovereign privilege.
But while interpreting the written text of the law, the court was to bear in mind that its
fundamental duty was to do justice and not to follow the letter of the law. Brihaspati enjoined:
" The court should not give its decision by merely following the letter of the shastra for if the
decision is completely devoid of reasoning, the result is injustice (dharma-hani)." Brihastpati
further says that the court should decide according to the customs and usages of the country
even if they are in conflict with the letter of the law; and he gives several remarkable
illustrations which incidentally throw a flood of light on contemporary social conditions. He
points out that the maternal uncle’s daughter is accepted in marriage by brahmanas of the
south; in Madhya desha (Central India), brahmanas become hired labourers and craftmen and
eat cow’s flesh; eastern brahmanas eat fish and their women are addicted to drinking and can
be touched by men even when in their monthly courses. On account of the acts specified these
communities, in their respective countries, should not be liable to undergo penance incur
judicial punishment.
exhortation intended to put the fear of God in him. All the texts are unanimous on this point.
According to Narada, "The judges should inspire awe in the witness by citing moral precepts
which should uphold the majesty of truth and condemn falsehood". All the smirtis were
unanimous in holding that perjury before a law court was a heinous sin as well as a serious
crime. There were other provisions, calculated to reduce the changes of false evidence being
given. Katyayana enjoined, with much common sense that there should be no delay in
examining witnesses- obviously because delay dims the memory and stimulates imagination.
"The Sovereign should not grant any delay in the deposition of witnesses; for delay leads to
great evil and results in witnesses turning away from the law.”
Administrative Courts
An important feature of the judicial system of ancient India were the Special Courts of
criminal jurisdiction called the Kantakasodhana Courts. The artha-shastra says, "Three
commissioners (pradeshtarah) or three ministers shall deal with measures to suppress
disturbance to peace (kantakasodhanam kuryuh). According to the artha-shastra these courts
took cognizance not only of offences against the States but also violations of the law by
officials in the discharge of their official duties. Thus if traders used false weights or sold
adulterated good, or charged excessive prices, if the labourer in the factory was given less
than a fair wage or did not do its work properly, the Kantakasodhana courts intervened to
punish the culprits. Officers charged with misconduct, persons accused of theft, dacoity and
sex offences had to appear before the same court. These Courts had all the characteristics of
administrative courts. The existence of an Administrative Code is indicated in the Fourth part
of the Artha-shastra.
Administrative Code
The State in ancient India had a public sector of huge dimensions engaged in commerce and
industry. The modern capitalist notion that there should be no industries run by the State
would have appeared idiotic to our ancients. Under the Mauryan Empire there was a State
mercantile marine, a state textile industry, a state mining industry, and a state trading
department in charge respectively of a Superintendent-General of Shipping (navadhyaksha).
Textiles (Sootradhyaksha), mining (akaradhyaksha), and commerce. The regulation of each
state industry was under its own rules and all the rules were compiled and classified in the
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artha-shastra and may be regarded as an Administrative Code. I shall give a few illustrations.
The artha-shastra provides a complete Administrative Code prescribing rules of maritime and
riparian navigation. It enjoined that the State should have a Superintendent-General of
Navigation whose duties are defined thus: "The Superintendent of ships shall examine the
accounts relating to navigation not only on the oceans and mouths of the rivers, but also on
lakes, natural or artificial, and in the vicinity of Sthaniya and other fortified cities.”58 The
chapter contains a provision for the ships to have adequate few for ships. There were strict
regulations to ensure the safety of vessels: "For navigation on large rivers which cannot be
forded (atarya) even during winter and summer season, there shall be a service of large boats
(mahanavo), with a captain (shasaka), pilot (niyamaka), a crew to hold the sickle and the
ropes, and to clear the boat of water.” The artha-shastra also contains regulations indicating
that the state mercantile marine operated on the high seas and it provided that "passengers
arriving in port on the royal ships shall pay their passage money (yatra-vetanam)."
The rates were to be fixed by the Superintendent-General. Incidentally, the existence of this
code proves beyond doubt that the people of India were a sea-faring people with extensive
trade relations with foreign countries. Similarly, the manufacture of textiles and cotton yarn,
which was a huge industry exporting textiles to foreign countries had a public as well as a
private sector. The public sector was under a SuperintendentGeneral of Textiles
(Sootradhyaksha). He had a large organization under him. The artha-shastra prescribed the
duties of the Sootradhyaksha and the other officials working under him. It enjoins: "The
Superintendent-Genral of Weaving shall employ qualified persons to manufacture treads
(sutra), coats (varma), clothes (vastra), and ropes.” One of his duties was to give employment
to women in their own homes. Cotton was distributed among them and spun into tread and
either collected by the department or delivered by the women themselves. But the artha-
shastra contains strict regulation against the taking of liberties with such women or
withholding their wages. It prescribed: "If the official of the Superintendent stares at the face
of such woman or tries to engage her in conversation about matters other than her work (in
other words, makes what an American would call a pass at her) he will be punished as if he is
guilty of a first assault. "Delay in payment of wages shall be likewise punishable. Another
regulation made it a punishable offence to show any undue favour to a women worker. It
provided; "If an official pays wages to a woman for no work done, he will be punished.”
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Collection of taxes and import duties There was a code prescribing rules governing the
collection of taxes and import duties. This development was in charge of the Superintendent
General of taxes (Shulkadhyaksh).
The merchants at the customs were liable to declare their merchandise which had to bear a
seal when imported. Penalties were prescribed for making a false declaration. One rule
enjoined: "If the merchandise bears no seal, their duty shall be doubled". But in case of
counterfeit seal, the merchant was liable to pay a penalty amounting to eight times the normal
duty. If the seal was torn, the merchant was liable to be detained in a lock-up reserved
loiterers. The Administrative Code in the 4th Section of the artha-shastra contains detailed
regulations for the control of the other departments of the state. These regulations were not
enforced by the ordinary courts but by Commissioners (Pradeshtarah) who functioned as
Kantak Shodhana courts. I shall sum up the fundamental principles on which the judicial
process in ancient India was founded: The trial was always in public and always by several
judges collectively. Cases were heard in their serial order except in case of urgency. Delay in
the disposal of cases was condemned by all authorities and judges who were guilty of such
delay were liable to be punished.
The Sovereign was not to interfere with the judiciary but on the contrary the latter was under a
duty to interfere in case of a wrong (judicial) decision by the king. The Judges were to be
impartial ; during the pendency of the suit they were forbidden to have any private talks or
relations with the parties. If a judge was guilty of partiality, or harassment, or deliberately
violated the prescribed procedure, he was liable to be punished. Corruption was the most
heinous offence in a judge and a corrupt judge was banished from the realm and forfeited all
his property. The procedure for suits was prescribed by law, and every suit was initiated by a
complaint or plaint filed by the aggrieved party who prayed for the redress of a legal wrong.
Citizens were strictly forbidden to instigate or finance or file complaints in which they were
not interested, and champerty was a punishable offence. I cannot do better than quote the
verdict of a very recent English writer: "In some respects the judicial system of ancient India
was theoretically in advance of our own today."
small kingdoms. But this did not result in any great change in the judicial system which had
taken roots during the preceding thousands of years. The standards and ideals of justice were
maintained in each kingdom, in spite of political divisions, the unity of civilization was
preserved, and the fundamental principles of law and procedure were applied throughout the
country. This I is indicated by the fact that the great commentaries on law like Mitakshara and
Shukarneeti Sar were written during this period and enjoyed an all-India authority. But the
establishment of the Muslim rule in India opened a new chapter in our judicial history.
The Muslim conquerors brought with them a new religion, a new civilization, and a new
social system. This could not but have a profound effect on the judicial system. The ideal of
justice under Islam was one of the highest in the Middle ages. The Prophet himself set the
standards. He said in the quran, "Justice is the balance of God upon earth in which things
when weighed are not by a particle less or more. And He appointed the balance that he should
not transgress in respect to the balance; wherefore observe a just weight and diminish not the
balance". He is further reported to have said that to God a moment spent in the dispensation of
justice is better than the devotion of the man who keeps fast every day and says prayer every
night for 60 years. Thus the administration of justice was regarded by the Muslim kings as a
religious duty. This high tradition reached its zenith under the first four Caliphs.
The first Qadi was appointed by the Caliph Umar who enunciated the principle that the law
was supreme and that the judge must never be subservient to the ruler. It is rported of him that
he had once a personal law suit against a Jewish subject, and both of them appeared before the
Qadi who, on seeing the Caliph, rose in his seat out of deference. "Umar considered this to be
such an unpardonable weakness on his part that he dimissed him from office."
The Muslim kings in India bought with them these high ideals. It is reported by Badaoni that
during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq the Qadi dimissed a libel suit filed by the
Kind himself against Shaikhzada Jami, but no harm was done to him. (This however did not
prevent the Sultan from executing the defendant without a trial). Individual Sultans had very
high ideals of justice. According to Barani, Balban regarded justice as the keystone of
sovereignty "wherein lay the strength of the sovereign to wipe out the oppression". But
unfortunately the administration of justice under the Sultans worked fitfully. The reason was
that the outstanding feature of the entire Sultanate period was confusion and chaos. No Sultan
felt secure for a long time. One dynasty was replaced by another within a comparatively short
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period, and the manner of replacement was violent. Consequently the quality of justice
depended very much on the personality of the sovereign.
As a modern writer says, "The medieval State in India as elsewhere throughout its existence
had all the disadvantages of an autocracy-everything was temporary, personal, and had no
basic strength. The personal factor in the administration had become so pronounced that a
slight deviation of the head from the path of duty, produced concomitant variations in the
whole ‘trunk’. If the King was drunk ‘his Magistrates were seen drunk in public’. Justice in
not possible without security, and the Sultans of India never felt secure. Consequently, the
democratic ideal of government preached by Islam was obscure in India. During the
Sultanate, Islamic standards of Justice did not take root in India as an established tradition,
unlike the judicial traditions of ancient India which had struck deep roots in the course of
several thousand years and could not be uprooted by political divisions. Under the Moghal
Empire the country had an efficient system of government with the result that the system of
justice took shape. The unit of judicial administration was Qazi-an office which was borrowed
from the Caliphate. Every provincial capital had its Qazi and at the head of the judicial
administration was the Supreme Qazi of the empire (Qazi-ul-quzat). Moreover, every town
and every village large enough to be classed as a Qasba had its own Qazi. In theory, a Qazi
had to be "a Muslim scholor of blameless life, thoroughly conversant with the prescriptions of
the sacred law.
According to the greatest historian of the Mughal Empire, "the main defect of the Department
of Law and Justice was that there was no system, no organization of the law courts in a
regular gradation from the highest to the lowest, nor any proper distribution of courts in
proportion to the area to be served by them. The bulk fo the litigation in the country
(excluding those decided by caste, elders or village Panchayats mostly for the Hindus)
naturally came up before the courts of Qazis or Sadars."81 This view is not accepted by other
writers.
On the appointment of a Qazi, he was charged by the Imperial Diwan in the following words:
"Be Just, be honest, be impartial. Hold trials in the presence of the parties and at the court-
house and the seat of Government (muhakuma). Do not accept presents from thepeople of the
place where you serve, nor attend entertainments given by anybody and everybody. Write
your decrees, sale-deeds, mortgage bonds and other legal documents very carefully, so that
learned men may not pick holes in them and bring you to shame. Know poverty (faqr) to be
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your glory (fakhr)." But due to lack of supervision and absence of good tradition, these noble
ideals werenot observed. According to Sircar, "all the Qazis of the Mughal period, with a few
honourable exceptions, were notorious for taking bribes. The Emperor was the fountain
source of justice. He held his court of justice every Wednesday and decided a few cases
selected personally by him but he functioned not as an original court but as the court of
highest appeal. There is overwhelming evidence that all the Emperors from Akbar to
Aurangzeb took their judicial function seriously and discharged their duties Jahangir made a
great show of it and his Golden Chain has become famous in history. The weakness of Indo-
Mohammedan Law, according to Jadunath Sircar, was that all its three sources were outside
India.
"No Indian Emperor’s or Qazi’s decisions was ever considered authoritative enough to lay
down a legal principle to elucidate any obscurity in the Quran, or syupplement the Quranic
law by following the line of its obvious intention in respect of cases not explicitly provided
for by it. Hence, it became necessary for Indian Qazis to have at their slbow a digest of
Islamic law and precedent compiled from the accepted Arabic writer. . . . . Muslim law in
India was, therefore, incapable of growth and change, except so far as it reflected changes of
juristic thought in Arabia or Egypt." After the death of Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire
collapsed within two generations. The provincial Governors and Faujdars arrogated to
themselves the status of sovereigns and awarded punishment for criminal offences in their
own names. A relic of this usurpation of the Emperors’ power is the name Faujdari given to
criminal trials even today.
After the conquest of Bengal by the British the process of replacement of the Mughal system
of justice by the British began. But it took a long time. In fact, The Sadre Diwani Adalat
continued to function till it was replaced by the High Courts. The Mughal judicial system has
left its imprint on the present system, and a good part of our legal terminology is borrowed
from it. Our civil courts of first instance and called Munsifs, the plaintiff and the defendant
are termed Muddai and Muddaliya and scores of other legal terms remind us of the great days
of the Mughal Empire.
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time. Subsequently, similar settlements started at Bombay and Madras. The British company
was entrusted with the responsibility of governing these three petty settlements in India. For
the administration of these settlements, they improvised an elementary judicial system
whereby they settled their mutual disputes inter-se. The notable feature of this system was that
the administration of law and justice was entrusted to non-legal and non-professional
Englishmen who belonged to the trading community having little knowledge of law and its
procedure. As a matter of fact they were expected to follow the provisions of English Law in
discharging their judicial functions, but in practice they decided cases according to their
common sense and their notions of justice. The judiciary in the Presidency Towns was
completely dependent and subordinated to the Executive which was the supreme
administrative authority in British occupied territories in India. This position continued for
about a hundred and fifty years.
H. Second Phase
The second phase of history of the Indian Judicial System commences from the establishment
of the Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William (Calcutta) under the Regulating Act, 1773
enacted by the British Parliament which is considered to be a landmark in the development of
legal institutions in India. It was an English Law Court which consisted of professional
English judges who were well versed in law and legal practice. There was also an English Bar
to assist the Court in the administration of justice. This Court was modeled on the pattern of
the Court of Westminster of England. The Supreme Court was completely independent of the
legislature as also the executive. To some extent it even exercised some control over the
executive and thus introduced in India the concept of judicial control of administrative
actions. The net result was that the powers of the executive government were drastically
curtailed which eventually led to hostility and frequent clashes between the Supreme Court
and the Supreme Council. It was only after the Settlement Act of 1781 that the differences
between these two premier institutions of the Company’s government in India were resolved
by making the Council independent of the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
I. Third Phase
The third phase in the evolution of the Indian Judicial System or Anglo-Indian legal history
begins when the Company itself took up the administration of justice in Bengal by
introducing the ‘Adalat System’ in the mofussils. In the initial stages, the Adaltas were
manned by the British executive civil servants of the Company who had no legal training.
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They, being primarily the executive officers of the Company’s government, considered
judicial work as their secondary functions of a lesser importance. However, in course of time
there was separation of the judicial functions from the executive in civil matters while the
administration of criminal justice still remained with the executive official called the
Collector. Thus, the Collector-Magistrate played a very significant role in the civil
administration and also in the criminal justice system of the Company’s government in India.
The Adalat System was later extended to other newly acquired territories of the Company in
India.
J. Fourth Phase
The next phase of the legal history of India is marked by the unification of dual system of
courts prevailing in the Presidency towns and mofussil areas into a single one with the
establishment of High Courts under the High Courts Act of 1861. The judicial system of
Presidency towns was essentially based on the English law having a distinct British character
while the Mofussil territories outside the Presidency town had the Adalat system based on
indigenous laws of Hindus and Muslims. The establishment of the High Court by abolishing
the Supreme Court and Sadar Adalats of Presidency Towns was an attempt to simplify the
judicial system. Therefore, as rightly suggested by Dr. M. P. Jain, “these High Courts may
rightly be considered as the precursor of the modern system of law and justice in India.”
Initially, High Courts were established in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay which were later
extended also to other Northern and Western Provinces.
K. Fifth Phase
The emergence of the ‘Privy Council’ as the highest Court of appeal from India, constitutes
yet another important phase of development in the Indian Judicial System. It stimulated
proper development of laws in India on a uniform pattern and also motivated the courts to
apply high judicial standards in discharging their functions as dispensers of justice. The
growth of laws became more conspicuous after 1833 with the setting up of the First Law
Commission which started the process of codification of Indian laws to ensure uniformity and
certainty in the administration of justice. The Second and the Third Law Commissions took in
their hand the task of codification of major laws in India.
L. Sixth Phase
The Government of India Act of 1935 set up the Federal Court of India to act as an
intermediate Appellant Court between High Courts and the ‘Privy Council’ in regard to
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matters involving the interpretation of the Indian Constitution. It was not to ‘pronounce any
judgment other than a declaratory judgment’ which meant that it could declare what the law
was but did not have authority to the exact compliance with its decisions. The Federal Court’s
power of ‘judicial review’ was largely a paper work and therefore, a body with very limited
power.
Constituent Assembly’s Adhoc Committee on the Supreme Court report formed the bulk of
the guidelines for judiciary. A.K.Ayyar, K.Santhanam, M.A.Ayyangar, Tej Bahadur Sapru,
B.N.Rau, K.M.Munshi,Saadulla and Dr. B.R.Ambedkar played important role in shaping the
judicial system of India.
The Unitary Judicial System seems to have been accepted with the least questioning. The
Supreme Court was to have a special, countrywide responsibility for the protection of
individual rights. Dr B. R. Ambedkar was perhaps the greatest apostle in the Assembly of
what he described as ‘one single integrated judiciary having jurisdiction and providing
remedies in all cases arising under the Constitutional law, the Civil, or the Criminal law,
essential to maintain the unity of the country’.
With the Indian independence in 1947, the judicial system had to be modified to suit the
changed conditions. The jurisdiction of the Privy Council over the Indian appeals came to an
end with the establishment of the Supreme Court of India on January 26, 1950. It must,
however, be stated that the pattern of judicial administration even after the independence of
India, remained more or less the same. Thus, the modern judicial system is essentially the
same as bequeathed to us by the British rulers. It has been said: “this is perhaps the best
legacy that the Englishmen have left behind.” Presently, India has a fairly advanced judicial
system having a well defined hierarchy of Courts with the Supreme Court at the apex and a
Interestingly, in the explanatory sections of the study, the Committee engaged with the issue of dividing rights
into justiciable and non-justiciable, though it did not propose anything in its recommendations. It, however,
alerted future drafters of the Constitution to pay attention to this question. This was arguably the first time a
constitutional document brought up the question of justiciable and non-justiciable rights in Indian constitutional
history.
Norman Brown, a renowned Indologist, in India’s Constitutional Issues (1946) argued that the Sapru Committee
Report ‘appears to be the most reflective and sustained Indian presentation of constitutional issues which has
been published’. However, scholars and commentators suggest that the report was ignored and did not create any
impact on key political players. Ray T Smith in The Role of Indian Liberals in the National Movement, 1915-
1947 (1968) argues that the report received ‘scant attention’. V.P Menon in Transfer of Power felt that the
absence of a top ranking Muslim in the Committee, and the Committee’s rejection of Pakistan and separate
electorates made the Muslim league hostile to the Report. The Congress too was cold towards the Report.
R.A. Wilson reviewed the Report in 1946 in a Royal Institute of International Affairs: ‘in an atmosphere less
charged with communal feelings they [the Sapru Committee] might have well “elicited the approbation of
thinking Indians” and formed a basis of discussions at least for a future constitution ”. A couple of months after
this review, a Constituent Assembly was set up and began framing the Indian Constitution. While
the Report may have been ignored or denounced when it was first published, it is plausible that the Report had
an indirect influence on the constitution-making process: seven members of Sapru Committee went on to
become the members of the Constituent Assembly. These included: M.R. Jayakar, Gopalaswami Ayyagar, John
Mathai, Frank Anthony and Sachidananda Sinha – who became the first (provisional) chairman of the
Constituent Assembly.
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number of subordinate Courts below it. The laws are mostly codified having a uniform
application throughout the country.
The primary object of judicial administration is to ensure even-handed justice to all alike and
establish Rule of Law throughout the country. It is, however, distressing to note that
introduction of ‘uniform civil code’ as contemplated by Article 44 of the Constitution of India
is not yet accomplished despite the Supreme Court decision in this regard. The independence
of judiciary has been well guarded by the Constitution of India and the provisions of appeal
are fair to ensure justice to common man.
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Structure of Judiciary
Under our Constitution there is a single integrated system of Courts for the Union as well as
the States, which administer both Union and State laws, and at the head of the system stands
the Supreme Court of India. Below the Supreme Court are the High Courts of different States
and under each High Court there are ‘subordinate courts’, i.e., courts subordinate to and under
the control of the High Courts. At the top of the judicial system is Supreme Court of India
followed by High Courts at State level. There are 25 High Courts in India, six having control
over more than one State/UT. Delhi has a High Court of its own among the Union Territories.
Each High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other judges as appointed by the
President of India. At the District level, there are Subordinate District Courts.
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- This discretion of the government was curtailed by the Supreme Court in the Second
Judges Case (1993), in which the Supreme Court ruled that the senior most judge of
the Supreme Court should alone be appointed to the office of the Chief Justice of
India.
- The sole opinion of the CJI does not constitute the consultation process. He should
consult a collegium of four senior most judges of the Supreme Court and even if
two judges give an adverse opinion, he should not send the recommendation to the
government.
- The court held that the recommendation made by the chief justice of India without
complying with the norms and requirements of the consultation process are not
binding on the government.
A HC collegium is led by its Chief Justice and four other senior most judges of that
court.
Names recommended for appointment by a HC collegium reaches the government only
after approval by the CJI and the SC collegium.
Judges of the higher judiciary are appointed only through the collegium system and the
government has a role only after names have been decided by the collegium.
What is the Working of the Collegium System and The National Judicial Appointments
Commission?
- The collegium recommends of the names of lawyers or judges to the Central
Government. Similarly, the Central Government also sends some of its proposed
names to the Collegium.
- Collegium considers the names or suggestions made by the Central Government and
resends the file to the government for final approval.
- If the Collegium resends the same name again then the government has to give its
assent to the names. But time limit is not fixed to reply. This is the reason that
appointment of judges takes a long time.
- Through the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014 the National Judicial
Commission Act (NJAC) was established to replace the collegium system for the
appointment of judges.
- However, the Supreme Court upheld the collegium system and struck down the
NJAC as unconstitutional on the grounds that the involvement of Political
Executive in judicial appointment was against the “Principles of Basic Structure”.
I.e. the “Independence of Judiciary”.
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- He should have been an advocate of a High Court (or High Courts in succession) for
ten years; or
- He should be a distinguished jurist in the opinion of the president.
The Constitution has not prescribed a minimum age for appointment as a judge of the
Supreme Court.
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the members of that House present and voting). The grounds of removal are two—proved
misbehaviour or incapacity.
- The Judges Enquiry Act (1968) regulates the procedure relating to the removal of a
judge of the Supreme Court by the process of impeachment:
- No judge of the Supreme Court has been impeached so far. Impeachment motions
of Justice V Ramaswami (1991–1993) and the Justice Dipak Misra (2017-18) were
defeated in the Parliament.
Mode of appointment
- Security of tenure
- Fixed service conditions
- Expenses charged on the consolidated fund
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Further, this jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not extend to the following:
- A dispute arising out of any pre-Constitution treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sand
or other similar instrument.
- A dispute arising out of any treaty, agreement, etc., which specifically provides that
the said jurisdiction does not extent to such a dispute.
- Inter-state water disputes.
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the reversal of his acquittal or where the high court sentences a person to death after
withdrawing the case from a subordinate court.
- In civil cases, appeals can be made before the Apex Court under Article
133(1) subsequent to the high court’s sanction.
- It enjoys a wide appellate jurisdiction which can be classified under four heads:
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- Be it the Chief Justice of India or Chief Justice of any high court it is he or she who
heads the administrative side. This includes allocation of matters before a judge as
well.
- So, no Judge can take up the matter on his own, unless allocated by the Chief Justice
of India.
High Courts
The Constitution provides for a High Court in each State under Article 214. However, the
Parliament is empowered to establish a common high court, by law, for two or more states.
There are 25 High Courts in India, six having control over more than one State/UT. Delhi has
a High Court of its own among the Union Territories. Each High Court shall consist of a
Chief Justice and such other judges as appointed by the President of India.
do away with the requirement of consulting the Chief Justice, However, in the case
of Supreme Court Advocate on Record Association v. Union of India (1993), the Amendment
was declared to be unconstitutional.
Review jurisdiction: Article 226 confers the review jurisdiction on the high courts
and empowers them to review their own judgments and orders. The high courts entertain a
review petition when there has been material error resulting in miscarriage of justice or where
there has been a flagrant procedural error.
An appeal can be made before the high court against the order of the Sessions Judge to
sentence the accused for a term exceeding 7 years. An appeal can also be made before the
high court in certain cases from the order of the metropolitan or other judicial magistrates.
However, it is pertinent to note that no appeal can be made before the high court in relation to
petty cases.
Subordinate Courts
The hierarchy of courts that lie subordinate to High Courts are referred to as Subordinate
Courts. It is for the State Governments to enact for the creation of Subordinate Courts. The
nomenclature of these subordinate courts differs from State to State but broadly there is
uniformity in terms of the organisational structure (i.e. the hierarchy remains the same for
every State at the most). Below the High Courts, there are District Courts for each district, and
has appellate jurisdiction in the district. Under the District Courts, there are the lower courts
such as the Additional District Court, Sub Court, Munsiff Magistrate Court, Court of Special
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Judicial Magistrate of I class, Court of Special Judicial Magistrate of II class, Court of Special
Munsiff Magistrate for Factories Act and labour laws, etc. Below the Subordinate Courts, at
the grass-root level, are the Panchayat Courts (Nyaya Panchayat, Gram Panchayat, Panchayat
Adalat, etc.). These are, however, not considered as courts under the purview of the criminal
courts jurisdiction.District Courts can take cognizance of original matters under special status.
The Governor, in consultation with the High Court, makes appointments pertaining to the
District Courts. Appointment of persons other than the District Judges to the judicial service
of a State is made by the Governor in accordance with the rules made by him in that behalf
after consultation with the High Court and the State Public Service Commission. The High
Court exercises administrative control over the District Courts and the courts subordinate to
them, in matters as posting, promotions and granting of leave to all persons belonging to the
State Judicial Service.
The land revenue matters in the state are decided by the revenue courts. The revenue courts
include the courts of Tehsildar, Collector, etc. The Board of Revenue constitutes the highest
revenue court.
Tribunal
Various special tribunals are set up by the government for dealing with specific matters such
as taxes, land disputes, etc. Tribunals may be judicial or quasi-judicial. The Tribunals provide
expeditious justice and are usually established when there are several pending matters relating
to a particular subject matter pending before the traditional courts. Thus, these tribunals help
in reducing the burden of the traditional courts.
Article 323A of the Constitution empowers the Parliament to establish Central as well as
State-level administrative tribunals which adjudicate on matters relating to the recruitment
and service of public servants.
Article 323B provides a list of subject matters for which the Tribunals may be established by
the Union Parliament or the State Legislatures. It includes tax, labour disputes, elections, land
reforms, etc. In the landmark case of Union of India v. R. Gandhi and Ors. (2010), it was held
that the list of matters provided in Section 323B is not intended to restrict the legislature from
establishing tribunals for adjudicating any other matters. The list is not exhaustive and the
legislature can establish Tribunals pertaining to any matter provided in the Seventh Schedule.
Nyay Panchayats
The Nyay Panchayats are established at the village level and are aimed at providing cheap and
expeditious justice. They are based on the direction provided by Article 40 which states that
the State must take steps to empower the panchayats. The 73rd Constitutional
Amendment conferred Constitutional status on the panchayats. These Nyay Panchayats
adjudicate on minor offences such as wrongful restraint or theft. While these Panchayats
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enjoy both civil as well as criminal jurisdiction, the pecuniary jurisdiction of these judicial
constituents is very low.
The Panches are appointed by the adult people of the village itself. Furthermore, since the
posts are honorary, the members do not receive any salary. The minimum age of the members
of Nyay Panchayat is 30 years.
The Ashok Mehta Committee which was constituted in 1977 made certain recommendations
for the reformation of the Nyay Panchayats. It suggested that the government should form a
special cadre for judges of the Nyay Panchayat. The civil jurisdiction of the Nyay Panchayats
should be broadened and their criminal jurisdiction should be equivalent to a judicial
magistrate of 1st class. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as well as the
provision of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 should not apply to the proceedings of a Nyay
Panchayat. However, the recommendations of the Committee have not been implemented.
Lok Adalat
Unlike the Nyay Panchayat, the Lok Adalats do not adjudicate disputes, rather, they aim at
resolving disputes through mediation and arbitration. The Lok Adalats are also known as the
‘People’s Court’. The Lok Adalats consist of judicial officers, retired and serving, and such
other persons as prescribed by the Central Government.
A statutory status was conferred on the Lok Adalats by the Legal Services Authorities Act,
1987. Chapter VI of the Act expressly deals with the organization of Lok Adalats. Section 21
of the Act provides that the award made by a Lok Adalat is deemed to be a decree of a civil
court. Furthermore, such an award is binding on the parties to the dispute.
The Lok Adalat has jurisdiction over such cases which are pending before the court for which
the Adalat is convened. The parties may either agree to refer the matter to the Lok Adalat or
one of the parties may apply before the Lok Adalat or the matter may be referred to the Lok
Adalat by the court. Section 20 provides that a Lok Adalat while discharging its duties, must
observe the principles of “justice, equity, fair play and other legal principles“.
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