Montesquieu

“Of all French political philosophers in the eighteenth century (other than
Rousseau) the most important was Montesquieu. Of them all he had perhaps the
clearest conception of the complexities of a social philosophy, and yet he too was
guilty of extreme over simplification.” (Sabine)

Montesquieu was born in 1689 at Chateau de la Bordeaux in a noble aristocratic family. His
father was an eminent French lawyer. At the age of twenty seven he became president of
Parliament of Bordeaux, the most important of parliaments in France except that of Paris.
For a long period of twelve years he continued as chief magistrate at Bordeaux, but he was
not satisfied with the job because he was an extensive reader of literature and history and
had deep sympathetic ties with the intellectual movements of his days. At last he left
presidency and moved to Paris. In 1728 he visited Austria, Hungary, Venice, Rome,
Switzerland, Holland and lastly England where he remained for above two years. During his
tour, he came across the leading politicians and political thinkers in England and he was
deeply impressed by the English conception of liberty and by the English system of
Government.

After his return he settled at La Brede and kept himself busy with the task of writing of
political philosophy. At that time France although under absolute control of King Louis XIV,
yet was more fertile for growth of political theory but Frenchmen were not satisfied with the
political situation, as were their fellows across the channel.

Important works of Montesquieu are:

1.The Persian Letter: He published these letters in 1721. it embodied a brilliant satire on
the existing political, religious and social institutions in France.

2.Reflections and the causes of the Greatness and Decline of the Romans. This book
was published in 1734.

3.The Spirit of Law published in 1748. This book won a great fame and immortality for
Montesquieu because it came out after fourteen year unremitting labor and he made it a
masterpiece for all ages.

Montesquieu’s doctrine of Separation of

Powers

Montesquieu expounds his theory of separation of powers to set forth the governmental
organization in order to safeguard the political liberty. He believed that the separation of
powers among the different organs of the government is the best safeguard against
tyranny. He pleads that each power must be exercised by a separate organ and a system of
checks and balances should thus be established for solidarity and harmony of the state.

The theory of separation of powers among Legislative, Executive and Judicial branches of
government was best realized in the British Constitution. He came to realize that for
maintaining liberty, the separation of powers was absolutely essential. Montesquieu did not
rely upon observation. Locke and Harrington had taught him what to expect and for the rest
he adopted the myth which was current among the English
themselves. Bolingbroke said, “It is by this mixture of monarchial, aristocratically
and democratically power blended together in one system and by these three
estates balancing one another, that our free constitution of Government has been
preserved so long inviolate.”

According to Montesquieu there are three kinds of power:

1.By virtue of the legislative power, the prince or magistrate exerts temporary or
permanent laws and amends or abrogates those laws, which are contrary to the will of the
subject.

2.By virtue of the executive powers, he makes peace or war, sends or receives
Ambassadors, establish the public security and provide protection against invasions.

3.By virtue of the judiciary powers, he is vested with the powers to punish criminals and
also to safeguard the life and property of the individuals.

When the executive and legislative are united in the same person, there can be no liberty
because apprehensions may arise. If the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislative and the executive then again there will be no liberty. When it is combined with
the legislative, the existence and liberty of people would be exposed to arbitrary rule. When
it is combined with executive organ, then there will be violence and oppression in the
capacity of a mortal God.

It is quite obvious from all above cited discussion, that the separation of powers among the
three organs of governments fully ensures liberty and freedom, by imposing healthy checks
on the despotism of the government bureaucrats. Montesquieu was of the view that liberty
is an indispensable fundamental for human progress and glory. Everyone is born to enjoy it
without any distinction of color, creed and religion.

Criticism:

1.Montesquieu’s study of English constitution is not very correct until this day; there is no
full separation of powers between different governmental agencies. There the House of
Lords is a legislative as well as a judicial body. The Lord Chancellor partakes of all the three
functions of government.

2.If all the branches are made separate and independent of each other, each branch will
endeavor to safeguard its interests and possibly may jeopardize other’s interest.

3.Perfect separate power in the functions of the government is impossible.

4.Mill was of the view “the separation of powers will result in a clash between the
three different organs of the government because each one will take interest only
in its own powers.”

In spite of all inconsistencies in the theory of separation of powers, it too wielded a

considerable influence in Pakistan, France and America. Montesquieu is placed in the first
rank of those distinguished thinkers who in the eighteenth century, held high standard of
idealism in all that pertains to liberty.

Montesquieu’s views on Forms of Government

The classification of government of Montesquieu is base partly on the number of those who
hold political power and partly on the manner in which that power is exercised. He gives
more importance to the principle on which government is based than to its nature. He
assigned a particular basic principle to every form of government. The principle of
democracy was virtue, of an aristocracy virtue-cum-moderation, of monarchy honor while
that of despotism was fear. He enunciated the dangers attending each form of government
if it lost its basic principle.

Montesquieu forms the government into three types:

1)Republic:
Montesquieu was of the view “A republican government is that in which the body or only a
part of the people, is possessed of the supreme power.” To him, when in a republic, the
body of the people is possessed of the supreme power it is called democracy. Sovereignty
rests with the people in democracy. In Republics, there can be no exercise of sovereignty
but by the votes of the people and these votes express their own will.

2)Monarchies:
Montesquieu remarks that monarchial government is that in which a single person governs
the state by fixed and established laws. He was of the view that the most intermediate
power is that of nobility. This in some measure seems to be essential to a monarchy, whose
fundamental maxim is no nobility no monarch, but there may be despotic process.

3)Despotism:
A despotic government is that in which a single person directs all functions of the
government with his own capricious will, without any law and without fixed rules. His own
words become laws of the land and complete subordination to these laws a expedient.

Each of the form is associated with its peculiar principle:

a) Democracy is based upon political virtue

b) Aristocracy is based upon moderation
c) Monarchy is based upon honor
d) Despotism is based upon fear and oppression

Relation between Forms of Government and religion & Size of State:

Montesquieu was of the view that certain religions had a definite affinity for certain types of
governments. Islam goes well with Democratic Republican form of government, wherein
fundamentals of religion i-e., equality, fraternity and freedom are deeply inculcated and
practiced for the security of mankind and glory of the state. Roman Catholicism is closely
affiliated with monarchial form of government with arbitrary rule and Protestantism even in
this modern age is deeply attached with despotism and cruel expansionism.

Republican form of government is possible only in a state of small size; monarchy suited the
moderate-sized state while a big country or an empire must have despotic government.
Real democracy is possible only ion small city-state. France of Montesquieu’s time was too
large for a republic form of government, Monarchy would suit her best. Montesquieu
declared monarchy, a worst form of government and he unlike Machiavelli discarded the
doctrine of aggrandizement and expansion.

Criticism:

1.It is quite wrong to assume, as Montesquieu does, that democracy and aristocracy are
sub-types of republican form.

2.It is a quite unfair to place despotic government at par with monarchial and republican
forms. Despotic state is not at all state because it is established by the absence of
established law, and hence it is a lawless state, which should not be included in the plan at
all.

3.Montesquieu’s scheme creates distinction between the republican and monarchic form
based upon the number of persons who possess the supreme power, the distinction
between the monarchic and despotic types depends upon the way in which the power of
governments are to be exercised.

Montesquieu as the Aristotle of 18th Century

1.Montesquieu follows the inductive and historical methods of Aristotle and like him, takes
keen interest in the practical political activities.

2.Like Aristotle, Montesquieu too pays his attention on the influence of physical
environment on the life of man and social institutions.

3.Montesquieu steps into the shoes of Aristotle, when he recognizes basic types of
government i-e, republican, monarchial and despotic.

4.Montesquieu closely follows Aristotle when he says that the fundamental types of political
constitutions are fixed once and for all but they are different to some extent under the
impact of the local conditions.

5.Montesquieu’s observation that the law of a society gives to its unique and particular
character, has its parallel in Aristotle’s statement that the constitution of a state determines
the very life and character of its people, if there occurs a change in the constitution, the
state itself becomes altogether a different state.

Montesquieu’s views on Forms of

Government

The classification of government of Montesquieu is base partly on the number of those who
hold political power and partly on the manner in which that power is exercised. He gives
more importance to the principle on which government is based than to its nature. He
assigned a particular basic principle to every form of government. The principle of
democracy was virtue, of an aristocracy virtue-cum-moderation, of monarchy honor while
that of despotism was fear. He enunciated the dangers attending each form of government
if it lost its basic principle.

Montesquieu forms the government into three types:

1)Republic:
Montesquieu was of the view “A republican government is that in which the body or only a
part of the people, is possessed of the supreme power.” To him, when in a republic, the
body of the people is possessed of the supreme power it is called democracy. Sovereignty
rests with the people in democracy. In Republics, there can be no exercise of sovereignty
but by the votes of the people and these votes express their own will.

2)Monarchies:
Montesquieu remarks that monarchial government is that in which a single person governs
the state by fixed and established laws. He was of the view that the most intermediate
power is that of nobility. This in some measure seems to be essential to a monarchy, whose
fundamental maxim is no nobility no monarch, but there may be despotic process.

3)Despotism:
A despotic government is that in which a single person directs all functions of the
government with his own capricious will, without any law and without fixed rules. His own
words become laws of the land and complete subordination to these laws a expedient.

Each of the form is associated with its peculiar principle:

a) Democracy is based upon political virtue

b) Aristocracy is based upon moderation
c) Monarchy is based upon honor
d) Despotism is based upon fear and oppression

Relation between Forms of Government and religion & Size of State:

Montesquieu was of the view that certain religions had a definite affinity for certain types of
governments. Islam goes well with Democratic Republican form of government, wherein
fundamentals of religion i-e., equality, fraternity and freedom are deeply inculcated and
practiced for the security of mankind and glory of the state. Roman Catholicism is closely
affiliated with monarchial form of government with arbitrary rule and Protestantism even in
this modern age is deeply attached with despotism and cruel expansionism.

Republican form of government is possible only in a state of small size; monarchy suited
the moderate-sized state while a big country or an empire must have despotic government.
Real democracy is possible only ion small city-state. France of Montesquieu’s time was too
large for a republic form of government, Monarchy would suit her best. Montesquieu
declared monarchy, a worst form of government and he unlike Machiavelli discarded the
doctrine of aggrandizement and expansion.

Criticism:
1.It is quite wrong to assume, as Montesquieu does, that democracy and aristocracy are
sub-types of republican form.

2.It is a quite unfair to place despotic government at par with monarchial and republican
forms. Despotic state is not at all state because it is established by the absence of
established law, and hence it is a lawless state, which should not be included in the plan at
all.

3.Montesquieu’s scheme creates distinction between the republican and monarchic form
based upon the number of persons who possess the supreme power, the distinction
between the monarchic and despotic types depends upon the way in which the power of
governments are to be exercised.

Montesquieu as the Aristotle of 18th Century

1.Montesquieu follows the inductive and historical methods of Aristotle and like him, takes
keen interest in the practical political activities.

2.Like Aristotle, Montesquieu too pays his attention on the influence of physical
environment on the life of man and social institutions.

3.Montesquieu steps into the shoes of Aristotle, when he recognizes basic types of
government i-e, republican, monarchial and despotic.

4.Montesquieu closely follows Aristotle when he says that the fundamental types of political
constitutions are fixed once and for all but they are different to some extent under the
impact of the local conditions.

5.Montesquieu’s observation that the law of a society gives to its unique and particular
character, has its parallel in Aristotle’s statement that the constitution of a state determines
the very life and character of its people, if there occurs a change in the constitution, the
state itself becomes altogether a different state.
Baron de Montesquieu, Charles-Louis
de Secondat
First published Fri Jul 18, 2003; substantive revision Wed Apr 2, 2014
Montesquieu was one of the great political philosophers of the Enlightenment. Insatiably
curious and mordantly funny, he constructed a naturalistic account of the various forms of
government, and of the causes that made them what they were and that advanced or
constrained their development. He used this account to explain how governments might be
preserved from corruption. He saw despotism, in particular, as a standing danger for any
government not already despotic, and argued that it could best be prevented by a system in
which different bodies exercised legislative, executive, and judicial power, and in which all
those bodies were bound by the rule of law. This theory of the separation of powers had an
enormous impact on liberal political theory, and on the framers of the constitution of the
United States of America.

 1. Life
 2. Major Works
 3. The Persian Letters
 4. The Spirit of the Laws
o 4.1 Forms of Government
o 4.2 Liberty
o 4.3 Climate and Geography
o 4.4 Commerce
o 4.5 Religion
 Bibliography
 Academic Tools
 Other Internet Resources
 Related Entries

1. Life
Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, was born on January
19th, 1689 at La Brède, near Bordeaux, to a noble and prosperous family. He was educated at
the Oratorian Collège de Juilly, received a law degree from the University of Bordeaux in
1708, and went to Paris to continue his legal studies. On the death of his father in 1713 he
returned to La Brède to manage the estates he inherited, and in 1715 he married Jeanne de
Lartigue, a practicing Protestant, with whom he had a son and two daughters. In 1716 he
inherited from his uncle the title Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu and the office of
Président à Mortier in the Parlement of Bordeaux, which was at the time chiefly a judicial
and administrative body. For the next eleven years he presided over the Tournelle, the
Parlement's criminal division, in which capacity he heard legal proceedings, supervised
prisons, and administered various punishments including torture. During this time he was
also active in the Academy of Bordeaux, where he kept abreast of scientific developments,
and gave papers on topics ranging from the causes of echoes to the motives that should lead
us to pursue the sciences.
In 1721 Montesquieu published the Persian Letters, which was an instant success and made
Montesquieu a literary celebrity. (He published the Persian Letters anonymously, but his
authorship was an open secret.) He began to spend more time in Paris, where he frequented
salons and acted on behalf of the Parlement and the Academy of Bordeaux. During this
period he wrote several minor works: Dialogue de Sylla et d'Eucrate (1724), Réflexions sur
la Monarchie Universelle (1724), and Le Temple de Gnide (1725). In 1725 he sold his life
interest in his office and resigned from the Parlement. In 1728 he was elected to the
Académie Française, despite some religious opposition, and shortly thereafter left France to
travel abroad. After visiting Italy, Germany, Austria, and other countries, he went to
England, where he lived for two years. He was greatly impressed with the English political
system, and drew on his observations of it in his later work.
On his return to France in 1731, troubled by failing eyesight, Montesquieu returned to La
Brède and began work on his masterpiece, The Spirit of the Laws. During this time he also
wrote Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and of their Decline,
which he published anonymously in 1734. In this book he tried to work out the application of
his views to the particular case of Rome, and in so doing to discourage the use of Rome as a
model for contemporary governments. Parts of Considerations were incorporated into The
Spirit of the Laws, which he published in 1748. Like the Persian Letters, The Spirit of the
Laws was both controversial and immensely successful. Two years later he published
a Defense of the Spirit of the Laws to answer his various critics. Despite this effort, the
Roman Catholic Church placed The Spirit of the Laws on the Index of Forbidden Books in
1751. In 1755, Montesquieu died of a fever in Paris, leaving behind an unfinished essay on
taste for the Encyclopédie of Diderot and D'Alembert.

2. Major Works
Montesquieu's two most important works are the Persian Letters and The Spirit of the Laws.
While these works share certain themes -- most notably a fascination with non-European
societies and a horror of despotism -- they are quite different from one another, and will be
treated separately.

3. The Persian Letters

The Persian Letters is an epistolary novel consisting of letters sent to and from two fictional
Persians, Usbek and Rica, who set out for Europe in 1711 and remain there at least until
1720, when the novel ends. When Montesquieu wrote the Persian Letters, travellers'
accounts of their journeys to hitherto unknown parts of the world, and of the peculiar
customs they found there, were very popular in Europe. While Montesquieu was not the first
writer to try to imagine how European culture might look to travellers from non-European
countries, he used that device with particular brilliance.
Many of the letters are brief descriptions of scenes or characters. At first their humor derives
mostly from the fact that Usbek and Rica misinterpret what they see. Thus, for instance, Rica
writes that the Pope is a magician who can "make the king believe that three are only one, or
else that the bread one eats is not bread, or that the wine one drinks is not wine, and a
thousand other things of the same kind" (Letter 24); when Rica goes to the theater, he
concludes that the spectators he sees in private boxes are actors enacting dramatic tableaux
for the entertainment of the audience. In later letters, Usbek and Rica no longer misinterpret
what they see; however, they find the actions of Europeans no less incomprehensible. They
describe people who are so consumed by vanity that they become ridiculous, scholars whose
concern for the minutiae of texts blinds them to the world around them, and a scientist who
nearly freezes to death because lighting a fire in his room would interfere with his attempt to
obtain exact measurements of its temperature.
Interspersed among these descriptive letters are the Persians' reflections on what they see.
Usbek is particularly given to such musings, and he shares many of Montesquieu's own
preoccupations: with the contrast between European and non-European societies, the
advantages and disadvantages of different systems of government, the nature of political
authority, and the proper role of law. He also seems to share many of Montesquieu's views.
The best government, he says, is that "which attains its purpose with the least trouble", and
"controls men in the manner best adapted to their inclinations and desires" (Letter 80). He
notes that the French are moved by a love of honor to obey their king, and quotes
approvingly the claim that this "makes a Frenchman, willingly and with pleasure, do things
that your Sultan can only get out of his subjects by ceaseless exhortation with rewards and
punishments" (Letter 89). While he is vividly aware of the importance of just laws, he
regards legal reform as a dangerous task to be attempted "only in fear and trembling" (Letter
129). He favors religious toleration, and regards attempts to compel religious belief as both
unwise and inhumane. In these reflections Usbek seems to be a thoughtful and enlightened
observer with a deep commitment to justice.
However, one of the great themes of the Persian Letters is the virtual impossibility of self-
knowledge, and Usbek is its most fully realized illustration. Usbek has left behind a harem in
Persia, in which his wives are kept prisoner by eunuchs who are among his slaves. Both his
wives and his slaves can be beaten, mutilated, or killed at his command, as can any outsider
unfortunate enough to lay eyes on them. Usbek is, in other words, a despot in his home.
From the outset he is tortured by the thought of his wives' infidelity. It is not, he writes, that
he loves his wives, but that "from my very lack of feeling has come a secret jealousy which
is devouring me" (Letter 6). As time goes on problems develop in the seraglio: Usbek's wives
feud with each other, and the eunuchs find it increasingly difficult to keep order. Eventually
discipline breaks down altogether; the Chief Eunuch reports this to Usbek and then abruptly
dies. His replacement is clearly obedient not to Usbek but to his wives: he contrives not to
receive any of Usbek's letters, and when a young man is found in the seraglio he writes: "I
got up, examined the matter, and found that it was a vision" (Letter 149). Usbek orders
another eunuch to restore order: "leave pity and tenderness behind. ... Make my seraglio what
it was when I left it; but begin by expiation: exterminate the criminals, and strike dread into
those who contemplated becoming so. There is nothing that you cannot hope to receive from
your master for such an outstanding service" (Letter 153). His orders are obeyed, and
"horror, darkness, and dread rule the seraglio" (Letter 156). Finally, Roxana, Usbek's favorite
wife and the only one whose virtue he trusted, is found with another man; her lover is killed,
and she commits suicide after writing Usbek a scathing letter in which she asks: "How could
you have thought me credulous enough to imagine that I was in the world only in order to
worship your caprices? that while you allowed yourself everything, you had the right to
thwart all my desires? No: I may have lived in servitude, but I have always been free. I have
amended your laws according to the laws of nature, and my mind has always remained
independent" (Letter 161). With this letter the novel ends.
The Persian Letters is both one of the funniest books written by a major philosopher, and
one of the bleakest. It presents both virtue and self-knowledge as almost unattainable.
Almost all the Europeans in the Persian Letters are ridiculous; most of those who are not
appear only to serve as a mouthpiece for Montesquieu's own views. Rica is amiable and
good-natured, but this is largely due to the fact that, since he has no responsibilities, his
virtue has never been seriously tested. For all Usbek's apparent enlightenment and humanity,
he turns out to be a monster whose cruelty does not bring him happiness, as he himself
recognizes even as he decides to inflict it. His eunuchs, unable to hope for either freedom or
happiness, learn to enjoy tormenting their charges, and his wives, for the most part, profess
love while plotting intrigues. The only admirable character in the novel is Roxana, but the
social institutions of Persia make her life intolerable: she is separated from the man she loves
and forced to live in slavery. Her suicide is presented as a noble act, but also as an indictment
of the despotic institutions that make it necessary.

4. The Spirit of the Laws

Montesquieu's aim in The Spirit of the Laws is to explain human laws and social institutions.
This might seem like an impossible project: unlike physical laws, which are, according to
Montesquieu, instituted and sustained by God, positive laws and social institutions are
created by fallible human beings who are "subject ... to ignorance and error, [and] hurried
away by a thousand impetuous passions" (SL 1.1). One might therefore expect our laws and
institutions to be no more comprehensible than any other catalog of human follies, an
expectation which the extraordinary diversity of laws adopted by different societies would
seem to confirm.
Nonetheless, Montesquieu believes that this apparent chaos is much more comprehensible
than one might think. On his view, the key to understanding different laws and social
systems is to recognize that they should be adapted to a variety of different factors, and
cannot be properly understood unless one considers them in this light. Specifically, laws
should be adapted "to the people for whom they are framed..., to the nature and principle of
each government, ... to the climate of each country, to the quality of its soil, to its situation
and extent, to the principal occupation of the natives, whether husbandmen, huntsmen or
shepherds: they should have relation to the degree of liberty which the constitution will bear;
to the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners,
and customs. In fine, they have relations to each other, as also to their origin, to the intent of
the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established; in all of which
different lights they ought to be considered" (SL 1.3). When we consider legal and social
systems in relation to these various factors, Montesquieu believes, we will find that many
laws and institutions that had seemed puzzling or even perverse are in fact quite
comprehensible.
Understanding why we have the laws we do is important in itself. However, it also serves
practical purposes. Most importantly, it will discourage misguided attempts at reform.
Montesquieu is not a utopian, either by temperament or conviction. He believes that to live
under a stable, non-despotic government that leaves its law-abiding citizens more or less free
to live their lives is a great good, and that no such government should be lightly tampered
with. If we understand our system of government, and the ways in which it is adapted to the
conditions of our country and its people, we will see that many of its apparently irrational
features actually make sense, and that to 'reform' these features would actually weaken it.
Thus, for instance, one might think that a monarchical government would be strengthened by
weakening the nobility, thereby giving more power to the monarch. On Montesquieu's view,
this is false: to weaken those groups or institutions which check a monarch's power is to risk
transforming monarchy into despotism, a form of government that is both abhorrent and
unstable.
Understanding our laws will also help us to see which aspects of them are genuinely in need
of reform, and how these reforms might be accomplished. For instance, Montesquieu
believes that the laws of many countries can be made be more liberal and more humane, and
that they can often be applied less arbitrarily, with less scope for the unpredictable and
oppressive use of state power. Likewise, religious persecution and slavery can be abolished,
and commerce can be encouraged. These reforms would generally strengthen monarchical
governments, since they enhance the freedom and dignity of citizens. If lawmakers
understand the relations between laws on the one hand and conditions of their countries and
the principles of their governments on the other, they will be in a better position to carry out
such reforms without undermining the governments they seek to improve.

4.1 Forms of Government

Montesquieu holds that there are three types of governments: republican governments, which
can take either democratic or aristocratic forms; monarchies; and despotisms. Unlike, for
instance, Aristotle, Montesquieu does not distinguish forms of government on the basis of
the virtue of the sovereign. The distinction between monarchy and despotism, for instance,
depends not on the virtue of the monarch, but on whether or not he governs "by fixed and
established laws" (SL 2.1). Each form of government has a principle, a set of "human
passions which set it in motion" (SL 3.1); and each can be corrupted if its principle is
undermined or destroyed.
In a democracy, the people are sovereign. They may govern through ministers, or be advised
by a senate, but they must have the power of choosing their ministers and senators for
themselves. The principle of democracy is political virtue, by which Montesquieu means "the
love of the laws and of our country" (SL 4.5), including its democratic constitution. The form
of a democratic government makes the laws governing suffrage and voting fundamental. The
need to protect its principle, however, imposes far more extensive requirements. On
Montesquieu's view, the virtue required by a functioning democracy is not natural. It requires
"a constant preference of public to private interest" (SL 4.5); it "limits ambition to the sole
desire, to the sole happiness, of doing greater services to our country than the rest of our
fellow citizens" (SL 5.3); and it "is a self-renunciation, which is ever arduous and painful"
(SL 4.5). Montesquieu compares it to monks' love for their order: "their rule debars them
from all those things by which the ordinary passions are fed; there remains therefore only
this passion for the very rule that torments them. ... the more it curbs their inclinations, the
more force it gives to the only passion left them" (SL 5.2). To produce this unnatural self-
renunciation, "the whole power of education is required" (SL 4.5). A democracy must
educate its citizens to identify their interests with the interests of their country, and should
have censors to preserve its mores. It should seek to establish frugality by law, so as to
prevent its citizens from being tempted to advance their own private interests at the expense
of the public good; for the same reason, the laws by which property is transferred should aim
to preserve an equal distribution of property among citizens. Its territory should be small, so
that it is easy for citizens to identify with it, and more difficult for extensive private interests
to emerge.
Democracies can be corrupted in two ways: by what Montesquieu calls "the spirit of
inequality" and "the spirit of extreme equality" (SL 8.2). The spirit of inequality arises when
citizens no longer identify their interests with the interests of their country, and therefore
seek both to advance their own private interests at the expense of their fellow citizens, and to
acquire political power over them. The spirit of extreme equality arises when the people are
no longer content to be equal as citizens, but want to be equal in every respect. In a
functioning democracy, the people choose magistrates to exercise executive power, and they
respect and obey the magistrates they have chosen. If those magistrates forfeit their respect,
they replace them. When the spirit of extreme equality takes root, however, the citizens
neither respect nor obey any magistrate. They "want to manage everything themselves, to
debate for the senate, to execute for the magistrate, and to decide for the judges" (SL 8.2).
Eventually the government will cease to function, the last remnants of virtue will disappear,
and democracy will be replaced by despotism.
In an aristocracy, one part of the people governs the rest. The principle of an aristocratic
government is moderation, the virtue which leads those who govern in an aristocracy to
restrain themselves both from oppressing the people and from trying to acquire excessive
power over one another. In an aristocracy, the laws should be designed to instill and protect
this spirit of moderation. To do so, they must do three things. First, the laws must prevent the
nobility from abusing the people. The power of the nobility makes such abuse a standing
temptation in an aristocracy; to avoid it, the laws should deny the nobility some powers, like
the power to tax, which would make this temptation all but irresistible, and should try to
foster responsible and moderate administration. Second, the laws should disguise as much as
possible the difference between the nobility and the people, so that the people feel their lack
of power as little as possible. Thus the nobility should have modest and simple manners,
since if they do not attempt to distinguish themselves from the people "the people are apt to
forget their subjection and weakness" (SL 5.8). Finally, the laws should try to ensure equality
among the nobles themselves, and among noble families. When they fail to do so, the
nobility will lose its spirit of moderation, and the government will be corrupted.
In a monarchy, one person governs "by fixed and established laws" (SL 2.1). According to
Montesquieu, these laws "necessarily suppose the intermediate channels through which (the
monarch's) power flows: for if there be only the momentary and capricious will of a single
person to govern the state, nothing can be fixed, and, of course, there is no fundamental law"
(SL 2.4). These 'intermediate channels' are such subordinate institutions as the nobility and
an independent judiciary; and the laws of a monarchy should therefore be designed to
preserve their power. The principle of monarchical government is honor. Unlike the virtue
required by republican governments, the desire to win honor and distinction comes naturally
to us. For this reason education has a less difficult task in a monarchy than in a republic: it
need only heighten our ambitions and our sense of our own worth, provide us with an ideal
of honor worth aspiring to, and cultivate in us the politeness needed to live with others whose
sense of their worth matches our own. The chief task of the laws in a monarchy is to protect
the subordinate institutions that distinguish monarchy from despotism. To this end, they
should make it easy to preserve large estates undivided, protect the rights and privileges of
the nobility, and promote the rule of law. They should also encourage the proliferation of
distinctions and of rewards for honorable conduct, including luxuries.
A monarchy is corrupted when the monarch either destroys the subordinate institutions that
constrain his will, or decides to rule arbitrarily, without regard to the basic laws of his
country, or debases the honors at which his citizens might aim, so that "men are capable of
being loaded at the very same time with infamy and with dignities" (SL 8.7). The first two
forms of corruption destroy the checks on the sovereign's will that separate monarchy from
despotism; the third severs the connection between honorable conduct and its proper
rewards. In a functioning monarchy, personal ambition and a sense of honor work together.
This is monarchy's great strength and the source of its extraordinary stability: whether its
citizens act from genuine virtue, a sense of their own worth, a desire to serve their king, or
personal ambition, they will be led to act in ways that serve their country. A monarch who
rules arbitrarily, or who rewards servility and ignoble conduct instead of genuine honor,
severs this connection and corrupts his government.
In despotic states "a single person directs everything by his own will and caprice" (SL 2.1).
Without laws to check him, and with no need to attend to anyone who does not agree with
him, a despot can do whatever he likes, however ill-advised or reprehensible. His subjects
are no better than slaves, and he can dispose of them as he sees fit. The principle of
despotism is fear. This fear is easily maintained, since the situation of a despot's subjects is
genuinely terrifying. Education is unnecessary in a despotism; if it exists at all, it should be
designed to debase the mind and break the spirit. Such ideas as honor and virtue should not
occur to a despot's subjects, since "persons capable of setting a value on themselves would be
likely to create disturbances. Fear must therefore depress their spirits, and extinguish even
the least sense of ambition" (SL 3.9). Their "portion here, like that of beasts, is instinct,
compliance, and punishment" (SL 3.10), and any higher aspirations should be brutally
discouraged.
Montesquieu writes that "the principle of despotic government is subject to a continual
corruption, because it is even in its nature corrupt" (SL 8.10). This is true in several senses.
First, despotic governments undermine themselves. Because property is not secure in a
despotic state, commerce will not flourish, and the state will be poor. The people must be
kept in a state of fear by the threat of punishment; however, over time the punishments
needed to keep them in line will tend to become more and more severe, until further threats
lose their force. Most importantly, however, the despot's character is likely to prevent him
from ruling effectively. Since a despot's every whim is granted, he "has no occasion to
deliberate, to doubt, to reason; he has only to will" (SL 4.3). For this reason he is never
forced to develop anything like intelligence, character, or resolution. Instead, he is "naturally
lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant" (SL 2.5), and has no interest in actually governing his people.
He will therefore choose a vizier to govern for him, and retire to his seraglio to pursue
pleasure. In his absence, however, intrigues against him will multiply, especially since his
rule is necessarily odious to his subjects, and since they have so little to lose if their plots
against him fail. He cannot rely on his army to protect him, since the more power they have,
the greater the likelihood that his generals will themselves try to seize power. For this reason
the ruler in a despotic state has no more security than his people.
Second, monarchical and republican governments involve specific governmental structures,
and require that their citizens have specific sorts of motivation. When these structures
crumble, or these motivations fail, monarchical and republican governments are corrupted,
and the result of their corruption is that they fall into despotism. But when a particular
despotic government falls, it is not generally replaced by a monarchy or a republic. The
creation of a stable monarchy or republic is extremely difficult: "a masterpiece of legislation,
rarely produced by hazard, and seldom attained by prudence" (SL 5.14). It is particularly
difficult when those who would have both to frame the laws of such a government and to live
by them have previously been brutalized and degraded by despotism. Producing a despotic
government, by contrast, is relatively straightforward. A despotism requires no powers to be
carefully balanced against one another, no institutions to be created and maintained in
existence, no complicated motivations to be fostered, and no restraints on power to be kept in
place. One need only terrify one's fellow citizens enough to allow one to impose one's will
on them; and this, Montesquieu claims, "is what every capacity may reach" (SL 5.14). For
these reasons despotism necessarily stands in a different relation to corruption than other
forms of government: while they are liable to corruption, despotism is its embodiment.

4.2 Liberty
Montesquieu is among the greatest philosophers of liberalism, but his is what Shklar has
called "a liberalism of fear" (Shklar, Montesquieu, p. 89). According to Montesquieu,
political liberty is "a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his
safety" (SL 11.6). Liberty is not the freedom to do whatever we want: if we have the freedom
to harm others, for instance, others will also have the freedom to harm us, and we will have
no confidence in our own safety. Liberty involves living under laws that protect us from
harm while leaving us free to do as much as possible, and that enable us to feel the greatest
possible confidence that if we obey those laws, the power of the state will not be directed
against us.
If it is to provide its citizens with the greatest possible liberty, a government must have
certain features. First, since "constant experience shows us that every man invested with
power is apt to abuse it ... it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be
a check to power" (SL 11.4). This is achieved through the separation of the executive,
legislative, and judicial powers of government. If different persons or bodies exercise these
powers, then each can check the others if they try to abuse their powers. But if one person or
body holds several or all of these powers, then nothing prevents that person or body from
acting tyrannically; and the people will have no confidence in their own security.
Certain arrangements make it easier for the three powers to check one another. Montesquieu
argues that the legislative power alone should have the power to tax, since it can then deprive
the executive of funding if the latter attempts to impose its will arbitrarily. Likewise, the
executive power should have the right to veto acts of the legislature, and the legislature
should be composed of two houses, each of which can prevent acts of the other from
becoming law. The judiciary should be independent of both the legislature and the executive,
and should restrict itself to applying the laws to particular cases in a fixed and consistent
manner, so that "the judicial power, so terrible to mankind, … becomes, as it were,
invisible", and people "fear the office, but not the magistrate" (SL 11.6).
Liberty also requires that the laws concern only threats to public order and security, since
such laws will protect us from harm while leaving us free to do as many other things as
possible. Thus, for instance, the laws should not concern offenses against God, since He does
not require their protection. They should not prohibit what they do not need to prohibit: "all
punishment which is not derived from necessity is tyrannical. The law is not a mere act of
power; things in their own nature indifferent are not within its province" (SL 19.14). The
laws should be constructed to make it as easy as possible for citizens to protect themselves
from punishment by not committing crimes. They should not be vague, since if they were,
we might never be sure whether or not some particular action was a crime. Nor should they
prohibit things we might do inadvertently, like bumping into a statue of the emperor, or
involuntarily, like doubting the wisdom of one of his decrees; if such actions were crimes, no
amount of effort to abide by the laws of our country would justify confidence that we would
succeed, and therefore we could never feel safe from criminal prosecution. Finally, the laws
should make it as easy as possible for an innocent person to prove his or her innocence. They
should concern outward conduct, not (for instance) our thoughts and dreams, since while we
can try to prove that we did not perform some action, we cannot prove that we never had
some thought. The laws should not criminalize conduct that is inherently hard to prove, like
witchcraft; and lawmakers should be cautious when dealing with crimes like sodomy, which
are typically not carried out in the presence of several witnesses, lest they "open a very wide
door to calumny" (SL 12.6).
Montesquieu's emphasis on the connection between liberty and the details of the criminal law
were unusual among his contemporaries, and inspired such later legal reformers as Cesare
Beccaria.

4.3 Climate and Geography

Montequieu believes that climate and geography affect the temperaments and customs of a
country's inhabitants. He is not a determinist, and does not believe that these influences are
irresistible. Nonetheless, he believes that the laws should take these effects into account,
accommodating them when necessary, and counteracting their worst effects.
According to Montesquieu, a cold climate constricts our bodies' fibers, and causes coarser
juices to flow through them. Heat, by contrast, expands our fibers, and produces more
rarefied juices. These physiological changes affect our characters. Those who live in cold
climates are vigorous and bold, phlegmatic, frank, and not given to suspicion or cunning.
They are relatively insensitive to pleasure and pain; Montesquieu writes that "you must flay a
Muscovite alive to make him feel" (SL 14.2). Those who live in warm climates have stronger
but less durable sensations. They are more fearful, more amorous, and more susceptible both
to the temptations of pleasure and to real or imagined pain; but they are less resolute, and
less capable of sustained or decisive action. The manners of those who live in temperate
climates are "inconstant", since "the climate has not a quality determinate enough to fix
them" (SL 14.2). These differences are not hereditary: if one moves from one sort of climate
to another, one's temperament will alter accordingly.
A hot climate can make slavery comprehensible. Montesquieu writes that "the state of
slavery is in its own nature bad" (SL 15.1); he is particularly contemptuous of religious and
racist justifications for slavery. However, on his view, there are two types of country in
which slavery, while not acceptable, is less bad than it might otherwise be. In despotic
countries, the situation of slaves is not that different from the situation of the despot's other
subjects; for this reason, slavery in a despotic country is "more tolerable" (SL 15.1) than in
other countries. In unusually hot countries, it might be that "the excess of heat enervates the
body, and renders men so slothful and dispirited that nothing but the fear of chastisement can
oblige them to perform any laborious duty: slavery is there more reconcilable to reason" (SL
15.7). However, Montesquieu writes that when work can be done by freemen motivated by
the hope of gain rather than by slaves motivated by fear, the former will always work better;
and that in such climates slavery is not only wrong but imprudent. He hopes that "there is not
that climate upon earth where the most laborious services might not with proper
encouragement be performed by freemen" (SL 15.8); if there is no such climate, then slavery
could never be justified on these grounds.
The quality of a country's soil also affects the form of its government. Monarchies are more
common where the soil is fertile, and republics where it is barren. This is so for three
reasons. First, those who live in fruitful countries are more apt to be content with their
situation, and to value in a government not the liberty it bestows but its ability to provide
them with enough security that they can get on with their farming. They are therefore more
willing to accept a monarchy if it can provide such security. Often it can, since monarchies
can respond to threats more quickly than republics. Second, fertile countries are both more
desirable than barren countries and easier to conquer: they "are always of a level surface,
where the inhabitants are unable to dispute against a stronger power; they are then obliged to
submit; and when they have once submitted, the spirit of liberty cannot return; the wealth of
the country is a pledge of their fidelity" (SL 18.2). Montesquieu believes that monarchies are
much more likely than republics to wage wars of conquest, and therefore that a conquering
power is likely to be a monarchy. Third, those who live where the soil is barren have to work
hard in order to survive; this tends to make them "industrious, sober, inured to hardship,
courageous, and fit for war" (SL 18.4). Those who inhabit fertile country, by contrast, favor
"ease, effeminacy, and a certain fondness for the preservation of life" (SL 18.4). For this
reason, the inhabitants of barren countries are better able to defend themselves from such
attacks as might occur, and to defend their liberty against those who would destroy it.
These facts give barren countries advantages that compensate for the infertility of their soil.
Since they are less likely to be invaded, they are less likely to be sacked and devastated; and
they are more likely to be worked well, since "countries are not cultivated in proportion to
their fertility, but to their liberty" (SL 18.3). This is why "the best provinces are most
frequently depopulated, while the frightful countries of the North continue always inhabited,
from their being almost uninhabitable" (SL 18.3).
Montesquieu believes that the climate and geography of Asia explain why despotism
flourishes there. Asia, he thinks, has two features that distinguish it from Europe. First, Asia
has virtually no temperate zone. While the mountains of Scandinavia shelter Europe from
arctic winds, Asia has no such buffer; for this reason its frigid northern zone extends much
further south than in Europe, and there is a relatively quick transition from it to the tropical
south. For this reason "the warlike, brave, and active people touch immediately upon those
who are indolent, effeminate and timorous; the one must, therefore, conquer, and the other be
conquered" (SL 17.3). In Europe, by contrast, the climate changes gradually from cold to
hot; therefore "strong nations are opposed to the strong; and those who join each other have
nearly the same courage" (SL 17.3). Second, Asia has larger plains than Europe. Its mountain
ranges lie further apart, and its rivers are not such formidable barriers to invasion. Since
Europe is naturally divided into smaller regions, it is more difficult for any one power to
conquer them all; this means that Europe will tend to have more and smaller states. Asia, by
contrast, tends to have much larger empires, which predisposes it to despotism.

4.4 Commerce
Of all the ways in which a country might seek to enrich itself, Montesquieu believes,
commerce is the only one without overwhelming drawbacks. Conquering and plundering
one's neighbors can provide temporary infusions of money, but over time the costs of
maintaining an occupying army and administering subjugated peoples impose strains that
few countries can endure. Extracting precious metals from colonial mines leads to general
inflation; thus the costs of extraction increase while the value of the extracted metals
decreases. The increased availability of money furthers the development of commerce in
other countries; however, in the country which extracts gold and silver, domestic industry is
destroyed.
Commerce, by contrast, has no such disadvantages. It does not require vast armies, or the
continued subjugation of other peoples. It does not undermine itself, as the extraction of gold
from colonial mines does, and it rewards domestic industry. It therefore sustains itself, and
nations which engage in it, over time. While it does not produce all the virtues -- hospitality,
Montesquieu thinks, is more often found among the poor than among commercial peoples --
it does produce some: "the spirit of commerce is naturally attended with that of frugality,
economy, moderation, labor, prudence, tranquility, order, and rule" (SL 5.6). In addition, it
"is a cure for the most destructive prejudices" (SL 20.1), improves manners, and leads to
peace among nations.
In monarchies, Montesquieu believes, the aim of commerce is, for the most part, to supply
luxuries. In republics, it is to bring from one country what is wanted in another, "gaining
little" but "gaining incessantly" (SL 20.4). In despotisms, there is very little commerce of any
kind, since there is no security of property. In a monarchy, neither kings nor nobles should
engage in commerce, since this would risk concentrating too much power in their hands. By
the same token, there should be no banks in a monarchy, since a treasure "no sooner becomes
great than it becomes the treasure of the prince" (SL 20.10). In republics, by contrast, banks
are extremely useful, and anyone should be allowed to engage in trade. Restrictions on which
profession a person can follow destroy people's hopes of bettering their situation; they are
therefore appropriate only to despotic states.
While some mercantilists had argued that commerce is a zero-sum game in which when
some gain, others necessarily lose, Montesquieu believes that commerce benefits all
countries except those who have nothing but their land and what it produces. In those deeply
impoverished countries, commerce with other countries will encourage those who own the
land to oppress those who work it, rather than encouraging the development of domestic
industries and manufacture. However, all other countries benefit by commerce, and should
seek to trade with as many other nations as possible, "for it is competition which sets a just
value on merchandise, and establishes the relation between them" (SL 20.9).
Montesquieu describes commerce as an activity that cannot be confined or controlled by any
individual government or monarch. This, in his view, has always been true: "Commerce is
sometimes destroyed by conquerors, sometimes cramped by monarchs; it traverses the earth,
flies from the places where it is oppressed, and stays where it has liberty to breathe" (SL
21.5). However, the independence of commerce was greatly enhanced when, during the
medieval period, Jews responded to persecution and the seizure of their property by
inventing letters of exchange. "Commerce, by this method, became capable of eluding
violence, and of maintaining everywhere its ground; the richest merchant having none but
invisible effects, which he could convey imperceptibly wherever he pleased" (SL 21.20).
This set in motion developments which made commerce still more independent of monarchs
and their whims.
First, it facilitated the development of international markets, which place prices outside the
control of governments. Money, according to Montesquieu, is "a sign which represents the
value of all merchandise" (SL 22.2). The price of merchandise depends on the quantity of
money and the quantity of merchandise, and on the amounts of money and merchandise that
are in trade. Monarchs can affect this price by imposing tariffs or duties on certain goods.
But since they cannot control the amounts of money and merchandise that are in trade within
their own countries, let alone internationally, a monarch "can no more fix the price of
merchandise than he can establish by a decree that the relation 1 has to 10 is equal to that of
1 to 20" (SL 22.7). If a monarch attempts to do so, he courts disaster: "Julian's lowering the
price of provisions at Antioch was the cause of a most terrible famine" (SL 22.7).
Second, it permitted the development of international currency exchanges, which place the
exchange rate of a country's currency largely outside the control of that country's
government. A monarch can establish a currency, and stipulate how much of some metal
each unit of that currency shall contain. However, monarchs cannot control the rates of
exchange between their currencies and those of other countries. These rates depend on the
relative scarcity of money in the countries in question, and they are "fixed by the general
opinion of the merchants, never by the decrees of the prince" (SL 22.10). For this reason "the
exchange of all places constantly tends to a certain proportion, and that in the very nature of
things" (SL 22.10).
Finally, the development of international commerce gives governments a great incentive to
adopt policies that favor, or at least do not impede, its development. Governments need to
maintain confidence in their creditworthiness if they wish to borrow money; this deters them
from at least the more extreme forms of fiscal irresponsibility, and from oppressing too
greatly those citizens from whom they might later need to borrow money. Since the
development of commerce requires the availability of loans, governments must establish
interest rates high enough to encourage lending, but not so high as to make borrowing
unprofitable. Taxes must not be so high that they deprive citizens of the hope of bettering
their situations (SL 13.2), and the laws should allow those citizens enough freedom to carry
out commercial affairs.
In general, Montesquieu believes that commerce has had an extremely beneficial influence
on government. Since commerce began to recover after the development of letters of
exchange and the reintroduction of lending at interest, he writes:
it became necessary that princes should govern with more prudence than they themselves
could ever have imagined; for great exertions of authority were, in the event, found to be
impolitic ... We begin to be cured of Machiavelism, and recover from it every day. More
moderation has become necessary in the councils of princes. What would formerly have been
called a master-stroke in politics would be now, independent of the horror it might occasion,
the greatest imprudence. Happy is it for men that they are in a situation in which, though
their passions prompt them to be wicked, it is, nevertheless, to their interest to be humane
and virtuous. (SL 21.20)

4.5 Religion
Religion plays only a minor part in the Spirit of the Laws. God is described in Book 1 as
creating nature and its laws; having done so, He vanishes, and plays no further explanatory
role. In particular, Montesquieu does not explain the laws of any country by appeal to divine
enlightenment, providence, or guidance. In the Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu considers
religions "in relation only to the good they produce in civil society" (SL 24.1), and not to
their truth or falsity. He regards different religions as appropriate to different environments
and forms of government. Protestantism is most suitable to republics, Catholicism to
monarchies, and Islam to despotisms; the Islamic prohibition on eating pork is appropriate to
Arabia, where hogs are scarce and contribute to disease, while in India, where cattle are
badly needed but do not thrive, a prohibition on eating beef is suitable. Thus, "when
Montezuma with so much obstinacy insisted that the religion of the Spaniards was good for
their country, and his for Mexico, he did not assert an absurdity" (SL 24.24).
Religion can help to ameliorate the effects of bad laws and institutions; it is the only thing
capable of serving as a check on despotic power. However, on Montesquieu's view it is
generally a mistake to base civil laws on religious principles. Religion aims at the perfection
of the individual; civil laws aim at the welfare of society. Given these different aims, what
these two sets of laws should require will often differ; for this reason religion "ought not
always to serve as a first principle to the civil laws" (SL 26.9). The civil laws are not an
appropriate tool for enforcing religious norms of conduct: God has His own laws, and He is
quite capable of enforcing them without our assistance. When we attempt to enforce God's
laws for Him, or to cast ourselves as His protectors, we make our religion an instrument of
fanaticism and oppression; this is a service neither to God nor to our country.
If several religions have gained adherents in a country, those religions should all be tolerated,
not only by the state but by its citizens. The laws should "require from the several religions,
not only that they shall not embroil the state, but that they shall not raise disturbances among
themselves" (SL 25.9). While one can try to persuade people to change religions by offering
them positive inducements to do so, attempts to force others to convert are ineffective and
inhumane. In an unusually scathing passage, Montesquieu also argues that they are unworthy
of Christianity, and writes: "if anyone in times to come shall dare to assert, that in the age in
which we live, the people of Europe were civilized, you (the Inquisition) will be cited to
prove that they were barbarians; and the idea they will have of you will be such as will
dishonor your age, and spread hatred over all your contemporaries" (SL 25.13).