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IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8

CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 59 of 2007

PETITIONER:
Navjot Singh Sidhu

RESPONDENT:
State of Punjab & Anr

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/01/2007

BENCH:
G.P. Mathur & R.V. Raveendran

JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Cr.M.P. No. 490 of 2007
In
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 59 OF 2007

G. P. MATHUR, J.

The appellant Navjot Singh Sidhu along with co-accused

Rupinder Singh Sandhu was tried for charges under Section 302 IPC
and Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC, but was acquitted by the
learned Sessions Judge, Patiala, by the judgment and order dated
22.9.1999 which order was challenged by the State of Punjab by
filing an appeal in the High Court which has been allowed and the
appellant has been convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC and has
been sentenced to 3 years R.I. and a fine of rupees one lakh. The co-
accused Rupinder Singh Sandhu has also been convicted under
Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC and has been sentenced
to 3 years R.I. and a fine of rupees one lakh. He has further been
convicted under Section 323 IPC and has been sentenced to 3 months
R.I. The appellant filed special leave petition in this Court in which
leave has been granted on 12.1.2007 and he has been released on bail
and thus the execution of the sentence imposed upon him has been
suspended. The appellant also moved an application for suspending
the order of conviction passed against him by the High Court on
which notice was issued to the State of Punjab and the said
application is being disposed of by the present order.

2. The circumstances leading to the filing of the application for

suspension of order of conviction need to be noticed. The appellant
was a sitting Member of Parliament. Immediately after the
pronouncement of judgment by the High Court, he resigned from the
membership of the Lok Sabha. It is stated in the application that for
maintaining probity and moral values in public life he resigned from
the membership of the Lok Sabha after his conviction. However, he
wants to remain in public life and, therefore, wants to contest the
election again and face the electorate in the changed scenario. The
reason for seeking a stay or suspension of order of conviction arises
on account of Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") by operation of which he
has incurred a disqualification for being chosen as, and for being, a
member of either House of Parliament. Section 7(b) and Sub-
sections (3) and (4) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951, which have a bearing on controversy in hand read as
under:-
"7(b) "disqualified" means disqualified for being
chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of
Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative
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Council of a State."

"8(3) A person convicted of any offence and sentenced

to imprisonment for not less than two years (other than
any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section
(2)) shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction
and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period
of six years since his release.

(4) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), sub-

section (2) and sub-section (3) a disqualification under
either sub-section shall not, in the case of a person who
on the date of the conviction is a member of Parliament
or the Legislature of a State, take effect until three
months have elapsed from that date or, if within that
period an appeal or application for revision is brought in
respect of the conviction or the sentence, until that appeal
or application is disposed of by the court."

By virtue of Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act the

appellant incurred the disqualification as he has been sentenced to 3
years R.I. Sub-section (4) of Section 8 provides that if on the date of
the conviction, a person is a Member of the Parliament then
notwithstanding anything in Sub-section (3), the disqualification
mentioned therein shall not take effect until 3 months have elapsed
from the date of order of conviction and if within that period an
appeal is brought in respect of the conviction or sentence, until that
appeal or application is disposed of by the Court. This provision has
been interpreted by a Constitution Bench in K. Prabhakaran v. P.
Jayarajan (2005) 1 SCC 754 and it has been held that the protection
against disqualification will be available only till the current life of the
House (Parliament or the Legislature of a State) and the person
continues to be a member of a House, and not thereafter. Since the
appellant was a sitting Member of Parliament, he would not have
incurred the disqualification as provided in Sub-section (3) of Section
8 of the Act, for a period of 3 months and if within that period he had
filed an appeal until the decision of the appeal. Therefore, the
appellant could have easily avoided the incurring of the
disqualification by filing an appeal within three months from the date
of his conviction by the High Court. However, he chose to resign
from the membership of the Lok Sabha soon after he was convicted
by the High Court and wants to seek a fresh mandate by contesting the
election.

3. Before proceeding further it may be seen whether there is any

provision which may enable the Court to suspend the order of
conviction as normally what is suspended is the execution of the
sentence. Sub-section (1) of Section 389 says that pending any appeal
by a convicted person, the appellate Court may, for reasons to be
recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or
order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement,
that he be released or bail, or on his own bond. This Sub-section
confers power not only to suspend the execution of sentence and to
grant bail but also to suspend the operation of the order appealed
against which means the order of conviction. This question has been
examined in considerable detail by a Three Judge Bench of this Court
in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 513 and
Ahmadi, C.J., speaking for the Court, held as under (para 19 of the
reports) :-
"19. That takes us to the question whether the scope of
Section 389(1) of the Code extends to conferring power
on the Appellate Court to stay the operation of the order
of conviction. As stated earlier, if the order of conviction
is to result in some disqualification of the type mentioned
in Section 267 of the Companies Act, we see no reason
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why we should give a narrow meaning to Section 389(1)
of the Code to debar the court from granting an order to
that effect in a fit case. The appeal under Section 374 is
essentially against the order of conviction because the
order of sentence is merely consequential thereto; albeit
even the order of sentence can be independently
challenged if it is harsh and disproportionate to the
established guilt. Therefore, when an appeal is preferred
under Section 374 of the Code the appeal is against both
the conviction and sentence and, therefore, we see no
reason to place a narrow interpretation on Section 389(1)
of the Code not to extend it to an order of conviction,
although that issue in the instant case recedes to the
background because High Courts can exercise inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code if the power
was not to be found in Section 389(1) of the Code. We
are, therefore, of the opinion that the Division Bench of
the High Court of Bombay was not right in holding that
the Delhi High Court could not have exercised
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code if it was
confronted with a situation of there being no other
provision in the Code for staying the operation of the
order of conviction. In a fit case if the High Court feels
satisfied that the order of conviction needs to be
suspended or stayed so that the convicted person does not
suffer from a certain disqualification provided for in any
other statute, it may exercise the power because
otherwise the damage done cannot be undone; the
disqualification incurred by Section 267 of the
Companies Act and given effect to cannot be undone at a
subsequent date if the conviction is set aside by the
Appellate Court. But while granting a stay or suspension
of the order of conviction the Court must examine the
pros and cons and if it feels satisfied that a case is made
out for grant of such an order, it may do so and in so
doing it may, if it considers it appropriate, impose such
conditions as are considered appropriate to protect the
interest of the shareholders and the business of the
company."

The aforesaid view has recently been reiterated and followed by

another Three Judge Bench in Ravi Kant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S.
Bagali JT 2006 (1) SC 578. After referring to the decisions on the
issue, viz., State of Tamil Nadu v. A. Jaganathan (1996) 5 SCC 329,
K.C. Sareen v. C.B.I., Chandigarh (2001) 6 SCC 584, B.R. Kapur v.
State of T.N. & Anr. (2001) 7 SCC 231 and State of Maharashtra v.
Gajanan & Anr. (2003) 12 SCC 432, this Court concluded (para 12.5
of the report) :
"All these decisions, while recognizing the power to stay
conviction, have cautioned and clarified that such power
should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances
where failure to stay the conviction, would lead to
injustice and irreversible consequences."

The Court also observed :-

"11. It deserves to be clarified that an order granting
stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be
resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a
case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the
conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction
itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be
operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of
course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but
only non-operative. \005\005.."
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The legal position is, therefore, clear that an appellate Court can
suspend or grant stay of order of conviction. But the person seeking
stay of conviction should specifically draw the attention of the
appellate Court to the consequences that may arise if the conviction is
not stayed. Unless the attention of the Court is drawn to the specific
consequences that would follow on account of the conviction, the
person convicted cannot obtain an order of stay of conviction.
Further, grant of stay of conviction can be resorted to in rare cases
depending upon the special facts of the case.

4. In the present case the appellant has sought the stay or

suspension of the order of conviction passed against him by the High
Court on the ground that he was a sitting Member of Parliament on
the date of the conviction and though he would not have incurred any
disqualification and could have continued to remain as Member of
Parliament by merely filing an appeal within three months and the
protection would have enured to his benefit till the decision of the
appeal but in order to set high standards in public life he immediately
resigned form the membership of the Lok Sabha. He now wants to
seek a fresh mandate from the electorate and wants to contest the
election for membership of the Lok Sabha which is due to take place
shortly on account of his resignation. Keeping in view the said fact
the present application needs consideration.

5. At this stage it is necessary to refer to the broad features of the

case and the evidence which is available on the record. The case of
the prosecution, in brief, is that at about 12.30 p.m. on 27.12.1988
Gurnam Singh (deceased) along with P.W.3 Jaswinder Singh and
P.W.4 Avtar Singh were going to State Bank of Patiala for
withdrawing some money for the forthcoming marriage of the son of
the deceased. When the Maruti car which was being driven by
Gurnam Singh reached near Sheranwala Gate Crossing, a Gypsy
bearing No.PAD-6030 was found standing ahead of them. When
Gurnam Singh tried to overtake the Gypsy, it turned and blocked the
way, on which Gurnam Singh and others asked the occupants of
Gypsy to move their vehicle. On this the appellant Navjot Singh
Sidhu got out of the Gypsy vehicle and after abusing the occupants of
the Maruti car, dragged out Gurnam Singh and gave fist blows to him.
P.W.3 Jaswinder Singh wanted to save Gurnam Singh but co-accused
Ravinder Singh Sandhu, who was also in the Gypsy, came out and
gave fist blows to him as well. Thereafter, the appellant and co-
accused Ravinder Singh Sandhu escaped in the Gypsy taking away the
keys of the Maruti car. Gurnam Singh had fallen down and he was
taken to Rajindra Hospital by Avtar Singh and Jaswinder Singh,
where the doctors declared him dead. Jaswinder Singh then lodged an
FIR of the incident at 1.30-1.45 p.m. at P.S. Kotwali. The inquest was
held on the body of the deceased and in the inquest report the
statements of Jaswinder Singh and Avtar Singh were also recorded.
After investigation of the case, the police submitted charge sheet only
against Ravinder Singh Sandhu and the name of the appellant was
mentioned in Column no.2. The learned Additional Sessions framed
charge under Section 304 Part I IPC against Ravinder Singh Sandhu
and after some evidence had been recorded including that of P.W.3
Jaswinder Singh, an order was passed under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
whereby the appellant was summoned to stand trial. Jaswinder Singh
had also filed a criminal complaint against both the accused on which
cognizance was taken and they were committed to the Court of
Sessions. In the trial the prosecution examined two witnesses of fact
viz., P.W.3 Jaswinder Singh and P.W.4 Avtar Singh, besides the
doctors and other formal witnesses. In his statement under Section
313 Cr.P.C. the appellant denied the prosecution case and stated that
at the time of the incident he was present in his office (the Head
Office of the State Bank of Patiala, Mall Road). He heard some
commotion and then came out and saw that a scooterist and a driver of
the truck were quarreling and shouting over each other. When he
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reached the spot, he found that a sikh gentleman was lying on the
ground after suffering a heart attack. He tried to pacify the people.
However, being a cricketer of international fame, he became centre of
attraction of the people and on suspicion he was involved in the case.
He also examined a defence witness, viz., D.W.1 Rajbir Singh, who
corroborated the version of the appellant.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned
Sessions Judge had given good reasons for acquitting the accused and
the High Court has committed manifest error of law in reversing the
finding of acquittal and in convicting the appellant. He has submitted
that in the site plan prepared by the Investigating Officer, the Maruti
car, which was allegedly being driven by the deceased, was not at all
shown nor any evidence has come on record to show as to how the car
was removed from the spot. The prosecution has later on come with
a case that a duplicate key was prepared by a mechanic by which the
car was started but no evidence in that regard has been produced nor
the said mechanic has been examined as a witness and this completely
falsifies the prosecution case. It has also been urged that the medical
evidence on record does not at all disclose commission of an offence
under Section 304 Part II IPC and even if the prosecution version of
the incident is accepted in toto, it may at best amount to a case under
Section 323 IPC in which the maximum sentence which can be
awarded is 1 year R.I. and in such circumstances the appellant would
not incur any disqualification under Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of
the Act.

7. Though for the purpose of decision of the prayer made by the

appellant for staying or suspending the order of conviction, it is not
necessary to minutely examine the merits of the case, nevertheless we
consider it proper to refer to the medical evidence, which has an
important bearing on the nature of the offence alleged to have been
committed by the appellant.

8. P.W.3 Jaswinder Singh was medically examined at 8.30 p.m.

on 27.12.1988 and his medical examination report reads as under :-
1. The patient complained of pain over the left side of the
fore-head and slight giddiness. Tenderness was present.

2. Patient complained of pain over the right and left flanks.

He was advised to be kept under observation and was
referred to Rajindra Hospital, Patiala.

PW.1 Dr. Jatinder Kumar Sadana conducted post-mortem

examination on the body of the deceased Gurnam Singh at 4.30 p.m.
on 27.12.1988 and found the following injuries on his person :-
1. An abrasion 0.75 cm x 0.5 cm over the left temporal
region at the junction of upper part of pinna.

2. An abrasion 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm over the front of left knee.

On opening the skull subdural haemorrhage was found present
on the left temporal region. The doctor was unable to give the cause
of death and deferred his opinion till the receipt of the report of the
Pathological examination. He sent the lungs, heart, part of liver,
spleen and kidneys for Pathological examination to Medical College,
Patiala. In his cross-examination the doctor stated that there was no
fracture under injury no.1 and the possibility could not be ruled out
that the said injury may have been received by a fall on the ground.
He further stated that there was no external injury on the front part
except the subdural haemorrhage and that subdural haemorrhage is
not fatal in all cases. The Pathological Report showed that the
deceased had a very weak heart and his main arteries were blocked.
Thereafter, a Board of Doctors was constituted which consisted of
seven doctors. Dr. Krishan Vij, Professor and Head of the Department
of Forensic Medicines, Government Medical College, Chandigarh,
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who was member of the Board appeared as a witness and he gave his
opinion Ex.PA which reads as under :-
"Death in this case is attributed to the effects of head
injury and cardiac condition. However, the head injury
itself could be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature."

In his cross-examination, he states thus :

"It is correct that an abrasion is hardly of any
significance from the point of view of loss of life. Injury
No.1 was an abrasion only."

He also stated that the condition of the heart of the deceased

was abnormal at the time of the post-mortem examination as it
suffered from various ailments mentioned in the report of the
Pathologist. He further stated that Dr. Gurpreet Singh, Head of the
Department of Cardiology was of the view that the cardiac condition
as reported by the Pathologist could also result in sudden cardiac
death under stress.

9. Some observations made by the learned Sessions Judge

regarding the head injury sustained by the deceased deserve notice
and they read as under :-
"Furthermore, the all important blow on the head of
Gurnam Singh was not specifically described in either
Ex.PQ (FIR) or Ex.DB (Jaswinder Singh’s statement
dated January 20 1993, recorded by the Addl. Sessions
Judge Patiala at the pre 319 Cr.P.C. stage). This was an
important omission since it was the injury on the head
which was alleged to be one of the causes of death\005.."

The High Court has not adverted to this aspect of the case, viz,
that in the FIR it was not specifically mentioned that the appellant
Navjot Singh Sidhu had given the blow on the head of the deceased.
This fact was also not stated by Jaswinder Singh in his statement
before the learned Sessions Judge which was recorded on 20.1.1993
before the order had been passed under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
summoning the appellant.

10. We have pointed out above the broad features of the case. The
incident happened all of a sudden without any pre-meditation. The
deceased was wholly unknown to the appellant. There was no motive
for commission of the crime. The accused are alleged to have lost
temper and started giving abuses on account of objection raised by the
occupants of the Maruti car due to obstruction being caused by the
vehicle of the appellant. Blows by fist are alleged to have been given
and no weapon of any kind has been used. The medical evidence
shows that the deceased had a diseased heart. The doctor who
performed the post-mortem examination was unable to give the cause
of death. The Medical Board gave its opinion after nearly a fortnight
and that too does not ascribe the death due to any external injury but
says "effects of head injury and cardiac condition." The medical
evidence does not conclusively establish that the death occurred due
to blow given on the head. If in the FIR, which is the earliest version,
and, also in his statement in Court which was recorded after more than
4 years on 20.1.1993, Jaswinder Singh did not assign any role of
causing injury on the head of the deceased to the appellant, whether
his subsequent statement given after several years, wherein he
assigned the specific role to the appellant of hitting the deceased on
the head by a fist and thereby making him responsible for causing the
death of the deceased should be believed, will certainly require
consideration at the time of hearing the appeal. If the statement which
Jaswinder Singh gave after several years wherein he attributed the
head injury to the appellant is not accepted for the reason that it is at
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variance with the version in the FIR and his earlier statement, the
appellant cannot be held guilty under Section 304 Part II IPC. These
features of the case which touch upon the culpability of the appellant,
prima facie appear to be in his favour. Another feature which has a
bearing is that the findings on factual aspects of the case recorded in
favour of the appellant by the learned Sessions Judge resulting in
acquittal have been reversed in appeal by the High Court.

11. The incident took place on 27.12.1988. It has no co-relation

with the public life of the appellant which he entered much later in
2004 when he was elected as a Member of the Parliament. It is not a
case where he took advantage of his position as M.P. in commission
of the crime. As already stated, it was not necessary for the appellant
to have resigned from the membership of the Parliament as he could
in law continue as M.P. by merely filing an appeal within a period of
3 months and had he adopted such a course he could have easily
avoided incurring any disqualification at least till the decision of the
appeal. However, he has chosen to adopt a moral path and has set
high standards in public life by resigning from his seat and in seeking
to get a fresh mandate from the people. In the event prayer made by
the appellant is not granted he would suffer irreparable injury as he
would not be able to contest for the seat which he held and has fallen
vacant only on account of his voluntary resignation which he did on
purely moral grounds. Having regard to the entire facts and
circumstances mentioned above we are of the opinion that it a fit case
where the order of conviction passed by the High Court deserves to be
suspended.

12. Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel for the State of
Punjab has submitted that the case in hand cannot be called as a rare
case where an order for suspension of conviction should be passed.
Learned counsel has also submitted that the appellant having given up
his rights under Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Representation of
the People Act and having himself resigned from the membership of
the Parliament, cannot again come back to the Parliament until the
appeal is decided in his favour. In our opinion the contentions raised
have no substance. The broad features of the case which impel us to
grant the order in favour of the appellant have already been discussed
earlier and it is not necessary to repeat the same. The argument that
the appellant having given up his right under Sub-section (4) of
Section 8 should not be permitted to offer himself as a candidate,
again is wholly misconceived. If a person convicted of any offence
enumerated in Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act
files an appeal within three months he continues to remain a Member
of Parliament or Legislature of a Sate on the basis of protection
afforded by Sub-section (4), but not on any moral authority because
the electorate had exercised their franchise prior to the order of
conviction and not when he had become a convict. But a person who
resigns from the Parliament or the Assembly and seeks a re-election,
if elected, will have greater moral authority to represent the
constituency. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contentions
raised by Shri Sushil Kumar.

13. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the

complainant has submitted that in order to maintain purity and probity
in public bodies, criminalisation of politics has to be stopped and
persons who have been convicted of any offence should not be
allowed to enter the Parliament. He has elaborated his argument by
submitting that irrespective of quantum of sentence if a person is
convicted for an offence referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 8
where the punishment imposed may be only a fine, a person will incur
the disqualification from the date of conviction which will remain for
a period of six years and this evinces the intention of the Legislature
that a convict should not enter the precincts of Parliament or
Legislature of a State. In our opinion the contention raised cannot be
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accepted. The Representation of the People Act, 1951 is a complete
Code. The preamble of the Act is \026
An Act to provide for the conduct of elections to the Houses of
Parliament and to the House or Houses of the Legislature of each
State, the qualifications and disqualifications for membership of those
Houses, the corrupt practices and other offences at or in connection
with such elections and the decision of doubts and disputes arising out
of or in connection with such elections.

The Act provides not only the eligibility and qualification for
membership of the House of People and Legislative Assembly but
also for disqualification on conviction and other matters. The
Parliament in its wisdom having made a specific provision for
disqualification on conviction by enacting Section 8, it is not for the
Court to abridge or expand the same. The decisions of this Court
rendered in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang & Ors. (supra) and Ravi
Kant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali (supra) having recognized the
power possessed by the Court of appeal to suspend or stay an order of
the conviction and having also laid down the parameters for exercise
of such power, it is not possible to hold, as a matter of rule, or, to lay
down, that in order to prevent any person who has committed an
offence from entering the Parliament or the Legislative Assembly the
order of the conviction should not be suspended. The Courts have to
interpret the law as it stands and not on considerations which may be
perceived to be morally more correct or ethical.

14. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi has also submitted that once an accused
has been convicted and sentenced, it is only the execution of the
sentence which can be suspended and the order of conviction cannot
be suspended or stayed as the same is not capable of being stayed or
suspended. For this reliance is placed on certain observations made
in paras 34 and 44 of the decision rendered in B.R. Kapur v. State of
T.N. & Anr. (2001) 7 SCC 231 and on paras 42, 43, 53 and 54 in K.
Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan (2005) 1 SCC 754. The contention is
that the appellant would not be absolved of the disqualification even if
an order of suspension or stay of the conviction is passed by this
Court. We are dealing here with the limited question, viz., the prayer
made by the appellant for suspending or staying the order of
conviction. We are not required to adjudicate upon the question as to
what will be the effect of the order and further whether he will
continue to be disqualified for the purpose of contesting the election
even if the prayer made by the appellant is granted as such an issue is
wholly alien to the present controversy which can arise only in an
election petition where the validity of the election may be called in
question.

15. Lastly, Shri Dwivedi has submitted that in view of the law laid
down in State of Tamil Nadu v. A. Jaganathan (1996) 5 SCC 329 and
K.C. Sareen v. C.B.I., Chandigarh (2001) 6 SCC 584 the order of
conviction passed against the appellant should not be suspended. The
cases cited have no application to the facts of the present case as both
of them related to conviction on charges of corruption and in that
context it was observed that when conviction is on a corruption
charge, it would be a sublime public policy that the convicted person
is kept under disability of the conviction instead of keeping the
sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal.
In such cases it is obvious that it would be highly improper to suspend
the order of conviction of a public servant which would enable him to
occupy the same office which he misused. This is not the case here.

16. For the reasons discussed above, we are of the opinion that the
application moved by the appellant deserves to be allowed. The
order of conviction passed against the appellant by the High Court on
1.12.2006 and the sentence awarded on 6.12.2006 are suspended and
the conviction shall not be operative till the decision of the appeal.