SEDITION LAW

(Section 124A of IPC)

A TERM PAPER
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE OF
BACHELOR IN SOCIAL SCIENCES (HONOURS)

GURU NANAK DEV UNIVERSITY

AMRITSAR
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
2022

SUBMITTED TO SUBMITTED BY
MS. ROCHNA ARORA SALONI
MS.SONIKA ATTRI SEMESTER 4
Roll no. 17132207573
Sedition Law

Sedition is the act of either causing or participating in a rebellion or

uprising against the established authority of a government through
speech, writing, or other forms of expression to encourage discontent,
hatred, or disaffection towards the government or its policies. The
term “sedition law” refers to a set of legislation that punishes speech
or behaviour that is regarded to pose a risk to national security or
governmental authority. Sedition is covered by Section 124A of the
IPC, which is heavily criticised for its misapplication as it is said that
it is used solely to suppress political opposition. Which therefore
hinders people from their right to free speech and expression.

HISTORY

Sedition laws were brought up in 1837 in England by Thomas

Macaulay, a British historian-politician. Under British rule, the
government’s orders prevailed over any public opinion as common
people were considered illiterate and their opinions were considered
detrimental to the Queen’s monarchy.

The Indian Penal Code, of 1860 never contained laws related to

sedition until 1870 when Section 124A was inserted into the Indian
Penal Code by an amendment introduced by James Stephen.
LEGISLATION

The marginal note of Section 124A of the I.P.C. uses the word
“Sedition.” The Section criminalises inciting hatred or contempt
towards the Government by stating that, “Whoever attempts to cause
hatred or contempt towards the Government established by due
procedure of law in India shall be punished.”

ORIGIN AND HISTORY

Section 124A was introduced by the British colonial government in

1870 to suppress dissent against their rule. It has since been a subject
of debate regarding its relevance and misuse.

UNDERSTANDING SECTION 124A

Section 124A defines sedition as any act or attempt to bring hatred or

contempt towards the government established by law in India, by
words, signs, or visible representation.

INTERPRETATION BY COURTS
Over the years, courts have interpreted sedition cautiously, balancing
freedom of speech with the need to maintain public order and
sovereignty.

CHALLENGES AND CRITICISM

Sedition law has faced criticism for being vague and overly broad,
leading to its potential misuse to suppress legitimate dissent and
criticism.

LANDMARK CASES

Highlight significant cases where sedition charges were invoked, such

as the Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar case, which set limitations
on the application of sedition.

In the case of Ram Nandan v. State of U.P. The Hon’ble High Court
held that section 124-A imposed restriction on the freedom of speech
which is not in the interest of the public and hence declared 124-A as
ultra vires. But this decision of the Hon’ble High Court was
overruled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kedarnath Das
v. State of Bihar, and held Section 124-A, intra vires.
In Tara Singh v. State of Punjab section 124-A, of Indian Penal Code
was struck down as unconstitutional being contrary to freedom of
speech and Expression guaranteed under Art 19

RECENT AMENDMENT AND CASES

The government has the authority to confiscate items that are

punished under Section 124A of the IPC on specific conditions under
Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973. Two conditions
must be met for this section. First, the material must be punishable
under Section 124-A, and second, the government must justify why it
believes the item should be forfeited under that provision.

The word “Sedition” does not occur in Section 124-A of the Indian
Penal Code or in the Defence of India Rule. It is only found as a
marginal note to Section 124-A and is not an operative part of the
section but merely provides the name by which the crime defined in
the section will be known.

To avert the constitutional difficulty because of the above referred

case. The constitutional 1st (Amendment) Act, 1951 added in Art 19

two words of widest import, wiz., “in the interest of” “public order”.
Thereby including the legislative restrictions on freedom of speech
and expression. The advocates of the other view held that section 124-
A of I.P.C is constitutional and is not in contravention of Art 19(1) (a)
as it is saved by the expression “in the interest of public order” in Art
19. It has been stated that the expression in the interest of public order
is of wider connotation and includes not only the Acts which are
likely to disturb public order but something more than that. In
accordance with this interpretation, section 124-A, I.P.C. has been
held intra vires of the constitution. This view found blessings from the
Supreme Court in the case of Kedarnath v. State of Bihar (supra)
wherein it was held that any law which is enacted in the interest of
public order may be saved from the voice of constitutional invalidity.

The court had further observed in the said case that the right
guaranteed under Art 19(1) (a) is subject to such reasonable
restriction as would come within the purview of clause (2), to Art 19
which comprises (a) security of the State, (b) friendly relations with
foreign states, (c) public order, (d) decency or morality, etc. with
reference to the constitutionality of section 124-A, of the I.P.C, as to
how far they are consistent with the requirements of clause (2) of Art
19 with particular reference to security of state and public order, the
section, it must be noted penalizes any spoken or written words or
science or visible representations, etc, which have the effect of
bringing, or which attempt to bring into hatred or contempt or excite
or attempt to excite disaffection towards “the government established
by law” has to be distinguished from the persons for the time being
engaged in carrying on the administration. “Government established
by law” is the visible symbol of the state would be in jeopardy, where
the government established by law is subverted.

The continued existence of the government established by law is an

essential condition of the stability of the state. Hence, any act within
the meaning of section 124-A, which has the effect of subverting the
Government by bringing that Government into contempt or hatred, or
creating disaffection against it, would be within the penal statute
because the feeling of disloyalty to the Government established by
law or enmity to it imports the idea of tendency to public disorder
using actual violence or incitement to violence. In other words, any
written or spoken words, etc., which have implicit in them the idea of
subverting Government by violent means, which are compendiously
included in the term ‘revolution’, have been made penal by the
section in question. But the section has taken care to indicate clearly
that strong words under lawful means used to express disapprobation
of the measures of the Government with the view to their
improvement or alteration would not come within the section.
Similarly, comments, however, strongly worded, expressing
disapprobation of actions of the Government, without exciting those
feelings which generate the inclination to cause public disorder by
acts of violence, would not be penal. In other words, disloyalty to
Government established by law is not the same thing as commenting
in strong terms upon the measures or acts of Government, or its
agencies, so as to ameliorate the condition of the people or to secure
the cancellation or alteration of the those acts or measure by lawful
means that is to say, without exciting those feelings of enmity and
disloyalty which imply excitation to public disorder or the use of
violence.

This section requires two essentials: -

1. Bringing or attempting to bring into hatred or contempt or

exciting or attempting to excite disaffection towards, the
Government of India.
2. Such act or attempt may be done.
3. (i) by words, either spoken or written,

(ii) by signs,

(iii) by visible representation.

The law of sedition as codified in India represents in substance. The

English law of sedition. In a charge under section 124-A of the penal
code, the prosecution must prove to the hilt that the intention of the
writer or the speaker, whoever he may be, is to bring into hatred or
contempt or excite or attempt to excite disaffection towards the
Government established by law in British India. The essence of the
crime of sedition, therefore, consists in the intention with which the
language is used and what is rendered punishable by section 124-A of
the penal code is the intentional attempt, successful or otherwise, the
rouse as against Government the feelings enumerated in the section, a
mere tendency in an Art. to promote such feelings is not sufficient to
justify a conviction; in other words, the prosecution must bring home
to the accused that his intention was as is described in the section
itself. The essence of the offence of sedition under section 124-A,
I.P.C., is the intention with which the language of a speech is used,
and that intention must be judged primarily from the language itself.
In forming an opinion as to the character of speech charged as
sedition, the speech must be looked at and taken as a whole, freely
and fairly, without giving undue weight to isolated passages and
without pausing upon an objectionable sentence here or a strong word
there, and, in judging of the intention of the speaker, each passage,
should be considered in connection with the others and with the
general drift of the whole. The provisions of section 124-A, I.P.C. are
very wide and in strict law they would cover everything that amounts
to defamation of the Govt. excluding any criticism in good faith of
any measures or acts of administration. If the Govt. comes into Court
and asks for a decision from a judge or a Magistrate whether
particular conduct is or is not within the terms of section 124-A, the
Court must express a perfectly fair opinion as between the parties
apart from its own ideas of political expediency and the terms of
section 124-A, are so wide that much they may generally be regarded
as justifiable speech would come within its terms.

A speech suggesting generally that the Government established by

law in India was thoroughly dishonest and unfair and that steps should
be taken either by violence or by threat of violence to abolish it,
comes within the provisions of section 124- A. the gist of the offence
under section 124-A lies in the intention of the writer to bring into
hatred and contempt the Government and is not to be gathered from
isolated or stray passages here and there but from a fair and generous
reading of the article as a whole. Further, in gathering the intention
allowance must be made for a certain amount of latitude for writers in
the public.

The offence does not consist in exciting or attempting to excite

mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance, great or small.
Whether any disturbance or outbreak was caused by the publication of
seditious articles is immaterial. If the accused intended by the articles
to excite rebellion or disturbance, his act would doubtless fall within
this section, and would probably fall within other sections of the penal
code. If he tried to excite feelings of hatred or contempt towards the
Government, that is sufficient to make him guilty under this section.
The Federal Court of India had, however, held that the gist of the
offence of sedition is incitement to violence; mere abusive words are
not enough. The view of the Federal Court was subsequently
overruled by the Privy Council, as being opposed to the view
expressed in several cases.

The quintessence of sedition is intention. Thus, here a speech

addressed to an audience consisting, mostly of ignorant zamindars
and the intention for holding the Darga in which the speeches were
delivered as unknown it was held that the intention must be gathered
solely from the speeches themselves and the effect, they were likely
to create on that ignorant audience. When the speaker told the
audience that the Government wanted to ruin those people who were
trying to set them on the right path, that the Englishmen had come to
India to make the people addicted to drink, opium and bhang, that the
executive and judiciary are partial to white men and exhorted the
audience to resolve not to live under Englishmen: It was held that the
speech was calculated to excite disaffection against the Government
and to bring it into hatred and contempt.Where the accused in one of
his speeches advocated the boycott of foreign goods, not as a means
for helping industries but to get rid of the English from India and
followed it up by imprecations as to the presence of the English in
India as a curse to the country, it was held that it amounted to sedition
punishable under section 124-A and 153-A, I.P.C. Where in course of
a speech at a meeting of the labourers, the accused urged upon the
labourers to unite in order to fight against their to enemies, the Govt.
and the capitalists, characterizing them as sucking the blood of the
labourers and dilated upon the advantages which would be conferred
upon them by a general strike, and emphasized that the Govt. were
getting afraid of labour and were putting labour leaders in jail for long
periods, it was held that the speech was not strong enough to promote
or attempt to promote feelings of enmity or hatred against the
capitalists, whether they constituted or not, a class within the meaning
of Section 153-A and that no offence punishable under that section
was committed. Dissenting from this view the minority held the
whole effect of the effect, so far as Govt. was concerned, was to
suggest to the persons to whom it was addressed that Govt. in taking
sides against them, was taking the part of their opponents, and that to
make a charge of gross partiality on that sort against Govt. was
calculated to feelings of enmity and disaffection towards Govt. and
that an offence under section 124-A, was committed.

It is true that it is not sedition to criticize administrative machinery or

the officers of Government but where the speaker exceeds the limits
of fair criticism and his object in attacking the existing Govt. is to
create disaffection the speech amounts to sedition. In cases under
Section 124-A, I.P.C., the Courts have not to see the effect on the
mind of the people and they are concerned with the construction of
the speech, and the speech must be taken as a whole and not just in
pieces. A man may criticize or comment upon any measure or act of
the Govt. and freely express his opinion upon it. He may express
condemnation but so long as he confines himself to that he will be
protected, but if he goes beyond that he must pay the penalty for it.
The question of intention is always an important factor in such cases.
Authorship of seditious material alone is not the gist of offence of
sedition. Distribution, circulation of seditious material may also be
sufficient.

Where a speaker said that the Government had wounded the feelings
of the Sikhs in the matter of Sis Ganj Gurdwara at Delhi and any one
could see the grief-provoking picture showing thousands of bullet
marks on the walls of the Gurdwara and that in the name of law and
order bullets were showered on the people: held, that the reference to
the Sis Ganj Gurdwara and to the motive of the authorities to rain
bullets under the cover of maintaining law and order was undoubtedly
such as to bring the Govt. established by law in India into hatred and
the speaker guilty of sedition. The essence of the crime of sedition
consists in the intention with which the language is used. The
intention of a speaker, writer or publisher, may be inferred from the
speech, article, or letter. The intention is gathered from the articles.
The requisite intention cannot be attributed to a person if he was not
aware of the contents of the seditious publication. If, on reading the
articles or speeches the reasonable and natural and probable effect of
the articles or speeches on the minds of those who read them, or to
whom they were addressed appears to be those feelings of hatred,
contempt or disaffection, old be excited towards the

Government the offence is committed. Where a person says in his

speech that he himself is the follower of the precept of non-violence
but at the same time says that he is nobody to find fault with people
who in their anger at oppression as is witnessed under the present
Govt. use more violent methods and shoot at members of the
assembly and where throughout his speech he insinuates various
disabilities of village life to be due to the present Govt. there is an
intention on his part to bring the Govt. into hatred and he commits the
offence under section 124-A.in order to decide whether or not a
speech constitutes an attempt to excite hatred, contempt or
disaffection, it should be viewed from the standpoint of the types of
persons o whom it was primarily addressed. On the one hand, their
limitations, if any, must be considered; on the other, the fact that the
words may convey to them a literal meaning must not be lost sight of.
The time and the place are also factors which should be considered.

The section places absolutely on the same footing the successful

exciting of feelings of disaffection and the unsuccessful attempt to
excite them. It is not an essential ingredient of sedition that the act
done should be an act which is intended or likely to incite to public
disorder. But this view of the law does no longer seem to be correct,
in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kedarnath’s case,
wherein SINHA, C.J. observed “comments, however strongly worded
expressing, disapprobation of actions of Govt., without exciting those
feelings which generate the inclination to cause public disorder by
acts of violence, would not be penal. In other words, disloyalty to
Govt. established by law is not the same thing as commenting in
strong terms upon the measures or acts of Govt. or its agencies, so as
to ameliorate the condition of the people or to secure the cancellation
or alteration of those acts or measures by lawful means, that is to say,
without exciting those feelings of enmity or disloyalty which imply
excitement to public disorder or the use of violence”. In this very case
it was further held that viewed in the context of antecedent history of
the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress the
provisions of S. 124-A and S. 505 of the Indian Penal Code should be
limited in their application to acts involving intention or tendency to
create disorder or disturbance of law and order or incitement to
violence. Where the propaganda secretary of a Gurdwara addressed a
gathering of Sikhs, some of whom were wearing black clothes and
turbans, and in course of his speech though he did not give direct
incitement to violence but he nevertheless gave exaggerated figures of
casualties following army action in Punjab, it has held that it would be
quite proper to infer from the text and tenor of the speech made by he
accused that the same was intended to bring the Govt. into contempt
with the likelihood of eruption of violence and public disorder
contemplated in Kedarnath’s case. In the circumstances, his petition
for quashing the criminal proceedings against him under were
rejected.

In a Supreme Court case it has been held that the casual raising of
slogans once or twice by two individuals alone cannot be aimed at
exciting or attempt to excite hatred or disaffection towards the Govt.
as established by law in India.

To sustain a conviction under section 124-A, it must be proved (a)

that the accused spoke the words in question, (b) that he thereby
brought or attempted to bring into hatred or contempt or excites or
attempts to excite disaffection, and (c) that such disaffection was
towards the Govt. established by law in India. An accused person may
be legally tried and convicted in one trial under sections 124- A and
153-A, I.P.C. on charges framed on three disconnected articles.

In a case a complaint was filed under Penal Code, Section 124-A but
no original or translation of alleged speech was attached to it. The
complaint was held not proper. It has however been held in earlier
case a complaint on a charge of sedition need not contain or set out
the speeches or the alleged seditious words. A complaint is not
intended to give information to the accused; and even if a complaint
should set out the seditious words, the omission is an irregularity
within section 537 (a), Cr.P.C.

Sedition is a colonial law supporting the notion of “King is Supreme”.

It has no place in a modern world with human liberties at its core.
Sedition ought to be abolished to ensure the exercise of the right to
dissent. Healthy dissent can contribute to the development of the
nation, and hence, it must not be penalised. But sedition is just one
axe in a tool-shed. Even after the abolishing of the sedition law, the
right to dissent would still be curbed by the misuse of UAPA, NSA,
preventive detention laws, etc. It is necessary to foster an environment
of dialogue and tolerance for different opinions in the nation. Only
then would India be able to speak with its rightful voice.
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