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EN BANC

RE: STATEMENTS MADE BY A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC

LORRAINE MARIE T. BADOY
ALLEGEDLY THREATENING •
JUDGE MARLO A. MAGDOZA-
MALAGAR.
x-------------------------------------------x x-------------------------- ---------x
ATTY. RICO V. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 263384
DEAN ANTONIO GABRIEL M.
LA VINA, DEAN MA. SOLEDAD Present:
DERIQUITO-MAWIS, DEAN
ANNA MARIA D. ABAD, DEAN
GESMUNDO, ChiefJustice,
RODEL A. TATON, ATTY.
LEONEN,
ARTEMIO P. CALUMPONG,
CAGUIOA,
ATTY. CHRISTIANNE GRACE F.
HERNANDO,
SALONGA, ATTY. RAY PAOLO
LAZARO-JAVIER,
J. SANTIAGO, AND ATTY. AYN
INTING,
RUTH Z. TOLENTINO-
ZALAMEDA,
AZARCON,
LOPEZ, M.,
Petitioners,
GAERLAN,
ROSARIO,
LOPEZ, J.,
DIMAAMPAO,
-versus-
MARQUEZ,
KHO, JR., and
SINGH,* JJ
LORRAINE MARIE T. BADOY-
PARTOSA, Promulgated:
Respondent. August 15, 2023
x----------------------------------------- c.:.:.::::.==~;;e;:~~ ~ - - x
j

DECISION

• On official leave .
 t
Decision 2 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

As a:
fundamental principle of every democratic government, 1 the
• !t public's freedom of expression should be respected and protected to the
fullest extent possible. 2 However, these rights must never threaten other
equally· important public interests, such as the maintenance of the courts'
integrity and the orderly administration of justice. 3 Unwarranted attacks on
the dignity of the courts are not constitutionally protected speech and may
constitute contempt of court.

This Court resolves the consolidated cases pertaining to the contempt

charges against Lorraine Marie T. Badoy-Partosa (Badoy-Partosa) for the
statements she made on Facebook against Judge Marlo A. Magdoza-Malagar
(Judge Magdoza-Malagar) .
•
The controversy arose after Judge Magdoza-Malagar of the Regional
Trial Court of l½anila, Branch 19, had issued a Resolution on September 21,
2022, dismissing the Department of Justice's petition to proscribe the
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army as a terrorist group
under the Human Security Act. 4

On September 23, 2022, Badoy-Partosa uploaded a public post on her

Facebook page 5 titled, "A Judgment Straight from the Bowels of Communist
Hell," where she launched multiple insults against the judge. She claimed
that the judge weaponized the court of law to rule in favor of her alleged
friends, the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army-
National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF). Badoy-Partosa then
threatened to kill Judge Magdoza-Malagar. The post reads:

A Judgment Straight From the Bowels of Communist Hell

In the proscription case against them, the CPP NPA NDF did not make an
appearance nor send any evidence to refute all charges against them by the
National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict- NOT ONE
[sic].

Turns out, they didn't need to. Judge Marlo Malagar, in about 135 pages
passionately lawyered for them.

She consistently used the Constitution of the CPP NPA NDF, this terrorist
organization, to back up her shameless decision, going as far as saying that
'An NPA member engages in violence and employs force, not for

Nicolas-lewis v. Commission on Elections, 859 Phil. 560, 586 (20 I 9) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., En Bancl
2
Roque, .k v. Catapang, 805 Phil. 921, 945-946 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
Garcia, Jr. v. Manrique, 697 Phil. 157, 169 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].
4
Rollo (G.R. No. 263384), p. 7.
Badoy-Partosa maintains a verified Facebook account accessible by the public through
https://www.facebook.com/lorraine.badoy. This account currently has at least 166,000 followers.
Decision 3 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
violence's sake, but in pursuit of the higher ideals contained in the
Constitution of the CPP.'

Meaning, the cold blooded murder of Kieth Absalon where he was shot
point-blank between his eyes as he begged for his life, the massacre of 39
members of the Bagobo Tagabawa tribe - MORE THAN HALF OF
THEM CHILDREN who were hacked to pieces and decapitated, the
recruitment of our children into violent extremism where countless
numbers of them have died as TERRORISTS, the murders of thousands
upon thousands of tribal chiefs, rape, child slavery, human trafficking,
kidnapping, the burning of government equipment, blowing up to pieces of
cell towers, the economic sabotage - all these are not acts of terrorism
according to Judge Malagar because they were done in pursuit of the
higher idea[l]s of the CPP NPA NDF.

What higher ideals is this unprincipled judge talking about? The CPP
NP A NDF has one goal and one goal alone: the seizure of political power
THROUGH VIOLENT MEANS.

There is nothing lofty about the murder of our citizens - who are seen as
collateral damage to their stupid war - that is deeply ingrained in the core
of the CPP NPA NDF.

This Judge also said that the CPP NPA NDF was not organized for the
purpose of engaging in terrorism but that this "armed struggle is only a
means to achieve the CPP's purpose".

Huh?

What she's saying is we must excuse the violence of the CPP NPA NDF,
kayo naman. Don't focus on the killings. So Vilma Absalon, mother of
Kieth, must not focus on the inhumane and brutal death of her son but
must instead, tell herself that his death was a small price to pay for the
CPP to achieve its purpose.

What she's telling us is this: Philippines, ano ba kayo? Hindi terorista

ang CPP NPA NDF. Wag nyo masyadong pansinin ang pagpapatay,
torture, pagpapasabog ng mga sundalo at kapulisan natin or pag ang anak
mo ang pinatay, isipin mo ganito ha: PARA SA MATAAS NA LAYUNIN
NG CPP NPA NDF YAN.

In other words, this idiot judge is telling us that we're so sensitive weeping
over the dead bodies of our children. Ano ba, mga nanay. Namatay na
bayani ang mga anak nyo. 0 diba? [sic] Sounds familiar? CPP na CPP
ang linya ni Judge.

She also claims that the incidents of terrorism that government presented
did not cause "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic" among
Filipinos. Those excesses were merely "pocket and sporadic occurrences"
that occurred in limited and scattered areas in the country.

That we were consistently on the top 10 list of the Global Terrorism Index
becanse of the CPP NP A NDF before NTF ELCAC came along is not
I
something this Judge worries her pretty head over.

Then in her airconditioned office in Manila, she has not seen the wide-
eyed panic and fear of our indigenous peoples who were targeted by this
Decision 4 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
terrorist organization from its very inception. She has not heard the
screams of terror and grief of mothers, fathers, siblings, at the murder of
their loved ones right before their eyes. She has not seen our mothers claw
the earth for the bodies of their children and she has not heard their [sic]
wails of grief of a mother cradling the dead body of her child.

No, this judge who is obviously a friend of the CPP NPA NDF has a
helmet as thick as the helmet of the urban operatives of the CPP NPA
NDF that she can step over the dead bodies of our children and pen this
shameless decision to lend powerful support and cover to these terrorists
who have stolen our childrenfrom us.

Judge Malagar asks that all those acts of terrorism of the CPP NPA NDF
should be considered as "political crimes and therefore be treated with
leniency."

So if I kill this judge and I do so out of my political belief that all allies of
the CPP NPA NDF must be killed because there is no difference [in my
mind] between a member of the CPP NPA NDF and their friends, then
please be lenient with me.

Like the true ally that she is of this terrorist organization, Judge Ma/agar
spoke about an issue that wasn't even part of this case and that is a
weapon badly needed by the CPP NP A NDF to continue recruitment of
our children, their fund-raising/extortion activities and propaganda against
government: red-tagging.

In other words, siningit ni Judge ang isang issue na hindi naman parte ng
kaso na ito. Pini/it nyang maisingit ang mahalagang oxygen na ito ng
terroristang CPP NPA NDF.

And of course this Judge ruled contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court
when the highest court of the land wrote, in Zarate vs. Aquino, that there is
no danger to life, liberty and security when one is identified as a member
of the CPP NPA NDF.

No urban operative of the CPP NPA NDF - not Teddy Casino, Neri
Colmenares, Sol Taule, Cristina Palabay, Raoul Manuel, Arlene Brosas,
France Castro, Carlos Zarate, Carol Araullo, Sonny Africa, Renato Reyes
- has foisted a more impassioned nor a more punctilious defense of the
CPP NP A NDF than Judge Marlo Malagar did.

Nor [sic] more blatantly shameless and brazen display of abuse ofpower
by weaponizing a court of law to further inflict harm on a people that have
long suffered the excesses and inhumanities of this terrorist organization
for over 5 decades.

The silver lining to this is that it gives the Filipino people a clear picture
and a deeper understanding of why this terrorist organization has lasted
over half a century and who the traitors are.

It is not only because of the CPP NPA NDF but its friends in high places:
in the judiciary, Senate, Congress, business leaders, university presidents,
university chancellors etc.

It is as the former rebels have told us: they are everywhere.

Decision 5 AM. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
There is something though that the CPP NPA NDF doesn't have and it is
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE who are now AWAKE and now know who the
enemy 1s.

This is a mere hiccup in our fight to finally rid our country of communist
terrorist vermin.

This Judge gave the CPP NP A NDF - a terrorist organization that is down
on its knees and begging for its mother - what they think is a gift:
propaganda material.

But the Filipino people are the angels of acrid necessity that have come to
tell these terrorists that it's all over.

By our Unity and by our Strength, we will deliver that message each and
every time they open their stupid mouths and use Judge Malagar's good
housekeeping seal of 'WE ARE NOT TERRORISTS, SABI NG AMIGA
NAMIN, BEH BEH BEH BEH BEH'

NO, YOU ARE TERRORISTS.

Judges like this Judge Malagar are a dime a dozen and she doesn't get to
define the parameters of this war we are waging.

We do. 'Ne get to call it.

The CPP NP A NDF is a terrorist organization and that is written in the

heart and soul of every Filipino. We will never forgive. We will never
forget. And we will no longer allow this terrorist organization to go one
step further with us.

We are a people rising and we have driven our sword into the heart of that
· beast, the TERRORIST ORGANIZATION CPP NPA NDF. 6 (Emphasis
supplied)

That same day, Badoy-Partosa uploaded a second post titled, "The

Judge Marlo Mala.gar Horror Series,"7 where she not only alleged that Judge
Magdoza-Malagar did not base her decision on the Constitution, but she
even threatened to bomb the offices of judges whom she deemed as "friends
ofterrorists[.]" 8 The relevant excerpts state:

The Judge, in other words, based her decision on the Constitution of this
terrorist organization, the CPP NP A NDF and not on the laws and the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 9

I really reallllly [sic] want to build an organization with the noble ideal of
establishing a Justice system that is free fi-om the infiltration of the

6
Rollo (G.R. No. 263384), pp. 8-11.
7 As of September 25, 2022, this Facebook post gained at least 1,300 reactions, 576 comments, and 642
shares.
Rollo (G.R. No. 263384), p. 13.
9
Id. at 12.
 Decision 6 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
terrorist vermin - the CPP NPA NDF - then members of my organization
will start bombing the offices of these corrupt judges who are friends of
terrorists- [sic] even if they kneel before us and beg for their lives - the
very same way Kieth Absalon begged for his life - then, going by your
Marco Valbuena/Teddy Casino/Neri Colmenares/Joma Sison logic, my
organization won't be a terrorist organization, right?

0 ano, Judge, game? Are you willing to go through what the Filipino
people have gone through and continue to go through for the past 53
years? 10 (Emphasis supplied)

The following day, Badoy-Partosa uploaded another Facebook post 11

describing Judge Magdoza-Malagar as "unprincipled and rotten" and
claiming that her husband was a member of the CPP. In this post, Badoy-
Partosa wrote:

Questions we need to ask Judge Marlo Malagar.

I. Is it true that your husband, Atty Leo Malagar, who is currently the 2 nd
UP Cebu Chancellor was a cadre of the CPP NP A NDF in the Youth
Sector?

2. Is he still active with the CPP NPA NDF?

3. How true is it that the ones who helped you craft your malodorous
decision regarding the terrorist organization CPP NPA NDF were Edre
Olalia, Sol Taule and Rachel Pastores?

So all these [sic] time, according to our asset, that Judge Malagar was
pretending to do independent research, the ones helping her craft her
obscene decision were some of the most fanatical and hard core [sic] urban
operatives of the CPP NPA NDF who get their directives straight from the
Central Committee of the terrorist CPP NP A NDF and from the terrorist
Joma Sison himself.

In other words, the decision this unprincipled and rotten judge wrote was
really by the Communist Party of the Philippines, a terrorist organization.

4. Who wrote your decision, Judge Malagar? Was it [sic] the CPP NPA
NDF cadre operatives Edre Olalia, Sol Taule, Rachel Pastores?

If so, that horrific decision that has enraged an entire nation was written by
no less than the TERRORIST Joma Sison and the Central Committee of
this Terrorist Organization the CPP NPA NDF.

10
Rollo (G.R. No. 263384), p. 13.
11
As of September 25, 2022, this Facebook p~st gained at least 2,400 reactions, 696 comments, and
1,000 shares.
Decision 7 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
Kung ito ay tutoo [sic], napakalaki at napakawalang hiyang pagtataksil
itong ginawa mong ito sa bayan, Judge Malagar. 12 (Emphasis supplied)

Badoy-Partosa's followers responded with generating comments,

remarks, images, and videos of the same vitriol as her posts, which she then
uploaded on her Facebook page from September 23, 2022 to September 26,
2022. 13 Some of them read:

Peter Flores Serrano: "Doc Lorraine Marie T. Badoy calls out Judge Marlo
Magdoza Malagar of the Manila Regional Trial Court on her treachery.
'She made this country the saddest country for the mothers.' We are right
behind you, Doc Lorraine. Just let us know what to do and we will oblige."

Ka Eric Almendras: "The voice of our people is more SUPREME AND

SOVEREIGN than the illogical and distorted political exhortation cum
decision of this Manila RTC-JUDGE who exhibits a pattern of mindset as
a CPP-NPA-NDF lover and promoter ofperpetual protracted destruction
of our country through justification using 'higher ideals and political
cause ... ' ...

Pastor Apollo YouTube video: "You're fired! Nakakahiya ka! Hindi ka

dapat maging Judge!"

Ka Eric YouTube video: "Sinadya niyang hindi alamin ang batas pabor sa
makakaliwang grupo." 14 (Emphasis supplied)

The series of social media posts caused various organizations from the
legal community, including HUKOM, Inc., 15 the Philippine Judges
Association, 16 and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 17 to issue official
statements denouncing Badoy-Partosa's "malicious and dangerous
utterances on social media." 18

On September 26, 2022, Badoy-Partosa responded to these statements

on her Facebook page. The relevant excerpts are:

A group of judges who form part of Hukom, Inc. has complained because
a 'member of the Bench is again being challenged' as if members of the
Bench ought to be beyond public scrutiny.

12
Rollo (G.R. No. 263384), pp. 14-15.
13
Id. at 15.
14
Id. at 15-16.
15
Id.atlS-19.
16
Id.at 19.
17
Id. at 19-20.
18
Id. at 17.
Decision 8 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
Shockingly enough, these judges have also used the issue of red-tagging
and have, alarmingly enough, parroted the lines of the CPP NPA NDF.

They make a big case out of their lives being threatened, echoing the CPP
NP A NDF lines of twisting my words and making it mean whatever they
want it to mean - an old, worn-out ploy straight out of the rotten
communist terrorist propaganda machine that the Filipino people are so
aware of now.

And that [sic] if they believe I had threatened to kill Judge Malagar, then
their reading comprehension, I am sorry to say, is lower than a kid fresh
out of nursery ....

The good judges of Hukom, Inc. then should refuse to be used by the CPP
NP A NDF and instead uphold the dignity and sanctity of their profession
and join the Filipino people in our expressions of rage and our cry to
investigate Judge Marlo Malagar and then if found guilty, strip her of the
immense power she holds so she can no longer hurt the Filipino people.

Otherwise, they are no different from the Judge they give cover to who has
weaponized the law against the Filipino nation.

Worst of all, they are no different from the terrorist organization that could
be behind this Judge. 19

On October 4, 2022, this Court, acting motu proprio on this matter,

docketed as A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC, issued a stem warning against those
who "continue to incite violence through social media and other means
which endanger the lives of judges and their families[.]" 20 We deemed such
acts as contempt of court, which would be dealt with accordingly. 21

We likewise issued a Show Cause Order, requiring Badoy-Partosa to

show cause why she should not be cited in contempt of court, and to respond
to the following questions: (1) whether she posted the statements attacking
Judge Magdoza-Malagar's ruling on her social media accounts; (2) whether
her social media post encouraged more violent language against the judge in /
her social media platforms; (3) whether her post was a clear incitement to ·
produce violent actions against a judge and was likely to produce such act;
and (4) whether her statements, which implied violence on a judge, was part
of her protected constitutional speech. 22

19
Id. at 21-22.
20
Id. at 23.
z1 Id.
22
Rollo (A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC), p. 23.
Decision 9 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

Meanwhile, on October 3, 2022, a group of lawyers23 filed an Urgent

Petition for Indirect Contempt24 before this Court. They prayed, among
others, that respondent Badoy-Partosa be found guilty of indirect contempt
of court. 25

First seeking to establish their legal standing, petitioners raise that

they are actively engaged in the practice of law and, as officers of the court,
are obligated to uphold the Constitution and the rule of law, including the
elimination of any act inimical to its survival. 26

Petitioners further argue that the issue of whether respondent should

be cited in contempt is of transcendental importance, given that her
statements threaten and assault the members of the Bench. 27 Her abhorrent
acts, they say, has "far-reaching consequences to our constitutional
democracy and the independence of the Judiciary." 28

Finally, petitioners maintain that this Court must take cognizance of

the Petition. While they recognize that Rule 71, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court states that charges of indirect contempt committed against judges must
be filed before the affected courts or those of higher or equivalent rank, or an
officer appointed by it, they opine that respondent's and her supporters'
contumacious conduct "constitutes a patently gross attack against the
Philippine Judiciary as an institution." 29

In an October 11, 2022 Resolution, this Court, without giving due

course to the Petition, required respondent to file a comment within 15 days
from notice. 30

Respondent filed a Comment/Opposition to the Show Cause Order, 31

positing that her post over Judge Magdoza-Malagar's decision dismissing
the proscription case was done "in the exercise of journalistic comments and
constitute fair comments on a matter of public interest." 32 She also asserted
that her comments were fair because of "eight palpable errors" 33 in Judge
Magdoza-Malagar' s Resolution.

23
Atty. Rico V. Domingo, Dean Antonio Gabriel M. La Vifia, Dean Ma. Soledad Deriquito-Mawis, Dean
Anna Maria D. Abad, Dean Rode! A. Taton, Atty. Artemio P. Calumpong, Atty. Christianne Grace F.
Salonga, Atty. Ray Paolo J. Santiago, and Atty. Ayn Ruth Z. Tolentino-Azarcon.
24
Rollo (G.R. No. 263384), pp. 3--44.
25
Id. at 37.
26
Id. at 25-26.
27
Id. at 28-29.
28
Id. at 28.
29
Id. at 29.
30
Id. at 264.
31
Rollo (A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC), pp. 33-83.
32
Id. at 35.
33
Id. at 37.
Decision 10 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

First, respondent points out that Judge Magdoza-Malagar erred in

ruling that the CPP-NP A cannot be proscribed as a terrorist group as it used
violence to achieve its noble goals. She cited United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 49/60, which sought to criminalize a number
of terrorist activities despite their political underpinnings, and which has
become customary after all United Nations members had adopted it without
objection. 34 Second, respondent stresses that Judge Magdoza-Malagar erred
in declaring that political crimes were not terrorist acts and in relying on an
outdated sense of leniency for acts of rebellion. 35

Third, respondent states that the judge's application of leniency

toward the acts of the CPP-NPA, because they were impelled by a single
criminal intent-achieving a political purpose-was wrong because
rebellion was not mutually exclusive with terrorism. 36 Fourth, respondent
faults Judge Magdoza-Malagar for declaring that the acts alleged did not
cause "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic" among Filipinos, which
was why she criticized the judge for being out of touch with what was
happening to the targeted indigenous peoples. 37

Fifth, respondent claims that Judge Magdoza-Malagar's conclusion

that guerilla warfare cannot constitute terrorism is wrong. 38 Sixth, she
asserts that the judge's declarations contradict local and foreign jurisdictions
declaring the CPP-NPA as a terrorist organization, and which should be
subject of mandatory judicial notice. 39

Seventh, she argues that the judge also erred in resolving the
proscription case under the Human Security Act and not the Anti-Terror Act
°
of 2020. 4 Finally, in relation to the seventh ground, respondent posits that
the judge erred in treating the proscription case akin to declaratory relief 1
and, in any case, she should have divested herself of jurisdiction since the
law vests jurisdiction to proscribe terrorist groups in the Court of Appeals. 42

Respondent thus asserts that all her social media posts were valid
criticisms; 43 hence, she should not be cited in indirect contempt without clear
and present danger44 or incitement of violence against Judge Magdoza-
Malagar.45 She also denies threatening the judge with her honest and

34
Id. at 37-39.
35
Id. at 40.
36
Id. at 44.
37
Id. at 46-47.
38
Id. at 47-48.
39
Id. at 48-50.
49
Id. at 51-52.
41
Id. at 52.
42
Id. at 53-54.
43
Id. at 56-58.
44
Id. at 60-64.
45
Id. at 66-67.
Decision 11 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
informed criticisms. 46 She reiterates that she merely used the judge's same
reasoning and established the flaw in it when she made her hyperbolic
statement or hypothetical syllogism, which is now subject of the contempt
case against her. 47

Meanwhile, in her Answer48 to the Petition in G.R. No. 263384,

respondent explains that as an advocate against the CPP-NPA-NDF, she
was "deeply disappointed" with Judge Magdoza-Malagar's dismissal of the
proscription case as it condoned the group's "countless atrocities and
violence" by declaring that they were done in pursuit of higher ideals. 49

Respondent claims to have merely vented her frustration and anger

on social media because she empathizes with the victims who have been
deprived of justice, while the CPP-NPA-NDF were treated with leniency
despite their many brutal acts. 50

She also denies threatening Judge Magdoza-Malagar and stresses

that her social media posts were misconstrued. 51 She says that the
supposed threatening words, 52 if read in their entirety, were but "a
hypothetical syllogism" to point out the error in the judge's ruling. 53

She also maintains that her social media posts were made in the
exercise of her freedom of expression, a valid criticism of a public officer;
thus, she should not be held liable for indirect contempt. 54 She argues that
her statements did not impede the administration of justice. 55 She says that
"such expression [of] exasperation could not in any way be deemed as evil
so strong that there is a need to curtail the freedom of expression and punish
for contempt, for[ ]it would send more chilling effects than the very issue
raised in this petition to be evil." 56

Finally, she posits that this Court's contempt power cannot impair the
freedom of the press and freedom of expression. 57

46
Id. at 60.
47
Id. at 60-6 I.
48
Rollo (G.R. No. 263384), pp. 270-286.
49
Id. at 271.
so Id.
51
Id. at 271, 279-280.
52
Id at 279. "So if I kill this judge and I do so out ofmy political belief that all allies of the CPP NPA
NDF must be killed because there is no difference in my mind between a member of the CPP NPA
NDF and their friends, then please be lenient with me."
53
Id. at. 273.
54
Id. at 272-277.
55
Id. at 276.
56
Id. at 277.
57
Id. at 277-281.
Decision 12 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

On February 14, 2023, this Court consolidated G.R. No. 263384 with
A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC and directed petitioners to file their reply to
respondent's pleadings. 58

In their Reply, 59 petitioners maintain that respondent cannot claim that

she merely exercised her freedom of expression since she disseminated lies
or half-truths. They point out that her use of"gutter language" to defame the
good name and reputation of Judge Magdoza-Malagar constitutes an abuse
of rights, violating Article 19 of the Civil Code. 60 Moreover, they say her
statements served as attacks not only against the judge, but the Judiciary and
respected lawyers, which rules out any defense of good faith on her part. 61

As her posts present serious and imminent threat to the administration

of justice, petitioners maintain that clear and present danger is present,
justifying this Court's exercise of contempt power. 62 They posit that her
statements have "far-reaching consequences" to constitutional democracy,
judicial independence, and the orderly system of dispensing justice. Finally,
they say that her statements assault the basic rights of the members of the
Bench, and thus, form matters of public concern. 63

The two issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether petitioners in G.R. No. 263384 have the standing to file
the Urgent Petition for Indirect Contempt against respondent; and

Second, whether respondent should be cited in indirect contempt of

court.

Legal standing refers to a party's "personal and substantial interest in

the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement."64 Interest, in turn, refers to a material interest and is
distinguished from a mere interest or curiosity in the question involved or an
incidental interest. 65 Thus, legal standing requires that the petitioner possess ;;J
"a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." 66 /

58
/d.at313.
59
Id. at 319-349.
60
Id. at 323-324.
61
Id. at 328.
62
Id. at 329-330.
63
Id. at 331-333.
64
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
65
Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618,633 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
66
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 471 (2010)
[Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
 Decision 13 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
This Court finds that petitioners in G.R. No. 263384 possess legal
standing to file the case for indirect contempt against respondent.

Petitioners-lawyers are officers of the court, having taken an oath to

"obey the laws of the land, promote respect for laws and processes[.]" 67 As
lawyers, they are not just tasked to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts, but must also ensure that other people observe the same respect,
including those not in the legal profession. 68

Further, as guardians of the rule of law and the indispensable partners

of this Court in administering justice, 69 lawyers must help maintain public
confidence in the Judiciary. A well-functioning society depends in part on a
high level of trust in the legal system. 70 Lumapas v. Tamin 71 warns that "[i]f
the people believe they cannot expect justice from the courts, they might be
driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
might be the result. Courts exist to promote justice." 72

In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 73 the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines, citing its responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution, assailed the deployment of the marines in Metro Manila to
conduct joint visibility patrols with the Philippine National Police for crime
prevention and suppression. This Court ruled that the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines had no legal standing as it "failed to present a specific and
substantial interest in the resolution of the case." 74 A bare invocation of the
duty to preserve the rule of law, without more, "is too general an interest
which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry." 75

Such is not the case here.

Petitioners, while also adverting to their duty to uphold the

Constitution and the rule of law, do so in their capacity as lawyers and
officers of the court. Respondent's vitriolic social media posts sow distrust
and undennine the respect accorded to our judicial system while also
creating actual danger for Judge Magdoza-Malagar, as evidenced by the
similarly heated comments supporting respondent's statements. As court
officers, petitioners have a material interest in the outcome of the contempt
charge against respondent to safeguard the stability of our judicial system.

67
CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, Canon Ill, sec. 2.
63
CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, Canon III, sec. 2.
69
Nulada v. Atty. Pauima, 784 Phil. 309,315 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
76
In Re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595,602 (1949) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].
71
452 Phil. 972 (2003) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. (Citations omitted)
72
Id. at 984.
73
392 Phil. 618 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
74
Id. at 633.
1s Id.
Decision 14 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

II

The Constitution provides full protection to the legitimate exercise of

the freedoms of expression, speech, and of the press. Article III, Section 4
of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of

speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

While its 1935 and 1973 counterparts do not say so, the 1987
Constitution purposely included - "separate and in addition to freedom of
speech and of the press"- the freedom of expression, which was deemed to
be wider in scope. 76 This freedom protected the public's "means of assuring
individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by
the people in social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the
balance between stability and change." 77

As a fundamental principle of every democratic govemment, 78 the

public's freedom of expression should be respected and protected to the
fullest extent possible. 79 In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections, 80 this Court touched on the role of freedom of expression in
creating an enlightened civilization or society, which is the alternative to a
"tyrannical, confonnist, irrational[,] and stagnant" society:

In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not

only petitioners' right to freedom of expression in the present case, but
also of others in future similar cases. The case before this court involves
an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform the political
landscape.. This has become a rare occasion when private citizens actively
engage the public in political discourse. To quote an eminent political
theorist:

[T]he theory of freedom of expression involves more than a

technique for arriving at better social judgments through
democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of society,
a faith and a whole way of life. The theory grew out of an
age that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of new
society in which man's mind was free, his fate determined
by his own powers of reason, and his prospects of creating
a rational and enlightened civilization virtually unlimited. It

76
The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301, 354 (2015) [Per J. Leanen, En
Banc].
77
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission on Elections, 380 Phil. 780, 792 (2000) [Per J.
Panganiban, En Banc]. (Citation omitted)
78
Nicolas-lewis v. Commission on Elections, 859 Phil. 560,586 (2019) [J. Reyes, Jr., En Banc].
79
Roque, Jr. v. Catapang, 805 Phil. 921, 945-946 (2017) [Per J. Leanen, Second Division].
80
751 Phil. 301 (2015) [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
 Decision 15 AM. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
is put forward as a prescription for attaining a creative,
progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community.
It contemplates a mode of life that, through encouraging
toleration, skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow man
to realize his full potentialities. It spurns the alternative of
a society that is tyrannical, conformist, irrational and
stagnant. 81 (Citation omitted)

The freedoms of speech and of the press, as components of freedom

of expression, are powerful weapons of accountability to keep the
government in check. 82_ Press freedom, in particular, "is the instrument by
which citizens keep their government informed of their needs, their
aspirations and their grievances." 83 A press that puts to light the
government's mistakes and abuses forces it to execute its duty properly and
efficiently. 84

These freedoms have been given the widest latitude in recognition of

their crucial role in our democracy:

The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is of course a

fundamental postulate of our constitutional system ....

The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of

expression is undeniable whether as a means of assuring individual self-
fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the people in
social including political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance
between stability and change. The trend as reflected in Philippine and
American decisions is to recognize the broadest scope and assure the
widest latitude to this constitutional guaranty. It represents a profound
commitment to the principle that debate of public issue should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. It is not going too far, according to
another American decision, to view the function of free speech as inviting
dispute. "It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger."

Freedom of speech and of the press thus means something more

than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic
arrangements, to lend support to official measures, to take refuge in the
existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. So
atrophied, the right becomes meaningless. The right belongs as well, if
not more, for those who question, who do not conform, who differ. To
paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no
less than for the thought that agrees with us. 85 (Citations omitted)

81
Id. at 331-332, citing In re Gonzales, 137 Phil. 471, 493--494 (1969) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
farther citing Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theo,y of the First Amendment, FACULTY
SCHOLARSHIP SERIES (1963 ).
82
United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 740-741 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, First Division].
83
Tordesillas v. Puno, 840 Phil. 699, 710 [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
" Id.
85
In re Gonzales, 137 Phil. 471, 492--493 (1969) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
Decision 16 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

Subsumed within the guarantees of freedom of speech and the press is

the right to criticize judicial conduct. Its exercise is primordial in ensuring
the maintenance of good government and proper administration of the law. 86
As comprehensively discussed in United States v. Bustos: 87

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government

demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment
on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The
sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound
can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer
must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be
exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorized defamation.
Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected
criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official, or
set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary
- to any or all the agencies of Government - public opinion should be
the constant source ofliberty and democracy.
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital
public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore,
a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of
the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion
will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on
the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of
Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the
individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up
bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one
[sic] owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any
alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public
officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire
into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed
so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the
conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free
government, but only in a despotism." 88 (Citations omitted)

The freedoms of expression, speech, and the press enjoy a preferred

status in our hierarchy of rights. 89 Without the enjoyment of these rights, "a
free, stable, effective, and progressive democratic state would be difficult to
attain" .90 As they make up the foundation of a functioning democracy, it is
imperative that government protection from any undue interference be given
to their exercise "for religious, political, economic, scientific, news, or
informational ends" 91 for all forms ofmedia. 92
86
United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 740 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, First Division].
87
37 Phil. 731 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, First Division].
88
Id. at 740~74 l.
89
I-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, 758 Phil. 67, 85 (2015) [Per J. Reyes, En
Banc].
0
' Soriano v. Laguardia, 605 Phil. 43, 105 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, En Banc].
91
Chavez v. Gonzales, 569 Phil. 155, I 98 (2008) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
92
Id., citing Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985 [Per J. Puno,
En Banc].
Decision 17 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

II (A)

Nevertheless, the exercise of these freedoms is not absolute. The

realities of life in a complex society require a degree of moderation. 93 "[T]he
freedom to express one's sentiments and belief does not grant one the license
to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must
be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of
others[.]" 94 Accordingly, Article 19 of the Civil Code states that every
person, in exercising their rights and performing their duties, must act with
justice, give everyone their due, and observe honesty and good faith. 95 As
explained in People v. Godoy: 96

The liberty of the press means that anyone can publish anything he
pleases, but he is liable for the abuse of this liberty. If he does this by
scandalizing the courts of his country, he is liable to be punished for
contempt. In other words, the abuse of the privilege consists principally in
not telling the truth. There is a right to publish the truth, but no right to
publish falsehood to the injury of others with impunity. 97

Further, these rights must never threaten other equally important

public interests. 98 Chavez v. Gonzales 99 discusses:

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would

appear that the right to free speech and a free press is not susceptible of
any limitation. But the realities of life in a complex society preclude a
literal interpretation of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that
would abridge such freedom. For freedom of expression is not an
absolute, nor is it an "unbridled license that gives immunity for every
possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse
this freedom."

Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech
may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive
police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of
others or those of the community or society. The difference in treatment is
expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g.,
political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech.
Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and
evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of
speech. W'e have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or
libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as "fighting words" are not entitled

93
Tordesillas v. Puno, 840 Phil. 699, 710-711 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
94
Soriano v. Laguardia, 605 Phil. 43, 105 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, En Banc], citing Lucas v. Spouses
Roya, 398 Phil. 400 (2000) [J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
95
CIVIL CODE, art. 19; In Re Jurado, 313 Phil. 119, 165 (] 995) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].
96
312 Phil. 977 (I 995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
97
Id. at 1017.
98
Garcia, Jr. v. Manrique, 697 Phil. 157, 169 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].
99
569 Phil. 155 (2008) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
Decision 18 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
to constitutional protection and may be penalized. 100 (Citations omitted)

II (B)

The exercise of the freedoms of expression, speech, and the press

gained further traction with the advent of the digital age. Social media has
not only encouraged the exercise of these rights, but has extended the reach
of its content to audiences across the globe-proving that "cyberspace is an
incomparable, pervasive medium of communication." 101 On the flip side,
caution has been raised that the original message on social media may be
taken out of context and misconstrued by the unintended audience:

These platforms in social media allow users to establish their own

social network. It enables instantaneous online interaction, with each
social networking platform thriving on its ability to engage more and more
users. In order to acquire more users, the owners and developers of these
social media sites constantly provide their users with more features, and
with more opportunities to interact. The number of networks grows as
each participant is invited to bring in more of their friends and
acquaintances to use the platforms. Social media platforms, thus, continue
to expand in terms of its influence and its ability to serve as a medium for
human interaction. These also encourage self-expression through words,
pictures, video, and a combination of these genres.

There can be personal networks created through these platforms

simply for conversations among friends. Like its counterpart in the real
world, this can be similar to a meeting over coffee where friends or
acquaintances exchange views about any and all matters of their interest.
In normal conversation, the context provided by the participants'
relationships assure levels of confidence that will allow them to exchange
remarks that may be caustic, ironic, sarcastic or even defamatory.

With social media, one's message in virtual conversations may be

reposted and may come in different forms. On Facebook, the post can be
"shared" while on Twitter, the message can be "retweeted." In these
instances, the author remains the same but the reposted message can be
put in a different context by the one sharing it which the author may not
have originally intended. The message that someone is a thief and an idiot
in friendly and private conversation when taken out of that context will
become defamatory This applies regardless of the standing of the subject
of conversation: The person called a thief and an idiot may be an
important public_figure or an ordinary person.

There are other problems created by such broad law in the Internet.
The network made by the original author may only be of real friends of
about IO people. The network where his or her post was shared might
consist of a thousand participants ....

100
Id at 198-199.
101
Disini, Jr. v. Secretary ofJustice, 727 Phil. 28, 122 (2014) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
Decision 19 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
A post, comment or status message regarding government or a
public figure has the tendency to be shared. It easily becomes "viral."
After all, there will be more interest among those who use the Internet with
messages that involve issues that are common to them or are about people
that are known to them-usually public officers and public figures. When
the decision in this case will be made known to the public, it is certain to
stimulate Internet users to initially post their gut reactions. It will also
entice others to write thought pieces that will also be shared among their
ji-iends andfollowers. 102 (Emphasis supplied)

As such, while social media is a powerful tool in advancing the

freedoms of expression, speech, and the press, it is a double-edged sword,
exponentially increasing the deleterious effects that abuse of the exercise of
these rights may have spawned. A statement, no matter how much thought
one has given it before uploading on social media, may be accessed by
anyone and could unleash a tidal wave of unforeseen consequences.

To quell the fears that unchecked statements will proliferate on social

media, proponents of freedom of speech suggest that truth will supposedly
stick better than falsity ever could. They suggest that instead of prior
restraint or censorship, the best test of truth is its adherence to a marketplace
of ideas:

[F]ree speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place

[sic] of ideas. This theory was articulated by Justice Holmes in that "the
ultimate good desired is better reached by [the] free trade in ideas:"

When men have realized that time has upset many

fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.

The way it works, the exposure to the ideas of others allows one to
"consider, test, and develop their own conclusions." A free, open, and
dynamic market place [sic] of ideas is constantly shaping new ones. This
promotes both stability and change where recurring points may crystallize
and weak ones may develop. Of course, free speech is more than the right
to approve existing political beliefs and economic arrangements as it
includes, "[t]o paraphrase Justice Holmes, [the] freedom for the thought
that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us." In fact, free
speech may "best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger." It is in this context that we should guard against any

102
J. Leonen, Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28, 379-
381 (2014) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
Decision 20 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
curtailment of the people's right to participate in the free trade ofideas. 103
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

However, this Court maintains that, as shown by current events, the

free marketplace of ideas has never been an equal playing field. Some ideas
have had a better chance at piercing and remaining in the public
consciousness because of factors such as source of information, speed of
news drowning out information, and the audience's own weakness in
distinguishing between truth and falsity.

Before the internet, sources of information were limited to traditional

media, such as print and broadcast, making it the "most powerful vehicle of
opinion on public questions." 104 Aware of the power it yielded and the
responsibility that went alongside its influence, it behooved the press to
adhere to the high ethical standards for the profession. 105 This assured
audiences that the contents of traditional media were carefully studied and
verified, reducing the risk of incorrect information.

In one fell swoop, the inte111et and rampant social media usage tore
down the traditional barriers that ensured the accuracy of published material.

By merely having access to social media, private individuals could

publish their thoughts without need of self-policing or adhering to the ethical
standards required of the press. As a result, content could be created and
shared with abandon, purely for clout or for "likes," and even in disregard of
the truth. Worse, its audience is so wide, certainly way above that of
traditional media, unconstrained by physical reach. This has inevitably led
to a glut in disseminated information, a large part of which is
disinformation-the "verifiably false or misleading information that is
created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally
deceive the public, and may cause public harm" on the intemet. 106

There are those who advance that "more speech" will trounce
censorship since those with contrary views will "vigorously and earnestly
contest it" to attain the truth. 107 However, this theory rests on the

103
The Diocese ofBacolodv. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301, 361-362 (2015) [Per J. Leanen, En
Banc].
104
Chavez v. Gonzales, 569 Phil. 155,201 (2008) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
105
Va/monte v. Belmonte, 252 Phil. 264,271 (1989) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
106
European Commission High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint
Communication to the European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, and the European
Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions: Action Plan Against
Disinformation, available at
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/action _plan_against_disinformation. pdf (last accessed
on October!, 2023). (Citation omitted)
107
Eric T. Kasper & Troy A. Kozma, Absolute Freedom of Opinion and Sentiment on All Subjects: John
Stuart Mill's Enduring (and Ever-Growing) influence on the Supreme Court's First Amendment Free
Speech Jurisprudence, 15 U. MASS. L. REV. 2 (2020).
Decision 21 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

assumptions that the audience is able to analyze its truthfulness and that the
publication will be easily accessible to those with contrary views.

Unfortunately, while great strides were made in increasing the

public's ability to publish content, the audience's ability to discern the
content's veracity made no such progress. People remain susceptible to
cognitive biases, i.e., confirmation and repetition biases, information
overload, and attention scarcity. 108 Readers are predisposed to
unquestioningly believe new information that confirms existing prejudices
and assumptions 109 and the statements made by people they deem credible.
Conversely, statements inconsistent with their beliefs or made by those who
have previously uttered views contrary to theirs are disregarded. 110

As a result, people wade through a constant stream of information,

with a great number absorbing without question what they come across
when it is aligned with prior views. Dubious and unverified statements are
placed on the saine footing-if not more-as credible and substantiated
information.

The materialization of "echo chambers" within social media, where

people would only encounter others of similar opinion, contributes a great
deal to the reduced exchange of ideas. These "echo chainbers" create an
environment free from contradiction, limiting the possibility that ideas
would be tested against others. In the end, it reinforces one's belief that
their sentiments are accurate and shared by the majority. 111

Thus, instead of the truth prevailing, the democratization of the

marketplace of ideas has led to "cheap speech," 112 which has in turn led to
abuses of the freedoms of speech, expression, and the press.

Due to the difficulty in determining which statements are true and

which are false, this Court in Chavez deemed it best to treat statements made
on social media similarly to those made in other platforms:

The emergence of digital technology - which has led to the

convergence of broadcasting, telecommunications and the computer
industry - has likewise led to the question of whether the regulatory
model for broadcasting will continue to be appropriate in the converged
environment. Internet, for example, remains largely umegulated, yet the
Internet and the broadcast media share similarities, and the rationales used
to support broadcast regulation apply equally to the Internet. 113 (Citations
omitted)

1
°' Lili Levi, Real "Fake News" and Fake "Fake News", 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232, 311-313 (2018).
109
Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 845,851 (2018).
110
Lili Levi, Real "Fake News" and Fake "Fake News", 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232, 312 (2018).
111
CASS R. SUNSTElN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 132 (2017).
2
" Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What ft Will Do, I 04 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995).
113
Chavez v. Gonzales, 569 Phil. 155, 217-218 (2008) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
Decision 22 AM. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

As we have repeatedly seen, the dawn of the digital age and social
media have far-reaching effects that greatly impact the Judiciary.

III

The Judiciary is the institution responsible for settling actual

controversies that are legally demandable and enforceable, and determining
whether any branch or instrumentality of the government commits grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 114

To properly execute this duty, the Judiciary must be able to decide its
cases independently and without outside influence or pressure. An
independent Judiciary ensures the protection of democracy, peace, and order
in a society. 115 It is the "vital mechanism that empowers judges to make
decisions that may be unpopular but nonetheless correct." 116

Judicial independence, as a key part m upholding a constitutional

democracy, has two aspects:

Judicial independence has both individual and institutional aspects.

As for the independence of individual judges, there are at least two
avenues for securing that independence: First, judges must be protected
from the threat of reprisals, so that fear does not direct their decision
making. Second, the method by which judges are selected, and the ethical
principles imposed upon them, must be constructed so as to minimize the
risk of corruption and outside influence. The first endeavor is to protect
judicial independence from outside threat. The second is to ensure that
judicial authority is not abused, and it is the core concern of the enterprise
of judicial accountability. 117

Maintaining the courts' dignity and their ability to command respect

from the public works hand-in-hand with its administration of justice. 118
Thus, while the freedoms of expression, speech, and the press include the
right to criticize judicial conduct, 119 such exercise must not threaten judicial
independence. As expounded in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan: 120

114
CONST., art. VIII, sec. I.
115
In re Published Alleged Threats aga;nst Members of the Court in the Plunder Case Hurled by Atty.
Leonard De Vera, 434 Phil. 503, 507 (2002) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
116
J. Leanen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic v. Sereno, 831 Phil. 271, 954-955 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, En
Banc].
117
J. Leanen, Dissenting Opinion in Re: Republic v. Sereno, 831 Phil. 271,956 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, En
Banc], citing Sandra Day O'Connor, Judicial Accountability Must Safeguard, Not Threaten, Judicial
Independence: An Introduction, 86 DENY. U. L. REV. I (2008).
118
In re De Vera, 434 Phil. 503, 507-508 (2002) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
119
United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 741 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, First Division].
no 248 Phil. 542 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
 Decision 23 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
[F]reedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is
not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important
public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration
of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity
of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance
of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in
other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice
which are accepted by the general community. 121

In In re De Vera, 122 the respondent put up the defense that he was

merely exercising his freedom of speech to justify his statements. However,
this Court categorically stated that unwarranted attacks on the courts' dignity
are not constitutionally protected speech:

Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss

judicial proceedings, but such right does not cover statements aimed at
undermining the Court's integrity and authority, and interfering with the
administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must
occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important
public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice.

Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the

Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as
free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and
confidence therein. It is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts should be immune from every extraneous influence
as they resolve the issues presented before them. The court has previously
held that-

. . . As important as the maintenance of an

unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of the
citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the
judiciary .... This Court must be permitted to proceed with
the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free
from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional
functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an
impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual
exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its
existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. 123 (Citations
omitted)

One's right to freedom of expression must be as fully protected as /

possible; however, its exercise must never transgress the equally important
aspects of democracy, not least of all the Judiciary's dignity and authority.

121
Id at 579.
122
434 Phil. 503 (2002) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
123
Id. at 508-509.
Decision 24 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

III (A)

To ensure judicial independence, courts possess the inherent power to

punish for contempt. This power is considered "a permissible subsequent
punishment for those who abuse their constitutional freedoms of speech, of
expression, and of the press." 124 It is a "a content-based restriction because
125
the 'communicative impact of the speech' is the subject of the regulation."
Nonetheless, it is essential to preserve order in judicial proceedings, and for
courts to enforce their judgments, orders, and mandates and ensure the due
administration of justice. 126 This prevents "the proliferation of untruths
which, if unrefuted, would gain an undue influence in the public
discourse." 127 In Regalado v. Go: 128

Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice[,] or

dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation. It is defined as
disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice,
and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
court's orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court
and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede
the due administration ofjustice.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is

essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of justice.

Thus, contempt proceedings has a dual function: (1) vindication of

public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct; and (2) coercion
to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires him to uphold the
power of the Court, and also to secure the rights of the parties to a suit
awarded by the Court. 129 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Contempt proceedings should be "impersonal, because that power is

intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions
that they exercise." 130 As such, the power to punish for contempt must be
"exercised judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end
in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of

124
ABS-CBNv. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
125
Id, citing C.J. Puno, Dissenting Opinion in Soriano v. Laguardia, 605 Phil. 43, 162 (2009) [Per J.
Velasco, Jr., En BancEn Banc].
126
in re Macasaet, 583 Phil. 391, 444-445 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc], citing Perkins v. Director of
Prisons, 58 Phil. 271, 274 (! 993) [Per J. Abad Santos, En Banc].
127
Guingguing v. Court ofAppeals, 508 Phil. 193,222 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
118
543 Phil. 578 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
129
Id. at 590-591.
130
Garcia, Jr. v. Manrique, 697 Phil. 157, 164 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, First Division]. (Citation omitted)
Decision 25 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

the court, not for retaliation or vindication. It should not be availed of unless
necessary in the interest ofjustice." 131

There are two forms of contempt court: direct and indirect. 132

Direct contempt is committed when one engages in "misbehavior in

the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings
before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness,
or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do
so[.]"133

Indirect contempt, on the other hand, involves actions that are

committed not within the presence of the court, 134 but are nonetheless
"directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially[.]" 135 The following acts, as enumerated in Rule 71, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court, constitute indirect contempt:

SECTION 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and

hearing. - After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt;

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his

official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or

judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after
being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the
judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction,
enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such
real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to
the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or

proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under
section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting J?

as such without authority; _,,,..r

131
Pa/adv. Patajo-Kapunan. 864 Phil. 804, 811 (2019) [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, Second Division]. (Citation
omitted)
132
RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, secs. I, 3.
133
RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, sec. I.
134
Barredo-Fuentes v. Albarracin, 496 Phil. 31, 41 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
135
Marantan v. Diokno, 726 Phil. 642,648 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
Decision 26 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the

custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court
held by him.

Indirect contempt, especially "improper conduct tending, directly or

136
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[,]"
is considered an "offense against organized society and . . . an offense
against public justice which raises an issue between the public and the
accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive." 137

The Court synthesized the key differences between direct and indirect
proceedings in Godoy:

A. As to the Nature of the Offense.

A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity

and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in
failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for
the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense
against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.

A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and

authority of the court, is an offense against organized society and, in
addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an
issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it
are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil
contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right
of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony
nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.

It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in

criminal contempt, and that no one can be punished for a criminal
contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.
On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil
contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant's intent in committing the
contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to
violate the court's order is not a defense in civil contempt.

B. As to the Purpose for which the Power is Exercised

A major factor in determining whether a contempt is civil or

criminal is the purpose for which the power is exercised. Where the
primary purpose is to preserve the court's authority and to punish for
disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the primary
purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured snitor and to coerce
compliance with an order, the contempt is civil. A criminal contempt

136 RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, sec. 3.

137
Pa/adv. Solis, 796 Phil. 216,227 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
Decision 27 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
involves no element of personal injury. It is directed against the power and
dignity of the court; private parties have little, if any, interest in the
proceedings for pnnishment. Conversely, if the contempt consists in the
refusal of a person to do an act that the court has ordered him to do for the
benefit or advantage of a party to an action pending before the court, and
the contemnor is committed until he complies with the order, the
commitment is in the nature of an execution to enforce the judgment of the
court; the party in whose favor that judgment was rendered is the real
party in interest in the proceedings. Civil contempt proceedings look only
to the future. And it is said that in civil contempt proceedings, the
contemnor must be in a position to purge himself.

C. As to the Character of the Contempt Proceeding

It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be

determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily
punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or
remedial.

Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the

· nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are pnnitive in nature,
and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their
prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the
authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its
orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or
prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime.
The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some
of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really
constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be
conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to
criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary
nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules
that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal
contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections
provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes
governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal
proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the
substantial rights of the accused are preserved.

Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and

civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of
some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing
required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one
instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action
and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such
a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of its
form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit,
of a special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed
order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in
an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure governing criminal
contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are
inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings. It has been held that a
f
proceeding for contempt to enforce a remedy in a civil action is a
proceeding in that action. Accordingly, where there has been a violation
of a court order in a civil action, it is not necessary to docket an
independent action in contempt or proceed in an independent prosecution
Decision 28 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

to enforce the order. It has been held, however, that while the proceeding
is auxiliary to the main case in that it proceeds out of the original case, it is
essentially a new and independent proceeding in that it involves new
issues and must be initiated by the issuance and service of new process.

In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an

aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest
in the right to be protected. In criminal ·contempt proceedings, it is
generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.

Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt,

the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to
prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil
contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on the
complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it
must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been
said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt proceeding lies
somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil
"fair preponderance" burden. 138 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

ABS-CB1V v. Ampatuan 139 expounds that in the exercise of the court's

contempt power, the following elements of speech must be considered: "the
content of the speech, intent on bringing ridicule to the courts and delay the
due administration of justice, and the effect of the speech to destroy the
courts' usefulness and public confidence in its administration ofjustice." 140

Another tool to ensure that the Judiciary can execute its duties
unhampered by prejudgment and extraneous influence is the sub Judice
rule, 141 which also relates to the court's contempt power. 142 Sub Judice is
defined in Canon II, Section 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Accountability:

SECTION 19. Sub-Judice Rule. - A lawyer shall not use any

forum or medium to comment or publicize opinion pertaining to a pending
proceeding before any court, tribunal, or other government agency that
may:

(a) cause a pre-judgment, or

(b) sway public perception so as to impede, obstruct, or influence
the decision of such court, tribunal, or other government
agency, or which tends to tarnish the court's or tribunal's
integrity, or
(c) impute improper motives against any of its members, or
(d) create a widespread perception of guilt or innocence before a
final decision.

ns P eop Iev. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977, 999-1002 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
139
G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
140
Id. (Citation omitted)
141
Romero If v. &trada, 602 Phil. 312, 319 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc]. citing Nestle
Philippines v. Sanchez, 238 Phil. 543 (1987) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
142
Republic v. Sereno, 83 I Phil. 271, 954-955 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, En Banc].
Decision 29 AM. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

The sub judice rule prohibits parties and the public 143 from making
"comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to
avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice." 144 While court proceedings are matters within the
realm of public discussion, 145 statements intended to pressure judges to
decide a pending case in a particular way are excluded from the guarantee of
free speech. 146 As such, a violation of the sub judice rule is considered
"improper conduct" and is punishable under indirect contempt. 147

In his opinion in Lejano v. People, 148 Justice Arturo D. Brion

discussed the importance of the sub Judice rule:

In so far as criminal proceedings are concerned, two classes of

publicized speech made during the pendency of the proceedings can be
considered as contemptuous: first, comments on the merits of the case, and
second, intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the
courts with respect to the case. Publicized speech should be understood to
be limited to those aired or printed in the various forms of media such as
television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and internet, and excludes
discussions, in public or in private, between and among ordinary citizens.
The Constitution simply gives the citizens the right to speech, not the right
to unrestricted publicized speech.

Comments on the merits of the case may refer to the credibility of

witnesses, the character of the accused, the soundness of the alibis offered,
the relevance of the evidence presented, and generally any other comment
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused. The danger posed by this
class of speech is the undue influence it may directly exert on the court in
the resolution of the criminal case, or indirectly through the public opinion
it may generate against the accused and the adverse impact this public
opinion may have during the trial. The significance of the sub Judice rule
is highlighted in criminal cases, as the possibility of undue influence
prejudices the accused's right to a fair trial. "The principal purpose of the
sub Judice rule is to preserve the impartiality of the judicial system by
protecting it from undue influence." Public opinion has no place in a
criminal trial. 149 (Citations omitted)

In cases where individuals are charged with contempt of court for

making utterances or publishing writings against the Judiciary, this Court
weighs one's freedom of speech against judicial independence. To
constitute constitutionally protected speech, the statements must be bona fide
and made with decency and propriety:

143
Causing v. Dela Rosa, 827 Phil. 261, 265(2018) [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
144
Marantan v. Diokno, 726 Phil. 642,648 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
145
Roque v. Armed Forces of the Philippines, 805 Phil. 921 (2017) [Per J. Leanen, Second Division].
146
In re De Vera, 434 Phil. 503 (2002) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
147
RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, sec. 3(d).
148
652 Phil. 512 (2010) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
149
J. Brion, Supplemental Opinion in Lejano v. People, 652 Phil. 512, 654----655 (20 I 0) [Per J. Abad, En
Banc].
Decision 30 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
But as we have emphasized time and time again, "[i]t is the
cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other." Obstructing, by means of opprobrious
words, spoken or written, the administration of justice by the courts will
subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court. And regardless of
whether or not the case of reference has been terminated is of little
moment. One may be cited for contempt of court even after the case has
ended where such punitive action is necessary to protect the court and to
vindicate it from acts or conduct calculated to degrade, ridicule, or bring it
into disfavor and thereby erode public confidence in that court. ·

A becoming respect for the courts should always be the norm.

Litigants, no matter how aggrieved or dissatisfied they may be of court's
decision, do not have the unbridled freedom in expressing their frustration
or grievance in any manner they want. Crossing the permissible line of
fair comment and legitimate criticism of the bench and its actuations shall
constitute contempt which may be visited with sanctions from the Court as
a measure of protecting and preserving its dignity and honor. 150 (Citations
omitted)

In In re Macasaet, 151 this Court explained the rationale for punishing

speech that oversteps the threshold of legitimate criticism and enters the
territory of illegitimate attacks against the Judiciary:

But there is an important line between legitimate cntic1sm and

illegitimate attack upon the courts or their judges. Attacks upon the court
or a judge not only risk the inhibition of all judges as they conscientiously
endeavor to discharge their constitutional responsibilities; they also
undermine the people's confidence in the courts.

Personal attacks, criticisms laden with political threats, those that

misrepresent and distort the nature and context of judicial decisions, those
that are misleading or without factual or legal basis, and those that blame
the judges for the ills of society, damage the integrity of the judiciary and
threaten the doctrine of judicial independence. These attacks do a grave
disservice to the principle of an independent judiciary and mislead the
public as to the role of judges in a constitutional democracy, shaking the
very foundation of our democratic government. 152

The courts are not powerless against cntic1sms and attacks that
directly threaten judges in the performance of their judicial functions. As
held in ABS-CBN:

However, attacks against a judge's personal security and safety

relating to the exercise of their judicial functions are also directed against

150
Bildner v. I/usorio, 606 Phil. 369, 384--387 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Second Division].
151
583 Phil. 391 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, R.T., En Banc].
152
Id at 436.
Decision 31 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
the "court as an organ of the administration of justice." Contempt in these
cases extends to this Court, as the protector of the Judiciary, who may
punish the personal attack in lieu of the judge. This Court's power to
protect judges and officers of the Court is rooted in our constitutional
supervision of members of the judicial system. This includes the duty to
uphold not only the dignity and authority of this Court as an institution but
also the duty to protect the personal safety and security of our judges,
lawyers, and other personnel of this Court.

When defamatory allegations are uttered against the courts,

justices and judges cannot defend themselves like other public officers.
They have no political machinery to speak for and defend them, and the
courts can only rely on their officers, who may likewise not be capable of
responding in real time. Moreover, the filing of defamation cases is not
available to them:

Under the American doctrine, to repeat, the great

weight of authority is that in so far as proceedings to punish
for contempt are concerned, critical comment upon the
behavior of the court in cases fully determined by it is
unrestricted, under the constitutional guaranties of the
liberty of the press and freedom of speech. Thus,
comments, however stringent, which have relation to
judicial proceedings which are past and ended, are not
contemptuous of the authority of the court to which
reference is made. Such comments may constitute a libel
against the judge, but it cannot be treated as in contempt of
the court's authority.

On this score, it is said that prosecution for libel is

usually the most appropriate and effective remedy. The
force of American public opinion has greatly restrained the
courts in the exercise of the power to punish one as in
contempt for making disrespectful or injurious remarks,
and it has been said that the remedy of a judge is the same
as that given to a private citizen. In such a case, therefore,
the remedy of a criminal action for libel is available to a
judge who has been derogated in a newspaper publication
made after the termination of a case tried by him, since
such publication can no longer be made subject of
contempt proceedings.

The rule, however, is different in instances under

the Philippine doctrine earlier discussed wherein there may
still be a contempt of court even after a case has been
decided and terminated. In such case, the offender may be
cited for contempt for uttering libelous remarks against the
court or the judge. The availability, however, of the power
to punish for contempt does not and will not prevent a
prosecution for libel, either before, during, or after the
institution of contempt proceedings. In other words, the
fact that certain contemptuous conduct likewise constitutes
I
an indictable libel against the judge of the court contemned
does not necessarily require him to bring a libel action,
rather than relying on contempt proceedings.
Decision 32 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

The fact that an act constituting a contempt is also

criminal and punishable by indictment or other method of
criminal prosecution does not prevent the outraged court
from punishing the contempt. This principle stems from
the fundamental doctrine that an act may be punished as .a
contempt even though it has been punished as a criminal
offense. The defense of having once been in jeopardy,
based on a conviction for the criminal offense, would not
lie in bar of the contempt proceedings, on the proposition
that a contempt may be an offense, against the dignity of a
court and, at the same time, an offense against the peace
and dignity of the people of the State. But more
importantly, adherence to the American doctrine by
insisting that a judge should instead file an action for libel
will definitely give rise to an absurd situation and may even
cause more harm than good.

Drawing also from American jurisprudence, to

compel the judge to descend ji-om the plane of his judicial
office to the level of the contemnor, pass over the matter of
contempt, and instead attack him by a civil action to satisfy
the judge in damages for a libel, would be a still greater
humiliation of a court. That conduct would be personal;
the court is impersonal. In our jurisdiction, the judicial
status is fixed to such a point that our courts and the judges
thereof should be protected from the improper
consequences of their discharge of duties so much so that
judicial officers have always been shielded, on the highest
considerations of the public good, from being called for
questioning in civil actions for things done in their judicial
capacity.

Whenever we subject the established courts of the

land to the degradation of private prosecution, we subdue
their independence, and destroy their authority. Instead of
being venerable before the public, they become
contemptible; and we thereby embolden the licentious to
trample upon everything sacred in society, and to overturn
those institutions which have hitherto been deemed the best
guardians of civil liberty.

Hence, the suggestion that judges who are unjustly

attacked have a remedy in an action for libel, has been
assailed as being without rational basis in principle. In the
first place, the outrage is not directed to the judge as a
private individual but to the judge as such or to the court as
an organ of the administration of justice. In the second
place, public interests will gravely suffer where the judge,
as such, will, _from time to time, be pulled down and
disrobed of his judicial authority to face his assailant on
equal grounds and prosecute cases in his behalf as a
private individual. The same reasons of public policy
which exempt a judge from civil liability in the exercise of
I
his judicial functions, most fundamental of which is the
policy to confine his time exclusively to the discharge of
Decision 33 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
his public duties, applies here with equal, if not superior,
force.

Justices and judges are restrained from engaging m any other

forum except in the content of their decisions. While they cannot be
sensitive against legitimate criticisms of their public personalities, courts
are weak to correct when false information about them is circulated.
Hence, the inherent contempt powers of the court should be available to
address the damaging effects of contemptuous speech. 153 (Citations
omitted)

III (B)

In reconciling the conflict between the freedom of speech and the

need to protect judicial independence, this Court generally uses the "clear
and present danger" test to determine if a statement constitutes contempt for
impeding the independence and integrity of the Judiciary.

Under the clear and present danger test, the freedom of speech
prevails if the consequence of the expression is not "extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high" for it to be punished. 154 But if it is
so, then the speech can be subsequently punished:

The [clear and present danger test], as interpreted in a number of cases,

means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be
"extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the
"disorderly and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a
definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what
words may be published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot
constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that
such advocacy will harm the administration of justice.

This rule had its origin in Schenck vs. U S., promulgated in 1919,
and ever since it has afforded a practical guidance in a great variety of
cases in which the scope of the constitutional protection of freedom of
expression was put in issue. In one of said cases, the United States
Supreme Court has made the significant suggestion that this rule "is an
appropriate guide in determining the constitutionality of restriction upon
expression where the substantial evil sought to be prevented by the
restriction is destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of
privacy." 155 (Citations omitted)

To fall under the clear and present danger test, "the publication must
have an inherent tendency to influence, intimidate, impede, embarrass, or
obstruct the court's administration of justice. It is ... a public wrong, a /

153
ABS-CBNv. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
154
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152, 161 (1957) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, First Division].
155 Id.
Decision 34 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

crime against the State, to undertake by libel or slander to impair confidence

in the judicial functions." 156 In Marantan v. Diokno: 157

The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow

them to conduct their business unhampered by publications and comments
which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise
obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of
freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the
Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in
determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights.

The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil
consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. There
must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the
administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired
through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no
doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to
the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a
likely, threat. 158 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

When the clear and present danger test is applied, good faith or the
absence of intent to harm the courts is considered a valid defense. 159
Nonetheless, "[a] person's intent, however good it maybe, cannot prevail
over the plain import of his speech or writing. It is gathered from what is
apparent, not on supposed or veiled objectives." 160

As such, a contempt petition must contain the following allegations

for the court to determine whether there is sufficient basis to punish the
respondent for contempt:

First, public statements were made regarding the merits of the case
while it is pending before the courts. The petition must clearly state the
contemptible conduct and reproduce the content of the speech ought to be
punished.

Second, since intent is necessary in criminal contempt, the required

mental element of the speaker who uttered the contemptuous speech in a
judicial proceeding must be specifically alleged. It must appear from the
story that the "ultimate purpose" of its publication is to impede, obstruct
or degrade the administration of justice. This is inferred from the totality
of the story, the context of its publication, the wording used, the manner of
reporting, and other relevant factors which may be derived from the story.

Third, the clear and present danger of the utterance to the court's
administration of justice must be alleged, specifically identifying the
importance and saliency of the information on the ability of courts to make

156
People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977, 1022 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc]. (Citations omitted)
157
726 Phil. 642 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
158
Id. at 649.
159
In re Canlas, 865 Phil. 279(2019) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
160
Garcia, Jr. v. Manrique, 697 Phil. 157. 167 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].
 Decision 35 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
an impartial decision. There must be a showing of the serious and
imminent threat of an utterance on the court's administration of justice for
it to be subject to subsequent punishment.

Finally, the effect of the speech on the administration of justice

must be shown, particularly, that the utterance will influence the court's
independence in ruling on a case, which will, in turn, affect the public
confidence in the Judiciary. 161 (Citations omitted)

On the other hand, the "dangerous tendency" test provides that if the
utterance tends to bring about a substantive evil, it cannot be deemed
covered under the mantle of freedom of expression:

The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been

adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted in determining
where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to protect
their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases
and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of
the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while
guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to
restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts
against contempt.

This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create

a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such
words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate
acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that
such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the
language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body seeks to prevent. 162 (Citations omitted)

The "balancing of interests" test is also applied "when courts need to

balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable
in a given situation of type of situation[.]" 163

Finally, when the speech may incite lawless action, the Brandenburg
test, as recently used in Calleja v. Executive Secretary, 164 is used. This test
determines whether a speech or expression is constitutionally protected or if
it "has a reasonable probability or likelihood of producing such lawless
action." 165 A speech that falls under the latter must be: "(l) directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action; and (2) is likely to incite or /

161
ABS-CBN v. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
162
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152, 163 ( I 957) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, First Division].
163
Chavez v. Gonzales, 569 Phil. 155, 200 (2008) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]. (Citation omitted)
164
G.R. Nos. 252578 et al., December 7, 2021 [Per J. Carandang, En Banc].
165
J. Caguioa, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578 et
al., December 7. 202 l [Per J. Carandang, En Banc].
Decision 36 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

produce such action." 166

Contemptuous speech is generally subject to punishment. However, if

it is duly proven that the complaint was: (a) "made in good faith and without
malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when
addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the
matter"; 167 (b) "a fair and true reporting of a proceeding or any of its
169
incidents"; 168 or (c) "fair commentaries on matters of public interest[,]"
then such utterance will fall under the recognized qualified privileges
protected under free speech. Nonetheless, to be considered fair, the
comment or criticism must be "grounded in truth and facts[.]" 170

Notably, one who asserts the existence of any of these qualified

privileges impiiedly admits engaging in improper conduct but justifies it
through these grounds. Once the respondent proves the existence of a
qualified privilege, the other party must establish that the contemptuous
speech was made with actual malice, a "form of knowledge of the falsity or
a reckless disregard for the falsity of the statements[.]" 171

IV

Courts are not immune to cnt1c1sm. The public has the right to
criticize court issuances, proceedings, and the public persona of members of
the Judiciary. 172 However, there is a well-defined line between legitimate
criticism and utterances that are intended to attack the integrity of the courts
or are aimed at influencing court decisions.

The Court has historically regulated three classes of speech, with the
restrictions based on the possibility of substantive evil to the administration
of justice because of the content, voluntariness, motive, and effect of the
speech. 173 The three classes of speech are: (1) speech between litigants and
their counsels; (2) speech of members of the Bar and Bench in general; and
(3) speech of the press and the public. 174 In ABS-CBN, this Court added
speech in social media as the fourth class of regulated speech.

Speech from these different actors in judicial proceedings are treated

differently. In particular, the "personality of the speaker and their

166
J. Leanen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578 et /
al., December 7, 2021 [Per J. Carandang, En Banc].
167
ABS-CBN v. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leanen, En Banc]. (Citation omitted)
168- Id.
169 Id.
110 Id.
171
Id. (Citation omitted)
172
United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (19 l 8) [Per J. Malcolm, First Division].
173
ABS-CBNv. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
114 Id.
Decision 37 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
corresponding duty to the courts are relevant m determining whether a
speech may be subsequently punished." 175

The first class, speech between litigants and their counsels, who are in
the closest proximity to the courts, is the most restricted because these actors
undertook to abide by the Rules of Court and the decorum expected m
judicial proceedings.

In Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, 176 this Court dismissed the

contempt charges against officers and members of a union that picketed in
front of the Supreme Court compound in Padre Faura, Manila to draw
attention to their pending case. However, this Court sternly warned them
and their lawyers of the decorum expected of them as litigants and counsels:

We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this

time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous
acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases
as well as in the earlier case of ABS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES
UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.,
G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in
any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently
resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court
will not hesitate in fature similar situations to apply the full force of the
law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into
acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if
any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through
appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the
respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to
"proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass
the administration of justice."

The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the

citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and
inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards
of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional
conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the
decision of issues offact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court;
and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies."

Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes

tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication
or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the
enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the
courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or
interference." The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only
an affront to the dignity of this Court, but equally a violation of the above-
stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

11s Id.
176
238 Phil. 543 (1987) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
Decision 38 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers

are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws.
They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly
are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence
courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse
thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did
they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice
constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising
them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their
counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by
this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of
their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all
members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court
to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude
toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a
continuing educational program for their members. 177 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

The second class of speech refers to the public commentaries of

lawyers on court decisions or judicial proceedings, and the permissible
restriction of speech of members of the Bench and Bar as part of this Court's
plenary disciplinary authority. 178

As court officers, lawyers must meet the exacting standards they

swore to uphold in their oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Accountability. They are expected "to share in the task and
responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society"; 179
thus, lawyers who impede the administration of justice by going beyond fair
comment and legitimate criticism are disciplined.

In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 180 this Court

reminded litigants' counsels that passionately advocating for their clients
does not justifjr the use of intemperate language or attempts to degrade the
administration of justice:

It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement

that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does
not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license.
Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that"[ s]ince lawyers
are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first
duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of
justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and their
conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant oflaw and ethics." 181
(Citation omitted)

177
Id. at 547-549.
17
' ABS-CBN v. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
119 Id.
180
142 Phil. I (1970) [Per J. Sanchez, Second Division].
181 Id.
 Decision 39 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
Members of the Bench, the magistrates of the court, are held to an
even higher ethical standard than what is expected of lawyers, as they are
expected to embody competence, integrity, and independence 182 in both their
professional dealings and in their personal lives. 183

The third class of speech pertains to the permissible restnct1on on

speech of the media and the public. ABS-CBN cautions against using the
courts' contempt power against the media as it might deter freedom of the
press and its obligation to publicize matters of public interest. We stressed
that this power "should never be wielded to stifle comments on public
interest." 184 Nonetheless, to be recognized as a qualified privilege, the
comments and criticisms by the media and the public must be based on facts
and not tainted with bad faith.

In People v. Castelo, 185 after scrutinizing the content and purpose of

the publication complained of, this Court dismissed an indirect contempt
charge against a journalist who reported on a pending murder case before the
trial court. This Court found that the "mere factual appraisal of the
investigation" 186 with no concomitant criticism or comment against the
judge, cannot be said to have been intended to impede or obstruct the
administration of justice. Further, this Court stressed that the assailed
publication was duly protected by the freedom of the press:

As this Court has aptly said, for a publication to be considered as contempt

of court there must be a showing not only that the article was written while
a case is pending but that it must really appear that such publication does
impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. Here,
there is no such clear showing. The very decision of the court shows the
contrary.

But, even if it may have that effect, we however believe that the
publication in question comes well within the framework of the
constitutional guaranty of the freedom of the press. At least it may be said
that it is a fair and true report of an official investigation that comes well
within the principle of a privileged communication, so that even if the
same is d~(amatory or contemptuous, the publisher need not be prosecuted
upon the theory that he has done it to serve public interest or promote
public good. Thus, under our law, it is postulated that "a fair and true
report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in such
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions", is deemed privileged and not punishable. 187
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

182
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon l, Rule 1.0 I.
183
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 2.
184
ABS-CBN v. Ampatuan, C.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
185
l 14 Phil. 892 (l 962) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
186
Id. at 899.
187
Id. at 900.
Decision 40 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

Finally, this Court added speech made through social media as the
fourth class of regulated speech, recognizing the effect of fake news spread
through social media on the public's confidence in the Judiciary and in its
administration of justice. In ABS-CBN:

Internet publicity and the danger it presents in the administration of

justice cannot be discounted. A social media post can be shared infinitely
and become viral in a matter of minutes. Organized networks of
disinformation thrive in anonymity and the lack of effective regulatory
mechanism in social media. The proliferation of fake news is a very
significant threat on the courts' legitimacy, which is anchored on the
public's confidence in our administration of justice. The internet may be
weaponized by those who desire to defeat public confidence against a
particular target, which may include the Judiciary.

We must recognize the dangers of unregulated speech against the

Judiciary on the internet and in various social media where truth suffers
from decay, where facts and objective analysis are inundated by false
information. This is a huge threat to democracy as it hampers the ability of
citizens to make informed decisions based on facts. 188 (Citations omitted)

In Camacho IV v. Francisco, 189 this Court expressed its concern at

how fake news can easily spread through social media "without regard for
°
the truth and the damage it might cause[.]" 19 Fake news in itself has
dangerous consequences. However, when the Judiciary as an institution and
the individuals who don judicial robes become the subject of these attacks, it
could stir public distrust in one of the main pillars of democracy.

Judges who are the subject of fake news in their judicial capacity are
prevented by propriety from defending themselves through social media or
explaining themselves through a representative. They may only defend
themselves in the proper forum~in contempt proceedings. This limitation
has unintended consequences, such that in the interim, the news or
information maligning them might have already spread like wildfire,
scorching everything in its path and creating doubt and disquiet in the public
consciousness. Even if the judge is later vindicated, this will not fix their
already tarnished reputation and will do little to reverse the damage wreaked
on the public confidence in the Judiciary.

These circumstances demand swift and corrective action, so that we

may curtail any further destruction of the Judiciary.

ABS-CBN points out that absolute restriction of criticisms against the

Judiciary in cyberspace is not the way to "stop the cancerous spread of /
disinformation online." 191 Instead, certain online speakers should be held to
188
Id. (Citations omitted)
189
A.C. No. 12765, October 6, 2021 [Notice, First Division].
190 id.
191
ABS-CBN v. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
Decision 41 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

the same standard expected of journalists and should be treated and

penalized similarly to writers in traditional media who were found to have
recklessly published falsities. 192

The focus is aptly put on online personalities who have a wide range
of followers, as compared to others whose online presence reach only those
they personally know. Their massive following signifies their influence on
social media and speaks of the weight and value of their every statement as
imprinted in the audience's consciousness.

To maintain their popularity, these online personalities tend to publish

a steady stream of shocking or attention-grabbing content to take advantage
of their audience's negativity bias, that is, the natural human tendency to
latch on to something bad rather than good. 193 In a bid to ensure that their
posts would become viral, they would make statements that produce
heightened negative emotions, chasing after the dopamine rush brought
about by the substantial increase in their followers and likes. The result is a
proliferation of posts made to further their personal gain and popularity,
without regard for the public good. 194 Celebrities, media sources, and
individuals chasing after followers will more likely spread fake news. 195
They deliberately sensationalize a topic to shock and rouse the public,
ensuring that the content go viral and lead to widespread damage.

ABS-CBN discussed this phenomenon as further justification to

require that an online influencer's speech be held to a higher standard than a
typical social media user:

The more viral online content is, as assessed from the volume of
people who saw the original post or by way of shared posts within the
same platform or cross-posting other social media, the greater its effect
and propensity to affect the public. The language employed may also be
deliberately used to infuriate the public to generate more public
engagement. Thus, an influencer's speech is held to a greater standard
than an average social media user. 196

Worse, the effects of statements made by these online personalities

are not limited to the cyberworld. They can spur concrete action in the real
world-even to the point of actual violence:

192 Id.
193
Tom Stafford, Psychology: Why bad nevvs dominates the headlines, BBC.COM, available at
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20140728-why-is-all-the-news-bad (last accessed on July 29,
2023).
194
Daniela C. Manzi, Managing the MisinjOrmation Marketplace: The First Amendment and the Fight
against Fake News, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2623, 2647 (2019).
195
Lili Levi, Real "Fake News" and Fake "Fake News", 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.232,314 (2018).
196
ABS-CBN v. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
Decision 42 AM. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
The unmediated character of social media speech also increases its
potential for sparking violence. Social media increase the number of
individuals who can engage in unmediated communication, which
inherently increases the probability of incendiary speech. Moreover, the
sheer size of prospective audiences also increases the potential for violent
audience reactions. Audience size matters: the bigger the audience, the
greater the chance at least one audience member will respond with
violence to speech that is offensive or advocates violence. 197 (Citation
omitted)

Recent years have proved the capacity of social media posts to wreak
havoc on the real world.

In 2014, Ashin Wirathu, a popular Buddhist monk, shared on his

Facebook page a post alleging that a Buddhist woman was raped by her
Muslim coworkers. Less than 24 hours later, angry and armed Buddhist
mobs descended on Muslims, targeting them and their belongings. The
ensuing violence culminated in the death of one Buddhist and one Muslim,
dozens of others injured, shops burned, and a mosque burned. An
investigation later showed that the shared post had been fabricated. 198

In 2016, a single tweet accusing Hillary Clinton, a presidential

candidate in the 2016 elections in the United States of America, of being
involved in a pedophilia ring prompted two armed citizens to storm a pizza
parlor to rescue the children allegedly trapped in the basement. During the
commotion, they fired multiple shots. Their search revealed that the claims
had been unjustified, and they were arrested. 199

Even the January 6, 2021 capitol riot was allegedly a response to then
United States of America president Donald Trump's tweet, urging his
supporters to join the riot protesting his loss in the 2020 elections. 200

In today's digital age where credibility seems to be measured by

online popularity instead of experience and hard-won credentials, online
personalities or influencers must be put to task for the effects of their speech,
since unregulated speech online and the unabated spread of fake news pose
very real consequences, even in the real world.

197
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 147, 149 (201 I 1-
2012).
198
Amina Waheed, Rape used as a weapon in Myanmar to ignite fear, October 28, 2015,
https://www .aljazeera.com/features/2015/ l 0/2 8/rape-used-as-a-weapon-in-myanmar-to-ignite-fear (last
accessed on August 2, 2023).
199
Marc Fisher, John Woodrow Cox, & Peter Hermann, Pizzagate: From rumor, to hashtag, to gunfire in
D. C., December 6, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pizzagate-from-rumor-to-hashtag-to-
gunfire-in-dc/20 l 6/12/06/4c7def50-bbd4-l ! e6-94ac-3d324840106c_story.htrnl (last accessed on
August 2, 2023).
200
Jude Sheerin, Capitol riots: 'Wild" Trump tweet incited attack, says inquiry, July 12. 2022,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-621404 IO (last accessed on August 2, 2023).
Decision 43 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

These online personalities have a duty to verify the truthfulness of the

content they put out on the internet. It behooves them to validate the source
of news through fact-checking a.,d even through source-checking, lest they
unwittingly disseminate fake news and even cause real-world harm.

This tendency to disseminate scandalous and unverified content to

increase one's popularity online or to pander to one's followers cannot be
allowed to fester. This rot must be excised and thrown out once and for all.

"The value of information to a free society is in direct proportion to

the truth it contains." 201 This value diminishes when the public is unable "to
distinguish between truth and falsehood in news reports, and the courts are
denied the mechanisms by which to make reasonably sure that only the truth
reaches print." 202 After all, "[d]emocracy is under threat when the truth is no
longer a check on power." 203

Here, the Urgent Petition for Indirect Contempt contains all the
necessary allegations for indirect contempt petitions, as outlined in ABS-
CBN,204 to be the basis for punishing respondent for contempt.

First, the Petition clearly stated and reproduced the published

Facebook posts respondent made on the merits of a case that was still
pending before the trial court. 205

Second, this statement in the Petition, among others, establishes the

required mental element that respondent's ultimate purpose in publishing her
statements was to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice:

33. Clearly, this latest display of Respondent Badoy-Partosa's

propensity to belittle and ridicule the entire Philippine judiciary is
downright contemptuous and is undoubtedly an indication that there is
absolutely nothing that would put an end to the Respondent's relentless
invite [sic] to mockery and condenmation of our judicial system[.]2° 6

Third, pet1t1oners sufficiently alleged that respondent's Facebook /

posts posed a clear and present danger to the court's administration of
justice:

201 In re Jurado, 313 Phil. l l 9, l 93 ( 1995) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].

202 Id
203
Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake Nr,ws, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 845, 869 (20 l 8).
204
ABS-CBN v. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leanen. En Banc].
205
Rollo (G.R. No. 263384), pp. 8-24.
206
Id. at 23.
Decision 44 AM. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
64. Indeed, the foregoing Facebook posts of Respondent Badoy-
Partosa are nothing less than contumacious as they directly besmirch and
tear down the reputation and credibility of Judge Malagar and likewise
impair the respect due, not only to Judge Malagar, but also to all members
of the Philippine Bench and Bar.

65. Respondent Badoy-Partosa's misconduct and misbehavior call

on the public to lose trust and confidence on the authority of the judiciary
and to disregard the dignity and integrity of the courts oflaw. Her actions
result to [sic J the inevitable discrediting of the authority of the court
magistrates, as well as of the entire administration of justice.207

68. Applying the wisdom of the Honorable Court to the facts at

hand, Respondent Badoy-Partosa's litany of falsehoods could not, by any
stretch of the imagination, be categorized as fair and bona fide criticism of
a public official's conduct. It is slanderous, unfair, abusive, criminal.
Respondent has threatened the life and security of Judge Malagar and her
husband; subjected them to slanderous accusations; and through her
actions, ca.lied on and encouraged the public to do the same. This is truly
detrimental to the independence of the judiciary and grossly violative of
the duty of respect to courts. 208

Lastly, by itemizing the different comments and posts made

responding to respondent's published statements, 209 petitioners showed the
effect of such speech on the public's confidence in the Judiciary.

As to the merits, respondent's posts are contemptuous.

First, the requirements of the "clear and present danger" test are met.

Contrary to respondent's allegation, her posts made on September 23,

2022 and September 25, 2022 constitute "improper conduct tending, directly
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice" 210~which equates to indirect contempt.

Her assertion that Judge Magdoza-Malagar dismissed the Department

of Justice's petition because of her supposed friendly ties with the CPP-
NP A-NDF threatens the impartial image of the Judiciary. Her claim that the
judge lawyered for one of the parties due to her alleged political leanings
similarly harms the court's administration of justice. Respondent even
claimed that the judge was assisted by the CPP-NP A-NDF when she wrote
the decision, putting into question its legality.

207
Id. at 36.
208
Id. at 36-37.
209
/d.atl5-17.
210
RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, sec. 3(d).
Decision 45 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

These statements constitute conduct that "tends to bring the authority

of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner
to impede the due administration of justice." 211

Respondent likewise failed to allege the existence of any qualified

privilege that applied when she published her posts on Facebook.

First, respondent's "criticisms" were not made in good faith or

without malice. She did not act with an "honest sense of duty" or with an
interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and public
affairs. 212 Instead, she was impelled by a self-seeking motive, which was to
stir discontent among her audience. Without a doubt, respondent's use of
violent and abrasive language in hurling accusations at Judge Magdoza-
Malagar belies any claim that she acted in good faith and without malice.

Second, respondent's comments were not a "fair and true reporting of

a proceeding or any of its incidents." 213 On the contrary, respondent
imputed serious allegations against Judge Magdoza-Malagar and the
Judiciary without showing any factual basis. Her posts and even the
pleadings she filed before this Court do not indicate that she possesses
evidence to support her scandalous statements. She launched the tirade
against the Judiciary without thinking of the consequences that her
unverified statements may bring.

Third, her statements subject do not constitute "fair commentaries on

matters of public interest" as they are not "grounded in truth and facts[.]" 214

Similarly, each of respondent's posts on September 23, 2022,

September 24, 2022, and September 26, 2022 are clear transgressions of
judicial independence as they violate the sub Judice rule for commenting on
a case that is pending before the Judiciary.

As early as 1916, this Court in In re Kelly 15 held that the publication

of criticisms directed toward a court is punishable for contempt for tending
to obstruct the administration of justice:

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts.

The power to fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy, or

enforce the observance of order, are powers which cannot be dispensed
with in the courts, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.

211
Regalado v. Go, 543 Phil. 578,590 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]. (Citation omitted)
212
ABS-CBN v. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
213 Id.
214 Id.
215
35 Phil. 944 (! 9 I 6) [Per J. Johnson, Second Division].
Decision 46 AM. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
The summary power to commit and punish for contempt, tending
to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as
essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their
authority, is a part of the law of the land.

Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by

their.very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in
their presence and submission to their lawful mandates, and as a corollary
to this provision, to preserve themselves and their officers from the
approach of insults and pollution.

The existence of the inherent power of courts to punish for

contempt is essential to the observance of order in judicial proceedings
and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and
consequently to the due administration of justice.

Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury.
the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the
suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of
court and is punishable.

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a

pending cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as
misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration ofjustice and subjects
such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right
to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal,
uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a
profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to
have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of
law, free from outside coercion or interference. 216 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)

By alleging that Judge Magdoza-Malagar had basis other than the

Constitution and the law in dismissing the proscription case, and by claiming
that the decision was written by the winning party, respondent cast doubt on
its legitimacy. The success of her efforts is evident in the overwhelming
response she attained-which she would even compile later and post as a
collection to further amplify the caustic voices-with numerous members of
the public prejudging the case. Respondent clearly intended to prejudge the
issue, influence the court, and obstruct the administration of justice, the very
evil that the sub judice rule seeks to avoid. 217

In ABS-CBN, this Court emphasized the effect of traditional media

and social media in shaping public opinion and how their prevalence has
inevitably led to a restriction of public coverage of judicial proceedings to
maintain a fair trial:

Technological advancements increased mass media's influence on

public and govermnent affairs. Justices, judges, lawyers, and witnesses
may be exposed to pressures outside judicial proceedings when cases are

216
Id. at 950-951.
217
Marantan v. Diokno, 726 Phil. 642,648 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
Decision 47 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
discussed freely and publicly in mass media due to their pervasive
presence in everyday life. This is especially true in the age of the internet
and social media.

Publicity of judicial proceedings is restricted because it may

endanger the fairness of trial:

Witnesses and judges may very well be men and

women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate, with
every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute
endurance, but it must also be conceded that "television can
work profound changes in the behavior of the people it
focuses on." Even while it may be difficult to quantify the
influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them
directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a
fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways
and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious
effect that such a coverage may have on the testimony of
witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated
but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote
of guilt or innocence to yield to it. It might be farcical to
build around them an impregnable armor against the
influence of the most powerful media of public opinion.

To say that actual prejudice should first be present

would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to justice that
a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and
deliberate dispensation of justice can create. The effect of
television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is
not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal
conception of a trial such as we know it now. 218 (Emphasis
in the original, citations omitted)

While "[m]ere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness,

soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case
made in good faith may be tolerated[,]" 219 declarations, such as those made
by respondent, ascribing improper motives to and rounding up public
support to exert pressure on Judge Magdoza-Malagar, cannot be seen as
criticism done in good faith. It is nothing but an act of intimidation to
influence the resolution of a pending case.

Malicious imputations made even after the finality of a decision still

fall under contemptuous speech if they tend to disrespect the court or create
clear and present danger in the administration of justice. Godoy expounds:

The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation

newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its
members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even
though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by
either of these two circumstances: (I) where it tends to bring the court into

218
ABS-CBN v. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
219
In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595,600 (l 949) (Per J. Feria, En Banc].
Decision 48 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; or (2) where there is
a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be
impeded. And this brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of
expression usually resorted to as a defense in contempt proceedings. 220
(Citation omitted)

The elements of the Brandenburg test are likewise present in

respondent's Facebook posts of September 23, 2022 when she unequivocally
stated that she wanted to build an organization free of terrorists, which
would bomb "the offices of these corrupt judges who are friends of
terrorists- even if they kneel before us and beg for their lives." 221
Respondent even argued that if she killed Judge Magdoza-Malagar, the
public should be lenient toward her, the way the judge purportedly showed
leniency towards the CPP-NPA-NDF.

These explosive statements directed toward respondent's considerable

number of followers were clearly made to incite and produce imminent
lawless action and are likely capable of attaining this objective, as evidenced
by the multiple comments made on the posts dated September 22, 2022,
September 23, 2022, and September 25, 2022 openly supporting the
statements and even offering assistance. Some have even gone as far as
asking for Judge Magdoza-Malagar's address, a clear sign that they intended
to execute respondent's call. One need not imagine how these responses
would have caused Judge Magdoza-Malagar to fear for her life and seek
shelter. The Brandenburg test has been met.

This Court gives no merit to respondent's insistence that she did not
intend to threaten Judge Magdoza-Malagar with physical harm, but merely
employed hypothetical syllogism to point out the errors in the ruling. 222 The
precise wording of her statements does not reveal any "hypothetical
syllogism," especially as she pled for leniency:

So if I kill this judge and I do so out of my political belief that all allies of
the CPP NP A NDF must be killed because there is no difference [in my
mind] between a member of the CPP NPA NDF and their friends, then
.
p1ease be 1ement wit. h me.--
??'
0

Her desire to build an organization to create a justice system free from

terrorists, as well as to bomb the offices of corrupt judges, is not merely
"hypothetical syllogism." 224 Her posts led multiple people to publish their
comments swearing to assist her cause. 225 If respondent truly meant no
harm, she would have pacified her followers and explained that she was

220
People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977, 1019-1020 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
221
Rollo (G.R. No. 263384), p. IO.
222
Id. at 273.
223
Id. at 10.
224
Id. at 13.
225
Id. at 15-16.
 Decision 49 AM. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
merely employing "hypothetical syllogism." Instead, respondent continued
to post scores of statements further stroking the fire.

An incitement to commit lawless violent action and is likely to cause

such violent action causing death or injury is not covered by the
constitutional privilege of protected speech. As shown by past experiences
here and abroad, 226 when such incitement to cause lawless violent action is
done through social media by its influencers, the imminence is high that it
will actually be committed by those so provoked.

Thus, respondent's posts must not be treated lightly. Her statements,

though unsubstantiated, have the power to spark a deluge of assaults against
the Judiciary and its members. Owing to her status as an online personality
with more than 166,000 Facebook followers, 227 respondent should have
observed the high standard expected of her.

Respondent's assertion that she was merely exercising her freedom of

expression cannot exculpate her from liability. "Liberty of speech must not
be confused with abuse of such liberty." 228 As earlier discussed, the ferocity
with which she responded to the trial court's ruling can in no way be
considered as a legitimate exercise of her constitutional right.

Respondent's statements were beyond objective criticism of the

decision, but were explicit declarations that the court was personally
motivated to rule in favor of the winning party, 229 that the court of law was
weaponized to inflict harm on the public, 230 and that the decision was written
by private citizens connected with the CPP-NPA-NDF. 231 Her clear threats
against Judge Nlagdoza-Malagar and other members of the Judiciary leave
no doubt that she was imbued with bad faith in making her post. In so
doing, respondent jeopardized the Judiciary by sowing distrust and
impairing the public's confidence in the honesty, integrity, and impartiality
of those donning judicial robes. She was not merely advancing her
advocacy when she made those incendiary statements on social media; she
effectively made a call to action against Judge Magdoza-Malagar and the
entire Judiciary. This, we cannot allow.

"This Court does not curtail the right of a lawyer, or any person for
that matter, to be critical of courts and judges as long as they are made in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels." 232 Citizens have

226
Charissa Yong, US Capitol riot: How social media helped enable attack by die-hard Trump fans, The
Strait Times, January 8, 2021, available at https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/how-
social-media-helped-enable-the-storming-of-the-us-capitol (last accessed on September 30, 2022).
227
Rollo (G.R. No. 263384), p. 8.
228
Mercado v. Security Bank Corp., 517 Phil. 690, 704 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
229
Rollo (G.R. No. 263384), p. 12.
210 Id.
231
Id. at 14.
232
Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr., 554 Phil. 323,338 (2007) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
Decision 50 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

a right to scrutm1ze and cnt1c1ze the Judiciary, but it is their ethical and
societal obligation not to cross the line. 233 In this case, this Court wields its
contempt power due to the harmful, vicious, and unnecessary manner in
which respondent launched her criticism, evident in the immediate
aftereffects her statements had on the public. In Zaldivar:

What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial

institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in
particulai. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a
given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of
[respondent] are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust
and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court of
last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of
such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic
?°4
government.-"

For her vitriolic statements and outright threats against Judge

Magdoza-Malagar and the Judiciary, respondent is found guilty of indirect
contempt and is fined PHP 30,000.00235 with a warning that repeating the
same or similar acts will lead to a more severe penalty.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds Lorraine Marie T. Badoy-Partosa

GUILTY of indirect contempt of court in accordance with Rule 71, Section
3(d) of the Rules of Court. She is FINED the amount of PHP 30,000.00 and
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
merit a more severe sanction.

SO ORDERED.

133
In re Macasaet. 583 Phil. 391,459 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
234
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 248 Phil. 542, 583 (1998) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
235 RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, sec. 7 states:
SECTION 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. - If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be
punished by a fine not exceeding thiriy thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months,
or both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a
fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (I) month, or both. If the
contempt consists in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status
quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation of
the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved.
The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the enforcement of a judgment
imposing a fine unless the court otherwise provides.
Decision 51 A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384
WE CONCUR:

~
.GESMUNDO

~uiiJrnANDu
Associate Justice

_'bf;;;,~VJEI<
ssociate Justice
HE

RODI EDA
A Justice

SAMUEi:-~aERLAN RICA .ROSARIO

Associate Justice As ociate Justice

JHOSE~OPEZ
Associate Justice

J
4~~
IDAS P. MARQUEZ
l'\ssociate Justice
Decision 52 AM. No. 22-09-16-SC
and G.R. No. 263384

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the court.

rt--
A m~Y_YG~E~SMUNDO
· e ustice