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G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017,

♦ Decision, Velasco, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Carpio, [J] Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Peralta, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Leonen, [J]

EN BANC

April 18, 2017

G.R. No. 214497

EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA,, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
1 2
May 29, 2014 Decision and September 15, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
3 4
CA-G.R. CR No. 35509. The challenged rulings sustained the petitioner's conviction of the
5
crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5(b ), Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610.

6
The Information reads:

AMENDED INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Ligao City hereby accuses EDUARDO QUIMVEL y
BRAGA also known as EDWARD/EDUARDO QUIMUEL y BRAGA of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, committed as follows:

That on or about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 18, 2007 at Palapas, Ligao City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste
design, through force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
7
insert his hand inside the panty of [AAA], a minor of 7 years old and mash her vagina, against
her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Facts

8
The facts of the case, as can be gleaned from the Decision of the CA, are as follows:

AAA, who was seven years old at the time of the incident, is the oldest among the children of XXX
and YYY. XXX worked as a household helper in Batangas while YYY was a Barangay Tanod who
derived income from selling vegetables. AAA and her siblings, BBB and CCC, were then staying
with YYY in Palapas, Ligao City.

On the other hand, Quimvel, at that time, was the caretaker of the ducks of AAA's grandfather. He
lived with AAA's grandparents whose house was just a few meters away from YYY's house.

At around 8 o'clock in the evening of [July 18,] 2007, YYY went out of the house to buy kerosene
since there was no electricity. While YYY was away, Quimvel arrived bringing a vegetable viand
from AAA's grandfather. AAA requested Quimvel to stay with them as she and her siblings were
afraid. He agreed and accompanied them. AAA and her siblings then went to sleep. However, she
was awakened when she felt Quimuel's right leg on top of her body. She likewise sensed Quimvel
inserting his right hand inside her panty. In a trice, she felt Quimvel caressing her private part. She
removed his hand.

Quimvel was about to leave when YYY arrived. She asked him what he was doing in his house.
Quimvel replied that he was just accompanying the children. After he left, YYY and his children
went back to sleep.

On [July 29,] 2007, XXX arrived from Batangas. Later in the evening while XXX was lying down
with her children, she asked them what they were doing while she was away. BBB told her that
Quimvel touched her Ate. When XXX asked AAA what Quimvel did to her, she recounted that
Quimvel laid down beside her and touched her vagina.

Upon hearing this, XXX and YYY went to the Office of the Barangay Tanod and thereafter to the
police station to report the incident. Afterwards, they brought AAA to a doctor for medical
examination.

As expected, Quimvel denied the imputation hurled against him. He maintained that he brought
the ducks of AAA' s grandmother to the river at 7 o'clock in the morning, fetched it and brought it
back at AAA's grandmother's place at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of [July 18,] 2007. After that, he
rested. He said that he never went to AAA's house that evening. When YYY confronted and
accused him of touching AAA, he was totally surprised. Even if he denied committing the crime, he
was still detained at the Barangay Hall. He was then brought to the police station for interrogation.
Eventually, he was allowed to go home. He did not return to the house of AAA's grandmother to
avoid any untoward incidents.

Ruling of the Trial Court

Lending credence to AAA' s straightforward and categorical testimony, the Regional Trial Court
9
(RTC), Branch 11 in Ligao City, Albay, on January 23, 2013, rendered its Judgment finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the
10
judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Finding the accused, EDUARDO QUIMVEL Y BRAGA a.k.a. EDWARD/ EDUARDO QUIMUEL
Y BRAGA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610 and thereby sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion
Temporal in its medium period as minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS and
NINETEEN (19) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal in its medium period as maximum; and
2. ORDERING the accused, EDUARDO QUIMVEL Y BRAGA a.k.a. EDWARD/ EDUARDO
QUIMUEL Y BRAGA, to pay the victim the amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and to pay a
fine in the amount of ₱30,000.00.

In the service of his sentence, accused EDUARDO QUIMVEL Y BRAGA a.k.a. EDWARD/
EDUARDO QUIMVEL Y BRAGA shall be credited with the period of his preventive detention
pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the Appellate Court

Thereafter, petitioner lodged an appeal with the CA but to no avail. For on May 29, 2014, the CA
rendered its assailed Decision affirming, with modification, the Judgment of the trial court. The
11
dispositive portion of the Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 23 January 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial
Region, Ligao City Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 5530, is hereby MODIFIED in that
accused-appellant EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA also known as EDUARDO/ EDWARD
QUIMVEL y BRAGA is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA moral damages, exemplary damages
and fine in the amount of ₱15,000.00 each as well as ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity. All damages
shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment.

SO ORDERED.

The Issues

Aggrieved, Quimvel elevated his case to this Court and raised the following issues for resolution:

I.

The CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court as the prosecution was not able to prove
that he is guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

II.

Assuming without admitting that he is guilty hereof, he may be convicted only of acts of
lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and not in relation to Sec. 5(b) of
RA 7610.

The Court's Ruling

We affirm the CA's Decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts
of Lasciviousness as penalized under Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610.

The Information charged the crime

of Acts of Lasciviousness under Sec.
5(b) of RA 7610

Petitioner contends that, granting without admitting that he is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness, he
should only be held liable for the crime as penalized under the RPC and not under RA 7610.
According to him, to be held liable under the latter law, it is necessary that the victim is involved in
or subjected to prostitution or other sexual abuse, and that the failure to allege such element
constituted a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of
12
accusation against him.

His argument fails to persuade.

i. The acts constituting the offense must

be alleged in the Information

It is fundamental that, in criminal prosecutions, every element constituting the offense must be
alleged in the Information before an accused can be convicted of the crime charged. This is to
apprise the accused of the nature of the accusation against him, which is part and parcel of the
13
rights accorded to an accused enshrined in Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Sections 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, in turn, pertinently provides:

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.-A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. (emphasis added)

Jurisprudence has already set the standard on how the requirement is to be satisfied. Case law
dictates that the allegations in the Information must be in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the
court to know ' the proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the
elements of the crime charged. The facts and circumstances necessary to be included therein are
14
determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes.

The main purpose of requiring the elements of a crime to be set out in the Information is to enable
the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. The allegations of facts constituting the offense
charged are substantial matters and the right of an accused to question his conviction based on
 15
facts not alleged in the information cannot be waived. As further explained in Andaya v.
16
People:

No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be
convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is
necessarily included therein. To convict him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his
defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. The rule is that a
variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be
fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it
affects his substantial rights. (emphasis added)

Indeed, the Court has consistently put more premium on the facts embodied in the Information as
constituting the offense rather than on the designation of the offense in the caption. In fact, an
investigating prosecutor is not required to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its
formal name in the law. What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an
accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the Information or Complaint, not the caption or
preamble thereof nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, being
17
conclusions of law. It then behooves this Court to place the text of the Information under
scrutiny.

ii. The elements of the offense penalized

under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 were
sufficiently alleged in the Information

In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the Information is deficient for failure to allege all the
elements necessary in committing Acts of Lasciviousness under Sec. 5(b) of RA 9160.

His theory is that the Information only charges him of the crime as punished under Art. 336 of the
RPC, which pertinently reads:

Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness.-Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon
other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned on the preceding article,
shall be punished by prision correccional.

Conviction thereunder requires that the prosecution establish the following elements:

1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

18
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconsc10us;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present; and

3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.

On the other hand, the prosecution endeavored to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for child abuse under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, which provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x (emphasis
added)

Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610,
the requisites of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Art. 336 of the RPC earlier
enumerated must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Sec. 5(b) of RA
19
7610, which are as follows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.

20
3. That child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. (emphasis supplied)

Hypothetically admitting the elements of Art. 336 of the RPC, as well as the first and third
elements under RA 7610 -that a lascivious act was committed against AAA who at that time was
below twelve (12) years old - petitioner nevertheless contends that the second additional element,
requiring that the victim is a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, " is
absent in this case.

The fault in petitioner's logic lies in his misapprehension of how the element that the victim is
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" should be alleged in the Information.

Guilty of reiteration, the accusatory portion of the Information reads:

AMENDED INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Ligao City hereby accuses EDUARDO QUIMVEL y
BRAGA also known as EDWARD/EDUARDO QUIMUEL y BRAGA of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, committed as follows:

That on or about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 18, 2007 at Palapas, Ligao City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste
design, through force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
insert his hand inside the panty of [AAA], 21 a minor of 7 years old and mash her vagina, against
her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

22
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. (emphasis added)

To the mind of the Court, the allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one "exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse." This is anchored on the very definition of the phrase
in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which encompasses children who indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of
23
any adult, syndicate or group.

Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution
wherein the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers
not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through
24
coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Hence,
the law punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse against children.
This is even made clearer by the deliberations of the Senate, as cited in the landmark ruling of
25
People v. Larin:

Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, 'who for money or profit.' I would like to amend this, Mr.
President, to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into this
lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, so that we can cover those situations and
not leave loophole in this section.
The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER
CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE
OR GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.

The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it
no longer be child prostitution?

Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we are still talking of the child
who is being misused for sexual purposes either for money or for consideration. What I am trying
to cover is the other consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the child being abused
or misused for sexual purposes, only for money or profit.

I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where the child may not have
been used for profit or...

The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because the essence of prostitution is
profit.

Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading ought to be expanded. But,
still, the President will agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse.

The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the Gentleman kindly restate the
amendment?

ANGARA AMENDMENT

Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr. President: MINORS,
WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE, WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER
CONSIDERATION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN
SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et cetera.

Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is
approved.

How about the title, 'Child Prostitution,' shall we change that too?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope.

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none,
the amendment is approved.

Clear from the records of the deliberation is that the original wording of Sec. 5 of RA 7610 has
been expanded so as to cover abuses that are not characterized by gain, monetary or otherwise.
In the case at bar, the abuse suffered by AAA squarely falls under this expanded scope as there
was no allegation of consideration or profit in exchange for sexual favor. As stated in the
Information, petitioner committed lascivious conduct through the use of ''force" and "intimidation."

iii. "Force and intimidation" is

subsumed under "coercion and
influence "

The term "coercionandinfluence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover ''force and
intimidation" as used in the Information. To be sure, Black's Law Dictionary defines "coercion" as
26
"compulsion; force; duress " while "[undue] influence" is defined as ''persuasion carried to the
27
point of overpowering the will. " On the other hand, ''force" refers to "constraining power,
28
compulsion; strength directed to an end " while jurisprudence defines "intimidation" as
29
"unlawfulcoercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear. " As can be gleaned, the terms are used
almost synonymously. It is then of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7 610 and
by the Information are different. And to dispel any remaining lingering doubt as to their
30
interchangeability, the Court enunciated in Caballo v. People that:

x x x sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult
exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues
the free exercise of the offended party's free will. Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules
on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which
manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:

The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or

assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children.

To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that
deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is
the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who
wields it." (emphasis added)

The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or

assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children.

With the foregoing, the Court need not burden itself with nitpicking and splitting hairs by making a
distinction between these similar, if not identical, words employed, and make a mountain out of a
mole hill.
It is not necessary that the description of the crime, as worded in the penal provision allegedly
violated, be reproduced verbatim in the accusatory portion of the Information before the accused
can be convicted thereunder. Sec. 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is relevant on this point:

Section 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting

the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.

The Court has held in a catena of cases 31 that the rule is satisfied when the crime "is described
in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of
the offense charged." Furthermore, "[t]he use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of
basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient " Hence, the exact phrase "exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other abuse" need not be mentioned in the Information. Even the
words "coercion or influence" need not specifically appear.

32
Thus, the Court, in Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, has similarly sustained the conviction of
therein petitioner Isidro Olivarez (Olivarez) for violating Sec. 5, RA 7610. The Information indicting
Olivarez of the offense read:

The undersigned 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecution (sic) of Laguna upon a sworn complaint filed
by the private complainant, [AAA], hereby accuses ISIDRO OLIY AREZ of the crime of
VIOLATION OF RA 7610, committed as follows:

That on or about July 20, 1997, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused actuated by lewd design did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation commit acts of
lasciviousness on the person of one [AAA], by touching her breasts and kissing her lips, against
her will, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (emphasis added)

Conspicuously enough, the Information in Olivarez is couched in a similar fashion as the

Information in the extant case. The absence of the phrase "exploited in prostitution or subject to
other sexual abuse" or even the specific mention of "coercion" or "influence" was never a bar for
the Court to uphold the finding of guilt against an accused for violation of RA 7610. Just as the
Court held that it was enough for the Information in Olivarez to have alleged that the offense was
committed by means of "force and intimidation," the Court must also rule that the Information in
the case at bench does not suffer from the alleged infirmity.

33
So too did the Court find no impediment in People v. Abadies, Malta v. People,[[34]] People v.
35 36 37
Ching, People v. Bonaagua, and Caballo v. People to convict the accused therein for
violation of Sec. 5, RA 7610 notwithstanding the non-mention in the Information of "coercion,"
"influence," or "exploited in prostitution or subject to other abuse."

The offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the designation of the offense as
appearing in the Information. The designation of the offense is a critical element required under
Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court for it assists in apprising the accused of the offense being
charged. Its inclusion in the Information is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him of the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 38 Its import is underscored in
this case where the preamble states that the crime charged is of "Acts of Lasciviousness in
relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610."

39
In Malto v. People, therein accused Michael John Z. Malto (Malto) was charged for violation of
RA 7610 in the following wise:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION
OF SECTION 5[b], ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take advantage and exert influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce
and/or seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to
indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him as in fact said
accused has carnal knowledge.

Contrary to law. (emphasis and words in brackets added)

Interestingly, the acts constitutive of the offense, as alleged in the Information, could make out a
40
case for violation of either Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 or Rape under the RPC. Nevertheless, the
Court affirmed the finding that Malto is criminally liable for violation of RA 7610, and not for Rape.

41
The Court is not unmindful of its pronouncements in People v. Abello(Abello) and Cabila v.
42
People (Cabila) that the second element must specifically be alleged in the Information and
thereafter proved.- However, these rulings cannot support petitioner's prayer that he be convicted
under Art. 336 of the RPC instead of under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.

To begin with, the factual milieu of Abello significantly differs with that in the case at bar. Our
refusal to convict therein accused Heracleo Abello was premised on the the fact that his victim
cannot be considered as a "child" within the purview of RA 7610. 43 The victim in Abello, was 21
years of age when the offense was committed. Although she had polio, the prosecution failed to
substantiate through evidence that the victim's physical condition rendered her incapable of fully
 44
taking care of herself or of protecting herself against sexual abuse. Hence, Abello was only
convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC.

Cabila, on the other hand, is a stray division case that has seemingly been overturned by the
45
Court's recent en banc ruling in Dimakuta v. People (Dimakuta). The latter case attempted to
punctuate the discussion on the issue at hand, but fell short as the conviction therein for violation
of Art. 336 of the RPC had already attained finality. Instead, what the Court en bane was
confronted with in Dimakuta, the bone of contention that remained, was whether or not an
accused is disqualified to apply for probation even if such appeal resulted in the reduction of the
non-probationable penalty imposed to a probationable one. The Court, therefore, deems it more
appropriate here to categorically abandon our ruling in Cabila.

46
Neither can petitioner buttress his claim by citing the dissent in the 2005 case of Olivarez v. CA
wherein it was expounded thus:

The first element refers to the acts of lasciviousness that the accused performs on the child. The
second element refers to the special circumstance that the child (is) exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse. This special circumstance already exists when the accused
performs acts of lasciviousness on the child. In short, the acts of lasciviousness that the accused
performs on the child are separate and different from the child's exploitation in prostitution or
subjection to "other sexual abuse."

Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is
neither exploited in prostitution nor subjected to "other sexual abuse." In contrast, under Section
5 of RA 7610, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is either exploited in
prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse."

Section 5 of RA 7610 deals with a situation where the acts of lasciviousness are committed on a
child already either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." Clearly, the
acts of lasciviousness committed on the child are separate and distinct from the other
circumstance that the child is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse."
(emphasis supplied)

Contrary to the exposition, the very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3(b) of RA 7610
does not require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside
from the act complained of. For it refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child. Thus, a violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed
sexual abuse against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront.

iv. There need not be a third person subjecting the exploited child to other abuse

The intervention by a third person is not necessary to convict an accused under Sec. 5 of RA
7610. As regards paragraph (a), a child may engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
regardless of whether or not a "bugaw " is present. Although the presence of an offeror or a pimp
is the typical set up in prostitution rings, this does not foreclose the possibility of a child voluntarily
submitting himself or herself to another's lewd design for consideration, monetary or otherwise,
without third person intervention. Needless to say, the child, would still be under the protection of
the law, and the offender, in such a situation, could still be held criminally liable for violation of Sec.
5(a) of RA 7610.

The Senate deliberations made clear, though, that other forms of sexual abuse, not just
prostitution, are within the extended coverage of RA 7610. The offense is even penalized under
the same prov1s1on as prostitution-Sec. 5 of the law. Both offenses must then be dealt with under
the same parameters, in spite of the differences in their elements. Thus, concomitant with the
earlier postulation, just as the participation of a third person is not necessary to commit the crime
of prostitution, so too is the circumstance unessential in charging one for other sexual abuse.

It is immaterial whether or not the accused himself employed the coercion or influence to subdue
the will of the child for the latter to submit to his sexual advances for him to be convicted under
paragraph (b). Sec. 5 of RA 7610 even provides that the offense can be committed by "any adult,
47
syndicate or group, " without qualification. The clear language of the special law, therefore,
does not preclude the prosecution of lascivious conduct performed by the same person who
subdued the child through coercion or influence. This is, in fact, the more common scenario of
abuse that reaches this Court and it would be an embarrassment for us to rule that such instances
are outside the ambit Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.

It is as my esteemed colleagues Associate Justices Diosdado M. Peralta and Estela M.

Perlas-Bernabe reminded the Court. Ratio legis est anima. The reason of the law is the soul of the
48
law. In this case, the law would have miserably failed in fulfilling its lofty purpose of providing
special protection to children from all forms of abuse if the Court were to interpret its penal
provisions so as to require the additional element of a prior or contemporaneous abuse that is
different from what is complained of, and if the Court were to require that a third person act in
concert with the accused.

The RTC and CA did not err in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt

Well-settled is the rule that, absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness
committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of
49
Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. This is so because the observance of the
deportment and demeanor of witnesses are within the exclusive domain of the trial courts. Thus,
considering their unique vantage point, trial courts are in the best position to assess and evaluate
50
the credibility and truthfulness of witnesses and their testimonies.

In the case at bar, the R TC held that the prosecution duly established petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt through AAA' s straightforward testimony. The trial court observed that when
AAA testified, she was able to steadily recount Quimvel's immodest acts, as follows:
Q Okay. On the same date, where was your mother, if you know?

A During that time, my mother was in Batangas, she being a household helper.

Q Alright. How about your father, where was he on July 18, 2007, at more or less 8: 00 o'clock in
the evening?

A He was on duty at Palapas, Ligao City.

Q Okay. What was your father's job?

A He was on duty, since he was a Barangay Tanod.

Q Okay. Now, on that date and time, where were you, if you recall?

A I was in our house. Q Who were with you inside your house?

A I was with my two (2) siblings.

Q Okay. Now, what happened while you and your siblings were there inside your house on that
date and time?

A Eduardo went to our house with a viand vegetable for us.

Q Okay. Who is this Eduardo that you are referring to?

A He is the helper of my grandfather.

Q Okay. If you know, why was he bringing you then a viand?

A He was sent by our Lolo to bring the viand for us.

Q Alright. When he brought the viand to you, what did you say, if any? A I told him to accompany
us in our house because we are afraid.

Q Okay. What did he say, if any, when you told him that?

A He told me, it's alright.

Q Okay. So, what did you do after he told you that?

A After that, I went to sleep.

Q How about your brother or sister, what did they do also?

A They too went to sleep.

Q And then what happened, if you recall?

A Since his leg was placed over my body. I was awaken[ed] because from that, he was also
inserting his hand inside my panty.

Q Alright. Now, could you tell us which leg was it that he placed on top of your body?

A His right leg(,) ma' am.

Q Okay. Now, you've mentioned that he inserted his hand inside your panty, do you recall what
you were wearing at that time?

A I was wearing shorts and panty.

Q Alright. How about on the upper portion of your body, what were you wearing then?

A I was wearing a blouse, like what I am wearing now. (Witness pointing to her blouse)

Q Alright. And you mentioned that he inserted his hand on your panty, which hand did he use?

A His right hand.

Q Alright. And after inserting his hand inside your panty, what did he do with it?

A After inserting his hand inside my panty, he rubbed my vagina. (Witness is demonstrating by
rubbing her left hand with her right hand.)

Q Now, could you tell us for how long did Eduardo rubbed or caressed your vagina? (sic)

A Maybe it took for about five (5) minutes.

Q Do you know how long is a minute?

A I do not know(,) ma'am.

Q Now, if you are going to count one (1) to ten (10), each count would be equivalent to one (1)
second and if you have counted for ten (10), on what number would you reach to approximate the
time wherein Eduardo caressed your vagina?

A It could be thirty (30) minutes.

COURT

Maybe she did not understand it.

PROS. CRUZ

Q Alright. Now, he (sic) took a long time for the accused to caress your vagina, is that what you
are trying to tell this Honorable Court?
A Yes(,) ma'am.

Q And what did you do when he was caressing your vagina for that long?

51
A I removed his hand from inside my panty.

The foregoing testimonial account demonstrates that all the elements of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, as earlier enumerated, are present. 1âwphi1

Let us not forget the circumstances of this case, not only was the offense committed against a
child under twelve (12) years of age, it was committed when the victim was unconscious, fast
asleep in the dead of the night. AAA, then a minor of seven (7) years, was awoken by the weight
of petitioner's leg on top of her and of his hand sliding inside her undergarment. His hand
proceeded to caress her womanhood, which harrowing experience of a traumatic torment only
came to a halt when she managed to prevent his hand from further touching her private parts.

As regards the second additional element, it is settled that the child is deemed subjected to other
sexual abuse when the child engages in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
52
adult. Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion
53
equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party.
The law does not require physical violence on the person of the victim; moral coercion or
54
ascendancy is sufficient.

The petitioner's proposition-that there is not even an iota of proof of force or intimidation as AAA
was asleep when the offense was committed and, hence, he cannot be prosecuted under RA
7610-is bereft of merit. When the victim of the crime is a child under twelve (12) years old, mere
moral ascendancy will suffice.

Here, AAA was a child at the tender age of seven (7) when the offense was committed. She was
residing with her father in Palagas, Ligao City, Albay while her mother works as a household
helper in Batangas. Her father, however, is out of the house most of the time, working two jobs as
a vendor and barangay tanod. Petitioner, on the other hand, was known to the victim and her
siblings as the caretaker of their grandmother's ducks. Thus, when petitioner brought some
vegetable viand to the victim's house at the day the crime was committed; he was requested by
the children to stay with them because they were afraid. AAA entrusted to petitioner her safety and
that of her siblings, only to be betrayed. In this situation, the Court finds that because of the
relative seniority of petitioner and the trust reposed in him, petitioner abused the full reliance of
AAA and misused his ascendancy over the victim. These circumstances can be equated with
"intimidation" or "influence" exerted by an adult, covered by Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. Ergo, the
element of being subjected to sexual abuse is met.

That AAA is a child of tender years does not detract from the weight and credibility of her
testimony. On the contrary, even more credence is given to witnesses who were able to candidly
relay their testimony before the trial courts under such circumstance. The child's willingness to
undergo , the trouble and humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her
55
complaint.

In stark contrast, Quimvel' s defense-that he did not go to AAA' s house on the alleged time of the
56
incident as he was busy watching over the ducks of AAA's grandmother at the latter's house
-deserves scant consideration. Jurisprudence is replete of cases holding that denial and alibi are
57
weak defenses, which cannot prevail against positive identification. A categorical and
consistent positive identification which is not accompanied by ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness prevails over mere denial. Such denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. It cannot be given a
greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
58
matters.

For his alibi to prosper, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that he was somewhere else
when the offense was committed, and that he was so far away it would have been impossible for
him to be physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of the
59
commission. But in his version of the events, petitioner failed to prove the element of physical
impossibility since the house of AAA' s grandmother, where he claimed to be at that time, is only
150 meters, more or less, from AAA's house. His alibi, therefore, cannot be considered
exculpatory.

Article 336 of the RPC was never repealed by RA 8353

Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) posits that Art. 336 of the RPC has
allegedly been rendered incomplete and ineffective by RA 8353, otherwise known as the
60
Anti-Rape law. The good justice brings our attention to Sec. 4 of the special law, which clause
expressly repealed Art. 335 of the RPC. And since the second element of Acts of Lasciviousness
61
under Art. 336 of the RPC is sourced from Art. 335 of the same code, it is then Justice
Leonen's theory that Acts of Lasciviousness ceased to be a crime under the RPC following Art.
335's express repeal.

We respectfully disagree.

Sec. 4 of RA 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC for if it were the intent of
Congress, it would have expressly done so. Rather, the phrase in Sec. 4 states: "deemed
1âwphi1

amended, modified, or repealed accordingly" qualifies "Article 335 of Act No. 3815, as amended,
and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and
regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of [RA 8353]."
As can be read, repeal is not the only fate that may befall statutory provisions that are inconsistent
with RA 8353. It may be that mere amendment or modification would suffice to reconcile the
62
inconsistencies resulting from the latter law's enactment. In this case, Art. 335 of the RPC,
63
which previously penalized rape through carnal knowledge, has been replaced by Art. 266-A.
Thus, the reference by Art. 336 of the RPC to any of the circumstances mentioned on the
erstwhile preceding article on how the crime is perpetrated should now refer to the circumstances
covered by Art. 266-A as introduced by the Anti-Rape Law.

We are inclined to abide by the Court's long-standing policy to disfavor repeals by implication for
laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the
subject. The failure to particularly mention the law allegedly repealed indicates that the , intent was
not to repeal the said law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the
64
terms of the new and old laws. Here, RA 8353 made no specific mention of any RPC provision
other than Art. 335 as having been amended, modified, or repealed. And as demonstrated, the
Anti Rape Law, on the one hand, and Art. 336 of the RPC, on the other, are not irreconcilable. The
only construction that can be given to the phrase "preceding article" is that Art. 336 of the RPC
now refers to Art. 266-A in the place of the repealed Art. 335. It is, therefore, erroneous to claim
that Acts of Lasciviousness can no longer be prosecuted under the RPC.

It is likewise incorrect to claim that Art. 336 had been rendered inoperative by the Anti-Rape Law
and argue in the same breath the applicability of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. The latter provision reads:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - x x x

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3,
for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x
(emphasis added)

If Art. 336 then ceased to be a penal provision in view of its alleged incompleteness, then so too
would Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 be ineffective since it defines and punishes the prohibited act by way
of reference to the RPC provision.

The decriminalization of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, as per Justice Leonen's theory,
65
would not sufficiently be supplanted by RA 7610 and RA 9262, otherwise known as the
Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Law (Anti-VAWC Law). Under RA 7610, only
minors can be considered victims of the enumerated forms of abuses therein. Meanwhile, the
Anti-VA WC law limits the victims of sexual abuses covered by the RA to a wife, former wife, or
any women with whom the offender has had a dating or sexual relationship, or against her child.
66
Clearly, these laws do not provide ample protection against sexual offenders who do not
discriminate in selecting their victims. One does not have to be a child before he or she can be
victimized by acts of lasciviousness. Nor does one have to be a woman with an existing or prior
relationship with the offender to fall prey. Anyone can be a victim of another's lewd design. And if
the Court will subscribe to Justice Leonen's position, it will render a large portion of our
demographics (i.e. adult females who had no prior relationship to the offender, and adult males)
vulnerable to sexual abuses.

The RTC and the CA imposed the proper prison term

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, Sec. 5 of RA 7610 provides that the penalty for lascivious
conduct, when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, shall be reclusion temporal in its
67
medium period, which ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.

68
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),
provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum
69
prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the special law prescribed.
70
Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark ruling of People v. Simon that the
situation is different where although the offense is defined in a special law, the penalty therefor is
taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under such circumstance, the legal effects
under the system of penalties native to the Code would also necessarily apply to the special law.

71
Thus, in People v. Santos (Santos), which similarly involved charges for Acts of Lasciviousness
under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, the Court applied the ISL and adjusted the prison term meted to the
accused-appellant therein.

In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the Court held that the maximum term
of the sentence to be imposed shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, which ranges from fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to
sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and nine (9) days. On the other hand the minimum term shall
be taken from the penalty next lower to reclusion temporal medium,that is reclusion temporal
minimum, which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months.

From the foregoing, it becomes clear that the prison term meted to petitioner (i.e. fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period as minimum to
fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and nineteen (19) days of reclusion temporal in its medium
period) must be modified to be in consonance with the Court's ruling in Santos. Accordingly, the
minimum prison term shall be reduced to twelve (12) years and one (1) day, while the maximum
term shall be adjusted to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R.
CR No. 35509 finding petitioner Eduardo Quimvel y Braga also known as Eduardo/Edward
Quimuel y Braga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 23 January 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial
Region, Ligao City Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 5530, is hereby MODIFIED in that
accused-appellant EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA also known as EDUARDO/ EDWARD
QUIMUEL y BRAGA is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as minimum to fifteen (15)
years. six (6) months. and twenty-one(21) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period as
maximum. He is further ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, moral damages, exemplary damages
and fine in the amount of P15,000.00 each as well as P20,000.00 as civil indemnity. All damages
shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

See dissenting opinion TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See separate opinion LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I join J. Carpio's and J. Caguioa's dissenting BIENVENIDO L. REYES

opinion Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

See separate opinion See dissenting opinion

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Please see concurring opinion

 Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

No part SAMUEL R. MARTIRES

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Associate Justice
Associate Justice

NOEL G. TIJAM
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
No part.

1
Rollo, pp. 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao and concurred in by
Associate Justices Elihu A. Ybanez and Carmelita S. Manahan.

2
Id. at 42-43.

3
Entitled People of the Philippines v. Eduardo Quimvel y Braga a.k.a. Eduardo Edward Quimvel y
Braga.

4
With modification as to the amo1mt of damages.

5
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION
AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
6
Rollo, p. 65.

7
Any information to establish or compromise the identity of the victim, as well as those of her
immediate family or household members, shall be withheld, and fictitious initials are used,
pursuant to RA 7610, "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes"; Republic Act No. 9262, "An
Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes"; Section 40 of AM. No.
04-10-11-SC, known as the "Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children," effective
November 15, 2004; and People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,

8
Rollo, pp. 30-31.

9
Id. at 65-73. Penned by Judge Amy Ana L. De Villa-Rosero.

10
Id. at 73.

11
Id. at 39-40.

12
Id. at 20-21. Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 421 (2005).

13
Section 14. x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided 1hal he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (emphasis added)

14
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 444 Phil. 499, 522 (2003).

15
Andaya v. People, 526 Phil. 480 (2006).

16
Id. at 497.
17
Espino v. People, 713 Phil. 377 (2013), citing People v. Manalili, 355 Phil. 652, 688 (1998).

18
The circumstances under which rape can be committed under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code have been modified by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law.

19
Cabila v. People, G.R. No. 173491, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 695.

20
Ebalada v. People, G.R. No. 157718, April 26, 2005, 457 SCRA 282.

21
Any information to establish or compromise the identity of the victim, as well as those of her
immediate family or household members, shall be withheld, and fictitious initials are used,
pursuant to RA 7610, "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes"; Republic Act No. 9262, "An
Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes"; Section 40 of A.M. No
04-10-11-SC, known as the "Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children," effective
November 15, 2004; and People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502
SCRA 419.

22
Rollo, p. 65.

23
People v. Larin, 357 Phil. 987 (1998).

24
Malto v. People, 560 Phil. 119 (2007).

25
Supra note 23, at 998-999.

26
<http://thelawdictionary.org/coercion/> last accessed on March 3, 2017.

27
<http://thelawdictionary.org/undue-influence/> last accessed on March 3, 2017.

28
<http://thelawdictionary.org/force/> last accessed on March 4, 2017.

29
Sazon v. Sandiganbayan, 598 Phil. 35 (2009).
30
710 Phil. 792, 805-806 (2013).

31
Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 600 Phil. 475 (2009); Serapio v. Sandiganbayan (I'hird
Division), 444 Phil. 499, 522 (2003).

32
Supra note 12.

33
433 Phil. 814, 818 (2002); the Information reads:

That on or about July 1, 1997, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused actuated by lewd design did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with force and intimidation commit acts of
lasciviousness upon the person of his 17-year old daughter [AAA] by kissing, mashing her breast
and touching her private parts against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

34
Supra note 24, at 126; the Information reads:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MAL TO of VIOLATION
OF SECTION 5(b), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of
17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse for several times with him as in fact said accused
had carnal knowledge.

Contrary to law.

35
563 Phil. 433, 436 (2007); the Information reads:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-99-87053

That in or about the month of May, 1998, in XXX, Philippines, the said accused by means of force
and intimidation, to wit: by then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drag said AAA, his
own daughter, 12 years of age, minor, inside a bedroom and undressed her and put himself on top
of her and thereafter have carnal knowledge with said AAA against her will and without her
consent.
 CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-99-87054

That in or about the month of May, 1998, in XXX, Philippines, the said accused by means of force
and intimidation, to wit by then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drag said AAA, his
own daughter, 12 years of age, minor, inside a bedroom and undressed her and put himself on top
of her and thereafter have carnal knowledge with said AAA against her will and without her
consent.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 0-99-87055

That in or about the year of 1996, in X:XX, Philippines, the said accused by means of force and
intimidation, to wit: by then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drag said AAA, his own
daughter, 12 years of age, minor, inside a bedroom and undressed her and put himself on top of
her and thereafter have carnal knowledge with said AAA against her will and without her consent.

36
665 Phil. 7 50, 7 55-7 56 (2011); the information reads:

That on or about the month of December 1998 in the City of Las Piñas and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with abuse of influence and moral
ascendancy, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously insert ' his tongue and finger into the genital of his daughter, [AAA], a minor then
eight (8) years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW and with the special aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority of the
private offended party, [AAA], being then only eight (8) years of age and relationship of the said
private offended party with the accused, Ireno Bonaagua y Berce, the latter being the biological
father of the former.

37
Supra note 30, at 796-797; the Information reads:

That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses Christian Caballo of the
crime of Violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610, committed as follows:

That in or about the last week of March 1998, and on different dates subsequent thereto, until
June 1998, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a 23-year-old man, in utter disregard of the prohibition of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 and taking advantage of the innocence and lack of worldly
experience of AAA who was only 17 years old at that time, having been born on November 3,
1980, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse upon said AAA,
by persuading and inducing the latter to have sexual intercourse with him, which ultimately
resulted to her untimely pregnancy and delivery of a baby on March 8, 1999, a condition
prejudicial to her development, to the damage and prejudice of AAA in such amount as may be
allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

38
Malto v. People, supra note 24.

39
Id. at 126.

40
Rape was still classified as a crime against chastity under the RPC at the time the offense was
committed.

41
601 Phil. 373 (2009).

42
Supra note 19.

43
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - (a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of
age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition;

44
Supra note 41.

45
G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015, 773 SCRA 228.

46
Supra note 12, at 444-445.

47
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

48
RA 7610, Section 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. - It is hereby declared to be
the policy of the State to provide special protection to children from all fmns of abuse, neglect,
cruelty exploitation and discrimination and other conditions, prejudicial their development; provide
sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis
intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. The State shall intervene
on behalf of the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the
child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation and discrimination or when
such acts against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having
care and custody of the same.

49
Uyboco v. People, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014, 744 SCRA 688.

50
People v. Pareja, 724 Phil. 759 (2014).

51
TSN, June 23, 2011, pp. 6-9.

52
Garingarao v. People, 669 Phil. 512 (2011 ).

53
Caballo v. People, supra note 30.

54
Dimakuta v. People, supra note 45.

55
Navarrete v. People, G.R. No. 147913, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 509.

56
Rollo, p. 67.

57
People v. Agcanas, G.R. No. 174476, October 11, 2011, 658 SCRA 842.

58
People v. Gani, G.R. No. 195523, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 530.

59
People v. Piosang, G.R. No. 200329, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 587.

60
Section 4. RepealingClause. - Article 335 of Act No. 3815, as amended, and all laws, acts,
presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent
with or contrary to the provisions of this Act are deemed amended, modified or repealed
accordingly.

61
Under Art. 336, the lascivious conduct must be performed under any of the circumstances
mentioned on its "preceding article," referring to the previous law penalizing rape. Prior to its
repeal, Art. 335 of the RPC provides that rape may be committed a) by using force or intimidation;
b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or c) when the
offended party is under 12 years of age.
62
Article 335. When and how rape is committed - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

63
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present. (as amended by RA 8353, Sec. 2)

64
Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 183517, June
22, 2010, 621 SCRA 461.

65
AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING
FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

66
RA 9262, Sec. 3(a).

67
REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 76.

68
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND PAROLE FOR ALL
PERSONS CONVICTED OF CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS; TO CREATE A BOARD OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND TO PROVIDE FUNDS
THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
69
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same. (emphasis added)

70
G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555.

71
G.R. No. 205308, February 11, 2015, 750 SCRA 471.

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