Europe-Asia Studies

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A Study of Vladimir Putin’s Rhetoric

Oksana Drozdova & Paul Robinson

To cite this article: Oksana Drozdova & Paul Robinson (2019) A Study of Vladimir Putin’s
Rhetoric, Europe-Asia Studies, 71:5, 805-823, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2019.1603362

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2019.1603362

Published online: 14 May 2019.

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 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, 2019
Vol. 71, No. 5, June 2019, 805–823

A Study of Vladimir Putin’s Rhetoric

OKSANA DROZDOVA & PAUL ROBINSON

Abstract
This article analyses the political rhetoric of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Scholars and journalists have
devoted considerable space to discussing Putin’s policies, but have paid little attention to his political
speeches, often assuming that he is purely a pragmatist and that his rhetoric is therefore of little interest.
This article argues that a comprehensive analysis of rhetoric helps to reveal Putin’s political and ideological
orientation. To do so, the article carries out a systematic examination of Putin’s political speeches and
interviews, and shows that Putin has demonstrated an overall consistency in the general line of his views,
albeit with certain changes within that line. Therefore his rhetoric is more than an instrument to confuse
political opponents and should be taken seriously as an indication of Putin’s policy direction.

ONE MIGHT IMAGINE THAT THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RUSSIA’S president Vladimir
Putin would be of great interest to scholars and journalists, but until very recently this has
not been the case. Books about Putin, such as Masha Gessen’s Man Without a Face,
Angus Roxburgh’s The Strongman, Karen Dawisha’s Putin’s Kleptocracy, and Steven Lee
Myers’ The New Tsar, devote considerable space to discussing corruption and the
allegedly autocratic nature of Russian politics but pay very little attention to Putin’s
political speeches (Gessen 2012; Roxburgh 2012; Dawisha 2014; Lee Myers 2015). In
examining the use of ‘path and building metaphors’ in Putin’s speeches, Koteyko and
Ryazanova-Clarke note that ‘the language used by the President has only rarely been
analysed’ (2009, pp. 112–27). There have been occasional attempts at discourse analysis
on very specific subjects. For instance, in an effort to determine Putin’s ideology,
Eltchaninoff (2015) examines the occasions on which Putin has quoted or mentioned
philosophers in his speeches. Hopf (2016) trawls the speeches of Presidents Putin and
Medvedev from 2005 to 2014 for clues as to how these two leaders perceived Russian
national identity and how this affected the decision to annex Crimea in 2014. Baturo and
Mikhaylov (2014) compare the rhetoric of Medvedev and Putin during the former’s
presidency, and Gavrilova (2004) examines inaugural speeches and addresses to the
Federal Assembly by Boris Yel’tsin and Vladimir Putin, and analyses the construction of
political discourse from a cognitive and rhetorical perspective. Overall, however, there has
been little detailed analysis which examines Putin’s rhetoric for evidence of his ideological
perspective. This possibly reflects a belief that Putin’s political statements are ‘purely
instrumental’ (Rodkiewicz & Rogoza 2015, pp. 5, 7), and that Putin is ‘the ultimate

© 2019 University of Glasgow

https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2019.1603362
806 OKSANA DROZDOVA & PAUL ROBINSON

pragmatist who appears less interested in any ideological system than in using any strategy
that will work to attack a problem’ (Herspring 2007, p. 3).
Some commentators, however, claim that Putin has become more ideological since
becoming president for a third time in 2012. Luke March remarks that in the past few
years the regime has adopted ‘an increasingly positive attitude to ideology’ (March 2012,
p. 404). ‘The pre-Crimea Putin was basically pragmatic’, writes Owen Matthews, while
‘post-Crimea, Putin has become a different kind of leader, motivated by ideology’
(Matthews 2014). Melik Kaylan claims ‘Putin has changed … and now espouses a
discernible, exportable, full-fledged “-ism” … . That “-ism” is conservatism’ (Kaylan
2014, p. 10). There is increasing talk of Putin’s ‘conservative turn’, which purportedly
reflects ‘the progressing ideologization of the ruling regime’ (Makarychev & Yatsyk 2014,
p. 2). This is, therefore, an appropriate time to take a closer look at what Vladimir Putin
himself has said about his political views in order to obtain a better understanding of what
his ideology might be.
Furthermore, an analysis of Putin’s rhetoric is valuable in showing how he positions
himself politically relative to others, how he justifies his policies, and how he exercises
power. Scholars of Critical Discourse Analysis note that discourse is concerned with
‘construction’ and ‘constitution’. Norman Fairclough (2013, p. 400), for instance, declares
that discourse is ‘an effective constituent of action’, and Ruth Wodak writes that
‘discourse … constitutes situations … and relationships between people and groups of
people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the status
quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it’ (Wodak 2011, pp. 39–40).
Political rhetoric, therefore, can be seen as doing more than merely reflecting the thinking
of the speaker; it is a means by which a politician exercises power; for instance, by
issuing orders, giving cues to subordinates, and sending messages to friends and enemies
alike. Russia has been described as a ‘weak state’ (Mendras 2012), and if this is so, words
may provide a means by which Russia’s ruler could compensate for the lack of powerful
formal tools for governing a vast country. A failure to analyse Putin’s words may,
therefore, lead to serious misunderstandings about the direction in which he is leading
Russia and how he is doing so.
This article therefore analyses hundreds of speeches and interviews given by Putin in his
three terms as Russian president, from late 1999 to May 2008, and from May 2012 up to April
2016, published on the official Kremlin.ru website, as well as several articles published under
his name. Putin’s term as prime minister between 2008 and 2012 is not included in the
analysis, as arguably, his political responsibilities were different.
Given that there is no previous analysis which has looked at Putin’s rhetoric to determine
whether it is consistent not merely within a given field of study, such as foreign policy, but
also consistent across fields, this article looks at Putin’s statements on both domestic and
foreign affairs, under the headings of ‘history and culture’, ‘the state and the political
system’, ‘economics’, and ‘foreign policy’, in order to make the analysis as broad and
comprehensive as possible. To undertake the analysis, we scanned over a thousand of
Putin’s speeches, articles, and interviews from the designated timeframe and extracted the
comments that fit within one of the four fields. We then further reduced the sample by
taking approximately 250 statements determined to be ideological in content rather than
descriptive. To avoid taking words out of context, we contextualised Putin’s statements to
 A STUDY OF VLADIMIR PUTIN’S RHETORIC 807

see how they fit within a particular discussion. In what remained, we identified the most
commonly mentioned topics and looked for consistencies and inconsistencies over time.
We also compared Putin’s rhetoric to that of other political actors, on the grounds that
what is not said is as significant as what is. From all this we drew our conclusions about
what these statements tell us about how the Russian president presents himself.

Views on rhetoric, policy and ideology

There is a strong body of scholarship on rhetoric and policy in Russia. For example, Stewart
and Zhukov (2009) use automated content analysis to examine statements made by Russia’s
military and political leaders during the Putin period to determine whether military elites
exert any restraining influence on Russian foreign and defence policy. They conclude that,
while more hesitant than their civilian political counterparts to embrace an interventionist
foreign policy agenda, Russian military elites have been more active in considering the
use of force as an instrument of foreign policy. Similarly, Baturo and Mikhaylov (2014)
undertake quantitative text analysis of the political rhetoric of governors to examine how
policy positions revealed in regional legislative addresses explain elites’ perceptions of the
distribution of power between Putin and Medvedev. Harley Balzer (2005) studies Putin’s
economics dissertation to determine if his scholarly opinions match his subsequent energy
and economic policies. Finally, in his recent analysis of the origins of Russia’s foreign
policy, Tsygankov (2016a) claims that Russia has followed three distinct foreign policy
trajectories based on national interest. All the above authors focus on individual policy
areas, such as national defence or foreign policy. A broader analysis of Putin’s rhetoric
across many fields is therefore warranted.
Many Western analyses of the Russian leader’s ‘ideological turn’ are journalistic and
politicised, using selective excerpts from Putin’s speeches to justify the authors’
preconceptions. At the most negative end of the spectrum, Gary Kasparov claims that
some of Putin’s speeches ‘closely resemble those of Nazi leaders’ (Kasparov 2015,
p. xxiii). According to Kalb (2015, pp. 2, 225), Putin is above all ‘ultranationalistic’ and
‘convinced that only an authoritarian, ultranationalist regime can protect Russia from its
enemies’. Similarly, Walter Laqueur writes that ‘Putinism’ consists of ‘several
components: religion (the Orthodox Church, Russia’s holy mission, the Third Rome, and
the New Jerusalem), patriotism/nationalism (with occasional leanings towards
chauvinism), geopolitics Russian style, Eurasianism, the besieged-fortress feeling, and
zapadophobia (fear of the West)’ (Laqueur 2015, p. 4). Eltchaninoff claims that Putin’s
occasional liberal rhetoric is merely a subtle judo tactic, ‘a method of reassuring
Westerners, while waiting for them to make mistakes’ (Eltchaninoff 2015, p. 44).
Eltchaninoff concludes that ‘the philosophical sources of Putinism, however diverse they
may be, rest on two pillars: the idea of empire and an apology for war. … He has decided
to champion an anti-modernist, paleoconservative paradigm, while remaining true to his
Soviet heritage’ (Eltchaninoff 2015, pp. 161, 171).
In these analyses, nationalism, social conservatism, and authoritarianism predominate.
Other authors express more nuanced opinions. According to Andrei Tsygankov, ‘Putin is
not a nationalist. While appropriating key concepts from the nationalist vocabulary, he
alternates them with ideas that nationalists may find objectionable’ (Tsygankov 2014).
808 OKSANA DROZDOVA & PAUL ROBINSON

Similarly, Paul Chaisty and Stephen Whitefield write that ‘while Vladimir Putin has shown
strong patriotic instincts throughout his political career, he is not a natural nationalist’
(Chaisty & Whitefield 2015, p. 166).
Some commentators consider Putin to be at least in some respects a liberal, or at least a
liberal-conservative. At the more liberal end of its spectrum, the Russian liberal-
conservative tradition stresses the importance of developing and maintaining a strong
state, on the grounds that only such a state is capable of introducing reform and
preventing Russia from descending into a state of anarchy. At the more conservative end
of its spectrum, this tradition views a strong state as a good in and of itself but recognises
that such a state depends upon reform and modernisation (Robinson 2012). Various
authors fit Putin firmly within this tradition. According to March, for instance, ‘the
greatest intellectual influence [on Putin] appears to be from so-called “liberal”
conservatives of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’ (March 2012, p. 405).
According to Sergei Prozorov, drawing on the ideas of Leonid Polyakov, vice-provost of
the Moscow Higher School of Economics, ‘Putin’s socioeconomic reform programme is
substantively liberal … but situationally and stylistically conservative’ (Prozorov 2005,
p. 124). Richard Sakwa similarly writes that ‘in Russia a unique synthesis of liberalism
and conservatism took shape and assumed political form in Putin’s rise to power’ (2007,
p. 97). Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy describe Putin as being on the one hand a ‘statist’,
determined to create a strong central state built on respect for the law and an inclusive
civic patriotism, and on the other hand, a ‘free marketer’ who has ‘made a point of
praising private ownership and criticizing too much government interference in the
economy’ (Hill & Gaddy 2013, p. 142). They conclude that Putin is ‘a conservative
reformer’ (Hill & Gaddy 2014, p. 213).
There is clearly little agreement on Putin’s ideological position. This study argues that in
terms of his rhetoric, Putin better fits the ‘liberal conservative’ model than the
‘ultranationalist, illiberal, authoritarian’ one. This becomes especially clear when Putin’s
rhetoric is compared to those who might be deemed ultranationalist, illiberal or
authoritarian. Baturo and Mikhaylov (2014, p. 978) position Putin as a ‘centrist’. This
article concurs with their conclusion.

History and culture

As suggested above, Putin’s ideas fit well with the Russian tradition of ‘liberal-conservatism’
and his comments on Russia’s history and culture reinforce this view. They also disprove
statements to the effect that the Russian leader is an ultranationalist who rejects modernity.
On the contrary, he is quite critical of Russia’s past, including both the tsarist and the
Soviet periods. In 2003, Putin gave a speech at Columbia University, New York, in which
he said that Russia had never had free speech. ‘As you know’, he continued ‘we had a
totalitarian state for a hundred years and before that tsarism was infringing upon
everything. We had no parliamentary activities; we formed a parliament and then
dissolved it and so on’ (Putin 2003a). Four years later, Putin still maintained the same
critical vision when, in an interview with Time magazine, he criticised Russia’s Soviet
past: ‘we should banish the period of our Soviet past when we tried to become the leaders
 A STUDY OF VLADIMIR PUTIN’S RHETORIC 809

of a social and communist revolution … a period when we tried to tell other countries how
they are supposed to live’ (Putin 2007f).
The analysis of Putin’s statements regarding Russian history and culture reveals that he
draws on historical events to make a case for an inclusive, civic, and patriotic identity
that, as he envisions it, characterises Russia as a country and society. He also uses
historical references to highlight the importance of a strong state in which the unity of
national groups and territories within one particular polity acts as a defence against
external foes. For Putin, history shapes the present and determines the future. In
November 2014, while speaking to young academics and history teachers, Putin said:

[History] is needed today and is so very important for our people and country. We see the attempts
being made to recode society in many countries, and such attempts are being made to recode our
society too. This always goes hand-in-hand with attempts to rewrite history and shape it to
particular geopolitical interests. (Putin 2014d)

He added that Russia had been through a series of wars and upheavals prompted by the lack
of fixed succession rules and that it was in Russia’s interest to remember this and prevent any
future weakening of central power, which could be destructive for the state: ‘the procedure for
succession to the throne in Russia was very complicated and tangled and created
fragmentation … [The heirs to the throne] began fighting amongst themselves which led to
fragmentation and weakening of the Russian state’ (Putin 2014d).
Contrary to frequent claims by his critics (Balcer 2018; Walker 2018), Putin does not
glorify or criticise a particular period of Russian’s past. Instead, he targets the times when
Russia was weak and the leaders whose actions, inadvertently or otherwise, led to the
weakening of the state. Indeed, Russian history for Putin is not something to be
interrogated or studied but a source of justification for a strong state supported by a
patriotic society. The role of historians is, therefore, to reconcile different fragments of
Russian history in a coherent narrative. In his talk to young historians and history
teachers, Putin concluded, ‘this history lesson about periods of fragmentation must trigger
a danger signal. We must treat this very carefully, and not allow such things under any
circumstances. We must know our history. … And if you could somehow reflect this [in
your work] it would be exceedingly important’ (Putin 2014d).
In the early years of his presidency, Putin grappled with the legacy of the Yel’tsin years.
Contrary to claims by writers such as Laqueur (2015) and Grigas (2016) that Putin’s ideology
is characterised by a chauvinist-leaning nationalism and imperial expansionism, an analysis
of Putin’s statements shows a different and more nuanced picture. In December 2000, in a
joint interview with the television channels ORT and RTR and Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
Putin said: ‘we should get rid of imperial ambitions. … Concentrating on our national
interests is the number one priority at the moment’ (Putin 2000k).
Laqueur labels Putin an anti-Western leader whose ideology is underpinned by Russian
Orthodoxy and a belief in its supremacy. However, in Putin’s rhetoric he has often
emphasised the multi-confessional nature of Russia and, faced with Islamic militants from
the Northern Caucasus, has sought to distinguish between religion and religious fanatics.
810 OKSANA DROZDOVA & PAUL ROBINSON

For instance, in 2002, during a joint press conference with Norwegian Prime Minister
Bunnevik, Putin said:

If you look at the statements and propaganda documents of international terrorists, you will see that
these people, in fact, have set themselves the goal of creating a ‘global caliphate’. This is very
reminiscent of the communist world revolution but dressed as the Islamic extremism. Which
means, they set a global goal. I would just like to point out that this should not be confused with
Islam in general. Islam in general has nothing to do with extremism. (Putin 2002b)

A year before that, during his speech in the Bundestag, Putin (2001c) said that it was
unacceptable to talk about any ‘war of civilisations’, and that it was a grave mistake to
equate Muslims in general and religious fanatics. These statements may be seen as an
earnest attempt by a young president to address the religious and ethnic complexity of
Russia, where several major religions have coexisted for centuries. Indeed, in the early
years of his presidential mandate, Putin had to navigate the maze of the Chechen conflict
in which Islamist militants represented a significant issue for the federal and local authorities.
A decade later, Putin’s message had not changed. His statements about religion and
Russia’s cultural heritage can be seen in light of his reformist policy when he tried to
address longstanding issues of the tsarist and Soviet legacy. In this respect, Orthodoxy to
Putin is not a matter of religion so much as a matter of identity. In his 2013 interview for
the documentary film The Second Baptism of Rus, Putin said:

I realised that the members of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad were truly Russian people. They
might live far from their homeland, but they keep it in their hearts. They realised that the time had
come to reunite the entire Russian [rossiiskoi] nation. To bring all the peoples of Russia together, all
the many different ethnic groups that are united by the Orthodox faith. As you may know, passports
issued during the Russian Empire did not classify people by ethnic group but did state their religious
denomination. (Putin 2013a)

Putin discusses religion both in historical perspective and in relation to the present-day
state of affairs in Russia. This rhetoric plays an important role in the historical explanation
and justification of his policies. For instance, a strong, centralised state, valued by Putin as
a pillar of stability, is buttressed by an Orthodoxy identity, a unifying force in a
multiethnic society. In the same interview, Putin remarks, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church
played a unique role in our people’s and country’s history after all. Essentially, it was after
adopting Orthodox Christianity as a religion that the Russian nation began to emerge as a
unified nation and began building a centralised Russian state’ (Putin 2013a).
Despite Putin’s near-two decades on the world stage as Russia’s leader, his political
philosophy remains unclear to scholars and journalists. John Daniszewski, in a 2013
interview, tried to uncover the foundations of Putin’s political philosophy and received the
following answer:

I guess I can call myself a pragmatist with a conservative perspective. I always take the realities of
today, and the lessons from the distant and recent past into consideration. I try to take these events
and this experience and project them into the future, in the medium and long-term perspective. …
Conservatism does not mean stagnation. Conservatism is based on traditional values, but at the
 A STUDY OF VLADIMIR PUTIN’S RHETORIC 811

same time it has one essential element, which is the goal of development. I think it is of fundamental
value. (Putin 2013b)

Judging by this statement and his previous speeches, Putin appreciates tradition and the
traditional values that preserve the strength of the centralised state, which he regards as
paramount in a country as diverse as Russia. These traditional values are represented by
conservatism which, in his opinion, can be quite progressive. By contrast, these
conservative statements distinguish Putin, to an extent, from Russia’s nationalists. For
instance, one of the more highly regarded Russian nationalists Mikhail Remizov,
criticises Putin for promoting civic rather than Russian ethnic nationalism. Civic
nationalism, he says, does not allow Russians ‘to realise ourselves as a nation’
(Remizov 2016, p. 26). Putin, he complains, outlines ‘no objective connected with the
national development of the Russian people, the preservation of the ethnic balance and
the preservation of Russia as a country in which Russian culture has a predominant
influence’ (Remizov 2016, p. 68).

The state and the political system

As noted above, Putin is sometimes described as a ‘statist’, as reflected by speeches in which
he discusses the purpose of the state, the ideal form of political system, and the construction
of Russian ‘statehood’ (gosudarstvennost’). Putin makes regular reference to the state
(gosudarstvo) as well as to state power (vlast’—sometimes used in the sense of ‘the
authorities’). The theme of a strong, but limited, state, bound by law and democratic in
nature, as a necessary prerequisite for a stable order that guarantees the prosperity and
freedom of the people, recurs regularly.
Given Russia’s turbulent history and the experience of the 1990s, including rapid
economic collapse and severe social stress, Putin stresses the importance of stability. This,
Putin says, ‘requires the development of a strong state’ (Putin 2000e). In the early stages
of his first presidency, he stressed that ‘we wish to return strength to state institutions’
(Putin 2000j). This concern remained important throughout the period which followed. ‘A
characteristic Russian tradition is a strong state’, Putin (2012c) told the Federal Assembly
on 12 December 2012.
In particular, Putin identifies a strong state with a presidential system of government, with
the president standing above party conflicts as the representative of the entire people. This is
necessary, in Putin’s view, because of Russia’s situation as a developing country with
imperfect political institutions, an often obstructive bureaucracy, and a poorly developed
system of political parties (Putin 2006). ‘In the medium term Russia will need a strong
presidential power’, he said on 14 September 2007, adding that ‘no other form of
democratic leadership, democratic I wish to underline, is possible other than strong
presidential power’ (Putin 2007d). A weak state, according to Putin (2000d, 2000e), can
cause harm to the people and it is therefore the duty and responsibility of the government
to ensure the strengthening of the central authorities. In a 2000 interview, Putin was asked
how he envisioned power (vlast’), to which he answered: ‘power should be effective, and
therefore strong. Otherwise, it is not power, but a mockery of the people’ (Putin 2000h). A
strong state is a guarantor of the stability that Russia needs in order to build the civic
812 OKSANA DROZDOVA & PAUL ROBINSON

society that then can keep the government in check. However, Putin noted, the nascent civic
society is too weak in Russia and therefore cannot function properly. In this case, it is the duty
of the state to secure stability through laws and certain restrictions (Putin 2001f).
A free media is an important element of civic society and is praised by Putin (Putin
2002a). However, as he has said in several interviews (Putin 2001b, 2001e, 2003a), the
media require a substantial financial base to be fully independent. In view of Russia’s
economic realities, he claims, this has been impossible and the media has become a tool in
the hands of oligarchs who wish to undermine the state and the government (Putin 2002a).
It is therefore the responsibility of the state to exercise a certain degree of control over the
media in order to protect the state and its citizens (Putin 2002a).
Putin, however, has combined his desire for a strong state with repeated rejections of
authoritarianism and totalitarianism, making various statements about the need for limits
to the state’s power: ‘Russia should not be and cannot be a police state’ (Putin 2000h). On
25 April 2005, he quoted philosopher Ivan Ilyin to make the point that ‘state power has its
limits’ (Putin 2005a). On 12 December 2012 he said that ‘attempts by the state to intrude
into the sphere of personal convictions and opinions are without doubt manifestations of
totalitarianism. This is completely unacceptable for us. We will not be going down this
path’ (Putin 2012c).
The purpose of the state, according to Putin, is ‘to create a comfortable society for our
citizens in which … citizens’ initiative will be strengthened, a society in which the interests
of the individual, of the specific person will be the top priority of state policy’ (Putin
2007d). The state cannot, however, do this by itself. In several speeches (Putin 2001a,
2001d, 2012c, 2015), Putin has expressed his frustration with a bureaucracy which fails to
implement government decrees and has therefore concluded that overcoming bureaucratic
opposition and corruption requires the help of civil society. In this sense, civil society is
envisaged as a partner of the state not as an external force playing an independent political role.
Putin contends (2007f) that a strong state is impossible without personal freedom and a
democratic system of government, as society will not help the state achieve its objectives if
citizens do not feel that they have any influence over the state’s actions. In his speeches,
therefore, Putin makes regular reference to democracy, and links this to the quest for
stability and a strong state: ‘I consider it very important to instil in our country democratic
principles and institutions and respect for the law and constitution. This is in reality the deep
foundation of stability in the country’ (Putin 2007b). Speaking to the Federal Assembly on
12 December 2012, Putin stressed that ‘Russia has no political option other than democracy.
I would also like to underline that we share the universal democratic principles accepted by
the whole world’ (Putin 2012c). At the same time, however, he remarked that:

Russian democracy means power precisely for the Russian people with its own traditions of national
self-governance, and not at all the implementation of standards imposed on us from outside.
Democracy is the observance of laws, rules, and norms. … Democracy is not only being able to
elect the authorities, but also being able to continue to control them, to evaluate the results of
their work. (Putin 2012c)

The link in this speech between democracy and law is one that Putin has made regularly.
‘Democracy is inseparable from the law and obedience of the law by all citizens and those in
 A STUDY OF VLADIMIR PUTIN’S RHETORIC 813

positions of responsibility’, Putin said on 14 September 2007 (Putin 2007d). On 20

December 2012, he stated that ‘democracy is above all the fulfilment of the law’ (Putin
2012d).
References to democracy are not particularly common in Putin’s speeches. Baturo and
Mikhaylov (2014, p. 979) also note that during Medvedev’s presidency, when Putin was
prime minister, Medvedev referred to democracy far more than Putin. This suggests that
democracy is not Putin’s top priority. What is also noticeable, however, is what Putin has
not said: he has never cast doubt on democracy in principle. This stands in stark contrast
to conservative intellectuals in Russia, who on occasion speak of democracy in negative
terms. For instance, former Duma deputy Nataliya Narochnitskaya writes: ‘I have no
illusions about the system known as democracy; in all the world it is the most
undemocratic system of governing society’ (Narochnitskaya 2015, p. 11). Similarly,
journalist Vitaly Tretyakov writes of ‘the deep crisis of party representation. Multiparty
democracy isn’t working … why impose on Russia something which has already stopped
working in Western Europe?’ (Tretyakov 2017, pp. 96–7). Compared to these statements,
Putin’s comments on democracy are quite positive.
Putin praises patriotism far more than democracy. Following the mass protests around the
2012 presidential elections and accusations of electoral fraud, the duties of citizens and the
limits of their political expression were redefined in Putin’s political discourse. The word
‘patriotism’ began to feature prominently in Putin’s interviews and official speeches. In a
2013 interview, he said:

disloyal elements are like germs that seek to undermine and destroy the social or public organism.
When they become active the immunity decreases, the problems arise, the mass of people,
millions of people, begin to suffer … . Pushkin, who was a freedom lover and a friend of the
Decembrists, once said, ‘We have a lot of people who oppose not the government, but Russia’.
Unfortunately, our intelligentsia has such a tradition. (Putin 2013b)

In his 2012 State Address, Putin developed the concept of civic duties and responsibilities:

The nation-wide responsibility for our country to the present and future generations is hailed by the
Constitution as a fundamental principle of the Russian state. It is in civil responsibility and patriotism
that I see the consolidating force behind our policy. … Being a patriot means not only to treat one’s
national history with love and respect, although, of course, that is very important, but first and
foremost to serve one’s country and society. (Putin 2012c)

Putin’s rhetoric suggests that a strong, centralised state is in the best interests of the people, as
only a strong state can guarantee stability, security, and freedom. Citizens, on the other hand,
must respond with full loyalty and patriotism to the state. While civic society is still weak in
Russia, the state must constrain certain freedoms, so as to effectively protect the people.
However, in all this, a strong state and obedience to the law are not portrayed as being
incompatible with freedom and democracy. Rather, Putin’s rhetoric suggests that they are
complementary. A strong state is not one which dictates to its citizens, but one which is
successful in bringing benefits to them. To that end, state and society should not be
viewed as opposed but must work together for the common good. This requires a
814 OKSANA DROZDOVA & PAUL ROBINSON

democratic order, which in Russia’s particular circumstances needs to involve strong

presidential power. This order must be firmly based upon law, which limits the freedoms
of both the state and the citizen. This viewpoint, which Putin has maintained with
remarkable consistency since his first presidency, fits the liberal-conservative model.

Economics
Vladimir Putin is alternately described as a free market liberal (Hill & Gaddy 2013) or as
somebody who has restored an important role for the state in the economy following the
free market reforms of the 1990s (Djankov 2015). In a speech on 11 August 1999, he
placed himself somewhere between these two extremes: ‘we have to move thoughtfully
towards a market economy, but also use full-bloodedly the means of government
regulation’.1 Such demand for government regulations can be explained by the fact that
Putin was shaped as a political figure and a statesman in the 1990s, ‘the crazy 90s’ as this
period is often called in Russia. Lawlessness, surging crime rates, the untrammelled theft
of public property by a small clique of oligarchs, and defenceless ordinary citizens
terrorised by mobsters created a clear idea in Putin’s head of what the government owed
to its citizens. In a 1999 interview, he said:

Our policies must be geared towards creating the conditions that can ensure a free and dignified life
for people. I am convinced that only the market economy can provide that. The government must
bring the economy to its full potential. The proprietor must be protected. Protected from the
abuses of bureaucrats and state officials, from rackets and mobsters. To me, a proprietor is not
only an oligarch but any person who owns property regardless of its size. The state’s
constitutional responsibility is to protect everyone. (Smirnov 1999)

Putin reiterated the same thought in several interviews in 2000. He said that the state must
consolidate all political forces that would be able to protect citizens to ensure that economic
development benefits everyone, and that no reform diminishes the wellbeing of the people
(Putin 2000b, 2000f, 2000g). In this sense, as argued by Gavrilova (2004, p. 228), Putin
shows his desire to be seen as an active, hands-on statesman and manager, which set him
aside from Yel’tsin. Even though the two presidents used the same vocabulary (for
example, ‘state structure’, ‘citizen’, ‘federation’, ‘sub-federal entity’, ‘local government’,
and ‘authority’), Putin’s speeches are filled with action verbs that transform abstract
concepts into particular actionable instructions for the regional governors. This becomes
particularly visible when analysing his statements on social issues in the early 2000s,
when Russia started to move away from the chaos of the 1990s. Putin then reinforced this
practice through working meetings with local officials combined with public discussions.
By participating in live online interviews, ‘direct lines’ (live television shows in which
Putin answers questions from the public), semi-official discussions in the form of round-
tables, and annual press conferences, Putin created the image of an approachable president
who was close to the people (Gavrilova 2004, pp. 25–30). Linked to Putin’s hands-on
approach is his denunciation of corruption on all levels of the government as one of

1
‘Russia’s New PM Vows to Keep Economy Stable’, Journal of Commerce, 11 August 1999.
 A STUDY OF VLADIMIR PUTIN’S RHETORIC 815

Russia’s main problems. In the early 2000s his interviews contained frequent criticism of
corruption for not only impeding the development of the state but also the prosperity of
ordinary citizens (Putin 2000d, 2000j).
In January 2016, in a discussion of communism, he declared his thoughts on the pros and
cons of a planned economy:

A planned economy has definite advantages; it allows general state resources to be concentrated to
fulfil very important tasks. This was how they resolved the issue of healthcare, which was an obvious
achievement of the Party in those times. This was how they resolved the situation with education—
also an obvious achievement of the Communist Party. … But in the final analysis, insensitivity to
changes, insensitivity to technological revolutions, to new technological structures, led to
economic collapse. (Putin 2016)

The state’s role, Putin added on 7 February 2000, was to ‘establish general principles for
managing the economy and also to guarantee the uniform implementation of rules without
any special privileges and preferences’ (Putin 2000e). In general, Putin describes the best
way to foster economic growth is to allow maximum freedom to private enterprise. On 4
December 2014, he said:

The most important thing now is to give the people an opportunity for self-fulfilment. Freedom for
development in the economic and social spheres, for public initiatives, is the best possible response
both to any external restrictions and to our domestic problems. … Conscientious work, private
property, the freedom of enterprise—these are the same kind of fundamental conservative values
as patriotism, and respect for the history, traditions, and culture of one’s country. (Putin 2014e)

A repeated theme of Putin’s speeches is that free enterprise is being strangled by excessive
government regulation and overly intrusive regulatory bodies. On 26 September 2001, he
called for ‘low taxes and de-bureaucratisation’ (Putin 2001d). Again, on 4 December 2014:

Things are changing very slowly here. The presumption of guilt is still very much alive. Instead of
curbing individual violations, they [regulatory bodies] stand in the way and create problems for
thousands of law-abiding, self-motivated people. It is essential to lift restrictions on business as
much as possible, free it from intrusive supervision and control. (Putin 2014e)

On 4 September 2015, Putin similarly remarked that ‘our general line consists of … the
de-bureaucratisation of our economic system, and improving the system for making
decisions, the business climate. … Generally, in times of crisis the best response is to
increase enterprises’ freedom’ (Putin 2015). On several occasions Putin has used the
words ‘liberal’ or ‘liberalisation’ to describe his economic policies: ‘the government’s
economic policy must have a moderately liberal character’ (Putin 2000d). Twelve years
later, his position had not changed: ‘when APEC was created, its aim was the
liberalisation of the world economy. … We intend to make this the key issue in the course
of discussions in Vladivostok’ (Putin 2012a).
Free trade, economic cooperation with foreign countries, and membership of key
international institutions such as the World Trade Organization also feature prominently in
the economic sections of Putin’s speeches. Putin has followed a consistent line throughout
816 OKSANA DROZDOVA & PAUL ROBINSON

the time span of this, with his speeches revealing a strong preference for free trade and
reduced government regulation of the economy.
In a 2012 article, Anders Åslund remarked that ‘judging by his words, Putin has returned
to his liberal economic positions of 2000–2002, and words do mean something in politics’
(Åslund 2012). Putin’s relative liberalism can be seen not only in what he says but by
comparison with others and what they say that he does not. For instance, one of the most
prominent critics of the Russian government’s economic policies, Sergei Glaz’ev, has
complained: ‘for 20 years we have been living on the basis of the ideology of radical
liberalism. … Our economy has turned into a cannibalistic mechanism of production, with
the offshore business-aristocracy taking money out of the country without paying taxes’
(Glaz’ev 2014a, pp. 62, 66). He argues against globalism, for tight control over the
movement of capital, and a return to ‘strategic planning’ (Glaz’ev 2014b). None of these
themes ever appears in Putin speeches.

Foreign policy
Throughout his years in power, Putin’s primary concerns in foreign policy have been
connected to Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with the specific
issues of NATO expansion and US missile defence most often raised in his speeches. By
contrast, Putin has mentioned China, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and
Eurasia (often in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union) much less. Judging by Putin’s
rhetoric, Russia’s relations with Europe have consistently been his top priority.
As in domestic affairs, so also in foreign policy, Putin has placed a great deal of
importance on stability, saying, for instance, on 1 September 2001 that ‘the general aim of
Russia’s external policy is to create a situation around our country which would help solve
internal economic and internal political tasks. This presupposes stability in the world’
(Putin 2001b). To promote such stability, Putin has made regular statements denying any
Russian global ambitions: Russia ‘does not pretend to the role of superpower’ and rejects
‘expansionism and any sort of conquest’ (Putin 2007b); ‘we will not support any Russian
nationalism, nor do we intend to resurrect the empire’ (Putin 2014b). That said, Putin has
made it equally clear that Russia will pursue an independent foreign policy and avoid any
formal alliances or blocs that might limit its sovereignty: ‘it goes without saying that
Russia will follow an independent policy’ (Putin 2001a). He has frequently denounced the
idea of formal ‘blocs’, which he says are an outdated legacy of the Cold War (Putin
2000a, 2007a, 2007f, 2014a). His often repeated objective is for a ‘single security space’
stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, all of which he has described as being part of
‘Europe’: ‘European culture and mentality [extend] as far as Vladivostok and the Pacific
Ocean’ (Putin 2003b).
This reflects another recurrent theme: that Russia is a European country. On 1 September
2001, for instance, Putin described Russia as ‘one of the centres of European culture’ (Putin
2001b) and continued to espouse this belief throughout his first and second terms as
president. On 26 October 2007, for instance, he remarked that ‘Russia is a country with
deep European roots and traditions’ (2007e).
Many commentators, however, have detected what they believe is a shift in Putin’s
rhetoric since 2007, claiming that Putin has adopted Eurasian ideas about Russia being a
 A STUDY OF VLADIMIR PUTIN’S RHETORIC 817

separate civilisation, neither European nor Asian (Clover 2016; Linde 2016; Tsygankov
2016b). In fact, Putin has made references to ‘Eurasia’ and ‘the Eurasian Union’
throughout his time in power and these terms do not appear more often now than in
earlier speeches. For instance, as far back as 10 October 2000, Putin spoke of his desire
to create a ‘Eurasian Economic Union’, and remarked that the work of the Eurasianist
ethnologist Lev Gumilev was ‘an assertion of the ideal of eternal commonality, of the
mutual dependency of the peoples populating the vast expanses of Eurasia. … Eurasian
ideas are particularly important today’ (Putin 2000i). In a speech on 19 September
2013, Putin referred to Russia as a ‘state-civilisation’ (2013c). This civilisational
discourse is seen by some (Clover 2016, pp. 14–20; Linde 2016, pp. 606–7; Tsygankov
2016b, p. 151) as a shift in favour of a Eurasianist discourse that describes the world as
divided into separate civilisations. It is true that Putin has made occasional use of the
language of civilisations throughout the period under study. In 26 August 2005 he
referred to Russia as ‘a bridge linking two great civilisations—the European and the
Asiatic’ (Putin 2005b). On 19 December 2007 he asked an American journalist, ‘why
have you [the American authorities and the American people] decided that your
civilisation is the very best? There are far older civilisations than the American. …
Russia is an ancient country, with ancient, deep traditions and with a very powerful
moral foundation’ (Putin 2007f).
Despite these occasional claims of civilisational differences, Putin continues to describe
Russia as essentially European. On 3 September 2013, he remarked that ‘our law has
enormous historical roots, it is part of the continental law of Europe’ (Putin 2013b). And
on 17 April 2014, he said that ‘all Europe … from Lisbon to Vladivostok should unite to
be able to compete and survive in a rapidly developing world’ (Putin 2014a). Finally, on
24 October 2014, he said, ‘nowadays we hear assertions that Russia is supposedly turning
away from Europe … it is searching other business partners, especially in Asia. I want to
say that this is absolutely not the case’ (Putin 2014c).
Europe, then, retains a central and positive role in Putin’s rhetoric. By contrast, from 2007
onwards, Putin’s language when speaking about the United States became more negative. For
instance, on 19 December 2007, he said:

Russia has said and demonstrated many times in the past 15 years that we don’t want just to be a
partner, but also a friend of America. But sometimes one gets the impression that America
doesn’t need friends. We have got the impression that the US needs vassals whom it can
command. (Putin 2007f)

‘They [the US] need an enemy, they need the image of an enemy, somebody to fight’, he said
on 6 September 2012 (Putin 2012a).
The shift towards a more anti-US tone should not, however, disguise the fact that Putin’s
stated preferences for the shape of the international order have remained very consistent. On
31 December 1999, he made these preferences clear: ‘Moscow will strive to build a
multipolar world’ (Putin 1999). Putin has repeated this claim many times since. For
instance, on 10 February 2007: ‘we will strive to create a multipolar world so that the
architecture of international relations is balanced and takes into account the interests of all
members of the international community’ (Putin 2007a).
818 OKSANA DROZDOVA & PAUL ROBINSON

Putin’s irritation with the United States appears based on a sense that Washington is not
interested in a multipolar world and is determined to maintain its hegemony. ‘What is a
unipolar world?’ he asked on 10 February 2007, ‘It is a world in which there is one
master, one sovereign. And in the end it is ruinous for not only for everybody in the
system, but also for the sovereign itself’ (Putin 2007b). On 24 October 2014, he
complained: ‘the moment of unipolarity has convincingly demonstrated that the growth of
domination of one centre of power is not conducive to better management of the global
processes’ (Putin 2014c).
Putin refers regularly to European and North American countries as ‘partners’ while
repeatedly expressing his opposition to aspects of NATO policy. NATO is the most
commonly mentioned subject in Putin’s foreign policy speeches, and two issues above all:
missile defence and NATO expansion. Putin’s discussions of US and NATO missile
defence plans relate, first, to Washington’s 2001 decision to withdraw from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty and, second, to NATO plans to create an anti-ballistic missile
defence system in eastern Europe (Putin 2001e, 2007c). Putin mentioned missile defences
ten times in 2000 and 2001. He returned to the subject in April 2007: ‘we see no
arguments for deploying an anti-missile defence system in Europe. … It turns out that
Russia has disarmed unilaterally and our partners are filling up the space of Central and
Eastern Europe with new types of weapons’ (Putin 2007c). He has mentioned the matter
several times since (Putin 2008a, 2012d, 2013d). There can be little doubt that this issue is
a serious irritant in Russian–Western relations.
As regards NATO expansion, as early as 11 January 2000, Putin said, ‘the strengthening of
military–political blocs poses a threat, above all the expansion of NATO to the east’ (Putin
2000a). This complaint has been repeated on many occasions since: NATO expansion is
‘not only inexpedient but also harmful and counterproductive’ (Putin 2008b); ‘we are
completely against NATO expansion’ (Putin 2008c). NATO, according to Putin, has
attempted to supplant the United Nations as the central organisation of the international
system, which he opposes: ‘we consider that the only universal international organisation
which can decide questions of a global character is the United Nations’ (Putin 2003c).
This has remained his consistent position ever since: ‘I am convinced that the only
mechanism for making decisions about the use of force as a last resort can be the UN
Charter’ (Putin 2007b). In Putin’s view, Western powers have undermined international
law by bypassing the UN and using force in countries such as Yugoslavia, Iraq and Syria
(Putin 2007b). Putin presents Russia as defending international law against such
encroachments. ‘We are not defending this government’, Putin said of Syria in October
2013, ‘we are defending something completely different. We are defending the norms and
principles of international law, we are defending the contemporary world order’ (Putin
2013b). Thus, contrary to many Western observers who regard Putin as challenging the
existing international order, Putin paints himself in a more conservative light, as defending
that order against the challenge posed to it by the exceptionalist policies of the West,
especially the United States. This stands in contrast to conservative Russian intellectuals
who tend to describe the West in far more critical terms. For example, Alexander Dugin
has suggested the creation of a ‘new empire’, which must be ‘Eurasian, continental, and in
the long-term global’ (Dugin 2000, p. 213). By comparison, Putin’s geopolitical
statements are far more modest.
 A STUDY OF VLADIMIR PUTIN’S RHETORIC 819

Conclusion
Analysis of Putin’s rhetoric is often drawn from a handful of disjointed statements that are
either taken out of their immediate context or not examined across Putin’s political career.
The evidence does not support the more extreme claims that Putin is a pure pragmatist
who is generally guarded in his speech and only reveals his true intentions through
actions. On the contrary, over the course of his active involvement in politics, Putin has
demonstrated an overall constancy in the general line of his political views, albeit
accompanied by a change in certain very specific views. This speaks to the fact that
rhetoric is more than an instrument in the hands of Vladimir Putin to confuse his political
opponents. Rather it suggests that his rhetoric should be taken seriously. Furthermore, the
evolution of his political views on certain specific issues, for example, his change of
attitude towards the United States, speaks to the fact that these statements are an earnest
way for Putin to grapple with Russia’s domestic and international affairs.
Overall, Putin’s rhetoric fits with the description of him by Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy
as a statist who is nevertheless in favour of a free market. Putin places a particularly strong
emphasis on stability, both domestically and internationally, which fits well with his
description of himself as a ‘pragmatist with a conservative perspective’. Domestically, a
desire for stability leads him to stress a strong, presidential state system that acts as
a guarantee of a strong state that is limited and bound by law. At the same time, a
recognition is given to popular support and thus a requirement for democracy and
cooperation with civil society. In this political model, state and society are not separate but
rather, reinforce and protect each other; the state is bound by law and protects society,
which in turn supports the state.
Internationally, Putin is very much in favour of cooperation with Europe, in spite of some
use of civilisational discourse and a certain shift of language towards Asia. Despite changes
in the international arena, Europe has remained the focus of Putin’s concern, and he still sees
Russia as part of a Europe that he envisions as stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Indeed,
Putin’s main frustration with the West is driven by the West’s refusal to share this vision and
its insistence on retaining the system of blocs. In Putin’s eyes, only a multipolar world order
can guarantee the stability which he seeks domestically as well as internationally. A
combination of such views fits within the liberal conservative and pragmatic conservative
models more than the ultranationalist one.

OKSANA DROZDOVA, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of

Ottawa, Ottawa K1N 6N5, Canada. Email: odroz053@uottawa.ca

PAUL ROBINSON, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa,
Ottawa K1N 6N5, Canada. Email: paul.robinson@uottawa.ca
820 OKSANA DROZDOVA & PAUL ROBINSON

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