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E-NOTES

Class : B.A.LL.B /BBA LL.B VIII Semester

Paper Code : LLB 406
Subject : Interpretation of Statutes

UNIT-IV

Rules of Interpretation

“The essence of law lies in the spirit, not its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external
manifestation of the intention that underlies it”

– Salmond

Interpretation means the art of finding out the true sense of an enactment by giving the words of the
enactment their natural and ordinary meaning. It is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the
words used in a statute. The Court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily and therefore there have been
certain principles which have evolved out of the continuous exercise by the Courts. These principles are
sometimes called „rules of interpretation‟.

The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature conveyed
expressly or impliedly in the language used. As stated by SALMOND, "by interpretation or
construction is meant, the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature
through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed."

Interpretation is as old as language. Elaborate rules of interpretation were evolved even at a very early
stage of the Hindu civilization and culture. The importance of avoiding literal interpretation was also
stressed in various ancient text books – “Merely following the texts of the law, decisions are not to be
rendered, for, if such decisions are wanting in equity, a gross failure of Dharma is caused.” Interpretation
thus is a familiar process of considerable significance. In relation to statute law, interpretation is of

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importance because of the inherent nature of legislation as a source of law.

The process of statute making and the process of interpretation of statutes are two distinct activities. In
the process of interpretation, several aids are used. They may be statutory or non-statutory. Statutory aids
may be illustrated by the General Clauses Act, 1897 and by specific definitions contained in individuals
Acts whereas non-statutory aids is illustrated by common law rules of interpretation (including certain
presumptions relating to interpretation) and also by case-laws relating to the interpretation of statutes.
Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. Vs Asher, “English Knowledge is not an instrument of
mathematical precision… It would certainly save the judges from the trouble if the acts of parliament
were drafted with divine precision and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears, a judge
cannot simply fold hand and blame the draftsman…” It is not within the human powers to foresee the
manifold permutations and combinations that may arise in the actual implementation of the act and also
to provide for each one of them in terms free from all ambiguities. Hence interpretation of statutes
becomes an ongoing exercise as newer facts and conditions continue to arise.

Interpretation of statutes has been an essential part of English law since Heydon's Case in 1854 and
although it can seem complex, the main rules used in interpretation are easy to learn. Elaborate rules of
interpretation were evolved even at a very early stage of Hindu civilization and culture. The rules given
by „Jaimini‟, the author of Mimamsat Sutras, originally meant for srutis were employed for the
interpretation of Smritis also.(Law Commission of India, 60th Report, Chapter 2, para 2.2).

The concept of interpretation of a Statute cannot be static one. Interpretation of statutes becomes an
ongoing exercise as newer facts and conditions continue to arise. We can say, interpretation of Statutes is
required for two basic reasons viz. to ascertain: • Legislative Language - Legislative language may be
complicated for a layman, and hence may require interpretation; and • Legislative Intent - The intention
of legislature or Legislative intent assimilates two aspects: i. the concept of „meaning‟, i.e., what the
word means; and ii. the concept of „purpose‟ and „object‟ or the „reason‟ or „spirit‟ pervading through the
statute. Necessity of interpretation would arise only where the language of a statutory provision is

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ambiguous, not clear or where two views are possible or where the provision gives a different meaning
defeating the object of the statute. If the language is clear and unambiguous, no need of interpretation
would arise.

In this regard, a Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court in R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay,
AIR 1984 SC 684 has held: “… If the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest
duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question
of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the
Statute would be self defeating.”

Again Supreme Court in Grasim Industries Ltd. v Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002)4 SCC 297
has followed the same principle and observed: “Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and
there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for court
to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions.” (para 10) The purpose of
Interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention of the Legislature – not to control
that intention or to confine it within the limits, which the Judge may deem reasonable or expedient. Some
Important points to remember in the context of interpreting Statutes:

• Statute must be read as a whole in Context

• Statute should be Construed so as to make it Effective and Workable – if statutory provision is

ambiguous and capable of various constructions, then that construction must be adopted which will give
meaning and effect to the other provisions of the enactment rather than that which will give none.

• The process of construction combines both the literal and purposive approaches. The purposive
construction rule highlights that you should shift from literal construction when it leads to absurdity.
A Rule is a uniform or established course of things. It is that which is prescribed or laid down as a guide
for conduct or action; a governing direction for a specific purpose; an authoritative enactment; a
regulation; a prescription; a precept; as, the rules of various societies; the rules governing a school; a rule

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of etiquette or propriety etc. It should be remembered that these Rules Are Rules of Practice and not
Rules of Law. Without these rules, it would soon become impossible to not only understand the law but
even just to apply it, as new situations are always coming to light which Parliament and the courts could
not have foreseen when the law was developed.

Rules of Interpretation
A Rule is a uniform or established course of things. It is that which is prescribed or laid down as a guide
for conduct or action; a governing direction for a specific purpose; an authoritative enactment; a
regulation; a prescription; a precept; as, the rules of various societies; the rules governing a school; a rule
of etiquette or propriety etc. It should be remembered that these Rules are Rules of Practice and not
Rules of Law. Without these rules, it would soon become impossible to not only understand the law but
even just to apply it, as new situations are always coming to light which Parliament and the courts could
not have foreseen when the law was developed. Do judges really use the rules of statutory interpretation?
If yes, which rule do they use first? – Judges rarely if ever, volunteer the information that they are now
applying a certain rule of interpretation. Often, judges look to see if there can be a literal meaning to the
words used in the disputed statutory provision.
However there is no rule that states that they must use the literal rule first. No Legal Rules exist which
state which rule of Interpretation can be used and the rules of interpretation that have been identified, are
not themselves legal rules. There are certain general principles of interpretation which have been applied
by Courts from time to time. Over time, various methods of statutory construction have fallen in and out
of favour. Some of the better known rules of interpretation also referred to as the Primary Rules of
Interpretation are discussed hereunder.

There are generally two kind of interpretation; literal interpretation and logical interpretation.

Literal interpretation

Giving words their ordinary and natural meaning is known as literal interpretation or litera legis. It is the
duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is clear and unambiguous,
effect should be given to the provisions of a statute whatever may be the consequence. The idea behind

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such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme law making body must know what it intends in
the words of the statute. Literal interpretation has been called the safest rule because the legislature‟s
intention can be deduced only from the language through which it has expressed itself.

In Municipal board v State transport authority, Rajasthan, the location of a bus stand was changed
by the Regional Transport Authority. An application could be moved within 30 days of receipt of order
of regional transport authority according to section 64 A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The
application was moved after 30 days on the contention that statute must be read as “30 days from the
knowledge of the order”.

The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made and hence rejected the application as
invalid. Lord Atkinson stated, „In the construction of statutes their words must be interpreted in their
ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context or in the object of the statute in
which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they were used in a special
sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense.

A literal construction would not be denied only because the consequences to comply with the same may
lead to a penalty. The courts should not be over zealous in searching for ambiguities or obscurities in
words which are plain. (Tata Consultancy Services V. State of A.P. (2005) 1 SCC 308)

The literal rule may be understood subject to the following conditions –

i. Statute may itself provide a special meaning for a term, which is usually to be found in the
interpretation section.

ii. Technical words are given ordinary technical meaning if the statute has not specified any other.

iii. Words will not be inserted by implication.

iv. Words undergo shifts in meaning in course of time.

v. It should always be remembered that words acquire significance from their context.

When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural ordinary and popular sense, it is
meant that words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they have in relation

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to the subject matter with reference to which and the context in which they have been used in the Statute.
In the statement of the rule, the epithets „natural, “ordinary”, “literal”, “grammatical” and “popular” are
employed almost interchangeably to convey the same idea.

The bare words of the Act must be construed to get the meaning of the statute and one need not probe
into the intention of the legislature. The elementary rule of construction is that the language must be
construed in its grammatical and literal sense and hence it is termed as litera legis or litera script.

The Golden Ruleis that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. This
interpretation is supreme and is called the golden rule of interpretation.

The Golden rule, or British rule, is a form of statutory interpretation that allows a judge to depart from a
word's normal meaning in order to avoid an absurd result. It is a compromise between the plain meaning
(or literal) rule and the mischief rule. Like the plain meaning rule, it gives the words of a statute their
plain, ordinary meaning.

However, when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislature's intention, the
judge can depart from this meaning. In the case of homographs, where a word can have more than one
meaning, the judge can choose the preferred meaning; if the word only has one meaning, but applying
this would lead to a bad decision, the judge can apply a completely different meaning. This rule may be
used in two ways. It is applied most frequently in a narrow sense where there is some ambiguity or
absurdity in the words themselves.

In Ramanjaya Singh V. Baijnath Singh, the Election tribunal set aside the election of the appellant
under s 123(7) of the Representation of People‟s Act, 1951 on the grounds that the appellant had
employed more persons than prescribed for electioneering purpose. The appellant contended that the
excess employees were paid by his father and hence were not employed by him. The Supreme Court
followed the grammatical interpretation of S 123(7) and termed the excess employees as volunteers.

In Maqbool Hussain V. State of Bombay, the appellant, a citizen of India, on arrival at an airport did
not declare that he brought gold with him. Gold, found in his possession during search in violation of

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government notification, was confiscated under S 167 (8) Sea Customs Act, 1878. He was charged under
s 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The appellant pleaded that his trial under the Act was
violate of Art 20(2) of the constitution relating to double jeopardy as he was already punished for his act
by was of confiscation of the gold. It was held by the Supreme Court that the sea customs authority is not
a court or a judicial tribunal and the confiscation is not a penalty. Consequently, his trial was valid under
the Act of 1947.

For example, imagine there may be a sign saying "Do not use lifts in case of fire." Under the literal
interpretation of this sign, people must never use the lifts, in case there is a fire. However, this would be
an absurd result, as the intention of the person who made the sign is obviously to prevent people from
using the lifts only if there is currently a fire nearby.

The second use of the golden rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a result that is obnoxious to principles of
public policy, even where words have only one meaning. Example: The facts of a case are; a son
murdered his mother and committed suicide. The courts were required to rule on who then inherited the
estate, the mother's family, or the son's descendants. There was never a question of the son profiting from
his crime, but as the outcome would have been binding on lower courts in the future, the court found in
favour of the mother's family.

In Madan Mohan v K. Chandrashekara, it was held that when a statute contains strict and stringent
provisions, it must be literally and strictly construed to promote the object of the act.

In Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd, it was held that according to the
fundamental principles of construction the statute should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter,
section by section and then word by word.

In Municipal board v State transport authority, Rajasthan, an application against the change of
location of a bus stand could be made within 30 days of receipt of order of regional transport authority
according to s 64 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the
contention that statute must be read as “30 days from the knowledge of the order”. The Supreme Court

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held that literal interpretation must be made and hence rejected the application as invalid.

In Raghunandan Saran v M/s Peary Lal workshop Pvt Ltd, the Supreme Court validated 14 (2) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 and provided the benefit of eviction on account of non-payment of rent.
The Supreme Court adopted grammatical interpretation.

Exceptions to the rule of literal interpretation-

Generally, a statute must be interpreted in its grammatical sense but under the following circumstances it
is not possible: -

A. Logical defects
B. ambiguity
C. inconsistency
D. incompleteness or lacunae
E. unreasonableness

Logical interpretation
If the words of a statute give rise to two or more constructions, then the construction which validates the
object of the Act must be given effect while interpreting. It is better to validate a thing than to invalidate
it or it is better the Act prevails than perish. The purpose of construction is to ascertain the intention of
the parliament.

The Mischief Rule

The mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that attempts to determine the legislator's intention.
Originating from a 16th century case (Heydon‟s case) in the United Kingdom, its main aim is to
determine the "mischief and defect" that the statute in question has set out to remedy, and what ruling
would effectively implement this remedy. When the material words are capable of bearing two or more
constructions the most firmly established rule or construction of such words “of all statutes in general be
they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law is the rule of Heydon‟s case. The

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rules laid down in this case are also known as Purposive Construction or Mischief Rule.
The mischief rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in order to discover
Parliament's intention. It essentially asks the question: By creating an Act of Parliament what was the
"mischief" that the previous law did not cover?
Heydon’s case
This was set out in Heydon's Case [1584] 3 CO REP where it was stated that there were four points to
be taken into consideration when interpreting a statute:
1. What was the common law before the making of the act?
2. What was the "mischief and defect" for which the common law did not provide?
3. What remedy the parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth?
4. What is the true reason of the remedy?
The office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and
pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it
allows him to effectively decide on Parliament's intent. It can be argued that this undermines Parliament's
supremacy and is u ndemocratic as it takes lawmaking decisions away from the legislature.
Use of this Rule
This rule of construction is of narrower application than the golden rule or the plain meaning rule, in that
it can only be used to interpret a statute and, strictly speaking, only when the statute was passed to
remedy a defect in the common law. Legislative intent is determined by examining secondary sources,
such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles and corresponding statutes. This rule has often
been used to resolve ambiguities in cases in which the literal rule cannot be applied.
In the case of Thomson vs. Lord Clan Morris, Lord Lindley M.R. stated that in interpreting any
statutory enactment regard must be had not only to the words used, but also to the history of the Act and
the reasons which lead to its being passed.

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In the case of CIT vs. Sundaradevi (1957) (32 ITR 615) (SC), it was held by the Apex Court that
unless there is an ambiguity, it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of
construction which is that the intention of the legislature should be primarily to gather from the words
which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and
considered on surrounding circumstances and constitutionally proposed practices.
The Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. V. State of Bihar, (AIR 1995 SC 661) applied the
mischief rule in construction of Article 286 of the Constitution of India. After referring to the state of law
prevailing in the province prior to the constitution as also to the chaos and confusion that was brought
about in inter-state trade and commerce by indiscriminate exercise of taxing powers by the different
Provincial Legislatures founded on the theory of territorial nexus, Chief Justice S.R.Das, stated “It was to
cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of interstate trade or commerce in the
Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial barrier that the constitution maker
adopted Article 286 in the constitution”.
In various Supreme Court cases it has been held that, „legislation both statutory and constitutional is
enacted, it is true, from experience of evils. But its general language should not, therefore, necessarily be
confined to the form that evil had taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes and new awareness of limitations. A principle to be valued must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it existence. This is particularly true of the constitutional
constructions which are not ephermal enactments designed to meet passing occasions. These are
designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it‟.
Mischief Rule is applicable where language is capable of more than one meaning. It is the duty of the
Court to make such construction of a statue which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
Advantages –
1) The Law Commission sees it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as opposed to the
Golden or Literal rules.
2) It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing.
Disadvantages –

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1) It is considered to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when common law was
the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not established.
2) It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be undemocratic.
3) In the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft acts on behalf of the king and were therefore well
qualified in what mischief the act was meant to remedy.
4) It can make the law uncertain.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS –

The principle of Noscitur a Sociis is a rule of construction. It is used by the court to interpret legislation.
This means that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase must be determined by the words that
surround it. In other terms, the meaning of a word must be judged by the company that it keeps. The
questionable meaning of a doubtful word will be derived from its association with other words. It is used
wherever a statutory provision constitutes a word or phrase that is capable of bearing more than one
meaning.

This rule is explained in the Maxwell on the interpretation of statutes in the 12th edition in following
words – When two or more words susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are
understood to be used in their cognate sense. The words take their color from and are quantified by each
other, the meaning of the general words being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general.

The principle of Noscitur a Sociis is a rule of construction. It is one of the rules of language used by
court to interpret legislation. This means that, the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be
determined by the words immediately surrounding it. In other words, the meaning of a word is to be
judged by the company it keeps. The questionable meaning of a doubtful word can be derived from its
association with other words. It can be used wherever a statutory provision contains a word or phrase
that is capable of bearing more than one meaning.

Relying on the above, in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bharti cellular it was held that term

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„technical servies‟ used in section 194J of the Income Tax Act is unclear. The word technical would take
colour from the words managerial & consultancy between which it is sandwiched. These terms
„managerial services‟ & „consultancy services‟ necessarily involve a human intervention. So applying
noscitur a sociis the word „technical‟ would also have to be construed as involving a human element.
Thus, interconnection & port access services rendered by the assessee do not involve any human
interface & therefore cannot be regarded as technical services u/s 194J of the Income Tax Act.
In sum, words must be construed in conjunction with the other words and phrases used in the text.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce a harmonious whole. Where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or
is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be clear and specific by considering the
company in which it is found or with which it is associated.

EJUSDEM GENERIS-
According to the Black‟s Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004) the principle of Ejusdem Generis is where
general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning,
such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. It is a canon of
statutory construction, where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of things, the
general words will be construed as applying only to things of the same general class as those
enumerated.
The expression Ejusdem Generis means of the same kind. Normally, general words should be given their
natural meaning like all other words unless the context requires otherwise. But when a general word
follows specific words of a distinct category, the general word may be given a restricted meaning of the
same category. The general expression takes it‟s meaning from the preceding particular expressions
because the legislature by using the particular words of a distinct genus has shown its intention to that
effect. This principle is limited in its application to general word following less general word only. If the

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specific words do not belong to a distinct. Genus, this rule is inapplicable.

Consequently, if a general word follows only one particular word, that single particular word does not
constitute a distinct genus and, therefore, Ejusdem Generis rule cannot be applied in such a case.
Exceptional stray instances are, however, available where one word genus has been created by the courts
and the general word following such a genus given a restricted meaning. If the particular words exhaust
the whole genus, the general word following these particular words is construed as embracing a larger
genus.
The principle of Ejusdem Generis is not a universal application. If the context of legislation rules out the
applicability of this rule, it has no part to play in the interpretation of general words. The basis of the
principle of Ejusdem Generis is that if the legislature intended general words to be used in unrestricted
sense, it would not have bothered to use particular words at all.
Thus, where a statute describes things of particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic
character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a kindred nature with those particularly
enumerated.
Unless there be something in the context of the statute to repel such influence. Ejusdem generis could be
expansive, however, because the list is not exclusive; it may be expanded if a juridical tie could be found
with another item.

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS-

It is a Latin phrase that means express mention of one thing excludes all others. This is one of the rules
used in interpretation of statutes. The phrase indicates that items not on the list are assumed not to be
covered by the statute. When something is mentioned expressly in a statute it leads to the presumption
that the things not mentioned are excluded.
For example, “weekends and public holidays” excludes ordinary weekdays.
It is generally used as a canon of construction of statutes or other legal documents, indicating that the
express inclusion of one or more things of a particular type necessarily implies an intention to exclude
others of that type.
It is a Latin phrase that says „Express Mention and Implied Exclusion‟ that means express mention of

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one thing excludes all other things. Here it is considered that the items which are not on the list are not
covered by the statute. When something is expressly mentioned in the statute it leads to the presumption
that the things which are not specified in the statute are excluded.

General words in a statute must receive a general construction unless the statute is specifying any special
meaning to the general words. Whenever something is added in the statute it is added with the due
consciousness. It is assumed that if something is not added in the statute there is a reason behind it,
which is to exclude that from the particular statute.
Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius means that one thing having been mentioned the other is
excluded. Lopes, L.J opines this maxim means a valuable servant but a dangerous master (Coluhoun v.
Brooks (1886)21 Q.B.D 52).
Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, it is a maxim for ascertaining the intention of the legislature.
Where the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, there is no scope for applying the rule
(Parbhani Transport Coop. Society v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1960 SC 801).
In sum, the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters,
it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. Where a statute, by its terms,
is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned.
Legal fiction-
Legal fiction is defined as: -

 An assumption of law that something which is false is true.

 A state of facts exists which has never really existed.

A legal fiction is a devise by which the law deliberately departs from the truth of things for some reason.

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E.g. A foreigner was treated to be a Roman citizen for the purpose of jurisdiction. Legal fiction is treated
in the provisions of an enactment by using the term “is deemed”. The deeming provision is for the
purpose of assuming the existence of fact does not really exist.

In New India Assurance Co. Ltd v Complete Insulation Pvt Ltd, the Supreme Court held that legal fiction
created under S.157 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the transfer of 3rd party insurance is deemed to
have effect from buyer to seller.

In Bengal Immunity Co Ltd v State of Bihar, the Supreme Court that the legal fiction should not be
extended beyond its legitimate limits. In Pandurang Vinayak v State of Bombay, the Supreme Court held
that for the purpose of legal fiction, the word “ordinance‟ is to be read as „enactment‟.

In Bombay corporation v CIT Bombay, S 43 of the Income Tax Act provided that under certain
circumstances, an agent is for all the purpose of this Act, deemed to be an agent of a non-resident person.
Such agent is deemed to be an assessed.

In Avatar Singh v State of Punjab, it was held that rules framed in contravention of the Electricity Act,
1910 are separate and hence theft of electricity is not an offence under the IPC. Legal fiction is an
important subsidiary rule of interpretation of Statute. It is useful in deciding case where certain things are
presumed to exist in fact of their non-existences.

REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS-

Reddendo singula singulis is a Latin term that means by referring each to each; referring each phrase or
expression to its corresponding object.Where multiple subjects and multiple objects are set out in a
provision, the reddendo singula singulis, or “referring each to each”, is a grammar based rule that helps
the reader sort out which subjects correspond to which objects.

It is a rule of construction used typically in distributing property. For example, when a will says "I
devise and bequeath all my real and personal property to A", the principle of reddendo singula singulis
would apply as if it read "I devise all my real property, and bequeath all my personal property, to B",

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since the word devise is appropriate only to real property and the term bequeath is appropriate only to
personal property.
The best example of reddendo singula singulis is quoted from Wharton‟s law Lexicon, “If anyone shall
draw or load any sword or gun the word draw is applied to sword only and the word load to gun only, the
former verb to former noun and latter to latter, because it is impossible to load a sword or to draw a gun,
and so of other applications of different sets of words to one another.” The reddendo singula singulis
principle concerns the use of words distributively.
Where a complex sentence has more than one subject, and more than one object, it may be the right
construction to provide each to each, by reading the provision distributively and applying each object to
its appropriate subject. A similar principle applies to verbs and their subjects, and to other parts of
speech.
Thus, Reddendo singula singulis is a Latin term that means by referring each to each; referring each
phrase or expression to its corresponding object. It is a rule of construction used typically in distributing
property. For example, when a will says "I devise and bequeath all my real and personal property to A",
the principle of reddendo singula singulis would apply as if it read "I devise all my real property, and
bequeath all my personal property, to B", since the word devise is appropriate only to real property and
the term bequeath is appropriate only to personal property.

GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT-

Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant is a legal maxim, used in India, means that “where there are general
words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending to subjects
specially dealt with by the earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier or special legislation
indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any
indication of particular intention to do so” (Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur v. Man Mohan Dev AIR
1966 SC 1931).

The literal meaning of this expression is that general words or things do not derogate from special. This
expression was explained to mean that when there is conflict between a general and special provision,

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the latter shall prevail (CIT v. Shahzada Nand & Sons [1966] 60 ITR 392 (SC) and Union of India v.
India Fisheries (P.) Ltd. AIR 1966 SC 35), or the general provisions must yield to the special provisions.
(State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai AIR 1979 SC 1098) The maxim is regarded as a „cardinal principle
of interpretation‟ (State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai AIR 1979 SC 1098.), and is characterized as a
well-recognized principle. (See Secy. of State v. Hindustan Co-operative Society AIR 1931 PC 149 and
Patna Improvement Trust v. Shrimati Lakshmi Devi AIR 1963 SC 1077.)

The general provision, however, controls cases where the special provision does not apply as the special
provision is given effect to the extent of its scope. (South India Corpn. (P.) Ltd. v Secretary Board of
Revenue AIR 1964 SC 207.) Thus a particular or a special provision controls or cuts down the general
rule. (Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661.)

In Paradip Port Trust v Their Workmen (AIR 1977 SC 36.), the Supreme Court was called upon to
decide whether representation by a legal practitioner was permissible in an industrial dispute before
adjudicatory authorities contemplated by the Industrial Disputes Act. By applying this maxim, the
Supreme Court held that the special provision in the Industrial Disputes Act would prevail in that regard
over the Advocates Act which was held to be a general piece of legislation relating to subject-matter of
appearance of lawyers before all courts, tribunals and other authorities, whereas Industrial Disputes Act
was concerned with the representation by legal practitioners.

This maxim was applied when the questions relating to assessments of a firm and its partners arose under
the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the dissolution of the firm and its succession are held to be governed by
the Special Act viz., the Income-tax Act and not the Partnership Act. The technical view of the nature of
a partnership cannot be taken in applying the law of income-tax.

Where a special provision is made in derogation of the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, the
effect is given to it. Where the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act are clear, resort cannot be had to
the provisions of another statute. (Dharam Pal Sat Dev v. CIT [1974] 97 ITR 302 (P&H) and Nandlal
Sohanlal v. CIT [1977] 110 ITR 170 (P&H) (FB).) When the Legislature has deliberately made a

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specific provision to cover a particular situation, for the purpose of making an assessment of a firm under
the Income-tax Act, there is no scope for importing the concept and the provisions of the Partnership
Act. (See CIT v. Shambulal Nathalal & Co. [1984] 145 ITR 329 (Kar).

In determining whether a statute is special or a general one, the focus must be on the principal subject-
matter plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other
purposes it may be special and distinction cannot be blurred when finer points of law are dealt with. The
Supreme Court inD.J. Bahadur‟s (See LIC of India v. D.J. Bahadur AIR 1980 SC 2181.) case held that
“…vis-á-vis „industrial disputes‟ at the termination of the settlement as between the workmen and the
Corporation, the Industrial Disputes Act is a special legislation and the LIC Act is a general legislation.
Likewise, when compensation on nationalization is the question, the LIC Act is the special statute. An
application of the generalis maxim as expounded by English textbooks and decisions leaves us in no
doubt that the I.D. Act being special law prevails over the LIC Act which is but general law.”

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