Psychological Bulletin Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association

2008, Vol. 134, No. 2, 163–206 0033-2909/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.134.2.163

Constructive and Unconstructive Repetitive Thought

Edward R. Watkins
University of Exeter

The author reviews research showing that repetitive thought (RT) can have constructive or unconstructive
consequences. The main unconstructive consequences of RT are (a) depression, (b) anxiety, and (c)
difficulties in physical health. The main constructive consequences of RT are (a) recovery from upsetting
and traumatic events, (b) adaptive preparation and anticipatory planning, (c) recovery from depression,
and (d) uptake of health-promoting behaviors. Several potential principles accounting for these distinct
consequences of RT are identified within this review: (a) the valence of thought content, (b) the
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

intrapersonal and situational context in which RT occurs, and (c) the level of construal (abstract vs.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

concrete processing) adopted during RT. Of the existing models of RT, it is proposed that an elaborated
version of the control theory account provides the best theoretical framework to account for its distinct
consequences.

Keywords: repetitive thought, rumination, worry, cognitive processing, control theory

Repetitive, prolonged, and recurrent thought about one’s self, applied and clinical value, in terms of improving recovery from
one’s concerns and one’s experiences is a mental process com- traumatic events and reducing vulnerability to anxiety and depres-
monly engaged in by all people (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & sion. Nonetheless, there have been few systematized attempts to
Shafran, 2004). Such thinking bridges many topics within psychol- account for the distinct constructive and unconstructive outcomes
ogy: social cognition, emotion, motivation, self-regulation, goal of RT (for initial suggestions, see Harvey et al., 2004; Martin &
attainment, stress, psychopathology, and mental health. Examples Tesser, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004b; Segerstrom, Stanton, Al-
of such thinking include worry, rumination, perseverative cogni- den, & Shortridge, 2003). Thus, the first aim of the current article
tion, emotional processing, cognitive processing, mental simula- is to address this omission by reviewing and organizing the exten-
tion, rehearsal, reflection, and problem solving (e.g., Martin & sive literature on the distinct consequences of RT in a coherent
Tesser, 1996; Mor & Winquist, 2002; Papageorgiou & Wells, way. The second aim is to identify principles and/or mechanisms
2004; Wyer, 1996). Across these constructs, there is considerable that could explain the distinct consequences of RT. The third aim
similarity and overlap in theoretical conceptualizations and oper- is to discuss existing models of RT in the light of this review to
ational definitions. However, because these constructs have determine which theory best accounts for the extant literature on
emerged in distinct research domains, they are usually not equated RT. I first define the constructs used in this review, including the
with one another and have rarely been considered together. More- generic construct repetitive thought, as well as more specific
over, research has shown that these constructs have diverse out- examples and classes of RT considered in this article. I then
comes, such that repetitive thought (RT) can have both uncon- evaluate the evidence relevant to making a distinction between
structive and constructive consequences. For example, on one constructive and unconstructive consequences of RT before sum-
hand, within the cognitive processing literature, RT about symp- marizing and abstracting the key factors that emerge from this
toms and upsetting events has been conceptualized as necessary review to account for these distinct consequences of RT. Finally,
for people to come to terms with traumatic and upsetting events I examine which of the existing models of RT best accounts for
(Horowitz, 1985; Pennebaker, 1997; Rachman, 1980; Tedeschi & this data.
Calhoun, 2004). On the other hand, RT about symptoms and
upsetting events has been found to predict future depression (In-
What Is Meant by RT?
gram, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000; Pyszczynski & Green-
berg, 1987) and poor recovery from traumatic and upsetting This review focuses on a number of thought processes that that
events. have been highlighted as important in the wider literature relevant
Accounting for the discrepant consequences of RT is critical in to self-regulation, psychopathology, and mental and physical
understanding the underlying mechanisms of RT and is of obvious health. A property common to all of these constructs is the process
conceptualized by Segerstrom et al. (2003, p. 909) as “repetitive
thought,”, defined as the “process of thinking attentively, repeti-
tively or frequently about one’s self and one’s world,” which was
This research was supported by Project Grants 065809 and 080099 from
the Wellcome Trust, United Kingdom.
proposed to form “the core of a number of different models of
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Edward adjustment and maladjustment.” As the rest of this section makes
Watkins, Mood Disorders Centre, School of Psychology, University of clear, these different classes of RT encompass a wide range of
Exeter, Washington Singer Laboratories, Perry Road, Exeter EX4 4QG, conceptualizations, associated with both unconstructive and con-
United Kingdom. E-mail: e.r.watkins@exeter.ac.uk structive consequences.

163
 164 WATKINS

Depressive Rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; see Davey, 1993, for a dis-
cussion of this and other measures; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, &
Nolen-Hoeksema defined depressive rumination as “behaviors Borkovec, 1990) assesses predisposition to worry (e.g., “I am
and thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symp- always worrying about something”).
toms and on the implications of these symptoms” (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569) and as “passively and repetitively focus- Perseverative Cognition
ing on one’s symptoms of distress and the circumstances
Perseverative cognition has been defined as “the repeated or
surrounding these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Lar-
chronic activation of the cognitive representation of one or more
son, 1997). Nolen-Hoeksema’s Response Styles Theory (RST;
psychological stressors” and is hypothesized to be a core feature of
1991, 2000, 2004a, 2004b) hypothesized that depressive rumina-
worry, rumination, and other forms of RT (Brosschot, Gerin, &
tion is a particular response style to depressed mood, which is
Thayer, 2006; Brosschot, Pieper, & Thayer, 2005; Pieper &
causally implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression.
Brosschot, 2005). Perseverative cognition is hypothesized to in-
Depressive rumination is typically assessed on the Response Styles
volve repeated cognitive representations of a psychological prob-
Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), which
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

lem or crisis, which acts to prolong the immediate psychological

asks participants to endorse how much they ruminate in response
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

and physiological responses to such life events and daily stressors

to sad or depressed mood (e.g., “When you feel sad, down or
such that the body’s systems associated with stress (e.g., cardio-
depressed how often do you: Think ‘Why do I always react this
vascular, hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal, and immune systems)
way?’”). A related questionnaire is the Rumination on Sadness
become chronically activated, leading to the development of dis-
Scale (RSS; Conway, Csank, Holm, & Blake, 2000), which as-
ease (Brosschot et al., 2006; A. R. Schwartz et al., 2003).
sesses tendency to engage in RT when feeling sad, down, or blue
(e.g., “I repeatedly analyze and keep thinking about the reasons for
Cognitive and Emotional Processing
my sadness”).
Cognitive processing has been defined as the process of actively
thinking about a stressor, the thoughts and feelings it evokes, and
Rumination (Martin & Tesser, 1996)
its implications for one’s life and future (J. E. Bower, Kemeny,
Rumination was defined as “a class of conscious thoughts that Taylor, & Fahey, 1998; Greenberg, 1995), thus falling within the
revolve around a common instrumental theme and that recur in the definition of RT (Silver, Boone, & Stone, 1983). Cognitive pro-
absence of immediate environmental demands requiring the cessing accounts propose that RT about upsetting events, for
thoughts” (Martin & Tesser, 1996, p. 7). Within this conceptual- example in the form of persistent intrusions about the event, is part
ization, rumination is RT on a theme related to personal goals and of the process of attempting to resolve the discrepancy between
concerns, which can have either constructive or unconstructive stressful events and core beliefs and assumptions (Greenberg,
consequences, depending on whether the RT helps or hinders the 1995; Horowitz, 1985; McCann, Sakheim, & Abrahamson, 1988;
progress toward the unattained goal that triggered the rumination. D. N. Mcintosh, Silver, & Wortman, 1993). Such accounts hy-
It is assessed with the Global Rumination Scale, which measures pothesize that in response to a stressful experience, people think
the extent to which an individual dwells on problems and concerns repetitively about their experience in order to work it through,
(W. D. McIntosh & Martin, 1992). make sense of it, and integrate it into their beliefs and assumptions
about the world (Harber & Pennebaker, 1992; Horowitz, 1986;
Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Tait & Silver, 1989). Similarly, RT is hy-
Worry pothesized to be a central process in the development of posttrau-
Worry has been defined as “a chain of thoughts and images, matic growth, defined as “the experience of significant positive
negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable” and as “an change arising from the struggle with a major life crisis” (Calhoun,
attempt to engage in mental problem-solving on an issue whose Cann, Tedeschi, & McMillan, 2000, p. 521; see also Calhoun &
outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more Tedeschi, 1998; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Tedeschi and Cal-
negative outcomes” (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & Depree, houn (2004) proposed that major traumatic events challenge or
1983, p. 9). Worry typically involves RT about future potential destroy key aspects of individuals’ beliefs and goals, producing
threat, imagined catastrophes, uncertainties, and risks (e.g., “What emotional distress, which in turn produces RT in order to resolve
if they have an accident?”). It is conceptualized as an attempt to the distress, leading to personal growth.
avoid negative events, to prepare for the worst, and to problem Emotional processing has been defined as volitional efforts to
solve, and it is linked to unconstructive outcomes including in- acknowledge and understand the significance of one’s emotions
creased negative affect, interference with cognitive function, and and is operationalized as persistent focus and analysis of feelings
disruptions to physiological processes (Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, (e.g., “I take time to figure out what I’m really feeling”; Stanton,
1998). However, worry is also proposed to serve a number of Danoff-Burg, et al., 2000; Stanton, Kirk, Cameron, & Danoff-
constructive functions when it is objective, controllable, and brief Burg, 2000). Emotional processing has been associated with both
(Tallis & Eysenck, 1994): (a) an alarm function that interrupts constructive outcomes, such as better adjustment, and unconstruc-
ongoing behavior and directs attention to an issue demanding tive outcomes, such as increased distress.
immediate priority; (b) a prompt function, keeping an individual
aware of potential unresolved threats; and (c) a preparation func-
Planning, Problem Solving, and Mental Simulation
tion, motivating an individual to prepare for difficulties and to RT can also take the form of cognitive coping strategies, such as
adopt adaptive behaviors that reduce potential threat. The Penn anticipatory coping, planning, rehearsal, and problem solving.
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 165

Problem solving has been conceptualized as involving several “self-absorption paradox,” which reflects the fact that private
stages: definition or appraisal of the problem, generation of alter- self-consciousness is positively associated with both increased
native solutions, selection of alternatives, implementing the chosen self-knowledge, which is assumed to facilitate psychological ad-
solution, and evaluating its effectiveness (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, justment, and increased psychological distress and psychopathol-
1971), each of which could involve RT. Plan rehearsal involves ogy. Noting that private self-consciousness was correlated with
envisioning the steps or strategies one could use to achieve a both Neuroticism and Openness to Experience, Trapnell and
desired outcome and often involves repetitive mental rehearsing of Campbell (1999) hypothesized that the self-absorption paradox
future actions and situations. Similarly, mental simulation has been could be explained if there was a neurotically motivated, threat-
defined as the imaginative and imitative mental construction and avoidant form of chronic self-focus, labeled rumination, which
representation of some event or series of events (Taylor, Pham, contributes to psychopathology, as well as a contrasting form of
Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989). Repeated chronic self-focus, motivated by epistemic curiosity, labeled re-
mental simulation can be an important process in planning, coping, flection, which would be associated with increased self-
and self-regulation, via rehearsal of likely future events or by knowledge. The Rumination–Reflection Questionnaire (Trapnell
replaying past events (Pham & Taylor, 1999). Mental simulations & Campbell, 1999) distinguishes between reflection (e.g., “I love
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

can also take the form of “painful ruminations that plague many analyzing why I do things”) and rumination, defined as RT about
people suffering from depression or reacting to trauma” (Taylor et the self prompted by threats, losses, or injustices to the self.
al., 1998, p. 431), for example, an individual repetitively replaying
a memory of a car accident. Mind Wandering
Mind wandering has been defined as “a shift of attention from
Counterfactual Thinking a primary task toward internal information, such as memories”
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, p. 946). Mind wandering can be
Counterfactual thinking is the generation of imagined mental
persistent and repetitive, and as such fits within RT. Mind wan-
representations of alternative versions of the past (Roese, 1997;
dering has unconstructive consequences in terms of reduced atten-
upward if better than what actually happened, e.g., “If only I had
tion to external task-related information and interfering with per-
studied more, I would have done better”; downward if worse than
formance on tasks that require substantial controlled processing
reality, e.g., “If I had turned left, I would have crashed”). Repeated
(Smallwood, Davies, et al., 2004; Teasdale, Dritschel, et al., 1995).
counterfactual thinking is often prompted by negative affect and in
However, it is hypothesized to facilitate problem solving by re-
response to difficult events (Roese & Olson, 1993). Upward coun-
peated working over unresolved current concerns (Smallwood &
terfactuals can have unconstructive consequences, such as exacer-
Schooler, 2006).
bating shame, guilt, anxiety, sadness, and regret (Mandel, 2003;
Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; Niedenthal,
Post-Event Rumination
Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Sanna, 1997), and can have construc-
tive consequences, such as generating inferences about the causes Post-event rumination (also called “post-event processing” and
of previous difficulties, guiding effective preparative and preven- “post-mortem thinking”) has been defined as “repetitive thoughts
tive behavior (Mandel & Lehman, 1996; Roese, 1997). about subjective experiences during a recent social interaction,
including self-appraisals and external evaluations of partners and
Defensive Pessimism other details involving the event” (Kashdan & Roberts, 2007, p.
286). Post-event rumination is hypothesized to contribute to the
Defensive pessimism is characterized by (a) setting low expec- development and maintenance of social anxiety (Clark & Wells,
tations about future outcomes and (b) a “thinking through” pro- 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).
cess, called reflectivity/reflection, in which individuals extensively
reflect on and rehearse possible “worst-case scenarios” of what Positive Rumination
could go wrong prior to an event and then imagine how these
Positive rumination has been defined as “the tendency to re-
negative outcomes might be prevented (Cantor & Norem, 1989;
spond to positive affective states with thoughts about positive
Norem & Cantor, 1986a, 1986b; Norem & Chang, 2002; Norem &
self-qualities, positive affective experience, and one’s favorable
Illingworth, 1993, 2004; Spencer & Norem, 1996). Defensive
life circumstances that might amplify the positive affect” (S. L.
pessimism is conceptualized as strategically serving (a) a self-
Johnson, McKenzie, & McMurrich, in press). Positive rumination
protective goal of preparing for possible failure and (b) a motiva-
is hypothesized to be a process that may contribute to the dysregu-
tional goal of increasing effort to enhance the possibility of doing
lation of positive affect in individuals vulnerable to mania and
well (Sanna, 1996, 2000; Showers, 1992; Showers & Ruben,
hypomania. The Responses to Positive Affect Questionnaire (Feld-
1990).
man, Joorman, & Johnson, in press) assesses how much an indi-
vidual ruminates in response to positive mood (e.g., “When you
Reflection feel happy, excited, or enthused how often do you: ‘Think about
how happy you feel’”).
Reflection has been defined as chronic self-consciousness that
involves playful exploration of novel, unique, or alternative self-
Habitual Negative Self-Thinking
perceptions, motivated by curiosity and pleasurable, intrinsic in-
terest in philosophical thinking (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The Habitual negative self-thinking is negative self-thinking that has
construct of reflection developed as an attempt to explain the become a mental habit, defined as having “a history of repetition,
 166 WATKINS

characterized by a lack of awareness and conscious intent, men- sults), helpful cognitions and behaviors (e.g., generating plans,
tally efficient, and sometimes difficult to control” (Verplanken, active behavioral problem solving, information seeking), and im-
Friborg, Wang, Trafimow, & Woolf, 2007, p. 526). The Habit proved cognitive functioning (e.g., improved memory recall, better
Index of Negative Thinking (Verplanken et al., 2007) assesses the concentration), with unconstructive consequences defined in terms
self-reported experience of the frequency, awareness, automaticity, of the reverse, detrimental and negative outcomes.
and control of negative thinking. Three principal types of studies were considered: (a) cross-
sectional designs in which a measure of RT was found to be
Overview correlated with a measure of positive or negative outcome; (b)
prospective longitudinal designs that assessed extent of RT at an
From this brief summary, it is clear that RT is a process common initial assessment point (T1) and examined whether it predicted a
to a number of important constructs in the realms of psychopa- dependent variable (e.g., depression) at a later date (T2), typically
thology and self-regulation that has been hypothesized to have controlling for the dependent variable at T1; and (c) experimental
both constructive and unconstructive consequences. Throughout designs that manipulated degree and/or nature of RT, and mea-
this article, I will use the construct RT as the generic label to
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

sured potential consequences, and, thus, could determine whether

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

represent the constructs reviewed above, in preference to other RT had a causal effect on the measured dependent variable. The
labels such as worry and rumination, because RT is (a) more latter two designs were given greater weight in the review because
inclusive than other conceptualizations, encompassing the full they demonstrate that the dependent variable is a consequence of
range of constructs reviewed above; (b) not wedded to a particular RT, through indicating either a direct causal role of RT (experi-
theoretical viewpoint, unlike, say, rumination, which is typically mental) or a predictive function for RT antecedent to the depen-
associated with RST; (c) less likely to cause confusion than other dent variable (longitudinal). Throughout, the review will be orga-
terms that already have multiple conceptualizations and meanings nized by type of study, and, where appropriate, by whether the
(e.g., rumination); (d) uncontaminated with prior assumptions as to
consequences are main effects of RT or are moderated by inter-
whether it is constructive or unconstructive, unlike rumination,
actions with other factors. It is worth noting at the outset that the
whose clinical usage typically reflects pathological processes; (e)
literature on the unconstructive consequences of RT has been
highly correlated with measures of worry and rumination, which in
better developed than the literature on the constructive conse-
turn are highly related to each other, suggesting the value of
quences of RT.
examining more generic conceptualizations of thought process
(Feldman & Hayes, 2005; Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, &
Heimberg, 2002; Harrington & Blankenship, 2002; Hong, 2007; RT With Unconstructive Consequences
Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005; Segerstrom,
Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; Verplanken et al., 2007; Watkins, The main findings that emerged from reviewing this literature
2004b; Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005). are that RT is implicated in (a) vulnerability to depression, (b)
vulnerability to anxiety, and (c) difficulties in physical health.
Studies Included in the Review Table 1 summarizes the relevant articles, reporting the design,
sample, measures, and main findings. The section on RT and
A computerized search using keyword terms was conducted to depression is the largest because of the extensive research on
identify relevant publications for this review. The search, intended depressive rumination.
to search for studies investigating RT, included the following
terms (using wild cards, such as ruminat* for ruminate, rumina-
tion, ruminator, ruminative): repetitive thought, worry, rumina- RT and Vulnerability to Depression
tion, perseverative cognition, mental simulation, cognitive pro-
cessing, emotional processing, reflection, problem solving, Cross-Sectional Studies
defensive pessimism, mind wandering, and counterfactual entered
into a number of academic databases (e.g., Web of Science— In cross-sectional studies using the RSQ, depressive rumina-
Science Citation Index Extended and Social Science Citation In- tion is found to be (a) elevated in currently depressed patients,
dex, PsycINFO, MEDLINE) from the beginning point of each formerly depressed patients, and women relative to men (Riso
database through the middle of 2007. The Social Science Citation et al., 2003; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998) and (b) associated
Index was also searched for references citing seminal articles (e.g., with depressive symptoms in adults (Eshun, 2000; Ito et al.,
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000). In addition, reference lists of the 2003; Lam, Smith, Checkley, Rijsdijk, & Sham, 2003; Rich-
obtained articles as well as numerous review articles and chapters mond, Spring, Sommerfeld, & McChargue, 2001; see the re-
(e.g., Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996) were reviewed for relevant view by Thomsen, 2006), children (Abela, Vanderbilt, &
articles. Rochon, 2004; Ziegert & Kistner, 2002), and adolescents
Studies were included in this review if they reported either (Kuyken, Watkins, Holden, & Cook, 2006). Moreover, depres-
constructive or unconstructive consequences associated with RT. sive rumination partially accounts for the 2:1 rates of depres-
Constructive consequences were defined in terms of beneficial and sion in women relative to men: Once statistically adjusted for,
positive outcomes and products, including (but not limited to) there is no difference between men and women in rates of
reduced negative affect, increased positive affect, decreases in depression (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Grant et al.,
anxiety and depression, improved physical or mental health, im- 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999).
proved performance (e.g., better academic grades and exam re- (text continues on page 175)
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 167

Table 1
Studies Demonstrating Unconstructive Consequences of Repetitive Thought (RT)

Author Design and sample Measure Main finding

Cross-sectional studies

Abbott & Rapee 54 socially anxious patients vs. Post-event RT for 1 wk after Post-event RT: Socially phobic ⬎ non-anxious
(2004) 32 non-anxious controls impromptu speech
Abela et al. (2004) 260 3rd & 7th grade children RSQ, CDI RT positively correlated depression.
Borkovec et al. Study 1: 305 u/g’s STAI, BDI, % of day worrying Worry correlated anxiety, depression, social-evaluative
(1983) fears
Callander & Brown 62 women at recurrent Thought listing, anxiety, depression Upward counterfactuals positively correlated anxiety
(2007) miscarriage clinic
Clohessy & Ehlers 56 ambulance service workers PSS, GHQ, responses to intrusions RT positively correlated with post-traumatic stress
(1999) (RT) symptoms
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Conway et al. Study 2: 188 u/g’s RSS, distress about current Rumination on sadness significantly positively
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

(2000) concern, BDI, NEO–FFI correlated with BDI & neuroticism

Edwards et al. High vs. low social anxious Post-event RT for 1 wk after Negative rumination: High anxious ⬎ low anxious
(2003) impromptu speech
El Leithy et al. 46 victims of physical assault IES–R, counterfactual fluency & Frequency of counterfactual thinking positively
(2006) frequency correlated with posttraumatic distress
Eshun (2000) 194 college students, USA & RSQ, suicidal ideation Gender and rumination accounted for significant
Ghana questionnaire variance in suicidal ideation
Feldman & Hayes Study 3; 325 u/g’s MMAP, RSQ, PSWQ, SPSI–R, Stagnant deliberation & outcome fantasy correlated
(2005) MASQ with increased depression & anxiety; problem
analysis correlated increased anxiety
Grant et al. (2004) 622 low-income, African RSQ, depression, anxiety on YSR Depression: girls⬎boys. Rumination correlated
American adolescents depression. Gender effect for depression mediated
by extent of rumination
Harrington & 199 u/gs BDI, BAI, GRS Rumination significantly positively correlated with
Blakenship depression and anxiety
(2002)
Harvey (2000) 30 insomnia patients, 30 good Semi-structured interview Pre-sleep worry: Insomnia patients ⬎ good sleepers
sleepers
Ito et al. (2003) Retrospective, 106 parents rumination, SCID, RSQ Ruminative coping after loss was significantly
following death of a child associated with MDE
Johnson et al. (in 28 Bipolar Disorder patients, RSQ, RPA Depressive rumination: Bipolar ⫽ MDD ⬎ no mood
press) 35 MDD patients; 44 no disorder; positive rumination: Bipolar ⬎ MDD ⫽
mood disorder no mood disorder. Positive rumination positively
correlated hypomania
Joorman et al. 64 MDD patients RSQ, emotional facial dot-probe Brooding significantly correlated with attentional bias
(2006) towards sad faces
Kocovski et al. 55 high vs. 57 low socially Vignettes of public mistakes Report of rumination: High socially anxious ⬎ low
(2005) anxious u/g’s socially anxious
Kuyken et al. High vs. low risk vs. MDD; EPQ–N, BDI, RSQ, PHQ–A Rumination: MDD ⬎ at risk (high N) ⬎ not at risk
(2006) 326 adolescents (age 14–18) Rumination correlated depression in MDD group
Lam et al. (2003) 109 MDD patients RSQ, BDI, ASQ, DAS Rumination correlated depression scores, number of
past depression episodes
Lyubomirsky et al. Retrospective, 70 breast cancer RSQ, delay in seeking help Time to presentation: High ruminators ⬎ low
(2006) survivors ruminators (on average 39 days longer)
Markman & Miller 58 u/gs divided into severe Coding of counterfactuals, rating of Greater reduction in negative ratings following RT for
(2006) depression, mild-to-moderate negative event less depressed. Uncontrollable, characterological
depression, no depression, counterfactuals: severe depression ⫽ no depression
generated counterfactuals ⬎ mild-to-moderate depression
about recent negative
academic event
Mellings & Alden 58 socially anxious; 58 non- Frequency of post-event RT Frequency of post-event RT: Socially anxious ⬎ non-
(2000) anxious following social interaction anxious. RT predicted recall of negative self-related
information, negative self-judgments when
anticipating a further social interaction
Meyer et al. (1990) Study 2: 405 u/g’s PSWQ, BDI, STAI Worry positively correlated anxiety and depression
Nolen-Hoeksema & 740 community sample RSQ, beliefs recontrollability of Beliefs about controllability of emotions, mastery of
Jackson (2001) emotions, mastery of negative negative events mediated gender difference in
events rumination
Papadakis et al. 223 girls between 7th–12th RSQ, discrepancy between actual Rumination interacted with discrepancy to predict
(2006) grade & ideal self, BDI concurrent depression
Perini et al. (2006) High vs. low socially anxious Post-event RT for 1 wk after Post-event rumination: Socially anxious ⬎ low
groups speech anxious
(table continues)
 168 WATKINS

Table 1 (continued)

Author Design and sample Measure Main finding

Cross-sectional studies

Rachman et al. 130 u/g’s BDI, social anxiety inventory, post Post-event RT significantly positively correlated with
(2000) event RT social anxiety and depression
Richmond et al. 145 u/g’s IDD, RSQ Increased rumination associated greater levels of
(2001) current and past depressive symptoms
Riso et al. (2003) Outpatients: 42 dysthymia; 27 SCID, DAS, ASQ, RSQ, IDS Ruminative response style: Dysthymia ⫽ nonchronic
nonchronic MDD; 24 MDD ⬎ never-ill controls
control participant
Roberts et al. Study 1: 13 CD; 13 PD; 19 RSQ, BDI, IDD, IDD–L Study 1: Rumination: currently dysphoric (CD) ⫽
(1998) ND; Study 2: 24 CD; 87 previously dysphoric (PD) ⬎ never-dysphoric (ND)
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

PPD; 149 BPD; 356 ND Study 2: Rumination: CD ⫽ prolonged PD ⬎ brief

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

PD ⬎ ND. Rumination: females ⬎ males.

Rumination mediates effects of gender & N on
dysphoria.
Rude et al. (2007) Study 1: 232 u/g’s. Study 2: Study 1: RSQ, STAI, Self-rating Study 1 & 2: both brooding & reflection positively
463 u/g’s depression scale; Study 2: non- associated depression, anxiety. Study 2: non-judging
judging RSQ, RSQ, BDI reflection not correlated with depression.
Schlotz et al. 219 pts Worry & work overload, saliva on Increased worry associated greater increase and
(2004) awaking & at 30, 45, 60 mins elevated mean levels of cortisol on weekdays
for 6 days
Schwartz et al. Recovery after anger recall; 30 Thoughts related to anger recall, Slower BP recovery after anger recall in women only
(2000) general population BP
Segerstrom et al. Study 1: 110 u/g’s; 40 CBT Measure of RT, RSQ, PSWQ, BDI, Study 1: RT correlated RSQ, PSWQ; anxiety &
(2000) outpatients BAI depression
Smallwood, Study 1: 30 u/g’s. Examined CES–D Mind wandering (task unrelated thought during
O’Connor, et al. mind wandering via thought probes) positively correlated with depression
(2004) probes during vigilance and
word encoding tasks
Smallwood et al. 37 u/g’s split into high vs. low CES–D, RSQ During word encoding, high dysphoric group showed
(2007) dysphoric, thought probes an increase in mind wandering relative to low
during word encoding vs. dysphoric group. Mind wandering associated slower
word shadowing followed reaction times, poorer recognition in the encoding
by word fragment condition.
completion recognition task
Steil & Ehlers 2 Studies: 159 & 138 RTA PSS, cognitive strategies incl. Rumination positively correlated with PTSD severity
(2000) survivors rumination
Suchday et al. 40 male students Recovery of BP after provocation, Angry rumination associated slower recovery of BP
(2004) angry rumination
Thomsen et al. 126 students ECQ–R, POMS, PSQI RT positively correlated with depressive, anxious &
(2003) angry mood, poorer sleep quality, longer sleep-
onset.
Trapnell & 3 samples u/g’s, n ⫽ 441, n ⫽ RRQ, NEO-FFI, BDI Rumination scale significantly positively correlated
Campbell (1999) 570, n ⫽ 710 with depressive symptoms (r ⫽ .38, r ⫽ .36) and
neuroticism (r ⫽ .64)
Verplanken et al. Study 2: 142 u/g’s; study 3: 97 HINT, ATQ, RSE Habitual negative self-thinking positively correlated
(2007) u/g’s negative thoughts, low self-esteem (Study 2, 3)
Ziegert & Kistner 201 adolescents RSQ, CDI Rumination elevated in girls relative to boys;
(2002) rumination associated with depressive symptoms

Longitudinal studies

Abela et al. (2002) T2 ⫽ 6 wks; 130 3rd & 184 RSQ, CDI RT at T1 predicted depressive symptoms at T2
7th grade children
Andrea et al. T2 ⫽ 10 mths; 253 low vs. PSWQ, self-reported fatigue Worry & fatigue strongly positively correlated at T1.
(2004) 204 high fatigue pts Worry at T1 predicted fatigue at T2, but only for
low fatigue participants after controlling T1 fatigue
Broadbent et al. T2 ⫽ 1st 20 hrs after hernia Pre-surgery worry, wound fluid Greater worry predicted lower levels of matrix
(2003) surgery; 36 hernia patients metalloproteinase-9 in wound fluid & self-reports of
painful, poorer, and slower recovery
Burwell & Shirk T1 ⫽ spring of 8th grade, T2 CDI, RSQ, CDRS-R Brooding predicted change in depression scores after
(2007) ⫽ fall of 9th grade, T3 ⫽ controlling for T1 depression, but reflection did not
spring of 9th grade (1 yr
later); 127 adolescents
(mean ⫽ 14 yrs)
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 169

Table 1 (continued)

Author Design and sample Measure Main finding

Longitudinal studies

Butler & Nolen- T2 ⫽ 2 wks; 125 male, 74 RSQ, BDI Rumination: female ⬎ male. Rumination predicted T2
Hoeksema female u/g’s BDI, controlling T1 BDI. Once rumination
(1994) included, gender not predict depression.
Calmes & Roberts T2 ⫽ 6–8 wks; 451 u/g’s BAI, BDI, PSWQ, RSQ RT (worry & rumination) predicted T2 anxiety but not
(2007) T2 depression, controlling for T1 symptoms.
Symptom-focused rumination predicted T2
depression.
Ciesla & Roberts Study 4: T2 ⫽ 6 wks; 169 RSQ, BDI, RSE, LES Study 4: RT at T1 predicted depressive symptoms at
(2007) u/g’s T2 only in pts with low self-esteem & high life
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

stress
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Ehlers et al. (1998) T1 ⫽ 3 mths after RTA, T2 ⫽ PSS, RT about RTA RT at T1 predicted PTSD symptoms at T2 after
1 yr after; 967 consecutive controlling severity
RTA patients
Ehlers et al. (2003) T2 ⫽ 6 mths; 81 children age PTSD symptoms, RT rating Cognitive variables including RT at T1 predicted
5–16 after RTA PTSD symptoms at T2
Evers et al. (1998) T2 ⫽ 1 year; 91 arthritis Self-reported functional status, grip Worry on PCI at T1 predicted functional status & grip
patients strength, worry strength at T2, controlling for T1 scores
Feldman & Hayes Study 4. T1 start 1st semester; MMAP, RSQ, PSWQ, SPSI–R, Study 4: Stagnant deliberation & outcome fantasy at
(2005) T2 end 1st semester (13 MASQ T1 predicted depression at T2, controlling for T1
wks); 110 1st year law depression
students
Fortune et al. Duration of PSWQ, HADS, psoriasis area & Worry predicted time to clearance: psoriasis cleared
(2003) photochemotherapy; 112 severity index 1.8 ⫻ slower in high worriers vs. low worriers
chronic psoriasis patients
Holeva et al. T2 ⫽ 6 mths; 265 RTA TCQ, PTS Use of worry to control thoughts at T1 predicted
(2001) patients PTSD at T2
Hong (2007) T2 ⫽ 1 mth; 241 u/g’s PSWQ, RSQ, MASQ, COPE T1 worry predicted T2 anxiety & depression;
controlling T1 symptoms. T1 rumination predicted
T2 depression, controlling T1 symptoms
Ito et al. (2005, T2 ⫽ 8 mths; 191 u/g’s RSQ, DAS, depression Negative rumination was significant predictor of
2006) depression
Just & Alloy Follow-ups every 6 weeks for RSQ, BDI, SADS–L, DAS, CSQ Rumination predicted onset of MDE & severity of
(1997) 18 mths; 189 non-depressed episode
u/g’s at high & low risk for
MDE
Kubzansky et al. T2 ⫽ 20 years; 1759 men free Trait worry Worry about social conditions predicts the onset of
(1997) CHD CHD
Kuehner & Weber T2 ⫽ 4 wks, T3 ⫽ 4 mths PSE–10, IDD, RSQ Rumination at T2 predicted (a) levels of depressive
(1999) after discharge; 49 unipolar symptoms at T3; (b) MDE at T3 in those not
MDD inpatients remitted at T2
Mayou et al. T1 after RTA, T2 ⫽ 3 mths, HADS, PSS, cognitive variables Rumination at T2 predicted depression, general
(2001) T3 ⫽ 1 yr; 773 consecutive incl. rumination anxiety and PTSD symptoms at T3, after
RTA patients adjustment other predictors (severity, previous
mood)
Mayou et al. T2 ⫽ 3 yrs; 546 RTA patients PSS, emotional response; Rumination at 3 mths & 1 yr predicted PTSD severity
(2002) rumination at 3 yrs, though not after controlling for PTSD at 3
mths
Michael et al. T1 12 wks post-assault, T2 6 PDS, BDI, intrusions incl. Rumination about intrusive thoughts at T1 predicted
(2005) mths; 73 assault survivors rumination PTSD symptoms at T2
Moberly & Between subsequent intervals ruminative self-focus, negative RSQ predicted momentary ruminative self-focus.
Watkins (in (1.5 hrs) in ESM design; 93 affect 8 ⫻ daily at random Ruminative self-focus predicted negative affect at
press) adults intervals, RSQ T2, controlling for negative affect at T1
Morrison & T2 ⫽ 6 mths; 161 u/g’s RSQ, life events Rumination at T1 interacted with reported stress to
O’Connor (2005) predict social dysfunction at T2
Murray et al. T2 ⫽ 4 wks, T3 ⫽ 6 mths; 27 PDS, cognitive factors incl. Rumination at T1 predicted PTSD symptoms at T2
(2002) inpatient, 176 outpatient rumination and T3
RTA patients Rumination at T2 predicted PTSD symptoms at T3,
even controlling for dissociation and injury severity
Nolan et al. (1998) T2 ⫽ 8–10 wks; 135 u/g’s EPQ–N, IDD, RSQ N & rumination predicted T2 depression controlling
T1 depression, with this effect moderated T1
depression
Nolen-Hoeksema T2 ⫽ 1 year; 1,109 community RSQ, HRSD, BDI, SCID, BAI Rumination predicted: (a) onset of MDE in never-
(2000) sample depressed; (b) levels of anxiety and depression at
T2, controlling T1 symptoms
(table continues)
 170 WATKINS

Table 1 (continued)

Author Design and sample Measure Main finding

Longitudinal studies

Nolen-Hoeksema et T2 ⫽ 1 year; 30 gay men, Rumination from interview Rumination predicted increased distress (intrusive &
al. (1997) whose partners died from transcripts, IES, CES–D avoidant thoughts) but not depression, although not
AIDS after controlling T1 IES
Nolen-Hoeksema et T2 ⫽ 1 year later; 1,132 BDI, HRSD, RSQ, chronic strain, Rumination, chronic strain, & mastery mediated
al. (1999) community adults mastery gender difference in depression
Nolen-Hoeksema & T2 ⫽ 10 days after quake (n RSQ, IDD Rumination at T1 predicted depression and PTSD
Morrow (1991) ⫽ 137), T3 ⫽ 7 wks after stress symptoms at T2 and T3, controlling for T1
quake (n ⫽ 41); 250 u/g’s 2 symptoms. Rumination about earthquake at T2
wks before 1989 Lomo predicted stress symptoms at T3
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Prieta earthquake
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Nolen-Hoeksema et 79 u/g’s 30 day diary of mood & More ruminative responses predicted increased
al. (1993) rumination duration of depressed mood, after controlling for
initial severity of mood
Nolen-Hoeksema et T2 ⫽ 6 mths; 253 adults, 1 RSQ, HRSD, BDI, Social support Rumination at T1 predicted level of depressive
al. (1994) mth after death of loved one symptoms at T2 controlling T1 depression
Nolen-Hoeksema et Annually for 4 yrs; 496 female RSQ, SADS for Children, Eating Rumination predicted increases in depression, bulimia
al. (2007) adolescents, 11–15 yrs old Disorder Examination, substance symptoms & substance abuse over following yr;
abuse controlling for 1 year lag of symptoms. Depression
and bulimic symptoms predicted increases in
rumination over yr
Raes, Hermans, T2 ⫽ 7 mths; 28 MDD RSS, BDI, HRSD, AMT Rumination on sadness at T1 predicted BDI at T2 &
Williams, patients mediated relationship between memory specificity
Beyers, et al. & BDI
(2006)
Rector & Roger T1 start of term, T2 ⫽ 8 wks ECQ–R, GHC, York self-esteem Anxiety, depression, insomnia on GHC at T2
(1996) later, 121 1st year u/g’s inventory predicted by rehearsal at T1
Robinson & Alloy T2 ⫽ 2.5 yrs; 148 u/g’s at Stress-reactive rumination, RSQ, Stress-reactive rumination at T1 predicted future MDE
(2003) high and low cognitive risk BDI, DAS, CSQ, SADS–L at T2 in individuals with high DAS, CSQ but not
low DAS, CSQ
Roelofs et al. T2 ⫽ 6 mths; 331 at T1, 73 at RSQ, RRQ, Zung depression scale, Joint factor “rumination on causes of sadness”
(2006) T2 u/g’s STAI interacted with T1 depression to predict T2
depression, after controlling T1 rumination &
depression
Roger & Najarian T1 ⫽ immediately after exam, ECO–R, urinary cortisol Increases in cortisol T1 to T2 associated with
(1998) T2 ⫽ 3 wks later; 51 increased RT
student nurses
Rohan et al. (2003) T1 ⫽ Oct–Nov, T2 ⫽ Jan– RSQ, BDI, SCID, HRSD In SAD, RT assessed at T1 predicted depressive
Feb; 20 SAD women; 20 symptoms during winter at T2, after controlling for
controls T1 depression
Sakamoto et al. T2 ⫽ 2 mths; 98 u/g’s RSQ, Self-Rating Depression Scale Rumination at T1 predicts ruminative responses and
(2001) cognitive symptoms of depression at T2
Sarin et al. (2005) T1 ⫽ grading of difficult RSQ, MASQ Rumination at T1 predicts increases in anxiety at T2
midterm exam; T2 ⫽ 4–8 and increases in both depression & anxiety at T3
hrs later, T3 ⫽ 4 days later;
87 u/g’s
Schmaling et al. Course of treatment; 96 RSQ, BDI, HRSD Rumination predicts more depression/poor treatment
(2002) dysthymia / minor response across all 3 treatment conditions: PST,
depression paroxetine or placebo
Schwartz & Koenig T2 ⫽ 6 wks; 397 adolescents RSQ, ASQ, CDI Rumination at T1 predicted depression at T2
(1996)
Segerstrom et al. 2, 8, 15 weeks after Northridge PSWQ, IES, POMS, NK cells NK cells: Low worriers ⬎ high worriers
(1998) earthquake 1994; 47 hospital Intrusive thoughts: High worriers ⬎ low worriers
workers
Segerstrom et al. Study 2: T1 ⫽ prior midterm Measure of RT, RSQ, PSWQ, BDI, Shared variance between RSQ & PSWQ (repetitive
(2000) exam; T2 ⫽ 1 wk BAI thought) predicted maintenance of anxiety, after
post-exam; 90 u/g’s controlling for T1 anxiety (p ⬍ .07)
Siegle et al. (1999) Treatment outcome; 53 MDD RSQ, weekly BDI during CBT Rumination was associated with slower recovery from
or dysthymia patients depression, in part mediated by initial depression
Smith et al. (2006) T2 ⫽ 2.5 yrs; 137 u/g’s with RSQ, BDI, DAS, CSQ, Presence & duration of suicidal ideation at T2
high vs. low cognitive risk hopelessness, suicidal ideation predicted by rumination at T1, with this effect
partially mediated by hopelessness
Spasojevic & Alloy Assessed every 6 weeks for RSQ, BDI, DAS, CSQ, SADS–L Rumination mediated effects of dysfunctional
(2001) 2.5 years; 137 u/g’s with attitudes, past depression, self-criticism on onset of
high vs. low cognitive risk MDE
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 171

Table 1 (continued)

Author Design and sample Measure Main finding

Longitudinal studies

Stanton, Danoff- T1 ⫽ 20 wks after treatment, COPE, emotional processing & Emotional processing at T1 predicted higher distress
Burg, et al. T2 ⫽ 3 mths later; 92 expression, POMS scores at T2, after controlling T1 distress and
(2000) female breast cancer patients emotional expression
Thomson, Mehlsen, T2 ⫽ 1 year; 96 20–35 yr ECQ–R, self-reported physical RT significantly predicted self-reported physical health
Hokland, et al. olds, 110 70–85 yr olds problems only for 20–35 yr olds
(2004)
Thomsen, Mehlsen, Immunological measures 7–14 ECO–R, POMS, MMSE, sleep RT associated sad mood & poor sleep quality
Olesen, et al. days after T1, follow-up 1 quality. Health care use In 70–85 yr olds, RT predicted numbers of leukocytes
(2004) yr; 196 20–35 yr olds; 314 and lymphocytes, and increased health care
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

70–85 yr olds utilization, esp. telephone consultation

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Treynor et al. T2 ⫽ 1 yr; 1130 community RSQ, BDI Brooding subscale at T1 predicted more depression at
(2003) sample T2 controlling for depression at T1
Verplanken et al. T2 ⫽ 9 mths; 1,102 HINT, HADS, DAS, life events Controlling for T1 symptoms, dysfunctional attitudes
(2007) Norwegian citizens & life events, habitual negative self-thinking
predicted anxiety & depression at T2
Young & Azam Sept to Nov (T1); Jan to 14 day diary of mood & Diary measure of rumination in the fall (T1) predicted
(2003) March (T2); 18 SAD rumination, BDI winter depression at T2, after controlling for T1
patients BDI

Experimental studies

Andrews & Velten inductions: worry vs. MAACL For MAACL depression: Depression ⫽ Worry ⫽
Borkovec (1988) depression vs. somatic Somatic anxiety ⬎ neutral. For MAACL anxiety:
anxiety vs. neutral; Somatic anxiety ⬎ worry ⬎ depression ⬎ neutral
128 u/g’s
Behar et al. (2005) 5-min counterbalanced worry depression & anxiety ratings Study 1, 2: Worry ⫽ verbal thought, trauma recall ⫽
vs. trauma recall vs. imagery. For anxiety: worry ⬎⫽ trauma recall ⬎
relaxation; u/g’s Study 1: relaxation. For depression: trauma recall ⬎ worry
78; Study 2: 43 ⫹/⫺ GAD, ⬎ relaxation.
PTSD symptoms
Blagden & Craske Anxious mood induction then POMS Anxious mood: Rumination ⬎ Distraction
(1996) RUM vs. DIS, activity vs.
passivity; 44 u/g’s
Borkovec et al. 30s relaxation vs. general- HR, fear rating HR during threat image: Relaxation ⬎ Thought-worry:
(1993) worry vs. thought-worry vs. other 3 conditions between but ns difference. Fear
image-worry vs. affect- rating during public speaking image: All Worry
worry, then public speaking conditions ⬎ Relaxation
image ⫻ 10; 75 female high
speech anxious u/g’s
Borkovec & Hu Day 1: Neutral vs. relaxation HR, fear rating HR increase to imagery: Relaxation ⬎ neutral ⬎
(1990) vs. worry, day 2: imagine worry. Fear report to images: Worry ⬎ neutral
public speaking ⫻ 10 trials;
45 female high speech
anxious u/g’s
Borkovec et al. Study 3: 0 vs. 15-min vs. 30- MAACL, HR Anxiety, depression, hostility: Worriers ⬎ nonworriers
(1983) min worry periods, with pre- Negative distracting thoughts: Increase in 15-min
& post-manipulation focus- worry, decrease in 0-min, 30-min worry
breathing tasks; 60 u/g
worriers vs. nonworriers
Brosschot & van Postpone worry to 30-min 6 day log of worry, somatic Postponers fewer somatic complaints than control
der Doef (2006) period daily vs. no symptoms for 3 days pre-/post- group, controlling for baseline complaints, with
intervention; 171 high intervention worry duration acting as mediator
school students

Bushman (2002) Anger induction (insult from MAACL-anger, PANAS, Anger: rumination ⬎ distraction ⫽ control
other pt), then hitting Aggression measure: noise Aggression: rumination ⬎ control
punchbag thinking about directed to other
other (rumination) vs.
thinking about getting fit
(distraction) vs. control; 602
u/g’s
(table continues)
 172 WATKINS

Table 1 (continued)

Author Design and sample Measure Main finding

Experimental studies

Bushman et al. Study 1 Provocation, then anger ratings, aggression measure Anger: rumination ⬎ distraction in all 3 studies
(2005) RUM vs. DIS vs. positive (evaluation research assistant/hot Study 1: After trigger, aggression in RUM ⬎ DIS ⫽
mood, then trigger vs. no sauce allocated to confederate/ positive mood; no difference after no trigger
trigger for irritation (poor noise directed at other) condition
vs. good performance of Study 2: Provocation ⫻ Rumination ⫻ Trigger
research assistant); 42 u/g’s interaction: for provoked participants, in the
Study 2: Provocation vs. no presence of trigger, more hot sauce allocated in
provocation, RUM vs. DIS, RUM than DIS, with this effect mediated by
trigger vs. no trigger negative affect in response to trigger.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

(positive vs. negative Study 3: After trigger, aggression in RUM ⬎ no rum,

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

evaluations from other pt); no difference if no trigger

385 u/g’s. Study 3:
provocation then RUM vs.
no-rumination, then 8 hr
later trigger vs. no trigger;
93 u/g’s
Ciesla & Roberts Study 1: negative mood BDI, MAACL, RSQ, RSS, RSE, Study 1: RT predicted post-delay dysphoria,
(2007) induction, followed by no- DAS, ASQ controlling for post-induction dysphoria but only in
task delay period; 126 u/g’s; low self-esteem/high DAS pts. Study 2: lower self-
Study 2: negative mood esteem/higher DAS associated higher levels of
induction, then RUM vs. dysphoria, this effect stronger in RUM vs. DIS.
DIS; 132 u/g’s
Conway et al. Study 3: mood induction, then RSS, distress about current High RSS scorers more distressed in delay condition
(2000) no delay vs. 5-min delay; 37 concern, BDI than no-delay condition
high vs. 24 low RSS scorers
Donaldson & Lam RUM vs. DIS; 36 MDD, 36 mood, MEPS In MDD (not controls), more negative mood and
(2004) controls poorer problem solutions in RUM ⬎ DIS
Glynn et al. (2002) Study 1: emotional vs. Study 1: BP, HR. Study 2. BP, HR Study 1: Elevated BP during rumination and slower
nonemotional stressor, high BP recovery following the emotional stressor
vs. low reactivity task, conditions (mental arithmetic, shock avoidance) but
followed by rumination (⫽ not following non-emotional stressors (physical
recall stressor vividly); 72 exercise, cold-pressor)
u/g’s. Study 2: mental Study 2: Speed of BP recovery: Distraction ⬎ RT
arithmetic task, then 10 mins
delay (potential rumination)
vs. DIS; 20 u/g’s
Guastella & Evening after mid-session RSQ, IES, Sleep-Disturbance Pre-sleep intrusive thoughts: High-trait ruminators ⬎
Moulds (2007) exam RUM vs. DIS; 59 high low-trait ruminators, RUM ⬎ DIS; Sleep quality:
vs. 55 low trait ruminators high-trait ruminators in RUM condition ⬍ other 3
groups
Hazlett-Stevens & Relaxation vs. control vs. Anxiety, HR, MSD of IBI Anxiety before and during first speech: worry ⬎
Borkovec (2001) worry prior to speech; 42 control ⬎ relaxation. HR, MSD of IBI no
speech-anxious u/g’s difference across conditions
Hertel (1998) RUM vs. DIS vs. waiting BDI, stem-completion memory test Controlled retrieval of target words: In Dys, DIS ⬎
condition; 36 Dys vs. 54 waiting ⫽ RUM; no difference in Non-dys
Non-dys u/g’s

Joorman & Siemer (Study 1): Positive vs. negative mood ratings, time to recall After negative induction, Non-Dys (not Dys) who
(2004) mood induction, then RUM memories to ⫹/⫺ cues ruminated recalled mood-incongruent (positive)
vs. DIS; 119 u/g’s, Dys vs. memories faster. After positive induction, Dys who
Non-Dys on CES-D ruminated recalled mood-congruent (positive)
memories slower than Non-Dys
Kao et al. (2006) RUM vs. DIS; 33 Dys u/g’s mood, MEPS, memory recall Post-manipulation dysphoria: Dys ruminators ⬎ other
(BDI ⬎ 14); 33 Non-dys during MEPS 3 groups. Effectiveness of problem solving: Dys
u/g’s (BDI ⬍ 6) ruminators ⬍ other 3 groups. Categoric memories:
Dys ruminators ⫽ Dys distractors ⬎ other 2 groups
Kashdan & Roberts Personal self-disclosure vs. Social anxiety, post-event At higher levels of social anxiety, post-event
(2007) small talk; 83 u/g’s rumination; BDI, PANAS rumination associated with increases in negative
affect following personal disclosure, but decreases
in negative affect following small talk
Lavender & RUM vs. DIS; 30 MDD vs. 30 Future thinking task, SCID Within MDD patients, no. of negative future events
Watkins (2004) control participants generated, RUM ⬎ DIS; no effect in controls
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 173

Table 1 (continued)

Author Design and sample Measure Main finding

Experimental studies

Lyonfields et al. Within-subject, baseline vs. HR, MSD of IBI, anxiety ratings Vagal (parasympathetic) tone (MSD of IBI): GAD ⬍
(1995) worry imagery vs. verbal controls. Little change in vagal tone across tasks in
worry; 15 GAD vs. 15 GAD group, but decline in vagal tone across tasks
controls in controls
Anxiety: verbal worry ⬎ worry imagery
Lyubomirsky et al. Study 1: RUM vs. DIS vs. Study 1: CIQ, reading task, Study 1: dysphoric mood, time spend reading passage,
(2003) planning, 45 Dys (BDI ⬎ interfering thoughts in Dys-ruminative group ⬎
15) vs. 46 Non-Dys (BDI ⬍ other 4 groups. Study 2: dysphoric mood, time
3) answering questions in Dys-ruminative group ⬎
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

other 3 groups
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Study 2: RUM vs. DIS, 28 Study 2: questions on videotaped Study 3: dysphoric mood, interfering thoughts, poorer
Dys vs. 26 Non-Dys. Study lecture. Study 3, COQ during proof-reading in Dys-ruminative group ⬎ other 3
3: RUM vs. DIS, 33 Dys vs. puzzle, proof-reading groups
32 Non-Dys
Lyubomirsky & RUM vs. DIS, Dys (BDI–SF Mood ratings. Study 1: CBQ. All studies - dysphoric mood: Dys-ruminative group
Nolen-Hoeksema ⬎ 7) vs. Non-Dys (BDI–SF Study 2: future predictions. ⬎ other 3 groups. Study 1: depressed-distorted
(1995) ⬍ 3); Dys vs. Non-Dys u/ Study 3: MEPS thoughts, pessimistic attributions: Dys-ruminative
g’s - Study 1: 33 vs. 36; group ⬎ other 3 groups. Study 2: likelihood of
Study 2: 36 vs. 37; Study 3: positive future events: Dys-ruminative group ⬍
36 vs. 33 other 3 conditions. Study 3: problem-solving
effectiveness: Dys-ruminative group ⬍ other 3
groups
Lyubomirsky et al. RUM vs. DIS, Dys vs. Non- Mood ratings Study 1, 2, 4: dysphoria, negativity of
(1998) Dys then (Study 1) free Memory measures autobiographical memories in Dys-ruminative group
recall memory task; (Study ⬎ other 3 groups
2) cued memory task; Study 3: dysphoria, reported frequency of negative
(Study 3) frequency ratings events in Dys-ruminative group ⬎ other 3 groups
for events; (Study 4) think
aloud during manipulation.
Dys vs. Non-Dys u/g’s -
Study 1: 38 vs. 34; Study 2:
25 vs. 24; Study 3: 39 vs.
33; Study 4: 20 vs. 20
McLaughlin et al. Within-subject, worry vs. BDI, PSWQ, MASQ, PANAS, In Study 1 & 2, both worry & rumination increased
(2007) rumination counterbalanced anxiety & depression ratings negative affect, anxiety, depression & reduced
Study 1: 60 u/g’s. Study 2: 34 positive affect. Both involve a predominance of
worrier / ruminator, 40 thought (versus imagery)
ruminator, 35 control
Moberly & Repeated focus on emotional PANAS, ACS–P, BDI After failure, higher levels of trait RT were associated
Watkins (2006) scenarios, abstract vs. with lower levels of positive affect, but only in
concrete, prior to failure; 61 abstract condition, not in concrete condition
u/g’s
Morrow & Nolen- Sad mood induction then RUM sadness, hostility & anxiety ratings Reduction in sadness post-induction to post-task:
Hoeksema vs. DIS, active vs. passive Distracting–active ⬎ distracting-passive ⬎
(1990) task; 35 male, 34 female ruminative-active ⬎ ruminative–passive
u/g’s

Nelson & Harvey Speech threat prior to bed, Distress, sleep-onset latency Initial distress: Imagery ⬎ Verbal worry Sleep-onset
(2002) think about speech verbally latency: Imagery ⬍ verbal worry. Depressed mood
(worry) vs. imagery; 31 increased for Dys participants who ruminated, but
insomnia pts decreased in other 3 groups
Nolen-Hoeksema & RUM vs. DIS; 24 Dys vs. 24 Mood ratings Depressed mood increased for Dys participants who
Morrow (1993) Non-Dys u/g’s ruminated, but decreased in other 3 groups
Park et al. (2004) RUM vs. DIS: Adolescents: 75 Despondency, AMT In MDD group, negative mood and categoric
1st episode MDD; 26 non- autobiographical memories: RUM ⬎ DIS
depressed psychiatric pts; 33
controls
Peasley-Miklus & Worry vs. relaxation then HR, facial EMG During 1st phase for HR: worry ⬎ relaxation. During
Vrana (2000) feared imagery for 24 trials; imagery phase for HR: relaxation ⬎ worry
51 Fearful female u/g’s
Rusting & Nolen- Study 1: angry mood anger, depression, anxiety ratings Study 1: RUM increased anger, DIS no change in
Hoeksema induction, then RUM vs. anger
(1998) DIS; 41 u/g’s. Study 3: Study 3 for anger: rumination ⬎ control (thought-
anger induction then RUM listing) ⬎ distraction
vs. DIS vs. thought-listing;
60 u/g’s
(table continues)
 174 WATKINS

Table 1 (continued)

Author Design and sample Measure Main finding

Experimental studies

Segerstrom et al. Exposure to phobic stimulus PSWQ, SCL, HR, immune function Increased SCL, HR both worry groups; increase in
(1999) vs. no exposure; NK cells in response to fear only in normal worry
Snake/spider fearful: 7 group
worriers, 8 non-worriers: 6
controls
Thayer et al. Baseline vs. relaxation vs. HR, IBIs, MSD of IBIs Cardiac IBIs: GAD ⬍ controls. Worry ⬍ baseline
(1996) worry; 34 GAD patients, 32 relaxation. Worry associated lower cardiac vagal
controls control
Thomsen, Mood induction; 56 u/g’s ECQ–R, mood ratings Trait RT positively correlated with post-induction
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Jorgensen, et al. stress, anxiety, anger & helplessness, controlling

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

(2004) pre-induction mood

Watkins (2004a) Failure then 3 ⫻ expressive ACS–P, BDI, MAACL, IES Higher levels of trait RT associated with higher levels
writing, abstract (why?) vs. of negative mood 12 hr after failure in the abstract
concrete (how?); 69 but not the concrete writing condition
community sample
Watkins & Brown Within subject, RUM vs. DIS Random number generation task For count score (index of less randomness), MDD
(2002) counterbalanced; 14 MDD, ruminators ⬎ other 3 conditions, i.e., DIS improved
14 controls randomness in MDD
Watkins & Analytical RUM vs. despondency, AMT pre-, post- Post manipulation despondency: Analytical,
Teasdale (2001) experiential RUM vs. DIS manipulation Experiential RUM (high self-focus) ⬎ DIS,
vs. abstraction; 36 MDD abstraction (low self-focus). Increase in specificity
patients of autobiographical memory: Experiential RUM,
DIS (low analytical) ⬎ analytical RUM, abstraction
(high analytical)
Watkins & Analytical RUM vs. despondency, AMT Increase in specificity of autobiographical memory
Teasdale (2004) experiential RUM; 28 MDD pre-to-post manipulation: Experiential RUM ⬎
patients Analytical RUM
Watkins et al. RUM vs. DIS; 48 Dys sample despondency, AMT Post-manipulation despondency: RUM ⬎ DIS
(2000) Increases in specificity of autobiographical memory
pre to post-manipulation: DIS ⬎ RUM
Wells & Watch upsetting film, then PSWQ, STAI, anxiety VAS, Number of intrusive images: worry about film ⬎
Papageorgiou control vs. imagery vs. intrusive image diary next 3 days control, all other groups not significantly different
(1995) distraction vs. worry about
film vs. worry usual
concerns; 70 u/g’s
York et al. (1987) Velten inductions worry vs. Negative intrusions, MAACL, HR Increases in negative intrusions during
somatic anxiety vs. neutral, breathing-focus: Worry ⬎ Neutral, Somatic anxiety
then breathing-focus task; 36 ns different from both. Increase in HR: Worry ⫽
u/g’s Somatic Anxiety ⬎ Neutral

Note. ACS–P ⫽ Action Control Scale—Preoccupation; AMT ⫽ Autobiographical Memory Test; ASQ ⫽ Attributional Style Questionnaire; ATQ ⫽
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire; BAI ⫽ Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI ⫽ Beck Depression Inventory; BP ⫽ blood pressure; BPD ⫽ brief previous
dysphoric group; CBQ ⫽ Cognitive Biases Questionnaire; CBT ⫽ cognitive-behavioral therapy; CD ⫽ currently dysphoric group; CDI ⫽ Childrens
Depression Inventory; CDRS–R ⫽ Children’s Depression Rating Scale—Revised; CES–D ⫽ Centre for Epidemiological Survey—Depression; CHD ⫽
coronary heart disease; CIQ ⫽ Cognitive Interference Questionnaire; COPE ⫽ the COPE scale; CSQ ⫽ Cognitive Styles Questionnaire; DAS ⫽
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; DIS ⫽ distraction manipulation; Dys ⫽ dysphoric participants; ECO–R ⫽ Emotional Control Questionnaire—Rehearsal;
EPQ–N ⫽ Eysenck Personality Questionnaire—Neuroticism scale; ESM ⫽ Experience Sampling Methodology; GAD ⫽ generalized anxiety disorder;
GHC ⫽ general health checklist; GHQ ⫽ General Health questionnaire; GRS ⫽ Global Rumination Scale; HADS ⫽ Hospital Anxiety and Depression
Scale; HINT ⫽ Habit Index of Negative Thinking; HR ⫽ heart rate; HRSD ⫽ Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression; IDD ⫽ Inventory to Diagnose
Depression; IDD–L ⫽ Inventory to Diagnose Depression—Lifetime; IDS ⫽ Inventory of Depressive Symptoms; IES ⫽ Impact of Event Scale; IES–R ⫽
Impact of Event Scale—Revised; LES ⫽ Life Experiences Survey; MAACL ⫽ Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist; MASQ ⫽ Mood and Anxiety
Symptom Questionnaire; MDE ⫽ major depressive episode; MDD ⫽ patients with major depressive disorder; MEPS ⫽ Means Ends Problem Solving task;
MMAP ⫽ Measure of Mental Anticipatory Processes; MMSE ⫽ Mini-Mental State Examination; MSD of IBI ⫽ Mean Successive Differences of Heart
Interbeat Intervals; N ⫽ Neuroticism; ND ⫽ never-dysphoric group; NEO–FFI ⫽ NEO-five factor inventory of personality; NK ⫽ natural killer cells;
Non-Dys ⫽ non-dysphoric participants; PANAS ⫽ Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; PCI ⫽ Pain Control Inventory; PD ⫽ previously dysphoric;
PDS ⫽ Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale; PHQ–A ⫽ Patient Health Questionnaire—Adolescent; POMS ⫽ Profile of Mood States scale; PPD ⫽ prolonged
previously dysphoric group; PSE–10 ⫽ Present State Examination—10; PSS ⫽ post-traumatic stress symptom scale; PST ⫽ problem-solving therapy;
PSQI ⫽ Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index; PSWQ ⫽ Penn State Worry Questionnaire; pts ⫽ participants; PTS ⫽ posttraumatic symptoms; PTSD ⫽
posttraumatic stress disorder; RPA ⫽ Responses to Positive Affect; RRQ ⫽ Rumination & Reflection Questionnaire; RSE ⫽ Rosenberg Self-Esteem
questionnaire; RSQ ⫽ Response Styles Questionnaire; RSS ⫽ Rumination on Sadness Scale; RTAs ⫽ road traffic accidents; RUM ⫽ rumination
manipulation; SAD ⫽ seasonal affective disorder; SADS–L ⫽ Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia—Lifetime; SCID ⫽ Structured Clinical
Interview for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; SCL ⫽ skin conductance; SPSI–R ⫽ Social Problem Solving Inventory—revised;
STAI ⫽ State Trait Anxiety Inventory; TCQ ⫽ Thought Control Questionnaire; T1 ⫽ initial baseline assessment, T2 ⫽ follow-up assessment, u/g’s ⫽
undergraduates; VAS ⫽ visual analogue scale; YSR ⫽ Youth Self Report.
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 175

Measures of forms of RT other than depressive rumination are also However, this concern has been offset by convergent evidence that
positively and significantly correlated with depression, including a other measures of RT predict depression. First, other measures of
general tendency toward RT (e.g., global rumination scale, Harrington depressive rumination predicted future depressive mood: (a) diary
& Blankenship, 2002; W. D. McIntosh & Martin, 1992; Segerstrom studies in which participants recorded their moods and responses
et al., 2000, Study 1), worry (PSWQ, Meyer et al., 1990; Segerstrom to their moods every day for at least 2 weeks, for both undergrad-
et al., 2000; or self-rating, Borkovec et al., 1983), rumination on uates (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993) and pa-
sadness (Conway et al., 2000), rumination as operationalized by tients with seasonal affective disorder (Young & Azam, 2003); (b)
Trapnell and Campbell (1999), content-independent perseverative rumination ratings of interview transcripts about a gay male part-
thinking (Ehring, 2007), or RT measured on the Measure of Mental ner’s recent death from AIDS (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1997); and
Anticipatory Processes (MMAP; Feldman & Hayes, 2005). The (c) experience sampling methodology in which momentary rumi-
MMAP assesses trait disposition to respond with various forms of RT native self-focus reported in response to randomly timed beeps on
when faced with an “important, difficult and stressful problem” (p. an electronic watch predicted negative affect at the subsequent
492), including Stagnant Deliberation (e.g., “Whenever I think about recording point (on average 1.5 hr later), after controlling for T1
the problem, I often wind up getting stuck”), Problem Analysis (e.g., negative affect (Moberly & Watkins, in press).
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

“I think about why this problem is happening”), Plan Rehearsal (e.g., Second, forms of RT other than depressive rumination predict
“I mentally visualize the steps involved in solving the problem”), and future levels of depression in prospective longitudinal studies includ-
Outcome Fantasy (e.g., “I fantasize about it all just going away”) ing (a) the Rumination to Sadness Scale in depressed patients with
subscales. Both Stagnant Deliberation and Outcome Fantasy were 7-month follow-up (Raes et al., 2006); (b) the Emotion Control
positively correlated with worry (PSWQ), depressive rumination Questionnaire—Rehearsal subscale with 8-week follow-up (Rector &
(RSQ), and depression symptoms. Likewise, mind wandering, as Roger, 1996); (c) Stagnant Deliberation and Outcome Fantasy sub-
measured by thought sampling during a task, is consistently associ- scales on the MMAP predicted depression symptoms 13 weeks later
ated with self-reported dysphoria across a wide range of tasks, includ- in 1st year law students, after controlling for initial levels of depres-
ing word learning (Smallwood et al., 2003; Smallwood, O’Connor, sion (Feldman & Hayes, 2005); (d) habitual negative self-thinking
Sudberry, Haskell, & Ballantyne, 2004; Smallwood, O’Connor, Sud- predicted depressive symptoms 9 months later, after controlling for
berry, & Obonsawin, 2007), sustained attention (Smallwood, Davies, baseline depression, negative life events, and dysfunctional attitudes
et al., 2004), and word fragment completion (Smallwood, O’Connor, in 1,102 Norwegian citizens (Verplanken et al., 2007); and (e) with an
& Heim, 2005). 8-month follow-up, rumination about negative content predicted fu-
ture depression and mediated the effects of depressive rumination in
predicting depression (Ito, Takenaka, & Agari, 2005; Ito, Takenaka,
Prospective Longitudinal Studies
Tomita, & Agari, 2006).
Main effect of RT. Prospective longitudinal studies have found Effect of RT moderated by context. Several studies reported
that the RSQ predicts (a) the future onset of a major depressive moderating relationships between depressive rumination and in-
episode across a range of follow-up periods in initially ND individuals trapersonal variables in predicting future depression. First, within
(Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; and Spasojevic & the Temple–Wisconsin Cognitive Vulnerability to Depression
Alloy, 2001, by using the same sample as Just & Alloy, 1997, found project, in which undergraduates selected for high and low risk on
that rumination mediated the effect of other risk factors on onset of negative cognitive style were followed up for 2.5 years, an inter-
depression); (b) depressive symptoms across a range of follow-up action of negative cognitive style and stress-reactive rumination
periods in initially ND individuals, after controlling for baseline significantly predicted the rate, number, and duration of major
symptoms (Abela, Brozina, & Haigh, 2002; Butler & Nolen- depressive episodes, even after controlling for level of depression
Hoeksema, 1994; Hong, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen- at T1 (Just & Alloy, 1997; Robinson & Alloy, 2003; for other
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, Cognitive Vulnerability to Depression studies, see J. M. Smith et
1994; Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007; Sakamoto, al., 2006; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). Stress-reactive rumination
Kambara, & Tanno, 2001; J. A. J. Schwartz & Koenig, 1996; J. M. assessed the tendency to ruminate about negative inferences fol-
Smith, Alloy, & Abramson, 2006); (c) depressive symptoms in pa- lowing stressful events by adapting the RSQ (e.g., “Think about
tients with clinical depression, after controlling for baseline depres- how the stressful event was all your fault,” Robinson & Alloy,
sion (Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Rohan, Sig- 2003). Negative cognitive style was assessed by the Dysfunctional
mon, & Dorhofer, 2003), although one non-replication should be Attitudes Scale (Weissman & Beck, 1978), which indexes the
noted (88 college students with recent onset major depressive episode, endorsement of maladaptive, perfectionistic beliefs about the con-
follow-up after 6 months; reported in both Kasch, Klein, & Lara, tingencies necessary to demonstrate self-worth (e.g., “If I do not do
2001; Lara, Klein, & Kasch, 2000). well all the time people will not respect me”) and by the Cognitive
It is worth noting one limitation of the RSQ: RSQ items are Style Questionnaire, which assesses attributions about the inter-
multidimensional, such that rumination assessed on the RSQ over- nality, stability, and globality of events and inferences about the
laps conceptually with a number of other constructs including consequences of events for self-worth. Stress-reactive rumination
depressive symptoms (Roberts et al., 1998; Treynor, Gonzalez, & predicted future episodes of major depression in individuals with
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003), negative affectivity–neuroticism (Kasch high levels of negative cognitive style, but not in individuals with
et al., 2001; Watson & Clark, 1984), and cognitive reactivity low levels of negative cognitive style.
(Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005; Segal, Gemar, & Williams, 1999; Second, trait depressive rumination, self-esteem, and stressful
Segal et al., 2006; Van der Does, 2002), each of which could life events interacted in predicting maintenance of depression over
potentially account for the RSQ predicting prospective depression. a 6-week period in mildly depressed undergraduates (Ciesla &
 176 WATKINS

Roberts, 2007). Depressive rumination predicted depression at Experimental Studies

follow-up only among participants with both low self-esteem and
a high level of stressful life events. Third, depressive rumination Main effect of RT. Studies that experimentally manipulated RT
interacted with baseline depression symptoms to predict future in the form of worry, by asking participants to briefly worry about
depression (Nolan, Roberts, & Gotlib, 1998; Roelofs, Muris, Hul- a self-chosen concern, found that worry increases depressed mood
bers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006). Moreover, one study found that in normal participants (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Behar, Zuel-
depressive rumination interacted with stressful life events to pre- lig, & Borkovec, 2005; Borkovec et al., 1983; McLaughlin, Bork-
dict future depression, indicating that situational context can mod- ovec, & Sibrava, 2007; see the review in Borkovec et al., 1998)
erate the effects of rumination (Morrison & O’Connor, 2005). and produces a short-term increase in negative intrusive thoughts,
Thus, across these studies, the unconstructive consequences of relative to relaxation or visual imagery or no instruction conditions
depressive rumination occurred only in individuals with more (Borkovec et al., 1983; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995; York, Bork-
negative self-beliefs, more pessimistic attributions, more de- ovec, Vasey, & Stern, 1987). Experimental studies have also
pressed mood, or negative life events. demonstrated that trait predisposition toward RT increases emo-
Effect of RT moderated by thought content. Factor analyses of tional reactivity to negative mood inductions and mood challenges,
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

particularly when participants are provided with a delay period that

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

the RSQ have identified distinct subtypes of depressive rumina-

tion: Brooding versus Reflective Pondering (Treynor et al., 2003), allows the opportunity to ruminate (Conway et al., 2000; Thomsen,
Dwelling on the Negative versus Active Cognitive Appraisal Jorgensen, Mehlsen, & Zachariae, 2004).
(Fresco et al., 2002), and Symptom-Focused Rumination versus Effect of RT moderated by intrapersonal context. Moreover, a
Introspection versus Self-Blame (Roberts et al., 1998). Across series of studies provided convergent evidence that RT in the form
these distinctions, the subtypes linked to more unconstructive of depressive rumination plays a causal role in a range of uncon-
consequences (Brooding, Dwelling on the Negative, Self-Blame) structive outcomes associated with depression, including exacer-
all share a common theme as reflected in scale items, that is, bating negative affect and increasing negative cognition (for fur-
negative, self-critical, evaluative (e.g., “Why can’t I handle things ther details, see Table 1). These studies used a standardized
better?”), judgmental, and comparative thinking about the self rumination induction, in which participants are instructed to spend
(e.g., “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”; Nolen- 8 minutes concentrating on a series of sentences that involve
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). The evidence is strongest for the rumination about themselves, their current feelings and physical
distinction between Brooding and Reflective Pondering, which state, and the causes and consequences of their feelings (e.g.,
was found when the RSQ was factor analyzed once the items “Think about the way you feel inside”; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
referring to symptoms of depression were removed. Brooding is Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). As a con-
characterized by “moody pondering” (Treynor et al., 2003, p. 251), trol condition, a distraction induction is typically used in which
whereas Reflective Pondering is characterized by items such as participants are instructed to spend 8 minutes concentrating on a
“Analyze recent events to understand why you are depressed” and series of sentences that involve imagining visual scenes that are
was interpreted “as a purposeful turning inward to engage in unrelated to the self or to current feelings (e.g., “Think about a fire
cognitive problem solving to alleviate one’s depressive symptoms” darting round a log in a fire place”).
(Treynor et al., 2003, p. 256). Brooding measured at T1 predicted Compared with the distraction induction, the rumination induc-
both increased concurrent depression and increased future depres- tion is reliably found to have negative consequences on mood and
sion assessed 1 year later, even after controlling for depression cognition. Critically, the differential effects of these manipulations
levels at T1, whereas Reflective Pondering measured at T1 pre- are found only when participants are already in a dysphoric mood
dicted increased concurrent depression but reduced future depres- before the manipulations, indicating a moderating role for intrap-
sion assessed 1 year later (Treynor et al., 2003). In adolescents, ersonal context. Under these conditions, compared with distrac-
Brooding but not Reflective Pondering predicted the development tion, rumination exacerbates negative mood (Lavender & Watkins,
of depressive symptoms over time (Burwell & Shirk, 2007). Fur- 2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-
thermore, in patients with major depression, Brooding but not Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Watkins &
Reflective Pondering was significantly correlated with an atten- Teasdale, 2001), increases negative thinking (Lyubomirsky &
tional bias toward sad facial expressions relative to neutral facial Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), increases negative autobiographical
expressions, as assessed on a facial dot-probe task, after control- memory recall (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema,
ling for level of depressive symptoms (Joormann, Dkane, & Got- 1998), reduces the specificity of autobiographical memory re-
lib, 2006). These results suggest that thought valence and content trieval (Kao, Dritschel, & Astell, 2006; Park, Goodyer, & Teas-
during RT may moderate its consequences, with the negative, dale, 2004; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Watkins, Teasdale, &
self-critical thinking typical of brooding being more maladaptive. Williams, 2000; see Williams et al., 2007, for a discussion),
Limitations. A general limitation of these longitudinal pro- increases negative thinking about the future (Lavender & Watkins,
spective studies is that many studies have not factored prior 2004), impairs concentration and central executive functioning
episodes of the relevant disorder (e.g., prior major depression as (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003; Watkins & Brown, 2002),
opposed to depressive symptoms) into the analyses. As such, the impairs controlled memory retrieval (Hertel, 1998), and impairs
possibility that past major depressive episodes is a common factor social problem solving (Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Lyubomirsky &
linking RT and prospective depression cannot be ruled out. For Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg,
example, if RT is the result of “scarring” from a previous episode, 1999). Likewise, when they ruminated after a negative mood
then this relationship could explain why RT is associated with induction, dysphoric individuals recalled more negative memories,
increased risk for future depression. whereas non-dysphoric individuals recalled more positive memo-
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 177

ries (Joormann & Siemer, 2004). This pattern of results has been is happening in each scenario or evaluating the causes, meanings,
found for both dysphoric, non-clinical participants and for de- and implications of each scenario, prior to an unanticipated failure
pressed patients (e.g., Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Lavender & experience. After the failure experience, higher levels of trait
Watkins, 2004; Park et al., 2004; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins preoccupation were significantly correlated with lower levels of
& Brown, 2002; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001), suggesting that the positive affect, but only for participants in the evaluative condition
effects generalize to clinical samples. and not for participants in the concrete condition.
Extending the role of intrapersonal context, Ciesla and Roberts Limitations. A limitation of many experimental studies com-
(2007) found that the effect of trait predisposition toward depres- paring rumination versus distraction is the lack of a no-
sive rumination (RSQ) on subsequent emotional response was intervention control making it impossible to determine whether the
moderated by dysfunctional attitudes and self-esteem, such that distinct consequences are due to active negative effects of rumi-
following a negative mood induction, higher levels of trait rumi- nation and/or active positive effects of distraction. However, se-
nation were associated with higher levels of dysphoric affect after lecting an appropriate control condition is difficult in dysphoric
an 8-minute no-task delay period in participants with low self- participants: A passive control condition that involves “doing
esteem or high dysfunctional attitudes but not in participants with nothing” may simply allow naturally occurring rumination to
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

high self-esteem or low dysfunctional attitudes. Moreover, self- continue (e.g., Hertel, 1998), whereas any active control condition
esteem and dysfunctional attitudes interacted with the rumination may act as a distraction. Nonetheless, a number of other experi-
versus distraction manipulations after a sad mood induction to mental manipulations of RT, for example, of worry, also included
predict later levels of dysphoria, such that individuals with lower a no-intervention control and replicated the finding that RT in-
self-esteem and more dysfunctional attitudes had elevated dyspho- creased depression, consistent with RT having an active detrimen-
ric mood, with this effect stronger in the rumination condition than tal effect.
in the distraction condition (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007).
Markman and Miller (2006) further extended the moderating
Summary of RT and Vulnerability to Depression
effect of level of depression on the consequences of RT to forms
of RT other than depressive rumination. A sample of students with This review reveals that there is an extensive body of findings
a range of depressive symptoms (non-depressed, ND; mild-to- suggesting that RT is involved in the onset and maintenance of
moderately depressed, MD; severely depressed, SD) generated depression, with both depressive rumination and a range of other
upward counterfactuals about a recent negative academic outcome types of RT predicting future depression in longitudinal prospec-
(Markman & Miller, 2006). There was a greater reduction in tive studies as well as increasing negative affect when experimen-
negative evaluation of the event following RT for the ND and MD tally induced. Thus, there is convergent evidence across numerous
participants than for the SD participants. Further, MD participants studies utilizing different populations, different measures (RSQ,
generated a greater proportion of counterfactuals focusing on spe- interview, self-report), different study designs, and different forms
cific controllable behaviors relative to uncontrollable, enduring of RT, all of which are consistent with the hypothesis that RT is a
qualities of the self than did the ND and SD participants. In turn, process underpinning the onset and development of depression.
the SD participants generated more counterfactuals involving char-
acterological self-blame than did the ND and MD participants.
Thus, RT was unconstructive in the SD group but constructive in
RT and Vulnerability to Anxiety
the MD depressed group. Cross-Sectional Studies
Effect of RT moderated by concrete versus abstract processing
during RT. The effect of trait predisposition toward RT on emo- In non-clinical samples, RT is significantly and positively cor-
tional reactivity is moderated by the thinking style adopted by related with increased levels of concurrent trait and state anxiety,
participants. Increasing trait predisposition toward RT (as assessed whether assessed as worry (e.g., Davey, Hampton, Farrell, &
on the Action Control Scale—Preoccupation; Kuhl, 1994; sample Davidson, 1992; Meyer et al., 1990; Siddique, LaSalle-Ricci,
item “When I am in a competition and have lost every time, the Glass, Arnkoff, & Diaz, 2006), Stagnant Deliberation, Outcome
thought that I lost keeps running through my mind”) was corre- Fantasy, Problem Analysis (Feldman & Hayes, 2005), global ru-
lated with slower emotional recovery following a prior failure mination (Harrington & Blakenship, 2002), rumination about a
experience (Watkins, 2004a) and greater emotional reactivity to a traumatic event (Steil & Ehlers, 2000), or emotional processing
subsequent failure experience (Moberly & Watkins, 2006), but (Stanton, Danoff-Burg, et al., 2000).
only in participants manipulated into adopting an abstract, evalu- Moreover, RT is a key element of a number of anxiety disorders
ative mindset focused on the causes, meanings, and implications of (Chelminski & Zimmerman, 2003; Harvey et al., 2004): general-
events. Watkins (2004a) randomly allocated participants to expres- ized anxiety disorder, social anxiety, and posttraumatic stress
sive writing about a previously induced failure in either an ab- disorder (PTSD). Chronic worry is a central and defining charac-
stract, evaluative way (e.g., “Why did you feel this way?”) or a teristic of generalized anxiety disorder (American Psychiatric As-
concrete, experiential way (e.g., “How did you feel moment-by- sociation, 1994; Hoyer, Becker, & Margraf, 2002). Within social
moment?”). At higher levels of preoccupation, levels of negative anxiety, post-event rumination has been identified as an important
mood 12 hours after the failure were greater, but only in individ- process: Compared with low-anxious control participants, individ-
uals who wrote in the abstract, evaluative way and not in individ- uals with high social anxiety and patients with a diagnosis of social
uals who wrote in the more concrete, experiential way. Moberly anxiety demonstrate significantly more post-event RT following
and Watkins (2006) trained participants to repetitively think about social interactions, performing mental “post-mortems” on how the
emotional scenarios, either imagining the concrete details of what interaction went and how they performed (Abbott & Rapee, 2004;
 178 WATKINS

Edwards, Rapee, & Franklin, 2003; Kocovski, Endler, Rector, & potential causal role for rumination in the development of post-
Flett, 2005; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Perini, Abbott, & Rapee, traumatic symptoms.
2006; Rachman, Gruter-Andrew, & Shafran, 2000; Rapee & Effect of RT moderated by interpersonal and situational context.
Heimberg, 1997). Kashdan and Roberts (2007) found that there was an interactive
RT has also been implicated as an important process in the effect of intrapersonal and situational context on the consequences
development of PTSD. Ehlers and colleagues have conceptualized of post-event rumination for next-day negative affect following a
RT about a traumatic event as a causal mechanism in the devel- social situation. Unacquainted undergraduates engaged in 45-
opment of PTSD. By using brief self-report measures of RT about minute interactions with randomly paired opposite-sex partners,
an identified traumatic event (e.g., “Do you go over and over what working through questions structured to induce either personal
happened again and again?”), they have found RT to be elevated self-disclosure (e.g., “What is your most treasured memory?”) or
in patients with PTSD compared with RT in non-clinical control to mimic small talk (“What is the best TV show you’ve seen?”).
participants (e.g., Ehlers, Mayou & Bryant, 1998). Likewise, in For individuals with higher levels of trait social anxiety, post-event
survivors of physical assault, the frequency of counterfactual rumination for the 24 hours post-event was associated with in-
thoughts was positively correlated with PTSD symptoms such as creases in negative affect following personal disclosure but asso-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

intrusions about the negative event (El Leithy, Brown, & Robbins, ciated with decreases in negative affect following small talk
2006), and for women who had experienced recurrent miscarriage, (Kashdan & Roberts, 2007). There was no interaction between
upward counterfactual thinking was positively correlated with rumination and situation in predicting negative affect for individ-
anxiety (Callander & Brown, 2007). Similarly, counterfactual uals with lower levels of social anxiety. Thus, in a situational
thinking following uncontrollable and traumatic events, such as context that was more personally revealing and, presumably, more
sudden infant death, is associated with a greater level of distress meaningful and threatening for individuals high in social anxiety,
(C. G. Davis, Lehman, Wortman, Silver, & Thompson, 1995). post-event rumination had more negative consequences.
Effect of RT moderated by concrete versus abstract processing
during RT. In an analogue study of posttraumatic stress symp-
Prospective Longitudinal Studies toms, undergraduates watched a distressing film showing the af-
termath of motor vehicle accidents, known to induce negative
In non-clinical samples, RT has been found to predict (a) ele- affect and intrusions, and were then randomly allocated to abstract
vated levels of self-reported anxiety in undergraduates following rumination, concrete rumination, or distraction (Ehring et al.,
their midterm exams, after controlling for baseline anxiety (Sarin, 2007). Across time, abstract rumination resulted in slower recov-
Abela, & Auerbach, 2005; Segerstrom et al., 2000); (b) prospec- ery from negative affect than did concrete rumination or distrac-
tive increases in anxiety for law students before and after their first tion. Moreover, concrete rumination resulted in fewer negative
semester final exams (Siddique et al., 2006); (c) prospective in- intrusions than did abstract rumination and distraction, which did
creases in anxiety over 1 month (Hong, 2007), over 6 – 8 weeks not differ from each other. Thus, these results suggest that abstract
(Calmes & Roberts, 2007), and over 9 months (Verplanken et al., rumination may be particularly unconstructive following exposure
2007); and (d) the onset and severity of posttraumatic stress to a distressing event.
symptoms following traumatic events such as the Lomo Prieta
earthquake of 1989 (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Further-
more, following traumatic events, RT about the trauma predicts the RT and Impaired Physical Health
persistence of PTSD in prospective longitudinal studies from 6 Consistent with the perseverative cognition hypothesis
months to 3 years later, for road accidents (Ehlers, Mayou, & (Brosschot et al., 2006), RT correlates with indices of poor phys-
Bryant, 1998, 2003; Holeva, Tarrier, & Wells, 2001; Mayou, ical health and prospectively predicts health-related outcomes.
Bryant, & Ehlers, 2001; Mayou, Ehlers, & Bryant, 2002; Murray,
Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002), assaults (Halligan, Michael, Clark, &
Ehlers, 2003; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005), and in Cross-Sectional Studies
ambulance workers (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999). First, RT is associated with increases in cortisol secretion, which
is an index of activation of the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal
axis, whether assessed as worry (Schlotz, Hellhammer, Schulz, &
Experimental Studies
Stone, 2004) or Rehearsal (Roger & Najarian, 1998). Second,
Main effects of RT. In experimental studies, RT has been high-trait worry is associated with suppression of the expected
found to increase anxiety, whether the RT consists of brief periods increase in natural killer immune cells when experimentally ex-
of worry about self-chosen concerns (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; posed to a fearful situation (Segerstrom, Glover, Craske, & Fahey,
Behar et al., 2005; Borkovec et al., 1983; McLaughlin et al., 2007) 1999) and with reduced natural killer immune cells in response to
or a rumination manipulation that exacerbates pre-existing anxious a naturally occurring trauma (Segerstrom, Solomon, Kemeny, &
mood (Blagden & Craske, 1996). When university students were Fahey, 1998). Third, RT is associated with dysregulated cardio-
asked to describe a distressing event that occurred in the last 2 vascular function: Worry is associated with reduced heart rate
years and then randomly allocated to rumination (prompts like variability and increased heart rate (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Bork-
“Why has this event happened to me?”) or distraction (a word ovec, Lyonfields, Wiser, & Deihl, 1993; Brosschot & Thayer,
generation task), rumination resulted in a greater increase in neg- 2003; Lyonfields, Borkovec, & Thayer, 1995); RT (Rehearsal) is
ative affect and higher levels of intrusive memories than did associated with delayed heart rate recovery following a challeng-
distraction (Ehring, Szeimies, & Schaffrick, 2007), suggesting a ing task (Roger & Jamieson, 1988; Roger & Najarian, 1989).
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 179

Reduced heart rate variability is an index of parasympathetic RT With Constructive Consequences

activity and a risk factor for increased mortality, specifically
associated with hypertension and cardiovascular disorders (P. K. There is also a growing literature indicating how RT can be
Stein & Kleiger, 1999). Fourth, high levels of depressive rumina- adaptive, functional, and beneficial, although, as noted earlier, the
tion are associated with delay in presenting the symptoms of breast constructive consequences of RT have been less investigated than
cancer to a healthcare professional (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, Chang, & the unconstructive consequences of RT. The relevant studies are
Chung, 2006), and RT is associated with more physical symptoms summarized in Table 2. The main emergent findings are that RT is
in women undergoing a breast cancer prevention trial (Segerstrom implicated in (a) successful cognitive processing and recovery
et al., 2003). Fifth, RT has also been implicated in the development from upsetting and traumatic events, (b) adaptive preparation and
of insomnia (Gross & Borkovec, 1982; Harvey, 2000; Nelson & planning for the future, (c) recovery from depression, and (d)
Harvey, 2002). Insomnia is associated with increased pre-sleep uptake of health-promoting behaviors.
worry (Harvey, 2000), and RT is associated with poorer sleep
quality and longer time to fall asleep (Thomsen, Mehlsen, Chris-
RT and Successful Cognitive Processing of Stress, Loss,
tensen, & Zachariae, 2003).
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

and Trauma
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Prospective Longitudinal Studies Cross-Sectional Studies

Main effects of RT. A number of studies have found that,
Increased RT prospectively predicts (a) increased heart disease
following stressful or traumatic events, RT in the form of cognitive
over a 20-year follow-up doubling the risk for high worriers
processing is associated with acceptance and recovery. People who
compared with low worriers (Kubzansky et al., 1997); (b) in-
actively think about the trauma and its implications are more likely
creased somatic health complaints in high school students, with the
to find meaning or to experience growth than people who do not
use of a controlled worry period reducing subsequent somatic
dwell on the trauma (J. E. Bower et al., 1998; Calhoun et al., 2000;
complaints (Brosschot & van der Doef, 2006); (c) higher levels of
Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004; Ullrich & Lutgendorf, 2002). Extent of
fatigue over a 10-month follow-up (Andrea et al., 2004); (d)
RT after a traumatic or stressful event was positively associated
slower recovery and impaired wound healing following surgery for
with more posttraumatic growth, as indexed by self-reported in-
hernias (E. Broadbent, Petrie, Alley, & Booth, 2003); (e) fewer
creases in relating to others, discovering new possibilities, discov-
natural killer cells in the months after the Northridge earthquake
ering personal strength, and increased appreciation of life (Cal-
(Segerstrom et al., 1998); (f) slower clearing of psoriasis in re-
houn et al., 2000). For example, RT immediately after a child’s
sponse to psoralen-UV-A photochemotherapy (Fortune et al.,
death was associated with posttraumatic growth in bereaved par-
2003); (g) reduced functional status and reduced grip strength 1
ents, whereas more recent RT was not, and, in older adults, growth
year after the diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis (Evers, Kraaimaat,
attributed to the struggle with their most stressful events was
Geenen, & Bijlsma, 1998); and (h) self-reported physical health
associated with frequency of rumination across all traumatic
problems 1 year later in 20 –35-year-olds and increased health care
events (Calhoun, Tedeschi, Fulmer, & Harlan, 2000; and Tedeschi,
utilization over the subsequent year in 70 – 85-year-olds (Thomsen,
Calhoun, & Cooper, 2000; both cited in Tedeschi et al., 2004).
Mehlsen, Hokland, et al., 2004, Thomsen, Mehlsen, Olesen, et al.,
Similarly, RT, which was defined as recurrent event-related
2004).
thoughts that help one understand, resolve, and make sense of
trauma-related events, was correlated with competency beliefs
Experimental Studies about ability to handle problems arising from the trauma in chil-
dren evacuated because of Hurricane Floyd (Cryder, Kilmer, Te-
Consistent with the hypothesis that RT plays a causal role in deschi, & Calhoun, 2006).
poor physical health, experimental manipulations of RT have been Effects of RT moderated by thought content. Segerstrom and
shown to influence health-related indices. First, experimental in- colleagues (2003) examined the nature of RT and its role in
duction of rumination about a previous emotionally stressful task adjustment in women who were exposed to a stressful situation
results in increased blood pressure (BP) and delayed recovery of through being identified at high risk for breast cancer. In previous
BP, whereas distraction facilitates BP recovery (Glynn, Christen- undergraduate studies, (Segerstrom et al., 2003, Studies 1 and 2),
feld, & Gerin, 2002). Second, trait anger rumination predicts multidimensional scaling across large samples of structured mea-
prolonged elevated BP after recalling an angry event (A. R. sures of ruminative thinking and sampled thoughts concerning
Schwartz et al., 2000) or after an anger provocation (Suchday, rumination had revealed that RT could be described on two inde-
Carter, Ewart, Larkin, & Desiderato, 2004). High sustained BP is pendent structural dimensions: valence of content (negative vs.
a risk factor for many diseases including cardiovascular disease positive) and purpose. As thought content became more negative,
and diabetes. Third, compared with distraction, rumination about a affect was rated as more negative. The purpose dimension re-
mid-session exam resulted in more pre-sleep intrusive thoughts flected the goals motivating rumination, with two extremes of
and poorer ratings of sleep quality for high-trait ruminators but not purpose: searching for new ideas and experiences versus solving
for low-trait ruminators (Guastella & Moulds, 2007). Fourth, Nel- problems and improving certainty and predictability. Solving was
son and Harvey (2002) gave patients with insomnia a speech threat defined as “trying to narrow down, to make sure, to make plans or
just prior to bedtime. Thinking about giving the speech in images to declare knowledge” (Segerstrom et al., 2003, p. 916). Examples
produced more initial distress and self-reported arousal but shorter included causal statements, summary statements, statements of
sleep onset latency than did worrying about the speech verbally. definite consequences, and planning. Searching was defined as
 180 WATKINS

Table 2
Studies Demonstrating Constructive Consequences of Repetitive Thought

Author Design and sample Measure Main finding

Cross-sectional studies

Belzer et al. (2002) 353 u/g’s PSWQ, Catastrophic worry Rational problem solving (constructive) & impulsiveness/
questionnaire, STAI, carelessness (unconstructive) positively correlated with
SPSI–R worry, after controlling trait anxiety & problem
orientation
Calhoun et al. (2000) 54 u/g’s with traumatic event in PTGI, rumination (items Early event-related rumination after trauma positively
past 3 yrs derived existing correlated with post-traumatic growth
measures)
Cryder et al. (2006) 46 children evacuated for Rumination, competency Rumination correlated positively with competency beliefs
Hurricane Floyd beliefs, PTGI but not with post-traumatic growth, although
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

competency beliefs correlated with post-traumatic

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

growth
Davey et al. (1992) Study 1: 105 u/g’s; Study 2: All studies: STAI, Student Study 1, 2: Worry correlated with trait anxiety. When
108 u/g’s; Study 3: 94 u/g’s Worry Scale. Study 1, 2: trait anxiety controlled, worry positively correlated
& p/g’s Coping with stress, self-reported strategies of active behavioral coping,
Study 3: Miller information-seeking, affective regulation. Study 3:
Behavioral Style scale- When trait anxiety held constant, worry positively
monitoring correlated monitoring.
El Leithy et al. 46 victims of physical assault IES–R, fluency & Fluency of counterfactual thinking positively correlated
(2006) frequency of with generation of behavioral plans
counterfactuals
Feldman & Hayes Study 3; 325 u/g’s MMAP, Reflection, SPSI– Study 3: Plan rehearsal negatively correlated depression,
(2005) R, MASQ positively correlated well-being
Perkins & Corr 68 salespeople PSWQ, ability, job perfor- Worry correlated with better job performance but only in
(2005) mance high ability individuals
Schorr & Roemer 141 students reporting trauma/ PTGI, “searching for a Attempts to make sense (RT) associated post-traumatic
(2002) loss way to make sense of growth
experience”
Segerstrom et al. Study 1: 978 u/g’s; Study 2: 25 Study 1: Emotional Study 1: Multidimensional scaling revealed Valence
(2003) u/g’s processing, IES, PSWQ, dimension (positive vs. negative), Purpose dimension
Study 3: 62 women in breast RSQ, RRQ, NEO–FFI (openness to experience vs. clarity & worry). Study 2:
cancer prevention trial Study 2, 3: self- Independent sorting of descriptions resulted in
generated descriptions of dimensions of Valence (positive vs. negative), Content
RT, ratings of affect (achievement vs. interpersonal), Purpose (searching vs.
Study 3, CES–D, quality solving). Valence dimension associated affect ratings.
of life, IES, STAI Study 3: More negative RT associated more negativity,
worse mental health, more anxiety, more physical
symptoms. When thought valence positive, searching
decreased ratings of physical health and positivity;
when thought valence negative, searching increased
ratings of physical health and positivity
Szabo & Lovibond 39 u/g’s 7 day diary of worry A large % of worry involved problem-solving attempts,
(2006) episodes sometimes leading to satisfying solutions
Trapnell & Campbell u/g’s: n ⫽ 441, n ⫽ 570, n ⫽ RRQ, NEO–FF, BDI Reflection scale not correlated with depressive symptoms
(1999) 710 (r ⫽ .04, r ⫽ .08) but correlated with openness to
experience (r ⫽ .61)
Verhaegen et al. 99 u/g’s Reflection from RSQ, Reflective pondering related to current depression, self-
(2005) CES–D rated creative interests & creative fluency originality
and elaboration

Longitudinal studies

Bower et al. (1998) Bereavement interview at T1, Interview transcripts: Cognitive processing significantly associated with
then blood samples every 6 cognitive processing, discovery of meaning. Discovery of meaning at T1
mths for 2–3 years. 40 HIV discovery of meaning, associated decrease in rate of CD4 decline T1 to T2
seropositive men after AIDS- CES–D, CD4 T-cells, and decreased rate of AIDS-related mortality
related bereavement mortality
Cantor et al. (1987) Transition to college. T1 ⫽ 1st DPQ, GPA, reflectivity ⫽ Reflectivity at T1 positively associated GPA at T2;
semester, T2 ⫽ 2nd semester; no. of ideas generated higher reflectivity predicted higher GPA in DP but
147 u/g’s for coping plans lower GPA in OP
Ciesla & Roberts Response to group treatment; RSQ, DAS, RSE, BDI Rumination interacted with cognitive style to predict
(2002) 32 MDD patients change in depression: in high self-esteem, low DAS
group, rumination predicted better outcome
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 181

Table 2 (continued)

Author Design and sample Measure Main finding

Longitudinal studies

Dijkstra & Brosschot T2 ⫽ 8 mths; 380 smokers, 324 T1: worry about health, In smokers, increased worry at T1 predicted more quit
(2003) ex-smokers self-efficacy, attempts T1 to T2, more so in group with high
disengagement beliefs. self-efficacy
T2 smoking behavior In ex-smokers, worry predicted relapse, especially in low
self-efficacy, high disengagement beliefs group
Feldman & Hayes Study 4. T1 start of 1st MMAP, Reflection, SPSI– Study 4: plan rehearsal at T1 predicted reduced
(2005) semester; T2 end of 1st R, MASQ depression at T2, although no longer sign when
semester after 13 weeks; 110 controlling T1 depression
1st year law students
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Hay et al. (2006) Meta-analysis of 12 prospective Breast cancer worry at T1, Breast cancer worry has small but reliable (r ⫽ 0.12)
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

studies; 3,342 high-risk & T2 breast examination, positive correlation with breast cancer
general population women mammography use screening-behavior; greater worry predicts greater
likelihood of screening
Siddique et al. T1 ⫽ law school orientation; PSWQ, self-efficacy, After controlling for trait anxiety, T1 worry significantly
(2006) T2 ⫽ 1 mth prior to 1st STAI, final exam scores, predicted better T3 exam performance & better T5 oral
semester final exam, T3 ⫽ performance rating for argument performance, & higher state anxiety at T2,
post 1st semester final exam; oral argument T3, T4
T4 ⫽ 1 mth prior oral
argument; T5 ⫽ oral
argument, 2nd semester; 184
1st year law students
Treynor et al. (2003) T2 ⫽ 1 yr; 1,130 community RSQ, BDI Reflective pondering subscale at T1 predicted less
sample depression at T2 controlling for depression at T1
Yamada et al. (2003) T2 ⫽ 6 mths after HRSD, rumination Rumination at T1 predicted reduced depression at T2
pharmacotherapy; 105 MDD questionnaire
patients

Experimental studies

Lyubomirsky et al. (Study 1): RUM vs. DIS vs. Ratings sadness & Study 1: dysphoric mood, time spend reading passage,
(2003) planning, 45 Dys u/g’s (BDI depression, reading task, interfering thoughts in dysphoric: Repetitive planning
⬎ 15) vs. 46 Non-dys (BDI interfering thoughts ⫽ distraction ⬍ rumination
⬍ 3) u/g’s (CIQ)
Moberly & Watkins Training to focus on emotional PANAS, ACS–P, BDI After failure, higher levels of trait RT were associated
(2006) scenarios, abstract vs. with lower levels of positive affect, but only in
concrete, prior to failure; 61 abstract condition, not in concrete condition
u/g’s
Norem & Illingworth Study 1: thought-listing re DPQ. Study 1: POMS, Study 1: Negative mood & anxiety: For DP, distraction
(1993) positive & negative outcomes STAI, mental arithmetic ⬎ thought-listing; for OP, thought-listing ⬎ distraction
(reflection) vs. distraction; 26 task. Study 2: ESM 4 Math performance - for DP, thought-listing ⬎ distraction
DP vs. 30 OP. Study 2: Rate times a day for 7 days, Study 2: DP who rated progress felt more positive and
goal progress vs. no progress; rating affect rated situations as easier than those who did not; OP
nursing students, 13 DP vs. who rated progress felt made less progress than those
11 OP who did not
Pham & Taylor Process vs. outcome vs. No. of study hours, Negative emotion: Process-simulation ⬍ no-process-
(1999) combined simulation vs. planning, worry, simulation. Planning, number of hours of study, exam
control, all daily for 1 wk. confidence, grades grades: Process-simulation ⬎ no process-simulation.
101 u/g’s 1 wk before Exam grades: Outcome simulation ⬍ no-outcome
midterm exam simulation
Rimes & Watkins Experiential RUM vs. analytical BDI, RSQ, VAS ratings of In MDD patients, analytical RUM increased post-
(2005) RUM; 30 MDD patients, 30 mood & global negative manipulation global judgments of worthlessness
controls self-judgments relative to experiential RUM. No effect of condition in
controls
Rivkin & Taylor Process-simulation on how Emotional self-ratings, Immediate positive affect: Process ⬎ outcome ⫽ control
(1999) problem arose and unfolded COPE immediately after One week later, positive reinterpretation, use of social
vs. outcome simulation vs. and 1 wk later support: Process ⬎ outcome ⫽ control
control; 77 u/g’s designate
ongoing stressful event
Showers (1992) Concrete positive-outcome- Study 1: Time talking Study 1: Negative-focus DP talked more, rated more
focus vs. concrete negative- during conversation, positively by confederate than positive-focus DP, no
outcome-focus on upcoming confederate & effect of focus on Ops Study 2: negative-focus DPs
conversation Study 1: 40 OPs participant ratings. Study reported more positive self-relevant thoughts than
vs. 38 DPs in social 2: thought listing as positive-focus DPs, no effect of focus on OPs
situations. Study 2: 27 OPs, anticipate conversation
31 DPs
(table continues)
 182 WATKINS

Table 2 (continued)

Author Design and sample Measure Main finding

Experimental studies

Spencer & Norem Coping imagery vs. mastery DPQ, performance on darts Dart performance - for DPs: Coping imagery ⬎ mastery
(1996) imagery vs. relaxation 97 imagery ⫽ relaxation; for OPs: Relaxation ⬎ mastery
u/g’s, DP vs. OP imagery ⫽ coping imagery
Taylor et al. (1998) Study 1, 3 Process-simulation Study 1: Anxiety, time Study 1: Hours of study, exam grades: Process-
vs. outcome simulation vs. spent studying, exam simulation ⬎ outcome-simulation ⫽ control. Study 2:
control for 5–7 days. Study grades. Study 3: % began on time: Process-simulation ⫽ outcome-
1; 77 u/g’s 1 wk before 1st planning fallacy (project simulation ⬎ control; % finish on time: process ⬎
midterm exam. Study 3, 84 began on time, finished outcome ⬎ control. Study 4: Immediate positive
u/g’s with project to on time). Study 4: affect: Process ⬎ outcome ⫽ control; One week later,
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

complete next wk. Study 4: emotional self-ratings, positive reinterpretation, use of social support: Process
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

process-simulation on how COPE immediately after ⬎ outcome ⫽ control

problem arose and unfolded and 1 wk later
vs. outcome simulation vs.
control; 77 u/g’s with
ongoing stressful event
Ulrich & Lutgendorf Writing about stressful event Ratings of post-traumatic Reported post-traumatic growth: Writing cognition &
(2002) (cognitions & emotions vs. growth emotion ⬎ emotions alone ⫽ non-expressive writing
emotions alone) vs. non-
expressive writing; 122 u/g’s
completed journals for 1 mth
Watkins (2004a) Failure then 3⫻ expressive ACS–P, BDI, MAACL, Higher levels of trait RT associated with higher levels of
writing, abstract-evaluative IES negative mood 12 hr after failure in the evaluative
(why?) vs. concrete (how?); condition but not in the concrete writing condition
69 community sample
Watkins & Baracaia No questions vs. abstract Why? SCID, BDI, RSQ, MEPS Problem-solving effectiveness: In no question condition,
(2002) Questions vs. concrete, never-depressed (ND) ⫽ recovered depressed (RD) ⬎
process, How? Questions currently depressed (CD). In abstract Why condition,
during concurrent MEPS; 32 ND ⬎ RD ⫽ CD. In concrete, process condition, ND
CD; 26 RD; 26 ND ⫽ RD ⫽ CD
Watkins & Moulds Abstract RUM vs. concrete despondency, MEPS In MDD group, for problem-solving effectiveness,
(2005a) RUM; 40 MDD patients; 40 concrete RUM ⬎ abstract RUM. No effect of
controls condition in controls
Watkins & Teasdale Analytical RUM vs. despondency, AMT, BDI Despondency: Analytical RUM, experiential RUM (high
(2001) experiential RUM vs. DIS vs. self-focus) ⬎ DIS, abstraction (low self-focus).
abstraction; 36 MDD patients Increase in specificity of autobiographical memory:
Experiential RUM, DIS (low analytical) ⬎ analytical
RUM, abstraction (high analytical)
Watkins & Teasdale Analytical RUM vs. despondency, AMT Increase in specificity of autobiographical memory:
(2004) experiential RUM; 28 MDD Experiential RUM ⬎ Analytical RUM
patients

Note. ACS–P ⫽ Action Control Scale—Preoccupation; AMT ⫽ autobiographical memory test; ASQ ⫽ Attributional Style Questionnaire; BDI ⫽ Beck
Depression Inventory; CD ⫽ currently depressed group; CES–D ⫽ Centre for Epidemiological Survey—Depression; CIQ ⫽ Cognitive Interference
Questionnaire; COPE ⫽ the COPE Scale; DAS ⫽ Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; DIS ⫽ distraction manipulation; DP ⫽ defensive pessimist; DPQ ⫽
Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire; Dys ⫽ dysphoric participants; ESM ⫽ experience sampling methodology; GOI ⫽ Goal Orientation Inventory;
HRSD ⫽ Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression; IES ⫽ Impact of Event Scale; MAACL ⫽ Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist; MASQ ⫽ Mood and
Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; MDE ⫽ major depressive episode; MDD ⫽ major depressive disorder; MEPS ⫽ Means Ends Problem Solving task;
MMAP ⫽ Measure of Mental Anticipatory Processes; ND ⫽ never-depressed group; NEO–FFI ⫽ NEO-Five Factor Inventory of Personality; NLEQ ⫽
Negative Life Events Questionnaire; Non-Dys ⫽ non-dysphoric participants; OP ⫽ optimist; PANAS ⫽ Positive & Negative Affect Schedule; POMS ⫽
Profile of Mood States scale; PSWQ ⫽ Penn State Worry Questionnaire; pts ⫽ participants; PTGI ⫽ posttraumatic growth inventory; RD ⫽ recovered
depressed group; RPA ⫽ Response to Positive Affect questionnaire; RRQ ⫽ Rumination & Reflection Questionnaire; RSE ⫽ Rosenberg Self-Esteem
questionnaire; RSQ ⫽ Response Styles Questionnaire; RT ⫽ repetitive thought; RUM ⫽ rumination manipulation; SCID ⫽ Structured Clinical Interview
for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; SPSI–R ⫽ Social Problem Solving Inventory—revised; STAI ⫽ State Trait Anxiety
Inventory; T1 ⫽ initial baseline assessment, T2 ⫽ follow-up assessment, u/g’s ⫽ undergraduates; VAS ⫽ Visual Analogue Scale.

“exploring, considering possibilities, or expressing confusion” affect, better overall mental health, less anxiety, and fewer phys-
(Segerstrom et al., 2003, p. 916). Examples included expressions ical symptoms (Segerstrom et al., 2003). Furthermore, there were
of uncertainty, generating options, indecision or confusion, listing also interactions between valence and purpose on affect and rat-
multiple possibilities, and learning new perspectives or ways. In ings of physical health: When the valence of RT content was
the breast cancer study, the valence of thought content during RT positive, a searching purpose was associated with decreased pos-
predicted concurrent affect and well-being: Less negative content itive affect and decreased ratings of physical health, but when the
during RT was associated with less negative affect, more positive valence of thought content was negative, a searching purpose was
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 183

associated with increased positive affect and increased ratings of majority of studies are only cross-sectional, and (b) the principal
physical health. This pattern of results suggests that during RT outcome measures are self-report, leading to questions as to
about negative content, RT with a searching, exploring purpose is whether reported benefits can be taken at face value or reflect
associated with more constructive outcomes than is RT with a inaccurate, biased, or defensive perceptions (Nolen-Hoeksema &
solving, making-sure purpose. Davis, 2004; Zoellner & Maercker, 2006).

Prospective Longitudinal Studies RT Contributes to Adaptive Preparation and Anticipatory

In a prospective study examining outcomes for HIV- Planning
seropositive men who had experienced an AIDS-related bereave- There is convergent evidence that RT contributes to anticipatory
ment, RT about the bereavement was associated with finding more planning and adaptive self-regulation, consistent with the hypoth-
meaning in the loss over the next 2–3 years, which in turn was esis that RT can facilitate preparatory and adaptive behaviors
associated with better immune responses and reduced AIDs- designed to reduce potential threats (Tallis & Eysenck, 1994).
related mortality over a 7-year follow-up (J. E. Bower et al., 1998).
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Finding meaning was operationalized as a major shift in values, Cross-Sectional Studies

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

priorities, or perspectives in response to the loss. RT about be-

reavement was a necessary although not a sufficient condition for RT is associated with better academic and workplace perfor-
discovery of meaning and improved physical health. Discovery of mance and is correlated with constructive problem solving and
meaning included the development of new personal growth goals, creativity. First, worry is associated with better workplace perfor-
an enhanced sense of living in the present, and the development of mance but only for more able individuals (Perkins & Corr, 2005).
new perspectives, such as “life is precious,” which are consistent Second, after controlling for trait anxiety, worry is correlated with
with the concept of finding benefit. Finding benefit is defined as increased report of active behavioral problem solving and seeking
considering positive meanings of the traumatic event and positive more information in response to a recent stressful event (Davey et
benefits or value learnt as a result of the event, and it is increas- al., 1992). Third, diary measures indicate that a large proportion of
ingly hypothesized to be an important contributor to successful worry reflects problem-solving attempts, which are often success-
cognitive processing of upsetting events (Affleck & Tennen, 1996; ful (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004, 2006). Fourth, for survivors of
King & Miner, 2000; Moskowitz, Folkman, Collette, & Vitting- physical assault, upward counterfactual fluency, assessed in terms
hoff, 1996). There is growing evidence from prospective longitu- of the number of different upward counterfactual thoughts gener-
dinal studies that finding benefit predicts better future psycholog- ated about the trauma, was correlated with the generation of
ical adjustment and more adaptive responses to negative life events behavioral plans (El Leithy et al., 2006). Fifth, reflectivity—
than does simply trying to understand and make sense of the event operationalized as the number of themes and ideas produced when
(C. G. Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998; N. Stein, Folk- generating actions, outcomes, and consequences for coping plans
man, Trabasso, & Richards, 1997; Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman, to hypothetical but common problem situations—is positively cor-
1983; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004; Tugade, Fredrickson, & Bar- related with better subsequent academic performance for individ-
rett, 2004). uals who preferentially use the defensive pessimism strategy but
negatively correlated with academic performance for individuals
Experimental Studies who preferentially use an optimistic strategy, characterized by high
expectations and little reflection prior to a task (Cantor, Norem,
Experimental studies of expressive writing, in which repeated Niedenthal, Langston, & Brower, 1987). Sixth, the Reflective
writing about distressing events was found to have more beneficial Pondering subscale from the RSQ is significantly positively cor-
consequences for psychological and physical health than those of related with self-rated creative interests and objectively measured
repeated writing about a neutral event, have provided broad evi- creative fluency, originality, and elaboration (Verhaeghen, Joor-
dence consistent with a constructive effect for (at least a con- mann, & Khan, 2005). Unfortunately, Brooding was not assessed,
strained form of) RT following distress (Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, so it is not known whether the relationship between RT and
1995; Klein & Boals, 2001; Pennebaker, 1997; Pennebaker, creativity is unique to Reflective Pondering or not.
Mayne, & Francis, 1997; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999; Sloan &
Marx, 2004; Smyth, True, & Souto, 2001). For example, when Prospective Longitudinal Studies
undergraduates completed journals for 1 month, those who wrote
about cognitions and emotions related to a stressful event had a After controlling for trait anxiety, worry prospectively predicts
greater increase in self-reported posttraumatic growth than did better academic performance during the 1st year of law school
those who wrote only about emotions related to a stressful event or (Siddique et al., 2006). Upward counterfactuals have also been
who wrote factually about media events (Ullrich & Lutgendorf, found to produce useful intentions for future behavior and to
2002). As described earlier, Ehring et al. (2007) found experimen- predict better subsequent performance on anagram tasks and aca-
tal evidence that concrete RT about a distressing film resulted in demic courses (Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese, 1994; Spellman &
fewer intrusions about the film compared with abstract RT or Mandel, 1999).
distraction.
Experimental Studies
Limitations Effect of RT moderated by thought content and intrapersonal
It is important to acknowledge that this cognitive processing and context. On a laboratory arithmetic task, during a lab-based
posttraumatic growth literature has two major limitations: (a) The social interaction, or when pursuing their personal goals during an
 184 WATKINS

experience sampling methodology study, defensive pessimists per- feeling down or depressed”), (b) a community sample (Treynor et
formed better (e.g., more arithmetic solutions, talking for longer, al., 2003, Reflective Pondering on RSQ), and (c) 1st year law
more positive ratings by other participant in conversation) and students (Feldman & Hayes, 2005; Plan Rehearsal).
experienced less negative affect and more positive self-relevant Effect of RT moderated by intrapersonal context. Depressive
thoughts when manipulated to repetitively focus on possible neg- rumination interacted with self-esteem and dysfunctional attitudes
ative outcomes compared with when manipulated to use no reflec- in predicting response to a group psychoeducational treatment for
tion or to focus on positive outcomes (Norem & Illingworth, 1993; patients with major or minor depression (Ciesla & Roberts, 2002).
Showers, 1992). In contrast, there was little effect on performance In participants with low self-esteem or high dysfunctional atti-
of manipulating reflection in optimists. Similarly, defensive pes- tudes, increased trait rumination was associated with worse treat-
simists performed best on a dart-throwing task when they imag- ment outcomes, whereas for participants with moderate levels of
ined what could go wrong as well as ways to correct these self-esteem or low levels of dysfunctional attitudes, increased trait
problems and performed significantly worse when they engaged in rumination predicted lower levels of depression symptoms post-
relaxation imagery or imagined a flawless performance (Spencer treatment, even when controlling for symptoms pre-treatment.
& Norem, 1996). Thus RT on negative outcomes was constructive
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

for defensive pessimists but not for optimists.

Experimental Studies
Effect of RT moderated by concrete versus abstract processing
during RT. There is evidence that the focus of attention during Effect of RT moderated by concrete versus abstract processing
repetitive mental simulations influences the effectiveness of plan- during RT. There is evidence from experimental studies suggest-
ning and self-regulation (Taylor et al., 1998; Taylor & Schneider, ing that RT can have constructive consequences on aspects of
1989). For example, students who repeatedly imagined the process cognition implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression. A
of how to take steps toward obtaining a high exam grade studied series of studies have adapted the standardized rumination induc-
more and obtained better grades than did students who repeatedly tion (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Importantly, all variants
imagined the outcome of obtaining a high grade or students who retain the key elements of the original rumination manipulation,
simply monitored their studying with no mental simulation (Pham namely, repetitive focus on self, symptoms, and mood, but with
& Taylor, 1999; Taylor et al., 1998). This effect of process instructions to adopt different styles of processing when focusing
simulation versus outcome simulation on exam performance was on the self. Thus, in depressed patients, a rumination induction
mediated by a reduction in anxiety and by increases in planning. encouraging more concrete, experiential processing, in which par-
Similarly, repeated imagining of an ongoing stressful event, how it ticipants were instructed to “focus attention on the experience of”
happened, and its associated emotions produced more positive feelings, mood, and symptoms, was compared with a rumination
affect and greater report of active coping after 1 week than did induction encouraging more abstract and evaluative processing, in
imagining having resolved the situation or not imagining the event which participants were instructed to “think about the causes,
at all (Rivkin & Taylor, 1999). Likewise, process simulations help meanings, and consequences” of feelings, mood, and symptoms
to reduce the planning fallacy, in which participants tend to un- (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004, p. 3; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001).
derestimate the time taken to complete tasks (Taylor et al., 1998). Compared with abstract, evaluative rumination, experiential rumi-
Similarly, prompting RT focused on causal attributions and ab- nation reduced negative global self-judgments such as “I am
stract evaluations (using a set of questions such as “Why did this worthless” (Rimes & Watkins, 2005), improved social problem
problem happen?”) impaired social problem solving in a recovered solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005a), and increased specificity of
depressed group, who performed as well as never-depressed par- autobiographical memory recall (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001,
ticipants in a no-prompt control condition, whereas prompting RT 2004). These cognitive processes are implicated in the onset and
focused on the concrete process of how to proceed (using a set of maintenance of depression (Williams et al., 2007). These findings
questions such as “How are you deciding what to do next?”) suggest that RT focused on the direct experience of moods and
ameliorated the problem-solving deficit normally found in a group feelings reduces patterns of cognitive processing implicated in
of currently depressed patients (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). increased vulnerability for depression relative to RT focused on
Again, RT focused on planning, induced by working through a list the causes, meanings, and consequences of moods and feelings. It
of the concrete (who, what) steps necessary to plan a charity is important to note that both variants of rumination involved focus
fundraiser, resulted in less dysphoric mood, better concentration, on negative content: Both repetitively focused attention on the
and more efficient performance on a subsequent reading task than feelings and symptoms of patients with current depression.1
did the standard rumination manipulation in dysphoric participants
(Lyubomirsky et al., 2003, Study 1).
1
Experiential rumination has some overlap with mindfulness medita-
tion, conceptualized as “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose,
RT Predicts Recovery From Depression in the present moment, non-judgementally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4).
However, it differs from mindfulness in that it does not involve a focus on
Prospective Longitudinal Studies acceptance, compassion, or decentering (viewing thought and feelings as
mental events), nor an explicit grounding in body state (focus on the breath
Main effect of RT. RT prospectively predicts reduced levels of or scanning the body). Moreover, this brief manipulation lacks the exten-
depression, whether in (a) currently depressed patients receiving sive formal and informal practice recognized as critical in engaging fully
pharmacotherapy (Yamada, Nagayama, Tsutiyama, Kitamura, & with the experience of mindfulness. Further, while mindfulness meditation
Furukawa, 2003, RT ⫽ rating of extent “absorbed in thought about can involve RT, it need not necessarily do so. Thus, these studies compared
the dysphoric mood itself, its cause, and possible results when different forms of RT to each other, rather than rumination to mindfulness.
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 185

RT Contributes to the Uptake of Health-Promoting depressive rumination was more strongly related to negative affect
Behaviors than was nonruminative self-focus. Thus, RT focused on negative
aspects of the self would have more negative consequences than
There is some preliminary evidence that RT is implicated in RT focused on positive aspects of the self. Fourth, depressive
health-promoting behaviors. First, increased worry about physical rumination, the form of RT most convincingly implicated in caus-
health predicted prospective attempts to quit smoking in smokers ing unconstructive consequences, is conceptualized in terms of
over the following 8 months (Dijkstra & Brosschot, 2003). High response to negative mood, and indexed by a measure (RSQ) that
worry was especially associated with a quit attempt in smokers explicitly focuses on negative content, with items characterized by
with both high self-efficacy and beliefs that denied or rationalized thinking about feelings and symptoms when feeling sad, down,
away the risks associated with smoking. However, in ex-smokers and depressed.
with low self-efficacy and high denial beliefs, worry predicted a Fifth, the result that “finding benefit” during RT has more
relapse back into smoking. Second, in a meta-analysis of 12 constructive consequences (e.g., J. E. Bower et al., 1998) is con-
prospective studies that measured worry about breast cancer at sistent with the valence of thought content influencing outcomes:
baseline and subsequent breast self-examination or utilization of
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Finding benefit involves a focus on positive content when repeti-

mammography, a small but reliable positive association was found
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

tively thinking about the difficult or traumatic event. Consistent

between worry about breast cancer and screening behavior, with with this, the measure of RT used in the posttraumatic growth
increased worry associated with greater probability of undertaking literature includes items that focus on positive gains (e.g., “I try to
screening (Hay, McCaul, & Magnan, 2006). think of some good things that happened to me after the flooding”;
Calhoun et al., 2000; Cryder et al., 2006). Sixth, the more patho-
Properties of Constructive and Unconstructive RT logical consequences found for Brooding could be a result of its
particularly negative thought content, focused on self-evaluative
Reviewing the extant literature, it therefore appears that RT can analysis and self-critical judgment (Treynor et al., 2003). A num-
be both helpful and unhelpful. It is important to acknowledge that ber of commentators have suggested that brooding is characterized
sometimes RT has predominantly either constructive or uncon- by self-evaluative, self-critical, and self-judgmental analysis, con-
structive outcomes but that at other times RT may simultaneously sistent with more negative valence (Gortner, Rude, & Pennebaker,
have both constructive and unconstructive outcomes; for example, 2006; Joormann et al., 2006; Mathews, 2006; Treynor et al., 2003;
posttraumatic growth can occur alongside increased distress (Te- Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). Seventh,
deschi & Calhoun, 2004). What then determines whether RT has when the items of the RSQ were altered to de-emphasize evalua-
constructive consequences and/or unconstructive consequences? tive, self-critical judgments, this Non-Judging Reflection scale was
Examining the literature reviewed, a number of properties emerge uncorrelated with depression symptoms, unlike the standard Re-
that potentially account for the distinct consequences of RT. These flection scale which was significantly correlated with depression.
properties reflect both structural aspects of RT, such as the valence Thus, changing the negative judgmental quality of these items
of thought content during RT, and process aspects, such as the reduced their relationship to depression (Rude, Maestas, & Neff,
level of construal (concrete vs. abstract processing) adopted during 2007). Eighth, while rumination about negative content predicted
RT.2 depression in an 8-month longitudinal study, rumination about
depression was no longer a significant predictor of depression after
Valence controlling for negative rumination (Ito et al., 2006). Thus, the
effects of rumination appear to depend on whether it is focused on
Unsurprisingly, valence is important in determining the conse- negative or non-negative content.
quences of RT, both in terms of thought content (positive vs. Ninth, the consequences of problem solving are known to de-
negative) and the cognitive–affective systems of the individual pend on the valence of the problem orientation adopted. A positive
engaged in RT (e.g., positive vs. negative mood; optimism vs. orientation encompassing confidence in one’s ability to solve the
pessimism). For example, RT about the acceptance of an article problem is associated with better outcomes than is a negative
that has had much work invested in it will have a very different and orientation characterized by reduced self-confidence, reduced op-
more positive affective quality than RT about the same article if it timism, and more extreme views of the severity and intractability
was rejected. of the problem (Belzer, D’Zurilla, & Maydeu-Olivares, 2002;
There is considerable evidence that the valence of thought D’Zurilla, Chang, Nottingham, & Faccini, 1998; D’Zurilla &
content is a major factor in determining whether RT is helpful or Nezu, 1990, 1999; Elliott, Sherwin, Harkins, & Marmarosh, 1995;
unhelpful. First, Segerstrom et al.’s (2003) structural analysis of Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1996; Shewchuk, Johnson, & El-
RT identified the valence of thought content as an important liott, 2000). Thus, the valence of thought content during RT
dimension within RT, with more negative content associated with appears to be a key determinant of whether RT has constructive or
worse overall mental health, more anxiety, and more physical unconstructive consequences.
symptoms. Second, Martin and Tesser (1996) identified that ru- One mechanism by which valence may moderate the conse-
mination contains several subclasses or modes, including RT about quences of RT is by determining the direction of action for the
positive content or about negative content. Third, in a large meta- magnifying effects of RT on mood and cognition. It has been
analysis of the self-focus literature, attention to negative aspects of
the self was strongly related to increased levels of negative affect,
whereas attention to positive aspects of the self was related to 2
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this distinc-
lower levels of negative affect (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Moreover, tion between structural versus process aspects of RT.
 186 WATKINS

hypothesized that RT exacerbates the pre-existing mood state and increase the likelihood of negative mood. Thus, by extension, in
amplifies the reciprocal relationships between existing cognition the context of a negative valenced intrapersonal or situational
and mood (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). It is context, RT about this negative context (which is itself negatively
argued that repetitive focus on affect and cognition serves to make valenced) would further amplify the effect of that context on mood
them more salient and, to further elaborate, to consolidate and and cognition.
strengthen them. Consistent with this RT amplification hypothesis, There is good evidence that the prevailing valence of an indi-
(a) a considerable body of research has indicated that self-focus viduals’ cognitive–affective system determines whether RT is
amplifies the effect of negative mood on thinking (Ingram, 1990; helpful or unhelpful. First, there is extensive evidence that dys-
Ingram & Smith, 1984; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987) and of phoric mood and/or depressed symptoms is a setting condition for
negative thoughts on mood (Mor & Winquist, 2002); (b) depres- depressive rumination to produce unconstructive consequences:
sive rumination is more strongly related to negative affect than is (a) The experimental literature repeatedly has found that there is
nonruminative self-focus, indicating additional effects of RT (Mor no maladaptive effect on mood and cognition of manipulating
& Winquist, 2002); (c) compared with distraction, rumination rumination compared with distraction in individuals who are not
exacerbates pre-existing anxious mood (Blagden & Craske, 1996),
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

already in a dysphoric mood (e.g., see the review by Nolen-

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

pre-existing anger (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), and in- Hoeksema, 2004b); (b) the effects of ruminative style on delay in
creases anger in response to a provocation (Bushman, 2002; Bush- presenting symptoms of breast cancer to a healthcare professional
man, Bonacci, Pedersen, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005). Thus, for was moderated in part by the experience of positive mood at the
negatively valenced cognitions, RT would amplify the negative time of symptom discovery (Lyubomirsky et al., 2006); (c) rumi-
consequences of these negative cognitions and exacerbate existing nation exacerbated the predictive effects of baseline depression on
negative mood, resulting in more unconstructive outcomes. depression 6 months later but did not predict prospective depres-
With this amplification hypothesis in mind, it is worth noting sion in the absence of depression (Roelofs et al., 2006). Second, in
that, while in the majority of cases more negative valence during a similar way, there is evidence that the consequences of worry are
RT will be associated with more unconstructive consequences, moderated by the levels of trait anxiety: Worry is associated with
positive valence during RT could possibly lead to unconstructive more active coping and greater information seeking (Davey et al.,
consequences in individuals vulnerable to hypomania and mania.
1992) and predicts better prospective performance (Siddique et al.,
Recent theories of bipolar disorder have hypothesized that re-
2006) once levels of associated trait anxiety are held constant,
peated dwelling on positive affect could amplify positive mood
suggesting that worry may be more constructive when levels of
and associated behavioral activation, fuelling the spiral of mood
anxiety are low but becomes more problematic as trait anxiety
and cognition up into hypomania (S. L. Johnson et al., in press).
increases. Trait anxiety is associated with poor problem-solving
Consistent with this hypothesis, compared with control partici-
confidence (Davey et al., 1992), which in turn is implicated in the
pants with no history of mood disorders and individuals with major
content of worrying becoming more negative and more cata-
depression, individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder endorsed
strophic, resulting in less constructive consequences (Davey, Jubb,
elevated emotion-focused rumination in response to positive af-
& Cameron, 1996). Davey et al. (1992, p. 145) hypothesized that
fect. Moreover, positive rumination was associated with hypo-
“pathological worrying is generated by a problem-focused cogni-
manic symptoms (S. L. Johnson et al., in press). Although prelim-
inary, these findings suggest a link between excessive positive tive style being thwarted by a lack of confidence in the solutions
rumination and bipolar disorder: Future research will need to being generated.” Thus, an intrapersonal context characterized by
examine its causal relationship with mania symptoms. ongoing negative affect, whether depressed mood or trait anxiety,
will lead to more negative content during RT, and, thereby, more
unconstructive consequences.
Intrapersonal and Situational Context in Which RT Third, a number of studies find that the ability of RT to predict
Occurs: Valence and Ability depression is moderated by the degree of negative self-related
The context in which repetitive thinking occurs is also an beliefs, with dysfunctional attitudes and self-esteem moderating
important determinant of the consequences of RT. Key elements of the extent to which rumination prospectively predicts (a) the onset
context are (a) the prevailing valence of the cognitive–affective of depressive episodes (Robinson & Alloy, 2003) and (b) worse
system of the individual engaged in RT, in terms of mood state, treatment outcome (Ciesla & Roberts, 2002). Likewise, the effects
self-beliefs, and dispositional traits; and (b) the situation and of experimentally manipulating rumination were moderated by the
environment in which RT occurs. Both contexts can range from negative self-related beliefs held by individuals (Ciesla & Roberts,
negatively valenced (e.g., intrapersonal: dysphoric mood, negative 2007). Similarly, the effects of worry on smoking behavior are
expectations, low self-esteem; situational: stressful, traumatic moderated by levels of self-efficacy (Dijkstra & Brosschot, 2003).
events) to positively valenced (intrapersonal: positive mood, pos- Thus, there is good evidence to suggest that negative representa-
itive expectations, high self-esteem; situational: successful, re- tions of the self and maladaptive beliefs about what is required to
warding events) and both will often determine the valence of be a worthwhile person moderate whether RT is constructive or
thought content during RT. For example, when an individual has unconstructive. In the absence of dysphoric mood or negative
low self-esteem or is in a dysphoric mood, negative thoughts, self-beliefs, RT focused on the self need not be negative; however,
memories and expectations become more easily accessible and in the presence of negative mood or negative self-beliefs, RT
available, as illustrated by the phenomenon of mood-congruent focused on the self is likely to involve negative content. As
memory (G. H. Bower, 1981; Teasdale, 1983, 1988). Similarly, a suggested by Ciesla and Roberts (2002, p. 447) “the process of
negative, stressful environment will activate negative thoughts and turning’s one attention inward may be particularly caustic if one’s
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 187

thoughts are dominated by self-deprecating and perfectionistic Taylor & Schneider, 1989). It is hypothesized that another prop-
cognitions.” erty that can account for whether RT has constructive or uncon-
Similarly, there is good evidence that situational context can structive consequences is the level of construal during RT. Re-
influence the effects of RT. First, Morrison and O’Connor (2005) search on mental representation in the cognitive and social–
found that depressive rumination interacted with reported stress to cognitive literatures makes a distinction between higher level,
predict social dysfunction 6 months later. Second, trait rumination abstract construals versus lower level, concrete construals (e.g.,
was predictive of depression at 6-week follow-up only among Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004;
initially mildly depressed undergraduates who had both low self- Freitas, Salovey, & Liberman, 2001; Liberman, Sagristano, &
esteem and a high level of stressful life events (Ciesla & Roberts, Trope, 2002; Markman & McMullen, 2003; Mischel & Shoda,
2007). Third, for individuals with higher levels of social anxiety, 1995; Trope, 1989; Trope & Liberman, 2003). High-level constru-
but not for individuals with low levels of social anxiety, post-event als are abstract, general, superordinate, and decontextualized men-
rumination was associated with increases in negative affect fol- tal representations that convey the essential gist and meaning of
lowing personal disclosure but was associated with decreases in events and actions, whereas low-level construals are more concrete
negative affect following small talk (Kashdan & Roberts, 2007). mental representations that include subordinate, contextual, spe-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Another aspect of context that influences the consequences of cific, and incidental details of events and actions.3 High-level
RT is an individual’s ability and expertise. Greater competence, abstract construals are focused on the desirability and importance
ability, practice, and expertise in the domain of concern are hy- of outcomes, whereas low-level concrete construals are focused on
pothesized to produce more constructive outcomes during RT. the feasibility and planning of outcomes. Thus, different levels of
First, the defensive pessimism literature has found that RT is construal can be adopted when perceiving one’s own and other’s
associated with constructive outcomes when RT is congruent with behavior: Inferences of global traits that are invariant across dif-
an individuals’ preferred strategy, such that defensive pessimists ferent situations (e.g., laziness) constitute relatively high-level,
find RT focused on negative outcomes an adaptive strategy but abstract construals of behavior, whereas inferences of situation-
optimists do not. Moreover, studies of defensive pessimism have specific states (e.g., tiredness), constitute relatively low-level con-
explicitly selected participants on the basis of a history of success crete construals of behavior (Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman,
in the studied domain, whether academia or social interactions 2003). Similarly, actions, events, and goals can be represented in
(e.g., grade point averages ⬎ 3.0 and reporting generally perform- terms of high-level or low-level construals: Representations of the
ing well in the past, Norem & Cantor, 1986a, 1986b), such that, by abstract “why” aspects of an action and of the ends consequential
definition, all defensive pessimists have been successful in the to an action constitute relatively high-level construals, whereas
domain under study. Thus, the benefit of RT for defensive pessi- representations of the specific “how” details of the action and of
mists occurs within the context of a reasonably high level of the means to the end constitute relatively low-level construals
experience and ability. Second, in a sample of financial sector (Freitas et al., 2004; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Weg-
managers, worry is correlated with better workplace performance ner, 1987).
for more able individuals, but worry is correlated with worse Across this review, there is evidence that RT characterized by
workplace performance for less able individuals, indicating the high-level, more abstract construals has more unconstructive con-
value of ability in moderating the role of RT (Perkins & Corr, sequences relative to RT characterized by low-level, more concrete
2005). Third, the more constructive consequences of RT for indi- construals, at least when RT is focused on negatively valenced
viduals with high self-esteem and high self-efficacy, may, in part, content (to date, the majority of studies relevant to level of con-
reflect greater objective ability as well as more positive subjective strual in RT have involved negatively valenced RT). First, within
perceptions of the self. Fourth, RT about the traits necessary to be experimental studies that manipulate RT, one experimental condi-
a good tennis player was negatively correlated with the quality of tion is often characterized by lower level construals that focus on
play in inexperienced players but not in experienced players, contextual details and the means to desired ends (e.g., experiential
suggesting that RT has less unconstructive consequences for those rumination, Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a;
with more expertise in the relevant domain (Wicklund & Braun, Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004; simulation of the process of how
1987). Thus, there is some evidence that personal ability and to achieve a goal, Taylor et al., 1998; mindsets involving imagin-
expertise may influence the consequences of RT. ing how things unfold or how to proceed, Moberly & Watkins,
2006; Watkins, 2004a; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002), whereas the
Level of Construal Adopted During RT
3
While valence is a major factor in determining the consequences It is important to note that the distinction between abstract and concrete
of RT, it cannot explain all observed findings. In particular, RT levels of representation used here differs from accounts in which concrete
focused on negative content has been found to have constructive levels of representation are associated with “hot,” emotionally arousing
consequences in studies of depressive rumination (Rimes & representations, whereas abstract levels of representation are associated
Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, with “cool,” less arousing representations (Ayduk, Mischel, & Downey,
2002; and Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005, who reported that distanced,
2001; 2004) and of defensive pessimism (Cantor & Norem, 1989;
non-emotionally immersed processing can be adaptive when focused on
Norem & Cantor, 1986a, 1986b; Norem & Chang, 2002; Spencer anger; for a theoretical account, see Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). The
& Norem, 1996). Moreover, simply focusing on positive outcomes level-of-construal and level-of-goal-hierarchy accounts discussed here do
in and of itself is not necessarily the most adaptive form of RT, as not make links between level of processing and emotional arousal, rather
revealed by the comparison of process versus outcome simulations degree of emotional arousal/distance is conceptualized as a separate di-
(Pham & Taylor, 1999; Rivkin & Taylor, 1999; Taylor et al., 1998; mension.
 188 WATKINS

other condition is characterized by higher level construals that Fourth, there is indirect evidence that level of construal could
focus on meanings and implications (e.g., analytical rumination, contribute to the beneficial effects of defensive pessimism. Defen-
Ehring et al., 2007; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, sive pessimists appear to have a strategy of viewing negative
2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004; outcome simulation, futures as temporally close, and this strategy predicts improved
Taylor et al., 1998; mindsets involving thinking about causes, task performance, through the mediator of increased preparation
meanings, consequences, Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins, (Sanna, Chang, Carter, & Small, 2006). Temporal construal theory
2004a; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). For example, because repre- proposes that thinking about distant futures involves more high-
sentations of desired ends and outcomes sought by an action level construals, whereas thinking about close futures involves
constitute relatively high-level construals, whereas representations more low-level construals (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Lower level
of the specific “how” details of the action and of the means to the construals would in turn lead to more specific preparation for an
end constitute relatively low-level construals, process simulations upcoming task.
involve relatively lower level construals than do outcome simula- One mechanism by which the level of construal may influence
tions. Critically, the manipulations of RT involving lower level the consequences of RT is by influencing the efficacy of problem
construals produce more constructive consequences than the ma- solving. Both the reduced concreteness theory (Stöber & Bork-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

nipulations of RT involving higher level construals, including ovec, 2002) and the action identification theory (Vallacher &
better social problem solving, more specific autobiographical Wegner, 1987) hypothesize that processing at a lower level of
memory, less global negative self-judgments (Rimes & Watkins, construal provides more elaborated and contextual detail about the
2005; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; specific means, alternatives, and actions by which to best proceed
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004), improved self-regulation and when faced with difficult, novel, or complex situations. Consistent
academic performance (Pham & Taylor, 1999; Rivkin & Taylor, with this hypothesis, lower level construals are associated with
1999; Taylor et al., 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989), better better problem solving (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins &
emotional recovery from prior failure (Watkins, 2004a), and up- Moulds, 2005a).
setting images (Ehring et al., 2007), and reduced emotional vul- A second mechanism by which level of construal may influence
nerability to subsequent failure (Moberly & Watkins, 2006). Im- the consequences of RT is through its effects on self-regulation.
portantly, these manipulations of RT are often matched for degree Increased focus on a concrete level of construal is hypothesized to
of negative thought content, such that the distinct functional con- facilitate self-regulation in situations where elevated self-focused
sequences cannot be due to differences in valence of thought attention and deliberate efforts to control behavior may be coun-
content. terproductive, such as choking under pressure and test anxiety
Second, the form of anticipatory RT within the MMAP focused (Leary, Adams, & Tate, 2006). Since elevated self-focused atten-
on low-level construals (Plan Rehearsal) was negatively correlated tion and increased efforts at self-regulation are often characteristic
with depression both concurrently and prospectively, whereas the of RT, in particular of rumination and worry, RT may become
form of anticipatory RT focused on higher level construals (Prob- more constructive as thinking becomes more concrete. Leary et al.
lem Analysis) was associated with increased anxiety (Feldman & (2006) argued that abstract construals about the evaluative or
Hayes, 2005). Third, the current construal-level analysis subsumes interpersonal implications of one’s behavior interrupt the smooth
the reduced concreteness theory of worry, which proposes that performance of behaviors, whereas, in contrast, more concrete
worry is predominantly experienced in a more abstract–verbal construals benefit self-regulation by (a) focusing attention on the
form rather than in a more concrete–visual imagery form and that immediate demands of the present situation, (b) reducing anxiety,
this reduced concreteness leads to negative consequences for prob- and (c) requiring less effort and thus using up fewer self-regulatory
lem solving and affect regulation (Borkovec et al., 1998; Stober, resources. For example, a basketball player would perform better
1998; Stober & Borkovec, 2002; Stober, Tepperwien, & Staak, when focusing on how to make the shot rather than when thinking
2000). Consistent with this theory, worry seems to be predomi- about the implications of missing. Consistent with this analysis,
nantly experienced in a verbal form rather than in images (Bork- the use of concrete construals frees up cognitive resources, reduces
ovec & Inz, 1990; Borkovec et al., 1993, 1998; Borkovec et al., anxiety, and/or improves task performance, whether in the form of
1983; Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1996; McLaughlin et al., implementation intentions specifying how and when an action will
2007). Moreover, elaborations of problems about which partici- be performed (“If I encounter situation X, then I’ll perform be-
pants worry are independently and blindly rated as more abstract havior Y”) or via focusing on the sound of one’s voice (vs. trying
and less concrete than those of problems about which participants to be persuasive) when giving a speech, especially when the task
do not worry (Borkovec et al., 1998; Stöber, 1998; Stöber & is considered difficult or occurs under conditions of high cognitive
Borkovec, 2002). Within reduced concreteness theory, concrete load (Brandstatter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001; Gollwitzer,
thought is defined as “distinct, situationally specific, unequivocal, 1999; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Vallacher, Wegner, & Somoza,
clear, singular” and abstract thought as “indistinct, cross- 1989; Webb & Sheeran, 2003).
situational, equivocal, unclear, aggregated” (Stöber & Borkovec, A third mechanism by which the level of construal may influ-
2002, p. 92), which fits within the existing conceptualization of ence the consequences of RT is by influencing the degree of
low-level versus high-level construals. Furthermore, reduced con- generalization in response to emotional events. Processing char-
creteness has been found during RT in currently depressed patients acterized by higher level construals produces mental representa-
(Cribb, Moulds, & Carter, 2006; Watkins & Moulds, 2007) and tions that generalize across situations and that do not incorporate
during rumination in undergraduates (McLaughlin et al., 2007), specific contextual details. Such generalizations can be beneficial
indicating that this analysis applies to other forms of RT than by allowing gainful and useful inferences across different situa-
worry. tions beyond available data and by enabling transfer of learning
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 189

from one situation to another (Forster & Higgins, 2005; Vallacher be constructive. The RST emphasizes the importance of repeated
& Wegner, 1987). However, in negative situations, more abstract and passive focus on depressed symptoms in determining the
construals could facilitate negative overgeneralizations where a negative effects of rumination (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
single failure is explained in terms of a global personal inadequacy Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2004b). The RST pro-
(e.g., “I am worthless”) rather than in terms of situation-specific poses that ruminative self-focus in response to a depressed mood
difficulties (Hamilton, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Cather, 1993). amplifies a vicious cycle between depressed mood and negative,
Such negative generalizations are implicated in the development of pessimistic thinking, thereby exacerbating negative mood and neg-
depression (Beck, 1976; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; ative thinking and impairing problem solving. Research has dem-
Carver, 1998; Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Carver, Lavoie, Kuhl, & onstrated that depressed mood has negative effects on thinking by
Ganellen, 1988). Thus, when faced with negative information, selectively priming mood-relevant information and activating
more concrete construals are hypothesized to be more adaptive by mood-congruent memories, beliefs, and expectations (G. H.
reducing negative overgeneralizations. Consistent with this hy- Bower, 1981; Teasdale, 1983). In turn, these negative cognitions
pothesis, more concrete thinking is found to facilitate the interpre- can then further maintain or exacerbate negative mood, producing
tation of the causes of negative events as unstable and controllable a vicious cycle between depressed mood and negative thinking.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

(Showers, 1988); voluntarily recalling an emotional event in spe- RST proposes that focus on symptoms further fuels this vicious
cific detail produces less emotional response than recalling it at a cycle, consistent with a considerable body of research indicating
more general level (Philippot, Baeyens, & Douilliez, 2006; Phil- that self-focus can act to amplify the effect of negative mood on
ippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003); and practice at recalling spe- thinking (Ingram, 1990; Ingram & Smith, 1984; Pyszczynski &
cific, contextualized autobiographical memories reduces the neg- Greenberg, 1987). As such, RST provides a good account of how
ative experience to a subsequent stressful task relative to practice structural factors such as negatively valenced thought content,
at recalling general, decontextualized memories (Raes, Hermans, current dysphoric mood, or negative self-beliefs would result in
Williams, & Eelen, 2006). RT with unconstructive consequences.
However, a major limitation of the RST is that it was not
Evaluating Models of RT designed to explain RT with constructive outcomes, and, as such,
does not directly instantiate how RT could have positive conse-
What theory best accounts for the data and properties described quences. Nonetheless, by logical extension, one can hypothesize
above? A first step toward answering this question is to consider that the amplifying effects of RT could also work for positive
the existing theoretical models of RT and to evaluate how well valence, such that RT focused on positive thought content would
they account for the different consequences and properties re- amplify a self-reinforcing cycle between positive mood and more
viewed. Three principal approaches can be identified: the response optimistic thinking, consistent with the observed influence of
styles approach (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2004b), the cognitive thought valence on the consequences of RT. However, even with
processing approach (Greenberg, 1995; Horowitz, 1985; Tedeschi this extension to the RST, it cannot account for the evidence that
& Calhoun, 2004), and the discrepancy-focused control theory RT focused on negative content can still have constructive conse-
approach (Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996).4 quences, as found in experimental manipulations of depressive
rumination, defensive pessimism, or cognitive processing of dis-
RST of Rumination tressing events. For example, several experimental studies found
that RT focused on depressive symptoms has constructive conse-
Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991, 2000, 2004b) seminal RST hypoth- quences (Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001;
esizes that rumination is a trait-like style of responding to de- 2004), inconsistent with the RST. Nor can the RST account for
pressed mood that has been found to be consistent across situations constructive consequences of RT that are not tied to increases in
and repeated testing (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993) and appears to positive affect, since the constructive effects of RT would depend
be a stable individual difference characteristic (Nolen-Hoeksema on amplifying the reciprocal cycle between positive mood and
& Davis, 1999). The ruminative response style is hypothesized to optimistic cognition. For example, improvements in problem solv-
be learnt in childhood, either because it was modeled by parents ing following RT that are not associated with improvements in
who themselves had a passive coping style (Nolen-Hoeksema, mood (e.g., Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002)
1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Mumme, Wolfson, & Guskin, 1995) or cannot be explained by RST. Furthermore, RST cannot account for
because the child failed to learn more active coping strategies for the influence of process aspects of RT on its consequences, in
negative affect as a consequence of overcritical, intrusive, and particular, the level of construal adopted during RT. A further
overcontrolling parents (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1995), or early limitation of RST is that it exclusively focuses on RT in response
physical/sexual abuse. Retrospective studies have found that ele-
vated rumination is associated with self-report of overcontrolling
4
parents (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2002) and reports of physical and Several theories of cognition and emotion share with the control theory
sexual abuse (Conway, Mendelson, Giannopoulos, Csank, & account an emphasis on (a) self-related discrepancies driving RT and (b)
different levels of processing and mental representation, notably the Self-
Holm, 2004), although, like all retrospective studies, current mood,
Regulatory Executive Function model (SREF; Papageorgiou & Wells,
memory biases, and demand biases could influence the report of 2003; Wells & Matthews, 1994) and the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems
past events, raising questions as to veridicality. theory (ICS; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). As many of the predictions and
The RST provides a detailed analysis of the mechanisms by principles of these models can be subsumed within the broader control
which RT leads to unconstructive outcomes but was conceived theory framework and are not exclusive to each particular theory, in the
with less explanatory power with regard to explaining how RT can interests of conciseness, these theories are not further elaborated here.
 190 WATKINS

to sad or depressed mood. Although this is an important focus for However, cognitive processing theories cannot account for how
RT, RT can also be triggered by and focused on other negative the level of construal could influence the consequences of RT. A
mood states, unresolved goals, and life events (Lavallee & Camp- further limitation of cognitive processing accounts is that they
bell, 1995; Millar, Tesser, & Millar, 1988; Robinson & Alloy, have predominantly focused on RT related to traumatic and dis-
2003), as well as on positive content (Martin & Tesser, 1996). tressing events, where there is a discrepancy between the meaning
of the distressing events and existing beliefs. As such, cognitive
processing theories do not account for different consequences of
Cognitive Processing Theories RT that are unrelated to such discrepancies in meaning and emo-
tion, for example, anticipatory RT associated with adaptive plan-
RT focused on coming to terms with past upsetting events is a ning and preparation or the uptake of health-promoting behaviors.
key element of the cognitive processing literature. Stressful and
traumatic events often contain novel information or give rise to
appraisals that are not consistent with prior mental structures such Control Theory Approaches to RT
as the beliefs and assumptions that people hold about themselves Control theory proposes that all behavior, including mental
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

and the world (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). For example, a violent

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

activities, reflects a process of feedback control. Individuals per-

assault and the increased sense of vulnerability it produces would ceive their current state and behavior and then compare these
clash with prior beliefs such as “the world is basically safe” and perceptions with salient reference values such as their goals, stan-
“bad things don’t happen to good people.” Cognitive processing dards, or desired outcomes. If the comparison indicates a discrep-
accounts propose that this discrepancy between the meaning of the ancy between actual state and reference value, such as an unre-
negative event and pre-existing mental structures makes it difficult solved goal, behavior will be adjusted in order to bring it closer to
to integrate this new information into current mental structures and the reference value (Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1990; Carver &
leads to distress. Recovery from distressing experiences is as- Scheier, 1998). In particular, discrepancies between expected rates
sumed to require that the person work through and resolve the of progress toward goals are hypothesized to influence behavior
incongruence between the information acquired from the distress- and affect. The original control theory approach to RT emphasized
ing experience and pre-existing mental structures representing the that rumination is triggered by a discrepancy in goal progress and
world (Horowitz, 1986). Within cognitive processing accounts, the that these goals are organized hierarchically (Martin & Tesser,
discrepancy between the meaning of the event and pre-existing 1989, 1996). Furthermore, RT focused on the discrepancy in
mental structures is proposed to produce RT in the form of re- attaining the unresolved goal is intended to serve the function of
peated intrusions and re-experiencing of the distressing event until facilitating progress toward the reference value. Within this ac-
the discrepancy is resolved. Thus, cognitive processing accounts count, the RT will continue either until the goal is met or until the
have explained the onset and maintenance of RT. However, these individual disengages from and abandons the goal (Carver &
accounts have not tended to explicitly instantiate what determines Scheier, 1990; Klinger, 1975; Martin, Shrira, & Startup, 2004;
whether RT has constructive or unconstructive outcomes. Indeed, Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987;
there has been some debate as to whether the RT is a necessary and Wells & Matthews, 1994). It is important to recognize that repre-
active part of working through the upsetting event or simply an sentations of both external stimuli (e.g., a physical situation, a
epiphenomenon of recovery (Harber & Pennebaker, 1992; Horow- concrete outcome) and internal stimuli (e.g., moods, feelings) can
itz, 1986; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Tait & Silver, 1989). act as reference values for goals, such that RT can be influenced by
Nonetheless, cognitive processing approaches are consistent discrepancies in representations of both external and internal
with structural factors such as valence influencing the conse- states.
quences of RT. Recent cognitive processing accounts emphasize There is accumulating evidence consistent with this goal-
that a focus on finding benefit when thinking about upsetting and discrepancy control theory approach to RT. RT about important
traumatic events results in better outcomes, consistent with the people and activities left behind when coming to college was
valence of thought content influencing the consequences of RT. In positively predicted by the extent to which these activities re-
addition, theoretical accounts of cognitive processing suggest that mained interrupted at college, that is, the extent these important
it will be easier to organize and make coherent one single event goals were not attained (Millar et al., 1988). Abstract goals that are
rather than multiple events simultaneously, because multiple mem- more important and meaningful to people, such as attaining hap-
ories will interfere with the processing of each other, take up more piness, and concrete goals that are linked to these important
central executive resources (Foa & Kozak, 1986), and include abstract goals, such as being in a romantic relationship, produce
more disparate material that does not easily fit into the temporal more RT when not attained (W. D. Mcintosh, Harlow, & Martin,
and spatial sequence necessary for the creation of a coherent story, 1995; W. D. McIntosh & Martin, 1992). In a diary study, negative
which is hypothesized to be essential for effective working through events that were related to personal goals produced more RT than
of upsetting events (Foa et al., 1995; Klein & Boals, 2001; Pen- goal-unrelated negative events (Lavallee & Campbell, 1995).
nebaker, 1997; Pennebaker et al., 1997; Pennebaker & Seagal, The tendency toward RT seems to depend on the perseverance
1999; Sloan & Marx, 2004; Smyth et al., 2001). Thus, because a of unresolved goal-related thoughts, as evidenced in the Zeigarnik
negative intrapersonal context increases the availability and acces- effect, in which recall of interrupted and uncompleted tasks is
sibility of negative concerns and negative memories (S. M. Smith significantly better than recall of completed tasks (Kuhl & Beck-
& Petty, 1995; Teasdale, 1983; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Teas- mann, 1985; Kuhl & Helle, 1986; Zeigarnik, 1938). There is an
dale & Dent, 1987), it may make it harder to effectively process extensive literature confirming that unresolved and blocked goals
any particular difficult event. increase the priming and accessibility of goal-relevant information
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 191

as well as the perseverance of goal-related thoughts (Brunstein & quences. Moreover, an individual’s beliefs and moods, particularly
Gollwitzer, 1996; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Martin & Tesser, 1989), those relevant to judging self-worth, will influence their goals and
whereas resolved goals inhibit the priming and accessibility of reference values, such that more extreme beliefs about what is
goal-relevant information, consistent with a control process ac- required to achieve self-worth will result in (a) harder-to-attain
count of how RT would be initiated and terminated (Forster, reference values, making discrepancies between the desired state
Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; R. E. Johnson, Chang, & Lord, 2006). and the actual state harder to resolve and (b) harder-to-abandon
Moreover, principles within control theory can be elaborated to goals. For example, negative mood can cause individuals to in-
account for the reviewed findings. Critically, unlike the other crease their standards for success, making it harder to resolve a
accounts, the control theory account (Martin & Tesser, 1989, goal discrepancy (Cervone, Kopp, Schaumann, & Scott, 1994),
1996) explicitly hypothesized that RT can have constructive or consistent with a control theory account of RT. In the context of
unconstructive consequences. Within control theory, RT produces RT, this analysis suggests that maladaptive beliefs about what is
constructive consequences if it helps to resolve the discrepancy required to be a worthwhile person, such as high levels of dys-
between the intended goal and actual current state, whether by functional attitudes, will lead to both harder-to-attain goals and
aiding progress toward the goal or by helping to modify or aban- reluctance to abandon these goals, trapping an individual in un-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

don the goal (Klinger, 1975; Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996; constructive RT, consistent with the observed findings (e.g., Ciesla
Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003). In contrast, RT & Roberts, 2007).
becomes unconstructive if a person experiences an inability to Moreover, self-representations can influence the ability of indi-
progress toward reducing the discrepancy and at the same time is viduals to disengage from an unresolved goal by substituting it
unable to give up on the reference value or goal. In such a case, RT with positive affirmations on another aspect of self that relates to
would serve only to focus attention on the discrepancy between the the same superordinate goal. Affirming valued aspects of the self
desired goal and the actual situation, making the unresolved dis- reduces RT about a frustrated goal (Koole, Smeets, van Knippen-
crepancy more salient, perpetuating the unresolved issue, and berg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999). However, individuals with reduced
exacerbating negative affect (Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998; self-esteem and more dysfunctional self-beliefs have reduced self-
Klinger, 1975; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985; Martin & Tesser, 1989, affirmational resources in response to difficulties (Koole et al.,
1996; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). It is important to distin- 1999; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993), making it harder to dis-
guish between disengaging from efforts at goal pursuit, whether engage from unconstructive RT about an interrupted or incomplete
mentally or physically, and disengaging from the underlying goal: goal and move onto more constructive RT (Di Paula & Campbell,
The former combines a lack of goal progress with the ongoing 2002; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985; Kuhl & Helle, 1986) or to disen-
maintenance of the desired but unattained goal, further highlight- gage from unsolvable tasks (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999). Since
ing the unresolved discrepancy, whereas the latter constructively expectancies are examples of positive and negative thoughts, while
reduces the goal discrepancy. beliefs and mood are elements of intrapersonal context, control
To date, control theory accounts have focused on hypothesizing theory thus accommodates the structural aspects of RT identified
the mechanisms underpinning the onset, frequency, and duration earlier.
of RT rather than instantiating the mechanisms that determine Second, and more pertinently, further elaboration of principles
whether RT is constructive or unconstructive. RT was proposed to within control theory accounts for the finding that process aspects
be beneficial if individuals “use a form of rumination that can of RT such as level of construal influence the consequences of RT.
provide a solution for the type of problem they are facing,” Within control theory, it is hypothesized that goals and behaviors
although this was not further specified other than to suggest that are hierarchically organized and can be processed at different
applying logic to insight problems or insight to logic problems levels of abstraction, with more abstract, superordinate goals and
may be unhelpful (Martin et al., 2004, p. 171). Nonetheless, there standards guiding and informing more specific, subordinate goals
are principles within control theory that can be elaborated to and standards. Within this hierarchical organization, pursuit to-
explain how the properties identified in this review can influence ward abstract goals occurs by specifying reference values at the
the consequences of RT. next lower level of abstraction, all the way down to the concrete
First, control theory can account for the findings that structural representations required to specify the actual behaviors needed to
aspects of RT such as valence of thought content and intrapersonal progress toward the goal (D. E. Broadbent, 1977; Carver &
context influence the consequences of RT. Within control theory, Scheier, 1990, 1998; Emmons, 1992; Powers, 1973a, 1973b;
expectancies and beliefs about the self and about the outcomes of Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Carver and Scheier (1990) proposed
behavior are hypothesized to play an important role in determining that the most abstract levels represent a global sense of idealized
how a person responds to a discrepancy between the actual state self, which in turn sets the broad principles that organize goals and
and the desired state, by influencing persistence at goal pursuit, the behavioral standards across multiple situations (e.g., to be an
reference values by which goal progress is judged, the interpreta- honest person), corresponding to higher level construals, whereas
tion of feedback, and the judgment of when to abandon a goal the more concrete levels represent the specific actions and behav-
(Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998; Hyland, 1987). More negative ioral programs necessary to implement the principles in a partic-
expectancies, such as doubts about ability to succeed, will lead to ular situation (e.g., telling the truth to a friend), corresponding to
attempts to disengage from goal pursuit as well as a greater lower level construals. Thus, this hierarchical organization affords
perceived discrepancy between desired state and actual state. As the use of high- and low-level construals, consistent with the
noted above, disengaging from goal pursuit will leave an unre- distinction between abstract versus concrete processing within RT.
solved discrepancy, which, in the absence of abandoning the Further, control theory hypothesizes that effective self-
unresolved goal, will cause RT to have unconstructive conse- regulation requires flexible and balanced coordination between the
 192 WATKINS

different levels within the goal hierarchy, such that the superordi- experienced driver in hazardous, unfamiliar driving conditions
nate level of control adaptively varies in response to situational such as a snowstorm since, in both cases, there is not well-
and task demands. Depending on context, a level of control that is established specification of how high-level reference values trans-
too abstract, too concrete, or that fails to link abstract levels to late into subgoals and concrete behavior. Instead, control of be-
concrete levels is hypothesized to be detrimental (Carver & havior needs to be located at low levels in the hierarchy concerned
Scheier, 1998, Chapter 13). Elaborating on key principles within with concrete and specific actions. Second, when the superordinate
control theory suggests that there are a number of distinct advantages abstract goal is ill-defined and it is difficult to specify how it might
and disadvantages for self-regulation when the level of control is actually be achieved, control at a higher level in the goal hierarchy
located higher or lower in the goal hierarchy, corresponding to ab- is going to be problematic. For example, a goal like “be happy”
stract versus concrete levels of construal, respectively. may be too abstract and vague to provide clear guidance as to how
Thus, one hypothesized advantage of higher level, abstract an individual might specify subgoals toward attaining it. Third,
control is increased consistency and stability of behavior toward processing at a more abstract level may interfere with goal disen-
long-term goals across time and across different situational de- gagement: The more abstract the level at which a goal is repre-
mands because higher level control ensures that subordinate goals
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

sented in the hierarchy, the more important the goal becomes to the
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

and actions remain directed toward personally important higher general sense of self, and the harder it becomes to disengage from
level goals and minimizes interference from incidental influences the goal (Martin & Tesser, 1996; W. D. McIntosh & Martin, 1992;
(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; 1989). In Millar et al., 1988). Such abstract construals will be unproblematic
contrast, low-level control is hypothesized to be more sensitive to when there is sufficient progress toward the relevant goal. How-
contextual and situational detail, resulting in increased impulsive- ever, when a goal is difficult or impossible to attain, processing at
ness and distractibility. Consistent with this hypothesis, a habitual too abstract a level will make it harder to relinquish the goal,
tendency toward more abstract construals is associated with more trapping the individual in the invidious state where he or she can
persistent and stable behavior, greater self-motivation, less impul- neither make progress toward the goal nor abandon it, leading to
siveness, and fewer action errors (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), and persistent but unconstructive RT. This analysis therefore suggests
adopting high-level construals produces greater self-control on that under circumstances of novelty, unfamiliarity, difficulty, or
experimental tasks than adopting low-level construals (Fujita, stress, RT characterized by higher level, abstract construals will be
Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006). A second hypothesized unconstructive as it gives limited guidance as to what to do next.
advantage of higher level control is that it provides more flexibility The elaborated control theory therefore proposes that for more
in responding to relatively low-level goals that are unattained difficult and novel tasks, where full specification through the
because processing at a higher level affords more alternative goal–action hierarchy is lacking, control of behavior at more
subgoals and behaviors to resolve the goal discrepancy (Brunstein concrete, lower levels in the hierarchy is more functional. Shifting
& Gollwitzer, 1996). For example, if an individual is failing to control down to lower levels of abstraction, which corresponds to
progress on the daily goal of writing a poem, control at the level a more concrete level of construal, is hypothesized to ensure that
of an abstract superordinate goal (e.g., “to be creative”) provides goals and standards are translated into effective goal pursuit,
alternative goals and means to resolve this discrepancy (e.g., play because processing at a more concrete level serves the functions of
music, draw, paint) that are not available if the functionally su- determining the specific means and actions by which to best
perordinate goal is just to complete a poem. Thus, this analysis proceed and focuses attention on the immediate environment
suggests that under some circumstances, for example, when con- (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Moreover,
sidering long-term goals, RT characterized by higher level, ab- lower level construals may provide more concrete indicators of
stract construals will be constructive. progress than might high-level construals (Emmons, 1992): It is
However, a logical elaboration from control theory is that higher easier to determine if one is being successful at pursuing a lower
level abstract control will become disadvantageous under particu- level goal like “keeping your desk clean” than the associated
lar circumstances. First, because pursuit toward abstract goals higher level goal of “being more organized.”5 Further, a more
occurs by specifying reference values at the next lower level, down concrete level of construal may make it easier to disengage from
to the actual concrete behaviors required, the aforementioned an unattainable goal by reducing its personal importance and
advantages of higher level control/abstract construals will only self-relevance.
occur when there is sufficiently operationalized specification from Thus, by logically elaborating on principles within control the-
the higher levels down to lower levels of representation (see also ory, it is hypothesized that higher level, abstract construals pro-
Carver & Scheier, 1998). When programs and sequences of goal- mote effective goal progress for unproblematic, familiar, or posi-
related behaviors are straightforward, familiar, and practiced, an
tive situations, but that lower level, concrete construals are more
individual will have developed extensive procedural knowledge
constructive for difficult or novel situations and unattainable goals.
specifying the links between goals and behaviors across all levels,
Therefore, the elaborated control theory hypothesizes an interac-
making higher level control of self-regulation effective (Anderson,
tion between structural aspects (valence) and process aspects (level
1983; Vera & Simon, 1993). However, under circumstances of
of construal) in determining the consequences of RT. Critically,
novelty, unfamiliarity, difficulty, or stress, this specification of
this account explains the observed pattern of findings in which
reference values down through the control hierarchy can break
down, such that the advantages of controlling self-regulation at a
higher level are lost. For example, adopting a high level of control 5
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting how more
focused on a goal such as “be punctual” would not be useful for concrete levels of construal would facilitate the monitoring of goal
either a learner driver still getting used to handling a car or for an progress.
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 193

adopting a more concrete level of construal during RT about and to expand on these approaches to explain process approaches
negative content or in the context of negative situations (e.g., to RT (level of construal). Moreover, this control theory account of
focusing on depressed mood, thinking about upsetting events, or RT is consistent with the extensive literature linking goal discrep-
planning for stressful events like exams) results in more construc- ancy with RT. A further advantage of the control theory approach
tive outcomes than does RT characterized by a more abstract level is that it can integrate the other theoretical approaches to RT and
of construal (e.g., Leary et al., 2006; Pham & Taylor, 1999; their associated findings within its conceptual framework. Control
Vallacher et al., 1989; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & theory can explain the findings within cognitive processing ac-
Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Webb & Sheeran, 2003). However, the counts, since both theories propose that a key mechanism driving
corollary prediction that during RT about positive content or in the RT is the attempt to reduce discrepancies, whether between current
context of positive situations abstract construals will have more outcome and desired goals or between current informational state
constructive outcomes than those of concrete construals has not and existing mental structures (Martin & Tesser, 1989). Within
been extensively tested. Recent evidence consistent with this pre- control theory, the adoption of a higher level goal such as “making
diction is the finding that people with low self-esteem induced to sense of events” or “reducing discrepant information” could ac-
think abstractly about a recent compliment from a romantic partner count for the observations within the cognitive processing account,
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

report greater state self-esteem and greater security in their rela- as explicitly outlined within models of posttraumatic growth (Te-
tionships than do people with low self-esteem induced to think deschi & Calhoun, 2004). Moreover, despite initial suggestions
concretely about a recent compliment (Marigold, Holmes, & Ross, that discrepancies were not necessary for depressive rumination to
2007). occur (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), theoretical accounts suggest that
A related prediction from the elaborated control theory is that by focus on the causes and consequences of depressed mood is likely
default individuals will adopt more abstract construals but will to involve focus on unresolved goal discrepancies (e.g., Brunstein
shift to more concrete construals when faced with difficulties (see & Gollwitzer, 1996; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Moreover,
also Wegner & Vallacher, 1987). Consistent with this hypothesis, recent findings within RST are consistent with the predictions of
individuals tend by default to use more abstract construals, focused control theory: (a) The content of experimentally induced rumina-
on the meanings, consequences, and implications of actions (Weg- tion is characterized by thinking about unresolved personal prob-
ner & Vallacher, 1987; Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, lems (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999); (b) depressive rumination is
1986; Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps, 1984), yet associated with meta-cognitive beliefs that rumination is useful for
when faced with difficult, novel, or complex situations, people understanding depression and solving problems, suggesting that
often move toward more concrete levels of processing (Beckmann, depressive rumination is adopted with the intention of resolving
1994; Vallacher, Wegner, & Frederick, 1987; Wegner et al., 1984; goal-based or meaning-related discrepancies (Lyubomirsky &
Wong & Weiner, 1981), although there are exceptions, including Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Watkins &
the tendency toward depressive rumination in response to sad Baracaia, 2001; Watkins & Moulds, 2005b); and (c) experimen-
mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) and occasions when more abstract tally induced rumination and discrepancy-focused thinking both
construals are adopted in response to failure and goal frustration increase anxiety and depressed mood to an equivalent degree and
(Wicklund, 1986). Other evidence consistent with this hypothesis are indistinguishable in terms of flow of thought content (Nolen-
is the finding that in neutral and happy moods people adopt a more Hoeksema, 2004a). Indeed, Treynoret al (2003, p. 256) interpreted
global, abstract processing style but shift into a more local, con- brooding as “a passive comparison of one’s current situation with
crete processing style in response to sad mood (Beukeboom & some unachieved standard,” consistent with a control theory ac-
Semin, 2005, 2006; Bless et al., 1996; Gasper & Clore, 2002; count.
Isbell, 2004; Kurman, 2003; Storbeck & Clore, 2005). This hy- A further advantage of the control theory account is that it can
pothesis predicts that RT will tend to be characterized by higher account for the adoption of the different structural and process
level, abstract construals when goal progress is unproblematic, but aspects of RT. For example, as noted earlier, there is evidence that
that RT will tend to be characterized by lower level, concrete in response to difficulties, individuals sometimes adopt a more
construals when goal progress is blocked. Because the elaborated concrete level of construal (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) but some-
control theory hypothesizes that higher level control is the default times adopt more abstract construals (Wicklund, 1986), as exem-
level of control, it also accounts for the finding that competence, plified by the abstract RT found during depressive rumination/
practice, and expertise influence the consequences of RT, for brooding. Thus, any theory of RT needs to explain the mechanisms
example, the benefit of RT for depressive pessimists. When an underpinning whether RT involves (a) negative or positive thought
individual is more familiar and skilled within a domain, he or she content and (b) an abstract or concrete level of construal. Structural
is more likely to have good specification from high levels to low factors, such as valence, are relatively straightforward to explain
levels in the goal–action hierarchy, reducing the likelihood of across all models of RT: Thought valence will be determined by
higher level control breaking down. the nature of the event and the context in which RT occurs as well
as by individual beliefs, expectancies, and learning history. In
The Control Theory Account: An Integrative Overview addition, within control theory, goal progress at a rate faster than
and Novel Predictions anticipated produces positive mood and cognition, whereas goal
progress slower than anticipated produces negative valence
One of the main strengths of this elaborated control theory (Carver & Scheier, 1990).
account is its ability to account for the findings reviewed regarding The elaborated control theory account hypothesizes that the
the different consequences of RT, in particular, its ability to level of construal is principally determined by adaptive regulation
accommodate both structural approaches to RT (valence, context) of level of construal in response to situational demands, such that
 194 WATKINS

construal typically becomes more concrete in response to difficul- adopt RT characterized by more abstract construals, despite it
ties, but that various situational, motivational, and cognitive fac- having unconstructive consequences.
tors can interfere with this regulatory process. First, the extent to The further test of the scientific utility of this elaborated control
which goal progress is blocked is hypothesized to influence the theory approach to RT is its ability to make unique testable
level of construal adopted (Martin & Tesser, 1996): When goal predictions that can be evaluated in future research. The current
progress is moderately thwarted it is still adaptive to shift to lower analysis has generated a number of such testable predictions. First,
level construals (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), whereas more severe as noted above, the level-of-construal dysregulation hypothesis
blockage, particularly for highly self-relevant goals, leads to predicts that whereas the majority of individuals will preferentially
higher level construals (Wicklund, 1986), as individuals re-orient adopt higher level construals in unproblematic, familiar, positive,
to their higher order concerns. Second, self-related beliefs are and neutral situations, but will shift to lower level construals in the
hypothesized to influence the preference toward more abstract or face of difficulties and negative mood, individuals at risk for
more concrete levels of construal. For example, meta-cognitive depression will continue to preferentially adopt higher level con-
beliefs that it is important to understand and make sense of feelings struals even in the face of difficulties and negative mood. Second,
and problems would encourage the use of higher level construals. as noted earlier, the elaborated control theory predicts an interac-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Likewise, low, unstable or contingent self-esteem leads to attempts tion between level of construal and valence in determining the
to pursue self-esteem by trying to validate abilities and qualities consequences of RT. Lower level construals are predicted to be
(Crocker & Knight, 2005; Crocker & Park, 2004; Crocker & more adaptive during RT focused on negative content or occurring
Wolfe, 2001), which typically involves evaluating one’s self-worth within a negative context, whereas higher level construals are
at a trait level, that is, the use of more abstract construals predicted to be more adaptive during RT focused on positive
(Baumeister & Tice, 1985; Lyubomirsky, 2001). Further, as the content or occurring within a positive context. Thus, the use of
perceived probability of an event reduces, construals become more repeated training paradigms in which individuals learn to adopt a
abstract (Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006) such that more concrete level of construal in response to emotional events
more negative expectations would engender more abstract constru- would be predicted to reduce emotional vulnerability to a subse-
als. Third, effective regulation of level of construal in response to quent negative event but also to reduce positive response to a
situational demands is hypothesized to require good cognitive and subsequent positive event. Likewise, since people construe nearer
central executive control. Thus, individuals with deficits in exec- future events in more concrete terms than distant future events
utive/inhibitory control, either because of greater cognitive load or (Forster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004; Liberman & Trope, 1998;
reduced cognitive resources, would be impaired at effectively Trope & Liberman, 2003), focusing on nearer future events during
regulating level of construal in response to situational demands. negatively valenced RT is predicted to result in more constructive
This analysis predicts that individuals with these vulnerability outcomes than focusing on distant future events, with the reverse
factors will be compromised in their ability to flexibly regulate pattern of findings predicted for positively valenced RT.
level of construal in response to situational demands to the extent Third, this approach has a number of implications for the treat-
that they do not show the functional shift toward lower level ment of psychological disorders, since RT has been demonstrated
construals typically observed in response to difficulties (Bless et to contribute to both anxiety and depression (Harvey et al., 2004).
al., 1996; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Isbell, 2004; Kurman, 2003; It suggests that when an individual starts to dwell on a negative
Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Given that patients with depression and event or difficulty, shifts in how he or she does this could poten-
depressive ruminators are observed to have such meta-cognitive tially move him or her from RT that exacerbates difficulties to RT
beliefs (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou & that helps recovery. This analysis suggests that the goal of therapy
Wells, 2001; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001; Watkins & Moulds, for people with unconstructive RT should not be to reduce their RT
2005b), reduced self-esteem, and deficits in executive/inhibitory but rather to shift them to more constructive forms of RT. Target-
control (R. N. Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Gotlib, Yue, & ing such changes could contribute to more effective and systematic
Joormann, 2005; Hertel, 1997; Joormann, 2004, 2006), this anal- treatments for psychological disorders. This analysis predicts that
ysis suggests the level-of-construal dysregulation hypothesis, RT with constructive consequences can be facilitated by (a) re-
which predicts that depression-prone groups will be impaired at ducing the extent and accessibility of negative thought content
regulating their level of construal in response to difficulties, lead- while increasing the extent and accessibility of positive thought
ing to an overly abstract level of construal and to RT that has content and (b) encouraging a shift into a more concrete level of
unconstructive consequences. Consistent with this prediction, a construal when focused on difficulties and negative mood (see
recent study found that individuals with mild-to-moderate depres- Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 1995, for a related analysis). These
sive symptoms generated counterfactual RT about a negative event predictions are consistent with a number of psychological thera-
characterized by more concrete construals than those of non- pies empirically shown to be effective in treating depression and
depressed individuals, whereas individuals with severe depressive anxiety. Both cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) and behavioral
symptoms generated counterfactual RT characterized by more activation implicitly encourage patients to be more concrete, spe-
abstract construals (e.g., global, characterological judgments). cific, and detailed in their description and analysis of activities.
Thus, mild depressive symptoms are associated with the adaptive Further, in both therapies, patients work to build up success,
regulation of level of construal in response to mood, but more mastery, and pleasurable activities, and, thereby, improve self-
extreme depressive symptoms are associated with dysregulation of esteem and strengthen and make more accessible positive cogni-
this process (Markman & Miller, 2006). Thus, this level-of- tion. Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy, which has been dem-
construal dysregulation hypothesis accounts for why the subset of onstrated to significantly reduce rates of relapse in people with a
individuals prone to depression and brooding show a tendency to history of recurrent depression in several trials (Ma & Teasdale,
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 195

2004; Teasdale et al., 2000) and to reduce depressive rumination fMRI amygdala activity in response to emotional words (Siegle,
(Ramel, Goldin, Carmona, & McQuaid, 2004), explicitly uses Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002). Sixth, the process of
meditation practice to train patients away from abstract levels of goal disengagement needs more detailed examination. Goal disen-
processing and into a more concrete mode of processing (Segal, gagement and goal reengagement are increasingly suggested to be
Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). Moreover, a recent adaptation of important in determining well-being (Rasmussen, Wrosch,
CBT that explicitly focuses on shifting processing toward lower Scheier, & Carver, 2006; Wrosch, Dunne, Scheier, & Schulz,
level construals has encouraging initial results in the treatment of 2006; Wrosch & Heckhausen, 1999; Wrosch et al., 2003; Wrosch,
residual depression, reducing symptoms and depressive rumina- Schulz, & Heckhausen, 2004) and, to date, are neglected in the
tion (Watkins et al., 2007). study of RT.
These examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive. None-
theless, they demonstrate how the control theory can generate Other Possible Moderators of the Consequences of RT
unique, testable predictions as well as account for current knowl-
edge. The veracity of the account should be subject to evaluation This review focuses on factors that were robustly demonstrated
by the rigorous testing of these and other relevant predictions. to moderate the consequences of RT. Nonetheless, there was
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

tentative evidence that several other factors may moderate the

Future Research consequences of RT. First, two correlational studies suggested that
the purpose motivating RT may moderate its consequences: RT
Areas for Future Investigation motivated by curiosity and by searching for new ideas and expe-
riences was associated with less negative affect/depression than
The current review also highlights important gaps in the re- RT motivated by neurotic, threat-related concerns or by the need
search on RT. First, the study of RT has been predominantly for certainty (Segerstrom et al., 2003; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).
focused on depression, worry, and trauma. Future research needs Prospective and experimental studies are necessary to explore
to examine the processes of RT with respect to other psychological whether the purpose of RT may be a potential moderator. Second,
disorders, other triggering events, and other emotions. Recent rigidity of thought during RT (e.g., perseveration on the same
findings linking RT prospectively to bulimia and substance abuse content vs. generation of many different ideas) may be a potential
in female adolescents (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2007) and concur- moderator of the consequences of RT. Several studies suggest that
rently to bipolar disorder (S. L. Johnson et al., in press) suggest the the generation of an increased number of different thoughts and
value of further RT research in these disorders. Second, many of ideas is associated with constructive consequences for RT (Cantor
the prospective studies of RT related to psychological disorders et al., 1987; El Leithy et al., 2006), whereas RT defined in terms
have not explicitly reported or controlled for previous episodes of of perseveration and Stagnant Deliberation is associated with
the relevant disorder (e.g., major depression), which could poten- increased depression (Ehring, 2007; Feldman & Hayes, 2005).
tially act as a common variable, explaining why elevated RT Thus, RT that is highly repetitive, “stuck,” and perseverative may
predicts future symptoms. Third, there is a preponderance of be unconstructive. This suggestion parallels Ingram’s (1990) pro-
research on RT with unconstructive consequences, which needs to posal that pathological self-focus is characterized by excessive
be balanced by more research into the constructive aspects of RT. frequency, sustained duration, and rigidity. By extension, it may be
In particular, more prospective longitudinal studies and experi- useful to investigate whether frequency, duration, and repetitive-
mental studies are necessary to investigate the constructive con- ness of RT moderate the consequences of RT.
sequences of RT, especially in the areas of cognitive processing
and posttraumatic growth, where most of the evidence is still only Conclusion
cross-sectional. Fourth, such research requires behavioral, physi-
ological, or observer-rated outcome measures that reduce the risk The analysis outlined here builds on many others and represents
of constructive outcomes resulting from inaccurate, biased, or ongoing efforts to identify the key mechanisms that influence the
defensive self-reports. different consequences of RT. In this article, I review evidence
Fifth, a valuable addition to research in this field will be the indicating that RT can have unconstructive and constructive con-
development of measures that can assess both constructive and sequences. In the course of reviewing the literature on RT, three
unconstructive aspects of RT, as well as RT across a wider range factors emerged to account for the differential consequences of
of situations and moods. The limitations of the RSQ were noted RT: the valence of thought content, the intrapersonal and situa-
earlier: Future research will usefully assess RT using alternative tional context of the individual engaged in RT, and the construal
questionnaires (Siegle, Moore, & Thase, 2004) that do not con- level of the RT. Table 3 describes how each of the major classes
found RT with the degree of negative affectivity and that can of RT reviewed earlier can be characterized in terms of these
capture other potentially relevant dimensions such as the duration, moderating factors. Thus, depressive rumination (Nolen-
controllability, and repetitiveness of RT. Likewise, the assessment Hoeksema, 1991) is characterized by negatively valenced thought
of RT through non-self-report measures is a priority, such as content (RT about depression), a negative intrapersonal context
developing on-line measures of RT, such as the use of thought (depressed mood, negative self-beliefs), and an abstract level of
sampling, or cognitive-experimental and psychophysiological in- construal (thinking about meanings and implications), with accom-
dices associated with self-reported RT, such as attentional bias panying unconstructive consequences. Several classes of RT have
(Joorman et al., 2006), sustained pupil dilation to negative infor- inclusive and broad definitions, such that they cannot be charac-
mation (Siegle, Granholm, Ingram, & Matt, 2001; Siegle, Stein- terized by a particular value for each factor (e.g., Martin & Tess-
hauer, Carter, Ramel, & Thase, 2003), or sustained event-related er’s, 1989, 1996, definition of rumination encompasses positive vs.
 196 WATKINS

Table 3
Major Classes of RT Classified by Valence, Context, and Level of Construal

Class of RT Valence Context Construal Consequence

Depressive rumination ⫺ ⫺ A ⫺
Rumination (Martin & Tesser, 1996) ⫹/⫺ ⫹/⫺ A/C ⫹/⫺
Worry ⫺ ⫺ A ⫺
⫺ ⫹/⫺ C ⫹
Perseverative cognition ⫺ ⫺ A ⫺
Cognitive/emotional ⫹ ⫺ A ⫹
Processing ⫺ ⫺ C ⫹
Planning/problem solving ⫺ ⫹ C ⫹
Counterfactuals ⫹/⫺ ⫹/⫺ A/C ⫹/⫺
Defensive pessimism ⫺ ⫹ C ⫹
Reflection ⫹ ⫹ A ⫹?
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Mind wandering ⫹/⫺ ⫹/⫺ A/C ⫹/⫺

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Post-event rumination ⫺ ⫺ A ⫺
Positive rumination ⫹ ⫹ BPD A? ⫺
⫹ ⫹ A ⫹
Habitual negative self-thinking ⫺ ⫺ A ⫺

Note. Valence ⫽ valence of thought content; context ⫽ situational and/or intrapersonal context; construal ⫽
level of construal; consequences ⫽ consequences of RT; ⫺ refers to negative valence/context or unconstructive
consequence; ⫹ refers to negative valence/context or constructive consequence; ⫹/⫺ means that valence,
context, or consequence is mixed or underspecified, for example, class of RT can have both constructive and
unconstructive consequences; A ⫽ abstract level of construal; C ⫽ concrete level of construal; ? ⫽ unclear/
unknown; BPD ⫽ vulnerability to bipolar disorder.

negative content, abstract vs. concrete construals). Worry has been and problem solving yet at other times exacerbates depression and
described as having unconstructive consequences and constructive anxiety.
consequences. Within the current analysis, all worry is character- This review was not meant to be, and clearly could not be,
ized by negative valence (thoughts of a real or potential problem), exhaustive. Given the breadth of the literature relevant to RT, it is
but worry characterized by a concrete level of construal is con- likely that other factors not mentioned here are compatible with
structive, whereas worry characterized by an abstract level of this analysis or could influence the consequences of RT. Further-
construal and negative intrapersonal context (e.g., low problem- more, this review has focused on the processes and mechanisms
solving confidence) is unconstructive. Moreover, although the most directly linked to the different consequences of RT, at the
valence of the context typically matches the valence of thought loss of detailed consideration of other factors potentially linked to
content, there are exceptions; for example, in problem solving and RT. In particular, biological, interpersonal, neuropsychological,
defensive pessimism, thought content is negative (thoughts of a and neurological factors, such as the role of neurotransmitters,
problem) but intrapersonal context is positive, reflecting high functional deficits in inhibitory processes, and functional neuro-
levels of optimism and positive self-belief. This analysis also anatomy, have not been reviewed (e.g., Mayberg, 2006; Ray et al.,
suggests that there may be two routes by which cognitive process- 2005; Siegle et al., 2001). This is not to argue that these factors do
ing could be constructive: Following a stressful event (negative not play a role in influencing RT; it is probable that they do; rather
situational context), it could be useful to either focus on finding it reflects the fact that there is currently little evidence that these
benefits (positive content) in as abstract a way as possible or to processes influence the consequences of RT, which was the focus
focus on the negative experience (negative content) in as concrete of this review. Future research would usefully examine these
and detailed a way as possible. It is important to acknowledge that, factors in relationship to the consequences of RT and, in particular,
although this mapping of function to classes of RT is consistent with reference to the control theory elaborated here. Nonetheless,
with all the evidence reviewed, it is not a definitive account but I hope that the integrative framework elucidated here provides a
rather a preliminary framework to organize findings across the RT novel and useful theoretical organization that will facilitate re-
literature, inform re-analysis of extant findings, and generate fur- search on the mechanisms underpinning RT and also provides the
ther hypotheses. first tentative answers to the highly significant question of “What
The key messages of this article are twofold. First, the article determines whether RT leads to constructive or unconstructive
extends the explanatory power of previous theorizing about RT by consequences?”
elaborating on the original control theory account of rumination
and suggests that the process of RT can be best understood within
this framework. As well as providing a theoretical framework to References
guide future research, this approach has considerable implications Abbott, M. J., & Rapee, R. M. (2004). Post-event rumination and negative
for understanding how thinking, action, and emotional state inter- self-appraisal in social phobia before and after treatment. Journal of
act. Second, this analysis is of particular relevance to answering Abnormal Psychology, 113, 136 –144.
the important theoretical and applied question of how RT about Abela, J. R. Z., Brozina, K., & Haigh, E. P. (2002). An examination of the
upsetting events sometimes leads to effective cognitive processing response styles theory of depression in third- and seventh-grade chil-
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 197

dren: A short-term longitudinal study. Journal of Abnormal Child Psy- phenomenon intimately linked to affective, physiological, and interper-
chology, 30, 515–527. sonal behavioral processes. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 22, 561–
Abela, J. R. Z., Vanderbilt, E., & Rochon, A. (2004). A test of the 576.
integration of the response styles and social support theories of depres- Borkovec, T. D., Robinson, E., Pruzinsky, T., & Depree, J. A. (1983).
sion in third and seventh grade children. Journal of Social and Clinical Preliminary exploration of worry: Some characteristics and processes.
Psychology, 23, 653– 674. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 21, 9 –16.
Affleck, G., & Tennen, H. (1996). Constructing benefits from adversity: Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36,
Adaptational significance and dispositional underpinnings. Journal of 129 –148.
Personality, 64, 899 –922. Bower, J. E., Kemeny, M. E., Taylor, S. E., & Fahey, J. L. (1998).
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical man- Cognitive processing, discovery of meaning, CD4 decline, and AIDS-
ual of mental disorders (4th ed., text revision). Washington, DC.: related mortality among bereaved HIV-seropositive men. Journal of
American Psychiatric Association. Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 66, 979 –986.
Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Brandstatter, V., Lengfelder, A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2001). Implemen-
Harvard University Press. tation intentions and efficient action initiation. Journal of Personality
Andrea, H., Beurskens, A. J. H. M., Kant, I. J., Davey, G. C. L., Field,
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

and Social Psychology, 81, 946 –960.

A. P., & van Schayck, C. P. (2004). The relation between pathological
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Broadbent, D. E. (1977). Levels, hierarchies, and locus of control. Quar-

worrying and fatigue in a working population. Journal of Psychosomatic terly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 29, 181–201.
Research, 57, 399 – 407. Broadbent, E., Petrie, K. J., Alley, P. G., & Booth, R. J. (2003). Psycho-
Andrews, V. H., & Borkovec, T. D. (1988). The differential effects of logical stress impairs early wound repair following surgery. Psychoso-
inductions of worry, somatic anxiety, and depression on emotional matic Medicine, 65, 865– 869.
experience. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, Brosschot, J. F., Gerin, W., & Thayer, J. F. (2006). The perseverative
19, 21–26. cognition hypothesis: A review of worry, prolonged stress-related phys-
Aspinwall, L. G., & Richter, L. (1999). Optimism and self-mastery predict iological activation, and health. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 60,
more rapid disengagement from unsolvable tasks in the presence of 113–124.
alternatives. Motivation and Emotion, 23, 221–245. Brosschot, J. F., Pieper, S., & Thayer, J. F. (2005). Expanding stress
Ayduk, O., Mischel, W., & Downey, G. (2002). Attentional mechanisms
theory: Prolonged activation and perseverative cognition. Psychoneu-
linking rejection to hostile reactivity: The role of “hot” versus “cool”
roendocrinology, 30, 1043–1049.
focus. Psychological Science, 13, 443– 448.
Brosschot, J. F., & Thayer, J. F. (2003). Heart rate response is longer after
Baumeister, R. F., & Tice, D. M. (1985). Self-esteem and responses to
negative emotions than after positive emotions. International Journal of
success and failure: Subsequent performance and intrinsic motivation.
Psychophysiology, 50, 181–187.
Journal of Personality, 53, 450 – 467.
Brosschot, J. F., & van der Doef, M. (2006). Daily worrying and somatic
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and emotional disorders. New York:
health complaints: Testing the effectiveness of a simple worry reduction
Meridian.
intervention. Psychology and Health, 21, 19 –31.
Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive
Brunstein, J. C., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1996). Effects of failure on subse-
therapy of depression. New York: Guilford Press.
quent performance: The importance of self-defining goals. Journal of
Beckmann, J. (1994). Ruminative thought and the deactivation of an
Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 395– 407.
intention. Motivation and Emotion, 18, 317–334.
Burwell, R. A., & Shirk, S. R. (2007). Subtypes of rumination in adoles-
Behar, E., Zuellig, A. R., & Borkovec, T. D. (2005). Thought and imaginal
cence: Associations between brooding, reflection, depressive symptoms,
activity during worry and trauma recall. Behavior Therapy, 36, 157–168.
Belzer, K. D., D’Zurilla, T. J., & Maydeu-Olivares, A. (2002). Social and coping. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 36,
problem solving and trait anxiety as predictors of worry in a college 56 – 65.
student population. Personality and Individual Differences, 33, 573– Bushman, B. J. (2002). Does venting anger feed or extinguish the flame?
585. Catharsis, rumination, distraction, anger, and aggressive responding.
Beukeboom, C. J., & Semin, G. R. (2005). Mood and representations of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 724 –731.
behaviour: The how and why. Cognition & Emotion, 19, 1242–1251. Bushman, B. J., Bonacci, A. M., Pedersen, W. C., Vasquez, E. A., &
Beukeboom, C. J., & Semin, G. R. (2006). How mood turns on language. Miller, N. (2005). Chewing on it can chew you up: Effects of rumination
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 553–566. on triggered displaced aggression. Journal of Personality and Social
Blagden, J. C., & Craske, M. G. (1996). Effects of active and passive Psychology, 88, 969 –983.
rumination and distraction: A pilot replication with anxious mood. Butler, L. D., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1994). Gender differences in re-
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 10, 243–252. sponses to depressed mood in a college sample. Sex Roles, 30, 331–346.
Bless, H., Clore, G. L., Schwarz, N., Golisano, V., Rabe, C., & Wolk, M. Calhoun, L. G., Cann, A., Tedeschi, R. G., & McMillan, J. (2000). A
(1996). Mood and the use of scripts: Does happy mood really lead to correlational test of the relationship between posttraumatic growth,
mindlessness? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 665– religion, and cognitive processing. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 13,
679. 521–527.
Borkovec, T. D., & Hu, S. (1990). The effect of worry on cardiovascular Calhoun, L. G., & Tedeschi, R. G. (1998). Beyond recovery from trauma:
response to phobic imagery. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 28, Implications for clinical practice and research. Journal of Social Issues,
69 –73. 54, 357–371.
Borkovec, T. D., & Inz, J. (1990). The nature of worry in generalized Callander, G., & Brown, G. P. (2007). Counterfactual thinking and psy-
anxiety disorder: A predominance of thought activity. Behaviour Re- chological distress following recurrent miscarriage. Journal of Repro-
search and Therapy, 28, 153–158. ductive and Infant Psychology, 25, 51– 65.
Borkovec, T. D., Lyonfields, J. D., Wiser, S. L., & Deihl, L. (1993). The Calmes, C. A. & Roberts, J. E. (2007). Repetitive thought and emotional
role of worrisome thinking in the suppression of cardiovascular response distress: Rumination and worry as prospective predictors of depressive
to phobic imagery. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 321–324. and anxious symptomatology. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 31,
Borkovec, T. D., Ray, W. J., & Stober, J. (1998). Worry: A cognitive 343–356.
 198 WATKINS

Cantor, N., & Norem, J. K. (1989). Defensive pessimism and stress and as a function of changes in problem-solving confidence. Cognitive
coping. Social Cognition, 7, 92–112. Therapy and Research, 20, 333–344.
Cantor, N., Norem, J. K., Niedenthal, P. M., Langston, C. A., & Brower, Davis, C. G., Lehman, D. R., Wortman, C. B., Silver, R. C., & Thompson,
A. M. (1987). Life tasks, self-concept ideals, and cognitive strategies in S. C. (1995). The undoing of traumatic life events. Personality and
a life transition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 109 –124.
1178 –1191. Davis, C. G., Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Larson, J. (1998). Making sense of
Carver, C. S. (1998). Generalization, adverse events, and development of loss and benefiting from the experience: Two construals of meaning.
depressive symptoms. Journal of Personality, 66, 607– 619. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 561–574.
Carver, C. S., & Ganellen, R. J. (1983). Depression and components of Davis, R. N., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2000). Cognitive inflexibility among
self-punitiveness: High standards, self-criticism, and overgeneralization. ruminators and nonruminators. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 24,
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 92, 330 –337. 699 –711.
Carver, C. S., Lavoie, L., Kuhl, J., & Ganellen, R. J. (1988). Cognitive Di Paula, A., & Campbell, J. D. (2002). Self-esteem and persistence in the
concomitants of depression: A further examination of the roles of face of failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83,
generalization, high standards, and self-criticism. Journal of Social and 711–724.
Clinical Psychology, 7, 350 –365. Dijkstra, A., & Brosschot, J. (2003). Worry about health in smoking
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1982). Control theory: A useful conceptual behaviour change. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 1081–1092.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

framework for personality—social, clinical, and health psychology. Psy- Donaldson, C., & Lam, D. (2004). Rumination, mood and social problem
chological Bulletin, 92, 111–135. solving in major depression. Psychological Medicine, 34, 1309 –1318.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of positive Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. L. (1988). A social cognitive approach to
and negative affect: A control process view. Psychological Review, 97, motivation and personality. Psychological Review, 95, 256 –273.
19 –35. D’Zurilla, T. J., Chang, E. C., Nottingham, E. J., & Faccini, L. (1998).
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the self-regulation of behavior. Social problem-solving deficits and hopelessness, depression, and sui-
Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. cidal risk in college students and psychiatric inpatients. Journal of
Cervone, D., Kopp, D. A., Schaumann, L., & Scott, W. D. (1994). Mood, Clinical Psychology, 54, 1091–1107.
self-efficacy, and performance standards: Lower moods induce higher D’Zurilla, T. J., & Goldfried, M. R. (1971). Problem solving and behavior
standards for performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol- modification. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 78, 107–126.
ogy, 67, 499 –512. D’Zurilla, T. J., & Nezu, A. M. (1990). Development and preliminary
Chelminski, I., & Zimmerman, M. (2003). Pathological worry in depressed evaluation of the Social Problem Solving Inventory. Psychological As-
and anxious patients. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 17, 533–546. sessment, 2, 156 –163.
Ciesla, J. A., & Roberts, J. E. (2002). Self-directed thought and response to D’Zurilla, T. J., & Nezu, A. M. (1999). Problem solving therapy: A social
treatment for depression:A preliminary investigation. Journal of Cogni- competence approach to clinical intervention (2nd ed.). New York:
tive Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 16, 435– 453. Springer.
Ciesla, J. A. & Roberts, J. E. (2007). Rumination, negative cognition, and Edwards, S. L., Rapee, R. M., & Franklin, J. (2003). Postevent rumination
their interactive effects on depressed mood. Emotion, 7, 555–565. and recall bias for a social performance event in high and low socially
Clark, D. M., & Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia. In anxious individuals. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 603– 617.
R. G. Heimberg, M. R. Liebowitz, D. A. Hope, & F. R. Schneier (Eds.), Ehlers, A., Mayou, R. A., & Bryant, B. (1998). Psychological predictors of
Social phobia: Diagnosis, assessment, and treatment (pp. 69 –93). New chronic posttraumatic stress disorder after motor vehicle accidents. Jour-
York: Guilford Press. nal of Abnormal Psychology, 107, 508 –519.
Clohessy, S., & Ehlers, A. (1999). PTSD symptoms, response to intrusive Ehlers, A., Mayou, R. A., & Bryant, B. (2003). Cognitive predictors of
memories and coping in ambulance service workers. British Journal of posttraumatic stress disorder in children: Results of a prospective lon-
Clinical Psychology, 38, 251–265. gitudinal study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 1–10.
Conway, M., Csank, P. A. R., Holm, S. L., & Blake, C. K. (2000). On Ehring, T. (2007, July). Development and validation of a content-
assessing individual differences in rumination on sadness. Journal of independent measure of perseverative thinking. In R. De Jong-Meyer
Personality Assessment, 75, 404 – 425. (Chair), Dismantling ruminative thinking. Symposium conducted at the
Conway, M., Mendelson, M., Giannopoulos, C., Csank, P. A. R., & Holm, Fifth World Congress of Behavioural and Cognitive Therapies, Barce-
S. L. (2004). Childhood and adult sexual abuse, rumination on sadness, lona, Spain.
and dysphoria. Child Abuse and Neglect, 28, 393– 410. Ehring, T. A., Szeimies, A.-K., & Schaffrick, C. (2007, July). The effects
Cribb, G., Moulds, M. L., & Carter, S. (2006). Rumination and experiential of rumination on analogue posttraumatic stress symptoms. In T. Ehring
avoidance in depression. Behaviour Change, 23, 165–176. (Chair), Cognitive processes in posttraumatic stress disorder. Sympo-
Crocker, J., & Knight, K. M. (2005). Contingencies of self-worth. Current sium conducted at the Fifth World Congress of Behavioural and Cog-
Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 200 –203. nitive Therapies, Barcelona, Spain.
Crocker, J., & Park, L. E. (2004). The costly pursuit of self-esteem. El Leithy, S., Brown, G. P., & Robbins, I. (2006). Counterfactual thinking
Psychological Bulletin, 130, 392– 414. and posttraumatic stress reactions. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
Crocker, J., & Wolfe, C. T. (2001). Contingencies of self-worth. Psycho- 115, 629 – 635.
logical Review, 108, 593– 623. Elliott, T. R., Sherwin, E., Harkins, S. W., & Marmarosh, C. (1995).
Cryder, C. H., Kilmer, R. P., Tedeschi, R. G., & Calhoun, L. G. (2006). An Self-appraised problem-solving ability, affective states, and psycholog-
exploratory study of posttraumatic growth in children following a nat- ical distress. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 42, 105–115.
ural disaster. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 76, 65– 69. Emmons, R. A. (1992). Abstract versus concrete goals: Personal striving
Davey, G. C. L. (1993). A comparison of 3 worry questionnaires. Behav- level, physical illness, and psychological well-being. Journal of Person-
iour Research and Therapy, 31, 51–56. ality and Social Psychology, 62, 292–300.
Davey, G. C. L., Hampton, J., Farrell, J., & Davidson, S. (1992). Some Eshun, S. (2000). Role of gender and rumination in suicide ideation: A
characteristics of worrying: Evidence for worrying and anxiety as sep- comparison of college samples from Ghana and the United States.
arate constructs. Personality and Individual Differences, 13, 133–147. Cross-Cultural Research, 34, 250 –263.
Davey, G. C. L., Jubb, M., & Cameron, C. (1996). Catastrophic worrying Evers, A. W. M., Kraaimaat, F. W., Geenen, R., & Bijlsma, J. W. J. (1998).
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 199

Psychosocial predictors of functional change in recently diagnosed rheu- depressive symptoms among low-income, urban, African American
matoid arthritis patients. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 179 – youth: A test of two mediational hypotheses. Journal of Youth and
193. Adolescence, 33, 523–533.
Feldman, G., & Hayes, A. (2005). Preparing for problems: A measure of Greenberg, M. A. (1995). Cognitive processing of traumas: The role of
mental anticipatory processes. Journal of Research in Personality, 39, intrusive thoughts and reappraisals. Journal of Applied Social Psychol-
487–516. ogy, 25, 1262–1296.
Feldman, G. C., Joorman, J., & Johnson, S. L. (in press). Responses to Gross, R. T., & Borkovec, T. D. (1982). Effects of a cognitive intrusion
positive affect: A self-report measure of rumination and dampening. manipulation on the sleep-onset latency of good sleepers. Behavior
Cognitive Therapy and Research. Therapy, 13, 112–116.
Foa, E., & Kozak, M. J. (1986). Emotional processing of fear: Exposure to Guastella, A. J., & Moulds, M. (2007). The impact of rumination on sleep
corrective information. Psychological Bulletin, 99, 20 –35. quality following a stressful life event. Personality and Individual Dif-
Foa, E. B., Molnar, C., & Cashman, L. (1995). Change in rape narratives ferences, 42, 1151–1162.
during exposure therapy for posttraumatic-stress-disorder. Journal of Halligan, S. L., Michael, T., Clark, D. M., & Ehlers, A. (2003). Posttrau-
Traumatic Stress, 8, 675– 690. matic stress disorder following assault: The role of cognitive processing,
Forster, J., Friedman, R. S., & Liberman, N. (2004). Temporal construal trauma memory, and appraisals. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

effects on abstract and concrete thinking: Consequences for insight and Psychology, 71, 419 – 431.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

creative cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, Hamilton, J. C., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Cather, C. (1993). A
177–189. self-regulatory perspective on psychopathology and psychotherapy.
Forster, J., & Higgins, E. T. (2005). How global versus local perception fits Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, 3, 205–248.
regulatory focus. Psychological Science, 16, 631– 636. Harber, K. D., & Pennebaker, J. W. (1992). Overcoming traumatic mem-
Forster, J., Liberman, N., & Higgins, E. T. (2005). Accessibility from ories. In S.-A. Christianson (Ed.), The handbook of emotion and mem-
active and fulfilled goals. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, ory: Research and theory (pp. 359 –387). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
41, 220 –239. Harrington, J. A., & Blankenship, V. (2002). Ruminative thoughts and their
Fortune, D. G., Richards, H. L., Kirby, B., McElhone, K., Markham, T., relation to depression and anxiety. Journal of Applied Social Psychol-
Rogers, S., et al. (2003). Psychological distress impairs clearance of ogy, 32, 465– 485.
psoriasis in patients treated with photochemotherapy. Archives of Der- Harvey, A. G. (2000). Pre-sleep cognitive activity: A comparison of
matology, 139, 752–756. sleep-onset insomniacs and good sleepers. British Journal of Clinical
Freeston, M. H., Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (1996). Thoughts, images, Psychology, 39, 275–286.
worry, and anxiety. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20, 265–273. Harvey, A. G., Watkins, E., Mansell, W., & Shafran, R. (2004). Cognitive
Freitas, A. L., Gollwitzer, P., & Trope, Y. (2004). The influence of abstract behavioural processes across psychological disorders. Oxford, United
and concrete mindsets on anticipating and guiding others’ self- Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
regulatory efforts. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 739 – Hay, J. L., McCaul, K. D., & Magnan, R. E. (2006). Does worry about
752. breast cancer predict screening behaviors? A meta-analysis of the pro-
Freitas, A. L., Salovey, P., & Liberman, N. (2001). Abstract and concrete spective evidence. Preventive Medicine, 42, 401– 408.
self-evaluative goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, Hazlett-Stevens, H., & Borkovec, T. D. (2001). Effects of worry and
410 – 424. progressive relaxation on the reduction of fear in speech phobia: An
Fresco, D. M., Frankel, A. N., Mennin, D. S., Turk, C. L., & Heimberg, investigation of situational exposure. Behavior Therapy, 32, 503–517.
R. G. (2002). Distinct and overlapping features of rumination and worry: Hertel, P. T. (1997). On the contributions of deficient cognitive control to
The relationship of cognitive production to negative affective states. memory impairments in depression. Cognition & Emotion, 11, 569 –583.
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 26, 179 –188. Hertel, P. T. (1998). Relation between rumination and impaired memory in
Fujita, K., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Levin-Sagi, M. (2006). Construal dysphoric moods. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 107, 166 –172.
levels and self-control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Holeva, V., Tarrier, N., & Wells, A. (2001). Prevalence and predictors of
90, 351–367. acute stress disorder and PTSD following road traffic accidents: Thought
Gasper, K., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Mood and global versus local process- control strategies and social support. Behavior Therapy, 32, 65– 83.
ing of visual information. Psychological Science, 13, 34 – 40. Hong, R. Y. (2007). Worry and rumination: Differential associations with
Glynn, L. M., Christenfeld, N., & Gerin, W. (2002). The role of rumination anxious and depressive symptoms and coping behavior. Behaviour Re-
in recovery from reactivity: Cardiovascular consequences of emotional search and Therapy, 45, 277–290.
states. Psychosomatic Medicine, 64, 714 –726. Horowitz, M. J. (1985). Disasters and psychological responses to stress.
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions: Strong effects of Psychiatric Annals, 15, 161–167.
simple plans. American Psychologist, 54, 493–503. Horowitz, M. J. (1986). Stress-response syndromes: A review of posttrau-
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Implementation intentions and matic and adjustment disorders. Hospital and Community Psychiatry,
goal achievement: A meta-analysis of effects and processes. Advances in 37, 241–249.
Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 69 –119. Hoyer, J., Becker, E. S., & Margraf, J. (2002). Generalized anxiety disorder
Gortner, E.-M., Rude, S. S., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2006). Benefits of and clinical worry episodes in young women. Psychological Medicine,
expressive writing in lowering rumination and depressive symptoms. 32, 1227–1237.
Behavior Therapy, 37, 292–304. Hyland, M. E. (1987). Control-theory interpretation of psychological
Goschke, T., & Kuhl, J. (1993). Representation of intentions: Persisting mechanisms of depression: Comparison and integration of several the-
activation in memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology:Learning, ories. Psychological Bulletin, 102, 109 –121.
Memory, and Cognition, 19, 1211–1226. Ingram, R. E. (1990). Self-focused attention in clinical disorders: Review
Gotlib, I. H., Yue, D. N., & Joormann, J. (2005). Selective attention in and a conceptual model. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 156 –176.
dysphoric individuals: The role of affective interference and inhibition. Ingram, R. E., & Smith, T. W. (1984). Depression and internal versus
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 29, 417– 432. external focus of attention. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 8, 139 –
Grant, K. E., Lyons, A. L., Finkelstein, J. A. S., Conway, K. M., Reynolds, 151.
L. K., O’Koon, J. H., et al. (2004). Gender differences in rates of Isbell, L. M. (2004). Not all happy people are lazy or stupid: Evidence of
 200 WATKINS

systematic processing in happy moods. Journal of Experimental Social The cessation of rumination through self-affirmation. Journal of Per-
Psychology, 40, 341–349. sonality and Social Psychology, 77, 111–125.
Ito, T., Takenaka, K., & Agari, I. (2005). Psychological vulnerability to Kross, E., Ayduk, O., & Mischel, W. (2005). When asking “why” does not
depression: Negative rumination, perfectionism, immodithymic person- hurt: Distinguishing rumination from reflective processing of negative
ality, dysfunctional attitudes, and depressive states. Japanese Journal of emotions. Psychological Science, 16, 709 –715.
Educational Psychology, 53, 162–171. Kubzansky, L. D., Kawachi, I., Spiro, A., Weiss, S. T., Vokonas, P. S., &
Ito, T., Takenaka, K., Tomita, T., & Agari, I. (2006). Comparison of Sparrow, D. (1997). Is worrying bad for your heart? A prospective study
ruminative responses with negative rumination as a vulnerability factor of worry and coronary heart disease in the normative aging study.
for depression. Psychological Reports, 99, 763–772. Circulation, 95, 818 – 824.
Ito, T., Tomita, T., Hasui, C., Otsuka, A., Katayama, Y., Kawamura, Y., et Kuehner, C., & Weber, I. (1999). Responses to depression in unipolar
al. (2003). The link between response styles and major depression and depressed patients: An investigation of Nolen-Hoeksema’s response
anxiety disorders after child-loss. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 44, 396 – styles theory. Psychological Medicine, 29, 1323–1333.
403. Kuhl, J. (1994). Psychometric properties of the Action Control Scale. In J.
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). Shattered assumptions: Towards a new psychol- Kuhl & J. Beckmann (Eds.), Volition and personality: Action versus
ogy of trauma. New York: Free Press.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

state orientation (pp. 47–59). Gottingen, Germany: Hogrefe.

Johnson, R. E., Chang, C. H., & Lord, R. G. (2006). Moving from
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Kuhl, J., & Beckmann, J. (1985). Action Control: From cognition to

cognition to behavior: What the research says. Psychological Bulletin, behavior. New York: Springer.
132, 381– 415. Kuhl, J., & Helle, P. (1986). Motivational and volitional determinants of
Johnson, S. L., McKenzie, G., & McMurrich, S. (in press). Ruminative depression: The degenerated-intention hypothesis. Journal of Abnormal
responses to negative and positive affect among students diagnosed with Psychology, 95, 247–251.
bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Kurman, J. (2003). The role of perceived specificity level of failure events
Research. in self-enhancement and in constructive self-criticism. Personality and
Joormann, J. (2004). Attentional bias in dysphoria: The role of inhibitory Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 285–294.
processes. Cognition & Emotion, 18, 125–147. Kuyken, W., Watkins, E., Holden, E., & Cook, W. (2006). Rumination in
Joormann, J. (2006). Differential effects of rumination and dysphoria on adolescents at risk for depression. Journal of Affective Disorders, 96,
the inhibition of irrelevant emotional material: Evidence from a negative
39 – 47.
priming task. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 30, 149 –160.
Lam, D., Smith, N., Checkley, S., Rijsdijk, F., & Sham, P. (2003). Effect
Joormann, J., Dkane, M., & Gotlib, I. H. (2006). Adaptive and maladaptive
of neuroticism, response style and information processing on depression
components of rumination? Diagnostic specificity and relation to de-
severity in a clinically depressed sample. Psychological Medicine, 33,
pressive biases. Behavior Therapy, 37, 269 –281.
469 – 479.
Joormann, J., & Siemer, M. (2004). Memory accessibility, mood regula-
Lara, M. E., Klein, D. N., & Kasch, K. L. (2000). Psychosocial predictors
tion, and dysphoria: Difficulties in repairing sad mood with happy
of the short-term course and outcome of major depression: A longitu-
memories? Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 113, 179 –188.
dinal study of a nonclinical sample with recent-onset episodes. Journal
Just, N., & Alloy, L. B. (1997). The response styles theory of depression:
of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 644 – 650.
Tests and an extension of the theory. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
Lavallee, L. E., & Campbell, J. D. (1995). Impact of personal goals on
106, 221–229.
self-regulation processes elicited by daily negative events. Journal of
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1990). Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your
Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 341–352.
body and mind to face stress, pain, and illness. New York: Dell Pub-
Lavender, A., & Watkins, E. (2004). Rumination and future thinking in
lishing.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1994). Mindfulness meditation for everyday life. London: depression. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43, 129 –142.
Piatkus. Leary, M. R., Adams, C. E., & Tate, E. B. (2006). Hypo-egoic self-
Kao, C. M., Dritschel, B. H., & Astell, A. (2006). The effects of rumination regulation: Exercising self-control by diminishing the influence of the
and distraction on over-general autobiographical memory retrieval dur- self. Journal of Personality, 74, 1803–1831.
ing social problem solving. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 45, Liberman, N., Sagristano, M. D., & Trope, Y. (2002). The effect of
267–272. temporal distance on level of mental construal. Journal of Experimental
Kasch, K. L., Klein, D. N., & Lara, M. E. (2001). A construct validation Social Psychology, 38, 523–534.
study of the response styles questionnaire rumination scale in partici- Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (1998). The role of feasibility and desirability
pants with a recent-onset major depressive episode. Psychological As- considerations in near and distant future decisions: A test of temporal
sessment, 13, 375–383. construal theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75,
Kashdan, T. B., & Roberts, J. E. (2007). Social anxiety, depressive symp- 5–18.
toms, and post-event rumination: Affective consequences and social Lyonfields, J. D., Borkovec, T. D., & Thayer, J. F. (1995). Vagal tone in
contextual influences. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21, 284 –301. generalized anxiety disorder and the effects of aversive imagery and
King, L. A., & Miner, K. N. (2000). Writing about the perceived benefits worrisome thinking. Behavior Therapy, 26, 457– 466.
of traumatic events: Implications for physical health. Personality and Lyubomirsky, S. (2001). Why are some people happier than others? The
Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 220 –230. role of cognitive and motivational processes in well-being. American
Klein, K., & Boals, A. (2001). Expressive writing can increase working Psychologist, 56, 239 –249.
memory capacity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130, Lyubomirsky, S., Caldwell, N. D., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1998). Effects
520 –533. of ruminative and distracting responses to depressed mood on retrieval
Klinger, E. (1975). Consequences of commitment to and disengagement of autobiographical memories. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
from incentives. Psychological Review, 82, 1–25. chology, 75, 166 –177.
Kocovski, N. L., Endler, N. S., Rector, N. A., & Flett, G. L. (2005). Lyubomirsky, S., Kasri, F., Chang, O., & Chung, I. (2006). Ruminative
Ruminative coping and post-event processing in social anxiety. Behav- response styles and delay of seeking diagnosis for breast cancer symp-
iour Research and Therapy, 43, 971–984. toms. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 25, 276 –304.
Koole, S. L., Smeets, K., van Knippenberg, A., & Dijksterhuis, A. (1999). Lyubomirsky, S., Kasri, F., & Zehm, K. (2003). Dysphoric rumination
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 201

impairs concentration on academic tasks. Cognitive Therapy and Re- nonlinkers: Goal beliefs as a moderator of the effects of everyday hassles
search, 27, 309 –330. on rumination, depression, and physical complaints. Journal of Applied
Lyubomirsky, S., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1993). Self-perpetuating prop- Social Psychology, 25, 1231–1244.
erties of dysphoric rumination. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- McIntosh, W. D., & Martin, L. L. (1992). The cybernetics of happiness:
chology, 65, 339 –349. The relation between goal attainment, rumination, and affect. In M. S.
Lyubomirsky, S., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1995). Effects of self-focused Clark (Ed.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 14, pp.
rumination on negative thinking and interpersonal problem-solving. 222–246). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 176 –190. McLaughlin, K. A., Borkovec, T. D., & Sibrava, N. J. (2007). The effects
Lyubomirsky, S., Tucker, K. L., Caldwell, N. D., & Berg, K. (1999). Why of worry and rumination on affect states and cognitive activity. Behavior
ruminators are poor problem solvers: Clues from the phenomenology of Therapy, 38, 23–38.
dysphoric rumination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, Mellings, T. M. B., & Alden, L. E. (2000). Cognitive processes in social
1041–1060. anxiety: The effects of self-focus, rumination and anticipatory process-
Ma, S. H., & Teasdale, J. D. (2004). Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy ing. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 243–257.
for depression: Replication and exploration of differential relapse pre- Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of
vention effects. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 72, gratification: Dynamics of willpower. Psychological Review, 106, 3–19.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

31– 40. Meyer, T. J., Miller, M. L., Metzger, R. L., & Borkovec, T. D. (1990).
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Mandel, D. R. (2003). Counterfactuals, emotions, and context. Cognition & Development and validation of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire.
Emotion, 17, 139 –159. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 28, 487– 495.
Mandel, D. R., & Lehman, D. R. (1996). Counterfactual thinking and Michael, T., Ehlers, A., Halligan, S. L., & Clark, D. M. (2005). Unwanted
ascriptions of cause and preventability. Journal of Personality and memories of assault: What intrusion characteristics are associated with
Social Psychology, 71, 450 – 463. PTSD? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 613– 628.
Marigold, D. C., Holmes, J. G., & Ross, M. (2007). More than words: Millar, K. U., Tesser, A., & Millar, M. G. (1988). The effects of a
Reframing compliments from romantic partners fosters security in low threatening life event on behavior sequences and intrusive thought: A
self-esteem individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, self-disruption explanation. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 12, 441–
92, 232–248. 457.
Markman, K. D., Gavanski, I., Sherman, S. J., & McMullen, M. N. (1993). Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive–affective system theory of
The mental simulation of better and worse possible worlds. Journal of personality: Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and
Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 87–109. invariance in personality structure. Psychological Review, 102, 246 –
Markman, K. D., & McMullen, M. N. (2003). A reflection and evaluation 268.
model of comparative thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Moberly, N. J., & Watkins, E. (2006). Processing mode influences the
Review, 7, 244 –267. relationship between trait rumination and emotional vulnerability. Be-
Markman, K. D., & Miller, A. K. (2006). Depression, control, and coun- havior Therapy, 37, 281–291.
terfactual thinking: Functional for whom? Journal of Social and Clinical Moberly, N. J. & Watkins, E. R. (in press). Ruminative self-focus and
Psychology, 25, 210 –227. negative affect: An experience sampling study. Journal of Abnormal
Martin, L. L., Shrira, I., & Startup, H. M. (2004). Rumination as a function Psychology.
of goal progress, stop rules, and cerebral lateralization. In C. Papageor- Mor, N., & Winquist, J. (2002). Self-focused attention and negative affect:
giou & A. Wells (Eds.), Depressive rumination (pp. 153–176). Chich- A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 638 – 662.
ester, United Kingdom: Wiley. Morrison, R., & O’Connor, R. C. (2005). Predicting psychological distress
Martin, L. L., & Tesser, A. (1989). Toward a motivational and structural in college students: The role of rumination and stress. Journal of Clinical
theory of ruminative thought. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Psychology, 61, 447– 460.
Unintended thought (pp. 306 –326). New York: Guilford Press. Morrow, J., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1990). Effects of responses to depres-
Martin, L. L., & Tesser, A. (1996). Some ruminative thoughts. In R. S. sion on the remediation of depressive affect. Journal of Personality and
Wyer (Ed.), Ruminative thoughts: Advances in social cognition (Vol. 9, Social Psychology, 58, 519 –527.
pp. 1– 47). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Moskowitz, J. T., Folkman, S., Collette, L., & Vittinghoff, E. (1996).
Mathews, A. (2006). Towards an experimental cognitive science of CBT. Coping and mood during AIDS-related caregiving and bereavement.
Behavior Therapy, 37, 314 –318. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 18, 49 –57.
Mayberg, H. S. (2006). Defining neurocircuits in depression. Psychiatric Muris, P., Roelofs, J., Rassin, E., Franken, I., & Mayer, B. (2005).
Annals, 36, 259 –268. Mediating effects of rumination and worry on the links between neurot-
Maydeu-Olivares, A., & D’Zurilla, T. J. (1996). A factor-analytic study of icism, anxiety and depression. Personality and Individual Differences,
the social problem-solving inventory: An integration of theory and data. 39, 1105–1111.
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20, 115–133. Murray, J., Ehlers, A., & Mayou, R. A. (2002). Dissociation and posttrau-
Mayou, R., Bryant, B., & Ehlers, A. (2001). Prediction of psychological matic stress disorder: Two prospective studies of road traffic accident
outcomes one year after a motor vehicle accident. American Journal of survivors. British Journal of Psychiatry, 180, 363–368.
Psychiatry, 158, 1231–1238. Nasco, S. A., & Marsh, K. L. (1999). Gaining control through counterfac-
Mayou, R. A., Ehlers, A., & Bryant, B. (2002). Posttraumatic stress tual thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 556 –568.
disorder after motor vehicle accidents: 3-year follow-up of a prospective Nelson, J., & Harvey, A. G. (2002). The differential functions of imagery
longitudinal study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 665– 675. and verbal thought in insomnia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111,
McCann, I. L., Sakheim, D. K., & Abrahamson, D. J. (1988). Trauma and 665– 669.
victimization: A model of psychological adaptation. Counseling Psy- Niedenthal, P. M., Tangney, J. P., & Gavanski, I. (1994). If only I weren’t
chologist, 16, 531–594. versus if only I hadn’t: Distinguishing shame and guilt in counterfactual
McIntosh, D. N., Silver, R. C., & Wortman, C. B. (1993). Religions role in thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 585–595.
adjustment to a negative life event: Coping with the loss of a child. Nolan, S. A., Roberts, J. E., & Gotlib, I. H. (1998). Neuroticism and
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 812– 821. ruminative response style as predictors of change in depressive symp-
McIntosh, W. D., Harlow, T. F., & Martin, L. L. (1995). Linkers and tomatology. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 22, 445– 455.
 202 WATKINS

Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1991). Responses to depression and their effects on Nussbaum, S., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Creeping dispositionism:
the duration of depressive episodes. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, The temporal dynamics of behavior prediction. Journal of Personality
100, 569 –582. and Social Psychology, 84, 485– 497.
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2000). The role of rumination in depressive disorders Oatley, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1987). Towards a cognitive theory of
and mixed anxiety/depressive symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychol- emotions. Cognition & Emotion, 1, 29 –50.
ogy, 109, 504 –511. Papadakis, A. A., Prince, R. P., Jones, N. P., & Stauman, T. J. (2006).
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2004a, November). Effects of four modes of self- Self-regulation, rumination, and vulnerability to depression in adoles-
reflection on depression and anxiety. In E. Watkins & D. Hermans cent girls. Development and Psychopathology, 18, 815– 829.
(Chairs), The role of processing modes in depressive and anxious psy- Papageorgiou, C., & Wells, A. (2001). Positive beliefs about depressive
chopathology. Symposium conducted at the 38th Annual Convention of rumination: Development and preliminary validation of a self-report
the Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy, New Or- scale. Behavior Therapy, 32, 13–26.
leans, LA. Papageorgiou, C., & Wells, A. (2003). An empirical test of a clinical
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2004b). The response styles theory. In C. Papageor- metacognitive model of rumination and depression. Cognitive Therapy
giou & A. Wells (Eds.), Depressive rumination (pp. 107–124). Chich- and Research, 27, 261–273.
ester, United Kingdom: Wiley. Papageorgiou, C., & Wells, A. (2004). Depressive rumination. Chichester,
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Davis, C. G. (1999). “Thanks for sharing that”: United Kingdom: Wiley.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Ruminators and their social support networks. Journal of Personality Park, R. J., Goodyer, I. M., & Teasdale, J. D. (2004). Effects of induced
and Social Psychology, 77, 801– 814. rumination and distraction on mood and overgeneral autobiographical
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Davis, C. G. (2004). Theoretical and methodolog- memory in adolescent major depressive disorder and controls. Journal of
ical issues in the assessment and interpretation of posttraumatic growth. Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 45, 996 –1006.
Psychological Inquiry, 15, 60 – 64. Peasley-Miklus, C., & Vrana, S. R. (2000). Effect of worrisome and
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Jackson, B. (2001). Mediators of the gender relaxing thinking on fearful emotional processing. Behaviour Research
difference in rumination. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 25, 37– 47. and Therapy, 38, 129 –144.
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Larson, J., & Grayson, C. (1999). Explaining the Pennebaker, J. W. (1997). Writing about emotional experiences as a
gender difference in depressive symptoms. Journal of Personality and therapeutic process. Psychological Science, 8, 162–166.
Social Psychology, 77, 1061–1072. Pennebaker, J. W., Mayne, T. J., & Francis, M. E. (1997). Linguistic
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., McBride, A., & Larson, J. (1997). Rumination and predictors of adaptive bereavement. Journal of Personality and Social
psychological distress among bereaved partners. Journal of Personality Psychology, 72, 863– 871.
and Social Psychology, 72, 855– 862. Pennebaker, J. W., & Seagal, J. D. (1999). Forming a story: The health
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Morrow, J. (1991). A prospective study of depres- benefits of narrative. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 55, 1243–1254.
sion and posttraumatic stress symptoms after a natural disaster: The Perini, S. J., Abbott, M. J., & Rapee, R. M. (2006). Perception of perfor-
1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- mance as a mediator in the relationship between social anxiety and
chology, 61, 115–121. negative post-event rumination. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 30,
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Morrow, J. (1993). Effects of rumination and 645– 659.
distraction on naturally-occurring depressed mood. Cognition & Emo- Perkins, A. M., & Corr, P. J. (2005). Can worriers be winners? The
tion, 7, 561–570. association between worrying and job performance. Personality and
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Morrow, J., & Fredrickson, B. L. (1993). Response Individual Differences, 38, 25–31.
styles and the duration of episodes of depressed mood. Journal of Pham, L. B., & Taylor, S. E. (1999). From thought to action: Effects of
Abnormal Psychology, 102, 20 –28. process- versus outcome-based mental simulations on performance. Per-
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Mumme, D., Wolfson, A., & Guskin, K. (1995). sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 250 –260.
Helplessness in children of depressed and nondepressed mothers. De- Philippot, P., Baeyens, C., & Douilliez, C. (2006). Specifying emotional
velopmental Psychology, 31, 377–387. information: Regulation of emotional intensity via executive processes.
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Parker, L. E., & Larson, J. (1994). Ruminative Emotion, 6, 560 –571.
coping with depressed mood following loss. Journal of Personality and Philippot, P., Schaefer, A., & Herbette, G. (2003). Consequences of spe-
Social Psychology, 67, 92–104. cific processing of emotional information: Impact of general versus
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Stice, E., Wade, E., & Bohon, C. (2007). Reciprocal specific autobiographical memory priming on emotion elicitation. Emo-
relations between rumination and bulimic, substance abuse, and depres- tion, 3, 270 –283.
sive symptoms in female adolescents. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Pieper, S., & Brosschot, J. F. (2005). Prolonged stress-related cardiovas-
116, 198 –207. cular activation: Is there any? Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 30,
Norem, J. K., & Cantor, N. (1986a). Anticipatory and post hoc cushioning 91–103.
strategies: Optimism and defensive pessimism in risky situations. Cog- Powers, W. T. (1973a). Behavior: The control of perception. Chicago:
nitive Therapy and Research, 10, 347–362. Aldine.
Norem, J. K., & Cantor, N. (1986b). Defensive pessimism: Harnessing Powers, W. T. (1973b, January 26). Feedback: Beyond behaviorism. Sci-
anxiety as motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, ence, 179, 351–356.
1208 –1217. Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (1987). Self-regulatory perseveration and
Norem, J. K., & Chang, E. C. (2002). The positive psychology of negative the depressive self-focusing style: A self-awareness theory of reactive
thinking. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 58, 993–1001. depression. Psychological Bulletin, 102, 122–138.
Norem, J. K., & Illingworth, K. S. S. (1993). Strategy-dependent effects of Rachman, S. (1980). Emotional processing. Behaviour Research and Ther-
reflecting on self and tasks: Some implications of optimism and defen- apy, 18, 51– 60.
sive pessimism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, Rachman, S., Gruter-Andrew, J., & Shafran, R. (2000). Post-event pro-
822– 835. cessing in social anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 611–
Norem, J. K., & Illingworth, K. S. S. (2004). Mood and performance 617.
among defensive pessimists and strategic optimists. Journal of Research Raes, F., Hermans, D., Williams, J. M. G., Beyers, W., Brunfaut, E., &
in Personality, 38, 351–366. Eelen, P. (2006). Reduced autobiographical memory specificity and
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 203

rumination in predicting the course of depression. Journal of Abnormal Rude, S. S., Maestas, K. L., & Neff, K. (2007). Paying attention to distress:
Psychology, 115, 699 –704. What’s wrong with rumination? Cognition & Emotion, 21, 843– 864.
Raes, F., Hermans, D., Williams, J. M. G., & Eelen, P. (2006). Reduced Rusting, C. L., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1998). Regulating responses to
autobiographical memory specificity and affect regulation. Cognition & anger: Effects of rumination and distraction on angry mood. Journal of
Emotion, 20, 402– 429. Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 790 – 803.
Ramel, W., Goldin, P. R., Carmona, P. E., & McQuaid, J. R. (2004). The Sakamoto, S., Kambara, M., & Tanno, Y. (2001). Response styles and
effects of mindfulness meditation on cognitive processes and affect in cognitive and affective symptoms of depression. Personality and Indi-
patients with past depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 28, vidual Differences, 31, 1053–1065.
433– 455. Sanna, L. J. (1996). Defensive pessimism, optimism, and simulating alter-
Rapee, R. M., & Heimberg, R. G. (1997). A cognitive-behavioral model of natives: Some ups and downs of prefactual and counterfactual thinking.
anxiety in social phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 741–756. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 1020 –1036.
Rasmussen, H. N., Wrosch, C., Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (2006). Sanna, L. J. (1997). Self-efficacy and counterfactual thinking: Up a creek
Self-regulation processes and health: The importance of optimism and with and without a paddle. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
goal adjustment. Journal of Personality, 74, 1721–1747. 23, 654 – 666.
Sanna, L. J. (2000). Mental simulation, affect and personality: A concep-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Ray, R. D., Ochsner, K. N., Cooper, J. C., Robertson, E. R., Gabrieli,

tual framework. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9, 168 –
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

J. D. E., & Gross, J. J. (2005). Individual differences in trait rumination

and the neural systems supporting cognitive reappraisal. Cognitive Af- 173.
fective and Behavioral Neuroscience, 5, 156 –168. Sanna, L. J., Chang, E. C., Carter, S. E., & Small, E. M. (2006). The future
Rector, N. A., & Roger, D. (1996). Cognitive style and well-being: A is now: Prospective temporal self-appraisals among defensive pessimists
prospective examination. Personality and Individual Differences, 21, and optimists. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 727–739.
663– 674. Sarin, S., Abela, J. R. Z., & Auerbach, R. P. (2005). The response styles
Richmond, M., Spring, B., Sommerfeld, B. K., & McChargue, D. (2001). theory of depression: A test of specificity and causal mediation. Cogni-
Rumination and cigarette smoking: A bad combination for depressive tion & Emotion, 19, 751–761.
outcomes? Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 69, 836 – Scher, C. D., Ingram, R. E., & Segal, Z. V. (2005). Cognitive reactivity and
vulnerability: Empirical evaluation of construct activation and cognitive
840.
diatheses in unipolar depression. Clinical Psychology Review, 25, 487–
Rimes, K. A., & Watkins, E. (2005). The effects of self-focused rumination
510.
on global negative self-judgements in depression. Behaviour Research
Schorr, Y.H. & Roemer, L. (2002, November). Posttraumatic meaning
and Therapy, 43, 1673–1681.
making: Toward a clearer definition. Poster presented at the annual
Riso, L. P., du Toit, P. L., Blandino, J. A., Penna, S., Dacey, S., Duin, J. S.,
meeting of the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies in
et al. (2003). Cognitive aspects of chronic depression. Journal of Ab-
Baltimore, MD.
normal Psychology, 112, 72– 80.
Schlotz, W., Hellhammer, J., Schulz, P., & Stone, A. A. (2004). Perceived
Rivkin, I. D., & Taylor, S. E. (1999). The effects of mental simulation on
work overload and chronic worrying predict weekend–weekday differ-
coping with controllable stressful events. Personality and Social Psy-
ences in the cortisol awakening response. Psychosomatic Medicine, 66,
chology Bulletin, 25, 1451–1462.
207–214.
Roberts, J. E., Gilboa, E., & Gotlib, I. H. (1998). Ruminative response style
Schmaling, K. B., Dimidjian, S., Katon, W., & Sullivan, M. (2002).
and vulnerability to episodes of dysphoria: Gender, neuroticism, and
Response styles among patients with minor depression and dysthymia in
episode duration. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 22, 401– 423.
primary care. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111, 350 –356.
Robinson, M. S., & Alloy, L. B. (2003). Negative cognitive styles and
Schwartz, A. R., Gerin, W., Christenfeld, N., Glynn, L., Davidson, K., &
stress-reactive rumination interact to predict depression: A prospective Pickering, T. G. (2000). Effects of an anger-recall task on poststress
study. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 275–291. rumination and blood pressure recovery in men and women. Psycho-
Roelofs, J., Muris, P., Hulbers, M., Peeters, F., & Arntz, A. (2006). On the physiology, 37, S12–S13.
measurement of rumination: A psychometric evaluation of the Rumina- Schwartz, A. R., Gerin, W., Davidson, K. W., Pickering, T. G., Brosschot,
tive Response Scale and the Rumination on Sadness Scale in undergrad- J. F., Thayer, J. F., et al. (2003). Toward a causal model of cardiovas-
uates. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 37, cular responses to stress and the development of cardiovascular disease.
299 –313. Psychosomatic Medicine, 65, 22–35.
Roese, N. J. (1994). The functional basis of counterfactual thinking. Schwartz, J. A. J., & Koenig, L. J. (1996). Response styles and negative
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 805– 818. affect among adolescents. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20, 13–36.
Roese, N. J. (1997). Counterfactual thinking. Psychological Bulletin, 121, Segal, Z. V., Gemar, M., & Williams, S. (1999). Differential cognitive
133–148. response to a mood challenge following successful cognitive therapy or
Roese, N. J., & Olson, J. M. (1993). The structure of counterfactual pharmacotherapy for unipolar depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychol-
thought. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 312–319. ogy, 108, 3–10.
Roger, D., & Jamieson, J. (1988). Individual differences in delayed heart- Segal, Z. V., Kennedy, S., Gemar, M., Hood, K., Pedersen, R., & Buis, T.
rate recovery following stress: The role of extraversion, neuroticism and (2006). Cognitive reactivity to sad mood provocation and the prediction
emotional control. Personality and Individual Differences, 9, 721–726. of depressive relapse. Archives of General Psychiatry, 63, 749 –755.
Roger, D., & Najarian, B. (1989). The construction and validation of a new Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. M. G., & Teasdale, J. D. (2002). Mindfulness-
scale for measuring emotion control. Personality and Individual Differ- based cognitive therapy for depression: A new approach to preventing
ences, 10, 845– 853. relapse. New York: Guilford Press.
Roger, D., & Najarian, B. (1998). The relationship between emotional Segerstrom, S. C., Glover, D. A., Craske, M. G., & Fahey, J. L. (1999).
rumination and cortisol secretion under stress. Personality and Individ- Worry affects the immune response to phobic fear. Brain Behavior and
ual Differences, 24, 531–538. Immunity, 13, 80 –92.
Rohan, K. J., Sigmon, S. T., & Dorhofer, D. M. (2003). Cognitive- Segerstrom, S. C., Solomon, G. F., Kemeny, M. E., & Fahey, J. L. (1998).
behavioral factors in seasonal affective disorder. Journal of Consulting Relationship of worry to immune sequelae of the Northridge earthquake.
and Clinical Psychology, 71, 22–30. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 21, 433– 450.
 204 WATKINS

Segerstrom, S. C., Stanton, A. L., Alden, L. E., & Shortridge, B. E. (2003). (2007). Mind-wandering and dysphoria. Cognition & Emotion, 21, 816 –
A multidimensional structure for repetitive thought: What’s on your 842.
mind, and how, and how much? Journal of Personality and Social Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2006). The restless mind. Psychological
Psychology, 85, 909 –921. Bulletin, 132, 946 –958.
Segerstrom, S. C., Tsao, J. C. I., Alden, L. E., & Craske, M. G. (2000). Smith, J. M., Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (2006). Cognitive vulner-
Worry and rumination: Repetitive thought as a concomitant and predic- ability to depression, rumination, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation:
tor of negative mood. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 24, 671– 688. Multiple pathways to self-injurious thinking. Suicide and Life-
Shewchuk, R. M., Johnson, M. O., & Elliott, T. R. (2000). Self-appraised Threatening Behavior, 36, 443– 454.
social problem solving abilities, emotional reactions and actual problem Smith, S. M., & Petty, R. E. (1995). Personality moderators of mood
solving performance. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 727–740. congruency effects on cognition: The role of self-esteem and negative
Showers, C. (1988). The effects of how and why thinking on perceptions mood regulation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68,
of future negative events. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 12, 225– 1092–1107.
240. Smyth, J., True, N., & Souto, J. (2001). Effects of writing about traumatic
Showers, C. (1992). The motivational and emotional consequences of experiences: The necessity for narrative structuring. Journal of Social
considering positive or negative possibilities for an upcoming event.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

and Clinical Psychology, 20, 161–172.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 474 – 484.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Spasojevic, J., & Alloy, L. B. (2001). Rumination as a common mechanism

Showers, C., & Ruben, C. (1990). Distinguishing defensive pessimism relating depressive risk factors to depression. Emotion, 1, 25–37.
from depression: Negative expectations and positive coping mecha- Spasojevic, J., & Alloy, L. B. (2002). Who becomes a depressive rumina-
nisms. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 14, 385–399. tor? Developmental antecedents of ruminative response style. Journal of
Siddique, H. I., LaSalle-Ricci, V. H., Glass, C. R., Arnkoff, D. B., & Diaz, Cognitive Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 16, 405– 419.
R. J. (2006). Worry, optimism, and expectations as predictors of anxiety Spellman, B. A., & Mandel, D. R. (1999). When possibility informs reality:
and performance in the first year of law school. Cognitive Therapy and Counterfactual thinking as a cue to causality. Current Directions in
Research, 30, 667– 676. Psychological Science, 8, 120 –123.
Siegle, G. J., Granholm, E., Ingram, R. E., & Matt, G. E. (2001). Pupillary Spencer, S. M., & Norem, J. K. (1996). Reflection and distraction: Defen-
and reaction time measures of sustained processing of negative infor- sive pessimism, strategic optimism, and performance. Personality and
mation in depression. Biological Psychiatry, 49, 624 – 636.
Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 354 –365.
Siegle, G. J., Moore, P. M., & Thase, M. E. (2004). Rumination: One
Stanton, A. L., Danoff-Burg, S., Cameron, C. L., Bishop, M., Collins,
construct, many features in healthy individuals, depressed individuals,
C. A., Kirk, S. B., et al. (2000). Emotionally expressive coping predicts
and individuals with lupus. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 28, 645–
psychological and physical adjustment to breast cancer. Journal of
668.
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 68, 875– 882.
Siegle, G. J., Sagrati, S., & Crawford, C. (1999, November). Effects of
Stanton, A. L., Kirk, S. B., Cameron, C. L., & Danoff-Burg, S. (2000).
rumination and initial severity on response to cognitive therapy for
Coping through emotional approach: Scale construction and validation.
depression. Paper presented at the meeting of Association of the Ad-
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 1150 –1169.
vancement of Behavior Therapy, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Steele, C. M., Spencer, S. J., & Lynch, M. (1993). Self-image resilience
Siegle, G. J., Steinhauer, S. R., Carter, C. S., Ramel, W., & Thase, M. E.
and dissonance: The role of affirmational resources. Journal of Person-
(2003). Do the seconds turn into hours? Relationships between sustained
ality and Social Psychology, 64, 885– 896.
pupil dilation in response to emotional information and self-reported
Steil, R., & Ehlers, A. (2000). Dysfunctional meaning of posttraumatic
rumination. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 365–382.
intrusions in chronic PTSD. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38,
Siegle, G. J., Steinhauer, S. R., Thase, M. E., Stenger, V. A., & Carter,
C. S. (2002). Can’t shake that feeling: Assessment of sustained event- 537–558.
related fMRI amygdala activity in response to emotional information in Stein, N., Folkman, S., Trabasso, T., & Richards, T. A. (1997). Appraisal
depressed individuals. Biological Psychiatry, 51, 693–707. and goal processes as predictors of psychological well-being in bereaved
Silver, R. L., Boone, C., & Stone, M. H. (1983). Searching for meaning in caregivers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 872– 884.
misfortune: Making sense of incest. Journal of Social Issues, 39, 21– Stein, P. K., & Kleiger, R. E. (1999). Insights from the study of heart rate
102. variability. Annual Review of Medicine, 50, 249 –261.
Sloan, D. M., & Marx, B. P. (2004). A closer examination of the structured Stöber, J. (1998). Worry, problem elaboration and suppression of imagery:
written disclosure procedure. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psy- The role of concreteness. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 751–
chology, 72, 165–175. 756.
Smallwood, J., Davies, J. B., Heim, D., Finnigan, F., Sudberry, M., Stöber, J., & Borkovec, T. D. (2002). Reduced concreteness of worry in
O’Connor, R., et al. (2004). Subjective experience and the attentional generalized anxiety disorder: Findings from a therapy study. Cognitive
lapse: Task engagement and disengagement during sustained attention. Therapy and Research, 26, 89 –96.
Consciousness and Cognition, 13, 657– 690. Stöber, J., Tepperwien, S., & Staak, M. (2000). Worrying leads to reduced
Smallwood, J., Obonsawin, M., Baracaia, S., Reid, H., O’Connor, R. C., & concreteness of problem elaborations: Evidence for the avoidance theory
Heim, S. D. (2003). The relationship between rumination, dysphoria and of worry. Anxiety Stress and Coping, 13, 217–227.
self-referent thinking: Some preliminary findings. Imagination, Cogni- Storbeck, J., & Clore, G. L. (2005a). With sadness comes accuracy; with
tion and Personality, 4, 315–317. happiness, false memory: Mood and the false memory effect. Psycho-
Smallwood, J., O’Connor, R. C., & Heim, S. D. (2005). Rumination, logical Science, 16, 785–791.
dysphoria and subjective experience. Imagination, Cognition and Per- Suchday, S., Carter, M. M., Ewart, C. K., Larkin, K. T., & Desiderato, O.
sonality, 24, 355–367. (2004). Anger cognitions and cardiovascular recovery following prov-
Smallwood, J., O’Connor, R. C., Sudberry, M. V., Haskell, C., & Ballan- ocation. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 27, 319 –341.
tyne, C. (2004). The consequences of encoding information on the Szabo, M., & Lovibond, P. F. (2004). The cognitive content of thought-
maintenance of internally generated images and thoughts: The role of listed worry episodes in clinic-referred anxious and nonreferred children.
meaning complexes. Consciousness and Cognition, 13, 789 – 820. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 33, 613– 622.
Smallwood, J., O’Connor, R. C., Sudberry, M. V., & Obonsawin, M. Szabo, M., & Lovibond, P. F. (2006). Worry episodes and perceived
 CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE REPETITIVE THOUGHT 205

problem solving: A diary-based approach. Anxiety Stress and Coping, reconsidered: A psychometric analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Re-
19, 175–187. search, 27, 247–259.
Tait, R., & Silver, R. C. (1989). Coming to terms with major negative life Trope, Y. (1989). Levels of inference in dispositional judgment. Social
events. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. Cognition, 7, 296 –314.
351–382). New York: Guilford Press. Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological
Tallis, F., & Eysenck, M. W. (1994). Worry: Mechanisms and modulating Review, 110, 403– 421.
influences. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 22, 37–56. Tugade, M. M., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2004). Resilient individuals use
Taylor, S. E., Pham, L. B., Rivkin, I. D., & Armor, D. A. (1998). positive emotions to bounce back from negative emotional experiences.
Harnessing the imagination: Mental simulation, self-regulation, and cop- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 320 –333.
ing. American Psychologist, 53, 429 – 439. Tugade, M. M., Fredrickson, B. L., & Barrett, L. F. (2004). Psychological
Taylor, S. E., & Schneider, S. K. (1989). Coping and the simulation of resilience and positive emotional granularity: Examining the benefits of
events. Social Cognition, 7, 194. positive emotions on coping and health. Journal of Personality, 72,
Taylor, S. E., Wood, J. V., & Lichtman, R. R. (1983). It could be worse: 1161–1190.
Selective evaluation as a response to victimization. Journal of Social Ullrich, P. M., & Lutgendorf, S. K. (2002). Journaling about stressful
events: Effects of cognitive processing and emotional expression. Annals
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Issues, 39, 19 – 40.

of Behavioral Medicine, 24, 244 –250.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Teasdale, J. D. (1983). Negative thinking in depression: Cause, effect, or

reciprocal relationship. Advances in Behaviour Research and Therapy, Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1987). What do people think they’re
5, 3–25. doing? Action identification and human behavior. Psychological Re-
Teasdale, J. D. (1988). Cognitive vulnerability to persistent depression. view, 94, 3–15.
Cognition & Emotion, 2, 247–274. Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1989). Levels of personal agency:
Teasdale, J. D., & Barnard, P. J. (1993). Affect, cognition, and change: Individual variation in action identification. Journal of Personality and
Re-modelling depressive thought. Hove, United Kingdom: Erlbaum. Social Psychology, 57, 660 – 671.
Teasdale, J. D., & Dent, J. (1987). Cognitive vulnerability to depression: Vallacher, R. R., Wegner, D. M., & Frederick, J. (1987). The presentation
An investigation of 2 hypotheses. British Journal of Clinical Psychol- of self through action identification. Social Cognition, 5, 301–322.
Vallacher, R. R., Wegner, D. M., & Somoza, M. P. (1989). That’s easy for
ogy, 26, 113–126.
you to say: Action identification and speech fluency. Journal of Per-
Teasdale, J. D., Dritschel, B. H., Taylor, M. J., Proctor, L., Lloyd, C. A.,
sonality and Social Psychology, 56, 199 –208.
Nimmosmith, I., et al. (1995). Stimulus-independent thought depends on
Van der Does, W. (2002). Cognitive reactivity to sad mood: Structure and
central executive resources. Memory and Cognition, 23, 551–559.
validity of a new measure. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 105–
Teasdale, J. D., Segal, Z., & Williams, J. M. G. (1995). How does cognitive
120.
therapy prevent depressive relapse and why should attentional control
Vera, A. H., & Simon, H. A. (1993). Situated action: A symbolic inter-
(mindfulness) training help. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 25–
pretation. Cognitive Science, 17, 7– 48.
39.
Verhaeghen, P., Joormann, J., & Khan, R. (2005). Why we sing the blues:
Teasdale, J. D., Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. M. G., Ridgeway, V. A., Soulsby,
The relation between self-reflective rumination, mood, and creativity.
J. M., & Lau, M. A. (2000). Prevention of relapse/recurrence in major
Emotion, 5, 226 –232.
depression by mindfulness-based cognitive therapy. Journal of Consult-
Verplanken, B., Friborg, O., Wang, C. E., Trafimow, D., & Woolf, K.
ing and Clinical Psychology, 68, 615– 623.
(2007). Mental habits: Metacognitive reflection on negative self-
Tedeschi, R. G., & Calhoun, L. G. (2004). Posttraumatic growth: Concep-
thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 526 –541.
tual foundations and empirical evidence. Psychological Inquiry, 15,
Wakslak, C. J., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Alony, R. (2006). Seeing the
1–18. forest when entry is unlikely: Probability and the mental representation
Thayer, J. F., Friedman, B. H., & Borkovec, T. D. (1996). Autonomic of events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, 641– 653.
characteristics of generalized anxiety disorder and worry. Biological Watkins, E. (2004a). Adaptive and maladaptive ruminative self-focus
Psychiatry, 39, 255–266. during emotional processing. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42,
Thomsen, D. K. (2006). The association between rumination and negative 1037–1052.
affect: A review. Cognition & Emotion, 20, 1216 –1235. Watkins, E. (2004b). Appraisals and strategies associated with rumination
Thomsen, D. K., Jorgensen, M. M., Mehlsen, M. Y., & Zachariae, R. and worry. Personality and Individual Differences, 37, 679 – 694.
(2004). The influence of rumination and defensiveness on negative Watkins, E., & Baracaia, S. (2001). Why do people ruminate in dysphoric
affect in response to experimental stress. Scandinavian Journal of Psy- moods? Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 723–734.
chology, 45, 253–258. Watkins, E., & Baracaia, S. (2002). Rumination and social problem solving
Thomsen, D. K., Mehlsen, M. Y., Christensen, S., & Zachariae, R. (2003). in depression. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 1179 –1189.
Rumination: Relationship with negative mood and sleep quality. Per- Watkins, E., & Brown, R. G. (2002). Rumination and executive function in
sonality and Individual Differences, 34, 1293–1301. depression: An experimental study. Journal of Neurology Neurosurgery
Thomsen, D. K., Mehlsen, M. Y., Hokland, M., Viidik, A., Olesen, F., and Psychiatry, 72, 400 – 402.
Avlund, K., et al. (2004). Negative thoughts and health: Associations Watkins, E., & Moulds, M. (2005a). Distinct modes of ruminative self-
among rumination, immunity, and health care utilization in a young and focus: Impact of abstract versus concrete rumination on problem solving
elderly sample. Psychosomatic Medicine, 66, 363–371. in depression. Emotion, 5, 319 –328.
Thomsen, D. K., Mehlsen, M. Y., Olesen, F., Hokland, M., Viidik, A., Watkins, E., & Moulds, M. (2005b). Positive beliefs about rumination in
Avlund, K., et al. (2004). Is there an association between rumination and depression: A replication and extension. Personality and Individual
self-reported physical health? A one-year follow-up in a young and an Differences, 39, 73– 82.
elderly sample. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 27, 215–231. Watkins, E., & Moulds, M. (2007). Reduced concreteness in depression: A
Trapnell, P. D., & Campbell, J. D. (1999). Private self-consciousness and pilot study. Personality and Individual Differences, 43, 1386 –1395.
the five-factor model of personality: Distinguishing rumination from Watkins, E., Moulds, M., & Mackintosh, B. (2005). Comparisons between
reflection. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 284 –304. rumination and worry in a non-clinical population. Behaviour Research
Treynor, W., Gonzalez, R., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2003). Rumination and Therapy, 43, 1577–1585.
 206 WATKINS

Watkins, E., Scott, J., Wingrove, J., Rimes, K., Bathurst, N., Steiner, H., et Watkins, E., & Dalgleish, T. (2007). Autobiographical memory speci-
al. (2007). Rumination-focused cognitive-behaviour therapy for residual ficity and emotional disorder. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 122–148.
depression: A case series. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 2144 – Wong, P. T. P., & Weiner, B. (1981). When people ask why questions, and
2154. the heuristics of attributional search. Journal of Personality and Social
Watkins, E., & Teasdale, J. D. (2001). Rumination and overgeneral mem- Psychology, 40, 650 – 663.
ory in depression: Effects of self-focus and analytic thinking. Journal of Wrosch, C., Dunne, E., Scheier, M. F., & Schulz, R. (2006). Self-regulation of
Abnormal Psychology, 110, 353–357. common age-related challenges: Benefits for older adults’ psychological
Watkins, E., & Teasdale, J. D. (2004). Adaptive and maladaptive self-focus and physical health. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 29, 299 –306.
in depression. Journal of Affective Disorders, 82, 1– 8. Wrosch, C., & Heckhausen, J. (1999). Control processes before and after
Watkins, E., Teasdale, J. D., & Williams, R. M. (2000). Decentring and passing a developmental deadline: Activation and deactivation of inti-
distraction reduce overgeneral autobiographical memory in depression. mate relationship goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
Psychological Medicine, 30, 911–920. 77, 415– 427.
Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1984). Negative affectivity: The disposition to Wrosch, C., Scheier, M. F., Miller, G. E., Schulz, R., & Carver, C. S.
experience aversive emotional states. Psychological Bulletin, 96, 465– (2003). Adaptive self-regulation of unattainable goals: Goal disengage-
ment, goal reengagement, and subjective well-being. Personality and
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

490.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2003). Can implementation intentions help to Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 1494 –1508.
overcome ego depletion? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Wrosch, C., Schulz, R., & Heckhausen, J. (2004). Health stresses and
depressive symptomatology in the elderly: A control-process approach.
39, 279 –286.
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13, 17–20.
Wegner, D. M., & Vallacher, R. R. (1987). The trouble with action. Social
Wyer, R. S. (1996). Ruminative thoughts: Advances in social cognition.
Cognition, 5, 179 –190.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Wegner, D. M., Vallacher, R. R., Kiersted, G. W., & Dizadji, D. (1986).
Yamada, K., Nagayama, H., Tsutiyama, K., Kitamura, T., & Furukawa, T.
Action identification in the emergence of social behavior. Social Cog-
(2003). Coping behavior in depressed patients: A longitudinal study.
nition, 4, 18 –38.
Psychiatry Research, 121, 169 –177.
Wegner, D. M., Vallacher, R. R., Macomber, G., Wood, R., & Arps, K.
York, D., Borkovec, T. D., Vasey, M., & Stern, R. (1987). Effects of worry
(1984). The emergence of action. Journal of Personality and Social
and somatic anxiety induction on thoughts, emotion and physiological
Psychology, 46, 269 –279. activity. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 25, 523–526.
Weissman, A. N., & Beck, A. T. (1978, November). Development and Young, M. A., & Azam, O. A. (2003). Ruminative response style and the
validation of the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale: A preliminary investi- severity of seasonal affective disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research,
gation. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of The Association for the 27, 223–232.
Advancement of Behavior Therapy, Chicago, IL. Zeigarnik, B. (1938). On finished and unfinished tasks. In W. D. Ellis
Wells, A., & Matthews, G. (1994). Attention and emotion: A clinical (Ed.), A source book of Gestalt psychology (pp. 300 –314). New York:
perspective. Hove, United Kingdom: Erlbaum. Harcourt, Brace, & World.
Wells, A., & Papageorgiou, C. (1995). Worry and the incubation of Ziegert, D. I., & Kistner, J. A. (2002). Response styles theory: Downward
intrusive images following stress. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, extension to children. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychol-
579 –583. ogy, 31, 325–334.
Wicklund, R. A. (1986). Orientation to the environment versus preoccu- Zoellner, T., & Maercker, A. (2006). Posttraumatic growth in clinical
pation with human potential. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), psychology: A critical review and introduction of a two component
Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior model. Clinical Psychology Review, 26, 626 – 653.
(pp. 6 –95). London: Guilford Press.
Wicklund, R. A., & Braun, O. L. (1987). Incompetence and the concern
with human categories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Received June 10, 2006
53, 373–382. Revision received August 30, 2007
Williams, J. M. G., Barnhofer, T., Crane, C., Hermans, D., Raes, F., Accepted August 31, 2007 䡲

E-Mail Notification of Your Latest Issue Online!

Would you like to know when the next issue of your favorite APA journal will be available
online? This service is now available to you. Sign up at http://notify.apa.org/ and you will be
notified by e-mail when issues of interest to you become available!