NATURAL JUSTICE

Susanna Afutu
Central University, Law Faculty
• Natural justice forms the bedrock for the determination of
cases in court.
• The principle of natural justice has 2 legs namely – audi
alteram partem (hear the other side) and nemo judex in
causa sua (do not be a judge in your own cause).
• Under this topic, we would be considering what both sides
mean.
Audi alteram partem (hear the other side)
• A basic principle of deciding matters (and this includes legal
cases) is that the judge or arbiter should not come to a
conclusion on the matter until he or she has heard both
sides of the story.
• This means that in deciding a matter, a judge must listen to
both the plaintiff and the defendant (in a civil case) or listen
to both the prosecution and the accused (in a criminal case)
before writing his judgment.
• This principle of hearing the other side dates back to the
Garden of Eden, where God heard the account of both Adam
and Eve on why they ate the forbidden fruit before deciding
to drive them out of the garden.
• However, it is necessary to add that there are instances in
which the defendant may refuse to appear and give his side
of the story in which case the judge would have to decide
the case based on what the plaintiff has said and the law.
• What is our focus here, therefore, is those instances where
both parties are available and willing to give an account of
their side of the story or to be heard.
• Students should refer to the Semester 1 reading list for a list
of cases under audi alteram partem. However a few shall be
discussed here.
• In the Baggs Case, the court held that when you are
disenfranchising a citizen, you must do so based on an Act of
parliament. Further, a person who was to be disenfranchised
needed to be heard.
• In the case of R v Chancellor, University of Cambridge, the
Court of King’s bench in England, directed the University of
Cambridge that they had to restore the degrees of Bachelor
of Arts and Bachelor of and Doctor of Divinity on one Dr.
Bentley, because he had been deprived of these degrees
without a hearing.
• In the case of Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works, the
plaintiff was a builder and the defendant was the Board of
Works for the Wandsworth District.
• The Plaintiff’s building was pulled down under the authority
of an Act of Parliament without giving the plaintiff a hearing.
The Court held that this was contrary to the rules of natural
justice and that the board would have suffered no
disadvantage if they had given him a hearing.
• Darkwa v The Republic – the appellant was a former senior
police officer who had adverse findings made against her by
the Committee appointed under the Committee of Inquiry
(Recent disturbances in the Police Force) Instrument.
• The recommendations of the letter required that she
proceed on retirement. She appealed against the findings of
the letter to the Court of Appeal.
• The Court held that a Committee of Inquiry like a
Commission of Inquiry, was a fact finding tribunal not a
criminal trial. They had a duty to verify the allegations which
involved giving the person involved an opportunity to
challenge the allegation.
Nemo judex in causa sua (do not be a judge in
your own cause)
• The second principle of natural justice which is nemo judex
in causa sua translates as do not be a judge in your own
cause or do not act as a judge in a case in which you are an
interested party.
• What it means to be an interested party has been decided by
the courts in a host of cases.
• In the case of R v Gough, the defendant had been convicted
of robbery. In a bid to get his conviction quashed, he
appealled, saying that a member of the jury was a neighbour
to his brother, and there was therefore a risk of bias.
• This was of particular significance as the defendant was charged
with conspiracy with that brother to commit burglaries.
• In this case, that juror signed an affidavit stating that she realized
she was a neighbour to the accused’s brother only after the trial
ended.
• The Court held that in deciding bias, the test was whether there
was a real danger of bias on the part of the judge or juror and
not just a mere possibility of bias. Per Lord Goff “When
considering whether there is a real danger of injustice, the court
gives effect to the maxim, but does so by examining all the
material available and giving its conclusion on that material”.
• If the court having done so is satisfied there is no danger of
the alleged bias having created injustice, then the application
to quash the decision should be dismissed.
• Lord Goff also noted in R v Gough that real likelihood of bias
should be limited to pecuniary and proprietary interest only.
• This test of real likelihood of bias was affirmed in Sallah v AG
when a preliminary objection was raised on whether Justices
Sowah and Apalloo could hear the case.
• Dimes v Grand Junction - The Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham,
owned a substantial shareholding in the defendant canal which was
an incorporated body. He sat on appeal from the Vice-Chancellor, and
affirmed a judgment in favour of the company. There was an appeal
on the grounds that the Lord Chancellor was disqualified.
• It was held that Lord Cottenham was disqualified from sitting as a
judge in the cause because he had an interest in the suit. The Court
held that the principle no man should be a judge in his own cause,
applies not only where the judge is a party in the case but also where
he has an interest in the case.
• Akufo-Addo v Qurashie Idun – A circular was issued to
judicial officers that only lawyers who had taken out
solicitors licenses should be given audience in Court. The
appellants brought an action in the Court of Appeal against
the interim injunction given against them. At the Court of
Appeal, the bench was empaneled by the Chief Justice,
Edward Akufo-Addo. The respondent argued that since the
Chief Justice had an interest in the matter, he would be
choosing judges in his own case contrary to the rules of
natural justice.
• Held – the duty of the CJ was to constitute benchers of the
Court of Appeal, this was part of his administrative duties.
The only situation when another could be nominated to do
this was when he was ill or outside the country. Where a
statute required a person to perform an act he had to do it
• even if its performance conflicted with the rules of natural
justice.
• This principle was affirmed in the more recent case of Agyei-
Twum v Attorney-General

• NB: students must note that the ability to set aside a ruling
on account of the fact that the rules of natural justice were
not followed only applies if the defaulting party is a public
body. In our next topic, we would examine this into detail.