AKASH BHATI

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MIDLEY
Moral isolationism consists in simply denying that we can ever understand any culture except our
own, well enough to make judgments about it.
According to it, the world is sharply divided into separate societies, each with its own system of
thought.
Suggesting never taking up a critical position to any other culture and that we can never claim
what is good or bad there. People usually take it up because they think it is a respectful attitude
to other cultures. But, in fact, it’s not respectful. Nobody can respect what they genuinely do not
understand. If we are to take anyone seriously, we have to know enough about him to make a
favorable judgement. And we do understand people in other cultures in this way.
To make things clear Midgley takes the following example, there is, a verb in classical Japanese
which means “to try out one’s new sword on a chance wayfarer.” A samurai sword had to be tried
out because, if it was to work properly, it had to slice through someone at a single blow, from the
shoulder to the opposite flank. If it couldn’t do this, the warrior bungled his stroke.
This injured his honor, offended his ancestors, and might let down his emperor. So, tests were
needed, and wayfarers had to be expended. Any wayfarer would do – provided, that he wasn’t
another samurai. Now, moral isolationists take on this would be that, when we hear of a custom
like this, we may well reflect that we do not understand it.
Thus, we are not qualified to criticize or judge it, because we are not members of any other
culture, except our own. But this can’t be so. To explain why it is impossible, Midgley considers
three questions. Midgley’s first argument is as follows: If moral isolationism is correct, then one
can respect a culture without judging it. Yet, this is logically incoherent, because judgment, which
Midgley sees as the formation of opinion – is logically antecedent to respect. One must judge a
culture, to some degree, in order to respect it.
Further, once one has an understanding of a culture, one can make positive and negative
judgments; the two go hand in hand. The moral isolationist’s injunction that we are only allowed to
be positive (i.e., respectful) of foreign cultures is impossible to uphold.
Midgley’s next argument is actually a simple – and reasonable – assertion: outsiders can, in fact,
judge foreign cultures. These judgements will be provisional and limited in scope, but they can still
be fair. In particular, she cites the judgments made by anthropologists as a paradigmatic
example. Moral isolationism is thus wrong in this matter too.
Midgley then argues that moral isolationism leads to a general ban on moral reasoning – an
unacceptable conclusion. She says that judging one’s own culture requires the ability to judge
other cultures, as a frame of reference. If we cannot judge other cultures, then we cannot judge
our own. This would lead to an inability to judge anything of moral significance whatsoever, which
is patently absurd.
Moral judgement is a necessary part of existence, and thus moral isolationism cannot be
correct. When we judge something to be bad or good, better or worse than something else, we
are taking it as an example to aim at or to avoid. If we really couldn’t form opinions of this sort,
we’d have no framework of comparison for our own policy. We couldn’t profit by other’s insights
or mistakes. Without that background of comparison, we couldn’t even form judgements about
our own actions. Our involvement in moral isolationism doesn’t actually flow from apathy, but
from a rather acute concern about human wickedness. We are rightly angry with those who
despise and oppress other cultures. But this is itself a moral judgement.
Midgley says,
Suppose, for instance, that criticize the bisecting samurai, that I say his behavior is brutal. What will
usually happen is that someone will protest, saying that I have no right to make criticisms like this
of another culture. But his next move isn’t usually to drop the subject. He will try to fill in the
background, to make me understand the custom by explaining the exalted ideals of discipline and
devotion which produced it. He may add, too, that the wayfarers didn’t seriously mind being
bisected, and consented to it. Now, if my objector talks like this, he is implying that it is possible to
understand alien customs – because that is just what he is trying to do. He implies, too, that if I do
manage to understand them, I shall do something better than giving up judging entirely. He expects
me to change my present judgement to a truer one – namely, one that is favorable.
And the standards I must use to do this can’t just be samurai standards. They have to be ones
current in my own culture.
This becomes clear when we look at the last argument the objector used – that of justification by
consent of the victim. The protester says that sudden bisection is quite all right, provided that it
takes place between consenting adults. But it can only work if we believe that consent makes a
transaction respectable – and this is a thoroughly modern and Western idea. It would probably
never occur to a samurai. It is our standard. And in applying it, we’re likely to make another
typically Western demand; namely we shall ask for good factual evidence that the wayfarers
actually do have this rather surprising taste,that they really are willing to be bisected. When we
apply Western standards in this way, we are not being confused or irrelevant. We are asking the
questions which arise from where we stand. (akash Bhati notes)
We can come to understand other societies better, and by doing that we may make their
questions our Society is not a sealed box, but a fertile jungle of different influences, into which
further influences are still pouring. Moral isolationists’ picture of separate, unmixable cultures is
quite unreal. The world has never been like that; it couldn’t be like it. All cultures are formed out of
many streams and all have the problem of digesting and assimilating things which, at the start,
they don’t understand
HARMAN
Morality arises when a group of people reach an implicit agreement about their relations with one
another. This agreement is made in the relevant sense when a group of people intend to adhere
to a set of principles based on the understanding that the rest also similarly intend.
Most moral judgments make sense only in relation to such an agreement. ‘Most’ because this
thesis is only about “inner judgments” which say that S ought to or ought not to have done D and
not about judgments that say S is evil or unjust. Inner Judgments Inner judgements are relevant
only within the relevant moral considerations of the agreement.
To illustrate, it would be odd to make the judgement that a conquering alien race which does not
harbor the slightest concern for human life should not attack us or to say that their actions are
wrong. The same goes for a band of cannibals eating the sole survivor of a shipwreck. Or even a
person, brought up in such a way as to have only contempt for people outside the family, who kills
a non-family member. It will be correct to say that the aliens are dreadful, that the cannibals are
inhuman, and that the murderer is a criminal.
But it would be inappropriate to judge their actions as wrong or to state that they ought not to
have done what they did since our moral considerations are clearly not relevant to them.
The use of the moral ‘ought’ with the qualification ‘to do’ should be differentiated from it use in the
form ‘ought to be’ to indicate expectation (“My girlfriend ought to be here soon”), rationality (“My
girlfriend ought to be in the 2 PM train”) or normative judgment (“My girlfriend ought to be
faithful”). Similarly, for the word ‘should’. Also, the use of ‘wrong’ in an evaluative sense (“My
girlfriend’s infidelity was wrong”) should be differentiated from its use in a descriptive sense (“It
was wrong for my girlfriend to be unfaithful”). The Logical Form of Inner Judgments Inner
judgments have two important characteristics.

● First, they imply that the agent has reasons to do something.

● Second, the speaker in some sense endorses these reasons and supposes that
the audience also endorses them.
If someone S says that another person A ought to do action D, S implies that A has reasons to do D
and S endorses those reasons.
The reasons that A has and are endorsed by S are assumed to be “goals, desires, or
intentions”. As such, there are certain motivating attitudes M which are shared by S, A, and S’s
audience. These attitudes are intentions to keep the agreement. The argument is that inner
judgments are relative to such an agreement. In other words, when S says that A ought to do D,
S assumes A’s sincere intention to observe a certain agreement composed of motivating
attitudes M that S, A, and S’s audience share. Putting these together, the moral “ought” can be
formulated as a four-place predicate, “Ought (A, D, C, M)” which relates an agent A, a type of act
D, considerations C and motivating attitudes M. The relativity of this formulation lies with C and
M. Any action of course is relative to considerations. (akash Bhati notes)
This relativity does not make the thesis a version of moral relativism. Rather, it is the relativity to
motivating attitudes that makes the thesis as such. This relativity to motivating attitudes is visible
in moral “ought” statements where a speaker invokes attitudes that he does not share.
For example, “As a Christian, you ought to turn the other cheek; I, however, propose to strike
back.” Here, moral judgment is explicitly relative to motivating attitudes. Put differently, “Ought
(A, D, C, M)” means that given considerations C, if A has motivating attitudes M, D is the best, or
‘moral’, course of action. Any such ‘ought’ statement necessarily has the first characteristic of
inner judgments (see first paragraph in this section). If such an ‘ought’ statement makes an
explicit or implicit reference to shared motivating attitudes, the statement satisfies the second
characteristic too and is hence an inner judgment. But if reference is made to attitudes that are
not shared, as in the example presented in the previous paragraph, the statement is not a full-
fledged moral judgment.
Moral Bargaining the further argument here is that motivating attitudes M derive from an
agreement i.e., intentions to adhere to a particular agreement on the understanding that others
also intend to do so.
Consider the following puzzle: even if we believe that doctors ought to help as many patients as he
can, we would object to the suggestion that he should cut up a patient and use his organs to save
five others. Helping others ranks lower than not harming others. Now consider a second
hypothetical case. This time you are to imagine yourself to be a surgeon, a truly great surgeon.
Among other things you do, you transplant organs, and you are such a great surgeon that the
organs you transplant always take. At the moment you have five patients who need organs.
Two need one lung each, two need a kidney each, and the fifth needs a heart. If they do not get
those organs today, they will all die; if you find organs for them today, you can transplant the
organs and they will all live. But where to find the lungs, the kidneys, and the heart? The time is
almost up when a report is brought to you that a young man who has just come into your clinic for
his yearly check-up has exactly the right blood-type, and is in excellent health. Lo, you have a
possible donor. All you need to do is cut him up and distribute his parts among the five who need
them. You ask, but he says, “Sorry. I deeply sympathize, but no.” Would it be morally
permissible for you to operate anyway? Everybody to whom I have put this second hypothetical
case says, No, it would not be morally permissible for you to proceed.
A way of navigating this puzzle is to consider the hypothesis that morality derives from an
agreement among people with varying powers and resources. Everyone would benefit if there
is a rule against harming each other. But if there is a rule in favor of helping as much as one can,
the rich would lose out. The compromise then would be a strong ‘no harm’ principle and a weak
‘help’ principle.
This compromise agreement is not and need not be explicit. It is reached through mutual
adjustment and implicit bargaining i.e., some form certain conditional intentions while others
with other interests form other conditional intentions which are then resolved into an agreement
through bargaining. Most of our moral views can be given a utilitarian explanation. And utilitarian
explanations can also be accounted for using an implicit agreement. The reverse is however not
possible. Examples would be the one already cited, the distinction between harming and
helping, and the feeling that everyone has an inalienable right to self-defense and self-
preservation.
Objections and Replies O.
It does not follow from having an agreement that we should therefore
keep that agreement. R. But we intend to keep it. Intention to keep it on the condition that others
intend similarly too is what makes the agreement relevant. O. What you think, or even agree, is
right may not be actually what is right. R. That’s true.
But the thesis is not about what is right. It’s about how what we understand to be right can be
made sense of in reference to agreement in intentions. It does not eliminate moral disputes or,
otherwise, preclude inconsistencies. O.
Not all agreements are morally binding. R. This would imply the existence of a prior principle to
the effect that agreements made under compulsion are inadmissible. This objection assumes
that the agreement is made through a ritual in which one indicates that he agrees.
The agreement here is clearly an agreement in intentions. And the argument here is that it is
only with reference to an existing agreement in intentions and not from “prior” principles that
such a principle about compelled agreements makes sense. O. (Akash Bhati notes)
When and how did we come to the agreement? What of those who don’t want to agree and what
if they don’t? R. As mentioned earlier, the agreement is not based on a ritual but on intentions. In
this sense of ‘agreement’, the questions of when and how the agreement came to be (there is no
given moment at which one agrees) and what to do with those who disagree (they will clearly be
outside the agreement) are rendered idle. O. People are
often unable to give a systematic and precise definition of their moral views. On what
understanding then can they form the agreement? R. Many understandings are of precisely this
sort. For example, the understanding among members of an orchestra or a team of acrobats. Also,
moral understandings are never absolute.
The principles agreed to are generally vague. For example, that respect should be shown
wherever possible.
Moral reasoning is a form of practical reasoning. It has to be coherent in the sense of generality
and lack of arbitrariness. But it also involves the maintenance of conservatism and the
satisfaction of basic needs and desires. One tries to make the least change that will best satisfy
one’s desires while maximizing the overall coherence of one’s attitudes. Someone can reach an
agreement with himself i.e., the membership of the group is one?
It is perfectly possible to make inner judgments about oneself. Consider the pacifist who judges
that it would be wrong of him to participate in killing but is unwilling to hold the same judgment for
others even though he is willing to say that it is bad that they participate. Individual morality of
this sort is extremely common.
“My conclusion is that relativism can be formulated as an intelligible thesis, the thesis that
morality derives from an implicit agreement and that moral judgments are in a logical sense
made in relation to such an agreement. Such a theory helps to explain otherwise puzzling
aspects of our own moral views, in particular why we think that it is more important to avoid harm
to others than to help others. The theory is also partially confirmed by what is, as far as I can
tell, a previously unnoticed distinction between inner and non-inner moral judgments.
Furthermore, traditional objections to implicit agreement theories can be met”
An Unprincipled Morality
Jonathan Dancy –
Moral particularism is the view that there are no, or at most few, true universal moral principles
and that competent reasoning and judgment do not require them. Instead of conformity to a
principle, particularists affirm that actions are justified by a situation’s salient features, and deny
that a feature must have the same moral significance in every situation in which it appears. But,
since the reason-giving force of a feature in one situation is not a guarantor of its status
elsewhere, particularism seems unable to account for moral learning
From cases.
Consideration of what would be morally required in the case is generally intended to provide
actionable guidance in a real situation. However, the features of a past or imaginary case are
not precisely those of the real situation before us. It is possible that a feature might be salient in
one case but not in another, and, on a particularist’s framework, appealing to cases seems likely
to lead us off track. The particularist’s opponent is the generalist.
Ethical generalism is the view that the rationality of moral thought and judgment depends on a
suitable provision of moral principles. One of the first things one learns when studying how
reasons behave is that a certain theory, atomism, is false.
Atomism holds that any feature that is a reason in favor of action in one case will always be a
reason in favor of action wherever it occurs. The same feature always makes the same reason; or,
a reason is a general reason. This theory is false; something that is a reason in favor of action in
one case may in another case be no reason at all or evens a reason against action. It all depends
on the circumstances.
Holism is the theory contrary to atomism; it states that a feature that is a reason in one case may
be no reason at all, or an opposite reason in another. Generalists consider that the refutation of
rationality is an immediate consequence of particularism, and on the basis of atomism in the
theory of reasons, support generalism. (akash Bhati notes)
Particularists, on the other hand, through accusing generalists of neglecting particular truths and
certain conditions, put forward holism in support of their attitude

Reasons come in two sorts.

There are reasons for belief and reasons for action.

First, the reason for belief, particularists suppose that this doctrine is true for reasons in general
so that its application to moral reasons is just part and parcel of a larger story. For an example
that comes from a non-moral context, suppose that it currently seems to me that something
before me is red. Normally, one might say, that is a reason (some reason, that is, not necessarily
sufficient reason) for me to believe that there is something red before me. But in a case where I
also believe that I have recently taken a drug that makes blue things look red and red things look
blue, the appearance of a red-looking thing before me is the reason for me to believe that there
is a blue, not a red, thing before me. It is not as if it is some reason for me to believe that there is
something red before me, but that as such a reason it is overwhelmed by contrary reasons. It is
no longer any reason at all to believe that there is something red before me; indeed it is a
reason for believing the opposite. Turning to reasons for action, we might point out that in some
contexts the fact that something is against the law is a reason not to do it, but in others, it is a
reason to do it (so as to protest, let us say, against the existence of a law governing an aspect of
private life with which the law should not interfere). That there are two people claiming to have
witnessed the same event is sometimes a reason to believe what they say, and sometimes a
reason to disbelieve it; it might even be both at the same time. It is only when we turn to a
special brand of reasons for action,
moral reasons.
Moral reasons are to be thought of based upon moral principles, but if atomism is false, there can
be no moral principles. All moral principles specify features that they suppose to constitute the
same reason wherever they occur, regardless of context. The principle that it is wrong to lie
asserts that if an action requires you to lie, this is always some reason against it. And if atomism is
false there are no such features.
Moral particularism holds that, because of the falsehood of atomism, there are plenty of moral
reasons but no moral principles. Some people are already convinced that moral reasons are
somewhat different from other reasons, that atomism is true of moral reasons even if not of other
sorts of reason. For them, moral reasons must be general reasons even if others are not. This
view is stated as ‘moral generalism’.
Generalists emphasize the necessity of principles in the decision-making process and claim that
the rationality of moral thought depends on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles.
It might be that there are some features that constitute the same moral reason wherever they
occur. Call these ‘invariant reasons’. It is invariant as a reason has nothing to do with the way in
which it functions as a reason in any particular case.
Most vary with the circumstances, being sometimes a reason in favor and sometimes a reason
against. This means that not all moral reasons are based on principles. Should we say that at
least the invariant ones are? This would give us a hybrid picture of moral reasons, some being
principle-based and others (probably the majority) not. We need to develop an understanding of
moral judgment which does not think of us as subsuming the case before us under one or many
principles. Rather, we will have to work out a conception of moral judgment as a sensitivity to the
nature of the situation we find ourselves in and to the demands that it places on us. There will be
a structure to that situation, a structure of reasons, and features to make it the case that here we
should do this rather than that. The competent moral judge is the person capable of recognizing
such a thing when it occurs. The development of this approach to ethics is the construction of a
fully-fledged moral particularism.
People reject the persuasive charms of particularism for, broadly, two sorts of reasons: reasons to
do with rationality, and reasons to do with motivation. For Reason to do with rationality first,
three points are made. The first and most direct is that thinking rationally requires at least one
think consistently, and in ethics, this just means taking the same feature to be the same reason
wherever it occurs. Particularism, therefore, denies the rationality of moral thought. The answer
to the first is that, when we are thinking of reasons for belief, the sort of consistency required of us
is mere that we do not adopt beliefs that cannot all be true together.
Why should we understand the consistency requirement in a different way when we turn to
moral reasons? Simply to insist that this is so must be to beg the question against particularism.
Second, what is the difference between moral choice and choosing chocolates? The difference
is that when choosing morally we are required to make similar choices in similar circumstances;
not so for the choice between rum truffles and peppermint creams. The second question asks
us to justify a distinction between matters of whim, such as the choice of chocolates, and
matters of weighty reasons, such as those involved in moral choice. But this need not be a
problem. (akash Bhati notes)
Moral reasons as the particularists understand them occur in one case and not in the other.
Nothing at all like them applies to the choosing of chocolates (normally). This does nothing to
show that in morality, unlike in the area of whim, we are required to make similar choices in
similar situations. There are quite enough other differences between morality and whim. Of
these three points, the third is the hardest. Third, what account can the particularists give of our
ability to learn from our moral experience? The generalist can understand this as the extraction
of a principle from an earlier case, which we then apply to later ones. What can the particularists
offer as an
Alternative account? The third question asks us what relevance other cases do have to a new
case, if not the sort of relevance that the generalist supposes. The answer to this is that
experience of similar cases can tell us what sort of thing to look out for, and the sort of relevance
that a certain feature can have; in this way, our judgment in a new case can be informed, though
it is not forced or constrained, by our experience of similar cases in the past.
There is no need to suppose that the way in which this works is by the extraction of principles
from the earlier cases, which we then impose on the new case. Now our focus turns to reasons
to do with motivation. The general idea here is that a particularist morality is a relaxed morality:
without principles.
But there are various ways in which this thought can be built up. The first is just to say that
morality is in the business of imposing constraints on our choices. For there to be constraints,
there needs to be regulation, and regulation means rules, and rules mean principles. This,
however, is just wrong. There can be fully particular constraints on action, and the judgment that
this action would be wrong is surely just such a thing. Constraints do not need to be general
constraints, any more than reasons need to be general reasons.
Furthermore, the person of principle will be unbudgeable; having taken a stand on an issue, he
will not be moved from it. A particularists will not be like this. But here two things can be said.
First, nothing prevents a particularists from being of firm conviction case by case; an
unbudgeable conviction need not be founded on the principle, but simply on the nature of the
case.
Unbudgeability and principle have nothing essentially in common. Second, even if it were true that
a principled person will on some points be unbudgeable, the question is whether those points
are the right points, which might not be—that in being driven by principle, our principled person
will distort the relevance of relevant features by insisting on filtering them through principles, in a
way that is at odds with the falsehood of generalism. (akash Bhati notes)
Unbudgeability and principles go very badly together. Unbudgeability may be a virtue in its
place, but to be unbudgeable involved in distortion is not good either. However, there is the ever-
present danger of backsliding in ethics; we see the right, but somehow cannot bring ourselves to
do it. With principles, we have something capable of stiffening our waning resolve. Without
principles, we will fall short all too often. The point about backsliding does nothing to show that
the decision from which we might otherwise slide needs to have been made on principle. The
supposed need for principles comes after that decision, not before. Special pleading though
might be a point to worry about.
The special pleader is the person who makes exceptions in their own favor. It would not be right
for most people to do what I propose to do, but I am special; so I am left off the moral hook that
others are caught by.
This sort of special pleading occurs in the process of making our moral decision. With
backsliding, it is said ‘this is wrong but I am going to do it all the same’; with special pleading, it is
said ‘this would be wrong for others, but not for me’. The failing is that we are appealing to
principles to rectify a natural distortion in moral judgment. If such judgment focuses only on the
reasons present in the case before us, it is all too easy to twist those reasons to suit oneself. So
we use principles to stop ourselves from doing that. But really the remedy for poor moral
judgment is just better moral judgment.
There is only one real way to stop oneself from distorting things in one’s own favor, and that is to
scrutinize the reasons present in the case and see if really one is so different from others that
what would be required of them is not required of oneself. This method is not infallible, but then
neither was the appeal to principle. In the end, it is emphasized that moral agents, in the
decision-making process and moral judgment, are not only in need of using moral principles but
also must have sufficient awareness about truths and conditions. For this reason, both
approaches (particularism and generalism) have particular advantages that should be taken
into account by moral philosophers.
A.J. Ayer.
Introduction
Emotivism:
He argues that our moral inclinations and expressions are only reducible to emotional attitudes
of approval or disapproval. Moral statements and judgments have no meaning beyond that. -
Speculative knowledge is of two types: questions of empirical fact and questions of value
Empirical fact – for example, you are a detective and you can follow the trail of blood to find a
criminal. This means you are using speculative reason which relates to the empirical facts
about the world.
You can also test whether the content of your statement matches up with the world or not, this
can further be verified. Statements of value – for example, one says that one ought to help old
ladies cross the street.
Opponents of Ayer argue that these statements are empirical statements about the real world.
Ayer says that these statements cannot be verified because here we don’t know what ought
really means. - Moral statements have no empirical verifiability: We should be able to verify all
statements for truth or falsity, if they are to have any meaning. (akash Bhati notes)
Ayer wants to argue that value statements are empirical but their content doesn't correspond to
what most people think it does. For example, if I said, "you ought to help old ladies across the
street", we must ask, what does "ought" correspond to in the empirical world? What could I check
this against in the real world to verify whether the statement is true? One possible answer is that
these statements correspond to moral facts. But how do I measure a moral fact? Where are
they? Can I touch them? Feel them? Taste them? See them? Hear them? This is a problem. -
Pseudo concepts and indefinable in nature: Ayer argues that ethical terms are not really
propositions at all – they are ’pseudo concepts’ which do not add any factual content to
sentences in which they occur, but merely express the feelings of the utterer. They can thus be
neither true nor false.
Ayer pursues this conclusion by attempting to show that the alternative theories of meaning with
regard to ethical terms – naturalistic theories and what he calls the ’absolutist’ theory – are
incorrect. Then, Ayer deals with a major objection to his theory.
2. Four common subjects of ethical philosophy
(i) The exploration of the meaning of ethical terms;
(ii) propositions describing moral experience;
(iii) Commands to be moral; and
(iv)The study of actual moral judgments. Ayer thinks (ii) is not philosophy but rather psychology;
(iii) is merely telling us what to do, and thus does not belong in philosophy or science, and (iv),
though not strictly categorizable, is not philosophy to the extent that it does not deal with ethical
terms. So, only (i) is really ethical philosophy, and thus Ayer only needs to demonstrate that it does
not deal with factual content to show that value judgments in general are not factual.

3. Defusing the two strongest naturalist theories: utilitarianism and subjectivism. Utilitarianism- it
is not contradictory to say that it is sometimes wrong to perform an action which will yield the
greatest happiness or satisfaction. Further, it is not contradictory to say some pleasant things
are not good. So utilitarianism cannot be correct about the meaning of ethical terms.
Subjectivism- It cannot be correct to define right by the number of people who approve of it. It is
not contradictory for a person to say that he approves of a thing that is not good. Absolutist’
view- The view that ethical terms are indefinable and un analyzable.
4. Ayer agrees with the absolutist view that ethical terms are indefinable and unanalysable; he
thinks this is the case because they are pseudo concepts which have no real factual meaning.
Ayer gives an example: If a person says ’You acted wrongly in stealing that money,’ in reality, he
has merely said ’You stole that money.’ The two sentences yield the same factual content. The
former, merely adds a certain tone to the latter sentence. If the ethical judgement is generalized
into a principle, the proposition containing it is
neither true nor false. So, the absolutist view is wrong about why ethical terms are indefinable and
unanalysable, and Ayer’s radical empiricist theory is the only alternative.

5. Normative ethical and descriptive ethical principles Ayer considers utilitarianism and
subjectivism to be concerned with descriptive symbols. By rejecting both of these theories, he
limits his analysis to normative ethical symbols. By normative, he means that which expresses
an ethical judgement. It is only normative symbols and not descriptive ones that he takes to be
indefinable in factual terms

6. Intuitionist’s position They maintain that value statements cannot be empirically verified but
rather known by intuition. Ayer proposes that people may have different views with respect to
having different intuition. Thereby, he rejects this theory since it is completely in opposition to the
logical positivist theory. An appeal to intuition is unjustifiable.

7. Example of stealing mango “You acted wrongly in stealing that mango”, is generalised to be
stealing is wrong, this generalization only expresses a feeling of moral disapproval and
provides no factual meaning. Without meaning, no proposition is present. Without the
presence of a proposition, the statement can neither be truth nor false. It is nearly as if one
said stealing with a certain tone of voice or an exclamation Approval/disapproval- no meaning-
no proposition- no true/false (Akash Bhati notes)
8. Expression of feeling and assertion of feeling half cheat Moral judgements do not only
express emotions but are also employed to arouse emotions and to incite others to action.
Subjectivists hold the view that ethical statements actually assert the existence of a certain
feeling. Ayer contends that these statements are only expressions of emotion which make no
claim to the actual existence of such emotions. They might not always involve any assertion.
Ayer’s theory escapes the objection to the ordinary subjectivist theory as it does not require
the existence of feelings as a necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of an ethical
judgement. It implies that ethical judgements cannot have any validity.
9. Moore’s objection to subjectivism Moore says that if subjectivism were true, there could be no
disputation of values but in fact there is disputation about values all the time. Ayer rejects this
view by saying there is only disputation about facts but not value. Do some close examination.
One will always try to get their opponents on their side by giving facts. We try convincing them
and it is justified since we live in the same social order. But when we fail to come on the same
page, we finally resort to mere abuse.
10. Removal of ethics from philosophy Ethical concepts is pseudo concepts and therefore un
analyzable. There are concepts which come under the ambit of psychology or sociology only.
Thus, the study of ethics is not a subject for philosophy but rather one of the social sciences.
Motivational factors such as fear, either of an angry God or an angry society can be a primary
motivation for moral action. This is what gives rise to categorical imperative. A second motivation
of moral behavior is that a society promotes such a system for its ultimate benefit like
eudemonism and hedonism.
GE MOORE
GE Moore solely wants to deal with the object or idea which is held right or wrong, the word
which is generally used to stand for. He also wants to discover the nature of that object or idea
and starts with the definition of what is good. Moore argues that ‘good’ denotes something both
simple and indefinable. He does this by refuting the only possible alternatives as to how ‘good’
can be understood: that good is merely equivalent to some natural object, that good is a
complex whole which requires analysis, and that good does not exist.

Definition of good He believes it is good to be synthetic and not analytic in nature. He believes it
to be a simple notion, something that is indefinable, just like the colour yellow.
Definition of horse. Horse has certain properties and qualities that you can define because you
can perceive those things. You can also define a unicorn without having a perception of it.
Complex objects can be broken down into parts and they can be defined like that. *Yellow and
good are both notions which are simple and you cannot define it. They are not a complex idea
because they cannot be further broken down.
Three types of definitions Arbitrary verbal definition, verbal definition proper and composite
definition. Good is not indefinable in the first or second sense but in the third sense which is the
composed definition. In this sense, good is indefinable. Difference between the good and the
good in itself the good is definable yet the good itself is indefinable. The good can be equated to
be intelligence and pleasure
. Definition Good, then if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when
we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition in the most important sense of that
word. A definition includes parts which invariably compose a certain whole, and in this sense
good has no definition because it is simple and has no parts. It is one of those innumerable
objects which are themselves incapable of definition. The good word denotes a simple and
indefinable quality Definition- yellow and naturalistic fallacy We can define yellow by describing
its physical equivalent, light vibrations to the normal eyes for us to perceive it. But these light
vibrations are not themselves what we mean when we say yellow. They are not what we
perceive.
Yet a mistake of this simple kind has been made by the word “good”. It may be true that all
things which are good are also something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow
produce a certain kind of vibration in the light which is not yellow in itself. This is called the
naturalistic fallacy. Good-> pleasure Simple concept and idea I am pleased means: I feel
pleasure, does not mean I am pleasure. Pleasure is good but not the same thing Naturalistic
fallacy Orange is yellow. Can’t define O as Y. Orange is sweet and yellow, but yellow is not sweet.
Yellow is yellow, it is indefinable. Open question argument The aim of the open-question
argument is to show that good is the name of a simple, unanalysable quality. The argument
itself is simple enough: it consists of taking any proposed definition of good and turning it into a
question. For instance, if the proposed definition is “Good means whatever leads to the greatest
happiness of the greatest number,” then Moore would ask: “Is whatever leads to the greatest
happiness of the greatest number good? Moore is not concerned with whether the answer is yes
or no. His point is that, if the question is at all meaningful—if a negative answer is not plainly
self-contradictory—then the definition cannot be correct, for a definition is supposed to preserve
the meaning of the term defined. If it does, a question of the type Moore asks would seem
absurd to anyone who understands the meaning of the term. Compare, for example, “Do all
squares have four equal sides?” The open-question argument does show that naturalistic
definitions do not capture all that is ordinarily meant by the word good. It would still be open to a
would-be naturalist, however, to argue that, though such naturalistic definitions do not capture
all that is ordinarily meant by the word, this does not show that such definitions are wrong; it
shows only that the ordinary usage of
good and related terms is muddled and in need of revision. As to the utilitarian definition of good
in terms of pleasure, it is questionable whether Mill really intended to offer a definition in the
strict sense; he seems instead to have been more interested in offering a criterion by which one
could ascertain whether an action was good or bad. Good= desire
i) Object of desire is not pleasure. Position: psychological and pleasure is something which occurs
ii) A=Good -> pleasant. B=Good -> desired. Trying hard to pursue what it really means. Good-
no meaning/ ethics does not exist Everyone understands the question “is this good”.
Everyone understands the question “is this pleasurable/desirable/approvable”. Distinct meanings
are there.
Conclusion Meanwhile, Moore is sure that good exists because, so he says, when any lucid person
asks a question about what “ought” to be the case, they have a clear, unique object in their mind
which is in fact ‘good’ itself. Good is to be understood as a property of things; Moore sees it as
uncontroversial that everyone has such a notion in their head. He merely believes it is indefinable
(because it is simple)
Realism
Michael Smith-
Moral Realism is a metaethical position which maintains that there are moral facts
i.e. they are capable of being judged as true or false. We can say that taking
somebody’s life/torturing/stealing and so on are wrong; and that this is not just a
matter of personal opinion/choice.
Smith contrasts this ethical theory with the other theories nihilism and expressivism and
considers it to be the most plausible one.
First Smith explains the criterions that any moral theory is required to fulfill. Then he presents the
dilemma realism might face in fulfilling those criterions. And in the end he suggests the solutions
through which realism can be rescued.
PROBLEM In the "Realism" Michael Smith wants to clarify what is at stake in the debate over
realism and why it seems to him that realists’ stance is much more plausible then the other
alternative positions (irrealism or non-cognitivism or expressivism and moral nihilism or error
theory).It is commonplace that we appraise each other's attitude and behavior from the moral
point of view. We say, for example, that we did the right thing when we encountered a car accident
and saved the child from inside the burning car and we did the wrong thing when we haven't used
our cell phone at least to call for help.
Philosophers’ worry about moral appraisal can be seen by focusing on two distinct features of
moral practice: Practicality and objectivity of moral judgement.
The idea of moral objectivity is that it is a distinctive feature of engaging in moral practice i.e. the
participants are concerned to get the answers to moral questions correct. We seem to think that
moral questions have correct answers that these answers are made correct by objective moral
facts, that these facts are determined by circumstances, and that, by arguing, we can discover
what these facts are. Moral judgments are thought to be practical because they are thought to
motivate those who accept them. For example: when we think that we did the wrong thing not
giving famine relief we think that we failed to do something for which there was good reason and
this has motivational implications. AKASH BHATI
Standard picture of human psychology Beliefs and desires Beliefs: they represent the world the
way it is, and thus can be rationally criticized or assessable in terms of truth and falsehood
according to its correspondence with the facts. There are desires, states that purport to represent
how the world is to be and they cannot be rationally criticized or assessed in terms of truth and
falsehood. Desires are rationally neutral.
Ex: To make this clear Smith takes two situations.
In the first case on seeing a spider I over comes with a morbid fear and thus a desire never to be
near a spider.
In the second case Acquire the desire never to be near a spider because I come to believe falsely
that spiders gave unpleasant odor. In the first case there is no change in my desire mandated by
reason, so not subjected to rational criticism. But in the second case my desire never to benear a
spider is based on further desire and false belief and beliefs are subject to rational criticism.
OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL JUDGEMENT
Metaphysical Implication: - There are not just facts about the consequences of our actions
but there are facts about the rightness and wrongness of our actions having these
consequences. Psychological Implication: -
(1) When we make a moral judgement we express our belief about the way these moral facts are.
(2) People who have certain moral belief may happen to have a corresponding desire or they
may not. In either way they cannot be criticized.
PRACTICALITY OF MORAL JUDGEMENTS
Psychological Implication: - Since making a moral judgement entails having a certain desire, and
no recognition of a fact about the world could rationally compel us to have one desire rather than
other, this imply that our judgments are simply expressions of our desires.
Metaphysical Implication: -
There are no moral facts when we judge that it is right to give famine relief. We are not
responsible to any moral fact what we are doing in judging that simply expresses our desire. So it
is just like yelling "Hooray for giving famine relief". Through these implications we can see that
objectivity and practicality pull in quite opposite directions from each other. Objectivity enables
us to make sense of moral argument but do not tell how or why having a moral view is supposed
to have any link with what we are motivated to do. And practicality of moral judgments on the
other enables us to make a good sense of link between having a moral view and being
motivated but do not tell what a moral argument is supposed to be an argument about. Thus
idea of moral judgement seems to be incoherent
Irrealism After a debate between objectivity and practicality we see that the idea of moral
practice become incoherent, much as the moral nihilists also suggests. When we agonize over
our moral opinions, we seem to be agonizing over whether our reasons for our beliefs are good
enough reasons for believing what we believe to be true. And no irrealists surrogate seems up to
the task of explaining this appearance away.
The irrealists’ account of moral judgement as an expression of a desire simply fails to make
sense of moral reflection.Thus in that case moral argument begins to look massively self-
obsessed, in imposition of our wants on the other.
REALISM Moral realists admit the existence of moral facts, thus they therefore have noproblem
in explaining the objectivity of moral judgment and related phenomena of moral reflection and
moral argument.
PROBLEM FACED BY REALISM
It cannot explain the practicality of moral judgment. As there is no explanation of practicality of
moral judgment, realists have no plausible story about what kind of fact a moral fact is.If there is
no possible, story about what kind of fact a moral fact is then realists have no plausible story about
what moral reflection and moral arguments are about. Two competing conception of a moral fact
On the one hand, we have the idea of a moral fact as a fact about what we have reason to do or not
to do. On the other, we have the idea of moral fact in terms of what tends towards social stability
and unrest. If the question is which conception allows us to make the best sense of moral
argument? Then the answer is surely former. For, to the extent that moral argument does focus on
what tend towards social stability, it does so because social stability is deemed morally important,
an outcome we have reason to produce. But that is simply return to the original conception of a
moral fact in terms of what we have reason to do.
Fundamental relativity - Fundamental relativity in the reasons we have. What we have reason to
do is relative to what we would desire under certain idealized conditions of reflection, and this
may differ from person to person.
This kind of theory of realism can be criticized because it postulates the existence of a kind of
"moral fact" which is non-material and does not appear to be accessible to the scientific method.
Moral truths cannot be observed in the same way as material facts (which are objective), so it
seems odd to count them in the same category.
G.E MOORE –Subject matter of ethics
Moore says that the subject-matter of ethics is most often concerned with human conduct, and
with the question of what is good or bad, what is right or wrong. Thus, the fundamental question of
ethics is how ‘good’ is to be defined. Good is a moral property and moral properties are often
claimed to be sui generis which means, one of a kind. Moore argues that ‘good’ cannot be
defined, because it is a simple object of thought and not a complex object which can be divided
into parts. It is not analytic in nature, but synthetic.
Moore, being a non-naturalist, argues that ‘good’ denotes something both simple and
indefinable. He does this by refuting that good is merely equivalent to some natural object, such
as pleasure or intelligence. He states: ‘nobody can foist upon us, axioms like, “pleasure is the
only good” or that “The good is the desired” on the pretence that this is “the very meaning of the
word”.’ He points out that, good is a simple notion, just as yellow is a simple notion, just as you
cannot explain to anyone who does not already know, what yellow is, in a similar manner you
cannot explain what good is. Complex terms such as the idea of horse or the idea of chimera can
be defined, as they can be reduced to simpler terms but, but simple terms in itself are impossible
to define, like what is yellow or what is good. We will merely be asserting what ‘is’ the case,
rather than what ‘ought’ to be the case. We will only be giving a descriptive account of what is
good. Since normativity is an essential requirement of ethics, we cannot equate good with
natural objects. Akash Bhati
The natural object which we think of as good may be an object of experience, or it may be an
object which is inferred to exist as a metaphysical reality. Pleasure is an example of a natural
object which may be thought of as good. A Supreme Good may be thought to exist as a
metaphysical reality. The ‘naturalistic fallacy’ assumes that if we name various properties of
things which we believe to be good, we are actually defining ‘good.’Thus, 'Naturalism' does not
provide any logical reason for any ethical principle, because it falsely assumes that it has
defined what is good. For them good is pleasure, good is this good is that and can be
understood in degrees. If good is simply given another name, such as pleasure, or the object of
desire, we cannot prove that any such name is better than any other. But if we ultimately
recognize that good cannot be defined, then we realize that we must be more careful to find
logical reasons for ethical principles. For any definition we come up with, for ‘good,’ Moore asserts,
we can ask whether that definition is good or not. It quickly becomes clear, then, that ‘good’ is
something separate from any of these definitions. For example, if we define good as that which we
desire to desire, then when we ask “Is A good?” we are asking “Is A that which we desire to
desire?” It is clear that no one asks such things, and thus ‘good’ cannot be defined as a complex
whole.
Meanwhile, Moore is sure that good exists because, when any lucid person asks a question about
what “ought” to be the case, they have a clear, unique object in their mind, which is in fact ‘good’
itself. Moore sees it as uncontroversial that everyone has such a notion in their head. He merely
believes it is indefinable, because it is simple. Criticism Moore looks for a “Idea definition” of the
term good, which is not possible. Another criticism is called sense- reference objection, sense of
pleasure is different, sense of good is also different, but the reference for both of them is same.
Thus, Moore has a vey narrow understanding of naturalism. Constant appeal to open question
argument shows that Moore has already accepted that there is no solution. He seems to have
already established his conclusion and then he came up with his proposition. Further, Moore says
that when we equate good
with natural objects (a move he calls the ‘naturalistic fallacy’), it becomes impossible to refute
such a definition and we limit ourselves to a verbal discussion of good.
That is to say, when we discuss good, we will merely be discussing how people use the word good,
rather than what good actually is.
AYER- Emotivism:
The development of emotivism in moral philosophy was the result of logical positivism. Logical positivists
believed that the purpose of philosophy was not to search for any ultimate being, but to analyze the
language. Emotivism is called non-descriptive theory, because emotivism claims that moral statements do
not express propositions or any fact but emotional attitudes only. Emotivism was stated vividly by A.J Ayer
in his book “Language, Truth and Logic”, but its development owes more to C.L Stevenson in “Ethics and
Language”.
EMOTIVISM ACCORDING TO A.J AYER:
According to Ayer, only two types of sentences can be truly meaningful, experimental propositions and
analytical propositions. Experiential propositions are based on our experience and they can be proved
true or false only by experience. For example, the laptop is kept in the table, the phone is blue, etc.
Analytical propositions are meaningful only because of the specific definition and analysis of some
woods. Their meaning is not tested by experience but by the rules related to the definition of words like a
triangle has three angles.
Ayer divides “ the ordinary system of ethics” into four classes:
1) Propositions that express definitions of ethical terms or judgments’ about the legitimacy or
possibility of certain definitions.
2) Propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience and their causes.
3) Sentence which are exhortations to moral duty or virtue. It is a communication emphatically urging
someone to do something.
4) Propositions which actual ethical judgments. First class constitutes ethical philosophy, second class is
allocating to the science like sociology, psychology, etc. , third class is more command and forth class is
too concrete for ethical philosophy.
Ayer holds that moral judgments is neither an experimental nor an analytical. Because moral judgments
can neither prove the true or false on the basis of facts, nor can their meaning be determined by the
definition of the words used. According to Ayer, moral judgments is not only a factually meaningful
sentence, but is only a sentimental expression, so they cannot be proved true or untrue by logical
arguments. According to emotivists, moral statements are meaningless. Moral statements only express the
speaker’s feelings about the issue.
Emotions aren’t the sort of things that can be true or false. Emotivism is the view that moral claims are
neither statements of objective fact nor statements whose truth is subjective. Moral claims are
expressions of our emotional reactions.
For example, to say that ‘murder is wrong’ is not to put forward something as true, but rather to express
your disapproval of murderer. When a person calls a action inappropriate to wrong, he does not say
anything about that action but only expresses his moral disapproval about it, which cannot be true or false.
Ayer concludes that ethical concepts are “mere pseudo concepts”. According to Ayer, moral judgments
are actually emotive by nature.
Purpose of moral judgment is to expresses the particular feelings of the decision maker himself and
evokes those feelings in others. Moral judgments create some special feelings in others and motivate them
to do or not to do something. As a result, Ayer has considered moral judgment to be similar to commands.
Example: It is your duty to speak the truth. Ayer’s emotivism is different from subjectivism. According to
subjectivism moral judgments can be true or false because they describe the feeling of a person or a
community. It is clear that subjectivism considers moral judgment to be genuine and meaningful.
Akash Bhati
 These two questions are downloaded from google:
Q1. "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other
office than to serve and obey them." Explain. OR How does Hume distinguish reason and
passions? Why can reason not be the sole drive for an action and why can't it oppose passions?
On the idea of Reason over Passions: Hume begins by talking about the alleged superiority of reason over
passions in his times. It was claimed that reason ought to rule over the passions and must direct/subdue them.
This has been the foundation of majority of the philosophical theories and the idea of a priori/pure reason
over the a posteriori/experience has been seen as the right way of forming and practicing a philosophical
system. Reason was considered to be eternal, invariable and divine while passions were considered to be
blind, inconsistent and deceitful. Hume aims at proving the fallacy of the above idea by the following
arguments: A) Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will. B) Reason can never oppose
passion in directing the will. REASON ALONE CAN NEVER BE A MOTIVE TO ANY ACTION OF THE WILL
Two functions of understanding: A) Abstract relations of our ideas: From reason: demonstration/certainty
applies. B) Relations of objects: From experience: Probabilityapplies.
(a) cannot be the only reason for any of our actions. Why not? Because reason operates in the 'world of
ideas' while our will acts in the world of realities. While mathematics is useful for mechanical engineering
and arithematic for another profession, they do not have any purpose in themselves. They can only be used
for for some designed end or purpose. Hume says, 'Abstract or demonstrative reasoning, therefore, never
influences any of our actions, but only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects, which leads
us to be second operation of the understanding (b).'
1)Hume lays down the way in which we act, how the psychology of humans leads them to act in order to
argue for his point:
All actions are influenced and motivated by the passion to seek or avoid an object. This cause and effect
relation between an object and act is pointed to us by reason and experience. Hume says, '..and it is plain that,
as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connection (between cause object and effect- pleasure/pain),
it cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us.'.
1) But can't reason stop one from pursuing animpulse? A passion?
No. Only another impulse can stop one from being pursued. In this conflict of impulses, both impulses have
an 'original influence on the will' through the world of realities consisting of objects. Reason does not have
any original influence on the will but only provides direction for the object to be sought or avoided chosen
by passions. Hume says that we only mistakenly regard reason as the source of any action. He adds,
'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend toany other office
than to serve and obey them.' REASON CAN NEVER OPPOSE PASSION IN DIRECTING THE WILL:
(i) Passion-A passion is what Hume calls 'an original existence' or 'modification of existence'. It is not
a representative quality or a copy of any other existence or modification. Every emotion is connected to
an object, like thirst, sickness, anger and so on.
(ii) Reason cannot contradict the passion ever. Because if reason opposes passion, it would mean that
ideas which are copies are contradicting or opposing the emotion connected with the object of whose
idea they are. That is, reason and passion are two different genres at some level. The idea of the object,
world of ideas is ruled by reason while passion operates in world of object, realities. The object leads to a
particular emotion, but the idea has no power to shake such an emotion for it is only an idea of the object
(a copy representing the object in the world), not a contrary impulse/emotion that can affect the former
emotion. An impulse can only be cancelled or modified by another emotion, not by an idea alone.
Under what condition can reason be opposed to passion? Only that can be contrary to reason which
has reference to it. Only our judgments refer to reason. Thus, passions can be contrary to reason only when they are
accompanied by a judgment orreason.
(i) The two senses under which a passion/affection can be called unreasonable?
a) The presence of a passion on the assumption of non-existent objects.
b) When we choose a particular means which seems sufficient to reach the end we want but
in actuality, we have mistaken judgment of causes andeffects.
Thus, a passion must be accompanied by a false judgment in order for it to be unreasonable. In this
situation, it is not the passion that is unreasonable but it is the judgment.
(ii) What happens when we have a false judgment about a passion? That is, if I realize that what I
believe to be the effect of cause is not really the case or that I believe in the presence of non-existent
thing?
The longing for the passion ceases
(iii) But then why do we believe that reason rules over passion?
a)The root of this mistake lies in believing that '..actions of the mind are entirely the same'. Hume says
that actions of the mind are not differentiable to feeling and perception immediately. For instance, it seems
that reason operates without arising any emotion. So, people believe that every action of the mind which is calm and
peaceful is that of reason. However, there are passions which are calm and peaceful and do not produce much
emotion in the mind. Such passions are of two kinds: they might be natural instincts like benevolence, love of life,
kindness or 'the general appetite to good and aversion to evil'. Such passions are taken to arise from the reason,
because they are calm and peaceful when indeed they are passions. Reason only judges the truth or falsity but
passions have been confused with reason because the sensation of the calm passions and operations of reason are
identical. Talking about the mistaken view of metaphysicians about such an idea, Hume says that we have
thought that the will is directed by either the operations of reason or passions. He says that people
often act knowingly against their interest and so on. Thus, passion or reason alone does not direct their
will. Both principles direct the will together. The action chosen is decided on the basis of 'general
character or present disposition of the person'. 'Strength of mind' implies prevalence of calm passions
over violent.
 Q2. What does Hume believe is the source of moral distinction between good and evil? What do you
think about it? Reason is the slave of passions and cannot oppose them. It is only an instrument which allows
the pursuing of the passions. It can never be the motivation for an action alone. That which we call unreasonable
is simply false judgments made (regarding existence of object of passion or aboutthe means to reach the object),
which accompany the passions. Hume believe that the source of moral distinctions is sentiment of pleasure
and pain. We will be putting forward arguments in steps to prove his point:
1) MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE PERCEPTIONS: Nothing is present to the mind but its perceptions.
Perceptions include judging, hating, falling, hearing and so on. No action apart from perceptions is
reachable by the mind. Moral judgments are also perceptions. 'To approve of one character, to condemn
another, are only so many different perceptions.
2) MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE IDEAS, NOT IMPRESSIONS Perceptions are of two kinds:
impressions and ideas. What do we use (by means of which) we say something is a virtue or vice and so
on? Is it through ideas or impressions?
(i) Those who believe that there are absolute values emanating from reason, like deontological ethics of
Kant, hold that morality (much like truth) is recognized/discerned by ideas, by the juxtaposition and
comparison of ideas. Hume questions such a position and asks if it is possible to come to know the
difference between moral good and evil from reason alone or we need any other principle for this. Since
morality applies to the world of realities consisting of actions and objects, it is not possible that morality is
derived from reason alone as it has no such power as discussed earlier. 'Morals excite passions, and
produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality,
therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.'
(I) Hume goes on to say that as long as we hold the original conclusion that reason acts only as an
instrument in pursuing the passions and is inactive, it is not possible for it to be the motivation for
passions or actions and to be the basis of our morality. He adds that "an active principle (morality) can
never be founded on an inactive (reason) one and if reason be inactive in itself, it must remain so in all
its shapes and appearances, whether it exerts itself in natural or moral subjects, whether it considers the
powers of external bodies or the actions of rationalbeings.". REASON IS NOT SOURCE OF
RIGHT AND WRONG/GOOD AND EVIL:
(i) Reason cannot be the source of right and wrong: There are two ways in which reason has impact on
our actions: (i) When reason tells us of an object of passion that it exists; (ii) When reason works out the
relation of cause and effect between you and the object of your passion. Here, the judgment of reason that
such an object exists or in working out the connection can be false or erroneous. But such errors are not
what we call 'immorality'. No one takes guilt over these judgments. They are only 'mistake of fact'. Since
such mistakes are not deemed immoral and these two are the only functions of reason, it is not possible to
say that moral distinctions are derived from reason. Hume uses the example of a man seeking a fruit which
appears to be pleasant but in actuality, is horrifying (mistaking nature of object of passion) and goes on to
use insufficient means to achieve it (mistaking the connection between cause and effect). He points out that
neither of these are considered moral or immoral. Thus, one can never say that an action is virtuous or
vicious depending on its agreement or disagreement withreason Mistakes of right: We make mistakes of
fact. But do we also not make mistakes of right? Can this not be the source of immorality? Hume says that
this is impossible. Why? Because this presupposes a real right and wrong in morals, independent on the
judgments of reason. No action can be seen in isolation as is being done here. There is an antecedent to
such a mistake and it is not devoid of judgmental error. Thus, it cannot solely be the source of immorality.
False judgments by the observer: We make judgments after actions. These are effects of our actions. If
these judgments are false, then we can say that the actions were contrary to truth and reason. Such
judgment succeeding actions are not present in ourselves but actions only bring out judgments from others.
That is, if I do an action, it is possibel that it will bring about many false conclusions in others. For instance,
if someone sees me playing with a child in the garden of a house, s/he can think that it is my child, when
indeed it might be my uncle's. Here, I do not do anything immoral, I only follow the object of my passion,
the desire to play with the child and false conclusions are made by the see-r. At some level, we can say that
the falsehood of the judgment that the person made can be traced to the action of me playing with the child
 itself. But such an action is not the source of immorality and the judgment is also not immoral.
Conclusion: Thus the distinction between good and evil cannot be made by reason because such a
distinction influences our actions and reason alone cannot lead to actions.
ii)REFUTATION OF THE IDEA OF ABSOLUTE MORAL VALUES- A CHALLENEGE TO
THE RATIONALISTS:
'... to show that those eternal immutable fitnesses and unfitnesses of things cannot be defended by sound
philosophy..'
Our understanding has two functions: (i) Comparison of ideas; (ii) Inferring matter of fact. If thought and
understanding are the source of right and wrong, then right/wrong should be one of these: (i) Relations of
objects; (ii) Matter of fact discovered by our reasoning. It cannot be (ii) as no matter of fact can be
demonstrated. So philosophers believe that '..vice and virtue must consist in some relations '
There are four relations which have evidence and can be demonstrated: (i) Resemblance; (ii) Contrariety;
(iii) Degrees in quality; and (iv) Proportions in quantity and number. These belong to our actions, passions
and volitions, and not to the notion of good/bad or right/wrong. Hume says that there is no other relation
than these four and since morality does not fall into any of these, understanding is not a source of morality.
(iii)FEATURES OF MORALITY THAT ANY SYSTEM MUST FULFILL IN ORDER TO
EXPLAIN ITS SOURCE:
RATIONALIST EXPLANATION FOR SOURCE OF MORALITY FAILS TO MEET THE QUALIFICATIONS
Moral good and evil belong to actions of the mind and are a result of (derived from) our situation 'with
regard to external objects'. The relations from which we say that morality arises must take into account this
relation between internal actions and external objects. It must not simply be applicable to internal actions or
external objects. Why not? If we consider morality as only internal actions, then we can do crimes 'in
ourselves' and independent of our situation in the universe. If morality is only applied to external objects,
then even inanimate objects would be vicious or virtuous. Since rationalists believe that there is 'an
abstract rational difference between moral good and evil', 'a natural fitness and unfitness of things' and that
these relations are eternal and immutable, then these relations must be the same for every rational being.
The effect of such relations on rational beings must also be the same. Then, actions of God and us
human beings will not differ. Why same effects? Rationality is said to have the same operation in all and
thus, the effect of a relation of every rational being will be the same. . Hume points out that rationalists
must be able to point out the connection between the moral relations and the will. That is, one has to prove
that the effect of these eternal moral relations will be the same in every rational being, because '..it is one
thing to know virtue and another to conform the will to it.'. Objection by Hume. Hume points out that there is
infinite diversity in human nature and we cannot show any relation to produce an action with certainty. That is, there is
no connection of cause and effect in the understanding and actions performed. Only by experience can we connect the
understanding, actions and objects. Such a connection can never be derived from rationality alone, as said by rationalists.
For (a) there is no certain causality between understanding and actions; and (b) experience allows to form the connection
between one's understanding and action through the object ofpassion.
Conclusion: Hume says that the two conditions cannot be fulfilled by any rationalist explanation of the
source of morality. (i) It is not possible to show any relation a priori upon which the distinction between
good and bad is based; (ii) We also cannot prove a priori that there is an eternal and universal relation
between understanding of all rational creatures, objects and actions, that is, that there is no causal
connection between one's understanding and action without taking into account the object of one's passion.
Thus, it is only by experience that we can explain the arising of morality. To illustrate his point, Hume takes
an example of a moral action that is condemned by all. The injuring of one's parents. Why does everyone
react the same way to such an instance? Is it (i) Demonstrative reasoning; (ii) Internal sense or (iii) A
sentiment which makes us feel like this?
(i) NOT BY DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING-
The primary function of reason is to compare ideas and discover relations between them. If these are
discovered by reason, then the relation between ideas must be of same character in every rational being. If
we can show that the relations have different characters, then we can say that those characters of the
relations are not discovered by reason alone. The relation between idea of parricide (killing of parent by
 child) and action is not of same character all the time. For instance, a parent tree might be
destroyed by its child seed which overgrows it. But we do not see this the same way we see a
human child harming her/his parent. The relation is the same: the killing of parent by child but
the causes are different. That is, the human child has a will/choice to kill the parents while the
tree doesn't. Now, we do not see all cases of parricide the same way, even inter-human parricide
and this shows that the discovery of such a relation is not immoral in all cases and does not arise
from discovery by reason. To take another example: why is incest in human relations looked
down upon, while in animals it is considered alright? One might say that human beings have
faculty to discover the moral deformity of such action while animals don't. Hume replies that
before reason can discover the moral deformity of such an action, such a moral deformity must
exist independent of what we think of it. That is, incest must be morally deformative in itself. It
is object of reason (that is, reason only discovers and repeats an idea about incest which is innate
in the action) and not the effect of use of reason. Our reason is only superior in degree and
allows us to discover this moral deformity in incest. But if incest is inherently morally
deformative, then animals with sense, appetite and will must know it too. Why? Because
morality would not need reason to 'make' it but only to discover it. All animals must be following
morality as human beings do and the only difference should have been that the latter are aware
of such a morality.
(ii) NOT AN INTERNAL SENSE: THAT IS, NOT A MATTER OF FACT KNOWN
INTERNALLY
Hume asks if one can ever find any real existence of that which we call 'vice' or 'virtue'. Is there
anything that would make an action automatically virtuous or vicious? No. We only find
'passions, motives, volitions and thoughts'. Ther is no matter of fact. Thus, such moral distinctions
are not derived from reason.
(iii) A SENTIMENT: YES We only find a sentiment of disapproval towards these acitons in us but no
eternal value of viciousness or virtuosity directed towards them. Morality is the object of feeling and not of
reason. 'It lies in yourself, not in the object. CONCLUSION: When we say that an action is virtuous or
vicious, all we mean is that we have a feeling of blame or praise towards the action. Hume goes on to say
that we can compare vice and virtue to sounds, heat, cold, colors which are perceptions of the mind (not
qualities of external objects as previously believed). Thus, the notion of virtue and vice are simply the
product of our natural constitution and not existent in the action in itself. Whatever action reduces our
pleasure or makes us uneasy, we call vicious and that which increases them, we call virtues.
(ii) THE FINAL BLOW: The naturalistic fallacy from 'is'/'is not' to 'ought'/'ought not'
Hume points out that in observing and studying the moral systems, he came across a point where
they made an unjustified jump from 'is'/'is not' to 'ought'/'ought not'

AKASHBHATI METAETHICS NOTES

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