CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE
(FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS)

Atty. Ramon Esguerra

 REMEDIAL LAW TOPICS
1093 QUESTIONS (865 ESSAYS, 225 MCQS)

508
195
190
85
65
Total # of Questions - 1093 17
17
8
5
3

Civil Procedure, 508 Evidence, 195

Criminal Procedure, 190 Special Proceedings, 85
Jurisdiction, 65 Katarungang Pambarangay Law, 17
Summary Procedure, 17 General Principles, 8
Rule for Small Claims Cases, 5 Rules for Environmental Cases, 3
 Bail 34
Motion to quash 29
Prosecution of offenses 26
Trial 19
Prosecution of civil action 18
Search and seizure 15
Arrest 11
Preliminary investigation 10
Arraignment and plea 9
Judgment 7
Appeal 5
Rights of the accused 3
Total # of Questions - 190
Pre-trial 2
Provisional remedies 1
New trial or reconsideration 1
BAIL
RULE 114
 BAIL
NATURE
¢ Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
to guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under conditions hereinafter specified. (Rule
114, Sec. 1)
¢ Bail is a constitutional and statutory right.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
MELCHOR D. BRITA
G.R. NO. 191260, 24 NOVEMBER 2014

Brita asserts that the grant of bail bolsters his

claim that the evidence of the prosecution is not strong
enough to prove his guilt. The Court is not convinced.
"A grant of bail does not prevent the trial court, as the
trier of facts, from making a final assessment of the
evidence after full trial on the merits." It is not an
uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted
bail is convicted in due course.
 WHEN A MATTER OF RIGHT;
EXCEPTIONS

When bail is a matter of right (Rule 114, Sec. 4)

¢ Before or after conviction by MTC;

¢ Before conviction by RTC of all offenses

punishable by penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua.
When right to bail not available.
(1) When evidence of guilt is strong in capital
offenses or offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.
Except: When the accused charged with a capital
offense is a minor, he is entitled to bail
regardless of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong.
Capital Offense: An offense which under the law
existing at the time of commission and of the
application for admission to bail is punishable
by death. (Rule 114, Sec. 6)
• The capital nature of the offense is determined by the
penalty prescribed by law and not the one actually
imposed.
• If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding 6 years, the accused shall be denied bail or his
bail shall be cancelled upon showing by the prosecution
of the following:
• Recidivism, quasi-recidivism, or habitual delinquency
or commission of a crime aggravated by reiteration.
• Previously escaped legal confinement, evaded sentence
or violated bail condition w/o justification
• Commission of an offense while under probation, parole
or conditional pardon
• Probability of flight
• Undue risk that he may commit another crime during
pendency of appeal
(2) Right to bail is not available in the military.
(Comendador v. De Villa, 1991)

(3) After a judgment of conviction has become

final.
• If he applied for probation before finality, he
may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail
(Rule 114, Sec. 24).

(4) After the accused has commenced to serve

his sentence. (Rule 114, Sec. 24)
 PADUA V. PEOPLE
G.R. 220913, 4 FEBRUARY 2019
The Supreme Court held that the petitioners are
entitled to bail as a matter of right as they have not been
charged with a capital offense. Estafa, under Art. 315 of the
RPC, as amended by R.A. 10951, has an imposable penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, which is still
bailable.
Under the law, the total penalty which may be
imposed for estafa under Art. 315 of the RPC, as amended,
shall not exceed 20 years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be; hence, bailable before conviction by the
RTC.
 WHEN BAIL IS A MATTER OF
DISCRETION
¢ (a) Before conviction, in offenses punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction,

an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is
the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly
and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception
and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail.
 ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015

Enrile also claims that the Prosecution has failed to establish

that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the
Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that
his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he
should not be considered a flight risk taking into account
that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition,
and his social standing.

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the

accused from committing additional crimes, but is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court.
 ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015

Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life

imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial
discretion. For purposes of admission to bail, the determination
of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial
court. But such discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for
the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty.

Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail. Enrile has

averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely:
that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.
 ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015

In granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court

is guided by the purpose of bail, which is to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever
so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of
the Philippines’ responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to uphold
the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. Enrile’s social and
political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in
court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely.
 ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015

His personal disposition from the onset of his

indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. At an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during
the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight
risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s
judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which
the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
 ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless

of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying Enrile bail despite imperiling his health and life
would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial. It is relevant to observe that granting provisional
liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not
only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to
finish before a meaningful consideration of the application for
bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle
the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial.
(b) Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.

• “Conviction” refers to conviction by the trial court,

which has not become final, as the accused still
has the right to appeal. After conviction by the
trial court, the accused convicted of a capital
offense is no longer entitled to bail, and can only
be released when the conviction is reversed by
appellate court. (Art. 3, Sec. 13, Constitution)
 LEVISTE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010

Accused was convicted of the lesser crime of

homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of more than six (6) years. He appealed his
conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he
filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending
appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and
claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on
his part, which was denied by the Court of Appeals.

In dismissing petitioner’s petition, the Supreme

Court held that the discretionary nature of the grant of
bail pending appeal does not mean that bail should
 LEVISTE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010

automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances

mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court. The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the
accused applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years.
The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in
the said paragraph not present. The second scenario
contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances. In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound
judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to
grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal
may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent.
 LEVISTE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate

court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to
carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no
other option except to deny or revoke bail pending
appeal. Thus, a finding that none of the said
circumstances is present will not automatically result in
the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the
court to use the less stringent sound discretion
approach.
 REYES V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 237172, 18 SEPTEMBER 2019
Reyes and Baguyo were charged with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, when they
allegedly gave unwarranted benefits, preference, and
advantage to Olympic Mines in the renewal of its Small
Scale Mining Permit. Reyes was found guilty of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. Baguyo was
acquitted. The Sandiganbayan had previously granted
Reyes bail of P60,000.00 after his conviction. However, his
bail was cancelled on the following grounds: (1) he violated
the conditions of his bail without any justification after he
had failed to appear before the Sandiganbayan despite a
directive for him to do so; and (2) there was a probability of
flight.
 REYES V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 237172, 18 SEPTEMBER 2019
HELD:
The grant of bail after a judgment of conviction is
discretionary upon the courts. Bail may be denied if the courts
find any of the circumstances present in Rule 114, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court. Bail after conviction is not a matter of right.
In this case, the prosecution filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion to
cancel petitioner's bail, stating that petitioner was a flight risk
and that his counsel could not produce him before the
Sandiganbayan on several occasions. When petitioner fled the
country in 2011 after a warrant of arrest for murder had been
issued against him, he has been a proven flight risk. Given that,
petitioner had the propensity to evade the lawful orders of the
court even before he could be convicted of murder. Since
petitioner had already been convicted, the Sandiganbayan had to
be more circumspect in examining the condition for petitioner's
bail in this case. Hence, the cancellation of his bail was proper.
 HEARING OF APPLICATION FOR
BAIL IN CAPITAL OFFENSES
¢ Capital offense is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and of the
application for admission to bail may be punished
with death. The capital nature of an offense is
determined by the penalty prescribed by law, and not
by the penalty that may be imposed after trial and on
the basis of the evidence adduced and the presence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstance. (Rule 114,
Sec. 6)
• Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment is not bailable when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution (Rule 114, Sec. 7)

Duty of judge to conduct hearing

• Where the prosecution agrees with the accused’s
application for bail or foregoes the introduction of
evidence, the court must nonetheless set the
application for hearing.
• It is mandatory for the judge to conduct a hearing
and ask searching and clarificatory questions for the
purpose of determining the existence of strong
evidence against the accused; and the order, after
such hearing, should make a finding that the
evidence against the accused is strong.
Prosecution has burden of proof
• At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that evidence of guilt is strong. (Rule 114,
Sec. 8)
• “EVIDENCE OF GUILT” in the Constitution and the
Rules refers to finding of innocence or culpability,
regardless of the modifying circumstances.
 GUIDELINES IN FIXING THE
AMOUNT OF BAIL
(RULE 114, SEC.9)

¢ DOJ Department Circular No. 89, as amended,

otherwise known as the “2000 Bail Bond Guide”
provides standards and criteria for
recommendation of amount of bail to be granted,
if possible, and the rules for the computation of
bail.
 Guidelines in fixing the amount of bail
(Rule 114, Sec.9)

• Financial ability of the accused

• Nature and circumstances of the offense
• Penalty for the offense charged
• Character and reputation of the accused
• Age and health of the accused
• Probability of the accused appearing at the trial
• Forfeiture of other bail
• Fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested
• Pendency of other cases where the accused is on
bail.
 BAIL, WHEN NOT REQUIRED
¢ When a person has been in custody for a period equal
to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment
of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced,
he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to
the continuation of the trial thereof or proceedings on
appeal.

¢ If the maximum penalty is destierro, he shall be

released after 30 days of preventive imprisonment.
Note: No bail shall be required in prosecution of
offenses covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure,
except:

• When a warrant of arrest was issued for failure

of the accused to appear when so required
• When the accused is:
• A recidivist
• A fugitive from justice
• Charged with physical injuries
• Has no known residence (Secs. 10 and 12, Rules
on Summary Procedure)
 INCREASE OR REDUCTION
OF BAIL
The court may either increase or reduce the amount of
bail:
— After the accused is admitted to bail;
— Upon good cause.
— INCREASED bail: Accused may be committed to custody
if he does not give bail in the increased amount within a
reasonable period of time. (Rule 114, Sec. 20)
— REDUCED bail: Person in custody for period equal to or
more than minimum of principal penalty prescribed for
the offense charged may be released on a reduced bond.
(Rule 114, Sec. 16)
 FORFEITURE AND
CANCELLATION OF BAIL
Forfeiture of bail (Rule 114, Sec. 21)
¢ If the accused fails to appear in person as required by the
court, bondsmen are given 30 days within which to:
— Produce the body of principal or give reason for the non-
production. Bondsmen may:
¢ Arrest the accused;

• Cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any

other person of suitable age or discretion upon written
authority endorsed on a certified copy of the
undertaking;
• Explain why the accused failed to appear.
• If the bondsmen fail to do these, judgment is rendered against
them, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail.
• Bondsmen’s liability cannot mitigated or reduced, unless the
accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.
 FORFEITURE AND
CANCELLATION OF BAIL

Cancellation of bail (Rule 114, Sec. 22)

• Upon application of the bondsmen with due notice
to the prosecutor, bail may be cancelled upon:
(a) surrender of the accused has been surrendered of the
accused; or
(b) proof of his death.
• Upon acquittal of the accused;
• Upon the dismissal of the case; or
• Upon execution of judgment of conviction.
 APPLICATION NOT A BAR TO OBJECTIONS IN
ILLEGAL ARREST, LACK OF OR IRREGULAR
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
¢ Bail is no longer a waiver of objections (Rule 114, Sec. 26;
Yusop v. Sandiganbayan, 2001), provided that the proper
objections are timely raised (i.e., before accused enters a
plea). An application or an admission to bail shall NOT bar
the accused from challenging or questioning the:
— Validity of his arrest
— Legality of the arrest warrant
— Regularity of PI
— Absence of PI
¢ The court shall resolve the objections as early as practicable
but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
 A.M. NO.15-06-10-SC
“REVISED GUIDELINES FOR CONTINUOUS TRIAL OF
CRIMINAL CASES”

(a) Petition for Bail

Petition for bail filed after the filing of the

information shall be set for summary hearing after
arraignment and pre-trial. Testimony of a witness in
petition for bail may be in the form allowed by
subheading III, item no. 11, par. B (Form of Testimony) of
the Revised Guidelines, provided that the demeanor of
the witness is not essential in determining his or her
credibility. (Sec. III (10)(a), par. 1 of the 2017 Guidelines for
Continuous Trial)
 Petition for bail shall be heard and resolved within
a non-extendible period of thirty (3) calendar days from
date of the first hearing, except in drug cases which shall
be heard and resolved within twenty (20) calendar days,
without need of oral argument and submission of
memoranda, consistent with the summary nature of the
proceedings.

Motion for reconsideration on the resolution of

petition for bail shall be resolved within a non- extendible
period of ten (10) calendar days from date of submission
of the motion. (Sec. III (10)(a) of the 2017 Guidelines for
Continuous Trial)
(b) Evidence in petition for bail
The resolution of petition for bail shall be based
solely on the evidence presented during the bail
proceedings by the prosecution. The prosecution shall
present only pieces of evidence that are essential in
establishing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The
accused need not present evidence to contradict or rebut
the prosecution's evidence. (Sec. III (10)(b) of the 2017
Guidelines for Continuous Trial)

(c) Non-suspension of the presentation of evidence

The court shall not suspend the presentation of the
evidence in chief while awaiting resolution of the petition
for bail or the motion for reconsideration. (Sec. III (10)(c) of
the 2017 Guidelines for Continuous Trial)
 HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER & BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION WATCHLIST

¢ Bondsmen can prevent accused from leaving country by

arresting him or asking for him to be re-arrested by a
police officer upon written authority. (Rule 114, Sec. 23)
¢ The accused may be prohibited from the leaving country
during the pendency of his case (People v. Uy Tuising,
1935; Manotoc v. CA 1986). If the accused released on bail
attempts to depart from the Philippines without the
permission of the court where his cases is pending, he
may be re-arrested without warrant. (Rule 113, Sec. 23)
¢ Hold-Departure Orders: This may be issued only by the
RTCs in criminal cases within their exclusive
jurisdiction. (SC Circular No. 39-97, 19 June 1997)
 CRUZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 224974, 3 JULY 2017 (J. LEONEN)

Through his bondsman, Cruz filed a Motion to Release

Cash Bond. The RTC denied the Motion on the ground that the
case was dismissed through desistance and not through
acquittal. Cruz filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the Motion to Release Cash Bond.

The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the

Petition, stating that Cruz should have filed an appeal, instead of
a petition for certiorari, to question the denial of their Motion to
Release Cash Bond. The Court of Appeals further stated that it
could not treat the Petition for Certiorari as an appeal since the
period for appeal had lapsed before its filing.
 CRUZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 224974, 3 JULY 2017 (J. LEONEN)

The automatic cancellation of bail, however, does not

always result in the immediate release of the bail bond to the
accused. A cash bond, unlike a corporate surety or a property
bond, may be applied to fines and other costs determined by the
court. The excess shall be returned to the accused or to the
person who deposited the money on the accused's behalf.

There was no fine imposed on Cruz. The Order does not

specify any costs of court that he must answer for. There was,
thus, no lien on the bond that could prevent its immediate
release. Considering these circumstances, petitioners could not
have been faulted for filing a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals since there was no legal basis for the Regional
Trial Court to deny their Motion to Release Cash Bond.
 PEOPLE V. ESCOBAR
G.R. NO. 214300, 26 JULY 2017 (J. LEONEN)
Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res
judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in criminal
proceedings.

Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with

finality the dispute between the parties or their successors-in-
interest. Trinidad v. Marcelo declares that res judicata, as found
in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil
law and "has no bearing on criminal proceedings." Indeed,
while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be
applied in criminal cases, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. An interlocutory order
denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in
nature, does not give rise to res judicata
 PERSONAL COLLECTION DIRECT
SELLING, INC. V.
TERESITA L. CARANDANG
G.R. NO. 206958, 8 NOVEMBER 2017 (J. LEONEN)

Personal Collection’s right to due process was

not violated when it was not given notice or an
opportunity to be heard on the Motion to Release Cash
Bond. No notice or hearing was necessary since the bail
was automatically cancelled upon the dismissal of the
case. Petitioner's hypothetical objections to the Motion to
Release Cash Bond would have been superfluous and
unnecessary since the release of the cash bond to
Carandang was already warranted under the Rules of
Court.
 GENUINO ET. AL V. DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 197930, 17 APRIL 2018

The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the

DOJ Circular No. 41, otherwise known as the "Consolidated
Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation
of Hold Departure Orders, Watchlist Orders and Allow
Departure Orders." There is no law particularly providing
for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail the
exercise of the right to travel, in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health. Moreover, the DOJ
cannot issue DOJ Circular No. 41 under the guise of police
power. Lastly, apart from lack of legal basis, DOJ Circular
No. 41 also suffers from other serious infirmities that
render it invalid. The apparent vagueness of the circular as
to the distinction between a HDO and WLO is violative of
the due process clause.
 A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC
“RULES ON PRECAUTIONARY HOLD
DEPARTURE ORDER”
A precautionary hold departure order is an order in
writing issued by a court commanding the Bureau of Immigration
to prevent any attempt by a person suspected of a crime to depart.
From the Philippines. (Sec. 1)

A precautionary hold departure order shall not issue

except upon determination by the judge that probable cause
exists and there is a high probability that respondent will depart
from the Philippines to evade arrest and prosecution of crime
against him or her.

If the judge finds that probable cause exists and there is a

high probability that the respondent will depart, he or she shall
issue the PHDO and direct the Bureau of Immigration to hold and
prevent the departure of the respondent at any Philippine airport
or ports. Otherwise, the judge shall order the dismissal of the
application. (Sec. 4)
MOTION TO
QUASH
RULE 117
 MOTION TO QUASH

GROUNDS (RULE 117, SEC.1)

The following grounds for a motion to quash are
EXCLUSIVE (Galzote v. Briones and People, G.R. No. 164682,
14 September 2011):
1. Facts charged do not constitute an offense.
2. Court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
3. Court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person accused.
4. Officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.
5. That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.
6. More than one offense is charged. Exception: When a
single punishment for various offenses is prescribed
by law.
7. Criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
8. Averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification.
9. Accused has been previously convicted or acquitted
of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent (Double Jeopardy Rule)

Matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to

quash. (Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824, 8 December
2010)
 DIO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 208146, 8 June 2016 (J. Leonen)
Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for libel. Dio
moved to quash the Informations, arguing that the "facts charged
do not constitute an offense." Initially, the trial court denied Dio’s
motion. Thereafter, the trial court granted Dio's Motion for
Partial Reconsideration, for failure to allege the element of
publication in the information.
When a motion to quash an information is based on a
defect that may be cured by amendment, courts must provide
the prosecution with the opportunity to amend the information.
If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that
can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made. In this case, since Dio had not been
arraigned yet, Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies. If
the information is defective, the prosecution must be given the
opportunity to amend it before it may be quashed.
 AMPONGAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 234670-71, 14 August 2019

The Ombudsman filed two Informations with the

Sandiganbayan charging petitioner with (1) violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended; and (2) violation
of Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Informations for lack
of jurisdiction, claiming that since the Informations did not
allege any damage to the government or any bribery, or
that granting without admitting that the damage had been
suffered by the government, the Informations did not
allege that the government suffered any damage in excess
of One million pesos. Hence, the jurisdiction is vested with
the proper RTC.
REYES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 232678, 3 July 2019

The Supreme Court reiterated that under Section 6,

Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed. It is
imperative that an indictment fully states the elements of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed. In the context
of the aforementioned provision, the Supreme Court held that
the afore-quoted Information contains the recital of facts
necessary to constitute the crime charged.
 REYES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 232678, 3 July 2019

The Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan

has jurisdiction over the offenses allegedly committed by
petitioner. Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try
a criminal case is to be determined at the time of
the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense.

In this case, the Informations were filed on 14

July 2017 for petitioner's violations of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 and Article 171(2) of the Revised
Penal Code, allegedly committed on 3 November 2014
or sometime prior or subsequent thereto.
 REYES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 232678, 3 July 2019

While R.A. No. 10660, which took effect on 5

May 2015, is the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, such law is not applicable to
petitioner's cases. the transitory provision of R.A. No.
10660 that the amendment introduced regarding the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall apply to cases
arising from offenses committed after the effectivity of
the law. The alleged offenses were committed six
months before the effectivity of R.A. No. 10660.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion
when it denied the motion to quash the Informations
since R.A. No. 10660 finds no application to
petitioner's case.
 ANTONE v. BERONILLA
G.R. No. 183824, 8 December 2010

The trial court quashed the Information on the

ground that the elements of Bigamy were rendered
incomplete after respondent presented documents to
prove a fact, which the court believed would negate the
allegation in the Information that there was a first valid
marriage. The evidence presented showed that
respondent later obtained a judicial declaration of
nullity of the first union following the celebration of a
subsequent marriage.
 ANTONE v. BERONILLA
G.R. No. 183824, 8 December 2010

The trial court erred when it sustained respondent’s

motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those
alleged in the Information. A motion to quash an Information
is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which
are apparent in the face of the Information. This motion is “a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
Information,” for which reason, the court cannot consider
allegations contrary to those appearing on the face of the
Information. In this case, the documents showing that: (1) the
court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such
judgment has already become final and executory, and x x x
 ANTONE v. BERONILLA
G.R. No. 183824, 8 December 2010

duly registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval,

Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact
contrary to that alleged in the Information ˗ that a first valid
marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent
contracted a subsequent marriage. This should not have been
considered at all because matters of defense cannot be raised
in a motion to quash.

Fundamental test: The fundamental test in determining the

sufficiency of the material averments of an information is
whether the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essentials elements of the
crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde, or matters extrinsic
of the Information, are not to be considered. People v. Dumlao,
G.R. No. 168918, 2 March 2009.
 DISTINGUISHED FROM DEMURRER
TO EVIDENCE

Motion to Quash:
• Filed before accused enters plea
• Does not go into the merits of the case

Demurrer to Evidence:
• Filed after the prosecution has rested its case
• Based upon the inadequacy of evidence
adduced by the prosecution
 EFFECTS OF SUSTAINING THE
MOTION TO QUASH

Court order sustaining motion

General Rule: The court may order that another

complaint or information be filed (Rule 117, Sec. 5)

Exception: If the MTQ was based on the following:

• Criminal action or liability has been extinguished
• Double Jeopardy
PEOPLE v. AQUILINO ANDRADE, et al.
G.R. No. 187000, 24 November 2014

It is clearly provided by the Rules of Criminal

Procedure that if the motion to quash is based on an
alleged defect in the information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be
made. In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly
dismissed the cases without giving the prosecution an
opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations.
Thus, the RTC and the CA, by not giving the State the
opportunity to present its evidence in court or to amend
the Informations, have effectively curtailed the State's
right to due process.
Court order sustaining motion

• General Rule: If in custody, the accused shall not be

discharged, unless admitted to bail. The order must
state either the release of accused or cancellation of his
bond.

• Exception: If no order is made or if having been made,

no new information is filed within the time specified in
the order or within such further time as the court may
allow for good cause.

• Exception to the exception: If the accused is in custody

for another charge. (Rule 117, Sec. 5)
• As a rule, when a motion to quash in a criminal
case is denied, petitioner’s remedy is not certiorari,
but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating
the special defenses invoked in his motion to
quash. In the event that an adverse decision is
rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal
therefrom is the next appropriate legal step.
 REMEDIES OF THE PROSECUTION

General Rule: To amend the information in order to

correct the defects if the trial court makes the order, and
thereafter prosecute on the basis of the amended
information (Rule 117, Sec. 4)

Exception: Prosecution is precluded where the ground

for the quashal would bar another prosecution for the
same offense.
 EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT
SUSTAINING THE MOTION IS NOT A
BAR TO ANOTHER PROSECUTION

Sustaining the MTQ will not be a bar to another

prosecution for the same offense (Rule 117, Sec.
6), except:
• If the ground for the quashal is either:
• The criminal action or liability has been
extinguished. (Rule 117, Sec.3[g])
• The accused has been previously convicted, or in
jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the
offense charged. (Rule 117, Sec.3[i])
 DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Rule on Double Jeopardy
• When a person is charged with an offense and the
case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or
in any other manner without the express consent of
the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with
the same or identical offense. (Rule 117, Sec. 3i)

Kinds of Double Jeopardy (Art. 3, Sec. 21, Constitution)

• No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the
SAME OFFENSE.
• When an act punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the SAME ACT.
Requisites for 1st Jeopardy to Attach
• A valid complaint or information - sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction;
• The court had jurisdiction;
• A valid arraignment;
• A valid plea; and
• Conviction, acquittal of the accused OR dismissal of
the case, without accused’s express consent

Previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence

Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries bars a second
prosecution for Reckless Imprudence resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property.
 JASON IVLER v. JUDGE MODESTO-SAN PEDRO
G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010

Petitioner assails the RTC’s Orders affirming sub-

silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the
double jeopardy clause to bar a second prosecution for
Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property, considering accused’s previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
arising from the same incident.

The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner would be

placed in double jeopardy in this case. Reason and
precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
 JASON IVLER v. JUDGE MODESTO-SAN PEDRO
G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010

acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the

accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
The essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determine the penalty; it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. As the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and
cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
 PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL

• Definition: A case is dismissed without prejudice to

its being refilled or revived.

• General Rule: Cases are provisionally dismissed

where there has already been arraignment and
accused consented to provisional dismissal, with
notice to the offended party.

• Exception: If dismissal was due to a demurrer to

evidence.
When dismissal becomes permanent:
• The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of
any amount, or both, shall become permanent one
(1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived (Rule 117, Sec.
8).
How to revive a case
• Refiling of the information.
• Filing of a new information for the same offense or
one necessarily included in the original offense
charged.

Periods of reinstatement or revival

• Within 1 year for offenses punishable by
imprisonment of not more than 6 years.
• Within 2 years for offenses punishable by
imprisonment exceeding 6 years.
Requisite procedure (Rule 117, Sec.8):
• Motion can be made:
• By the prosecution, with the express conformity
of the accused
• By the accused
• By both

Requisites for Provisional Dismissal:

• Consent of the prosecutor;
• Consent of the accused; and
• Notice to the offended party
• N.B.: It bears emphasizing that an oral order
has no juridical existence until and unless it
had been reduced into writing and
promulgated, i.e. delivered by the judge to
the clerk of court for filing, release to the
parties and implementation. Thus, a
provisional dismissal, which was declared in
open court, but was never reduced into
writing, has no juridical existence. (People v.
Salak, G.R. No. 181249, 14 March 2011)
 REMEDY AGAINST THE DENIAL OF A
MOTION TO QUASH

GODOFREDO ENRILE VS. HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS

G.R. No. 166414, 22 October 2014
The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the
movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be
adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error
the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order,
is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari
because of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law.
(However, in GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO VS. PEOPLE G.R. No.
220598, 19 July 2016, the Supreme Court, through Justice Bersamin, ruled
that when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the issuance of an interlocutory order, the remedy of
certiorari is available.)
PROSECUTION
OF OFFENSES
RULE 110
 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
¢ CRIMINAL ACTIONS, HOW INSTITUTED
— Commenced by the filing of the complaint/information. (Rule 110,
Sec.1)
— NOTE: This tolls the running of the prescriptive period of the offense.

¢ WHO MAY FILE CRIMES THAT CANNOT BE PROSECUTED

DE OFFICIO
— All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor. (Rule 110, Sec.5)
— In cases of public prosecutor’s heavy work schedule or in the event of
lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized
to prosecute the case.
Cases Which Cannot Be Prosecuted De Officio
— Adultery/concubinage
— Seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness
— Defamation which consists of the imputation of any of the
foregoing offenses

Offended parties who can file a complaint

— In adultery and concubinage – the offended spouse. Both
guilty parties should be included if both are still alive.
— In oral defamation – only by the offended party.
 PAVLOW V. MENDENILLA
G.R. NO. 181489, 19 APRIL 2017 (J. LEONEN)
The mother of a victim of acts of violence against
women and their children is expressly given personality to file
a petition for the issuance of a protection order by Section 9(b)
of the Anti-VAWC Law. However, the right of a mother and of
other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file such a petition is
suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself.
Nevertheless, in this case, the mother filed her petition
after her daughter's complaint-affidavit had already been
dismissed.
The filing of daughter’s complaint-affidavit did not even
commence proceedings on her own petition for the issuance of
a protection order. Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at
the level of the prosecutor, does not form part of trial. It is not a
judicial proceeding that leads to the issuance of a protection
order. Thus, the pendency and subsequent dismissal of
daughter’s Complaint-Affidavit did not engender the risk of
either litis pendentia or res judicata, which would serve the
basis of a finding of forum shopping by her mother.
 CONTROL OF PROSECUTION

¢ a. Prior to filing of a case:

— The public prosecutor has the discretion whether or not to file
a criminal action.

¢ b. After a case is filed in court:

— It is the prosecutor’s duty, regardless of his personal conviction
or opinion, to proceed with the presentation of the evidence to
enable the court to arrive at its own judgment as to the
accused’s guilt; in this situation, the public prosecutor has no
discretion to dismiss the action without the court’s approval.
 CONTROL OF PROSECUTION

¢ b. After a case is filed in court:

— While the Secretary of Justice has the authority to review the
acts of his subordinates in criminal cases, the court always has
the discretion to try a motion to dismiss which the prosecution
may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed
decision. (Roberts v CA, G.R. No. 113930)
— The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently asses
the merits of the case.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
JOSE C. GO, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 201644, 24 SEPTEMBER 2014
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the criminal cases,
ruling that the Go and Dela Rosa’s right to speedy trial was
violated as they were compelled to wait for five (5) years
without the prosecution completing its presentation of evidence
due to its neglect. In their petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals, respondents failed to implead the People of the
Philippines as a party thereto.
The petition for certiorari was obviously defective. As
provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under
the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it
behooved the respondents herein to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondent in the case before the Court of
Appeals to enable the Solicitor General to comment on the
petition.
 JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORP.
V. JUDGE LIDUA, SR.
G.R. NO. 169588, 7 OCTOBER 2013 (J. LEONEN)
Petitioner Jadewell, thru its General Manager Norina C. Tan,
Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan, alleged in their affidavit-
complaint that on 7 May 2003, herein respondents and 2 John Does
forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of Walan’s Nissan Cefiro car,
which was considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed
parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by
Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents
took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and
value which is P26,250.00. The incident resulted in two cases filed by
petitioner and respondents against each other. Jadewell filed two
Robbery cases against respondents.
Jadwell then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
arguing that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive
period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed. The RTC
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.
 JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORP. V.
JUDGE LIDUA, SR.
G.R. NO. 169588, 7 OCTOBER 2013 (J. LEONEN)
The mere filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor on 23 May 2003 for violation of an ordinance did not toll the
prescription period. The offense was committed on 7 May 2003 and was
discovered by the attendants of Jadewell on the same day. These actions
effectively commenced the running of the prescription period. The
procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.
Clearly, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged involved is an ordinance.
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this
already has the effect of tolling the prescription period of the crime
charged. The case of People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia
v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. The
Pangilinan case referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well.
However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special
laws but not to ordinances.
 SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION
¢ A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party,
any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated. (Rule 110, Sec.3)
¢ An information is an accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and
filed with the court. (Rule, 110, Sec.4)
¢ A complaint or information is sufficient if it states:
— the name of the accused;
— the designation of the offense given by the statute;
— the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
— the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and
— the place where the offense was committed.
 SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION
¢ When an offense is committed by more than one person,
all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information. (Rule 110, Sec.6)

¢ An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the

elements of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of
a crime is not an essential element of it. Thus, in a
prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to
be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time
of its commission. The failure to specify the exact date
or time when it was committed does not ipso facto
make the information defective on its face. (People v.
Dion, G.R. No. 181035, 4 July 2011)
 LITO CORPUZ V. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 180016, 29 APRIL 2014
The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received
to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence
is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion
of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter
fatally defective. Therefore, Corpuz’s argument that the
Information filed against him is formally defective because
the Information does not contain the period when the pieces
of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date
when the crime occurred was different from the one testified
to by private complainant Tangcoy is untenable.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DANILO
FELICIANO, JR. ET AL.
G.R. NO. 196735, 5 MAY 2014
The inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or
other forms of disguise" in the information does not
violate the constitutional rights of appellants Feliciano.
Every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be
stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating
circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the
prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of
"wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the
information in order for all the evidence, introduced to
that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA V.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 183652, 25 FEBRUARY 2015
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only
one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The rationale behind this
rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the
accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable
him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap
upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his
defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to
quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply
because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of
the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to
have waived their right to question the same. Also, where the
allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different
counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the
instant case, there is no duplicity to speak of.
 DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE
¢ The acts and omissions constituting the offense must be
alleged.

¢ Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be

specified.(Rule 110, Sec. 8)

¢ In case of conflict between the designation of the crime

and the recital of facts constituting the offense, the latter
prevails.

¢ Minority: As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of

rape, the concurrence of the victim's minority and her
relationship to the accused-appellant must be both
alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People v.
Albalate, Jr. G.R. No. 174480, December 18, 2009)
 DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE
¢ A mere statement or a conclusion of law is
insufficient to convict an accused. (People v.
Pangilinan, G.R. No. 183090, 14 November 2011)
— Thus, an information charging sexual abuse, stating that
accused “with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally commit acts of lasciviousness”
upon the person of the offended party is insufficient as it
does not contain the essential facts constituting the offense,
but a statement of a conclusion of law. (People v. Pangilinan,
supra.).
 DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE
¢ There is no substitution of the information where the
amendment of the information consists of the
allegation of a different mode by which a certain
crime is committed, i.e. when an information
charging an accused with violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019 was modified to change the specification as
to the mode of commission thereof. (Saludaga v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 184537, 23 April 2010)
 PENDOY V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 228223, 10 JUNE 2019

The accused was indicted for the crime of rape. The

information alleged that accused, with the use of force or
intimidation, made AAA, a 16-year-old minor lie down on the
kitchen floor, remove her panty and insert his finger into her
vagina. Thereafter, accused placed himself on top of her and
inserted his erect penis into her vagina, thereby succeeding in
having carnal knowledge with the said victim without her
consent and against her will. Upon arraignment, the accused
pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The Supreme Court held that it was proper that the

accused was convicted of both rape by sexual intercourse and
rape through sexual intercourse in the same Information.
 PENDOY V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 228223, 10 JUNE 2019
In the case at bench, the evidence bears out that what
was proven by the People beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal
Case No. 1089 was the felonious coitus committed by the
accused against AAA on 24 January 2006. Likewise borne by
the records is the insertion of accused's finger into AAA' s
vagina. AAA testified that before the accused mounted on her
and inserted his penis into her private part, he first inserted his
finger into her genital. Inasmuch as the accused failed to object
and file a motion to quash anchored on the ground that more
than one offense is charged before he pleaded thereto, the effect
is that he is deemed to have waived such defect and he can be
convicted of the crimes of rape and rape as an act of sexual
assault. Jurisprudence elucidates that an offender may be
convicted for both rape and rape as an act of sexual assault for
one incident provided that these crimes were properly alleged
in the information and proven during trial.
 SALUDAGA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 184537, 23 April 2010
An Information charging petitioners Saludaga
and SPO2 Genio for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 by causing undue injury to the government was
dismissed “for failure of the prosecution to allege and
prove the amount of actual damages caused the
government, an essential element of the crime charged.”
The Office of the Special prosecutor re-filed the
information, charging the petitioners for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by giving unwarranted
benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the
government. The issue is whether or not there was a
substitution of the information that should have
warranted the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
 SALUDAGA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 184537, 23 April 2010
There is no substituted information here. The Information
dated August 17, 2007 charged the same offense, that is, violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Only the mode of commission was
modified. While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of
committing the offense, thus: (a) by causing any undue injury to any
party, including the government; or (b) by giving any private party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does not mean
that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may
be charged under either mode or under both should both modes
concur.
Petitioners’ reliance on the case of Teehankee v. Madayag, ruling
that, “in substitution of information another preliminary investigation
is entailed and that the accused has to plead anew to the new
information” is not applicable to the present case because, as already
stated, there is no substitution of information there being no change
in the nature of the offense charged.
 SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 17575051, 2 APRIL 2014
Moleta filed a case against Consigna, the Municipal
Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, for violation
of AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices and Estafa before the
Sandiganbayan. Cosigna argued that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction because the crime as charged did not
specify the provision of law allegedly violated, i.e., the
specific type of Estafa. On that issue, the Supreme Court
ruled that what is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charge or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited.
 CANCERAN V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 206442, 1 JULY 2015
In the subject information, the designation of the
prosecutor of the offense, which was “Frustrated Theft,” may be
just his conclusion. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the
charge was qualified by the additional allegation, “but,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause
independent of accused’s will, that is, they were discovered by
the employees of Ororama Mega Center who prevented them
from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds White
Beauty Cream, x x x.” This averment, which could also be
deemed by some as a mere conclusion, rendered the charge
nebulous. There being an uncertainty, the Supreme Court
resolved the doubt in favor of the accused, Canceran, and held
that he was not properly informed that the charge against him
was consummated theft.
 DUNGO, ET AL. V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 209464, 1 JULY 2015
The Amended Information reads:

That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of 14 January 2006,

at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, during a planned initiation rite and
being then officers and members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity
and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty
other members and officers, whose identity is not yet known,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA
y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his
admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical
harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the victim.
 DUNGO, ET AL. V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 209464, 1 JULY 2015

Petitioners claim that the amended information avers a

criminal charge of hazing by actual participation, but the only
offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement.
Their contention must fail. It is evident that the Information
need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
The test is whether it enables a person of common
understanding to know the charge against him, and the court
to render judgment properly. The “planned initiation rite” as
stated in the information included the act of inducing
Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event
can be understood to have different phases. Likewise, the
hazing activity had different stages and the perpetrators had
different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to
the neophyte.
 DUNGO, ET AL. V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 209464, 1 JULY 2015

One of the roles of the petitioners in the hazing activity

was to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo and Sibal not only
induced Villanueva to be present at the resort, but they actually
brought him there. They fulfilled their roles in the planned
hazing rite which eventually led to the death of Villanueva. The
hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts
of the petitioners that induced the victim to be present. Secrecy
and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of
hazing. To require the prosecutor to indicate every step of the
planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the
criminal case, when details of the clandestine hazing are almost
nil, would be an arduous task, if not downright impossible. The
law does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad impossibilia).
 DUNGO, ET AL. V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 209464, 1 JULY 2015

The proper approach would be to require the

prosecution to state every element of the crime of hazing, the
offenders, and the accompanying circumstances in the
planned initiation activity, which has been satisfied in the
present case. Accordingly, the amended information
sufficiently informed the petitioners that they were being
criminally charged for their roles in the planned initiation
rite.
 CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION
¢ Allegations required to safeguard the right to be
informed
— Allegations must be in ordinary or concise language, sufficient
to enable person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged.
— This must be done both for the offense charged and the
circumstances involved in its commission. (Rule 110, Sec. 9)
— The prosecutor’s characterization of the crime is immaterial
and purposeless. The facts stated in the body of the
complaint/information determine the crime of which the
accused stands charged and for which he must be tried.
— Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged.
— Aggravating circumstances must be specified in the
information, otherwise they are not to be considered even if
proven during the trial. (Rule 110, Sec. 8)
 DUPLICITY OF THE OFFENSE
General Rule:
— The information must charge only one offense.

Exception:
— When the law prescribes a single punishment for various
offenses.
— Remedy of accused when the information charges more
than one offense: file a Motion to Quash.
— Section 3, Rule 120 states that "[w]hen two or more offenses
are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved,
and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out
separately the findings of fact and law in each offense."
 AMENDMENT OR SUBSTITUTION OF
COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
Amendments in form and substance before plea

General Rule:
— It must be made before the accused enters his plea.

Exception:
— If the amendment downgrades the nature of the offense charged in,
or excludes any accused from, the complaint/information, it can be
made only upon motion of the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court.
— Substantial amendments after plea are proscribed. Unlike formal
amendments, substantial amendments cannot be introduced after
plea. (Leviste v. Almeda, 2010)
— Formal amendments may be made after plea and during trial; but it
should not cause prejudice to the rights of the accused.
 AMENDMENT V. SUBSTITUTION
Amendment
¢ formal or substantial changes;
¢ can be effected without leave of court;
¢ if only as to form, no need for another PI and plea;

¢ the amended information refers to the same offense

charged in the original information or to an offense
included in the original charge;
¢ accused can invoke double jeopardy.
 AMENDMENT V. SUBSTITUTION

Substitution
¢ involves a substantial change from the original charge;
¢ must be with leave of court;

¢ another preliminary investigation is entailed and the

accused has to plead anew to the new information; and
¢ requires or presupposes that the new information
involves a different offense which does not include or is
not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the
accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
 DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 179962, 11 JUNE 2014
Dr. Joel Mendez was charged with tax evasion. However,
the prosecutor filed an amended complaint which changed the
date of the commission of the offense. The Court ruled that
amendments that do not charge another offense different from
that charged in the original one; or do not alter the prosecution's
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered
merely as formal amendments. The test on whether a defendant
is prejudiced by the amendment of an information pertains to
the availability of the same defense and evidence that the
accused previously had under the original information. In the
this case, this thread remained consistently under the amended
information, alleging the petitioner’s failure to file his return and
consequently to pay the correct amount of taxes. Accordingly,
the petitioner could not have been surprised at all.
 VENUE OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS
Venue - the place where action is to be instituted.

Venue of criminal actions shall be:

— in the court of the municipality or territory
— where offense was committed; or
— where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

How venue or jurisdiction is determined

— Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential
element jurisdiction. (Macasaet v. People, 2005)
— For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. (Uy v. CA, 1997)
 VENUE OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS
When crime is continuing
— A person charged with transitory crime maybe validly tried in
any municipality or province where the offense was in part
committed. (People v. Gorospe, 1984)

Libel cases
— If a private individual, action may also be filed in the province
where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the defamatory article was printed and first
published. If a public officer, action may be filed in the court of
the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense. (Art 360, RPC) (Bonifacio v. RTC of
Makati, 2010)
 VENUE OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS
Offense committed on railroad
— Action may be instituted and filed in the court of the first port of
entry or any municipality or territory where said train, aircraft or
vehicle passed thru, including place of departure or arrival. (Rule
110, Sec.15[b])

Offense committed on a vessel

— Action may be instituted and filed in the court of the first port of
entry or any municipality or territory where the vessel passed
during such voyage, subject to generally accepted principles of
international law. (Rule 110, Sec. 15[c])

Offense committed outside the Philippines

— Cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed.
(Rule 110, Sec.15[d])
 A.M. NO. 17-11-03-SC
“RULE ON CYBERCRIME WARRANTS”

e) The criminal actions for violation of Section 4 (Cybercrime

offenses) and/or Section 5 (Other offenses), Chapter II of R.A.
No. 10175, shall be filed before the designated cybercrime court
of the province or city where the offense or any of its elements
is committed, or where any part of the computer system used is
situated, or where any of the damage caused to a natural or
juridical person took place: Provided, that the court where the
criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the other courts. All other crimes defined and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and other
special laws, committed by, through, and with the use of
information and convergence technology, as provided under
Section 6 Chapter II of R.A. No. 10175, shall be filed before the
regular or other specialized regional trial courts, as the case
may be. (Section 2.1. of A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC).
 A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC
“2019 SUPREME COURT REVISED RULE ON
CHILDREN IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW”

Subject to the provisions of this section Section 15,

Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, any
criminal or civil action involving a child shall be instituted
and tried in the appropriate court nearest the place where
the offense was committed or where any of its essential
elements occurred. (Section 24 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC).
 CABRAL V. BRACAMONTE
G.R. NO. 233174, 23 JANUARY 2019
Respondent Bracamonte and petitioner Cabral
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in Makati
City for the purchase of shares of stock in two
corporations. Simultaneous with the signing of the MOA,
Bracamonte issued a postdated check to Cabral. When the
check was presented for payment, however, the drawee
bank in Makati City dishonored it for lack of sufficient
funds. For failure to settle the obligation, Cabral instituted
a complaint for estafa against Bracamonte in Paranaque
City.
 CABRAL V. BRACAMONTE
G.R. NO. 233174, 23 JANUARY 2019
Bracamonte moved to quash the Information on the
ground that the venue was improperly laid in Paranaque City,
since the postdated ·check was delivered and dishonored in
Makati City. The RTC denied the Motion to Quash, holding that
it has jurisdiction over the case because Bracamonte employed
fraudulent acts against Cabral in Paranaque City prior to the
issuance of the postdated check. The CA set aside the RTC
decision and dismissed the Information. The Supreme Court
affirmed the CA.
It was merely stated in the Information, and alleged by
Cabral in his complaint, that the crime of estafa was committed
in Paranaque City because it was in Paranaque where he was
convinced to sell the subject shares of stock. Apart from said
allegation, however, Cabral did not present his evidence that
would support or corroborate his assertion.
 CABRAL v. BRACAMONTE
G.R. No. 233174, 23 January 2019

On the contrary, and as the appellate court pointed out, what

were actually proven by the evidence on record are the following: (1)
Cabral and Bracamonte executed a MOA in Makati City; (2)
Bracamonte issued and delivered a postdated check in Makati City
simultaneous to the signing of the agreement; (3) the check was
presented for payment and was subsequently dishonored in Makati
City. As such, the Court does not see why Cabral did not file the
complaint with the Makati City trial court. Not only were the MOA
and subject check executed, delivered, and dishonored in Makati City,
it was even expressly stipulated in their agreement that the parties
chose Makati City as venue for any action arising from the MOA
because it was executed there. To repeat, case law provides that in this
form of estafa, it is not the non-payment of a debt which is made
punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check.
 INTERVENTION OF OFFENDED
PARTY
General Rule:
— An offended party has the right to intervene in the prosecution
of a crime. (Rule 110, Sec. 16)

Exceptions:
— Where, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and
punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private
offended party.
— Where, from the nature of the offense, the private offended
party is entitled to civil indemnity arising therefrom but he
waived the same or has expressly reserved his right to institute
a separate civil action or he has already instituted such action.
— Offended party has already instituted action.
 LEONARDO A. VILLALON, ET AL. V.
AMELIA CHAN
G.R. NO. 196508, 24 SEPTEMBER 2014

Sec. 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure expressly allows an offended party to intervene
by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the
recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
is instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall
be deemed instituted with the criminal action, except
when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
 LEONARDO A. VILLALON, ET AL. V. AMELIA CHAN
G.R. NO. 196508, 24 SEPTEMBER 2014

In this case, the Court of Appeals found no such

waiver from or reservation made by Chan. The fact that
Chan, who was already based abroad, had secured the
services of an attorney in the Philippines reveals her
willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of
the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the
petitioners. Thus, the trial court should have allowed, and
should not have disqualified, Atty. Atencia from
intervening in the bigamy case as Chan, being the offended
party, is afforded by law the right to participate through
counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect to the
civil aspect of the case
TRIAL
RULE 119
 TRIAL

INSTANCES WHEN PRESENCE OF ACCUSED

IS REQUIRED BY LAW

Presence is mandatory:
¢ For purposes of identification;
¢ At arraignment; (Rule 116, Sec. 1[b])

¢ At the promulgation of judgment;

¢ Exception: If the conviction is for a light offense.
(Rule 120, Sec. 6)
• Examination of prosecution witness (Rule 119,
Sec. 15)
• When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for
the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at
the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave
the Philippines with no definite date of returning,
he may forthwith be conditionally examined
before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in
his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him, shall be
conducted in the same manner as an examination
at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to
attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be
admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
 REQUISITE BEFORE TRIAL CAN BE
SUSPENDED ON ACCOUNT OF ABSENCE
OF WITNESS

Absence or unavailability of an essential witness

• “Absent” means that his whereabouts are unknown

or cannot be determined by due diligence.

• “Unavailable” means that his whereabouts are

known but presence for the trial cannot be obtained
by due diligence.
 TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

Requisites:
• Accused has been arraigned;
• He was duly notified of trial; and
• His failure to appear is unjustified.

• Purpose: To speed up disposition of cases.

• General Rule: The right to be present at one’s trial

may be waived.
Exceptions: At certain stages: (Lavides v. CA, G.R.
No. 129670, 2000)

• Arraignment and plea;

• Promulgation of sentence, unless for light offense
• During trial whenever necessary for ID purposes
• Exception to the exception: If the accused
unqualifiedly admits in open court after
arraignment that he is the person named as the
defendant in the case on trial.
REMEDY WHEN ACCUSED IS NOT BROUGHT
TO TRIAL WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED
PERIOD
Effect of delay (Rule 119, Sec.9)
• On motion of the accused, the information may be
dismissed on the ground of his right to speedy trial.
• This must be raised before trial otherwise it is
considered a waiver of the right to dismiss under this
section.
• It is subject to the rules on double jeopardy such that if
it is with prejudice, it cannot be revived anymore.
• The accused has the burden of proving the ground of
denial of right to speedy trial, while the prosecution
has the burden of going forward with the evidence to
establish the exclusion of time under Rule 119, Sec. 3.
REQUISITES FOR DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED
TO BECOME A STATE WITNESS

• General Rule: It is the duty of the prosecutor to

include all the accused in the complaint or
information.

• Exception: The prosecutor may ask the court to

discharge one of them after complying with the
conditions prescribed by law. (Rules 119, Sec. 17)

• This applies only when the information has already

been filed in court.
REQUISITES FOR DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED
TO BECOME A STATE WITNESS

Requisites: (Rule 119, Sec. 17)

• When two or more persons are jointly charged with

the commission of an offense, upon motion of the
prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct
one or more of the accused to be discharged with their
consent so that they may be witnesses for the state
when, after requiring the prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge,
the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested;

(b) The is no other direct evidence available for the proper

prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially

corroborated in its material points;

(d)Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;

and

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
 • Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall
automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies
the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness,
his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.

General Rule: The order of discharge shall: (Rule 119,

Sec. 18)
• Amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused;
• Bar future prosecutions for the same offense.

Exception: if the accused fails or refuses to testify against

his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis for his discharge.
• Any error in asking for and in granting discharge
cannot deprive the discharged of the acquittal and the
constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy.
(People v. Verceles, 2002)

• Subsequent amendment of the information does not

affect discharge. (People v. Taruc, 1962)
 WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
(R.A. No. 6981)

Admission in to the Program (Section 3)

• Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge or

information on the commission of a crime and has
testified or is testifying or about to testify before any
judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any
investigating authority, may be admitted into the
Program, provided that:

(A) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a

grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code,
or its equivalent under special laws;
(B) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in
its material points;

(C) he or any member of his family within the second

civil degree of consanguinity or affinity is subjected to
threats to his life or bodily injury or there is a
likelihood that he will be killed, forced, intimidated,
harassed or corrupted to prevent him from testifying,
or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on account
of his testimony; and

(D) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he

would be testifying against the other law enforcement
officers. In such a case, only the immediate members
of his family may avail themselves of the protection
provided for under this law.
• If the Department of Justice, after examination of said
applicant and other relevant facts, is convinced that the
requirements of this law and its implementing rules
and regulations have been complied with, it shall
admit said applicant to the Program, require said
witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his
knowledge or information on the commission of the
crime, and thereafter issue the proper certification. For
purposes of this law, any such person admitted to the
Program shall be known as the Witness.
 Memorandum of Agreement
With the Person to be Protected (Section 5)

• Before a person is provided protection under this law,

he shall first execute a memorandum of agreement
which shall set forth his responsibilities including:

a) to testify before and provide information to all

appropriate law enforcement officials concerning all
appropriate proceedings in connection with or arising from
the activities involved in the offense charged;

b) to avoid the commission of the crime;

c) to take all necessary precautions to avoid detection by
others of the facts concerning the protection provided him
under this law;

d) to comply with legal obligations and civil judgments

against him;

e) to cooperate with respect to all reasonable requests of

officers and employees of the Government who are
providing protection under this law; and

f) to regularly inform the appropriate program official of

his current activities and address.
 Breach of Memorandum of Agreement
(Section 6)

• Substantial breach of the memorandum of

agreement shall be a ground for the
termination of the protection provided under
this law: Provided, however, that before
terminating such protection, the Secretary of
Justice shall send notice to the person
involved of the termination of the protection
provided under this law, stating therein the
reason for such termination.
 Confidentiality of Proceedings
(Section 7)

• All proceedings involving application for admission

into the Program and the action taken thereon shall be
confidential in nature. No information or documents
given or submitted in support thereof shall be
released except upon written order of the Department
of Justice or the proper court.
• Any person who violates the confidentiality of said
proceedings shall upon conviction be punished with
imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not
more than six (6) years and deprivation of the right to
hold a public office or employment for a period of five
(5) years.
 State Witness
(Section 10)

Any person who has participated in the commission of a

crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply
and, if qualified as determined in this law and by the
Department of Justice, shall be admitted into the Program
whenever the following circumstances are present:

(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a

grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code
or its equivalent under special laws;

(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed;

(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on

its material points;

(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and

(f) he has not at any time been convicted of any crime

involving moral turpitude
 An accused discharged from an
information or criminal complaint by the court in
order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to
Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Court may upon his petition be admitted to
the Program if he complies with the other
requirements of this law. Nothing in this law
shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that
he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Court.
 Sworn Statement of a State Witness
(Section 11)

• Before any person is admitted into the Program pursuant to

the next preceding Section he shall execute a sworn statement
describing in detail the manner in which the offense was
committed and his participation therein. If after said
examination of said person, his sworn statement and other
relevant facts, the Department of Justice is satisfied that the
requirements of this law and its implementing rules are
complied with, it may admit such person into the Program
and issue the corresponding certification.

• If his application for admission is denied, said sworn

statement and any other testimony given in support of said
application shall not be admissible in evidence, except for
impeachment purposes.
Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program
(Section 12)

• The certification of admission into the Program by the

Department shall be given full faith and credit by the
provincial or city prosecutor who is required not to
include the Witness in the criminal complaint or
information and if included therein, to petition the court
for his discharge in order that he can utilized as a State
Witness. The Court shall order the discharge and
exclusion of the said accused from the information.

• Admission into the Program shall entitle such State

Witness to immunity from criminal prosecution for the
offense or offenses in which his testimony will be
given or used and all the rights and benefits provided
under Section 8 hereof.
 Failure or Refusal of the Witness to Testify
(Section 13)

• Any Witness registered in the Program who fails or refuses

to testify or to continue to testify without just cause when
lawfully obliged to do so, shall be prosecuted for contempt.
If he testifies falsely or evasively, he shall be liable to
prosecution for perjury. If a State Witness fails or refuses to
testify, or testifies falsely or evasively, or violates any
condition accompanying such immunity without just cause,
as determined in a hearing by the proper court, his immunity
shall be removed and he shall be subject to contempt or
criminal prosecution. Moreover, the enjoyment of all rights
and benefits under this law shall be deemed terminated.
• The Witness may, however, purge himself of the
contumacious acts by testifying at any appropriate stage of
the proceedings.
 A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
The Judicial Affidavit Rule is applicable to all
criminal actions:
• where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed
six years;

• where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits,

irrespective of the penalty involved; or

• with respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the

penalties involved are (Judicial Affidavit Rule, Section 9).

*Note that the Judicial Affidavit Rule is deemed modified by A.M.

No.15-06-10-SC, or the “Revised Guidelines For Continuous Trial Of
Criminal Cases,” which took effect on 1 September 2017.
 A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE

• The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of

its witnesses not later than five days before the pre-
trial, serving copies of the same upon the accused. The
complainant or public prosecutor shall attach to the
affidavits such documentary or object evidence as he
may have, marking them as Exhibits A, B, C, and so
on. No further judicial affidavit, documentary, or
object evidence shall be admitted at the trial (Judicial
Affidavit Rule, Section 9).
 A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE

• If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after

receipt of the judicial affidavits of the prosecution, he
shall have the option to submit his judicial affidavit as
well as those of his witnesses to the court within ten
days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a copy of
each on the public and private prosecutor, including
his documentary and object evidence previously
marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on. These affidavits
shall serve as direct testimonies of the accused and his
witnesses when they appear before the court to testify
(Judicial Affidavit Rule, Section 9).
 LIM V. LIM
G.R. NO. 214163, 1 JULY 2019 (J. LEONEN)
Ronald Geralino M. Lim (Ronald) filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor, (OCP) a Complaint for
grave threats against his brother, Edwin M. Lim (Edwin).
Acting favorably on the Complaint, the OCP filed an
Information against Edwin with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 5, Iloilo City (MTC). Pre-trial
ensued but was reset for a number of times. Prosecution
moved that they be allowed to submit the judicial
affidavits of Ronald and their witness later that day,
explaining that it had completed the Judicial Affidavits
earlier, but “for whatever reason,” was not able to submit
them. Despite the defense counsel’s insistent opposition,
the MTC granted the Motion and gave the prosecution
until 5:00 p.m. that day to submit the judicial affidavits.
 LIM V. LIM
G.R. No. 214163, 1 July 2019 (J. Leonen)

The Supreme Court held that the MTC’s non-

compliance with procedural rules may be questioned through a
petition for certiorari. It is undisputed that the Municipal Trial
Court committed grave abuse of discretion in blatantly
disregarding the clear wording of A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC or the
Judicial Affidavit Rule. The Rule is explicit: the prosecution is
mandated to submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not
later than five (5) days before pre-trial. Should they fail to
submit them within the time prescribed, they shall be deemed
to have waived their submission.

Nevertheless, if the belated submission of judicial

affidavits has a valid reason, the court may allow the delay
once as long as it "would not unduly prejudice the opposing
party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not less than
Pl,000.00 nor more than P5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.
 A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC
“REVISED GUIDELINES FOR
CONTINUOUS TRIAL
OF CRIMINAL CASES”
For First Level Courts, in all criminal cases, including
those covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, the
testimonies of witnesses shall consist of the duly subscribed
written statements given to law enforcement officers or the
affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted before the investigating
prosecutor and if such are not available, testimonies shall be in
the form of judicial affidavits. The trial prosecutor may opt to
dispense with the sworn statements submitted to the law
enforcement officers and instead prepare judicial affidavits or
modify or revise the said sworn statements.
 A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC
“REVISED GUIDELINES FOR CONTINUOUS
TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES”
For Second Level Courts, Sandiganbayan and Court of
Tax Appeals, where the demeanor of the witnesses is not
essential, like the forensic chemist, medico-legal officers,
investigators, auditors, accountants, engineers, custodians,
expert witnesses and other similar witnesses, who will testify on
the authenticity, due execution and the contents of public
documents and reports, and in criminal cases that are
transactional in character, such as falsification, malversation,
estafa or other crimes where the culpability or innocence of the
accused can be established through documents, the testimonies
of the witnesses shall be the duly subscribed written statements
given to law enforcement officers or the affidavits or counter-
affidavits submitted before the investigating prosecutor, and if
such are not available, testimonies shall be in the form of judicial
affidavits.
 A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC
“REVISED GUIDELINES FOR CONTINUOUS TRIAL
OF CRIMINAL CASES”

For Second Level Courts, Sandiganbayan and Court

of Tax Appeals, x x x

In cases where the culpability or the innocence of the

accused is based on the testimonies of the alleged
eyewitnesses, the testimonies of these witnesses shall be in
oral form.
 DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

• Definition: Objection by one of the parties to the effect

that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue. (Gutib v. CA,
1999)

• How initiated (Rule 119, Sec. 23)

• After the prosecution rests its case, the court may
dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard OR (2) upon
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or
without leave of court.
• Motion for leave to file demurrer (Rule 119, Sec.
23)
• It must specifically state its grounds.
• It must be filed within a non-extendible period of 5
days after the prosecution rests. Prosecution may
then oppose within a non-extendible period of 5 days
from its receipt.

• Effects of granting the demurrer to evidence

• The court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. (Rule 119, Sec. 23)
• Sufficient evidence for frustrating a demurrer is
evidence that proves: (Gutib v. CA, 1999)
• Commission;
• Precise degree of participation.

• The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting

the demurrer to evidence of the accused as it is
equivalent to an acquittal, unless the prosecution can
sufficiently prove that the court’s action is attended
with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the
constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy will be violated. (People v. Sandiganbayan and
Basco, et al., G.R. No. 164577, 5 July 2010)
PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND BASCO, et al.
G.R. No. 164577, 5 July 2010

In a charge for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.

3019, as amended, accused filed their respective motions
for leave to file their demurrer to evidence after the
prosecution rested its case. The motions were granted.
The Sandiganbayan then granted the demurrers to
evidence and dismissed the case. A Rule 45 Petition was
filed by the People of the Philippines, represented by the
Ombudsman, assailing the Sandiganbayan’s ruling.

The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling

granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused as it is
equivalent to an acquittal, unless the prosecution can
 PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND BASCO, et al.
G.R. No. 164577, 5 July 2010

sufficiently prove that the court’s action is attended with grave

abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the constitutional right of the
accused against double jeopardy will be violated.

Procedurally, the prosecution resorted to a wrong

remedy. It is settled that the appellate court may review
dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer
to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not
result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is
annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original
special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against
double jeopardy is not violated.
 PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND BASCO, et al.
G.R. No. 164577, 5 July 2010

Unfortunately, what the prosecution filed with the

Court in the present case is an appeal by way of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure
question of law, which is different from a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
 Effect of denial of motion for leave to file
demurrer

• Order denying the motion for leave or order denying

the demurrer itself is not reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before judgment. (Rule 119, Sec. 23)

• It is interlocutory, but it may be assigned as error and

reviewed in the appeal that may be taken from the
decision on the merits (Cruz v. People, 1999)

• The accused has the right to present evidence after

demurrer is denied (Rule 119, Sec. 23)
If Demurrer was filed with leave of court:
• If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with
leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense.

If Demurrer was filed without leave of court:

• When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave
of court, the accused waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution
• Even if the demurrer is granted, the trial court may
hold the accused civilly liable and he can no longer
adduce evidence on the civil aspect because of his
waiver. (Alferez v. People, 31 January 2011)
 Effect of denial of demurrer to evidence

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VS. PEOPLE

G. R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused former

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget
and Accounts Manager Aguas then separately filed their
demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not
establish a case for plunder against them. The same were
denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient
evidence to show that they had conspired to commit plunder.
After the respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA
and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they
filed their respective petitions for certiorari.
 Effect of denial of demurrer to evidence

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VS. PEOPLE

G. R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not

proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial
court because of the availability of another remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the
motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before judgment.”
 Effect of denial of demurrer to evidence

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VS. PEOPLE

G. R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016

It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that

the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the
proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that
in case of their conviction, they may then appeal the conviction, and
assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is
doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue
should not be limited, because to do so “x x x would be to destroy its
comprehensiveness and usefulness. In the exercise of the Supreme
Court’s superintending control over other courts, it is to be guided by
all the circumstances of each particular case “as the ends of justice
may require.” So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to
prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.”
 Effect of denial of demurrer to evidence

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VS. PEOPLE

G. R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016

The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted
by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the
convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion
whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the
interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to
evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the
remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
 REVERSE TRIAL
• A reverse trial is one where the accused presents
evidence ahead of the prosecution and the latter is to
present evidence by way of rebuttal to the former’s
evidence.
• This kind of trial may take place when the accused
made known to the trial court, on arraignment, that he
is to adduce affirmative defense of a justifying or
exempting circumstance and thus impliedly admitting
the acts/s imputed to him.
• The trial court may then require the accused to present
evidence first, proving the requisites of the justifying
or exempting circumstance he is invoking, and the
prosecution to present rebuttal evidence controverting
it.
PROSECUTION OF
CIVIL ACTION
RULE 111
 PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
RULE ON IMPLIED INSTITUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
WITH CRIMINAL ACTION
General Rule:
— When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of damages is deemed instituted with the criminal action.
(Rule 111, Sec. 1)
Exception:
— If the offended party:
— waives a civil action;
— institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action; or
— reserves the right to institute it separately.
Exceptions to the exception:
— Claims arising out of a dishonored check under BP 22 where “no
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.“
— Claims arising from an offense which is cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. (Sec. 4, PD 1606, as amended by RA 8249)
 WHEN CIVIL ACTION MAY PROCEED
INDEPENDENTLY
¢ The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil
action shall be made:
— before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence, and
— under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

Procedure for making the reservation

¢ Filing a manifestation in the criminal case that the offended
party is reserving his right to file a separate civil action.
¢ Filing the separate civil action and informing the court
trying the criminal case that the offended party has filed a
separate civil action.
¢ No counterclaim, cross-claim or 3rd party complaint may be
filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of
action which could have been subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1)
 WHEN SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IS
SUSPENDED
¢ The civil action which should be suspended after the
institution of the criminal action is that arising from
delict or crime.
¢ Civil actions mentioned in Rule 111, Sec. 3 of the
Rules of Court, and under Arts. 32-34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, are exempted from the rule that after a
criminal action has been commenced, the civil action
which has been reserved cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action.
 EFFECT OF THE DEATH OF ACCUSED OR
CONVICT ON CIVIL ACTION (RULE 111, SEC.4)
General Rule:
¢ If death is before arraignment, the case is dismissed without
prejudice to the filing of civil action against estate of the
deceased.
¢ If death is after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action, it extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused.
Exceptions:
¢ If civil liability is predicated on other sources of obligations, as
with independent civil actions, recovery may still be made
against the estate of the deceased or legal representative after
proper substitution.
¢ If death is while appeal is pending – it extinguishes criminal
liability and civil liability based thereon.
 EFFECT OF THE DEATH OF ACCUSED OR
CONVICT ON CIVIL ACTION (RULE 111, SEC.4)
Effect of judgment on civil case on the criminal action
¢ A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the
defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal
action against the defendant for the same act or omission
subject of the civil action. (Rule 111, Sec.5)
 PILI, JR. V. RESURRECCION
G.R. NO. 222798, 19 JUNE 2019

Respondent Resurreccion entered into an agreement

with Conpil Realty Corp. (Conpil) for the purchase of a house
and lot, and issued 2 checks in favor of Conpil. The checks were
dishonored. A criminal complaint for violation of B.P. 22 was
filed against respondents. Although the checks were issued in
favor of Conpil, the complaint was signed by petitioner Pili,
who at that time was the President of Conpil.
After trial, the MTC acquitted respondent Resurreccion
but ordered him to pay P500,000.00 by way of civil indemnity.
Respondent appealed the MTC’s ruling on her civil liability
with the RTC, which affirmed the MTC’s ruling. Respondent
appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC’s decision. The CA
held that the criminal case was not prosecuted in the name of
the real party-in-interest because Conpil was not included in
the title of the case even if it was a party.
 PILI, JR. V. RESURRECCION
G.R. NO. 222798, 19 JUNE 2019

HELD:
It has long been settled that in criminal cases, the
People is the real party-in-interest and the private
offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of
offenses, the interest of the private offended party is
limited only to the aspect of civil liability. The private
complainant is the real party-in-interest only as regards
the civil aspect arising from the crime. A review of the
records of the instant case unequivocally shows that the
civil aspect of the criminal case was, in fact, appealed by
respondent and that it was Conpil, being the victim of the
fraud, that was the private complainant therein. Conpil
authorized its President, the petitioner, to file the
complaint on its behalf.
 DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO AND DR.
CLENIO YNZON V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 163879, 30 JULY 2014
It is clear that the death of the accused Dr. Ynzon
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability. However, the recovery of civil liability subsists as
the same is not based on delict but by contract and the
reckless imprudence he was guilty of under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. For this reason, a separate civil
action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based, and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
 PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
¢ A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal.

¢ The prejudicial question must be determinative of the

case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and
resolve the question must be lodged in another court or
tribunal.
 PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
Requisites of a Prejudicial Question
¢ Previously initiated civil action involves issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action;
¢ The resolution of such issue determines WON the criminal
action may proceed.

Effect of prejudicial question

¢ Gen Rule: Where both a civil and a criminal case arising
from the same facts are filed in court, the criminal case takes
precedence.
¢ Exception: If there exists a prejudicial question which should
be resolved first before an action could be taken in the
criminal case.
 PEOPLE V. ARAMBULO
G.R. NO. 186597, 17 JUNE 2015
In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted that
the resolution of the two (2) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
cases in their favor would necessarily result in their acquittal in the
criminal case for estafa. The first case, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659, is an
action for accounting of all corporate funds and assets, annulment of sale,
injunction, receivership and damages. The second case, SEC Case No. 03-
99-6259, involves the issue on whether the group of Rodrigo and Buban
are the lawful representatives of the corporation and whether they are
duly authorized to make a demand for remittance.

The following requisites must be present for a civil action to be

considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be
lodged in another tribunal.
 PEOPLE V. ARAMBULO
G.R. NO. 186597, 17 JUNE 2015
SEC Case No. 05-97-5659, which is an action for accounting of
all corporate funds and assets, annulment of sale, injunction,
receivership and damages, does not present a prejudicial question to the
criminal case for estafa. Even if said case will be decided against
respondents, they will not be adjudged free from criminal liability. It
also does not automatically follow that an accounting of corporate
funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale of corporate assets
would result in the conviction of respondents in the estafa case.
With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, a prejudicial question
exists. The Complaint in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 prays for the
nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers, including
Buban. Essentially, the issue is the authority of the aforesaid officers to
act for and behalf of the corporation. If it is ruled in the SEC case that
the present Anaped directors and officers were not validly elected, then
respondent Victoria may have every right to refuse remittance of rental
to Buban. Hence, the essential element of misappropriation in estafa
may be absent in this case.
RULE ON FILING FEES IN CIVIL ACTION
DEEMED INSTITUTED WITH THE
CRIMINAL ACTION
¢ General Rule: Actual damages claimed or recovered by
the offended party are not included in the computation of
the filing fees. (Rule 111, Sec. 1)

¢ Exception: In criminal actions for violation of BP22, the

amount of the check involved shall be considered as the
actual damages for which no separate civil action is
allowed.
 RULE ON FILING FEES IN CIVIL ACTION
DEEMED INSTITUTED WITH THE
CRIMINAL ACTION
INDEMNITY

¢ Civil indemnity is automatically awarded upon proof of the

commission of the crime by the offender. (People v. Corpuz,
G.R. No. 175836, 30 January 2009).
¢ The rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime
charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil liability,
unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Courts can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still
order payment of civil damages in the same case. It is not
even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted.
(Romero vs. People, G.R. No. 167546, 17 July 2009).
SEARCH AND
SEIZURE
RULE 126
 SEARCH AND SEIZURE

NATURE OF SEARCH WARRANT

¢ A search warrant (SW) is an order in writing; issued in the

name of the People of the Philippines; signed by a judge;
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search
for personal property described in the warrant and bring
it before the court. (Rule 126, Sec. 1)

¢ A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin

to a writ of discovery. (Malaloan v. CA, 1994)
 CHARLIE TE V. HON. AUGUSTO VS. BREVA
G.R. NO. 164974, 5 AUGUST 2015
Petitioner argued that impleading the People of the
Philippines as respondents in his petition for certiorari before the
CA to annul and set aside the order of the RTC denying the
petitioner's motion to quash the search warrant issued against
him was premature because no criminal case had yet been filed
against him with only the application for the issuance of the
search warrant having been made.

However, impleading the People of the Philippines in the

petition for certiorari did not depend on whether or not an actual
criminal action had already been commenced in court against the
petitioner. It cannot be denied that the search warrant in question
had been issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, and
that fact rendered the People of the Philippines indispensable
parties in the special civil action for certiorari brought to nullify
the questioned orders of respondent Presiding Judge. We also
note that the impleading is further expressly demanded in Section
3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
 CHARLIE TE V. HON. AUGUSTO VS. BREVA
G.R. NO. 164974, 5 AUGUST 2015

It may be true that the application for the search

warrant was not a criminal action; and that the application
for the search warrant was not of the same form as that of a
criminal action. However, it is clear that the sworn
application for the search warrant and the search warrant
itself were upon the behest of the People of the Philippines.
It defies logic and common sense for the petitioner to
contend, therefore, that the application against him was not
made by the People of the Philippines but by the interested
party or parties. The immutable truth is that every search
warrant is applied for and issued by and under the
authority of the State, regardless of who initiates its
application or causes its issuance.
 SEARCH WARRANT WARRANT OF ARREST
Order in writing in the name of the Order directed to the peace officer to
Republic of the Philippines; signed by execute the warrant by taking the
a judge; and directed to a peace person stated therein into custody that
officer, commanding him to search for he may be bound to answer for the
personal property described in the commission of the offense.
warrant and bring it before the court.
(Rule 126, Sec. 1)

Probable cause to search requires facts In order to determine probable cause

to show that particular things to arrest, the judge (not the
connected with crime are found in a prosecutor) must have sufficient facts
specific location. in his hands that would tend to show
that a crime has been committed and
that a particular person committed it.

The rules on searches and seizures The rules on arrest are concerned with
cover a wider spectrum of matters on the seizure of a person. A search may
the search of both persons and places follow an arrest but the search must be
and the seizure of things found incident to a lawful arrest.
therein.
 APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT,
WHERE FILED
1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a
crime was committed. (Rule 126, Sec.2)
2. For compelling reasons stated in the application:
¢ If the place of the commission of the crime is known, any court within
the judicial region where the crime was committed.
¢ Any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be

enforced.
3. However, if the criminal action has already been
filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending.
¢ Exception: Malaloan v. CA (1994), subject to Rule 126, Sec. 1
¢ if a case has not yet been filed, it may be filed in a court with a

territorial jurisdiction other than that where the illegal articles sought
to seized are located.
 APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT,
WHERE FILED
4. In intellectual property rights cases (see A.M. No. 10-
3-10-SC, 18 October 2011):
— The issuance of these writs shall be governed by the rules prescribed
in Re: Proposed Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for
Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights (A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, which
took effect on February 15, 2002).

(A) Special Commercial Courts in Quezon City, Manila, Makati,

and Pasig shall have authority to act on applications for the
issuance of writs of search and seizure in civil actions for
violations of the Intellectual Property Code, which writs shall be
enforceable nationwide.

(B) Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, the Special

Commercial Courts in the judicial regions where the violation of
intellectual property rights occurred shall have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of search and seizure.
 REQUISITES FOR ISSUING
SEARCH WARRANT
A SW shall not issue except:
1. upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense;
2. to be determined personally by the judge;

3. after examination under oath or affirmation of

complainant and the witnesses he may
produce;
4. particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. (Rule
126, Sec. 4)
 SERVICE OF SEARCH WARRANT
Period of validity – 10 days from its date.
— Thereafter, it shall be void. (Rule 126, Sec. 10)

Right to break door or window to effect search.

— The officer, if refused admittance to the place of
directed search after giving notice of his purpose and
authority, may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house or any part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant, or to liberate himself
or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully
detained therein. (Rule 126, Sec. 7)
 SERVICE OF SEARCH WARRANT

¢ Search
of house, room, or premise, to
be made in presence of two witnesses.
— No search of a house, room, or any other
premises shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or
any member of his family or in the absence
of the letter, two witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality.
(Rule 126, Sec. 8)
 SERVICE OF SEARCH WARRANT (SW)
¢ Time of making search
— General rule: DAY TIME.
— Exception: When the affidavit asserts that the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to
be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day or
night. (Rule 126, Sec. 9)
— A SW violates the above rule if the time of the
search is left blank, thus enabling the officers to
conduct the search in the evening of the appointed
search. (Asian Surety v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312 cited in
People v. CA, G.R. No. 117412, 8 December 2000)
 PROBABLE CAUSE
¢ Probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and
the objects sought in connection with that offense are in
the place to be searched (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA
800 [1984]).

¢ The judge determining probable cause must do so only

after personally examining under oath the complainant
and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to "the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof
is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance
of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." (Id.)
 COMPARISONS
¢ Probable cause in preliminary investigation is the existence
of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in
a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge
of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted. (Buchanan v. Vda. De
Esteban, 1915).

¢ Probable cause in warrantless arrests: Rule 113.5(b) requires

that the person making the arrest has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just
been committed. Probable cause must be based on reasonable
ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been or is about to
be committed. (People. v. Aruta, 1998).
 PERSONAL EXAMINATION BY JUDGE
OF THE APPLICANT AND WITNESSES

¢ Determined by judge himself

— The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath, the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements,
together with the affidavits submitted (Rule 126, Sec. 5).

¢ Searching questions and answers

— Such questions as have the tendency to show the
commission of a crime and perpetrator thereof. (Luna v.
Plaza, 1968)
 PARTICULARITY OF PLACE TO BE
SEARCHED AND THINGS TO BE SEIZED
¢ Warrant issued must particularly describe the place to
be searched and the persons to be seized.

¢ Description of place to be searched is sufficient if the

officer with the SW can, with reasonable efforts,
ascertain and identify the place intended. (People v.
Veloso, 1925)

¢ An apparent typographical error will not necessarily

invalidate the SW, as long as the application contains
the correct address. (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 1984)
¢ Search Warrant must be for only one specific offense.

— General Rule: The offense alleged must be specific to enable

the judge to find the existence of probable cause. Definite
provisions of the allegedly violated laws must be referred to.

— Exception: In People v. Marcos (1990), the SW was declared valid

despite lack of mention of specific offense because the
application stated that the owner of the grocery store against
whom warrant was directed, had in his possession
unadulterated stocks in violation of the provisions Art. 188 and
189, RPC, which are closely allied articles as the punishable acts
defined in one of them can be considered as including or is
necessarily included in the other.
 TEST OF PARTICULARITY
¢ The executing officer’s prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the SW is relevant.
¢ This would seem especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit
the SW had issued, and when he knows that the
judge who issued the SW intended the building
described in the affidavit.
¢ It has also been said that the executing officer
must look to the affidavit in the official court file
to resolve an ambiguity in the SW as to the place
to be searched. (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 1984)
 PERSONAL PROPERTY TO BE SEIZED

What may be seized (Rule126, Sec. 3)

¢ Personal property subject of the offense.

¢ Personal property stolen/embezzled and other
proceeds/fruits of the offense.
¢ Personal property used or intended to be used
as the means of committing an offense.
 EXCEPTIONS TO
SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Instances when warrantless searches are allowed
¢ 1. As incident of lawful arrest (Rule 126, Sec. 13)

— A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous

weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

— A motorist flagged down by a policeman for not wearing a

helmet is not deemed arrested since he was only given a traffic
citation and the penalty for the ordinance is only a fine. Hence
the subsequent search of the motorcyclist was illegal and the
items seized were inadmissible in evidence. (Luz v. People, G.R.
No. 197788, 29 February 2012)
 EXCEPTIONS TO
SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT
¢ 2. Plain view doctrine.
Requisites:
a) A valid prior intrusion, i.e., based on a valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
b) Evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have a
right to be where they are;
c) Evidence must be immediately apparently illegal (e.g. drug
paraphernalia);
d) Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

— An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight.

(Miclat v. People, G.R. No. 176077, 31 August 2011)
— Objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in
the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. (Fajardo v. People, G.R. No. 190889, 10 January 2011)
 EXCEPTIONS TO
SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT

3. Search of moving vehicle.

— Police may conduct searches of moving vehicles without
warrant because it is impracticable to secure prior judicial
search warrant since the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant may be sought.

— These searches are generally limited to visual inspection, and

the vehicles or their occupants cannot be subjected to body
searches EXCEPT when there is probable cause to believe that
the occupant is a law offender or the vehicles’ contents are
instruments or proceeds of some criminal offense.
 EXCEPTIONS TO
SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT
4. Searches conducted in checkpoints.
— They are valid as long as they are warranted by the
exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists.
— Here, the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to body search (inspection of the vehicle is limited
to visual search).

5. Consented warrantless searches.

— When a person voluntarily submits to a search or consents
to have it made of his person/premises. (People v.
Malasugui, 1936)
 EXCEPTIONS TO
SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT

6. Customs searches.
— For the enforcement of customs duties and tariff laws, the
Collector of Customs is authorized to effect search and
seizure without search warrant, except in search of a
dwelling/house. (General Travel Services v. David, 1966)
7. Stop and Frisk.
— It is a limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapon. (Malacat v. CA, 1997)
— Probable cause is not required. But a genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding condition to warrant a belief that a person has
weapons concealed.
 PEOPLE V. SISON
G.R. NO. 238453, 31 JULY 2019 (J. LEONEN)
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Sison, Yanson, and Bautista were charged with violation
of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, for unlawfully transporting,
shipping and carrying along with them in a vehicle, without any
permit from the authorities, six (6) kilos of prohibited drugs, i.e.,
dried marijuana leaves/Indian Hemp, placed inside two (2)
separate sacks. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Sison,
Yanson, and Bautista of the crime charged. It sustained the search
conducted on the tipped vehicle as a valid warrantless search
because, according to it, the accused consented anyway. On
appeal by Yanson, the CA affirmed the RTC decision and ruled
that there was probable cause to conduct an extensive search
since the information received by the police officers was
sufficiently accurate, given how the pickup "was spotted in the
place where it was said to be coming from and was actually
loaded with marijuana." Hence, Yanson’s appeal to the SC.
 PEOPLE V. SISON
G.R. NO. 238453, 31 JULY 2019 (J. LEONEN)
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
HELD:

The appeal is granted.

A search of a moving vehicle is one of the few permissible

exceptions where warrantless searches can be made. However,
for a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to be valid, probable
cause remains imperative. Law enforcers do not enjoy unbridled
discretion to conduct searches.

A solitary tip hardly suffices as probable cause. There must be a

confluence of several suspicious circumstances. Items seized
during warrantless searches based on solitary tips are
inadmissible as evidence.
 PEOPLE V. SISON
G.R. NO. 238453, 31 JULY 2019 (J. LEONEN)
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
HELD:
The appeal is granted.
A search of a moving vehicle is one of the few permissible
exceptions where warrantless searches can be made. However,
for a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to be valid, probable
cause remains imperative. Probable cause requires the existence
of a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged. Law enforcers do not enjoy unbridled discretion to
conduct searches.
A solitary tip hardly suffices as probable cause. There
must be a confluence of several suspicious circumstances. Items
seized during warrantless searches based on solitary tips are
inadmissible as evidence.
 PEOPLE V. SISON
G.R. NO. 238453, 31 JULY 2019 (J. LEONEN)
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In this case, there was no valid search and seizure
conducted on the pickup boarded by Yanson, Sison and Bautista.
There is no evidence other than the original tip for the arresting
officers to search the accused. When the vehicle was stopped by a
team of police officers at the checkpoint, Sison did not have much
of a choice when he was asked to open the hood of the vehicle.
He could not have given his genuine, sincere consent to the
extensive search conducted by the police officers. Applying the
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution, the two (2) sacks of marijuana supposedly being
transported in the pickup cannot be admitted in evidence.
While it was only Yanson who appealed, accused Sison
and Bautista must also be acquitted. Rule 22, Section 11(a) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “an appeal taken
by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court
is favorable and applicable to the latter.”
 PEOPLE V. COGAED
G.R. NO. 200334, 30 JULY 2014 (J. LEONEN)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST, WARRANTLESS SEARCH –
STOP AND FRISK
The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through
facts that were not based on their personal knowledge. The
information as to the accused's whereabouts was sent through a text
message. The accused who never acted suspicious was identified by
a driver. The bag that allegedly contained the contraband was
required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and without
the accused having been fully apprised of his rights.

This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of

the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would
allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of
rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and
without improper pressure or coercion. The evidence, therefore, used
against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article III,
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible admissible
evidence, the accused should be acquitted.
 PEOPLE V. ACOSTA
G.R. NO. 238865, 28 JANUARY 2019
The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
Here, the second requisite is absent since the discovery of
the police officers of the marijuana plants was not inadvertent,
but was prompted by Salucana. It is clear from Salucana's
testimony that he knew of accused’s illegal activities even prior
to the mauling incident. In People v. Valdez, the Court held that
the "plain view" doctrine cannot apply if the officers are
actually "searching" for evidence against the accused, as in this
case. Thus, the seized marijuana plants are inadmissible in
evidence against accused for being fruits of the poisonous tree.
 ESQUILLO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 182010, 25 AUGUST 2010
The trial court found petitioner guilty of illegal possession
of shabu. On appeal, petitioner assails the application of “stop-
and-frisk” in convicting him of said offense. However, the
Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s contention. To determine the
validity of “stop-and-frisk,” essential is the existence of a genuine
reason, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests
unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband
concealed about him. Such a “stop-and-frisk” practice serves a
dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.
 ESQUILLO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 182010, 25 AUGUST 2010

From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned

act of the police officers constituted a valid “stop-and-frisk”
operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially
noticed in petitioner’s possession - later voluntarily exhibited
to the police operative - was undertaken after she was
interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and
after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police
officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting
suspicious behavior and, in fact, attempted to flee after the
police officer had identified himself.
 EXCEPTIONS TO
SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT
8. In flagrante delicto.
— When a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to
the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant, as the
offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view.

9. Hot Pursuit.
— A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person when an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
(Rule 113, Sec. 5). In this case, the person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
(Rule 126, sec. 13).
 EXCEPTIONS TO
SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT
10. Prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment.
— A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another (Rule 113, Sec. 5). In this case, the person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may have been used or constitute proof
in the commission of an offense (Rule 126, sec. 13).
REMEDIES FROM UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE

¢ Employ any means to prevent search.

— Without a SW, the officer cannot insist on entering a citizen’s
premises. If he does so, he becomes an ordinary intruder.
— The person to be searched may resist the search and employ
any means necessary to prevent it, without incurring any
criminal liability. (People v. Chan Fook, 1921)

¢ File a criminal action against officer.

— A public officer/employee who procures a SW without search
just cause is criminally liable under Art. 129, RPC (search
warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained).
REMEDIES FROM UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE

¢ File a motion to quash the illegal SW.

— This remedy is employed if search is not yet conducted.

¢ File a motion to return seized things.

— This is the remedy used if the search was already
conducted and goods where seized as a consequence
thereof.

¢ File a motion to suppress evidence.

— This is anchored on the inadmissibility of seized items.
ARREST
RULE 113
 ARREST
ARREST, HOW MADE
— Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
(Rule 113, Sec.1)
Constitutional requirements of arrest
— The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses that he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
(Art. 3, Sec. 2, Constitution)
¢ An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.
¢ No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making
an arrest. Person arrested shall not be subject to a greater
restraint than necessary. (Rule 113, Sec. 2)
¢ Time to make arrest: Arrest may be made on any day and
at any time of the day or night. (Rule 113, Sec. 6)
 ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT,
WHEN LAWFUL.
¢ In Flagrante Delicto – Literally, caught in the act of
committing a crime. When the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing or is attempting
to commit an offense in the presence of the peace
officer or private person who arrested him. (Rule 113,
Sec. 5a)
¢ When a police officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby,
and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an
arrest without a warrant, as the offense is deemed
committed in his presence or within his view. (People v.
Ng Yik Bun, G.R. No. 180452, 10 January 2011)
 ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT,
WHEN LAWFUL.
¢ When an arrest is made during an entrapment or a buy-
bust operation, it is not required that a warrant be
secured in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section
5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court allowing warrantless
arrests by a peace officer or a private person when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. (People v. Sembrano, G.R. No. 185848, 16 August
2010)
 PEOPLE V. SEMBRANO
G.R. NO. 185848, 16 AUGUST 2010
Accused was arrested after the police conducted a
buy-bust operation and was eventually convicted for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165. On the issue of the
legality of the arrest of the accused, the Supreme Court
ruled that accused was arrested during an entrapment
operation where he was caught in flagrante delicto of selling
shabu. When an arrest is made during an entrapment
operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line
with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised
Rules of Court allowing warrantless arrests by a peace
officer or a private person when, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
 PEOPLE V. SEMBRANO
G.R. NO. 185848, 16 AUGUST 2010
Furthermore, a buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a
valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal
safeguards, a buy-bust operation, such as the one involving
accused, deserves judicial sanction. Consequently, the
warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure
conducted on the person of accused were allowed under
the circumstances. The search, incident to accused‘s lawful
arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its validity. Thus,
there is no doubt that the sachets of shabu recovered during
the legitimate buy-bust operation, are admissible and were
properly admitted in evidence against him.
 PEOPLE V. SEMBRANO
G.R. NO. 185848, 16 AUGUST 2010

Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior

surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the
buy-bust operation and the warrantless arrest of the accused
caught in flagrante delicto. (People v. Manlangit, G.R. No.
189806, 12 January 2011)
 VERIDIANO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 200370, 7 JUNE 2017 (J. LEONEN)
A concerned citizen called the police radio operator of the
Nagcarlan Police Station, informing them that a certain alias "Baho,"
who was later identified as Mario Veridiano (“Veridiano”), was on the
way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.

A checkpoint was set up and at around 10:00 a.m., they chanced

upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo,
Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to
disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-
shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the
contents of their pockets. The police officers recovered from Veridiano
"a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana." POI Cabello
confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano was
arrested and then brought to the police station.The contents of the tea
bag tested positive for marijuana.
 VERIDIANO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 200370, 7 JUNE 2017 (J. LEONEN)

The Supreme Court held that no valid warrantless

arrest or valid warrantless search conducted. In this case,
petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante
delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint.
Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit
any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers
that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless
arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to
support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the
person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been
committed, was being committed, or is about to be
committed.
 LAPI V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 210731, 13 FEBRUARY 2019 (J. LEONEN)
Right to question validity of arrest may be waived.

As with certain constitutional rights, the right to

question the validity of a warrantless arrest can be waived.
This waiver, however, does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of the evidence seized during the illegal
arrest. In this case, petitioner admits that he failed to
question the validity of his arrest before arraignment. He did
not move to quash the Information against him before
entering his plea. He was assisted by counsel when he
entered his plea. Likewise, he was able to present his
evidence. Hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of the warrantless arrest.
 MANIBOG V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 211214, 20 MARCH 2019 (J. LEONEN)
STANDARDS OF STOP-AND-FRISK VIS-À-VIS SEARCH
INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL WARRANTLESS ARREST

A policeman received information from a police

asset that Manibog was standing outside the Municipal
Tourism Office of Dingras, Ilocos Norte with a gun tucked
in his waistband. To verify this information, a team of
policemen proceeded to the Municipal Tourism Office, the
Chief Inspector saw Manibog standing outside the
building. The team slowly approached him for fear that he
might fight back. As he moved closer, the Chief Inspector
saw a bulge on Manibog's waist, which the police officer
deduced to be a gun due to its distinct contour. The Chief
Inspector went up to Manibog, patted the bulging object
on his waist, and confirmed that there was a gun tucked
in Manibog's waistband.
 MANIBOG V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 211214, 20 MARCH 2019 (J. Leonen)

The Supreme Court held that the warrantless search

falls under a valid stop-and-frisk search. The gun confiscated
from Manibog is admissible in evidence.

For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer

must have had personal knowledge of facts, which would
engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an illicit act.
Anything less than the arresting officer's personal
observation of a suspicious circumstance as basis for the
search is an infringement of the "basic right to security of
one's person and effects.” The combination of the police
asset's tip and the arresting officers' observation of a gun-
shaped object under petitioner's shirt already suffices as a
genuine reason for the arresting officers to conduct a stop
and frisk search on petitioner.
 DELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 209387, 11 JANUARY 2016 (J. LEONEN)
When Dela Cruz presented his bag for inspection to port
personnel, the x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector
manning the x-ray machine station, there was no unreasonable
search. There is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy
when coming into airports or ports of travel.
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port
authorities, although done without search warrants, are not
unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions
protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to
deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling
public.
Searches pursuant to port security measures are not
unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning
and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security
procedures in airports.
 ENTRAPMENT V. INSTIGATION
¢ Instigation presupposes that the criminal intent to
commit an offense originated from the inducer and not
the accused who had no intention to commit the crime
and would not have committed it were it not for the
initiatives by the inducer. In entrapment, the criminal
intent or design to commit the offense charged originates
in the mind of the accused. Instigation leads to the
acquittal of the accused, while entrapment does not bar
prosecution and conviction.
HOT PURSUIT ARREST
¢ When an offense has just been committed and the officer or
private person has probable cause to believe, based on
personal knowledge of acts or circumstances, that the
person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Sec. 5b)

ARREST OF ESCAPED PRISONER – When the person to be

arrested is a prisoner who has escaped: (Rule 113, sec. 5c)
¢ From a penal establishment or place where he is:
¢ Serving final judgment;
¢ Temporarily confined while his case is pending;
¢ While being transferred from one confinement to another;
¢ Escapee may be immediately pursued or re-arrested
without warrant at any time and in any place within the
Philippines. (Rule 113, Sec. 13)
 WARRANTLESS ARREST INVOLVING
DRUGS CASES
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended
by Republic Act No. 10640:

“SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of

Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
 “(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected
public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
 (2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon
confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, the same shall be submitted to the
PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
“x x x
“(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory
examination results, which shall be done by the forensic
laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon
the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when
the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating
therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however,
That a final certification shall be issued immediately
upon completion of the said examination and
certification; xxx
 WARRANTLESS ARREST INVOLVING
DRUGS CASES
PEOPLE V. LIM
G.R. NO. 231989, 4 SEPTEMBER 2018

A buy bust operation was conducted for the

apprehension of the accused allegedly with illegal possession of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), Evident, however, is
the absence of an elected public official and representatives of
the DOJ and the media to witness the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items. In fact, their signatures do not
appear in the Inventory Receipt.

The issue before the Supreme Court is whether the

accused is liable for the crime of sale of dangerous drugs,
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride despite the absence of witness
required under R.A. No. 9165.
 The Court held that the accused cannot be held
liable for the sale of dangerous drugs.

In this case, a police officer testified that the

witnesses did not arrive at the crime scene because it was
late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for
them. Another police officer testified that the inventory
was made in the PDEA office considering that it was late
in the evening and the media representative and
barangay officials are unavailable despite their effort to
contact them. He admitted that there are times when they
do not inform the barangay officials prior to their
operation as they might leak the confidential information.
 The links in the chain of custody that must be
established are: (1) the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of
the seized illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the illegal drug
by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and
submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist
to the court.
 The Supreme Court held that these justifications
are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient
attempt to comply with the law.

The Supreme Court ruled that so as to “weed out early on

from the courts’ already congested docket any orchestrated
or poorly built up drug-related cases,” the following should
be enforced as a mandatory policy in connection with arrests
and seizures related to illegal drugs:

(1) In the sworn statements/affidavits, the

apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance
with the requirements of Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR);
 (2) In case of non-observance of the provision, the
apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification
or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have
taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized/confiscated items;

(3) If there is no justification or explanation

expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits,
the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case
before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for
further preliminary investigation in order to determine
the (non) existence of probable cause; and
 (4) If the investigating fiscal filed the case
despite such absence, the court may exercise its
discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment
order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case
outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court.
Effect of Failure to Object to Warrantless Arrests
¢ Any objection to the procedure followed in the
matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be opportunely
raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived.
 METHOD OF ARREST
A. By officer with warrant

¢ Duties of the arresting officer:

¢ Execution of warrant (Rule 113, Sec.4);

¢ The head office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered

shall cause the warrant to be executed within 10 days from
its receipt;
¢ To make a report to the judge who issued the warrant within
10 days after expiration of the period to execute;
¢ In case of his failure to execute, he shall state the reasons
therefore;
¢ To arrest the accused and deliver him to the nearest police
station or jail without unnecessary delay. (Rule 113, Sec. 3)
 METHOD OF ARREST
B. By officer without warrant

Duties of arresting officer without warrant:

¢ The officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his
authority and the cause of the arrest. (Rule 113, Sec. 8)
— Exceptions:
¢ The person to be arrested is engaged in the commission of the
offense;
¢ He is pursued immediately after its commission;
¢ He escapes, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has the
opportunity to so inform him;
¢ Giving such information will imperil the arrest.

¢ The private person shall inform the person to be arrested of the

intention to arrest him and the cause of the arrest. (Rule 113, Sec.
9)
¢ Exceptions: same as those for the arrest by an officer.
 METHOD OF ARREST

C. By private person

Duties of private person effecting an arrest:

¢ The private person must deliver the arrested
person to the nearest police station or jail, and
he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Sec. 7.
¢ Otherwise, the private person may be held
liable for illegal detention.
Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.

(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone

acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or
investigates any person for the commission of an offense
shall inform the latter, in a language known to and
understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel, preferably of
his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer
privately with the person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the
services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating
officer. (Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 7438)
 REQUISITES OF A VALID
WARRANT OF ARREST
¢ It must be issued upon probable cause which
must be determined personally by a judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. (Art. 3, Sec. 2, Constitution)
 INSTANCES WHEN JUDGE ISSUES
WARRANT OF ARREST
¢ Upon the filing of the information by the
public prosecutor and after personal
evaluation by the judge of the prosecutor’s
resolution and supporting evidence. (Rule
112, Sec. 6a)
¢ Upon application of a peace officer and after
personal examination by the judge of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce.
(Rule 112, Sec. 6b)
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR ISSUANCE OF
WARRANT OF ARREST
¢ Probable cause is the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested.
 DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR ISSUANCE OF
WARRANT OF ARREST
™The probable cause test is an objective one,
for in order that there be probable cause, the
facts and circumstances must be such as
would warrant a belief by a reasonable
prudent man that the accused is guilty of the
crime which has been committed. (People v.
Allado, 1994)
 DISTINGUISH PROBABLE CAUSE
OF PROSECUTOR FROM
THAT OF A JUDGE
¢ The law requires personal determination on the part
of the judge. The judge may rely on the report of the
investigating prosecutor provided he also evaluates
the documentary evidence in support thereof. Hence,
the fiscal’s finding of probable cause is not conclusive
upon the judge as to his determination of whether or
not there is indeed probable cause. (AAA v. Carbonell,
2007)
 DISTINGUISH PROBABLE CAUSE OF
PROSECUTOR FROM THAT OF A JUDGE
• PC of Prosecutor: WON there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and should be held for
trial for which information is to be filed
• PC of Judge: WON there is reasonable
ground to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be
arrested, and warrant of arrest should be
issued so that the accused may be held in
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.
 TAGASTASON V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 222870, 8 JULY 2019
On 4 April 2012, the City Prosecutor issued an Omnibus
Motion finding probable cause against petitioners for Murder
and Frustrated Murder. Accordingly, the City Prosecutor filed
the Informations on the same date. On 10 April 2012, the cases
were raffled to the sala of Executive Judge Francisco F. Maclang
(Judge Maclang) who was also the same judge handling all the
other cases pending between the parties. On the same day, Judge
Maclang issued the Warrants of Arrest against petitioners.
Petitioners then filed the following: (1) Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice; (2) Administrative Complaint
against the City Prosecutor; and (3) Motion for Inhibition and
Holding in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest before
the trial court.
In this case, petitioners assail the issuance of the warrants of
arrest against them by Judge Maclang.
 TAGASTASON V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 222870, 8 JULY 2019
HELD:
The issuance of a warrant of arrest is within the discretion
of the issuing judge upon determination of the existence of
probable cause.
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a
function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed
the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. The
judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is
one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity
for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice.
 TAGASTASON V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 222870, 8 JULY 2019
The difference is clear: The executive determination of
probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough
evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial
determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon
the determination of probable cause is exclusive and cannot be
deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the
Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause, which is a
function that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation
of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the
exclusive prerogative of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest.
Judge Maclang did not commit any mistake in issuing
warrants for their arrest after personally determining that the
said warrants should be issued.
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
RULE 112
 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
NATURE OF RIGHT
¢ Preliminary investigation (“PI”) – an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. (Rule 112, Sec.1)

¢ The right to PI is a statutory right in those instances where it is

required, and to withhold it would violate the constitutional
right to due process (People v Oandasa, 1968); it is not a formal
or technical right but a substantial right.

¢ It is a personal right which the accused may waive expressly or

impliedly.
 PURPOSES OF
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
¢ To determine whether or not a crime has been
committed and whether or not there is probable
cause to believe the accused is guilty;
¢ To protect the accused from inconvenience,
expense and burden of defending himself in a
formal trial;
¢ To secure the innocent against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecution.
 RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA V.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 146376, 23 APRIL 2014
Agdeppa’s assertion that he had been denied due
process is misplaced, bearing in mind that the rights to be
informed of the charges, to file a comment to the complaint,
and to participate in the preliminary investigation, belong to
Junia. Clearly, the right to preliminary investigation is a
component of the right of the respondent/accused to
substantive due process. A complainant cannot insist that a
preliminary investigation be held when the complaint was
dismissed outright because of palpable lack of merit. It goes
against the very nature and purpose of preliminary
investigation to still drag the respondent/accused through
the rigors of such an investigation so as to aid the
complainant in substantiating an accusation/charge that is
evidently baseless from the very beginning.
 PEOPLE V. OMILIG
G.R. NO. 206296, 12 AUGUST 2015
Accused executed his extrajudicial confession during
the preliminary investigation. Is this extrajudicial
confession admissible in evidence?

Custodial Interrogation/Investigation “is the

questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.” On the
other hand, Preliminary Investigation “is an inquiry or a
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.” A person undergoing
preliminary investigation cannot be considered as being
under custodial investigation.
 PEOPLE V. OMILIG
G.R. NO. 206296, 12 AUGUST 2015

The import of the distinction between custodial

interrogation and preliminary investigation relates to the
inherently coercive nature of a custodial interrogation which
is conducted by the police authorities. Due to the
interrogatory procedures employed by police authorities,
which are conducive to physical and psychological coercion,
the law affords arrested persons constitutional rights to
guarantee the voluntariness of their confessions and
admissions, and to act as deterrent from coercion by police
authorities. These safeguards are found in Article III, Section
12(1) of the Constitution and Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438. Sans
proper safeguards, custodial investigation is a fertile means
to obtain confessions and admissions in duress.
 PEOPLE V. OMILIG
G.R. NO. 206296, 12 AUGUST 2015

In this case, accused’s extrajudicial confession is

admissible in evidence because it was obtained obtained
during a preliminary investigation. And even if accused’s
extrajudicial confession was obtained under custodial
investigation, it is admissible. To be admissible, a confession
must comply with the following requirements: it “must be
(a) voluntary; (b) made with the assistance of a competent
and independent counsel; (c) express; and (d) in writing.” In
the case at bar, the prosecution did not present proof of the
absence of any of these requirements.
 WHO MAY CONDUCT DETERMINATION
OF EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
¢ Provincial/city prosecutors and their assistants, national and
regional state prosecutors, and other officers as may be
authorized by law. (Rule 112, Sec.2)
¢ COMELEC may conduct investigation re: election offenses.
(Omnibus Election Code)
¢ Ombudsman is authorized to conduct PI re: criminal cases
involving public officers and employees. (Ombudsman Act)
 ANLUD METAL RECYCLING
CORPORATION V. ANG
G.R. NO. 182157, 17 AUGUST 2015
Petitioner explains that there are two determinations
of probable cause: the first is for the purpose of filing a
criminal information in the court, and the second is for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner submits that since
the first kind is executive in nature, then the Regional Trial
Court had absolutely no jurisdiction to determine the
existence of probable cause to hold respondent as an accused
in the crime of estafa. Hence, for petitioner, the Regional
Trial Court grievously erred when it gave due course to the
Omnibus Motion of respondent, which questioned the
determination of probable cause by the prosecutor.
Respondent counters this argument by alleging that the
Regional Trial Court may resolve issues brought before it
pursuant to the power of the court to administer justice.
 ANLUD METAL RECYCLING CORPORATION v. ANG
G.R. No. 182157, 17 August 2015

Petitioner’s interpretation of the rules on the determination of

probable cause is inaccurate. Although courts must respect the executive
determination of probable cause, the trial courts may still independently
determine probable cause. They are not irrevocably bound to the
determination of probable cause by the prosecutor and the Department of
Justice. The trial court actually has the following options upon the filing of
a criminal information: (a) immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; (b) issue a warrant of
arrest if it finds probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the
existence of probable cause. These options are provided in Rule 112,
Section 6 (a) of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the Regional Trial Court is
allowed to dismiss the charge of estafa against Ang notwithstanding the
executive determination of probable cause by the prosecutor. If we were
to construe otherwise, we would be contradicting the basic principle that
“once an information is filed in Regional Trial Court, any disposition of
the case rests already in the sound discretion of the court.”
HILARIO P. SORIANO VS. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
FOR LUZON VICTOR C. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 168157, 19 August 2015
The public respondents, in dismissing the charge against Atty.
Cleofe, did not gravely abuse their discretion. The Office of the
Ombudsman found the evidence against him to be insufficient to support
a finding of probable cause to charge him. Undoubtedly, he was a public
officer discharging official functions, an essential element of the crime of
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. However, the other
elements of the crime, specifically: that the accused must have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
that his acts complained of caused any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions were
not shown to be present.
The discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman in the
determination of probable cause to charge a respondent public official or
employee cannot be interfered with in the absence of a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 MINA et. al. v. CA and TANDOC
G.R. No. 239521, 28 January 2019
This case stemmed from an Affidavit-Complaint4 for Perjury, as
defined and penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
filed by petitioners against respondent Tandoc with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Pangasinan. After preliminary
investigation proceedings, the OPP dismissed petitioners' criminal
complaint against Tandoc for lack of probable cause5 Aggrieved,
petitioners appealed before the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor
(ORSP) located in San Fernando City, La Union. However, the ORSP
affirmed the OPP's findings that no probable cause exists to indict Tandoc
for the crime of Perjury. Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA.
The CA dismissed the petition outright on the ground that
petitioners availed of a wrong remedy. It held that under Department of
Justice (DOJ) Department Circular No. 70-A, petitioners should have first
appealed the adverse ORSP ruling to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) before
elevating the matter to the regular courts.
 MINA et. al. v. CA and TANDOC
G.R. No. 239521, 28 January 2019
HELD:
The petition is granted, and remanded to the CA for resolution on
the merits.
DOJ Department Circular No. 70 was amended by DOJ
Department Circular No. 70-A. It delegated to the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor the authority to rule with finality cases subject of
preliminary investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, provided
that:

a) the case is not filed in the National Capital Region (NCR); and
b) the case, should it proceed to the courts, is cognizable by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (collectively, “MTCs”) -which includes not only violations
of city or municipal ordinances, but also all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties
attached thereto.
 MINA et. al. v. CA and TANDOC
G.R. No. 239521, 28 January 2019
This is, however, without prejudice to the right of the SOJ to
review the ORSP’s ruling, should the former deem it appropriate to do
so in the interest of justice.
The above amendment is further strengthened by a later
issuance, DOJ Department Circular No. 018-14 dated 18 June 2014. In
Cariaga v. Sapigao, the Court harmonized the foregoing DOJ Circulars,
and accordingly, interpreted the prevailing appeals process of the NPS:

(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by the
MTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be appealed by way of petition for
review before the ORSP, which ruling shall be with finality;
xxx
(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c), the SOJ may,
pursuant to his power of control and supervision over the entire
National Prosecution Service, review, modify, or reverse the ruling of
the ORSP or the Prosecutor General, as the case may be.
 MINA et. al. v. CA and TANDOC
G.R. No. 239521, 28 January 2019
In this case, records show that petitioners filed a criminal
complaint before the OPP accusing Tandoc of Perjury. The complaint
was, however, dismissed by the OPP and such dismissal was upheld by
the ORSP. Since (a) the criminal complaint was filed outside of the NCR;
(b) perjury cases are cognizable by the first-level courts or the MTCs
since the maximum penalty therefor is imprisonment for less than six
(6) years; and (c) it appears that the SOJ did not exercise its power of
control and supervision over the entire NPS by reviewing the ORSP
ruling, the ORSP's affirmance of the OPP ruling was with finality. As
such, petitioners have already exhausted the administrative remedies
and availed of the correct remedy by filing a petition for certiorari with
the CA.
PROCEDURE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

¢ Filing of Complaint (Rule 112, Sec. 3[a]);

¢ Action of the investigating prosecutor (Rule
112, Sec. 3[b]);
¢ Respondent’s counter-affidavit (Rule 112, Sec.
3[c]);
¢ Hearing (Rule 112, Sec. 3[e]).
 RESOLUTION OF INVESTIGATING
PROSECUTOR
¢ If there is no finding of probable cause, the
investigating prosecutor dismisses the case.
¢ If there is probable cause, he prepares the
information and resolution.
¢ Note: The investigating prosecutor cannot file
information without prior approval of superior.
 REVIEW
¢ Within 5 days from resolution, the investigating
prosecutor officer will forward the case to the prosecutor
or Ombudsman.
¢ Within 10 days from receipt, the prosecutor or
Ombudsman will act on the case, who must
authorize/approve the filing of the information by the
investigating prosecutor.
 REVIEW

¢ In case of dismissal by the investigating

prosecutor, the prosecutor or Ombudsman, if he
disagrees, may file the information himself or any
deputy or order any prosecutor to do so without
conducting a new PI.
¢ The Secretary of Justice may direct the filing of
information or dismissal of the complaint. If an
information is already filed in court, he may direct
the prosecutor to move for the dismissal of the
information with notice to the parties.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 198366, 26 JUNE 2019
The Office of the Ombudsman found no probable
cause to charge the officers of the Development Bank of the
Philippines (Development Bank) and ALFA Integrated
Textile Mills, Inc. (ALFA Integrated Textile) for violation of
Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It held that the six (6)
loans obtained by ALFA Integrated Textile from
Development Bank were not behest loans. This prompted
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), to
file a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court,
assailing the Ombudsman's resolution.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 198366, 26 JUNE 2019

The Supreme Court held that the finding of probable

cause by the Ombudsman is not subject to their review. It is
established that this Court generally does not interfere when the
Office of the Ombudsman has made its finding on the existence
of probable cause. This exercise is an executive function, and is in
accordance with its constitutionally-granted investigatory and
prosecutorial powers. For this Court to review the Office of the
Ombudsman's exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial
powers in criminal cases, there must be a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion. Otherwise, this Court does not generally
interfere with the Ombudsman's findings. Disagreement with the
Ombudsman’s findings is not enough to constitute grave abuse of
discretion. There must be a showing that it conducted the
preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law.
 PEOPLE V. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. NOS. 219824-25, 12 FEBRUARY 2019
Finding probable cause, the Ombudsman filed with
the Sandiganbayan three (3) informations for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended (docketed as SB-
15-CRM-0016 to -0018), and three (3) informations for
malversation (docketed as SB-15-CRM-0019 to -0021)
against respondents, arising from the “PDAF Scam.”
Except for SB-15-CRM-0017 and SB-15-CRM-0020,
the Sandiganbayan found probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against respondents.
Petitioner assails the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of
the Criminal Case Nos. SB-15-CRM-0017 and SB-15-CRM-
0020 against respondents.
 PEOPLE V. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. NOS. 219824-25, 12 FEBRUARY 2019
HELD:
The Sandiganbayan has the authority to determine
whether or not to dismiss the case. Petitioner essentially attacks
the Sandiganbayan's reversal of the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause, contending that the function of determining
whether or not probable cause exists is executive in nature that is
lodged within the competence of the Ombudsman. While it is
true that the Ombudsman retains full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan, the latter gains full control as soon as the case
has been filed before it. This must necessarily be so considering
that when an information is filed in court, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the case and the concomitant authority to
determine whether or not the case should be dismissed being the
"best and sole judge" thereof.
 PEOPLE V. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. NOS. 219824-25, 12 FEBRUARY 2019
Thus, when the Sandiganbayan chose to issue the
correspondent warrants of arrest in the other criminal cases,
ordered the prosecution to present the subject SARO which
respondents denied having signed and processed, and
thereafter, upon examination of the subject SARO, dismissed the
criminal cases for lack of probable cause, the Sandiganbayan, in
fact acted well within its competence and jurisdiction. There is
therefore no reason to ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Sandiganbayan for having reversed the
Ombudsman’s earlier determination of probable cause.
 PROCEDURE OF APPEAL TO THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE FROM A RESOLUTION ON PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION

¢ Filing of a verified Petition for Review within 15

days from receipt of resolution, or of the denial of
the motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation.
¢ Outright dismissal by the Sec. of Justice if the
petition is patently without merit or manifestly
intended for delay.
¢ Verified comment to the petition by the adverse
party within a non-extendible period of fifteen
(15) days from receipt of a copy of the petition
PROCEDURE OF APPEAL TO THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE FROM A RESOLUTION ON
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
¢ Reinvestigation if the Secretary of Justice finds it necessary to
reinvestigate the case.

¢ Disposition/Decision of Appeal. The Sec. of Justice may

reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. (only one
MR of the Decision is allowed)

¢ It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw

an Information (on the ground of lack of probable cause to
hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ
Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an
independent assessment of the merits of the motion and
should not merely rely on the findings of the
Secretary. (Harold Tamargo v. Romulo Awingan, et al., G.R. No.
177727, 19 January 2010)
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V.
PRICE RICHARDSON CORP.
G.R. NO. 197032, 26 JULY 2017 (J. LEONEN)

Courts may pass upon the prosecutor's

determination of probable cause only upon a showing of
grave abuse of discretion.
A prosecutor gravely abuses his or her discretion
in not finding probable cause by disregarding or
overlooking evidence that "are sufficient to form a
reasonable ground to believe that the crime ... was
committed and that the respondent was its author." In
this case, grave abuse of discretion exists, which warrants
this Court's interference in the conduct of the executive
determination of probable cause.
 DE LIMA V. REYES
G.R. NO. 209330, 11 JANUARY 2016 (J. LEONEN)

Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court,

however, the Secretary of Justice may motu proprio reverse
or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or
the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition
for review.
The Secretary of Justice exercises control and
supervision over prosecutors and it is within her authority
to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her
prosecutors.
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to
appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised
Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control
and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus
affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
 PEMBERTON V. DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 217508, 18 APRIL 2016 (J. LEONEN)
A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine
National Police-Olongapo City Police Office and private
respondent Marilou Laude (“Laude”) against petitioner Joseph
Scott Pemberton (“Pemberton”). The City Prosecutor of Olongapo
City found probable cause against Pemberton for the crime of
murder, and on the same day, filed an Information for murder
against him before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. The
trial court issued a warrant of arrest.
Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice. In the Resolution dated January 27, 2015,
Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton's Petition for Review and
stated that based on the evidence on record, there was "no reason
to alter, modify, or reverse the resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Olongapo City." Pemberton filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court, questioning the validity of Secretary de Lima’s
resolution.
 PEMBERTON V. DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 217508, 18 APRIL 2016 (J. LEONEN)

ISSUES:
1. Whether Secretary de Lima committed grave abuse of
discretion in sustaining the finding of probable cause
against petitioner Pemberton; and
2.Whether this case has been rendered moot and academic.
HELD:
1. No. There is no basis to doubt that respondent De Lima
judiciously scrutinized the evidence on record. Based on
respondent De Lima's assessment, there was ample evidence
submitted to establish probable cause that petitioner murdered
the victim:
First, the killing of Laude has been indubitably
confirmed.
 PEMBERTON V. DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 217508, 18 APRIL 2016 (J. LEONEN)

Second, the various pieces of evidence so far presented in this

case, i.e., the CCTV footage of Ambyanz showing Gelviro,
Laude and respondent leaving the club together; the
unequivocal testimonies of Gelviro and Gallamos positively
identifying respondent as the person who was last seen with
Laude on the night he died; the result of the general physical
examination conducted on respondent showing abrasions and
light scratches on different parts of his body; his latent print on
one of the condoms found at the crime scene; and the
unequivocal testimonies of respondent's fellow Marine
servicemen who were with him on that fateful night, lead to no
other conclusion than that respondent was the perpetrator of
the crime.
 PEMBERTON V. DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 217508, 18 APRIL 2016 (J. LEONEN)

Third, the results of the physical examination conducted on

respondent and Laude's cadaver, as well as the ocular
inspection of the crime scene, demonstrate the attendant
qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior
strength, and cruelty.
Finally, the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide as
provided under the RPC, as amended. Hence, the charge of
murder.
The convergence of the foregoing circumstances all taken
together leads to the fair and reasonable inference that
respondent is probably guilty of killing Laude through
treachery, abuse of superior strength, and cruelty.
 PEMBERTON V. DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 217508, 18 APRIL 2016 (J. LEONEN)

2. Yes. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of

the preliminary investigation in any other venue is rendered
moot by the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the conduct of
arraignment. In De Lima v. Reyes (G.R. No. 209330, 11 January
2016), the filing of the information and the issuance by the trial
court of the respondent's warrant of arrest has already
rendered this Petition
 PEMBERTON V. DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 217508, 18 APRIL 2016 (J. LEONEN)

Here, the trial court has already determined,

independently of any finding or recommendation by the First
Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable
cause has been judicially determined. Likewise, respondent De
Lima's manifestation regarding the conviction of petitioner of
the crime of homicide is well-taken. However, even without
the conviction, this Petition has already been rendered moot
and academic by virtue of the judicial finding of probable
cause in the form of the Regional Trial Court's issuance of an
arrest warrant against petitioner
 MAZA V. HON. EVELYN A. TURLA
G.R. NO. 187094. 15 FEBRUARY 2017 (J. LEONEN)
Petitioners Maza, Ocampo, Casiño, and Mariano are
former members of the House of Representatives. Inspector
Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners, who were
allegedly responsible for the death of Bayudang, Peralta, and
Felipe. His findings show that the named individuals
conspired, planned, and implemented the killing of the
supporters of AKBAYAN Party List (AKBAYAN). Bayudang
and Felipe were AKBAYAN community organizers, whereas
Jimmy Peralta was mistaken for a certain Ricardo Peralta, an
AKBAYAN supporter. Inspector Palomo recommended that a
preliminary investigation be conducted and that an Information
for each count of murder be filed against the 19 individuals.
The panel found probable cause for murder in the killing of
Carlito Bayudang and Jimmy Peralta, and for kidnapping with
murder in the killing of Danilo Felipe, against the nineteen 19
suspects.
 MAZA V. HON. EVELYN A. TURLA
G.R. NO. 187094. 15 FEBRUARY 2017 (J. LEONEN)
However, the panel considered one of the suspects, Julie
Flores Sinohin, as a state witness. The panel recommended that
the corresponding Informations be filed against the remaining
suspects. On the same day, two (2) Informations for murder
were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City,
Branch 40 in Nueva Ecija, (Palayan cases) and an Information
for kidnapping with murder was filed in Guimba, Nueva Ecija
(the “Guimba case”). Judge Turla REMANDED the case to the
prosecutor. On 18 July 2008, Judge Turla issued an Order on the
Palayan cases and held "the proper procedure in the conduct of
the preliminary investigation was not followed in the Palayan
cases" There is no dispute that the two (2) Informations for
murder were filed without first affording the movants their
right to file a motion for reconsideration
 MAZA V. HON. EVELYN A. TURLA
G.R. NO. 187094. 15 FEBRUARY 2017 (J. LEONEN)
Petitioner filed a certiorari with the SC, praying that the
Orders of Judge Turla be set aside and annulled and that the
murder cases against them be dismissed for failure to show
probable cause. Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order of
remanding the case back to the prosecutors had no basis in law,
jurisprudence, or the rules.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent Judge Turla gravely abused her

discretion when she remanded the Palayan cases to the
Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of preliminary
investigation.
 MAZA V. HON. EVELYN A. TURLA
G.R. NO. 187094. 15 FEBRUARY 2017 (J. LEONEN)
HELD:
A remand by the judge of the criminal cases to the
Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of another preliminary
investigation is improper.
The determination of probable cause by the trial court
judge is a judicial function, whereas the determination of
probable cause by the prosecutors is an executive function.
Regardless of Judge Turla's assessment on the conduct of the
preliminary investigation, it was incumbent upon her to
determine the existence of probable cause against the accused
after a personal evaluation of the prosecutors' report and the
supporting documents. She could even disregard the report if
she found it unsatisfactory, and/or require the prosecutors to
submit additional evidence. There was no option for her to
remand the case back to the panel of prosecutors for another
preliminary investigation. In doing so, she acted without any
legal basis.
 HAROLD TAMARGO V. ROMULO
AWINGAN, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 177727, 19 JANUARY 2010
Informations for murder were filed against
respondents. The DOJ, on review, directed the withdrawal
of the Informations, and declared that the extrajudicial
confession of Columna was inadmissible against
respondents and that, even if it was admissible, it was not
corroborated by other evidence. The trial prosecutor filed a
motion to withdraw the Informations. The issue now is
whether or not Judge Daguna erred in denying the said
motion.
 HAROLD TAMARGO V. ROMULO AWINGAN, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 177727, 19 JANUARY 2010

It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to

withdraw an Information (on the ground of lack of probable
cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the
DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an
independent assessment of the merits of the motion. It may either
agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary.
Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an
abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a
prima facie case. The court must itself be convinced that there is
indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. Here, Judge
Daguna seriously erred by limiting her evaluation and
assessment only to evidence that supported probable cause while
completely disregarding contradicting evidence.
 HAROLD TAMARGO V. ROMULO AWINGAN, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 177727, 19 JANUARY 2010

The validity and merits of a party’s defense or

accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at
the preliminary investigation. (Lee, et al. v. KBC Bank N.V.
G.R. No. 164673, 15 January 2010)
 LEE, ET AL. V. KBC BANK N.V.
G.R. NO. 164673, 15 JANUARY 2010

As to the issue of probable cause for estafa,

petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it
ruled that the admissibility of the facsimile message is a
matter best ventilated in a full-blown trial.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of

Appeals. The presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense
that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits. In fine, the validity and merits of a party’s defense
or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies
and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper
than at the preliminary investigation.
WHEN WARRANT OF ARREST MAY ISSUE
¢ PC for Prosecutor: WON there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be
held for trial for which the information is to be filed.
¢ PC for Judge: WON there is reasonable ground to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested,
and warrant of arrest should be issued so that the accused may be
held in custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
¢ If the judge finds PC, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if accused is already arrested.
¢ The judge need not personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in the determination of PC, but he must personally
evaluate the prosecutor’s report supporting evidence, and on that
basis, dismiss the case, issue warrant of arrest, or require further
affidavits.
 MENDOZA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 197293, 21 APRIL 2014 (J. LEONEN)
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then
"personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence" to determine whether there is probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage,
a judicial determination of probable cause exists.

While it is within the trial court's discretion to make an

independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for the
purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the
prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor's
determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a
determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor's
finding.
While the information filed by the Prosecutor was valid,
Judge Capco-Umali still had the discretion to make her own
finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of
the accused and proceed with trial.
 PDIC V. HON. CASIMIRO
G.R. NO. 206866, 2 SEPT 2015
It was error on the part of the Ombudsman to
simply discredit Gomez’s affidavit as inadmissible in
evidence for being hearsay. It is noteworthy to point out
that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not
be applied in the course of its proceedings. In the recent
case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, the Court declared that
hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable
cause in preliminary investigations because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Citing a case
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was
held that probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay.
 CASES NOT REQUIRING
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
¢ If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor
involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less
than 4 years, 2 months and 1 day, the procedure outlined
in Rule 112, Sec. 3(a) shall be observed. The prosecutor
shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and
other supporting documents submitted by the
complainant within 10 days from filing.
 REMEDIES OF ACCUSED IF THERE WAS
NO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Effect of denial of right to PI:
— While PI is a statutory and substantive right and a component part
of due process, its absence :
— (1) does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective;
— (2) neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court;
— (3) nor constitute a ground for quashing the information.
 REMEDIES OF ACCUSED IF THERE WAS
NO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
¢ Before the information or complaint is filed, the
person arrested may ask for a PI, but he must sign a
waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC in the
presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver,
he may apply for bail. The investigation must be
terminated within 15 days from its inception.

¢ After the filing of the complaint/information in court

without a P.I., the accused may within 5 days from the
time he learns of its filing, ask for a PI.

¢ In practice, when an Information is filed and the

accused did not undergo PI, he may file a Motion for
Reinvestigation in court.
 INQUEST
Definition of inquest
¢ Inquest is a summary inquiry conducted by the
prosecutor for the purpose of determining whether
the warrantless arrest of a person is based on
probable cause.
General Rule:
¢ PI is required to be conducted before a
complaint/information is filed for an offense where
the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2
months and 1 day, without regard to the fine. (Rule
112, Sec. 1)
 INQUEST
Exception:
¢ When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant
involving an offense that requires a PI, a
complaint/information may be filed without conducting
the PI if the necessary inquest is conducted.
¢ After the filing of the complaint or information in court
without a PI, the accused may, within 5 days from the
time he learns of its filling, ask for a PI with the same
right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in
Rule 112. (Rule112, Sec. 6)
 A.M. NO. 18-07-05-SC
“RULE ON PRECAUTIONARY HOLD DEPARTURE
HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER”

a) Finding of probable cause

Upon motion by the complainant in a criminal complaint

filed before the office of the city or provincial prosecutor, and
upon preliminary determination of probable cause based on the
complaint and attachments, the investigation prosecutor may
file an application in the name of the People of the Philippines
for a precautionary hold departure order (PHDO) with the
proper regional trial court. The application shall be
accompanied by the complaint-affidavit and its attachments,
personal details, passport number and a photograph of the
respondent, if available. (Sec. 3, A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC)
 A.M. NO. 18-07-05-SC
“RULE ON PRECAUTIONARY HOLD DEPARTURE
HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER”
b) Preliminary finding of probable cause

Since the finding of probable cause by the judge is solely

based on the complaint and is specifically issued for the purpose of
issuing the PHDO, the same shall be without prejudice to the
resolution of the prosecutor of the criminal complaint considering the
complaint-affidavit, reply-affidavit, and the evidence presented by
both parties during the preliminary investigation. If the prosecutor
after preliminary investigation dismisses the criminal complaint for
lack of probable cause then the respondent may use the dismissal as a
ground for the lifting of the PHDO with the regional trial court that
issued the order. If the prosecutor finds probable cause and files the
criminal information, the case with the court that issued the PHDO, on
motion of the prosecutor shall be consolidated with the court where
the criminal information is filed. (Sec. 5, A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC)
 A.M. NO. 18-07-05-SC
“RULE ON PRECAUTIONARY HOLD DEPARTURE
HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER”
c) Where filed

The application for precautionary hold departure order

may be filed by a prosecutor with any regional trial court within
whose territorial jurisdiction the alleged crime was committed:
Provided, that for compelling reasons, it can be filed with any
regional trial court within the judicial region where the crim
was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known; Provided, further, that the regional trial courts in the City
of Manila, Quezon City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and
Cagayan de Oro City shall also have the authority to act on
applications filed by the prosecutor based on complaints
instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation, regardless
where the alleged crime was committed. (Sec. 2, A.M. No. 18-07-
05-SC)
 A.M. NO. 18-07-05-SC
RULE ON PRECAUTIONARY HOLD DEPARTURE
HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER

d) Lifting of the Order

The respondent may file a verified motion before

the issuing court for the temporary lifting of PHDO on
meritorious ground; that, based on the complaint-affidavit
and the evidence that he or she will present, there is doubt
that probable cause exists to issue the PHDO or it is shown
that he or she is not a flight risk: Provided, that the
respondent posts a bond; Provided, further, that the lifting
of the PHDO is without prejudice to the resolution of the
preliminary investigation against the respondent (Sec. 7,
A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC)
ARRAIGNMENT
AND PLEA
RULE 116
 ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA, HOW MADE

¢ Arraignment is the stage where the accused is formally

informed of the charge against him by reading before
him the information/complaint and asking him whether
he pleads guilty or not guilty. (Rule 116, Sec. 1a)

¢ It is the stage where the issues are joined and without

which the proceedings cannot advance further or, if
held, will otherwise be void. (Borja v. Mendoza, 1977)
 HOW ARRAIGNMENT MADE

• the complaint or information is furnished the accused in

open court;
• it is read to him in a language or dialect known to him;
• the accused is asked whether he pleads guilty or not
guilty; and
• the accused enters his plea.
A. In general:

• The accused must be arraigned before the court where the

complaint or information was filled or assigned for trial.
• The accused must be present at the arraignment and must
personally enter his plea.
• NO ARRAIGNMENT IN ABSENTIA (Nolasco v. Enrile,
1985) – The presence of the accused is not only a personal
right but also a public duty, irrespective of the gravity of the
offense and the rank of the court.
B. If the accused is under preventive
suspension:

• The case shall be raffled and its records transmitted

to the judge to whom the case was raffled within 3
days from the filling of the information complaint.
• The accused shall be arraigned within 10 days from
the date of the raffle.
WHEN SHOULD PLEA OF NOT GUILTY BE
ENTERED

• Plea of NOT GUILTY to be entered for the accused

when either: (Rule 116, Sec. 1c)
• Refuses to plead;
• Makes a qualified plea of guilty;
• Plea of guilty, but accused presents exculpatory
evidence.
WHEN MAY ACCUSED ENTER A PLEA OF GUILT
TO A LESSER OFFENSE (RULE 116, SEC. 2)

• At the arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the

offended party and prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial
court to plea guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged.

• After arraignment but before the trial, the accused may

still be allowed to plea guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary.
 ACCUSED PLEADS GUILTY TO CAPITAL
OFFENSE, WHAT THE COURT SHOULD DO

• When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the

court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused
may present evidence in his behalf. (Rule 116, Se. 3)
 SEARCHING INQUIRY

• It is the process by which the Court conducts a hearing or

asks searching and clarificatory questions from the accused

• The court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the

voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of his culpability, and the
accused may present evidence in his behalf; such
procedure is mandatory. Failure to observe the duties in
this regard on the part of the trial judge amounts to grave
abuse of discretion. (People v. Devico,1997)

• The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies in

cases of re-arraignment.
• The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not
be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense
counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea
to the accused. (People v. Janjalani, G.R. No. 188314, 10
January 2011)

IMPROVIDENT PLEA

• It is a plea without proper information as to all

circumstances affecting it; based upon a mistaken
assumption or misleading information/advice. (Black’s
Law Dictionary)
• General Rule: Improvident plea should not be accepted. If
accepted, it should not be held to be sufficient to sustain a
conviction. (People v. De Ocampo Gonzaga, 1984). Case is
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
• Exception: If the accused appears guilty beyond
reasonable doubt from the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and defense. (People v. Documento, G.R. No.
188706, March 17, 2010).

• To emphasize: Convictions based on an improvident plea

of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of
the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and
credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the
judgment must be sustained, because then it is predicated
not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but also on
evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.
(People v. Documento, id.)
 GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION OF
ARRAIGNMENT

• Unsound mental condition of the accused at the

time of the arraignment;
• Prejudicial question exists;
• Pending petition for review of the resolution of the
prosecutor with the DOJ or Office of the President.
(Rule 116, Sec.11)
• Accused should file motion to suspend and secure a
ruling on his petition for review within 60 days from
the filing of his petition for review.
• N.B.: The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No.
15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an
Information in the proper court upon a finding of
probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion
for reconsideration. Therefore, if the filing of a motion
for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable
cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding
information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of
the accused, which, in the normal course of criminal
procedure, logically follows the filing of the
information. (Gen. Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
172476-99, 15 September 2010)
 ABS-CBN CORPORATION V. GOZON, ET AL.
G.R. No. 195956, 11 March 2015 (J. Leonen)

The controversy arose from GMA-7’s news coverage on the

homecoming of Filipino overseas worker and hostage victim Angelo
dela Cruz on July 22, 2004, which was apparently footages of ABS-
CBN. Assistant Prosecutor Venturanza found probable cause to indict
respondents for copyright infringement. Thereafter, respondents filed
for a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Then
DOJ Secretary Gonzales held that good faith may be raised as a
defense in the case and ruled in favor of the respondents (the
“Gonzales Resolution”). Both parties moved for the reconsideration of
the Gonzales Resolution.
Meanwhile, on January 19, 2005, the trial court granted the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed earlier by respondents Dela
Peña-Reyes and Manalastas. Perusing the motion, the court finds that
a petition for review was filed with the DOJ on January 5, 2005 as
confirmed by the public prosecutor.
 ABS-CBN CORPORATION V. GOZON, ET AL.
G.R. No. 195956, 11 March 2015 (J. Leonen)

Thus, pursuant to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of

Criminal Procedure, the court be suspended the case for a period of
sixty (60) days counted from January 5, 2005.
In 2010, DOJ Secretary Agra issued a resolution reversing
the Gonzales Resolution. Respondents thus assailed the Agra
Resolution through the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
granted the Petition and set aside the Agra Resolution.

The issue is whether the trial court properly granted the

Motion to Suspend Proceedings
 ABS-CBN CORPORATION V. GOZON, ET AL.
G.R. No. 195956, 11 March 2015 (J. Leonen)
Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
allows the suspension of the accused’s arraignment in certain
circumstances only. However, this court emphasized the limits of
the order of deferment under the Rule, particularly, while the
pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the
arraignment, the provision limits the deferment of the arraignment
to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration
of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to
deny the motion to defer arraignment.

In this case, the trial court should have proceeded with

respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after
the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for Review with
the Department of Justice on 8 March 2005. It was only on
September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued
by the Court of Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act
on the criminal case during the interim period.
 GEN. RAMISCAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 172476-99, 15 September 2010

The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan twelve

(12) Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and
twelve (12) Informations for falsification of public documents
against petitioner and several other co-accused. Petitioner
questioned the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman
and is pending second motion for reconsideration. In the
meantime, in the Sandiganbayan, petitioner moved to set
aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second
motion for reconsideration.
 GEN. RAMISCAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 172476-99, 15 September 2010

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the

Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No.
15 sanction the immediate filing of an Information in the
proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even
during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration.
Therefore, if the filing of a motion for reconsideration of
the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the
filing of the corresponding information, then neither can
it bar the arraignment of the accused, which, in the
normal course of criminal procedure, logically follows the
filing of the information.
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ
v. REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO B. JOSON
G.R. No. 176033, 11 March 2015

Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of

the Motion for Reconsideration before the DOJ. However, the
lapse of almost 1 year and 7 months warranted the
application of the limitation of the period for suspending
arraignment. While the pendency of a petition for review is a
ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the
trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the
motion to defer arraignment.
JUDGMENT
RULE 120
 JUDGMENT

REQUISITES OF A JUDGMENT

¢ Written in official language.

¢ Personally and directly prepared by the judge.
¢ Signed by the judge.
¢ Contains clearly and distinctly a statement of facts proved
and the law upon which judgment is based.
¢ Judge who penned the decision need not be the one who
heard the case.
¢ The fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was
not the one who rendered the judgment but merely relied
on the record of the case does not render his judgment
erroneous or irregular.
 CONTENTS OF JUDGMENT
Conviction

The judgment of conviction shall state:

• The legal qualification of the offense and the
attendant aggravating, mitigating circumstances.
• Participation of the accused (principal, accomplice or
accessory)
• That penalty should not be imposed in the
alternative.
• The civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful
act, if any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability
is by a separate civil action, or is waived or reserved.
Judgment for 2 or more offenses

• General Rule: Complaint/information must

charge only one offense.
• Exception: Cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.

• General Rule: Duplicitous information is

subject to a motion to quash.
• Exception: Defect is waived when accused
fails to move for quashal.
• Thus, where the accused fails to object to 2 or more
offenses charged in a single information/complaint
before trial (Rule 120, Sec.3), the court may:

(a) Convict him of as many offenses as are charged and

proved; and
• Exception: One of the offenses has been a necessary
means for committing the other offense and where
both have been result of a single act.

(b) Impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting

out separately the findings of fact and law in each
offense.
• Exception: maximum duration of offense: Follow the
three-fold rule on the service of penalty (Revised Penal
Code, Art. 70).
 Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof

• General Rule: The defendant can be convicted only

of the crime with which he is charged.

• Rationale: He has the right to be informed of the

nature of the offense with which he is charged before
he is put on trial.

• However, minor variance between the information

and the evidence:
• Does not alter the nature of the offense;
• Does not determine or qualify the crime or penalty;
• Cannot be ground for acquittal.
• Exception: The accused can be convicted of an offense only
when it is both charged and proven.
• - He can be convicted of an offense proved provided it is
included in the charge, or of an offense charged which is
included in that which is proved. (Rule 120, Sec.4)

• The mere fact that the evidence presented would indicate

that a lesser offense outside the court’s jurisdiction was
committed does not deprive the court of its jurisdiction
which had vested in it under the allegations in the
information.
• Exception to the exception: Where there are facts that
supervened after the filing of the information which change
the nature of the offense.
 When an offense includes or is included in
another (Rule 120, Sec. 5)

• The offense charged necessarily includes the

offense proved when some of the essential
elements/ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint/information,
constitute the latter.
• An offense charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.
 Effects:
• The accused shall be convicted of: (Rule 120, Sec. 4)
• The offense proved which is included in the
offense charged; or
• The offense charged which is included in the
offense proved
• The right to be informed of the charges has not been
violated because where an accused is charged with a
specific crime, he is duly informed also of lesser
crimes/offenses included therein. (People v.
Villamar, 1998)
• Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence
fails to support the charge as to one of the
component offenses, the accused can be convicted of
the one which is proven.
 RICHARD RICALDE V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 211002, 21 January 2015 (J. Leonen)
XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s
Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00 p.m. Ricalde, then 31 years old, is a
distant relative and textmate of XXX, then 10 years old. After dinner,
XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was
late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor. It
was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and
stomach and something inserted in his anus." He saw that Ricalde
"fondled his penis."

Ricalde denied the allegations against him. He argues that this

masturbation could have caused an irritation that XXX mistook as
penetration. XXX could also have mistaken the "overreaching fingers as
a male organ trying to enter his [anus]. Assuming these acts took place,
these would only be considered as acts of lasciviousness and the court
should have applied the "variance doctrine" and found him guilty for
the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness.
 RICHARD RICALDE V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 211002, 21 January 2015 (J. Leonen)

The Supreme Court did not apply the Variance

Doctrine.

XXX testified that he "felt something was

inserted [into his] anus." The slightest penetration into
one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of
lasciviousness from the crime of rape. Thus, no
variance exists between what was charged and what
was proven during trial considering that prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of
the crime of rape through sexual assault.
State liability for unjust conviction
• Under R.A. No. 7309, victims of unjust
imprisonment or detention may file a claim for
compensation with the DOJ Board of Claims.

Who may file claims for compensation:

• (a) any person who was unjustly accused,
convicted and imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal;
• (b) any person who was unjustly detained and
released without being charged;
• (c) any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention by
the authorities as defined in the Revised Penal Code
under a final judgment of the court; and
• (d) any person who is a victim of violent crimes.
• For purposes of this law, violent crimes shall include
rape and shall likewise refer to offenses committed
with malice which resulted in death or serious
physical and/or psychological injuries, permanent
incapacity or disability, insanity, abortion, serious
trauma, or committed with torture, cruelly or
barbarity.
 CONTENTS OF JUDGMENT
Acquittal
¢ Definition: A finding of not guilty based on the merits, either:

¢ The evidence does not show that his guilt is beyond reasonable
doubt; or
¢ A dismissal of the case after the prosecution has rested its case
and upon motion of the accused on the ground that the evidence
fails to show beyond doubt that accused is guilty.
¢ REASONABLE DOUBT- Doubt engendered by an investigation
of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let
the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt.
¢ Rationale: It is always better to err in acquitting than in
punishing. (People v. Lizada, G.R. No. 97226, 1993)
¢ The Judgment of acquittal shall state whether:
¢ The evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused, or
¢ It merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
— However, on this second statement, this does not extinguish the
civil liability of the accused arising from his acts, since civil
liability arose not from a crime but from the damage caused by
such acts.

¢ The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it

the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
 PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT;
INSTANCES OF PROMULGATION OF
JUDGMENT IN ABSENTIA
¢ Promulgation: An official proclamation or announcement of
judgment or order.
¢ Two things are essential and necessary for the valid
promulgation of a court decision:
¢ There must be a judge or judges legally appointed or elected
and actually acting either de jure or de facto, and
 PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT;
INSTANCES OF PROMULGATION OF
JUDGMENT IN ABSENTIA
¢ The said judgment must be duly signed and promulgated
during the incumbency of the judge who signed it. (Miguel
v. MTC,1986)
¢ The judgment or sentence does not become a judgment or
sentence in law until it:
— Is read and announced to the defendant; or
— Has become a part of the record of the court. (US v. CFI of Manila, 24
Phil 321)
¢ Where there is no promulgation of judgment, no right to
appeal accrues.
Notice for Promulgation
¢ Clerk of Court gives notice to accused personally or
through bondsman or warden and counsel.
¢ If the accused jumps bail or escapes from prison and was
tried in absentia, notice will be served at his last known
address. (Rule 120, Sec. 6)

¢ Sin perjucio judgment: Judgment without a statement of

facts. (Dizon v. Lopez, 1997)

Promulgation where the judge is absent

¢ The judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court
when the judge is absent or outside the province or city.
(Rule 120, Sec. 6)
Presence of accused required in promulgation;
exception
¢ General rule: Presence of the accused is mandatory.
¢ Exception: convictions for light offenses.

Presence of accused required in promulgation;

exception
¢ If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the
accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he
shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against
the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Judgment becomes final in 4 instances:
¢ After the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal;
¢ When the sentence has been partially / totally satisfied or
served; or
¢ The accused has expressly waived in writing his right to
appeal,
¢ When the accused applies for probation, and thereby
waives right to appeal
 COLINARES V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 182748, 13 DECEMBER 2011
It is true that under the probation law the accused
who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is
disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction
have been meted out to herein accused: one, a conviction
for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set
aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the
Supreme Court. x x x The Court’s finding that accused was
guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted
homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time
imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the trial court
done him right from the start, it would have found him
guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right
penalty of two years and four months maximum. This
would have afforded accused the right to apply for
probation.
 COLINARES V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 182748, 13 DECEMBER 2011

Since the Court found accused guilty only of the

lesser crime of attempted homicide and held that the
maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be
lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of
prision correccional, as maximum, it would be but fair to
allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand
of the case to the trial court.
WHEN DOES JUDGMENT BECOME
FINAL
When judgment of acquittal becomes final
¢ It is immediately final and executory.
¢ The State may not seek its review without placing the
accused in double jeopardy.

¢ N.B.: The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment
was not the one who had the occasion to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses during trial but merely relied on
the records of the case does not render the judgment
erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is
sufficient to support its conclusion. (People v. Paling, G.R.
No. 185390, 16 March 2011)
 DAVAO ACF BUS LINES, INC. V. ANG
G.R. NO. 218516, 27 MARCH 2019
The present controversy is a consequence of the
execution of judgment in the case of People of the Phils. vs.
Rodolfo Borja Tanio, who was the driver of a Daewoo Bus
registered under the name of ACF. Tanio was charged with
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
MTCC convicted Tanio and ordered him to pay damages. The
decision became final and executory and the prosecution
moved for Execution. However, the writ was returned
unsatisfied as the latter had allegedly no properties that could
be levied to satisfy the money judgment. Hence, upon motion,
the MTCC issued a writ of execution against ACF, being the
employer of accused Tanio.
Consequently, ACF filed a Motion to Recall and/or
Quash The Writ of Execution against it which was, however,
denied by the MTCC. The CA denied the appeal filed by ACF.
 DAVAO ACF BUS LINES, INC. v. ANG
G.R. No. 218516, 27 March 2019

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s ruling. The primary

argument of ACF is centered on the supposed erroneous award of
damages against the ACF's employee Tanio. But as amply explained
by the court a quo, such supposed errors merely pertain only to
mistakes of law and not of jurisdiction, thus putting them beyond
the ambit of certiorari. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect,
as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari.

More importantly, ACF's act of assailing the award of damages

made by the MTCC is tantamount to an attack against a final and
executory judgment, being a clear violation of the doctrine of
immutability of judgment. The Judgment of the MTCC awarding
civil indemnity, which is now being assailed by ACF, was not
appealed; thus making it final and executory.
APPEAL
RULE 122
 APPEAL

EFFECT OF AN APPEAL
¢ An appeal in a criminal proceeding in throws the
whole case open for review and it becomes the duty
of the appellate court to correct an error as may be
found in the appealed judgment, whether or not it is
made the subject of assignment of errors. (People v.
Calayca, 1999)
 WHERE TO APPEAL
¢ To the RTC – from the MTC/MeTC/MCTC
¢ To the Sandiganbayan – from the RTC or
MTC/MeTC/MCTC if accused is government-official or
employee and act is duty-related (i.e. filed under EO 1, 2, 4
and 14-A)
¢ To the CA – from the RTC (if it involves questions of
questions of fact and of law)
 WHERE TO APPEAL
¢ To the SC – from the RTC
— If it involves questions of law only
— If it involves constitutionality or validity of any treaty /
ordinance / Executive Order / regulation or the jurisdiction of
the inferior court
— In criminal cases involving offense for which penalty imposed
is death or life imprisonment
— Other offenses, which, arose out of the same occurrence or
which may have been committed by the accused on the same
occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense
 WHERE TO APPEAL
¢ To the SC – from the CA or the Sandiganbayan
¢ Improper designation
— The designation of the wrong court does not necessarily
affect the validity of the notice of appeal. However, the
designation of the proper court should be made within the
15-day period to appeal. Otherwise, Section 2, Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court would apply. (Torres v. People, 2011)
 HOW APPEAL TAKEN
(RULE 122, SEC. 9)
Transmission of record to RTC
¢ Within 5 days from the perfection of the appeal, the clerk
of court shall transmit the original record to the
appropriate RTC.

Notifications of parties
¢ Upon receipt of the complete record, Transcript of
Stenographic Notes (TSN) and evidence of the case, the
RTC clerk of the court shall notify the parties of such fact.
 HOW APPEAL TAKEN
(RULE 122, SEC. 9)
Submission of memoranda/briefs
¢ Within 15 days from the receipt of notice, the parties
may submit memoranda/briefs, or may be required by
the RTC to do so.

Decision
¢ After the submission of such memoranda/briefs or upon
the expiration of the period to file the same, the RTC
shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of
the case and of such memoranda/briefs as may have
been filed.
 WHEN APPEAL TO BE TAKEN
(RULE 122, SEC. 6)
¢ Within 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment
or from notice of the final order appealed from.
¢ Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatory
and imperative. Only strong considerations of equity
will lead us to allow an exception to the procedural rule
in the interest of substantial justice. (Villamor v. People;
and Vios v. People, 2011)
 EFFECT OF APPEAL BY ANY OF
SEVERAL ACCUSED
¢ General Rule: An appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal.
— As to the appealing party, the execution of judgment appealed
from is stayed upon the perfection of the appeal.
— As to the co-accused who did not appeal, the judgment of the
trial court insofar as it relates to him becomes final and the
appellate court has no power to interfere with it. (Salvatierra v.
CA, 1996)
 EFFECT OF APPEAL BY ANY OF
SEVERAL ACCUSED

¢ Exception: Insofar as the judgment of the appellate court

is favorable and applicable to those who did not appeal
or who withdrew his appeal. (People v. Escano)
¢ The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect
shall not affect the criminal aspect of the judgment or
order appealed from.
GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

¢ When appeal by the people will not lie:

— The People/State cannot appeal when it will put the
accused in double jeopardy.
— The prosecution cannot appeal from a judgment of
acquittal.

¢ Rationale: A verdict of this nature is immediately final

and to try it again on the merits, even in an appellate
court, places the accused in double jeopardy. (Central
Bank v. CA, 1989)
 QUESTIONING AN ACQUITTAL
THROUGH A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
¢ A Rule 65 Petition for certiorari is the remedy to question
a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the
appellate level. By way of exception, a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a
clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the
assailed judgment void. (People v. Asis, G.R. No. 173089,
25 August 2010)
 PEOPLE V. ASIS
G.R. NO. 173089, 25 AUGUST 2010

Accused Abordo was acquitted by the trial court

for two (2) counts of murder. The prosecution filed a Rule
65 Petition with the Court of Appeals, which was
dismissed. A Rule 45 Petition was thereafter filed with the
Supreme Court to contest the Court of Appeals’ Decision.

The Supreme Court held that a Rule 65 Petition for

certiorari, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict
of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate
level. The Philippine judicial system adheres to the
finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of
acquittal is final and unappealable.
 PEOPLE V. ASIS
G.R. NO. 173089, 25 AUGUST 2010

By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a

criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing
by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void. In this petition, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Abordo’s
acquittal in Criminal Case No. N-2213 was improper. Since
appeal could not be taken without violating Abordo’s
constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy,
the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court.
 REPRESENTATION DURING APPEAL
¢ N.B.: If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court
or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines
on appeal. The private offended party or complainant
may not take such appeal.
 BDO UNIBANK, INC. V. PUA
G.R. NO. 230923, 8 JULY 2019
In a plethora of cases, the Court has consistently
ruled that only the OSG may bring or defend actions in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the
People or State in criminal proceedings before the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This is subject to
two exceptions where a private complainant or offended
party in a criminal case may file a petition directly with
this Court, to wit: (1) when there is denial of due process of
law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to
act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private
offended party; and (2) when the private offended party
questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court.
RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED
RULE 115
 RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

RIGHTS OF ACCUSED AT THE TRIAL

(1) To be presumed innocent;

(2) To be informed of the nature and cause of

accusation;

(3) To be present and defend in person OR by

counsel;
(4) Right to be present at every stage of the
proceedings:

This right may be waived when:

• Accused is absent without just cause at the trial;
• Accused under custody escapes.

However, presence is mandatory:

• For purposes of identification;
• At arraignment; (Rule 116, Sec. 1b)
• At the promulgation of judgment;
• Exception: If the conviction is for a light offense.
(Rule 120, Sec. 6)
 Requisites of Trial in absentia: (Parada v. Veneracion,
1997)
• Prior arraignment;
• Proper notice of the trial;
• Failure to appear is unjustifiable.
• Effects: waiver of right to be present, right to present
evidence and right to cross-examine witnesses. (Gimenez
v. Nazareno, 1998)

(5) Right to counsel;

• The general rule is that a client is bound by the
counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the realm of
procedural technique, except, when the reckless or
gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of
due process of law.

(6) Right to defend in person;

(7) To testify as witness in his behalf;
(8) Right against self-incrimination;

DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 200748, 23 July 2014

A police officer arrested for extortion was

compelled to undergo a drug test by submitting his
urine sample. He was found positive for drugs and
thereafter convicted for use of dangerous drugs (Sec. 15,
Art II R.A. 9165). The Court held that the urine sample
is inadmissible for being violative of the accused’s right
against self-incrimination. Cases where non-testimonial
compulsion has been allowed reveal that the pieces of
evidence obtained were all material to the principal
cause of the arrest.
(9) Right to confrontation;

(10) Right to compulsory process;

(11) Right to speedy, impartial and public trial;

Remedies against denial of right:

• Motion to dismiss
• Dismissal subject to rules on double jeopardy
• Petition for Mandamus (Vide Abadia v CA, 1994)

(12) Right to appeal.

 KIM LIONG V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200630, 4 June 2018 (J. Leonen)
Denying an accused the right to cross-examine will
render the testimony of the witness incomplete and
inadmissible in evidence. However, like any right, the
right to cross-examine may be waived. When an accused
is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but
fails to avail of it, the accused shall be deemed to have
waived this right.
 KIM LIONG V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200630, 4 June 2018 (J. Leonen)

Here, the delay is attributable to accused’s own actions

and evident tactic to delay the case. Accused was given more
than enough opportunity to cross-examine witness Dela
Rama. Contrary to his allegation, five of the cancellations are
attributable to him. Accused failed to aggressively exercise
his rights to confront and cross-examine witness Dela Rama.
The absence of counsel during the two (2) hearings was never
explained. Accused had the habit of frequently changing
counsels. In fact, he was even admonished for again
changing his counsel and causing delay to the proceeding.

When the accused abuses its option to choose his

counsel as in this case, he can be deemed to have waived his
right to confrontation and cross-examination.
 CESAR M. CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NOS. 206438 AND 206458, 31 JULY 2018 (J. LEONEN)

Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy

disposition of cases. Inordinate delay in the resolution and
termination of a preliminary investigation will result in the
dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is not
determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through
the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding each
case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point
of view of how much time a competent and independent public
officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case.
Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her constitutional
rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so could be
considered by the courts as a waiver of right.

In this case, Cagang is considered to have waived his right.

Despite the pendency of the case since 2003, Cagang only
invoked his right to speedy disposition of cases when the
informations were filed on 17 November 2011.
RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION (SEC. 2, R.A. NO. 7438)
¢ (1) To be assisted by counsel at all times.
¢ Waiver of the right to counsel must be made with the
assistance of counsel. (Art. 3, Sec. 12(1), Constitution)
¢ To be assisted specifically in the following instances:

¢ Signing of the written custodial report;

¢ Signing of the written extra-judicial confession

— In the absence of counsel and upon valid waiver,

it may be made in the presence of any of his
parents, elder brothers and sisters, spouse, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest/minister of gospel as
chosen by him.
¢ Signing of the waiver of the provisions of Art. 125,
RPC.
• (2) To be informed, in a language known to and
understood by him, of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all
times be allowed to confer privately with the
person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation.
• If he cannot afford to have his own counsel, he must
be provided with a competent and independent
counsel by the investigating officer.
• Assisting counsel may be any lawyer, except those:
• Directly affected by the case;
• Charged with conducting preliminary investigation;
• Charged with the prosecution of crimes (Sec. 3, RA
7438)
(3) To be allowed visits by or conference with:
• Any member of his immediate family (“Immediate
family” includes his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée,
parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or
grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and
guardian or ward), or
• Any medical doctor or
• Priest or religious minister
• Chosen by him or by any member of his immediate
family or by his counsel, or by
• Any national NGO duly accredited by the Commission
on Human Rights or by any International NGO duly
accredited by the Office of the President.
 DOUBLE JEOPARDY
¢ The Supreme Court held that a judgment acquitting
the accused is final and immediately executory upon
its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may
not seek its review without placing the accused in
double jeopardy. (People v. Balunsat, G.R. No. 176743,
28 July 2010)
 PEOPLE V. BALUNSAT
G.R. No. 176743, 28 July 2010

Accused was convicted by the RTC of two (2) counts of

rape and one (1) count of attempted rape. Upon appeal, the
CA modified the judgment by (a) acquitting him of rape on
the ground of reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 762-T
and (b) downgrading the attempted rape to consummated
acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 781-T.

The Supreme Court held that a judgment acquitting

the accused is final and immediately executory upon its
promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its
review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such
acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double
jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at
the CA.
 PEOPLE V. BALUNSAT
G.R. No. 176743, 28 July 2010

In Criminal Case No. 781-T, the CA modified the guilty

verdict of the RTC from attempted rape to acts of
lasciviousness. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s
modification, and held that it can no longer review the
“downgrading” of the crime by the appellate court without
violating the right against double jeopardy, which proscribes
an appeal from a judgment of acquittal or for the purpose of
increasing the penalty imposed upon the accused. In effect,
the CA already acquitted accused of the charge of attempted
rape, convicting him only for acts of lasciviousness, a crime
with a less severe penalty. Hence, the High Court limited
itself to determining whether there is enough evidence to
support accused’s conviction for acts of lasciviousness.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE COMPUTATION OF TIME
IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
TRIAL

• Under Rule 119, Section 3, the only delays that may be

excluded from the time limit within which trial must
commence are those resulting from proceedings
concerning the accused. The time involved in the
proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue can only be
excluded from said time limit if it was the accused who
instituted the same. Hence, in this case, the time during
which the petition for transfer of venue filed by the private
complainant is pending, cannot be excluded from the time
limit of 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order imposed
in Section 1, Rule 119. (Mari v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 187728, 12
September 2011)
PRE-TRIAL
RULE 118
 PRE-TRIAL

PRE-TRIAL ORDER

When issued

¢ The Pre-Trial Order is issued by the court after the pre-

trial conference.

¢ Judgment of acquittal based on pre-trial despite disputed

documents and issues of fact amounts to grave error and
renders the judgment void (People v. Santiago, 1989).
Contents
• Action taken;
• Facts stipulated; and
• Evidence marked.

Effects
• It binds the parties, limits the trial to matters
not disposed of, and controls the course of
action during trial, unless modified by the
court to prevent manifest injustice (Rule 118,
Sec. 4).
 REFERRAL OF SOME CASES FOR COURT
ANNEXED MEDIATION AND JUDICIAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION

AM No. 03-1-09-SC

• After arraignment, the court shall set the pre-

trial conference within 30 days from the date
of arraignment.
• In mediatable cases, the judge shall refer the
parties and their counsel to the Philippine
Mediation Center unit for purposes of
mediation if available.
 CRUZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 210266, 7 June 2017 (J. Leonen)

The rule is that no evidence shall be allowed

during trial if it was not identified and pre-marked during
trial. This provision, however, allows for an exception:
when allowed by the court for good cause shown. There is
no hard and fast rule to determine what may constitute
"good cause," though this Court has previously defined it
as any substantial reason "that affords a legal excuse."
 CRUZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 210266, 7 June 2017 (J. Leonen)

The trial court retains its discretion to allow any evidence

to be presented at trial even if not previously marked during
pre-trial. Here, the trial court allowed the presentation of the
counterfeit credit card at trial due to the prosecution's
explanation that during pre-trial, the counterfeit credit card was
still in the Criminal Investigation and Detective Group's
custody.

The prosecution was able to present and mark during

pre-trial Citibank's certification that the access device used was
counterfeit. It is this certification that makes the possession and
use of the access device illegal. Therefore, the trial court
determined that the access device could still be presented at trial
since it merely formed part of an· exhibit that had already been
presented and marked during pre-trial.
PROVISIONAL
REMEDIES
 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
IN CRIMINAL CASES
NATURE
¢ The provisional remedies in civil actions, insofar as they
are applicable, may be availed of in connection with the
civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action.
(Rule 127, Sec. 1)

KINDS OF PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

1. Attachment.—When the civil action is properly

instituted in the criminal action as provided in Rule
111, the offended party may have the property of the
accused attached as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered from the accused in
the following cases:
(a) When the accused is about to abscond from the
Philippines;

(b) When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or

property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted
to the use of the accused who is a public officer, officer of a
corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk, in the
course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a
fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;

(c) When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of

his property, or is about to do so; and

(d) When the accused resides outside the Philippines. (Rule

127, Sec. 1)
 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
IN CRIMINAL CASES
2. Preliminary Injunction

3. Receivership

4. Delivery of Personal Property

5. Support Pendente Lite

NEW TRIAL OR
RECONSIDERATION
RULE 121
 NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL. (RULE 121, SEC. 2)
¢ (1) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused have been committed
during the trial;
— General Rule: Error of the defense counsel in the conduct of the
trial is neither an error of law nor an irregularity.
— Exception: Acquittal would in all probability have allowed the
introduction of certain testimony which was not submitted at
the trial under improper or injudicious advice of incompetent
counsel.
— Irregularities must be with much seriousness as to affect
prejudicially the substantial rights of the accused.
GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL. (RULE 121, SEC. 2)
¢ (2) That new and material evidence has been discovered which
the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered
and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment.
GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION (RULE 121, SEC. 3)
— Errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further
proceedings.
— Rationale: To afford the trial court the opportunity to correct its
own mistakes and to avoid unnecessary appeals.

EFFECTS OF GRANTING A NEW TRIAL OR

RECONSIDERATION (RULE 121, SEC. 6)
• In all cases:
• The original judgment is set aside or vacated; and
• A new judgment is rendered accordingly.
 SPECIFIC EFFECTS WHEN GRANTED UPON
DIFFERENT GROUNDS:

A. Errors of law or irregularities committed during the

trial
¢ All proceedings and evidence affected shall be set
aside and taken anew.
¢ If error or irregularity goes into the jurisdiction, entire
proceeding is void and must be set aside.
¢ Further, the Court may allow introduction of
additional or other evidence in the interest of justice.
 SPECIFIC EFFECTS WHEN GRANTED UPON
DIFFERENT GROUNDS

B. Newly-discovered evidence
¢ Evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-
discovered and such other evidence shall be taken and
considered together with the evidence already on
record.
¢ All proceedings and evidence affected shall be set
aside and taken anew.
¢ Further, the Court may allow introduction of
additional or other evidence in the interest of justice.
APPLICATION OF NEYPES DOCTRINE IN
CRIMINAL CASES
Neypes v. CA, 2005:
¢ (See YU v. TATAD)

¢ Fresh Period of Appeal after denial of Motion for

New Trial or Motion for Reconsideration
¢ “Henceforth, the “fresh period rule” shall also apply
to Rule 40 governing appeals from the MTCs to the
RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs
to the CA; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court.
APPLICATION OF NEYPES DOCTRINE IN
CRIMINAL CASES.
¢ The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to
standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules
and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-
day appeal period should be counted. Litigants today
need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-
day period is now counted from receipt of the order
denying a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution. (Yu v.
Samson-Tatad, GR No. 170979, 9 February 2011)
 JUDITH YU V. SAMSON-TATAD
GR NO. 170979, 9 FEBRUARY 2011
An information for estafa against petitioner was filed
with the Regional Trial Court which convicted the
petitioner as charged. Fourteen days later, petitioner filed a
motion for new trial, alleging that she discovered new and
material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for
which she was convicted. The respondent judge denied the
petitioner's motion for new trial for lack of merit.

The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the

Regional Trial Court, alleging that she had a fresh period of
15 days from the receipt of the denial of her motion for new
trial, within which to file a notice of appeal. The
prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being
belatedly filed and a Motion for execution of the decision.
 JUDITH YU V. SAMSON-TATAD
GR NO. 170979, 9 FEBRUARY 2011
To standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules
and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal
period should be counted, the “fresh period rule” applies to
appeals in criminal cases. Were we to strictly interpret the “fresh
period rule” in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period
to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage
an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a
better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case – a
situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly
discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a
double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where
property interests are at stake, as against a situation where
liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this
double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason.
REVISED GUIDELINES
OF CONTINUOUS TRIAL
IN CRIMINAL CASES
A.M. No.15-06-10-SC
SALIENT FEATURES
 MOTIONS
Prohibited Motions. -- The following prohibited motions
shall be denied outright before the scheduled arraignment
without need of comment and/or opposition:

¢ Motion for judicial determination of probable cause;

¢ Motion for preliminary investigation filed beyond 5-day
reglementary period in inquest proceedings under Sec.
6, Rule 112, or when preliminary investigation is
required under Sec. 8, Rule 112, or allowed in inquest
proceedings and the accused failed to participate in the
preliminary investigation despite due notice.
(Sec. III (2)(b), 2017 Guidelines for Continuous Trial)
 MOTIONS
Prohibited Motions.

¢ Motion for reinvestigation of the prosecutor

recommending the filing of information once the
information has been filed before the court (1) if the
motion is filed without prior leave of court; (2) when
preliminary investigation is not required under Sec. 8,
Rule 112; and (3) when the regular preliminary
investigation is required and has been actually
conducted, and the grounds relied upon in the motion
are not meritorious, such as issues of credibility,
admissibility of evidence, innocence of the accused, or
.lack of due process when the accused was actually
notified, among others;
 MOTIONS
Prohibited Motions.

¢ Motion to quash information when the ground is not

one of those stated in Sec. 3, Rule 117 ;
¢ Motion for bill of particulars that does not conform to
Sec. 9, Rule 116;
¢ Motion to suspend the arraignment based on grounds
not stated under Sec. 11, Rule 116; and
¢ Petition to suspend the criminal action on the ground of
prejudicial question, when no civil case has been filed,
pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 111.
(Sec. III (2)(b), 2017 Guidelines for Continuous Trial)
 MOTIONS
Meritorious Motions. -- Motions that allege plausible
grounds supported by relevant documents and/or
competent evidence, except those that are already covered
by the Revised Guidelines, are meritorious motions, such
as:

¢ Motion to withdraw information, or to downgrade the

charge in the original information, or to exclude an
accused originally charged therein, filed by the
prosecution as a result of a reinvestigation,
reconsideration, and review;
¢ Motion to quash warrant of arrest;
(Sec. III (2)(c), 2017 Guidelines for Continuous Trial)
 MOTIONS
Meritorious Motions

¢ Motion to suspend arraignment on the ground of an

unsound mental condition under Sec. ll(a), Rule 116;
¢ Motion to suspend proceedings on the ground of a
prejudicial question where a civil case was filed prior to
the criminal case under Sec. ll(b), Rule 116;
¢ Motion to quash information on the grounds that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, lack of
jurisdiction, extinction of criminal action or liability, or
double jeopardy under Sec. 3, par. (a), (b), (g), and (i),
Rule 117;
 MOTIONS
Meritorious Motions

¢ Motion to discharge accused as a state witness under

Sec. 17, Rule 119;
¢ Motion to quash search warrant under Sec. 14, Rule 126
or motion to suppress evidence; and
¢ Motion to disnuss on the ground that the criminal case
is a Sfrategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation
(SLAPP) under Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases.
(Sec. III (2)(c), 2017 Guidelines for Continuous Trial)
 MOTIONS
Meritorious Motions

Ø The comment of the adverse party shall be filed within a non-

extendible period of 10 calendar days from notice/receipt of
the order of the court
Ø Court shall resolve the motion within a non-extendible
period of 10 calendar days from the expiration of the 10-day
period, with or without comment.
Ø The Court, at its discretion, may set the motion for hearing
within a non-extendible period of 10 calendar days from the
expiration of the 10-day period to file comment, in which
case the same shall be submitted for resolution after the
termination of the hearing, and shall be resolved within a
non-extendible period of 10 calendar days thereafter. Reply
and memorandum need not be submitted.
 MOTIONS
Meritorious Motions

¢ In case of a Motion to Discharge accused as State witness,

where the prosecution is required to present evidence in
support thereof, such motion shall be submitted for
resolution from the termination of the hearing, and shall be
resolved within a non-extendible period of 10 calendar days
thereafter .
¢ The MR of the resolution of a meritorious motion shall be
filed within a non-extendible period of 5 calendar days from
receipt of such resolution, and the adverse party shall be
given 5 calendar days from receipt of the MR within which to
submit its comment. Thereafter, the MR shall be resolved by
the court within a non-extendible period of 5 calendar days
from the expiration of the 5-day period to submit the
comment.
 MOTIONS
Motions for Postponement.

¢ General Rule: Prohibited.

¢ Exception: acts of God, force majeure or physical inability
of the witness to appear and testify. If the motion is
granted based on such exceptions, the moving party
shall be warned that the presentation of its evidence
must still be finished on the dates previously agreed
upon.
¢ A motion for postponement, whether written or oral, shall at all
times be accompanied by the original official receipt from the Office
of the Clerk of Court evidencing payment of the postponement fee.
 ARRAIGNMENT AND PRE-TRIAL

Schedule of Arraignment and Pre-trial. -

¢ Once the court has acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the accused, the arraignment of the accused and the
pre-trial shall be set within 10 calendar days from date
of the court's receipt of the case for a detained accused,
and within 30 calendar days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction (either by arrest or voluntary
surrender) over a non-detained accused, unless a
shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme
Court circular.
¢ N.B. To expedite proceedings, the courts now set
arraignment and pre-trial on the same date.
 BAIL
(a) Petition for Bail

Petition for bail filed after the filing of the

information shall be set for summary hearing after
arraignment and pre-trial. Testimony of a witness in
petition for bail may be in the form allowed by
subheading III, item no. 11, par. B (Form of Testimony) of
the Revised Guidelines, provided that the demeanor of
the witness is not essential in determining his or her
credibility. (Sec. III (10)(a), par. 1 of the 2017 Guidelines for
Continuous Trial)
 BAIL
Petition for bail shall be heard and resolved within
a non-extendible period of thirty (3) calendar days from
date of the first hearing, except in drug cases which shall
be heard and resolved within twenty (20) calendar days,
without need of oral argument and submission of
memoranda, consistent with the summary nature of the
proceedings.

Motion for reconsideration on the resolution of

petition for bail shall be resolved within a non- extendible
period of ten (10) calendar days from date of submission
of the motion. (Sec. III (10)(a) of the 2017 Guidelines for
Continuous Trial)
 BAIL
(b) Evidence in petition for bail

The resolution of petition for bail shall be based

solely on the evidence presented during the bail
proceedings by the prosecution. The prosecution shall
present only pieces of evidence that are essential in
establishing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The
accused need not present evidence to contradict or rebut
the prosecution's evidence. (Sec. III (10)(b) of the 2017
Guidelines for Continuous Trial)
 BAIL
(c) Non-suspension of the presentation of evidence

The court shall not suspend the presentation of the

evidence in chief while awaiting resolution of the petition
for bail or the motion for reconsideration. (Sec. III (10)(c)
of the 2017 Guidelines for Continuous Trial)
TRIAL (FORM OF TESTIMONY)
For First Level Courts, in all criminal cases,
including those covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, the testimonies of witnesses shall consist of the
duly subscribed written statements given to law
enforcement officers or the affidavits or counter-affidavits
submitted before the investigating prosecutor and if such
are not available, testimonies shall be in the form of
judicial affidavits. The trial prosecutor may opt to
dispense with the sworn statements submitted to the law
enforcement officers and instead prepare judicial
affidavits or modify or revise the said sworn statements.
[Sec. III (11)(a) of the 2017 Guidelines for Continuous
Trial]
TRIAL – FORM OF TESTIMONY
For Second Level Courts, Sandiganbayan and Court of
Tax Appeals, where the demeanor of the witnesses is not
essential, like the forensic chemist, medico-legal officers,
investigators, auditors, accountants, engineers, custodians,
expert witnesses and other similar witnesses, who will testify
on the authenticity, due execution and the contents of public
documents and reports, and in criminal cases that are
transactional in character, such as falsification, malversation,
estafa or other crimes where the culpability or innocence of the
accused can be established through documents, the testimonies
of the witnesses shall be the duly subscribed written statements
given to law enforcement officers or the affidavits or counter-
affidavits submitted before the investigating prosecutor, and if
such are not available, testimonies shall be in the form of
judicial affidavits. (Section 11(b), Revised Guidelines)
TRIAL – FORM OF TESTIMONY
For Second Level Courts, Sandiganbayan and
Court of Tax Appeals, x x x

In cases where the culpability or the innocence of

the accused is based on the testimonies of the alleged
eyewitnesses, the testimonies of these witnesses shall be in
oral form. [Sec. III (11)(b) of the 2017 Guidelines for
Continuous Trial]
 OFFER OF EVIDENCE
¢ The offer of evidence, the comment/objection thereto, and
the court ruling thereto shall be made orally. A party is
required to make his/her oral offer of evidence on the same
day after the presentation of his/her last witness, and the
opposing party is required to immediately interpose his/her
oral comment/objection thereto. Thereafter, the court shall
make a ruling on the offer of evidence in open court.
¢ In making the offer, the counsel shall cite the specific page
numbers of the court record where the exhibits being offered
are found, if attached thereto. The court shall ensure that all
exhibits offered are submitted to it on the same day of the
offer.
¢ If the exhibits are not attached to the record, the party
making the offer must submit the sa1ne during the offer of
evidence in open court. [Section 13(c), Revised Guidelines]
 DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
¢ After the prosecution has rested its case, the court shall
inquire from the accused if he/she desires to move for
leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, or to
proceed with the presentation of his/her evidence.

¢ If the accused orally moves for leave of court to file a

demurrer to evidence, the court shall orally resolve the
same If the motion for leave is denied, the court shall
issue an order for the accused to present and terminate
his/her evidence on the dates previously scheduled and
agreed upon, and to orally offer and rest his/her case on
the day his/her last witness is presented.
 DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
¢ If despite the denial of the motion for leave, the accused
insists on filing the demurrer to evidence, the previously
scheduled dates for the accused to present evidence
shall be cancelled.
¢ The demurrer to evidence shall be filed within a non-
extendible period of 10 calendar days from the date
leave of court is granted, and the comment shall be filed
within a non-extendible period of 10 calendar days
counted from date of receipt of the demurrer to
evidence.
¢ The demurrer shall be resolved by the court within a
non-extendible period of 30 calendar days from date of
the filing of the comment or lapse of the 10-day period
to file the same.
 DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
¢ If the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence is granted, and the subsequent demurrer to
evidence is denied, the accused shall likewise present
and terminate his/her evidence (one day apart, morning
and afternoon) and shall orally offer and rest his/her
case on the day his/her last witness is presented.
¢ The court shall rule on the oral offer of evidence of the
accused and the comment or objection of the
prosecution on the same day of the offer. If the court
denies the motion to present rebuttal evidence because
it is no longer necessary, it shall consider the case
submitted for decision. [Section 13(d), Revised
Guidelines]
 PROMULGATION
Schedule of promulgation

The court shall announce in open court and include

in the order submitting the case for decision, the date of
the pro1nulgation of its decision which shall not be more
than 90 calendar days from the date the case is submitted
for decision, except when the case is covered by Special
Rules and other laws which provide for a shorter period.
[Section 16(a), Revised Guidelines]
 PROMULGATION
Resolution of MR of judgment of conviction or MNT

An MR of a judgment of conviction or MNT under

Rule 121 filed within the reglementary period of 15 days
from promulgation shall be resolved within a non-
extendible period of 10 calendar days from the submission
of the comment of the prosecution. With or without
comment, the court shall resolve the motion within the 10-
day period. [Section 16(b), Revised Guidelines]
 PROMULGATION
Resolution of MR of judgment of conviction or MNT

An MR of a judgment of conviction or MNT under

Rule 121 filed within the reglementary period of 15 days
from promulgation shall be resolved within a non-
extendible period of 10 calendar days from the submission
of the comment of the prosecution. With or without
comment, the court shall resolve the motion within the 10-
day period. [Section 16(b), Revised Guidelines]
THANK
YOU!