Protective Security Policy Framework
Protective Security Policy Framework
Protective SecurityPolicy
PolicyFramework
Framework
A. Purpose
1. This policy describes the management structures and responsibilities that determine how security decisions
are made in accordance with security practices. This provides a governance base for entities to protect
their people, information and assets.
2. Effective management structures and responsibilities require people to be appropriately skilled,
empowered and resourced. This is essential to achieving security outcomes.
B. Requirements
B.1 Core requirement
The accountable authority must:
a. appoint a Chief Security Officer (CSO) at the Senior Executive Service 1 level with a
minimum security clearance of Negative Vetting Level 1, to be responsible for
protective security in the entity
b. empower the CSO to make decisions about:
i. appointing security advisors within the entity
ii. the entity’s protective security planning
iii. the entity’s protective security practices and procedures
iv. investigating, responding to, and reporting on security incidents (other
than cyber incidents)
c. appoint a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) with appropriate capability
and experience and a minimum security clearance of Negative Vetting Level 1, to
be responsible for cyber security in the entity
d. empower the CISO to make decisions about:
i. the entity’s cyber security strategy and associated implementation
program
ii. appointing cyber security advisors within the entity
iii. the entity’s data and systems that process, store or communicate data
iv. the entity’s implementation of the Information Security Manual
v. investigating, responding to, and reporting on cyber incidents.
e. ensure personnel and contractors are aware of their collective responsibility to
foster a positive security culture, and are provided sufficient information and
training to support this.
1
Where an entity has fewer than 100 employees the accountable authority may appoint their Chief Security Officer at the
Executive Level 2 (EL2), providing the EL2:
• reports directly to the accountable authority on security matters, and
• has the sufficient authority and capability to perform the responsibilities of the CSO role.
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# Supporting requirements
Requirement 4. Entities must provide personnel in specialist and high-risk positions (including contractors and
Specific training security incident investigators) with specific security awareness training targeted to the scope and
nature of the position.
Requirement 5. Entities must maintain a monitored email address as the central conduit for all security-related
General email matters across governance, personnel, information, cyber and physical security.
C. Guidance
C.1 Management structures
C.1.1 Management structure accountability for protective security
3. Accountable Authority – Under section 12 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act
2013 (PGPA Act), the accountable authority is the person or group of persons responsible for, and with
control over, each Commonwealth entity’s operations – answerable to the portfolio minister for the
security of their entity (see the PSPF policy: Role of accountable authority).
4. Chief Security Officer (CSO) – SES officer (with appropriate seniority and a minimum security clearance of
Negative Vetting Level 1) responsible for oversight of entity protective security arrangements across
governance, information (other than cyber security), personnel and physical security (refer section C.2).
5. Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) – officer (with appropriate seniority and a minimum security
clearance of Negative Vetting Level 1) responsible for the entity’s cyber security strategy, associated
implementation program and ensuring compliance with cyber security policy, standards, regulations and
legislation. The CISO complements the CSO role, and is also likely to report directly to the CSO or
accountable authority on cyber security matters, and work with the entity’s Chief Information Officer, Chief
Operating Officer or other senior executives in the entity (refer section C.3).
6. Security governance committee – Senior committee to support the accountable authority, CSO and CISO in
achieving protective security objectives and monitoring performance, particularly where the entity's
arrangements are large or complex (refer section C.4).
7. Security advisors – Personnel appointed to perform security functions or specialist services (refer section
C.5).
8. Line managers – Responsible for positively influencing the protective security behaviour of their personnel
(including contractors). See the PSPF policy: Ongoing assessment of personnel.
9. Entity personnel, including contractors – Responsible for understanding and applying robust security
practices to protect government people, information and assets. See the PSPF policy: Ongoing assessment
of personnel.
2
Where another legislative obligation or structural arrangement requires a security advisor to report to another position in the
entity (eg the Chief Information Officer), the CSO is recommended to retain oversight of the advisor’s security related functions.
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17. The scope and complexity of the CSO role depends on the nature of the entity's business and its risk
environment. For smaller entities, it may be that the accountable authority takes on the role of the CSO
and delegates the day-to-day functions of protective security to appointed security advisors.
18. The Department of Home Affairs recommends that the CSO has sufficient experience or be trained to
perform the required security leadership and oversight functions.
25. For further information on the CISO role, see the ISM’s Guidelines for Cyber Security Roles.
28. For further information on the CISO role, see the ISM’s Guidelines for Cyber Security Roles.
31. While not mandatory, where an entity has a security governance oversight committee, the Department of
Home Affairs recommends that the CSO be appointed as the Chair of the committee and that the CISO
holds membership.
i. telephones
ii. internet and email gateways
iii. cloud-based services
iv. data storage and recovery.
3
Entitles are encouraged to consider where other legislative obligations overlap with security advisor roles. For example, the
Privacy (Australian Government Agencies — Governance) APP Code 2017 requires entities to appoint a dedicated privacy
officer(s) to maintain a record of the entity’s personal information holdings and a register of privacy impact assessments.
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40. Given the range and complexity of security functions, it may be appropriate to the entity's operations or
size to appoint separate advisors for information, personnel and physical security matters.
41. Many functions of a security advisor involve specialised skills. The Department of Home Affairs suggests
such advisors demonstrate comprehensive knowledge or technical competencies in:
42. The knowledge, competencies and skills can be attained through on-the-job training, prior experience in a
related field or formal qualifications (eg tertiary qualifications such as the Certificate IV, Diploma in
Government Security or equivalent qualification). Where entities provide training towards formal
qualifications for security advisors, the Department of Home Affairs recommends that this training be
delivered by a Registered Training Organisation (RTO). RTOs are accredited training providers that offer
nationally recognised training courses. A list of these organisations is available from www.training.gov.au.
43. Where the CSO or CISO contracts service providers for specific security functions, including where
professional technical certification is required (eg SCEC security zone consultants for Type 1a security alarm
system compliance and IRAP Assessors for ICT systems), the entity retains the security accountability. This
does not transfer to the contractor. The Department of Home Affairs recommends the CSO, CSIO or
appointed security advisor establishes arrangements to monitor any outsourced security service providers.
44. For information on ensuring contractors comply with security requirements, see the PSPF policy: Security
governance for contracted goods and service providers.
procedures when significant changes in the risk environment occur. The Department of Home Affairs also
recommends entities put in place measures to monitor the effectiveness of procedures and security
performance and update annual security awareness training with relevant messaging.
i. Information compromise includes, but is not limited to: loss, misuse, interference,
unauthorised access, unauthorised modification, or unauthorised disclosure.
55. The Information Security Manual defines a cyber security incident as an unwanted or unexpected cyber
security event, or a series of such events, that has either compromised business operations or has a
significant probability of compromising business operations. See the ISM’s Guidelines for cyber incidents
for further information.
56. A significant security incident is a deliberate, negligent or reckless action that leads, or could lead, to the
loss, damage, compromise, corruption or disclosure of official resources.
57. Examples of security incidents include:
59. PSPF policy: Reporting on security outlines an entity’s obligation to report security incidents to external
entities. Non-compliance with reporting of security incidents obligations is considered a security incident.
60. Where a suspected security incident involves the major compromise of official information or other
resources that originate from, or are the responsibility of another entity, it is important to seek advice from
the originating entity prior to instigating any investigation. The originating entity may have operational
security requirements that need to be applied to the investigation. In some cases, it may be more
appropriate that the originating or responsible entity carries out the investigation.
i. clearly defined roles and responsibilities (of personnel involved in the administration of security
incidents and the conduct of investigations)
ii. escalation points, relationships and connection points (internal or external) and
communication channels
iii. timeframes for incident response and recovery
iv. assessment and categorisation of the level of harm or compromise
v. technical requirements and continuity
vi. prioritisation where multiple incidents or events occur simultaneously
vii. addressing entity-specific issues or incident types
viii. linkages to other entity procedures such as business continuity or disaster recovery plans
ix. reporting to the CSO, CISO (for cyber incidents) and security governance committee
x. testing and review cycles
67. Where security investigation functions are shared across entity work areas or with an outsourced service
provider, the Department of Home Affairs recommends that the CSO, CSIO (or another delegated SES
officer) maintain oversight of the investigation and establish mechanisms to monitor the investigation and
ensure communication of issues, findings and decisions to all relevant parties.
68. Refer to Annex B for further guidance on security incident management.
4
Noting that under the Notifiable Data Breach scheme a data breach likely to result in serious harm to any of the individuals to
whom the information relates requires an objective assessment. Refer to guidance material on identifying eligible data
breaches.
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incidents (actual or suspected), may be necessary to resolve an existing breach or vulnerability and
remediate the impact. An investigation may provide valuable information for future risk reviews and
assessments and will help entities to evaluate current security plans and procedures.
72. When gathering evidence following a cyber security incident, it is important that it is gathered in an
appropriate manner and that its integrity is maintained. In addition, if the ACSC is requested to assist with
investigations, no actions which could affect the integrity of evidence should be carried out before the
ACSC becomes involved.
C.8.2.1 Case Study – Australian National Audit Office audit Administration of security incidents, including
the conduct of security investigations
74. Once the CSO, CISO or appointed security advisor has established the need for an investigation, they are
encouraged to assess:
75. The Department of Home Affairs recommends that, where possible, entities apply the Australian
Government Investigations Standards (AGIS) to maintain a minimum quality standard within investigations.
76. The principles of procedural fairness apply to all investigations. These principles require that individuals
whose rights, interests or expectations are adversely affected, be informed of the case against them and be
given an opportunity to be heard by an unbiased decision-maker. Procedural fairness also applies to actions
taken as the result of an investigation. Procedural fairness gives regard to ensuring the security integrity of
any current or future investigation of the entity or of another entity.
77. Requirement 2 mandates that the CSO must establish procedures to investigate, respond to, and report on
security incidents. The Department of Home Affairs recommends investigation procedures cover:
iv. aware of the consequences of non-compliance with security practices and procedures
v. comfortable to challenge others on non-compliance with entity security practices and
procedures
vi. confident in making decisions on applying protective markings, storing and sharing government
information
83. The Department of Home Affairs recommends the CSO establishes appropriate metrics to measure the
maturity of the entity’s security culture. See the PSPF policy: Security maturity monitoring.
86. Security awareness training is an important element of protective security and supports implementation of
physical, information and personnel security policies, practices and procedures. The Department of Home
Affairs recommends that entities use their security plan to identify areas to include in their security
awareness training program.
87. Security awareness training is most effective when it:
91. If an entity elects to use an outsourced training provider to deliver the security awareness training, the
Department of Home Affairs recommends they have sufficient knowledge of the PSPF and expertise in
delivering adult education.
93. Previously reported or investigated security incidents can be used in security awareness training as
examples demonstrating what could happen, how to respond to incidents, and how to minimise them in
the future. The Department of Home Affairs recommends that information be redacted to maintain
appropriate confidentiality.
100. Where the entity is unable to provide a generic email address for security-related matters and relies on
an individual’s email address, entities are encouraged to ensure the flow of security information is
maintained during periods of absence, or if the person leaves the position. For example, the individual’s
email nominated for security-related matters is monitored by another officer, or is accessible to other
officers who perform security functions.
101. This requirement does not preclude entities from maintaining other security-related mailboxes (eg to
limit information based on the need-to-know or for sensitive matters). However, the main monitored email
address will be used for all PSPF related correspondence unless otherwise advised.
2. The Department of Home Affairs recommends entities record the details of each reported security incident,
including:
Step 4: Learn
6. Embedding post-incident learning into incident reports or updated procedures can provide useful insights
into opportunities for improvements and emerging issues, vulnerabilities in processes and training, or
personnel’s understanding of how to apply security obligations. The Department of Home Affairs
recommends that a process of continual improvement be applied to monitoring, evaluating, responding to
and managing security incidents.
7. The Department of Home Affairs recommends that entities identify, document and share learnings
internally (ie with and between the accountable authority, security advisors and security governance
committee) and externally, where appropriate (ie with co-located entities, entities with similar risk profiles
or through whole-of-Government arrangements).
8. Possible questions to consider once the incident is resolved:
Criminal investigations
3. A Commonwealth criminal offence refers to an act that will generally be an offence under the
Crimes Act 1914 or the Criminal Code or other Commonwealth legislation.
4. The purpose of a criminal investigation is gathering admissible evidence which may lead to placing the
offender/s before the court.
5. As outlined in the Australian Government Investigations Standards, if a security matter is considered
by the entity to be a serious crime or complex criminal investigation, it must be referred to the AFP in
accordance with the AFP referral process (see www.afp.gov.au), except where:
6. Where another entity has legislative investigative powers (eg Comcare and ASIO), that entity may have
primacy in determining which type of investigation takes precedence.
7. Where a suspected Commonwealth criminal offence is not or cannot be referred to the AFP for
investigation (see AFP website), or requires initial investigation prior to establishing a need to refer to
the AFP, entities may need to conduct an investigation for matters such as suspected fraud, theft and
unauthorised disclosure of official information. To the extent possible when investigating a suspected
Commonwealth criminal or a matter that may result in a criminal investigation, entities are
encouraged to consider the rules of evidence.
8. The rules of evidence cover:
9. For guidance on obtaining, recording and storing evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence,
refer to the Australian Government Investigations Standards (AGIS).
10. For further guidance on integrity of evidence for cyber investigations, refer to the ISM’s Guidelines for
cyber incidents.
20. Evidence gathered in a security investigation may not comply with the rules of evidence and therefore
may not be satisfactory in a criminal investigation, or where legal proceedings might arise in relation to
the incident. For guidance on obtaining, recording and storing evidence, refer to the AGIS.
Standard of proof
23. In drawing conclusions regarding administrative investigations, whether conducted for security or
other reasons such as disciplinary purposes, the decision-maker needs to be satisfied that the
allegations are proved ‘on the balance of probabilities’.