UNIT 12 PARTITION OF INDIA

Structure
12.1 Introduction
Aims and Objectives

12.2 British Policies and Partition

12.3 Muslim League and Jinnah
12.4 Congress and Partition
12.5 Gandhi and Partition
12.6 The 1946 Election and Popular Opinion
12.6.1 Cabinet Mission Plan and a Strong State

12.7 Social and Economic Background

12.8 Overview
12.9 Summary
12.10 Terminal Questions
Suggested Readings

12.1 INTRODUCTION
The British conquered India and gave it a political unity that it had enjoyed only for short
periods of time in its long history. This political unification based on imperialist expansion
quickened the pace of political change in India in conjunction with the spread of modern
education and the growth of modern forms of transport and communications. Yet, when
the British left India in 1947, the country was divided along religious lines into India and
Pakistan. This has been attributed to a policy of divide and rule that the British followed.
That Britain was responsible in the break-up of British India was believed by all the
Indian nationalists including Gandhi; he believed that both Hindus and Muslims ought to
strive for communal harmony, which was consciously damaged by the ‘third party’ i.e. the
British rulers. During the period of World War II, Gandhi even said that the communal
problem would never be resolved until the British left India. Since the British deliberately
encouraged the League and its demand for Pakistan after March 1940, Gandhi argued
that Hindu-Muslim unity was a pre-requisite for fighting the British and for freedom
around 1942, and also argued that the communal problem would never be settled until
the British left India.
The partition of India was the product of complex processes and was the outcome of
several factors and the role of the British, the Muslim League and the Indian National
Congress for the division of the subcontinent. Partition was neither inevitable nor the
product of sheer chance. It was not the fulfillment of destiny or the logical outcome of
the two nation theory; nor was it simply an accident that was produced by a single wrong
decision or failure of judgment. It was the period 1937-1947 that saw the quickening of
Partition of India 133

the pace of political developments, but there were underlying differences in the levels of
economic and social development of the Hindu and Muslim communities of the subcontinent
that played a role. Conflicts based on class and culture got intertwined with new forms
of politics and concepts of democracy and nation-states during the closing years of
colonial rule.
Aims and Objectives
After reading this Unit, you would be able to understand
 The socio-economic and political background to the partition of India
 The role of the Congress and Muslim League in the process and
 The 1946 popular opinion that also played a role in the partition

12.2 BRITISH POLICIES AND PARTITION

The British’s purpose of the policy of divide and rule, for deliberately favouring one
community and then the other, is to prevent the coming together of Indians against the
British. The acceptance of the Muslim League demand for separate electorates in 1909
was a major divisive move that vitiated the political culture of India until independence in
1947. Some argue that the Muslim League deputation to the Viceroy in 1906 itself was
a command performance and the League was set up soon after by an elite group trying
to promote its interest. The British extended it to the Sikhs as well. Gandhi and B.R.
Ambedkar, through a compromise in 1932 thwarted a British attempt to drive a wedge
between the Depressed classes and the upper caste Hindus by offering separate
electorates to the former. The argument is no longer confined to the institutional
mechanisms of representative government that were slowly being introduced by the British
in India. Historians and anthropologists now argue that the British classification practices
encouraged the representation as well as the self-representation of Indians according to
caste and religion.
The Census listed various castes and communities in India, and also counted them. The
colonial practice of census and surveys thus encouraged the idea of ‘enumerated
communities’ and led to the concept of majority and minority in different parts of the
country. Fuzzy identities were replaced by hard and singular identities often forcing groups
with complex and multiple identities to choose one (Cohn, Appadurai, Kaviraj). The
British Orientalist scholarship played a role in the development of ideas about the
peculiarities of Indian society. The codification of the laws of the Hindus led to the
freezing of the dynamic nature of traditional society and culture and valourised a primarily
textual and elitist upper caste conception of Hindu law and practices. The codification of
Muslim Law also led to the rigid interpretation of law and reduced the role of
interpretation that had been important in Muslim jurisprudence. The writing of history also
shaped ideas of community that soon became the commonsense of the time. The British
perception of Indian society in terms of religious and cultural differences led to the
exaggeration of religious and cultural conflict (Mushirul Hasan, Gyan Pandey).
As Gandhi had observed in Hind Swaraj, the Hindus and Muslims had learned to live
with each other before the British established their rule in India. It was British rule that
produced greater differences between the two communities. The historians focused only
on the periods of conflict ignoring the much longer periods of harmony between
134 Gandhi: The Man and His Times

communities. The colonial construction of the notion of communities grew more elaborate
with time and the introduction of representative government and separate electorates gave
the government ample opportunity to heighten this process of community formation. The
logic of competition then took over and stronger notions of the boundaries of communities
developed by the early twentieth century. The British were willing to go to any length to
prolong their rule in India; they deliberately encouraged Jinnah’s Muslim League after
1940 to weaken the national movement and thwart Congress participation in government
during the war. They were willing to consider not only the partition of India but also the
balkanisation of India. Their attitude towards the Indian problem was shaped by Britain’s
role in Asia after World War II and the emerging Cold War (Bayly and Harper).

12.3 MUSLIM LEAGUE AND JINNAH

In the nationalist accounts of the partition of India, Mohammad Ali Jinnah played a
prominent role in the partition process. Other nationalist historians have argued that he
was alienated by the transformation of the Congress after mass mobilisation began under
Gandhi after 1920. This made Jinnah the moderate nationalist and constitutionalist less
relevant in national politics although he remained opposed to the hardline communal
politics. Gradually the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity turned hostile and became an
implacable foe of the Congress. He had opposed the Nehru report of 1928 that had
advocated a unitary form of government and representation to minorities on the basis of
numerical importance in different regions. There is a difference between Jinnah’s Fourteen
points and the demand for Pakistan; Jinnah, as a liberal Muslim, was not averse to
negotiations with the Congress. It was the poor performance of the Muslim League in the
elections to the Provincial assemblies in 1937 that compelled him to rethink his strategy.
Rejection of a coalition government with the League in Uttar Pradesh by the Congress
after the former’s poor showing in the elections led to a strong reaction from the League.
Outright condemnation of the Congress Ministries was orchestrated by the League and the
party decided to reject the notion that the Muslims could live as a minority under ‘Hindu’
Congress domination.
In 1940 the League declared the right of self determination of Muslim majorities in the
North West and East of India. The demand for separate states within a common
framework even if it meant statehood without a demand for a separate nation, as argued
by Ayesha Jalal and the revisionists, fanned communal fears and animosities in the years
after (Ayesha Jalal). If Jinnah did not want to divide the subcontinent, he chose an
unwise policy. The communal polarisation that resulted from enthusiastic responses to the
Pakistan idea undermined the cross communal alliances that were crucial to retain the
Punjab and Bengal in the ‘autonomous’ Pakistan zones of an All India government. The
virulent campaign for Pakistan got intertwined with various communal, linguistic and
cultural anxieties and acquired a momentum of its own. Even if Jinnah did not want to
create a separate nation state, his campaign for seven long years made it possible. The
idea of using the power of the Muslim majority provinces to protect the interests of the
Muslims in the Muslim minority provinces by creating a common government at the
Centre was undermined by the unrestrained propaganda in the campaign for Pakistan. It
is arguable that Muslim interests would have been far better served by emphasising the
rights of provinces within a loose federation rather than the chimerical ideal of Pakistan.
In any case Jinnah’s strategy and Muslim League propaganda rather than his hidden
objectives influenced Indian political developments and led to the partition of India.
Partition of India 135

12.4 CONGRESS AND PARTITION

The early nationalist accounts apportioned the blame for partition exclusively between the
British and the Muslim League. The Congress tried to bring under its umbrella all sections
of Indian society, but separate electorates, British policy of divide and rule, the intransigence
of Jinnah and the communal and reactionary grip over the League led to the partition of
the subcontinent. The Congress was unable to reach out to the Muslim masses and
therefore reluctantly accepted the wishes of the majority of the Indian Muslims to carve
a nation for themselves. This account has been challenged by two strands in Indian
history. Bipan Chandra argues that there was a Hindu tinge in the Congress and that
Hindu liberal communalists like Lala Lajapat Rai and Madan Mohan Malaviya were able
to create doubts about the inclusive nationalist credentials of the Congress party.
However, he believes that extreme communalism was promoted by the League and that
Congress failed to handle the problem (Bipan Chandra). This was both because of
pressure from Hindu communalists and insufficient mass mobilisation.
A second strand argues that the Congress was substantially to blame for the partition of
the country. The Congress did not have a sufficiently inclusive approach towards Muslim
communities in India. The culture and ideology of the Congress party was majoritarian-
the belief that the view of the majority party must prevail. It wanted to dominate public
life because it was the largest party. The other argument was that even Congress’s
inclusive nationalism entailed the denial of Muslim identity and that any signs of Muslimness
were regarded as separatist or communal. Ayesha Jalal is unwilling to accept the binary
opposition between Congress secular nationalism and Muslim communalism. In her Self
and Sovereignty, however, the distinction between a political and religious notion of
majoritarianism often gets blurred and the basis for characterising individuals and political
demands or movements as acceptably communitarian or unacceptably communal is often
unclear. The Congress was not a party that wanted to establish Hindu majority rule and
a policy of safeguards for minorities, emphasis on fundamental rights and federalism could
have taken care of the dangers of religious majoritarianism.
The argument has also been made that the Congress, particularly Jawaharlal Nehru and
Vallabhbhai Patel, were supporters of a strong state and therefore preferred to have a
smaller and more centralised state than a united but confederal India with the Muslim
League. This was why they rejected the Confederation that was recommended by the
Cabinet Mission that came to India in 1946. It is argued that the partition of the
subcontinent was imposed by the central leaders of the Congress who favoured a tighter
grip over the provinces and a unitary conception of nationalism (A. Jalal). Patel wanted
a strong state because of the need to create a unified nation and Nehru because he
favoured a policy of state backed economic growth. Although the Congress leaders did
favour the strong state this was not the view of the two leaders alone. A considerable
number of Congressmen and nationalists favoured a strong government for various reasons
(A. I. Singh, R.J. Moore). - Anita Inder Singh and R. J. Moore
It has been argued that many Indian Muslims did not accept the principles of liberal
individualism and believed that their representatives should belong to the Muslim community
and share their values and concerns. It was not enough to represent them and their
secular interests (Farzana Shaikh). In the perception of many Congressmen and Hindu
nationalists, a weak centre in India had been responsible for repeated invasions and
British conquest and therefore the post independence state had to be strong enough to
136 Gandhi: The Man and His Times

protect its citizens and provide for their well-being. The beliefs of the leaders of the
Congress and the League were not those of a handful of leaders even if there is no way
of knowing how many shared such views. If indeed Jinnah and the Muslim League did
not want a separate state of Pakistan the leaders of the Congress could not have forced
it upon eighty million Muslims against their will (Asim Roy).

12.5 GANDHI AND PARTITION

The partition of India was a severe blow to the leaders of the Indian National Congress
who tried to avert it till the terms for preserving unity seemed unacceptable to them. The
strongest reaction to partition came from Gandhi who had worked for communal harmony
for decades. He had brought a large number of Indian Muslims into the national
movement by linking grievances about the treatment of the Khalifa and the dismemberment
of the Ottoman Empire with the nationalist outrage following the Jallianwala Bagh
massacre at Amritsar in April 1919 and the imposition of martial law in Punjab. The
Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movement brought forth Muslim participation on a scale
which the Congress never managed to achieve after this. The withdrawal of the movement
in early 1922 was followed by the outbreak of communal conflicts in many parts of north
India stretching from Kohat to Calcutta between 1922 and 1926. The critics of Gandhi
think that the use of a religious issue like Khilafat was dangerous since it encouraged
extra-territorial loyalties and Pan-Islamic tendencies among Indian Muslims (B.R. Nanda).
It has also been argued that Gandhi’s collaboration with the Ali brothers led to Muslim
mass mobilisation within India for achieving objectives within India (Gail Minault). Secular
and Marxist historians consider the use of religion in politics a ‘double-edged weapon’
and therefore have regarded this strategy as fraught with dangerous consequences (Bipan
Chandra, Sumit Sarkar).
Gandhi believed in spiritualising politics and did not consider it essential to separate
religion and politics as in the western conception of secularism. He believed in communal
harmony and in Hindu-Muslim unity. His ideas and personality appealed to Maulana Abul
Kalam Azad, who began as a radical Pan-Islamist and became a supporter of composite
nationalism. Azad was a devout Muslim who believed in communal harmony and the need
to preserve the unity of the country. His role and personality is frequently contrasted with
that of the westernised Jinnah who was an unconventional Muslim fighting for the rights
of Muslims and a separate state using appeals to religion (Aijaz Ahmad, T.N. Madan).
The argument has been advanced that it was the emphasis on secularism and modernity
that led to the failure to deal with the specific grievances of the Muslim community. It is
difficult to accept this in so far as the problem was really about uneven development,
economic grievances and sharing of power rather than hard secularism or communitarian
identities. In so far as communitarian identities are concerned the Gandhian emphasis on
Hindustani in the Devanagari script had very little impact on the cultural politics of the
Hindi speaking states. This was not a matter that could be understood primarily in terms
of the secular-religious divide or the modernity and tradition distinction. The politics of
language did play a role in the alienation of the Muslims of North India. Gandhi, Nehru
and Bose despite their differences as well as moderate nationalists and progressive writers
were all in favour of Hindustani but could not make much headway (Francis Robinson,
F. Orsini).
The ideas of Gandhi were misunderstood by many and the message of communal
harmony and removal of untouchability were also regarded with suspicion by orthodox
Partition of India 137

and even moderate Muslims. Some Muslims felt this was a subtle way of consolidating
the Hindu vote bank and reducing the bargaining power of the Muslim community
(William Gould). There was some recrimination after the Khilafat-Non-Cooperation
movement was withdrawn and the Ali brothers were upset by Gandhi’s withdrawal of the
movement. The concept of Ramrajya was not a Hindu ideal as far as Gandhi was
concerned though it might have sprung from within the Hindu tradition. Many orthodox
Muslims regarded this as an unacceptable ideal and preferred to express themselves in an
Islamic idiom. The existence of separate electorates and fears of Hindu consolidation
ensured that the Muslims never supported the Congress in sufficient numbers during the
period that led up to independence and partition. After the Gandhi-Ambedkar pact of
1932 the reserved seats for the depressed Classes led moderate nationalists and Hindu
nationalists to enhance their influence among the depressed classes and thus to work for
Hindu consolidation especially in Bengal (Joya Chatterjee). To those who did not dwell
deeply on the matter, the Gandhian and Hindu nationalist concern with Harijan uplift
would appear as part of the same agenda.
The essentialist understanding is that Pakistan was the product of a longstanding difference
between Hindus and Muslims in the subcontinent. The historicists have rightly focused on
the changes during the last decade of colonial rule. Historians disagree on the precise
reasons for the partition of the subcontinent but agree that it came about towards the end
of colonial rule because of the failure of the Congress and the League to come to a
settlement. The British policy of encouraging Muslim separatism and eagerness to withdraw
from India after the Second World War made the partition more likely. There is a sense
in which the economic and political consequences of World War II had an impact on
political developments that could not be foreseen. Likewise the consequences of the
demand for partition and the jostling for power in the localities speeded up the process
of communal polarisation that influenced the decisions of the principal protagonists in the
story of partition. In the final analysis the postwar crisis and the polarisation in society
during the last few years of colonial rule contributed to the climate in which the decision
was taken in 1946-47.

12.6 THE 1946 ELECTIONS AND POPULAR OPINION

The League was able to use the British compulsion to justify a constitutional deadlock in
India to build a substantial following during the period 1940-1946. The election results of
1946 gave the Muslim League the authoritative position to represent Indian Muslims that
Jinnah had long wanted. The poor performance in the 1937 elections was a thing of the
past and the League was in a position to drive a hard bargain. In 1937 the League was
unable to gain acceptance as a coalition partner in the United Provinces but in 1946 it
was able to speak for the majority of Muslims who had the right to vote at that time.
The Congress too had won the majority of votes from among the non-Muslims eligible
to vote- about one-tenth of the total population. The election results of 1946 surely
indicated the strength of the Muslim League, reasons for the League’s victory being the
use of populist slogans and not merely religious appeals by the League. Fear of Hindu
majority rule and the Congress also played a part in ensuring the victory of the League
(David Gilmartin, Ian Talbot). The Communal polarisation had grown although the violence
was to become significant only in 1946. It was the growth in the electoral strength of the
League and the popularity of the notion of Pakistan that compelled the Congress to take
the demands of the League seriously. The demand for Pakistan was no longer seen as
a bargaining counter but a serious demand, while the supporters of the two-nation theory
138 Gandhi: The Man and His Times

regarded the verdict of 1946 as a vindication of their stand. Even if Congressmen were
reluctant to accept Pakistan as a demand of Muslim nationalism they were aware of the
popularity of the idea. Even Gandhi felt that the demand was granted by the Congress
“because you asked for it. The Congress never asked for it…. But the Congress can feel
the pulse of the people. It realized that the Khalsa as also the Hindu desires it. We do
not wish to force anyone. We tried hard.” (Gandhi’s address to the prayer meeting, 11th
June 47, CWMG, vol 88, pp. 73-75, cited in S.Mahajan, p. 335). Gandhi was eager
to avoid the division of the country and did not participate in all the discussions of the
Congress about these developments during 1946. He was in Noakhali in East Bengal
trying to restore harmony. He was kept informed by the Congress leaders and he did
participate in some of the discussions leading upto partition.
On 14th June, 1947 Gandhi told the delegates to the AICC session that they could
remove the members of the Working Committee if they believed they were acting
wrongly. He did not think they were in a position to challenge and replace them and
Gandhi himself did not feel that the conditions were appropriate for him to ‘take up the
flag of revolt’ (Prayer meeting, 5th June 1947, CWMG, Vol 88, p.154 cited in S
Mahajan, p.371). Gandhi was against the partition of the country but he did not want to
rebel against the Congress because it had to reluctantly accept the partition of the country.
He was not in favour of a mass movement against the decision to partition the country
because the conditions were not conducive for such a movement and because he was not
sure whether he could secure the support of the people in such an endeavour.

12.6.1 Cabinet Mission Plan and a Strong State

In ‘Sole Spokesman’, Ayesha Jalal had suggested that the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946
was the one that came closest to what Jinnah really wanted but the Congress leadership
had other plans based on the preference for a strong centre. In Self and Sovereignty, the
communitarian perspective is used to understand the alienation of the Muslims from the
Congress as well as the multiple identities that unitarian or singular conceptions of
nationalism sought to control or delegitimise in the name of nationalism. It is important to
highlight that if there had been no demand for Pakistan, no matter what the demand
meant to different groups, the federal character of the polity would have been easier to
preserve. Even if the Muslims of Punjab and Bengal were to demand substantial
autonomy within a federation, based on the self-confidence of Muslim elite about being
able to wield power at the provincial level because of their numerical preponderance, it
would have been on a less communal basis. Muslim communitarian identities, as well as
the multiplicity of other identities, would not have been adversely affected if a demand for
provincial autonomy within a federation had been advocated by the League.
The communitarian anxieties of the Sikhs of the Punjab too contributed to communal
tensions and the demand for Pakistan created higher levels of polarisation in a region that
was an important contributor of manpower to the British Army in India. The tensions
were more likely to spin out of control in this region where there were so many volunteer
organisations and demobilised soldiers after the war ended. In the eastern region, there
was communal polarisation but fewer demobilised soldiers and a weaker ‘martial’
tradition. The fear of living under a majority community was not confined to the Muslim
community alone. Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab too began to worry about their fate in
a future Pakistan and a Muslim majority group in the North West was also a cause for
concern. Some Sikhs demanded a separate homeland and adequate safeguards for their
community.
Partition of India 139

The opposition to the division of the province on religious lines was stronger in Bengal
than in the Punjab. The British had deliberately promoted Jinnah’s League during the war
but were reluctant to support his claim for a separate state. Their reluctance to prevent
the spread of virulent propaganda helped the League gain adherents. The British also
preferred the League and Wavell’s Breakdown Plan indicated a withdrawal to the North
West of India away from Congress controlled areas. It is another matter that the decision
to withdraw announced in 1947 and the advancement of Indian independence compelled
Indians to come to a decision sooner than they would have liked and probably made
partition and the violence that accompanied it more likely. Some historians believe that the
British wanted to retain influence in the region after they left and therefore promoted a
smaller and more pliable country like Pakistan.
The Cabinet Mission Plan was not accepted by the Congress because it gave very limited
powers to a common central government for the whole subcontinent. It also created three
Groups of provinces, two groups with Muslim majority provinces in the North West and
North East of India. It was grouping that was a source of difficulty for the Congress.
Initially the Congress was willing to accept the Cabinet Mission proposals. When it was
clarified that the scheme for Groups of provinces could not be modified, Sardar Patel
decided to oppose it (Nandurkar). Gandhi wanted a duly constituted court to pronounce
its judgement on the different interpretations of the proposals by the Congress, the League
and the Cabinet Mission itself (Interview to Preston Grover, October 21, 1946. CWMG,
Vol LXXXVI, p.10). Though Gandhi was opposed to the idea of the partition of India,
he also opposed the compulsory inclusion of Assam, North West Frontier Province and
the Sikhs of the Punjab in the Groups that would be dominated by the Muslim League
under the Cabinet Mission Plan (Instructions for Congress Working Committee, 28/30
December, 1946. CWMG, Vol- LXXXVI, pp.285-286).
Nehru argued that a central government was bound to increase its powers and that a
future Constituent Assembly would be free to determine the future of India. Maulana Azad
felt that this was a blunder since the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission proposals could
have preserved the unity of India (M. Azad).
In order to preserve the unity of the country and restore communal harmony, Gandhi
proposed that Muhammad Ali Jinnah be made the Prime Minister of India. This was a
proposal he made twice- once in 1946 and the second time in April 1947. In May 1947
he wrote to Lord Mountbatten that the British should “leave the Government of the whole
of India, including the States to one party” (CWMG, Vol. LXXXVII, p. 436). Mountbatten
should hand over power to either the Muslim League or the Congress, grant Dominion
Status, remain as Governor-General for the next thirteen months and “then leave them to
their own devices” (Interview with Lord Mountbatten, May 4, 1947. CWMG, Vol-
LXXXVII, Appendix. XV, pp. 549-550). These proposals were not accepted by the
Congress leaders. This has been interpreted as the rejection of Gandhi’s vision or the
clinching evidence for the political ambitions of the top leaders of the Congress.
It is arguable that the gestures of goodwill that Gandhi made would not have resolved the
problem of sharing power between two major political parties representing two different
ideologies. In any case Gandhi did not feel he could confront the Congress leaders on
this question because he was not sure whether even the Hindus would be willing to follow
his advice. Gandhi did not accept the idea of partition and thought that the partition
should not divide the hearts of people even if the boundaries were redrawn. It was a fait
140 Gandhi: The Man and His Times

accompli but should not be allowed to influence the ordinary people. Gandhi was “as
much against forced partition as against forced unity” (CWMG, Vol-LXXXVII, p.30).
Although he could not resolve the dispute between the Congress and the League or
launch a mass movement, Gandhi worked for communal harmony in the riot affected
areas. Even those scholars like Sumit Sarkar who believe that a mass movement against
the British was possible during the last two years of colonial rule, during the winter of
1946-47, believe that Gandhi’s struggle against the blazing fires of communalism in Bengal,
Bihar and Delhi was of immense significance and constituted his ‘finest hour’ (Sumit
Sarkar).

12.7 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

The discussion of the partition of India cannot be reduced to the intentions or decisions
of a few top leaders, no matter how significant their role might have been in the closing
years of colonial rule. Moreover, the notion of inflexible forces in history leading to
communal polarisation and partition are also untenable. The argument of the Indian
communists that there are many nations in India and that the demand for Pakistan was
a nationality demand is logically consistent but does not tell us how and why it emerged
during the last decade of colonial rule. Yet there is a middle level formulation about the
growing support for a separate state of Pakistan or partition of Punjab and Bengal during
the last few years of colonial rule. The inchoate demand for Pakistan stirred poets and
propagandists who influenced the popular mood and fuelled communal tensions and
anxieties. Several scholars like Mushirul Hasan, who do not subscribe to the binary
opposition between Indian nationalism and Muslim communalism and separatism, believe
that the propaganda of the League had a deep impact on several sections of society
(Mushirul Hasan). This helped to create not only support for a separate state in the
Muslim majority regions like Punjab and Bengal but also fuelled anxieties among the
minorities in these regions.
The Sikhs had created their own reform movement and the Singh Sabha movement
strengthened the communitarian identities of the Sikhs in the Punjab. The fear of being left
defenceless, especially after the community had played a vital role in the agricultural
colonisation and military service, created a vital unsettling factor. The growth of various
volunteer organisations and communal polarisation undermined the cross-communal alliance
created by the Unionist Party of the Punjab under Fazli Husain and Sir Sikandar Hyat
Khan. The politics of the Punjab was heavily influenced by certain forms of communitarian
identities – based on caste, language and religion but these were often competing and
overlapping identities. Nevertheless the propaganda of the League upset this alliance and
compelled those Muslims like Sikandar Hyat Khan, who believed in provincial autonomy,
to accept the ideological preeminence of the League leadership. The support for Jinnah
and the Muslim League may not bring back memories of the legendary Islamic hero
Saladin, but the Pakistan idea had acquired considerable support in the North West of
India (Akbar Ahmad and Ian Talbot). The attitude of the Muslim landlords of Punjab
was of crucial importance in the creation of Pakistan (Hamza Alavi).
Ayesha Jalal has argued that although Punjabis were “especially unwilling to make
concessions to rival communities” the majority of Punjabis were opposed to the partition
of their province on religious lines in March 1947 (Jalal, EPW, August 8, 1998). She
argues that Hindus had indicated their unwillingness to accept Muslim domination at the
provincial level twice before; this was reflected in their response to Lala Lajpat Rai’s
Partition of India 141

proposals in 1924 and C. Rajagopalachari’s formula of 1944 calling for the separation of
Hindu majority regions in Punjab and Bengal. Jalal argues that sub-regional and class
factors influenced the behaviour of individuals more than communitarian identities, but the
central leadership imposed the partition of the Punjab from above. It is arguable that rival
communitarian and ‘nationalist’ or communal perspectives led to a paralysis of political will
or the unwillingness to come to a compromise that enabled the British government and
the central leaderships of the League and the Congress to impose their will on the Punjab.
This failure to come to an agreement was not the failure of a few leaders in the Punjab
but of the clash of economic interests of social groups that underpinned communitarian
identities and of widespread and extreme distrust of the other.
Communitarian differences were sustained by economic and legal-constitutional arrangements
like the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900 and the district-wise enumeration of
agricultural castes whose lands could not be taken away by urban moneylenders. Marxist
formulations about the economic basis of communalism or the communalisation of the
class struggle may seem overstated or too general but communitarian identities have
always been underpinned and qualified by economic and class differences. The opposition
to Hindu merchant-moneylender domination brought together the Hindu, Sikh and Muslim
agrarian interests in the Punjab in the Unionist party. The Congress led popular and
peasant movements but its mass base was limited. The Congress in the Punjab was
weaker than in the United Provinces because it was perceived as a representative of
urban Hindu groups and its Hindu Mahasabha rivals often stole the support that the
Congress sought in the crucial years before partition. The Muslim League was able to
destroy the support for the Unionist party by winning the support of the landowners of
western Punjab, forging an alliance with the pirs and sajjda nashins, a network that had
been used by the British and the Unionist party earlier (David Gilmartin).
The partition of Bengal has been regarded as a tragedy that could have been averted but
for the imposition from above. Sarat Bose argued for a united autonomous Socialist
Republic of Bengal and the idea also appealed to Suhrawardy who felt that the loss of
Calcutta would weaken the economy of East Pakistan (Sugato Bose, Christopher Bayly
and Tim Harper, pp. 292-301). Gandhi himself offered to act as Suhrawardy’s honorary
private secretary in May 1947 if he worked to retain Bengal for the Bengalis by non-
violent means (CWMG, Vol-LXXXVII, p. 460). Joya Chatterjee has argued that the
bhadralok of Bengal had turned to a more Hindu nationalist position after the Communal
Award of 1932 and weakened the social dominance of the upper castes in Bengal. In
order to bolster their position, the bhadralok turned to the Depressed Castes to maintain
their hold on the province. Sarat Chandra and the Hindu Mahasabha played an active
role in creating a Hindu nationalist tendency. There was a strong movement by Hindus
and a section of the Congress to call for the partition of Bengal in the late 1940s. This
movement was popular in the eight Hindu majority districts of south-central Bengal (Joya
Chatterjee, 1994). It was not the only trend in Bengal politics, but secular nationalism and
socialist radicalism were not as robust as believed earlier (Pradip Datta).
Although there was the growth of a radical peasant movement in East Bengal, it had
acquired a religious or communitarian perspective. Whether the peasants who supported
the Krishak Praja party during the 1930s and 1940s were communal or not, they were
no supporters of the Hindu landlords and the bhadralok (Tajul Hashmi). Some historians
have argued that Muslim rent receivers were considered part of the peasant community
but not Hindus in a similar economic position because of acceptance of insider exploitation
142 Gandhi: The Man and His Times

(Partha Chatterjee). Anti-landlord and anti-moneylender legislation supported by the

Krishak Praja party was viewed by Hindu bhadralok as anti-Hindu and communal.
Radical initiatives were often seen in terms of their impact on specific communities.
Advocates of Pakistan advised Muslim peasants during the Tebhaga movement: ‘why
agitate for a larger share of the crop when under Pakistan you would have it all?’ For
their part, the Hindu communalists reminded peasants of the plight of their co-religionists
in Noakhali. The call for Direct Action by the League led to a bloodbath in Calcutta in
1946 and killings in East Bengal strengthened fears of Muslim majority rule in a united
Bengal.
There is a persistent belief that a mass movement in 1946-47 could have dissolved the
communal tensions and a last anti-imperialist struggle could have helped to bring about
national unity. Officers and soldiers of the Indian National Army created by Subhas
Chandra Bose inspired Indians from all regions and communities, particularly in Punjab
and Bengal. The postwar discontent was leading to peasant movements and protests in
Bengal, Andhra and elsewhere. The grievances of the soldiers in the British Indian Army
posted overseas and the mutiny of the naval ratings in 1946 led to hopes of a popular
struggle against an emasculated British government in India. Although there were mass
demonstrations in support of the INA officers and soldiers, the communal polarisation had
also grown quite substantial. Some historians have noted the tendency of some peasant
radicals to participate in communal movements. Others have observed that supporters of
the INA, and some soldiers as well, were involved in communal violence during August
1946 in Calcutta (Suranjan Das).
The social discontent of the post-war period in combination with the communal polarisation
did not bode well for an anti-imperialist struggle to combat the idea of Pakistan. Muslim
mass contact had not worked well in the 1930s before the Muslim League had
demonstrated its electoral strength. Any movement launched in a period of social tensions
of the post-war years was bound to exceed the limits of non-violence prescribed by
Gandhi. Therefore the option of a mass movement was not accepted by Gandhi. A
movement launched by the left nationalists, with or without the support of the Congress,
was unlikely to break the communal impasse produced by the fear of Hindu and Muslim
majority rule. Members of the Muslim middle class and the capitalists had realised that
a separate state was bound to give them a distinct advantage and they were unlikely to
forego it. In Bengal not only did Muslim merchants like Ispahani favour Pakistan but the
Marwaris of Calcutta also wanted to be free of Muslim domination (Claude Markovits).
The left wing nationalists were too weak to influence the outcome of any mass movement
and there were clear material and cultural rewards that members of the Muslim elite of
Punjab and Bengal were unwilling to forego. The East Bengal assembly, however, voted
against the partition of Bengal.
According to Joya Chatterjee, a section of the Hindu elite and the Congress were willing
to go to any extent to escape the Muslim majority rule. They wanted to remain in power
in the newly carved Hindu majority state of Bengal. At the time of the drawing up of the
boundary of West Bengal, the Congress wanted to create a state “with an unequivocal
Hindu majority, containing as few Muslims as possible” (J. Chatterjee, 2008, p39). In
Punjab the problem of settling the demobilised soldiers would have posed a problem for
peace as well as communal harmony if there was a confrontation between rival communities
for dominance after the rout of the Unionist party. Therefore, the chances of a mass
movement overcoming the problems posed by the demand for Pakistan were rather
Partition of India 143
The failure of the
limited, but cannot be completely ruled out. The differences between him and the radicals Congress to prevent
partition stemmed
and the left were too substantial for Gandhi to overlook when he suggested to the AICC from its inability to
understand the
that the Congress Working Committee leadership should be opposed and removed. threat and danger of
communal forces. It
12.8 OVERVIEW devoted little
attention to develop
a strategy to
Gandhi was not in favour of partition and he was willing to go further than all the combat the
communal forces.
prominent members of the Congress to avert it. He had been willing to offer the The Congress
primeministership to Jinnah if that could avert partition. Yet he was aware that he had lost leaders, including
Gandhi, believed that
the support of large numbers of Hindus and that the Muslims no longer trusted him. The the communal rift
Muslim voters had not reposed any faith in the Congress even during the heyday of the between the Hindus
and the Muslims was
Gandhian leadership of the Congress and it was unlikely that in a period of great a direct result of
communal polarization, they would listen to him. The Muslim mass contact movements had British presence in
India. Once the
not succeeded because of the conservative social base of the local Congress party and British quit India, the
its members (Gyan Pandey, Sumit Sarkar). If Gandhi could not get the Muslims to join communaldifferences would
the Congress during the 1930s, then there was little chance that any gesture of goodwill disappear on its own
accord. When they
or any mass movement could have brought a sizable Muslim following in 1946-47. finally realized the
destructive power of
This was the logic not only of communal politics but also of electoral politics based on communalism in
a limited franchise and separate electorates. The problem was not so much the denial of 1946, it was too late.
By that time, Jinnah
the religiously informed identities of Indian Muslims as the Muslim perception, and the was in no mood for
League propaganda, that their economic and political rights were threatened by a compromise. Congress slowly
The

monolithic Hindu community and an overbearing Congress party. Uneven development and came to realization
that no amount of
struggle for dominance led to the growing polarisation; the real distribution of power and concessions would
resources created mutual rivalry and distrust, not so much differences about religion. satisfy Jinnah except
the partition of the
These factors explain why the unorthodox Jinnah was able to become the leader of Indian country.
Muslims and a devout Muslim and an avowed nationalist like Maulana Azad had very
little support within his community during 1946-47. Even with adult franchise, the
problems associated with religiously determined majorities and power sharing was not
likely to disappear. This might have been a factor in the acceptance of partition as a
resolution of the communal problem. The scale of the violence during partition was
unforeseen and the migrations were on a much larger scale than anyone had imagined but
it resolved the question of power sharing with religiously defined minorities in both India
and Pakistan.
Many Gandhians believe that Gandhi’s friends and supporters abandoned him and his
ideals even before he was assassinated. This has been termed a betrayal of Gandhian
ideals. Liberals see a departure from Gandhian ideals but not a complete break (Anthony
Parel). Marxists have called the transition to power that his leadership of the Congress
helped to bring about as a passive revolution (Partha Chatterjee). Yet the fact remains that
he was unable to carry forward his agenda on a range of issues because of his pivotal
role in India’s freedom struggle. Gandhi was not able to promote Hindu-Muslim unity
despite the great emphasis he placed on communal harmony. The left nationalists and
Marxists believe that his methods of struggle, howsoever laudable, were unable to
produce a radical transformation of the national movement. Therefore the possibility of
reducing the influence of the conservative Hindu and Muslim elites, who were locked in
a struggle for power and dominance, by mass mobilisation, could not be realised.
144 Gandhi: The Man and His Times

12.9 SUMMARY
Gandhi struggled valiantly, but could not preserve the unity of India. It was not something
even a leader as great as he was could have handled by himself. Powerful economic and
political forces were at play and eventually prevailed. Gandhi did not know how to cope
with the constitutional problems and alternatives that were discussed before the final
partition of the country; he was not too old and marginalised to offer his views. Therefore
he did not offer his views forcefully on a constitutional solution to the communal deadlock
in 1946-47, although the idea of the ‘oceanic circle’ gives us a glimpse of his vision for
India. Probably he immersed himself in fighting communalism by touring the riot-affected
regions because that was something he could do without any help from others. The
satyagrahi who believed in non-violence and a decentralised government was unable to
give detailed advice on how competing notions of nationalism and nationalist projects for
modernisation could be best tackled. He was unhappy with partition but he was not
willing to fight the party he had led for nearly three decades. The partition of India was
the outcome of several factors that have been dealt with so far. No single individual
brought it about or could have averted it. This holds true for Gandhi as well.

12.10 TERMINAL QUESTIONS

1. Enumerate the Socio-economic reasons behind partition.
2. What was the role of the League and the congress regarding partition?
3. Do you think Gandhi was responsible for partition? Give reasons.

SUGGESTED READINGS
1. Raghuramaraju, A., (ed), Debating Gandhi: A Reader, OUP, Delhi, 2006.
2. Ahmad, Aijaz., Lineages of the Present: Ideology and Politics in Contemporary South
Asia, London, Verso, 1995
3. Ahmad, Akbar., Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin,
Routledge, London, 1997.
4. Singh, Anita Inder., The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947, OUP, Delhi,
1987
5. Parel, Anthony., Gandhi’s Philosophy and the Quest for Harmony, Cambridge, 2007.
6. Arjun Appadurai., ‘Number in the Colonial Imagination,’ in Carol Breckenridge and
Peter Veer (eds), Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament, Philadelphia, 1993.
7. Roy, Asim., (ed), Islam in History and Politics: Perspectives from South Asia, OUP,
Delhi, 2006.
8. Jalal, Ayesha., The Sole Spokesman, Jinnah, the Muslim League and the demand for
Pakistan, Cambridge, 1985
9. Jalal, Ayesha., ‘Nation, Reason and Religion: Punjab’s Role in the Partition of India,’
Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 33, no 32, August 8-14, 1998, pp 2183-2190.
10. Jalal, Ayesha., Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam
since 1850, Oxford, Delhi, 2001.
Partition of India 145

11. Nanda, B.R., ‘Nehru, the Indian National Congress and the Partition of India, 1935-
47,’ in Philips and Wainwright (eds), The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives,
1935-1947, London, 1970.
12. Bimal Prasad., ‘Gandhi and India’s Partition,’ in Amit Gupta (ed), Myth and Reality:
The Struggle for Freedom in India, 1945-47, New Delhi, 1987.
13. Chandra, Bipan., Communalism in India, New Delhi, 1984
14. Bayly, Christopher and Tim Harper., Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain’s Asian
Empire, Allen Lane, 2007.
15. Markovits, Claude., ‘Businessmen and the Partition of India,’ in C. Markovits,
Merchants, Traders, Entrepreneurs: Indian Business in the Colonial Era, Permanent
Black, Delhi, 2008.
16. Page, David., Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of
Control, 1920-1932, Oxford, Delhi, 1982.
17. Gilmartin, David., Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, Oxford,
Delhi, 1989.
18. Robinson, Francis., Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United
Provinces’ Muslims, 1860-1923, Cambridge, 1974.
19. Shaikh, Farzana., Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in
Colonial India, 1860-1947, Cambridge, 1991.
20. Orsini, Francesco., The Hindi Public Sphere 1920-1940: Language and Literature in
the Age of Nationalism, New Delhi, Oxford, 2002.
21. Minault, Gail., The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilisation
in India, New York, 1982.
22. Pandey, Gyanendra., The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India,
Oxford, Delhi, 1990.
23. Pandey, Gyanendra., Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in
India, Cambridge, 2001.
24. Alavi, Hamza., ‘Social Forces and Ideology in the Making of Pakistan,’ Economic
and Political Weekly, Vol 37, No 51, December 21-27, 2002, pp. 5119-5124.
25. Brown, Judith., Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope, New Haven, 1989
26. Chatterjee, Joya., Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947,
Cambridge, 1994.
27. Chatterjee, Joya., The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967, Cambridge,
2008.
28. Talbot, Ian., Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the
Muslim League in North West and North East India, 1937-1947, Karachi, 1988.
29. Gandhi, M.K., Hind Swaraj, Navjivan Trust, Ahmedabad, original edition,1909.
30. Mushirul Hasan.,(ed), India’s Partition- Process, Strategy and Mobilisation, Oxford,
Delhi, 1993.
31. Hasan, Mushirul., Nationalim and Communal Politics in India, 1885-1931, Delhi,
1991.
146 Gandhi: The Man and His Times

32. Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam., India Wins Freedom, Delhi, Orient Longman, 1989
33. Ispahani, M.A.H., ‘ Factors Leading to the Partition of British India,’ in C.H. Philips
and M.D. Wainwright (eds), The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, 1935-
1947, London,1970.
34. Das, M.N., (ed), A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress, Vol III,
1935-1947, Vikas Delhi, 1985.
35. Nandurkar., (ed), Sardar’s Letters- Mostly Unknown I, Ahmedabad, 1977.
36. Gupta, Partha Sarathi., Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964,
London, 1975.
37. Datta, Pradip., Carving Blocs: Communal Ideology in Early Twentieth-century Bengal,
Oxford, Delhi, 1999.
38. Peter Ronald deSouza., ‘ Institutional Visions and Sociological Imaginations: The
Debate on Panchayati Raj,’ in Rajeev Bhargava, (ed), Politics and Ethics of the
Indian Constitution, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2008, pp. 79-91.
39. Ahmad, Rafiuddin., (ed), Understanding the Bengal Muslims: Interpretive Essays,
Oxford, Delhi, 2001.
40. Moore, R.J., Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian problem,
Oxford, 1983.
41. Moore, R.J., Endgames of Empire: Studies of Britain’s Indian Problem, Delhi, 1988.
42. Gopal, Sarvepalli., Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol I, 1889-1947, New Delhi,
1976.
43. Das, Suranjan., Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947, Delhi, 1991
44. Mahajan, Sucheta., Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in
India, Sage, Delhi, 2008 edition.
45. Sugato Bose., ‘Between Monolith and Fragment; A Note on the Historiography of
Nationalism in Bengal,’ in Shekhar Bandyopadhyay (ed), Bengal: Rethinking History
Essays in Historiography, New Delhi, Manohar, 2001, pp. 283-96.
46. Sarkar, Sumit., ‘Popular’ Movements and ‘Middle Class’ Leadership: Perspectives
and Problems of a ‘History from Below,’ Calcutta, 1983.
47. Thomas Pantham., ‘Gandhi and the Constitution: Parliamentary Swaraj and Village
Swaraj,’ in Rajeev Bhargava, (ed), Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution,
Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2008, pp. 59-78.
48. Madan, T.N., Modern Myths, Locked Minds: Secularism and Fundamentalism in
India, OUP, Delhi, 2003.
49. Gould, William., Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial
India, Foundation Books, Delhi, 2005.
UNIT 36 COMMUNALISM AND THE
PARTITION OF INDIA

Structure
36.0 Objectives
36.1 Introduction
36.2 Background to Pakistan
36.2.1 Transformation of the Muslim League
36.2.2 Extremist Phase of Hindu Communalism
36.2.3 The Brit~shPolicy
36.3 Post-War Developments
36.3.1 Simla Conference and Elections
36.3.2 The Cahinet Mission
36.3.3 Formation of Interim Government
36.3.4 Fixing of a Time Limit for British Withdrawal
36.3.5 The Third June Plan and its Outcome
36.4 Congress and Partition
36.5 Congress's Handling of the Communal Problems
36.5.1 Pitfalls of Conciliation
36.5.2 The Basic Failure
36.6 Let Us Sum Up
36.7 Key Words
36.8 Answer to Check Your Progress Exercises

36.0 OBJECTIVES
After reading this Unit you will be able to:
explain the nature of communalism in the last decade of British rule,
get an idea of the background to the demand for Pakistan,
trace the political developments leading upto the partition of India,
assess the role played by Muslim League, the British and the Congress in the creation of
Pakistan.

36.1 INTRODUCTION
In Unit 14 of Block IV you learnt about the various forces which led to the emergence and
growth of communalism in modem India. You have already become familiar with the
major developments related to communalism upto 1940. However, the 1940s represent the
most crucial and decisive phase of communalism. It was in this period that the biggest
communal demand - the demand for Pakistan-was put forward, and popularised by the
Muslim League. This period also witnessed the actual coming into being of Pakistan in
1947. This Unit attempts to explain the process of the formation of Pakistan, and gives you
a summary of the major events which led to it.

36.2 BACKGROUND TO PAKISTAN

The demand for Pakistan did not arise in a vacuum. It was a product of certain political
developments which took place after 1937. The period after 1937 witnessed serious
changes in the politics of both the Hindu communal and the Muslim communal forces. In
the popularisation of the Pakistan demand the British Policy also played a very active role,
by giving it acknowledgement and credibility. Let us look at their role separately.

36.2.1 Transformation of the Muslim League

The year 1937 was a turning point in the history of Muslim communalism. In the elections
held for the Provincial Legislative Assemblies that year, the League won only 109 out of
Towards A Sovereign State 492 reserved Muslim s pf the total Muslim votes. The poor ekction
results showed the Lea d its popular base among different sections of
g the urban lower middle classes. A radical

in danger" and threat from the impending

' "Hindu Raj". T o a from the threats being forced upon it soon
turned into a cam llowers of other religions. According to
full of "fervour. fear, contempt and bitter
hatred". Jinnah and othe t the real aim of the Congress was not
ble them to fulfil their basic motive - the
ir faith. Once the prospect of a Hindu Raj

ign state for the Muslims on the ground that

36.2.2 Extremist P H of~ a d u Communalism

sanhe choice faced them, they had either to obtain
ction. Their predicament was aggravated in 1938
sts from working withill the Congress organisation.
ogramme and resorted to appeals to religion a ~ tile~ d
t. Muslim League llad done

wtaken by leaders who were willing to take their

Mahasabha, and M.S.
vak Sangh. Golwalkar's book. We, became the
Muslims were vilified and Congressmen were
Aerate enemies". The Muslims were told that they
y ceased to be foreigners. i.e:become Hindus.
any privileges or special
nly nation living in India
itizens was the Hindu
communalists' version n qheory and the demand for a "separate
homeland".
The language of Hi came extremely vicious by 1946-47. As communal
itall them, or stem the drift towards ~ a k i s t a n ,
saviours of Hindus. They

tetaliate and teach a lesson to the Muslims. Their

partition as the communalised atmosphere
demand was raised that since Pakistan was an
Hindu Raj. When their hope of overthrowing the

at R.S.S. and Mahasabha meetings and Mahatma

1948. The killing of Gandhi clearly showed that

le rlirnate for the creation of Pakistan.

at that particular juncture. Earlier the colonial

the backward and schedule castes against the
e Congress into Right and Left wings, but without
success. The elections of 1937 showed that the only weapon left in the armoury of the Communalism and the
Partition of India
British to devide Indian nationalism was communalism.
After the outbreak of the Second World War the Muslim League was assiduously fostered
by Viceroy Linlithgow. The Pakistan demand was used to counter the demand of the
Congress that the British should promise that India would be free after the War and as
proof of their sincerity, transfer actual control of the government to Indians immediately.
The British pointed out that Hindus and Muslims must come to an agreement on how
polver was to be transferred before the process could begin. The League was officially
recognised as the representative voice of Muslims (even though its performance in the last
elections hardly substantiated this claim) arid promised that no political settlement would
be made unless it was acceptable to the League. This was a blanket power of veto, which
Jinnah was to use to good effect after the War had ended.
T h e Cripps Mission: March-April 1942
In March 1942 Stafford Cripps, (a Labour Party leader with friendly links with many
leaders of the Congress) headed a mission to India whose declared intention was "the
earliest possible realisation of self-government in India". However, the actual provisions of
the offer belied this declaration by Cripps. Dominion status, not full independence was
promised and that too after the War, and the people of the princely states were to be
represented in the proposed Constituent Assembly by nominees of the princes.
It was clear that the British would retain control over defence in the new Executive
Council. The Congress could hardly have accepted what was, according to the Secretary of
State, Amery, a conservative, reactionary and limited offer. But above all the Cripps;
proposals brought in 'Pakistan' through the backdoor via the "local option" clause.
Provinces were given the right to sign individual agreements with Britain about their
future status should they choose to reject the new constitution that would be framed.
Though the Cripps Mission failed, Cripps' proposals gave a fillip to the activities of the
Muslim League and provided legitimacy to the Pakistan demand by accommodating it in
their provision for provincial autonomy. At a time when the demand had hardly been taken
seriously by Indians, its sympathetic consideration by officialdom was a great service to
the cause of Pakistan.

Check Your Progress 1

1) Why did the Muslim League raise the cry of Islam in danger? Answer in ten lines.

2) Read the following statements and mark right ( 4 ) or wrong (x)

i) Hindu communalism took a 'fascist' turn after 1937-38.
ii) The Cripps proposals were a milestone on the pathway to Pakistan.
....
111) The British Government tried to check the growth of Muslim communalism after
1940.

36.3 POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS

In this section we will give you a sequence of events from the end of the war till the
Towards A Sovereign State rtition and the ultimate shape of Pakistan
in these two years.

Viceroy, Wavell, the Congress leaders

and invited to Simla to work out an interim
political agreemen

government as this deni ta the Muslims of the Unionist Party of Punjab,

i! 19. M u add Jinaah at Simla.

i
Elections - The water4 ed
The elections held in the inter of 6 to the Central and Provincial Legislative
Assemblies were fought the Le a straight forward communal slogan- "A
vote for the League and kistan for Islam". Mosques were used for election

i
meetings and pirs (holy n) per ssue farwas (directives) that Muslims must vote
for the League. The choi betwee s and the League was portrayed as a choice
between the Gita and the oran. It 811 wonder then, that the League made a clean
sweep of the Muslim seat .
36.3.2 The Cabinet Mission Communalism and the
Partition of India
By early 1946 the British authorities had come to the conclusion that a graceful withdrawal
from India was the best option for them. The Cabinet Mission was sent to India in March
1946 to establish a national government and work out a constitutional arrangement for
transfer of power. Now when the British had decided to leave it was believed that the old
policy of divide and rule would no longer be suitable. British strategies in the Indian
subcontinent after independence, it could be argued, would be better served if India was
united. It was believed that a united India, which was friendly with Britain, could be an
active partner in the defence of the Commonwealth, whereas a divided India's defence
potential would be weak and conflict between India and Pakistan would frustrate the joint
defence plans.
The change, in the British attitude towards the Congress and the League around this time
reflects this understanding. The British Prime Minister, Attlee, declared on 15th March
1946 that "a minority will not be allowed to place a veto on the progress of the majority".
This was in sharp contrast to the Viceroy Wavell's attitude during the Simla Conference in
June-July 1945 when Jinnah had been allowed to wreck the Conference by his insistence on
nominating all Muslims. The Cabinet Mission also believed that Pakistan would not be
viable as a separate entity. Therefore the plan that was drawn up by the Mission was to
safeguard the interests of the Muslim minority within the overall framework of unity of
the country. Three sections were planned which would have separate meetings to work out
their constitutions. The Congress provinces like Madras, Bombay, U.P., Bihar, Central
Provinces and Orissa, would form group A; Punjab, N.W.F.P and Sind would go into
Group B and Bengal and Assam would make up Group C. The common centre would look
after defence, foreign affairs and communications. A province could leave the group to
which it was assigned after the first general elections and after ten years it could demand
modification of both the group and union constitutions.
Ambivalence over Grouping _____________________________________________________ > ~ Differences arose between the Congress and
Disagreement arose between the Congress and the League over the issue of grouping. The League over the issue of grouping. The
Congress demanded that grouping should be
Congress demand was that provinces should have the option not to join a group at a very optional, and provinces be allowed to join any of
beginning, rather than wait till general elections were held. The. Congress raised this the groupings even before the next general
elections. Compulsory grouping defied
objection keeping in mind the Congress ruled provinces of Assam and N.W.F.P., which autonomy of the provinces. The Congress also
had been placed in sections C and B. The League demanded that provinces be given the regarded the absence of elected members from
right to modify the Union Constitution immediately and not wait for ten years. Thus, the princely states as unacceptable (as the plan
proposed members from princely states to the
basic problem was that the Cabinet Mission Plan was not clear about whether grouping was assembly to be nominated by their respective
compulsory or optional. In fact the Cabinet Mission deliberately refused to clarify its princes).
stand, even when asked to do so. This was because of the hope that their ambivalence
~ The League, on the other hand, desired the
might reconcile the irreconcilable position of the Congress and the League, but in effect, it groupings to be compulsory as it projected the
only complicated matters. probability of Group B and C developing into
solid entities and seceding into Pakistan in the
Soon it was obvious that the League and the Congress were at cross-purposes in their future. It also demanded that provinces be
interpretation of the Mission Plan. Both parties saw it as a confirmation of their stand. given the right to modify the Union Constitution
without having to wait for 10 years.
Sardar Pate1 drew satisfaction from the fact that Pakistan was now out of the picture and
the League's power of veto had been withdrawn. The League made it clear (in the 6th June ~ Initially, both the factions accepted the
1946 statement) that it accepted the Plan in so far as the basis of Pakistan was implied by long-term vision of the mission.
But, on 10 July 1946, Nehru stated that the
the clause of compulsory grouping. Nehru explained in his speech to the A.I.C.C. (on 7th Congree Working Committee would join the
June 1946) that the Congress Working Committee had only decided that the Congress sovereign body of the Constituent Assembly
would participate in the Constituent Assembly. Since the Assembly was a sovereign body, and work for a Union Constitution as "the big
probability is that there would be no grouping as
it would formulate the rules of procedure. The implication was that the rules laid down by NWFP and Assam would have objections to
the Mission could be amended. The League, whose acceptance of the Plan had in any case, joining sections B and C" respectively.
This provided Jinnah an opportunity to withdraw
been qualified, quickly took advantage of Nehru's speech to withdraw its acceptance of the its acceptance of the long-term plan of the
Mission Plan on 29th July 1946. Cabinet Mission in response to Nehru's
statement on 29 July 1946 and provide the
36.3.3 Formation of Interim Government basis of launching the 'Direct Action' Plan.

The British Government was now placed in a dilemma - should it wait till the League
came around or should it implement the short-term aspect of the plan, and set up an
Interim Government with the Congress alone? Wavell's preference was for the first oition
but His Majesty's Covernment was of the opinion that Congress cooperation was
absolutely necessary for their long-term interests. Accordingly the Congress was invited to
form an Interim Government which came into being on 2nd September 1946 with
Jawaharlal Nehru functioning as its de facto head. This was a sharp departure from earlier
British practice, as, for this first time, the British were willing to defy Jinnah's stand that
no constitutional settlement be made unless it was acceptable to the League.
Towards A Sovereign State

,) 20. ~ e of Interim
w Government.

He warned the British

British would compel
league had already ac
and the new slogan was Larke Lenge Pakistan

dements retaliated, perhaps with equal brutality,

and 5000 people we
The trouble broke o st Bengal in early October 1946 and Noakhali
sparked off widespread in Bihar in late October 1946. The following
months saw riots every ay, Punjab and N.W.F.P. The tide could not be
stemmed.

placating the Musli ugh the league was their creation, it had now
assumed the shape hich could not tamed". Wave11 had kept up

Interim Governme

Government witho e plan of Direct Action.

Furthermore, it di

s not in the League's interest and

e had no intention to share with Congress the

 responsibility for running the Government. On the other hand, the intention apparently was Communalism and the
Partition of India
to demonstrate that cooperation between the two was impossible. The League ministers
made it a point to disagree with actions taken by their Congress colleagues. They refused
to attend the parties at which Congress members would arrive at decisions before the
formal meeting of the Executive Council so as to sideline Wavell.
Interim Government-Threat of Breakdown
The Congress leaders had raised the objection (right after the League members were sworn
in) that the League could not join the Interim Government without accepting the Cabinet
Mission Plan.
Later, when non-cooperation of the League both inside and outside the Government
became clear, the Congress members demanded that the League either give up Direct
Action or leave the government. Further, the League refused to participate in the
Constituent Assembly which met on 9th December 1946 even though the statement made
by His Majesty's Government (on 6th December 1946) upheld the League's stand on
grouping. The breaking point came when the League demanded that the Constituent
Assembly be dissolved because it was unrepresentative. On 5th February 1947 the
Congress members of the Interiin Government sent a letter to Wa:lell with the demand that
the League members should be asked to resign. A crisis was imminent.

36.3.4 Fixing of a Time-Limit for British Withdrawal

The situation was saved by Attlee's announcement in Parliament on 20the February 1947
that the British would withdraw from India by 30th June 1948 and that lord Mountbatten
would replace Wavell as Viceroy. This was no answer to the constitutional crisis that was
at hand but it showed that the British decision about leaving India remained unchanged.
The Congress responded with a gesture of cooperation to the League. Nehru appealed to
Liaqat Ali Khan:
The British are fading out of the picture and the burden of this decision must rest on
all of us here. It seems desirable that we shouid face this question squarely and not
speak to each other from a distance.
But Jinnah's reaction to Attlee's statement was entirely different. He was confident that
now he oiily needed to stick firmly to his position in order to achieve his goal of Pakistan.
After all, the declaration made it clear that power would be transferred to more than one
authority if the Constituent Assembly did not become a fully representative body, i.e. if
the Muslim majority provinces did not join it.

i The Governor of Punjab had warned in this regard that "the statement will be regarded as
the prelude to the final showdown", with every one out to "seize as such power as they
can, if necessary by force". He was soon proved right. The League began a civil
disobedience campaign in Punjab which brought about the collapse of the coalition
ministry headed by Khizr Hayat Khan of the Unionist Party.

I Thus the situation which Mountbatten found on his amval in India was a fairly intractable
one. The League was on the war path, as Punjab showed, and Jinnah was obdurate that he
would accept nothing less than a sovereign Pakistan. The Cabinet Mission Plan had clearly
become defunct and there was no point in persisting with it. The only way the British
could maintain unity was by throwing all their weight behind it. The role of mediators
i between the Congress and League had to be discarded. Those who opposed unity had to be
put down firmly and those who wanted unity had to be openly supported. Despite Attlee's
claim years later - we would have preferred a united India. We couldn't get it, though
"

we tried hard", the truth was that the British chose to play safe and take both sides along
1 without exercising any check or restraint even when the situation demanded this type of
assertion of authority.

36.3.5 The 3rd June Plan and its Outcome

This was done by making concessions to both the Congress and the League. India would be
d i v i d ~ dbut in a manner that maximum unity was retained. The League's demand would be
~ ~ c o m r n o d a t ebyd creating Pakistan, but it would be made as small as possible in order to
accomnlodate the Congress stand on unity. Since Congress was making the bigger
concession i.e. it was giving up its ideal of a united India, all its other stands were to be
j upheld by the British. For example, Mountbatlen supported the Congress stand that

I princely states must not be given the option of independence. Mountbatten realised that it
Towards A Sovereign State

was vital to retain th ngress if he hoped to persuade India to remain in

the Commonwealth. red a chance of keeping India in the
Commonwealth, even hence the 3rd June Plan declared that power
would be handed over 47 on the basis of dominion status to India and
Pakistan.

nd taking the communally explosive situation in

about preventing the communal situation from
p the situation in his statement to the Viceroy:
't let us govern". The British had abdicated
e for withdrawal to 15th August 1947 made this
more apparent.

raflsfer of power and division of the country, equally

eneral of India and Pakistan. There was no

g from division could be referred and even
wn in December 1947 as a fall-out of the hostilities in
Kashmir.

y in announcing the awards of the

e trbgedy of partition. These were Mountbatten's
 decisions. Mountbatten delayed the announcement of the Boundary Commission Award Communalism and the
Partition of India
(even though it was ready by 12th August 1947) to disown responsibility for further
complications. This created confusion for ordinary citizens as well as the officials. People
living in the villages between Lahore and Amritsar stayed on in their homes in the belief
I that they were on the right side of the border. Migrations necessarily became a frenzied
I
affair. often culminating in massacres. The Boundary Comminsion was consultative
i committee created in July 1947 to recommend

I
The officials were busy arranging their own transfers rather than using their authority to how the Punjab and Bengal regions of the Indian
maintain law and order. This was conceded by none other than Lackhart, who was subcontinent were to be divided between India
and Pakistan shortly before each was to become
Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army from 15th August to 3rd December 1947: independent from Britain.
Had officials in every grade in the civil services, and all the personnel of the armed
services, been in position in their respective new countries before independence Day,
1 it seems there would have been a better chance of preventing widespread disorder.

!
Check Your progress 2
1 ) Read the following statements and mark right ( 4)
or wrong (x).
j ,
i) Muslim League contested the elections on the basis of a socio-economic programme.
ii) The Interim Government could not work because the Congress workers were
unwilling to cooperate.
iii) Jinnah wanted Mountbatten to became the Common Governor Genera1 of India and
Pakistan.

I 2) What were the basic merits and flaws in the Cabinet Mission Plan? Write in five lines.

36.4 CONGRESS AND PARTITION

I
Why did the Congress accept Partition? It was one thing for the League to demand
1 Pakistan and the British to concede it because it was in harmony with the politics they had

1 pursued in the part. But why did the Congress, which had fought for unity for long years,
-
give uo its ideal of an united India. One view is that the
~ -~ -Coneress
~. .--
- " - - -
- ~ ~leaders succumbed to the
- ~ ~

temptation of power and struck a deal with the British by which they got quick power
~
~~ - - - --
- ~ ~ ~ - -

while the nation paid the price of partition. This view is both simplistic and incorrect.
What was involved was not the personal failings - of the top leaders but a basic failbre of the
entire organisation.
The Congress acceptance of Partition was the consequence of its failure over the years to
I
bring the Muslim masses into the nationalist mainstream and since 1937, to stem the
I advancing tide of Muslim communalism. By 1946 it was dear to the Congress leaders that
the Muslims were behind the League as it had won 80 per cent Muslim seats in the
elections. However, the point of no return was reached a year later when the battle for
Pakistan was no longer confined to the ballot box but came to be fought on the streets.
I
communal riots engulfed the country and the Congress leaders concluded that Partition was
1 a lesser evil than a civil war.
I
1 The breakdown of the Interim Government only confirmed the inevitability of Pakistan.

1
1
I
Nehru remarked that the Interim Government was an arena of struggle and Sardar Patel, in
his speech at the AICC meeting on 14th June 1947. drew attention to the fact that Pakistan
was actually fucctioning not only in Punjab and Bengal but also in the Interim
i Government! Mureover, the Interim Government had no power to intervene in the
i provinces (even when the League ministry in Bengal was guilty not only of inaction but
complicity in the riots in Calcutta and Noakhali ). Nehru realised that there was no point in
1 holding office when "murder stalks the streets and the most amazing cruelties are indulged
in by both the individual and the mob." Immediate transfer of power would at least bring
I about a government that would have the power to fulfil its responsibilities.
Towards A Sovereign State

22. Millions, Upr{ed--Pbotog#s od Partition days.

52
 Another consideration in accepting partition was that it firmly ruled out the specter of the Communalism and the
Partition of India '
'balkanisation' of the country. The Congress had the support of the Viceroy, and behind
him His Majesty's Government, in refusing the option of independence to the princely
states. Through persuasion or force, they were made to join either the Union of India or
Pakistan.
I Gandhi and Partition
It is common knowledge that Gandhi was so distressed when partition became an imminent
reality that he no longer wished to live for 125 years, as he had stated earlier. One popular
I interpretation is that Gandhi's advice was ignored by his disciples, Nehru and Patel, who
L
I
wanted power at any cost and though he felt this betrayal acutely, he did not wish to
condemn them publicly because they had been his faithful followers.
Gandhi's own statements, however, suggest that the main reason for his helplessness lay in
the communalisation of the masses. The Muslims began distrusting the Hindus and then the
Hindu and Sikhs also got convinced that mutual co-existence was impossible. It was the
HIndus' and Sikhs' desire for Partition that made him a mass leader without any masses
behind him in his struggle for unity. The Muslims had already declared him to be their
I
enemy. When different segments of people wanted partition, what could be or the
Congress do but to accept it? At his daily prayer meeting on 4th June 1947 Gandhi said:
I
"The demand has been granted because you asked for it. The Congress never asked
for it .... But the Congress can feel the pulse of the people. It realised that the Khalsa
as also the Hindus desired it".
Socialists and Gandhians appealed to Gandhi to launch a struggle for unity bypassing the
Congress leaders. Gandhi pointed out that the problem was not that he was unwilling to go
ahead without the Congress leaders. After all, few had agreed with his assessment in 1942
that the time was right for a struggle of the Quit India type, and yet he had defied their
counsels and he had been proved right. The crucial lacuna in 1947 was that there were no
"forces of good" upon which he could "build up a programme". He confessed - "Today I
see no sign of such a healthy feeling. And, therefore, I shall have to wait until the time
conies".
The time never came, for political developments were moving at too fast a pace. Partition
was announced on 3rd June and implemented on 15th August 1947. Gandhi's advice to
Congressmen, conveyed in his speech to the AICC meeting on 14th June 1947, was to
accept Partition as an unavoidable necessity for the present, but not accept it in their hearts
a i ~ afight to reverse it later, when passions would subside.

36.5 CONGRESS' HANDLING OF THE COMMUNAL

PROBLEMS
It is often argued that partition could have been avoided if the Congress had been willing
to conciliate Jinnah, not only before he came up with the demand for a separate state in
1940, but also in 1942 at the time of the Cripps Mission or even in 1946 when the Cabinet
Mission Plan was put forward. Maulana Azad in his autobiography Indla Wins Freedom
has supported this position. This view ignores the fact that Jinnah laid down the impossible
condition that he was willing to negotiate with the Congress only if it declared itself a
Hindu body and accepted the Muslim League as the sole representative of the Muslims.
Had the Congress accepted this demand, it would have had to give up its secular character.
This would not only have meant betrayal of the nationalist Muslims who had resolutely
stood behind the Congress at great personal cost, but betrayal of the Indian people and
their future. The logical culmination of accepting Jinnah's demand would have been the
; creation of a Hindu fascist state, from a Hindu body to a Hindu state being a logical next
1 step. In Rajendra Prasad's words, the Congress "would be denying its own past, falsifying
its history, and betraying its future".

36.5.1 Pitfalls of Conciliation

In fact, though the Congress refused to negotiate with Jinnah on his terms, it made
unilateral concessions to Muslim demands despite Jinnah's intransigence. The Congress
accepted the autonomy of Muslim majority provinces during the negotiations with the
Towards A Sovereign State

nnah in 1944 Gandhi recognised that Muslim

self-determination. When the Cabinet Mission
Plan proposed that Musli es (groups B and C) would set up a separate
Constituent Assembly if ongress did not oppose this. Congress opposed

not wish to join) but by ehru declared that his party would accept the
interpretation of the Fe

quitely accepted the><w interpretation. As

1947. So when the

e's demand. It was the culmination of a process

Muslim majority state.

assertive "Muslims nat

every round of conc

was betraying in th

This lack of under ism in the 1940s was only

 Communalism and the
Though the Congress was committed to securalism and though Gandhi staked his life for Partition of India
Hindu Muslim unity, the Congress was not able to formulate a long term strategy to fight
communalism in its different forms at the level of both politics and ideology. The
Congress leaders naively believed that reassurances, generous concessions and willingness
to reach a compromise would solve the communal problem. As Prof. Bipan Chandra has
said:
"The fact is that communalism is basically an ideology which could not have been,
and cannot be, appeared; it had to be confronted and opposed ... The failure to do so
was the real weakness of the Congress and the national movement. (India's Struggle
for Independence).

Cneck Your Progress 3

1) Read the following statements and mark right ( d ) or wrong (X).
i) Congress accepted partition because the congress leaders succumbed to the
temptation of power.
ii) British Government accepted partition because it was in keeping with its policies
pursued. in the past.
iii) The Congress policies of concessions and concilations contributed in the making of
Pakistan.
iv) The real failure of the Congress lay in not being able to evolve a long term strategy
to fight communalism.

- 2) Why did Gandhi feel so helpless regarding the partition of India'? Write in five lines.

LET US SUM UP
The partition of India was primarily the result of the persistent efforts o i the Muslim
League from 1940 onwards to obtain a separate homeland for the Muslims. Through an
astute combination of constitutional methods and direct actions, the League, under Jinnah's
stewardship, consolidated its position and forced the political situation into a deadlock,
from which partition was the only escape. But Pakistan could not have been created
without the help given by the British. British authorities used the communal card in their
moves to counter the national movement which was growing from strength to strength.
They gave credibility to the Pakistan demand, recognised the League as the sole
representative of Muslims and gave the League the power to veto progress in political
settlements. Even when their own interests inclined them towards leaving behind a United
India, they proved incapable of standing up to Jinnah and tamely surrendered to the
blackmail of direct action. Official inaction in checking the rapidly deteriorating
communal situation reached a point from which partition appeared preferable to civil war.
The Congress for its part, failed to prevent the partition despite its long-standing
commitment to a United India. Its weakness lay on two fronts. It failed to draw the
Muslim masses into the national movement and was not able to evolve a strategy to
successfully fight communalism.

36.7 KEY WORDS

Divide and Rule : a term which refers to the British policy of creating divisions in the
Indian society so as to perpetuate their rule in India.
'Local Option' Clause: a clause in the Cripps Proposal, which recognised the right of any
part of the Indian Dominion, to refuse to join it. This clause provided the much needed
legitimacy to the demand for Pakistan.
Towards A Sovereign State

1 24. ~ e h r w w l i Partition
n ~ Victims.
I

36.8 ANSWERS f 0 CH K YOUR PROGRESS

of 1937, ii) the need the utility of religious slogans in

unds and turning them against Hindus; and
iv) to drive home t meland for Muslims.
See Sub-sec. 36.2.1
2 i ) ( v ' ) ii) ( v '

Check Your Progress 2 ~

36.3.2
 In conclusion we can say that the Partition of India was not an ‘inevitable’ culmination of
Muslims separatism or the colonial policy. The creation of Pakistan far from being the logical
conclusion of the ‘two-nation theory’ was in fact its most decisive political abortion. The
Partition arose from a complex interaction of changing communal policy, communal
question and the demands and strategies of the Congress and the League. The Partition of
India in 1947 cannot be seen merely in terms of Jinnah’s demands and Nehru’s opposition.
It also needs to be seen in the context of the relationship between ‘high politics’ and popular
sentiments. The Partition of India was not inevitable. It arose out of the specific conditions
of the post-war period, growing communal tensions and the nature of political strategy of
the League and the Congress.