www.scholarjournals.

com
ISSN 2412-3218(Print) International
Scholar Journal of
Accounting and
International Scholar Journal of Accounting and
Finance,Volume-2, No.1(2016) 11-20
Finance

Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance:

A Case Study In Bangladesh
Md. Ahsan Habib*

Founder Principal, Global International School & College, Rajshahi-6204, Bangladesh.

ABSTRACT
This empirical study, the first of its kind, seeks to quantify the relationship between
corporate governance and the performance of firms on DSE listed. As part of this study,
the authors undertook an intensive review of literature to identify a range of elements
that contribute to overall corporate governance. Using the generalized least square (GLS)
technique on 77 listed firms trading over the period from 2010 to 2012. The findings of
this study indicate that elements of corporate governance such as the presence of female
board members, the duality of the CEO, the working experience of board members, and
the compensation of board members have positive effects on the performance of firms, as
measured by the return on asset (ROA). However, board size has a negative effect on the
performance of firms. This study also presents that ownership of board members has a
nonlinear relationship with a firm’s performance.
Copyright © 2016, Scholar Journals. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Corporate governance, ownership structure, firm performance, listed firms.

JEL classifications: M10, M14

1. INTRODUCTION
Many realistic studies have been conducted over the last two decades to investigate a
relationship between corporate governance and a firm’s performance in the world.
However, similar studies in the context of Bangladesh are very rare. In Bangladesh,
studies on this topic are mainly conducted in a qualitative form by referencing to the
history of corporate governance in Bangladesh using legal documents. As such, this
study aims to quantify the contribution of corporate governance to the performance for
listed companies in Bangladesh. Literature review and previous empirical studies from
overseas have been referenced to develop a research framework and to develop research
hypotheses in relation to the relationship between corporate governance and a firm’s
performance. Previous studies have indicated that corporate governance can be measured
through the following elements: (i) board size; (ii) presence of female board members; (iii)
duality of the CEO; (iv) education level of board members; (v) board working experience;

*
Corresponding Author: Mob. No.+8801711-104311
Email address: ahsanhabibgisc@gmail.com
Page | 11

Electronic copy
Electronic available
copy availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819099
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2819099
 M.A. Habib

(vi) independent (outside) directors; (vii) board compensation; (viii) board ownership. In
addition, a firm’s performance is measured by the return on asset, known as the ROA
ratio. This study has examined various research hypotheses based on a sample of 77
listed companies on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) for the period of 3 years from 2010
to 2012, the longest possible data set when this study was conducted. The general least
square (GLS) technique is adopted together with other econometric techniques in this
study. The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance
and firm performance. The specific objectives of the study are:
(a) to measure the level of firm performance made by the companies in Bangladesh.
(b) to examine the association between corporate governance and firm performance of
listed companies in Bangladesh.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES:

Evidence from previous empirical studies from academic literature has sought to confirm
the effect of corporate governance on a firm’s performance. A literature review from
relevant academic studies has indicated the following characteristics applied to corporate
governance such as: (i) board size; (ii) presence of female board members; (iii) duality of
the CEO; (iv)education level of board members; (v) board working experience; (vi)
independent directors; (vii) board compensation; (viii) board ownership. Each of these
characteristics will be discussed in details and in turn below.

2.1 Board’s size:

In relation to a relationship between the size of a board and a firm’s performance, there
are two distinct schools of thoughts. The first school of thought argues that a smaller
board size will contribute more to the success of a firm (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen,
1993; Yermack, 1996). However, the second school of thought considers that a large
board size will improve a firm’s performance (Pfeffer, 1972; Klein, 1998; Rouf, 2011, Coles
and ctg, 2008). These studies indicate that a large board will support and advise firm
management more effectively because of a complex of business environment and an
organizational culture (Klein, 1998). Moreover, a large board gather much more
information. As a result, a large board size appears to be better for firm performance
(Dalton and ctg, 1999). On the ground of this study, a research hypothesis is formed as
below:
H1: There is a negative relationship between board size and a firm’s performance.

2.2 Female board members:

Female board members are examined very often in empirical studies. The female board
members reflect a diversified characteristic of the board (Dutta và Bose, 2006). In
addition, Smith et al. (2006) considered three different reasons to recognize the
importance of females on a board. First, female board members usually have a better
understanding of a market in comparison with male members. As such, this
understanding will enhance the decisions made by the board. Second, female board
members will bring better images in the perception of the community for a firm and this
will contribute positively to firm’s performance. Third, other board members will have
enhanced understanding of the business environment when female board members are
appointed. Moreover, this study also indicated that female board members can positively
affect career development of junior female staff in a business. As a result, a firm’s
performance is improved directly and indirectly with the presence of female board
members.
H2: There is a positive relationship between female board members and firm’s performance.

Page | 12

Electronic copy
Electronic available
copy availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819099
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2819099
 International Scholar Journal of Accounting and Finance, 2(1), 2016, 11-20

2.3 Duality of the CEO:

Even though empirical studies cannot provide an agreed view on a contribution of duality
to a firm’s performance, there is an agreement between shareholders, institutional
investors, and policymakers that a chairman or chairwoman of a board should not be the
same with the chief executive officer (Rouf, 2011). In their study, Dahya et al. (2009)
presented that, between 1994 and 2003, policymakers in 15 advanced nations and the
United Kingdom recommended a chairman or chairwoman of a board should not be the
same with the chief executive officer. In Europe, 84 per cent of firms separate the roles of
a chair of a board and a CEO of a firm (Heidrick and Struggles, 2009). Accoring to a
Hewa-Wellalage and Locke 2011 study, in Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan code of best practice
on corporate governance emphasizes the balance of power within a firm to minimize any
one individual’s influence to the decision making process. These rules provided
recommendation that when there is a duality in a firm, a number of independent
directors on a board should be a majority to provide balance and an effective and efficient
operation of a board. As a result, this study’s research hypothesis is developed as follows:
H3: A duality negatively affects a firm’s performance.

2.4 Board’s educational level:

The role of a board is the internal corporate governance of a firm (Fama, 1980). A board is
also a control system in a business (Fama and Jensen, 1983). A board of directors
supervising management decisions in an efficient manner will improve firm’s
performance. Doing so requires each board member to be fully equipped with
management knowledge such as finance, accounting, marketing, information systems,
legal issues and other related areas to the decision making process. This requirement
implies that the quality of each board member will contribute significantly and positively
to management decisions which is then translated into the firm’s performance (Nicholson
and Kiel, 2004; Fairchild and Li, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007). On a ground of the
above analysis, a research hypothesis is developed as below:
H4: Board’s educational level will positively contribute to firm’s performance.

2.5 Board’s experience:

It is argued that board members with a higher age average will have much more
experience compared to a younger age average. This experience is expected to positively
contribute to the better performance of a firm. However, older-age board member appears
to be more aggressive and dictatorial with decisions. These characteristics of board
members may result in risky decision making, which may undermine a firm’s
performance (Carlson and Karlsson, 1970). In addition, board members with a higher age
average may face more limited pressures to a changing business environment and this
may hinder the implementation of more strategic decisions (Child, 1975). Even though
there has been a conflicting view on the relationship between a board’s level of experience
and a firm’s performance, a theory on restrained resources considers that board
members with more experience will cope better within a business environment by
working well in a group which will contribute positively to a firm’s performance (Wegge et
al., 2008).
H5: Board’s level of experience is positively correlated with a firm’s performance.

2.6 Board’s independent directors:

Many empirical studies have agreed on the importance of independent directors to the
success of a firm. For example, Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) concluded that firms with high
ratio of independent directors in a board face less frequent financial pressure. In
addition, when a business environment worsens, firms with many independent directors
have had lower probability of filing for bankruptcy (Daily et al., 2003). As such, a
research hypothesis is presented below.
H6: Independent directors will contribute positively to a firm’s performance.

Page | 13

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819099

 M.A. Habib

2.7 Board’s compensation:

One of the key objectives in modern corporate governance is to deal with agency problems
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A representative agency theory considers that the goals
adopted by a firm’s management and the shareholders are generally not similar. As such,
shareholders should attach their financial benefits to compensation paid to a firm’s
management. Once management behavior is unclear, compensation is a corporate
governance mechanism to encourage management to run a firm in the interest of
shareholders. This link will resolve an agency issue between management and
shareholders and contribute positively to a firm’s performance (Akhtaruddin and Rouf,
2012, Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Mehran, 1995).
H7: There is a positive correlation between management’s compensation and a firm’s
performance.

2.8 Board’s ownership:

Brickley et al. (1988) concluded that the board’s ownership is an encouragement for
board members. This encouragement will help board members supervise management in
a more efficient way. Consistent with this view, Jensen and Murphy (1990), Rouf and
Harun(2011), Chung and Pruitt (1996) considered that, board’s ownership will improve
firm’s performance. Mehran (1995) presented empirical evidence that there is a positive
correlation between board ownership and firm’s performance.
H8: Board’s ownership is positively related to a firm’s performance.

3. MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES
Variables used in this empirical study include: (1) dependent variable (firm’s
performance); (2) independent variables. Concepts and measurements of these variables
are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Concepts and measurements of variables in the study

Variables Definition Measurement
Dependent variable
ROA Return on asset (Earnings Before Tax and Interest)/Total Assets
Independent variables

Board Board members Number of inside and outside directors on the

size board
Gender Female board Number of women present on the board
members
Duality CEO Dual Coded “1” if Chairman also holds the position of
CEO and “0” otherwise
Edu Board’s Number of directors holding postgraduate degrees
educational level
Board Board’s working Average age of all directors on the board
Age experience
Out Dir Outside Director Number of non-executive directors on the board
Comp Board’s Average compensation of all directors on the
compensation board; natural logarithm is taken after adding 1
to all firms to control firms that didn’t pay
compensation
Own Board’s Ratio of shares held by director divided by total
ownership outstanding

Page | 14

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819099

 International Scholar Journal of Accounting and Finance, 2(1), 2016, 11-20

4. CHARACTERISTICS OF A DATA SAMPLE:

A sample was collected from 122 listed firms on the Dhaka Stock Exchange for the period
from 2010 to 2012 inclusive. This sample did not include banks, financial companies,
insurance firms and investment funds due to significant difference of the capital
structures and operations’ requirements. It is noted that formats of annual reports and
financial statements of these 122 listed firms are not similar. As such, missing data is
unavoidable. As a result, listed firms missing any required data are excluded from the
final sample of the study. Our final sample only includes 77 listed firms with the total of
325 observations. This research sample includes listed companies in 7 different
industries: cement & ceramics, engineering, food & allied, fuel & power, pharmaceuticals
& chemicals, textile, and miscellaneous

5. CALCULATIONS:
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables

Variables Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum

ROA 21.8% 7.8% -10.2% 49.5%
Board size 5.85 1.29 5 11
Gender 0.88 1.04 0 7
Duality 51.4% 50.1% 0 1
Edu 1.48 1.31 0 9
Board Age 45.5 5.4 30.4 50.5
Out Dir 2.57 1.23 0 8
Comp 85.61 102.58 0 546.21
Own 8.50% 12.45% 0% 60.25%

Table-2 presents the results from the return on assets indicate (ROA) that the average
profitability in the sample companies is 21.8%. The highest score achieved by a firm is
49.5% and the lowest score is -10.2% with a standard deviation of 7.8%. It seems that
the firms are widely earned with regard to return on assets. The average board size is (no.
of director) 5.85 with standard deviation of 1.29.

Table-3: Pearson Correlation analysis results

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1.ROA 1.000
2.Boardsize -.016 1.000
3.Gender .297(**) .222* 1.000
4.Duality .407(**) .256** .051 1.000
5.Edu .314(**) .059 .162* .136 1.000
6.BoardAge .231(*) -.144 .055 -.273(**) -.206* 1.000
7.OutDir .017 -.105 -.017 .077 .286** -.090 1.000
8.Comp .307(**) .161(*) .049 .058 .192* .039 .763(**) 1.000
9.Own .071 -.121 .059 -.101 .049 -.91 .041 .037 1.000
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 3 indicates a correlation matrix between dependent variables and independent

variables. The result of Pearson product-moment correlation exposed that percentage of

Page | 15

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819099

 M.A. Habib

female director, duality, Board’s educational level and Board’s compensation are
positively related to voluntary disclosure (P<0.01, Two- tailed).

Model specification and multiple regression

Model includes all variables represented for corporate governance which are used to
explain the linear relationship between corporate governance and firm’s performance.
Table-4 shows the result of regression analysis is an equation that represents the best
prediction of a dependent variable from several independent variables.
This method is used when independent variables are correlated with one another and
with the dependent variable.
The following regression equation is estimated as follow:

Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 + β8X8 + εi

Where, Y=ROA, X1=Board size, X2=Gender, X3=Duality, X4=Edu, X5=Board Age,

X6=Out Dir, X7=Comp, X8=Own

Expected sign (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (-) (+) (-)
β0 = constant, and  = the error term
In this model, all independent variables enter the regression equation at once to examine
the relation between the whole set of predictors and the dependent variable.

Table-4: Multiple Regression Results

Variables Coefficient Standard Error Bata t Values Significance

Board size -0.024 0.155 0.357 0.722
Gender 0.233 2.179 3.294 0.002***
Duality 0.410 0.056 5.690 0.000***
Edu 0.049 0.643 0.634 0.019*
Board Age 0.406 0.000 3.804 0.012*
Out Dir -0.038 0.000 -0.351 0.726
Comp 0.245 0.066 3.509 0.001***
Own -0.038 0.000 -0.351 0.726
R Square = 0.549 ; Adjusted R squire = 0.522
F value =20.084 ; F significance = 0.000
* P<0.1, two-tailed, ** P<0.05, two-tailed, *** P<0.01, two-tailed

6. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS:

Using the GLS method, there are various results indicating the relationship between
variables in the model. The relationship could be: (i) positively correlated; (ii) negatively
correlated; (iii) non-linearly correlated; and no correlation at all. First, characteristics of
the corporate governance, including female board members, duality of the CEO, board’s
working experience, and board’s compensation all have positive correlations with firm’s
performance. In particular, this study finds that female board members represent a
diversification of board’s membership and this diversified nature will contribute positively
to firm’s performance. In addition, when the board’s chairman is also the CEO of a firm
(known as a duality of the CEO), firm’s performance is improved. This finding is
supported on the basis of the managerial theory. This study also finds the empirical
evidence to support the view that experienced board members will contribute positively to
firm’s performance and board’s compensation, being the link between the benefits of
shareholders and that of firm’s management, will also contribute positively to firm’s
performance. On the grounds of the findings from this empirical study on the

Page | 16

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819099

 International Scholar Journal of Accounting and Finance, 2(1), 2016, 11-20

contribution of corporate governance to firm’s performance, the following conclusions

reached.
First, This study indicates that board’s size reduces firm’s performance. As such, it is
appropriate to reduce a number of members within a Board. Second, during the process
in which data was collected, it is noted that there are many listed firms without data on
board’s ownership. From the findings of this study, board’s ownership will contribute
positively to firm’s performance. As a result, it is argued that data on business operations
from listed firms must be provided on a transparent basis. This empirical study aims to
provide empirical evidence for listed firms in enhancing their understanding in relation to
the development of a corporate governance mechanism. As a result, listed companies are
now provided with evidence to set up a flexible, dynamic and efficient. Some specific
lessons can be summarized as below.
 There should not be too many members on the board because a larger board’s
size will contribute negatively to firm’s performance.
 Board should appoint female board members because these females will make a
significant contribution to firm’s performance
 The outcomes from this study also indicate that board’s compensation will
positively contribute to firm’s performance. As a result, it is necessary for listed
firms to consider an appropriate and competitive compensation level of board’s
members. The compensation will provide a better link between shareholders and
firm’s management and this link will enhance firm’s performance to maximize
shareholders’ value.

REFERENCES
Adams, R., B. and Ferreira, D. (2007), “A theory of friendly boards”, Journal of Finance,
62(1), 217-250
Akhtaruddin, M., and Rouf, M. A. (2012).Corporate Governance, Cultural Factors and
Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Selected Companies in Bangladesh, Corporate
Board: Role, Duties & Composition, 8(1), 46-58
Becker, B. et al (2011), “Estimating the effects of large shareholders using a geographic
instrument”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(4), 907-942
Bhabra, G., S. et al (2003), “Corporate Governance in Singapore: The Impact of Directors’
Equity Ownership”. Advances in Financial Economics, 8, 29-46
Brickley, J., A., Lease, R., C. and Smith, Jr., C. (1988), “Ownership structure and voting
on antitakeover amendments”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 267-291
Burkart, M., Gromb, D. and Panunzi, F. (1997), “Large shareholders, monitoring, and the
value of the firm”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3), 693-728
Carlson, R., Karlsson, K. (1970), “Age, cohorts, and the generation of generations”,
American Sociological Review, 35(4), 710-718
Chen, C., W., Lin, J., B. and Yi, B. (2008), “CEO Duality and Firm Performance: An
Endogenous Issue”. Corporate Ownership and Control, 6(1), 58-65
Child, J. (1975), “Managerial and Organizational Factors Associated with Company
Performance - Part II. A Contingency Analysis”, Journal of Management Studies,
12, 12-27
Chung, K., H. and Pruitt, S., W. (1996), “Executive ownership, corporate value, and
executive compensation: A unifying framework”, Journal of Banking and Finance,
20(7), 1135- 1159
Coles, J., L., Daniel, N., D. and Naveen, L. (2008), “Boards: Does one size fit all?”, Journal
of Financial Economics, 87(2), 329-356
Dahya, J., Garcia, L., G. and van Bommel, J. (2009), “One Man Two Hats: What's All the
Commotion”, The Financial Review, 44(2), 179-212
Dalton, D., R. et al (1999), “Number of Directors and Financial Performance: A Meta-
Analysis”, The Academy of Management Journal, 42(6), 674-686

Page | 17

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819099

 M.A. Habib

Daily, C., M., Dalton, D., R. and Cannella, A., A. (2003), “Corporate Governance: Decades
of Dialogue and Data”, The Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 371-382
Denis, D., K. and McConnell, J. (2003), “International Corporate Governance”, Journal of
Finance and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), 1-36
Dutta, P. and Bose, S. (2006), “Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Financial
Performance of Commercial Banks: Evidence from Bangladesh”, The Cost and
Management, 34(6), 70- 74.
Elloumi, F. and Gueyié, J., P. (2001), “Financial distress and corporate governance: an
empirical analysis”,Corporate Governance, 1(1), 15-23
Fama, E., F. (1980), “Agency problems and the theory of the firm”, Journal of Political
Economy, 88(2), 288-307
Fama, E., F. and Jensen, M. C. (1983), “Separation of ownership and control”, Journal of
Law and Economics, 15(2), 301-325
Fairchild, L. and Li, J. (2005), “Director Quality and Firm Performance”, The Financial
Review, 40(2), 257-279.
Gedajlovic, E., R and Shapiro, D., M. (1998), “Management and Ownership Effects:
Evidence from Five Countries”. Strategic Management Journal, 19(6), 533-553.
Heidrick & Struggles (2009), “Corporate Governance Report 2009-Boards in turbulent
times”. Heidrick and Struggles International, Inc
Hewa-Wellalage, N. and Locke, S. (2011), “Does CEO Duality is Really Matter? Evidence
from an Emerging Market”, Corporate Ownership and Control, 8(4), 112-122.
Jensen, M., C. (1993), “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and The Failure of
Internal Control Systems”. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880.
Jensen, M., C. and Meckling, W., H. (1976), “Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4),
305-360
Jensen, M., C. and Murphy, K., J. (1990), “Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives”,Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225-264
Klein, A. (1998), “Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure”, Journal of Law and
Economics, 41(1), 275-303.
Lipton, M. and Lorsch, J., W. (1992), “A modest proposal for improved corporate
governance”, Business Lawyer, 48(1), 59-77
Mehran, H. (1995), “Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership and Firm
Performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, 38(2), 163-184.
Myers, S., C. (2000), “Outside Equity”, The Journal of Finance, 55(3), 1005-1037.
Nicholson, G., J. and Kiel, G., C. (2004), “Breakthrough board performance: how to
harness your board’s intellectual capital”. Corporate Governance: The International
Journal of Business in Society, 4(1), 5-23.
Pfeffer,J.(1972)“Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Organization
and its Environment”, Administrative Science Quarterly,17(2),218-228.
Rouf, M.A., Siddique, N.A., and Rahman, M.A.(2010).Good Corporate Governance
Principles and Recommendations for Good Practices, Journal of Socioeconomic
Research and Development, Volume-7, Issue-5, October-2010, pp:970-974
Rouf,M.A. and Harun, A.A.(2011). Ownership Structure and Voluntary Disclosure in
Annual Reports of Bangladesh”, Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Science,
Volume-5, Number-1, 2011, pp-129-139
Rouf, M.A.(2011). The Role of CEO, Board Composition and Firm Performance: An
Empirical Study of Listed Companies in Bangladesh, Indian Journal of Commerce
& Management Studies, Volume-II, Issue-2, March-2011, pp-77-84
Rouf,M.A.(2011).Corporate Characteristics, Governance Attributes and the Extent of
Voluntary Disclosure in Bangladesh”, African Journal of Business Management
Vol.5 (19), pp. 7836-7845
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., W. (1997), “A Survey of Corporate Governance”. The Journal
of Finance, 52(2), 737-783.

Page | 18

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819099

 International Scholar Journal of Accounting and Finance, 2(1), 2016, 11-20

Smith, N., Smith, V. and Verner, M. (2006), “Do Women in Top Management Affect Firm
Performance? A Panel Study of 2500 Danish Firms”, International Journal of
Productivity and Performance Management, 55(7), 569-593.
Truong, Q. and Dang, C. (1998), “Effective leadership in joint ventures in Vietnam: a
crosscultural perspective”. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 11(4),
357-372.
U.S. Census Bureau (2008), “2007 NAICS Definitions”, Retrieved March 10, 2008, from:
http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/htmls/4/448110.htm
Wegge, J. et al (2008), “Age and Gender Diversity as Determinants of Performance and
Health in a Public Organization: The Role of Task Complexity and Group Size”.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 93(6), 1301-1313.
Wooldridge, J., M., (2002), “Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach”. 2nd Ed.,
SouthWestern College.
Yermack, D. (1996), “Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of
Directors”.Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211.

Page | 19

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819099

 M.A. Habib

International Scholar Journal of Accounting and Finance

(ISJAF)
www.Scholarjournals.com

Instructions for Authors

Aims and Scope

International Scholar Journal of Accounting and Finance (ISJAF) is dedicated to the
advancement and dissemination of research across all the leading fields of financial
inquiry by publishing, through a blind, refereed process, ongoing results of research in
accordance with international scientific or scholarly standards. Articles are written by
business leaders, policy analysts and active researchers for an audience of specialists,
practitioners and students in all areas related to accounting and finance in business and
education. Studies reflecting issues concerning budgeting, taxation, process,
investments, regulatory procedures, and business financial analysis are suitable themes.
ISJAF also covers theoretical and empirical analysis relating to financial reporting, asset
pricing, financial markets and institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance,
banking, insurance and business administration. Articles of regional interest are
welcome, especially those dealing with lessons that may be applied in other regions
around the world. The language of the journal is English.
Submission of Papers
The journal publishes both applied and conceptual research. The papers should be typed
in MS Word (Office 2007/2003/97) of A4 format with 1” margins (right, left, top, bottom),
double-spaced, using Times New Roman 12 point font. Only Electronic Version of the
manuscript should be submitted through the link: www.scholarjournals.com. Authors
should list their short biography and contact information on the cover letter. So please
ensure that there are no author details mentioned in the paper.
The cover page of the manuscript should contain the information: (i) the title; (ii) the
author/s name; (iii)the author/s designation; (iv) academic or professional affiliation of
the author/s; (v) the mailing addresses of the author/s; and (vi) e-mail address of the
corresponding author.
Inside should contain the information: (i) the title; (ii) abstract; (iii) keywords; (iv) JEL
classification (v)main text; (vi) acknowledgements (if necessary); (vii) references; and (viii)
appendix (if necessary).
Proofreading
The manuscripts will be submitted to two referees for review. The authors will receive an
unsigned copy of the referees’ reports. Once accepted for publication, the corresponding
author is encouraged to send the final version of the manuscript.
Copyright
By submitting a manuscript, the author(s) agree that the copyright of the published
article is transferred to the Scholar Journals. The copyright covers the exclusive rights to
reproduce and distributes the articles, including reprints, photographic reproductions,
microform, or any other reproductions, and translation. All opinions, information and
data published in the articles are overall responsibility to the author(s). The editorial
board does not accept any responsibility for the views expressed in papers.
Questions?
Send your questions, if any, to Managing Editor, ISJAF. E-mail: editorisjaf@gmail.com

Page | 20

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819099