REPORT APRIL

544 2016

Standardization of barrier definitions

Supplement to Report 415
This document has been mapped against PETRONAS E&P Generic Operation Performance
Standard Assurance EP OE GEN OPS Rev 1.0 dated 05 May 2014

control prevent
Acknowledgements
This report was developed by the IOGP Process Safety Subcommittee.

Photography used with permission courtesy of BP p.l.c. and ©SGV/

iStockphoto (Front cover) ©Nostal6ie/iStockphoto (Back cover)

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 REPORT APRIL
544 2016

Standardization of
barrier definitions
Supplement to Report 415

Revision history

VERSION DATE AMENDMENTS

1.1 April 2016 First release

 Standardization of barrier definitions 4

Contents

1. Background 5
Barriers represent a grouping of risk controls 5
Key Performance Indicators applied using the barrier concept 6

2. Scope 7

3. Defining barrier types 8

4. Hardware barrier categories 10

5. Human barrier categories 14

6. Management System Elements 15

7. Categorizing LOPC events and improving barrier effectiveness 16

Appendix A 17
Example 1: Offshore pipeline cathodic protection 17
Example 2: Tank overfill 17
Example 3: Valve bullplug 18
Example 4: Hose rupture 18
Example 5: Piping handover 19
Example 6: Pump seal in offshore module 20

Appendix B 21
Hardware barrier 21
Human barriers 21

References 24
 Standardization of barrier definitions 5

1. Background

Barriers represent a grouping of risk controls

IOGP Report 415, Asset Integrity – the key to managing major incident risks [1],
published in 2008, explicitly addressed asset integrity and process safety risks as
part of a company’s overall health, safety and environment management system
(HSE-MS).

Guidance on establishing an Operating Management System (OMS) is now

integrated within IOGP Report 510, Operating Management System Framework for
controlling risk and delivering high performance in the oil and gas industry, published
in 2014 [2].

Reports 415 and 510 both provide guidance on how apply risk management as a
fundamental process that puts planned measures in place to eliminate or reduce
release of hazards by applying risk controls.

Report 415 introduced the concept of establishing a set of barriers, each of which
represents a grouping of risk controls.

A barrier is designed to either prevent an event caused by release of a hazard or

to mitigate an event’s potential consequences, including major incidents. Multiple
barriers are deployed in combination to address each type of threat or cause of an
event and its consequences.

Barrier
A risk control that seeks to prevent unintended events from occurring,
or prevent escalation of events into incidents with harmful consequences.
From IOGP 510 [2].

Implementation of the barrier concept is described in Report 415 using

• the bow tie model (an analysis of all potential threats), and
• the Swiss Cheese model (an analysis of a single threat within the bow tie).

The concept of barrier thinking in risk management is well understood. However,

in practice the term ‘barrier’ is used in different ways and at different levels of
detail, which makes it difficult to consistently link event or incident causes with
necessary improvements in controls.
 Standardization of barrier definitions 6

Key Performance Indicators applied using the

barrier concept
The barrier concept was further developed in IOGP Report 456, Process Safety –
Recommended Practice on Key Performance Indicators in 2011 [3]. The application of
leading process safety KPIs benefits from application of the barrier concept.

Report 456 established four Tiers of Key Performance Indicators to collect data
on significant loss of primary containment (LOPC) events (Tiers 1 and 2) and to
establish leading indicators to assess barriers (Tiers 3 and 4).

Report 556, Process Safety – Leading key performance indicators is a new

supplement to Report 456 in preparation [4]. It will align the hardware and human
barrier categories defined here with the development of leading KPIs at the Tier 3
and 4 levels.
 Standardization of barrier definitions 7

2. Scope

This report standardizes the types and categories of process safety barriers.
The target audience is all leaders and workers that contribute to process safety
performance on an asset.

The terminology provides a basis of common understanding which companies can

use to further refine or develop more detail as appropriate to their activities.

The use of consistent and simple terminology is aimed at personnel at all levels and
will assist in communication. The standardization and common understanding will
assist the review of bow ties and related tools to ensure clarity and completeness.

Barrier standardization also provides the means to identify areas of shortfall in

a consistent way, gathering data from more operations (and operators) enabling
trending and focus on the specific causes of failure on certain barriers and
facilitate improvements.

Figure 1 illustrates how consistently defined information drawn from events and
incidents can provide learning to strengthen barriers, reduce risk and improve
operating performance.

Using consistent barrier definitions through this cycle enables the identification of
trends in similar barrier failures and the opportunity to learn and improve.

Events &
Incidents
LE
IE W

AR
REV

Improved Stronger
Performance Barriers

APPLY

Figure 1: Barrier performance cycle

 Standardization of barrier definitions 8

3. Defining barrier types

Figure 2 illustrates two primary types of barrier: hardware barriers and

human barriers.

Hardware and human barriers are put in place to prevent a specific threat or cause
of a hazard release event, or to reduce the potential consequences if barriers have
failed and an event has occurred.

Both hardware and human barriers are supported by the processes and
procedures contained within the Management System Elements, such as those in
the Operating Management System in Report 510 [2].

Hardware Hardware Hardware Hardware

Threat /
EVENT Consequence
Cause

Human Human Human Human

Hardware barriers Human barriers

Safety System Integrity Operating Discipline

Plant People

Management System Elements*

Supports hardware
and human barriers

* i.e. processes and procedures within the Management System elements

Processes
Figure 2: Barrier types
 Standardization of barrier definitions 9

The previous barrier type, i.e. Plant/People/Processes has been renamed

Hardware barriers
Primary containment, process equipment and engineered systems designed
and managed to prevent LOPC and other types of asset integrity or process
safety events and mitigate any potential consequences of such events. These
are checked and maintained by people (in critical activity/tasks).

Human barriers
Barriers that rely on the actions of people capable of carrying out activities
designed to prevent LOPC and other types of asset integrity or process safety
events and mitigate any potential consequences of such events.

Management System Elements

Management System Elements that group processes and practices designed
to prevent LOPC and other types of asset integrity or process safety events
and mitigate any potential consequences of such events. Management System
Elements support hardware and human barriers.
 Standardization of barrier definitions 10

4. Hardware barrier categories

Hardware barriers implemented by the oil and gas industry

for process safety can be broadly categorized under
eight hardware barrier categories:
Category 1: Structural Integrity

Category 2: Process Containment

Category 3: Ignition Control

Category 4: Detection Systems

Category 5: Protection Systems – including deluge and

firewater systems

Category 6:  hutdown Systems – including operational well

S
isolation and drilling well control equipment

Category 7: Emergency Response

Category 8:  ife-saving Equipment – including

L
evacuation systems

PETRONAS E&P Generic Operation Performance Standard Assurance EP OE

GEN OPS Rev 1.0 dated 05 May 2014 is in line with definition above
Examples of hardware barrier subcategories for an
operating facility
Operators may define subcategories slightly differently but the objective is
alignment under the eight categories.
Markup here denotes differences between PTS (red font) and OGP (black font/original font).
Subcategories of Category 1, Structural Integrity
SI001 Subsea/Vessel Hull/GBS/Foundation Structures /Weathertight Enclosures/Piles etc.
SI002 Topsides/Surface Structures (incl. Helidecks, Crane Pedestals; Bridges; Flare Tower etc.)
SI003 Heavy Lift Cranes & Mechanical Handling Equipment
SI004 Ballast and Cargo Management Systems
SI005 Road Vehicles
SI006 Mooring Systems
SI007 Drilling Systems.
SI008 Bridge Connections to Support Vessel
SI009 Station Keeping / Propulsion / Dynamic Positioning / Thrusters
SI010 Wells Structure
 Standardization of barrier definitions 11

Subcategories of Category 2, Process Containment

PC001 Pressure Vessels
PC002 Heat Exchangers

PC003 Rotating Equipment

PC004 Tanks (incl. IBC's containing hazardous (flammable, toxic, etc.) fluids
PC005 Piping Systems
PC006 Pipelines and Risers
PC007 Relief Systems (PRV, PSV, PVV and Burst Disc)
PC008 Operational Well Containment
PC009 Fired Heaters PC013 Well Intervention/Well Control Equipment (Incl. BOP
System/Connector/Diverter, Cement Sys, Ramrig,
PC010 Gas Tight Floor/Wells Drilling Instrumentation, Well Control Equipment)
PC011 Tanker Loading Systems PC014 Moveable and Temporary Equipment
PC012 Helicopter Refuelling Equipment.

Subcategories of Category 3, Ignition Control

IC001 Hazardous Area Ventilation
IC002 Non-Hazardous Area Ventilation
IC003 Certified Electrical Equipment
IC004 Cargo Tanks Insert Gas System
IC005 Earth Bonding
IC006 Fuel Gas Purge System
IC007 Chemical Tanks Inert Gas Blanket System
IC008 Miscellaneous Ignition Control Components
IC009 Flare Tip Ignition System.

Subcategories of Category 4, Detection Systems

DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
DS002 Security Systems
DS003 Water-in-Condensate/Gas (Dew Point) Measurement.
 Standardization of barrier definitions 12

Subcategories of Category 5, Protection Systems

– including deluge and firewater systems
PS001 Deluge System
PS002 Fire and Explosion Protection including Blast Barriers and Venting Provisions
PS004 Firewater Pumps (Incl. Caissons, Tank and Supports)
PS005 Firewater Ring Main and Other Distribution Systems
PS006 Passive Fire Protection (Incl. Doors, Walls and Penetrations)
PS007 Gaseous Fire Protection System
PS008 Fine Water Spray System
PS009 Sprinkler System
PS010 Power Management System PS003 Helideck Fire Fighting Systems
PS011 Fixed Foam System
PS012 Sand Filters
PS013 Chemical Injection Systems
PS014 Navigation Aids (Aircraft)
PS015 Collision Avoidance Systems (Nav. Aids, weather monitoring, lights foghorns & radar)
PS016 Metocean Data Gathering Systems
New Cathodic Protection. In PTS, Cathodic Protection is a sub-element falling under SI010 and PC006

Subcategories of Category 6, Shutdown Systems – including

operational well isolation and drilling well control equipment
SD001 Emergency Shutdown System
SD002 Depressurization System
SD003 High Integrity Protection Systems (HIPPS)
SD004 Operational Well Isolation
SD005 Pipeline Isolation Valves
SD006 Process Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs)
SD007 Subsea Isolation Valves (SSIVs)
SD008 Drilling and Well Intervention Well Control Equipment.
SD009 Instrument Air
 Standardization of barrier definitions 13

Subcategories of Category 7, Emergency Response

ER001 Temporary Refuge/Primary Muster Areas
ER002 Escape and Evacuation Routes ER008 Manual Fire Fighting Equipment
ER009 Process Control and Alarms
ER003 Emergency/Escape Lighting
ER004 Communication Systems (Internal, External and Emergency)
ER005 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
ER006 Helicopter Facilities (Incl. Markings, Nets, Obstacle Marking / Lighting etc.)
ER007 Emergency Power (Incl. Generation and Distribution)
ER010 Open Hazardous Drains Systems (Incl. Non-Hazardous)
New Miscellaneous Ignition Control Components This is covered in IC008. Duplication or typo ?
New Flare Tip Ignition Systems. This is covered in IC009. Duplication or typo ?
ER011 Oil Spill Contingency (Oil Booms and Dispersants)

Subcategories of Category 8, Life-saving Equipment

– including evacuation systems
LS001 Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
LS002 Rescue Facilities (Incl. Standby Vessel / MOB boat / FRC)
LS003 Lifeboats/TEMPSCs
LS004 Tertiary Means of Escape.(Liferafts, Scramble Nets and Ladders to Sea)
Operator-specific systems can further break down the subcategories into specific
components or equipment lists as appropriate.
 Standardization of barrier definitions 14

5. Human barrier categories

Human barriers implemented by the oil and gas industry

for process safety can be broadly categorized under
six human barrier categories:
Category 1: Operating in accordance with procedures, e.g.
• Permit To Work
• Isolation of equipment
• Overrides and inhibits of safety systems
• Shift handover

Category 2: Surveillance, operator rounds and routine inspection

Category 3: Authorization of temporary and mobile equipment

Category 4:  cceptance of handover or restart of facilities or

A
equipment

Category 5:  esponse to process alarm and upset conditions

R
(e.g. outside safe envelope)

Category 6: Response to emergencies

Operators may define subcategories slightly differently but the objective is

alignment under these six categories.

A human barrier model requires a desired set of individual and collective

behaviours that ensure the barriers remain effective (e.g. not short-cutting
procedures, honouring the full Management of Change process, and staying within
the safe operating envelopes). Sometimes these behaviours are referred to as
‘operating discipline’.

Without these desired behaviours, resilience of human barriers will be very low.
Strong, energetic and consistent leadership will always be required to maintain
acceptable human barrier health.

Human barriers do not include critical activity/tasks required to check and

maintain hardware barriers. This is typically defined in the process supporting
the hardware barrier e.g. Maintenance and Inspection (M&I) or Technical
Integrity Management described within the Management System.
 Standardization of barrier definitions 15

6. Management System Elements

An Operating Management System (OMS) Framework

comprises four fundamentals and ten Management
System Elements. See IOGP Report 510 [2].
IOGP Report 511 [5] describes the Elements in detail.

The processes and practices (plans, procedures, instruction, etc.) within the ten
Management System Elements directly support hardware and human barriers that
are designed to prevent LOPC and other types of asset integrity or process safety
events, and mitigate any potential consequences of such events.

Some examples are:

• Permit to work (Element 8)
• Management of Change (Element 5)
• Emergency Response Procedure (Element 7)
• Competency Management (Element 3)
• Contractor Management (Element 3)
• Technical Integrity (Element 6)
• Corrosion Management (Element 6)
• Equipment Isolation (Element 8).
 Standardization of barrier definitions 16

7. Categorizing LOPC events and

improving barrier effectiveness
The most severe LOPC events are categorized as Tier 1 and 2, and indicate the
failure of multiple barriers. Barrier definitions used for Tier 1 and Tier 2 can also
be used in the reporting of events where no loss of containment or incident has
occurred but where one or more barriers, or supporting systems, failed or did not
functioned as expected, i.e. Tier 3 process safety events.

(Tier 3 process safety events are also sometimes called ‘single barrier (failure)
events’, ‘barrier events’ or ‘controls non-compliance’. Standardization of this
terminology will assist consistent communication by leadership, learning/sharing
of lessons and the development of performance metrics.)

An impaired hardware or human barrier can contribute to a Tier 1, 2 or 3 process

safety event (PSE) [3]. An ineffective Management System Element can contribute
to the failure of a hardware or human barrier, resulting in a Tier 1, 2 or 3 PSE.

Tier 4 KPIs are used to monitor activities that that maintain or strengthen the
Management System Elements, which in turn support the effectiveness of the
barriers. This is further developed in [4].

Together, the four Tiers support continuous improvement of barrier effectiveness,

particularly in response to any failures or weaknesses identified through Tier 1–3
events.

It can be hard to precisely attribute a barrier category when learning from a

process safety event but precise attribution should not be an issue if an actionable
improvement can be applied to prevent a recurrence.

Take for example an event (not necessary a process safety event) that has resulted
from a failure of an individual to recognize a hazard/risk (e.g. entering an area
which should be treated as a confined space). This can be attributed to a human
barrier failure (failure to operate in accordance with procedures). However,
the cause may be attributable to one or more Management System Elements,
e.g. Communication or Competence management.
 Standardization of barrier definitions 17

Appendix A

Examples of hypothetical events with a loss of primary

containment, where malfunctioning or failed barriers
and critical processes are identified

These are hypothetical examples for illustrative purposes only and are not
intended to represent actual events.

Example 1: Offshore pipeline cathodic protection

A crude submarine pipeline has a sudden failure in near shore area due to degradation
of the cathodic protection system affording protection against external corrosion. This
degradation resulted from a lack of maintenance. The spill response was effective.

Threat Corrosion
Consequence Release to the Environment
Barrier Hardware barriers – Process Containment – Pipelines
Barrier Hardware barriers – Protection Systems – Cathodic
protection
OMS Element/Process Technical Integrity Preventative Maintenance
and Practice (Element 7 or Element 8)

Example 2: Tank overfill

An LOPC occurs due to overfill from a truck loading produced water. The flow
totalizer failed to shut the inlet flow (because it was bypassed) and the operator
response was delayed to the overflow. The overflow drained off the pad due to
plugged drains that were not identified during regular site tours.

Threat Overfill
Consequence Release to the Environment
Barrier Hardware barriers – Process Containment – Other
equipment type (road tanker)
Barrier Hardware barriers – Shutdown Systems – Emergency
shutdown systems
Barrier Hardware barriers – Emergency Response – Drain
Systems
Barrier Human barriers – Response to emergencies
OMS procedure/process Operating Integrity
OMS procedure/process Emergency Response
 Standardization of barrier definitions 18

Example 3: Valve bullplug

An LOPC occurs from a threaded bullplug connection on the bottom of a valve at
a gas gathering site. The bullplug had blown out due to corrosion and rust marks
indicating corrosion on the underside of the valve had not been detected on rounds.
The release is unignited and the system is quickly isolated and depressurized to flare.

Threat Corrosion
Consequence Release to the Environment
Barrier Hardware barriers – Process Containment – Piping
Systems – Threaded connection
Barrier Human barriers – Surveillance, operator rounds and
routine inspection
OMS procedure/process Technical Integrity – Equipment Inspection
OMS procedure/process Operating Integrity

Example 4: Hose rupture

A temporary flexible hose is employed on a site to transfer oil from a waste
separator and, due to heavy use, has sustained chaffing and abrasion damage. The
hoses are not included in the monthly revalidation check. The hose ruptures and
there is a hydrocarbon spill and a fire. Emergency response is effective although
there are learnings to improve the speed of response.

Threat External Damage (e.g. wear, impact)

Consequence Fire/explosion
Barrier Hardware barriers – Process Containment – Piping
Systems – Flexible Hose
Barrier Human barriers – Authorization of temporary and
mobile equipment
Barrier Human barriers – Response to emergencies
OMS procedure/process Management of Change
OMS procedure/process Emergency Response
 Standardization of barrier definitions 19

Example 5: Piping handover

A mechanical supervisor and production supervisor check that all pipe work and
fittings are satisfactorily closed up and checked after process containment system
reinstated. One coupling remains to be completed once tensioning equipment
becomes available later. The handover documentation is signed off (e.g. Statement
of Fitness/Handshake) with the exception noted. The incomplete work is not
captured in the handover to night shift and on start up, a significant leak occurs.
The leak ignites because of an electrical equipment with an incorrect classification
and is quickly extinguished and the asset isolated and depressured.

Threat Incorrect Operation

Consequence Fire/explosion
Barrier Hardware barriers – Process Containment – Piping
Systems – Flange
Barrier Hardware barriers – Ignition controls
Barrier Human barriers – Acceptance of handover or restart
of facilities or equipment
OMS procedure/process Technical Integrity – Pipe fitting/flange make up
OMS procedure/process Operating Integrity (Shift Handover)
OMS procedure/process Design Integrity
 Standardization of barrier definitions 20

Example 6: Pump seal in offshore module

There is a significant undetected loss of containment with a condensate mist filling
an offshore module. The fire and gas detection system fails to detect the leak
due to improper positioning The situation is not recognized by the control room
operators through video and/or process alarms. Eventually the leak is detected in
adjacent modules and an automatic ESD occurs. The release is unignited and is
reduced and isolated. It is identified that the leak originated from a transfer pump
seal that failed prematurely due to improper alignment done by crew missing
training on this type of equipment. Quantity of condensate lost would have been
significantly reduced by more timely recognition and response to the upset.

Threat Fatigue (Mechanical)/Vibration

Consequence Release to the Environment
Barrier Hardware barriers – Process Containment – Rotating
Equipment – Seal
Barrier Hardware barriers – Detection – Fire and Gas Detection
Barrier Human barriers – Surveillance, operator rounds and
routine inspection
Barrier Human barriers – Response to emergencies
Barrier Human barriers – Response to process alarm and
upset conditions
OMS procedure/process Competence management
OMS procedure/process Operating Integrity
OMS procedure/process Design Integrity
OMS procedure/process Emergency Response
 Standardization of barrier definitions 21

Appendix B

Examples of hypothetical events where a barrier has

malfunctioned or failed but there has been no incident or
loss of primary containment
These events can also be referred to as ‘single barrier failure events’ or ‘barrier
events’ and correspond to API Tier 3 and 4 Process Safety Events PSE.

Reporting against these can use the same defined barriers and will form part of a
later implementation programme (Phase 2).

Hardware barrier

Example
A survey of the cathodic protection levels of a submarine pipeline carrying crude
in the near shore area shows a drop in protection to unacceptable levels due to
deterioration of the grounding connections. Immediate action is taken to restore
protection levels to an adequate level.

Barrier Hardware barriers – Process Containment – Pipeline

Barrier Hardware barriers – Protection Systems – Cathodic
protection
OMS procedure/process Technical Integrity Preventative Maintenance

Human barriers

Example 1
In a flaring event, a flare high level Knockout drum reaches high level. A procedure
is in place to shutdown the contributing streams. However, the high level is noticed
after the Level Alarm High High (LAHH) just prior to overflow. No LOPC occurs.

Barrier Human barrier – Response to process alarm and

upset conditions
OMS procedure/process Operating Integrity – Alarm Management
 Standardization of barrier definitions 22

Example 2
Maintenance work on a pump had been suspended until next day shift; adjacent
pipe work isolated and gas detection in module overridden. During shift handover,
this was not effectively communicated and hot work was approved in the same
module without recognizing that gas detection system was disabled.

Barrier Human barrier – Acceptance of handover or restart of

facilities or equipment
OMS procedure/process Operating Integrity – Shift Handover

Example 3
Following gas tests and permit issued where hot work is to be performed, one of
the construction supervisors notices that there is a drain nearby where there is
a strong smell of hydrocarbon yet this has not been discussed in the permit or
the pre job toolbox talk. The supervisor fails to highlight this and commences the
welding work and does not inform the PTW signatory. The job is stopped by the
operations permit issuer on a follow-up walk through.

Barrier Human barrier – Operating in accordance with

procedures
OMS procedure/process Permit to Work

Example 4
A pump on routine Preventative Maintenance (PM) is noticed to have a damaged
seal and a check indicates high vibration had occurred. No LOPC involved. Routine
monitoring had not detected the vibration.

Barrier Human barrier – Surveillance, operator rounds and

routine inspection
OMS procedure/process Technical Integrity

Example 5
A field supervisor notes unusual and excessive vibration from pipe work near
compression modules but does not advise the control room immediately to take
appropriate measures. The excessive vibration increases and later causes a
shutdown and equipment replacement, but not an LOPC.

Barrier Human barrier – Surveillance, operator rounds and

routine inspection
OMS procedure/process Operating Integrity
 Standardization of barrier definitions 23

Example 6
A site supervisor notes that, despite having a current ‘approved for use on site’
certificate, an electric access scissor lift platform in use in the field has damage to
the insulation of the power cables to the hydraulic pump and personally ensures
that it is removed from the facility.

Barrier Human barrier – Authorization of temporary and

mobile equipment
OMS procedure/process Technical Integrity – Equipment inspection

Example 7
Supervisor suspends vacuum truck operations until truck is returned to
maintenance to have earthing cables and clamps satisfactorily repaired, re-
inspected and tested. A check had not been completed during the authorization of
the vacuum truck to ensure earthing equipment was in good order.

Barrier Human barrier – Authorization of temporary and

mobile equipment
OMS procedure/process Technical integrity – Equipment inspection

Example 8
During the loading of crude offshore from a Floating Production Storage Offloading
(FPSO) vessel to a tanker, a buildup of pressure in the system was not recognized in the
control room as it was difficult to hear or see the problem. An off-shift maintenance
foreman heard an unusual noise from the loading pumps and raised the alarm with
the control room that something was wrong. They immediately ceased loading and
depressurized the loading line thus averting a potential significant spillage.

Barrier Human barrier – Response to process alarm and

upset conditions
OMS procedure/process Operating Integrity

Example 9
Automatic sampling equipment for H2S levels in a process stream offshore
has failed and manual sampling undertaken instead. The change has not been
recognized and, as a result, the necessary steps to manage the new risks have not
been taken or approved (e.g. assessment, training, PPE and recovery measures).

Barrier Hardware barrier – Detection Systems

OMS procedure/process Management of Change
 Standardization of barrier definitions 24

References

[1] IOGP. Report 415. Asset integrity – the key to managing major incident risks.
London: December 2008.
[2] IOGP–IPIECA. Report 510. Operating Management System Framework for
controlling risk and delivering high performance in the oil and gas industry.
London: June 2014.
[3] IOGP. Report 456. Process Safety – Recommended Practice on Key Performance
Indicators. London: November 2011.
[4]. IOGP. Report 556. Process Safety – Leading key performance indicators.
Supplement to IOGP Report 456. (In preparation.)
[5] IOGP–IPIECA. Report 511. OMS in practice. A supplement to Report No. 510,
Operating Management System Framework. London: June 2014.
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The concept of barrier thinking

in risk management is well
understood. However, in practice
the term ‘barrier’ is used in
different ways and at different
levels of detail, which makes it
difficult to consistently link event
or incident causes with necessary
improvements in controls.
This report standardizes the types
and categories of process safety
barriers. The target audience is all
leaders and workers that contribute
to process safety performance on
an asset.