Role of Public Interest Litigation in Protection and Promotion of the

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Deprived,

Marginalised and Weaker Sections of the Society

Jai S. Singh1

I. Introductory Remarks:
In simple parlance the expression “public interest” means something in which
some interest of the people in general or their rights and liabilities are affected.
According to Stroud’s judicial dictionary the expression ‘public interest’ means “a
matter in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest or some
interest by which their rights or liabilities are affected”2. Thus, the expression
‘public interest litigation’ is to mean the legal action initiated in a court of law for
the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class
of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal
rights or liabilities are affected.
In the constitutional jurisprudence of India, public interest litigation is a unique
phenomenon. This legal instrument is unparallel in the entire legal history of the
world. This powerful instrument is concerned with the protection and promotion
of the interests of a class or group of persons who are either the victims of State
constitutional and legal authorities lawlessness, oppression, or social oppression or
denied their constitutional and statutory human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Further, this technique provides assistance to those weaker sections of the society
who are not in a position to approach the court for the redressal of their grievances
due to the lack of resources or ignorance or their disadvantaged social and economic
conditions. In the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms, judicial activism
was evolved in the post emergency period.

II. Public Interest Litigation— A Dynamic Approach:

In accordance with the constitutional and statutory system of adversarial
actions, only the person aggrieved could approach the Court for the redressed
of grievances. Thus, those class of the weaker section of the society who,
because of their poverty, lack of resources, or economic disability and legal
ignorance and illiteracy, could not reach the Court on their own approach, had
to suffer gross violations of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.
There was nobody in the society who could espouse their cause on behalf of
them. Consequently, for the poor, the disadvantaged, ignorant, exploited and
weaker sections of society, the legal procedure became a hindrance for the
1 LL. M., D. Phil., Reader, Faculty of Law, University of Allahabad. Email:
jaishankarsingh08@gmail.com, Mobile N.-09451846407.
2 Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Volume 4 (5th edition).

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vindication of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Highest Court
of the country realized this shortcoming and deficiency in our legal system.
Certain Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court, particularly Justices P.N.
Bhagwati and V.R. Krishna Iyer strongly started to disregard the restrains and
constrains of Anglo-Saxon legal system to protect and promote the human rights
and fundamental freedoms of the poor, illiterate, ignorant, disadvantaged and
weaker sections of the society. This was done by granting the relaxations of the
principles of locus standi. In the leading case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India3,
Justice P.N. Bhagwati narrated the marvelous principles of court in the following
unique words4.
Where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a
determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any constitutional or legal
right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal
provision, or without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal injury or
illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of persons is by
reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged
position, unable to approach the court for relief, any member of the public can
maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High
Court under Article 226 and in case of breach of fundamental right of such person
or determinate class of persons, in this court under Article 32 seeking judicial
redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of
persons. This novel classical principle invented by the Supreme Court of India
affords a beautiful opportunity to any member of the public acting in a bona fide
manner to espouse the cause of the victims of human rights and fundamental
freedoms violations.
In essence, public interest litigation is a movement to involve the judicial
process for the creation of norms of a just social order based upon the principles
of justice and humanism. In this pious and novel movement, people participate in
the activation of the judicial power for creating a regime of human rights and
fundamental freedoms with the active support of the social activists. Public interest
litigation seeks to hold the State instrumentalities within the leading strings of
egalitarianism, humanism and fairness and correct by judicial admonition, episodes
of governmental lawlessness and excesses of power or abuse of authority or
lapses. Further, the public interest litigation activism addresses and confronts the
domination formations in civil and civilized society. It activates public discourse
on practices of power with the partnership of the media, legal academics, bar and
the judges.

3 AIR 1982 SC 149. In Janata Dal v. H.S.Chaudhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305, the Supreme
Court has re-examined the scope and object of public interest litigation. Also see Bipin
Chandra v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1982 Guj. 99.
4 Id. at 210.

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III. Human Right and Fundamental Freedom to Speedy Trial:
Hussainara Khatoon (I)5 was the first reported case of public interest
litigation seeking relief for the under-trial prisoners languishing in jails. The public
interest litigation proceedings in this case resulted in the release of nearly 40,000
under trial prisoners, then languishing in Bihar jails. In this case the Supreme
Court declared the right to speedy trial as a part of fundamental right to life and
personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. In that case, on the basis of a
newspaper report that large number of men and women, including children were
behind prison bar for years awaiting their trial in courts of law.
Expressing shock at such alarming disclosures, the Supreme Court in the
absence of appearance by the respondent-State passed interim orders for their
release and held that a procedure which keeps such large number of people behind
bars without trial so long cannot possibly be regarded as ‘reasonable, just or fair’
so as to be in conformity with the requirement of Article 21. It is necessary,
therefore, that the law as enacted by the Legislature and as administered by the
courts must radically change its approach to pretrial detention and ensure
‘reasonable just and fair’ procedure which has creative connection after Maneka
Gandhi6 case. Justice Bhagwati stated that longer period imprisonment of under-
trials is a denial of human rights and withholding of basic freedoms. We are shouting
from housetops about the protection and preservation of human rights. But, human
right has no meaning in India, unless it is utilized for helpless and poor persons. He
laid emphasis upon the poor person’s human rights, jurisprudence.
Following the principles laid down in his earlier judgment Maneka Gandhi
v. Union of India7, Bhagwati J. held that even under the Constitution, though
speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in
the broad sweep and content of Article 21. He held that a procedure which does
not provide a reasonably quick trial can not be regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or
just’ and it would be violative of Article 21. Therefore, speedy trial means reasonably
expeditious trial, and it is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to
life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. He expressly declared the right to speedy
trial as a fundamental right8.
Justice Bhagwati laid emphasis upon the human rights of men, women and
children who were behind prison bar awaiting their trial in a court of law for years.
In a country like India, where millions of people are living below poverty line,
human right had no meaning for them. The objectives of human rights can be
realised only if that may be available to poor and helpless persons. Human rights
and fundamental freedoms of poor people must be protected otherwise they will
be deprived of their real life and personal liberty. They cannot acquire benefits of

5 Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 SC 1360.

6 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
7 AIR 1978 SC 597.
8 AIR 1979 SC 1360 at 1365.

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law and justice. If they are sent to prison they cannot exercise their human rights,
therefore, the learned Judge declared the right to speedy trial as a fundamental
right under Article 21 of the Constitution.
In Hussainara Khatoon (II) case9, the Supreme Court considered the
decision of the Government of Bihar to withdraw certain cases. The Court
appreciated the decision of the Government and expressed its happiness. The
Court re-emphasized the expeditious view for withdrawal of cases against under-
trials for more than two years. The Court directed to the Social Welfare Department
of the Government of Bihar to contact the women and children who had already
been released on their personal bond and to arrange for looking after them. The
Court also directed the jail authorities that, as and when they release any women
and children on their personal bond they would refer them to the Social Welfare
Department of the Government of Bihar to make arrangement for being their
taken care of and look after. In Hussainara Khatoon (III) case10, a counter-
affidavit, filed on behalf of the Government of Bihar disclosed that few women
prisoners were kept in jail without even being accused of any offence merely
because they happened to be victims of an offence or they were required for the
purpose of giving evidence or they were in protective custody.
The Supreme Court held that the expression ‘protective custody’ was a
euphemism calculated to design what was really and in truth nothing but
imprisonment. Thus, the Court imposed a duty upon the State to protect women
and children who were homeless or destitute. The Court further directed that all
women and children who were in jails in the State of Bihar under ‘protective
custody’ or who were in jail because their presence was required for giving evidence
or who were victims of offence should be released and taken forthwith to welfare
homes or rescue homes and should be kept there and properly looked for.
In Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar 11, in
continuation of Hussainara (I) and (III) the Court considered the affidavits filed in
response to its earlier orders and addressed it to some of those issues again and
passed further directions. A list was filed on behalf of the State of Bihar which
showed that there were certain under-trial prisoners who were in jail for periods
longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced, if
convicted. Justice Bhagwati held that the list disclosed a shocking state of affairs
and betrayed complete lack of concern for human values. It exposed the callousness
of legal and judicial system which could remain unmoved by such enormous misery
and suffering resulting from totally unjustified deprivation of personal liberty. He
directed that under-trial prisoners should be released forthwith because their
detention was already illegal and in violation of their fundamental right guaranteed

9 Hussainara Khatoon (II) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 91.
10 Hussainara Khatoon (III) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 93.
11 (1980) 1 SCC 98.

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under Article 21 of the Constitution12.
In Hussainara Khatoon (V) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar13, the
Court considered the extent to which directions in Hussainara (IV) had been
complied with, passed further directions and gave more time where necessary.
In Hussainara (VI) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar14, in the matter
relating to pending cases and their disposal to ensure speedy trial, the Court
requested further details from the High Court and also directed the State
Government to file affidavit in reply. A list was handed over to the Court of under
trial prisoners who were accused of multiple offences and who had already been
in jail for the maximum term for which they could be sentenced on conviction,
even if the sentence awarded to them were consecutive. The Court held that they
should be released because their further detention would be violative not only of
human dignity but also of their fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution.
But where the period undergone was less than that but still more than the maximum,
if the sentences were concurrent they had to be released on a personal bond of
Rs. 50 only without surety and without verification as to their financial insolvency.
In Hussainara series cases the Supreme Court recognized the ‘right to
speedy trial’ and the ‘right to legal aid services’ as a fundamental right under
Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court recognized the human rights of poor
persons and afforded a new shape to the ambit of human rights. Through these
public interest litigation judgments, Justice Bhagwati opened the door of human
rights and fundamental freedoms to the poor and helpless people of India.

IV. Human Right and Fundamental Freedom to Protect and Promote

Marine Environment:
For the protection and promotion of environment, the Apex Court has
addressed the issues of environmental degradation such as vehicular pollution15,
leakage of oleum gas from a factory16, danger to the Taj Mahal from Mathura
refinery17, degradation of Ridge area in Delhi18, tanneries19, and chemical

12 Id. at 107-108, para 10.

13 (1980) 1 SCC 108.
14 (1980) 1 SCC 115. Also see Mantoo Mazumdar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1980 SC 847, Sant
Bir v. State of Bihar, AIR 1982 SC 470, Mathew v. State of Bihar, AIR 1984 SC 1554,
Kamladevi v. State of Punjab, AIR 1984 SC 1895. Anil Yadav. State of Bihar, (1981) I
SCC 622, Khatri v. State of Bihar (1981) I SCC 627, Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar (1982)
2 SCC 583.
15 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1996 (1) SCALE 42.
16 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395.
17 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 351.
18 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1996) 1 SCALE SP-22, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India
(1996) 6 SCC 756.
19 Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647.

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industries20 and so on. The court has taken several activist measures to ensure
compliance of pollution standards. The Apex Court has taken bold steps to protect
and promote marine environment from the pollution caused by shrimp farming. In
this regard S. Jagannath v. Union of India 21 is an important case decided by a
Division Bench of the Supreme Court. The Apex Court held that before any shrimp
industry or shrimp pond is permitted to be installed in the ecology fragile coastal
area it must pass through a strict environmental test. There has to be a high
powered “Authority” under the Act to scrutinize each and every case from the
environmental point of view. There must be an environmental impact assessment
before permission is granted to install commercial shrimp farms. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court issued following directions:
1. The Central Government shall constitute an authority under Section 3(3)
of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and shall confer on the said authority
all the powers necessary to protect the ecologically fragile coastal areas, sea
shore, water front and other coastal areas and specially to deal with the situation
created by the shrimp culture industry in the coastal States/Union Territories. he
authority shall be headed by a retired Judge of a High Court. Other members
preferably with expertise in the field of aquaculture, pollution control and
environment protection shall be appointed by the Central Government. The Central
Government shall confer on the said authority the powers to issue directions
under section 5 of the Act and for taking measures with respect to the matters
referred to in clauses (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x) and (xii) of sub-section (2) of
Section 3. The Central Government shall constitute the authority before January
15, 1997.
2. The authority so constituted by the Central Government shall implement
‘the Precautionary Principle’ and ‘the Polluter pays principles’.
3. The shrimp culture industry/the shrimp ponds are covered by the prohibition
contained in Para 2(1) of the CRZ Notification. No shrimp culture pond can be
constructed or set up within the coastal regulation zone as defined in the CRZ
notification. This shall be applicable to all seas, bays, estuaries, creeks, rivers and
backwaters. This direction shall not apply to traditional and improved traditional
types of technologies (as defined in Alagarswami report) which are practiced in
the coastal low lying areas.
4. All aquacultures industries/shrimp culture industries/shrimp culture ponds
operating/set up in the coastal regulation zone as defined under the CRZ Notification
shall be demolished and removed from the said area before March 31, 1997. We

20 In re Bhavani River Sakti Sugar Ltd, (1998) 6 SCC 335.

21 S. Jagannath v. Union of India & ors, AIR 1997 SC 811. The case was heard by a
Division Bench consisting of Kuldip Singh and S. Saghir Ahmad JJ. However, the
judgment of the Court was delivered by Kuldip Singh, J. See also Indian Council and
Enviro-Legal Action V. Union of India, (! 995) 3 SCC 77.

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direct the Superintendent of Police/Deputy Commissioner of Police and the District
Magistrate/Collector of the area to enforce this direction and close/demolish all
aquaculture industries/shrimp culture industries, shrimp culture ponds on or before
March 31, 1997. A compliance report in this respect shall be filed in the Supreme
Court by these authorities before April 15, 1997.
5. The farmers who are operating traditional and improved traditional
systems of aquacultures may adopt improved technology for increased production
productivity and return with prior approval of the “authority” constituted by this
order.
6. The agricultural lands, salt pan lands, mangroves, wet lands, forest lands,
land for village common purpose and the land meant for public purposes shall not
be used / converted for construction of shrimp culture ponds.
7. No aquaculture industry/shrimp culture industry/shrimp culture ponds
shall be constructed /set up within 1000 meter of Chilka Lake and Pulicat Lake
(including Bird Sanctuaries namely Yadurapattu and Nelapattu).
8. Aquaculture industry/shrimp culture industry/shrimp culture ponds already
operating and functioning in the said area of 1000 meter shall be closed and
demolished before March 31, 1997. We direct the Superintendent of Police/Deputy
Commissioner of Police and the District Magistrate/Collector of the area to enforce
this direction and close/demolish aquaculture industries/shrimp culture industries,
shrimp culture ponds on or before March 31, 1997. A compliance report in this
respect shall be filled in the Supreme Court by these authorities before April 15,
1997.
9. Aquaculture industry/shrimp culture industry/shrimp culture ponds other
than traditional and improved traditional may be set up/constructed outside the
coastal regulation zone as defined by the CRZ notification and outside 1000 meter
of Chilka and Pulicat lakes with the prior approval of the “authority” as constituted
by this Court. Such industries which are already operating in the said areas shall
detain authorisation from the “Authority” before April 30, 1997 failing which the
industry concerned shall stop functioning with effect from the said date.
The Court further directed that any aquaculture activity including intensive
and semi-intensive which has the effect of causing salinity of soil, of the drinking
water or wells and/or by the use of chemical feeds increases shrimp or prawn
production with consequent increase in sedimentation which, on putrefaction is a
potential health hazard, apart from causing silication turbidity of water courses
and estuaries with detrimental implication on local fauna and flora shall not be
allowed by the aforesaid Authority.
10. Aquaculture industry/shrimp culture industry/shrimp culture ponds which
have been functioning/operating within the coastal regulation zone as defined by
the CRZ Notification and within 1000 meter from Chilka and Pulikat Lakes shall
be liable to compensate the affected persons on the basis of the “polluter pays”
principle.

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 11. The authority shall, with the help of expert opinion and after giving
opportunity to the concerned polluters assess the loss to the ecology/environment
in the affected areas and shall also identify the individuals/families who have
suffered because of the pollution and shall assess the compensation to be pain to
the said individuals/families. The authority shall further determine the compensation
to be recovered from the polluters as cost of reversing the damaged environment.
The authority shall lay down just and fair procedure for completing the exercise.
12. The authority shall compute the compensation under two heads namely,
for reversing the ecology and for payment to individuals. A statement showing the
total amount to be recovered, the names of the polluters whom the amount is to be
recovered, the amount to be recover from each polluter, the persons to whom the
compensation is to be paid and the amount payable to each of them shall be
forwarded to the Collector/District Magistrate of the area concerned. The Collector/
District Magistrate shall recover the amount from the polluters, if necessary, as
arrears of land revenue. He shall disburse the compensation awarded by the
authority to the affected persons/families.
13. The Court further directed that any violation or non-compliance of the
directions of the Supreme Court shall attract the provisions of the Contempt of
Courts Act in addition.
14. The compensation amount recovered from the polluters shall be deposited
under a separate head called “Environment Protection Fund” and shall be utilized
for compensating the effected persons as identified by the authority and also for
restoring the damaged environment.
15. The authority, in consultation with expert bodies like NEERI, Central
Pollution Control Board, respective State Pollution Control Boards shall frame
scheme/schemes for reversing the damage cause to the ecology and environment
by pollutions of the coastal States/Union Territories. The scheme/schemes so framed
shall be executed by the respective State Governments/Union Territory
Governments under the supervision of the Central Government. The expenditure
shall be met from the “Environment Protection Fund” and from other sources
provided by the respective State Governments/Union Territory Governments and
the Central Government.
16. The workmen employed in the shrimp culture industries which are to be
closed in terms of this order, shall be deemed to have been retrenched with effect
from April 30, 1997 provided they have been in Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) for
not less than one year in the industry concerned before continuous service (as
defined in Section 25-B of the said date. They shall be paid compensation in terms
of Section 25-F(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. These workmen shall also
be paid, in addition, six years wages as additional compensation. The compensation
shall be paid to the workmen before May 31, 1997. The gratuity amount payable
to the women shall be paid in addition.
Thus, the Central Government should constitute an authority under Section

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3 (3) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. It must confer on the said authority
all the powers necessary to protect the ecologically fragile coastal areas, sea
shore, water front and other coastal areas. The authority so constituted by the
Central Government must implement ‘the Precautionary Principle’ and ‘the Polluter
pays principles’ as directed by the Apex Court of the country. It was further
directed that any violation or non-compliance of the directions of the Supreme
Court shall attract the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act in addition.

V. Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, Fundamental Freedoms

and Human Dignity of Bonded Labourers:
The bonded labour system continues to be the most pernicious form of
human bondage in our country. Under such system, a worker continues to serve
his master in consideration of a debt taken by him. Bondage can be inter-generational
or child bondage or loyalty bondage or bondage through land allotment. The public
interest litigation on bonded labour seeks to implement the aims and objectives of
the Act. The first leading public interest litigation on this subject was Bandhua
Mukti Morcha v. Union of India22. However, most of the directions could not be
implemented for many years. The Apex Court acknowledged its limited capacity
in monitoring the schemes of rehabilitation. In 1992 the Apex Court recounted the
history of the case.
It is important to note that there was not the slightest improvement in the
conditions of the workers of the stone quarries. The litigation ended up with one
more warning to the government to be responsive to judicial directions23. It is
submitted, that the public interest actions focusing on the plight of bonded labourers
have to some extent assisted the implementation of the aims and objectives of the
Act. But the basic problem in the implementation of the aims and objectives of the
Act is that emphasis is being placed only on the identification, release and
rehabilitation of bonded labourers.
The Court has not made any effort to punish the owners of these labours.
The real emancipation of bonded labourers would be achieved not by cutting them
off from the life support system but rather by allowing them to work where they
are working. It is an obligation of the Government to ensure them a reasonable
wage and better living conditions. According to Dr. B. P. Dwivedi, “It is most
important to give effect to the rehabilitation plans. There may be non-political
social action groups and voluntary agencies for the purpose of ensuring
implementation of the Act” 24. Further, a nationwide movement must be initiated

22 (1984) 4 SCC 161. Also see Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India (2000) 10 SSC 104.
23 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 38. Also see Mukesh
Advani v. State of M.P., AIR 1985 SC 1363, H.P. Sivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1983
(2) SCALE 45, T. Chakkachal v. State of Bihar, JT 1992 (1) SC 106.
24 Dr. B.P.Dwivedi,.The Changing Dimension of Personal Liberty in India, (Wadhwa &
Company, Allahabad, 1998), p.188.

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all over the country.

VI. Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

of Women:
Matters relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms of women have
increasingly been brought before the Supreme Court with the growth of women’s
movement and investigative journalism exposing cases of dowry, rape, sexual
harassment and discrimination based on gender. It is considered that investigation
into crimes against women has been unsatisfactory and in some cases even the
judges have shown gender bias. Further, there are complaints about long delays in
final disposal of cases not only in lower courts but also in superior courts of the
country.
In Vishaka case,25 the Apex Court stated that sexual harassment of women
at workplace constitutes violation of gender equality and right to dignity, which are
fundamental rights. The Court pointed out that the existing civil and penal laws in
India did not provide adequate safeguards against sexual harassment at work
place. The Court laid down 12 guidelines to be followed by every employer to
ensure prevention of sexual harassment. The Court remarked that all courts in
India must interpret the contents of fundamental rights provided in Part III of the
Constitution in the light of international conventions if the provisions of such
conventions were not inconsistent with fundamental rights and other provisions of
the Constitution.
In Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v. Union of India26, at the
instance of the petitioner, Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum, through public
interest litigation invoked the benign provisions of Article 32 of the Constitution to
espouse the pathetic plight of four domestic servants who were subject to indecent
sexual assault by seven army personnel in a running train while traveling by the
Muri Express from Ranchi to Delhi. The victims were helpless tribal women
belonging to the State of Bihar. They were vulnerable to intimidation.
Notwithstanding the occurrence of such barbaric assault on the person and dignity
of women neither the Central Government nor the State Government had bestowed
any attention as to the need for provision of rehabilitate and compensatory justice
for women. A three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court disposed of the writ
petition with certain basic observations and directions. Delivering the decision
Mohan, J. stated that it is rather unfortunate that in recent time, there has been an
increase in violence against women causing serious concern. Rape does indeed

25 (1997) 6 SCC 241. The principles laid down in this case were followed with approval in
Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A. K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 634.
26 Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 14. The
principles laid down in this case was accepted with approval in Budhisattwa Gautam
v. Subhra Chakraborty, AIR 1996 SC 922.

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pose a series of problems for the criminal justice system. There are cries for the
harshest penalties, but often times such crimes eclipse the real plight of the victim.
The learned Judge observed:
Rape is an experience which shakes the foundations of the lives of the
victims. For many, its effect is a long-term one, impairing their capacity for personal
relationships, altering their behavior and values and generating endless fear. In
addition to the trauma of the rape itself, victims have had to suffer further agony
during legal proceedings27. The learned Judge further observed:
We will only point out that the defects of the existing system: Firstly,
complaints are handled roughly and are not given such attention as is warranted.
The victims, more often than not, are humiliated by the police. The victims have
invariably found rape trials a traumatic experience. The experience of giving
evidence in court has been negative and destructive. The victims often say, they
considered the ordeal to be even worse than the rape itself. Undoubtedly, the
court proceedings added to and prolonged the psychological stress they had to
suffer as a result of the rape itself28.
The learned Judge laid down the broad parameters in assisting the victims of
rape which are as follows:
(1) The complainants of sexual assault cases should be provided with
legal representation. It is important to have someone who is well- acquainted with
the criminal justice system. The role of the victim’s advocate would not only be to
explain to the victim the nature of the proceedings, to prepare her for the case and
to assist her in the police station and in court but to provide her with guidance as to
how she might obtain help of a different nature from other agencies, for example,
mind counseling or medical assistance. It is important to secure continuity of
assistance by ensuring that the same person who looked after the complainant’s
interests in the police station represents her till the end of the case.
(2) Legal assistance will have to be provided at the police station since
the victim of sexual assault might very well be in a distressed state upon arrival at
the police station, the guidance and support of a lawyer at this stage and whilst she
was being questioned would be of great assistance to her.
(3) The police should be under a duty to inform the victim of her right to
representation before any questions were asked of her and that the police report
should state that the victim was so informed.
(4) A list of advocates willing to act in these cases should be kept at the
police station for victims who did not have a particular lawyer in mind or whose
own lawyer was unavailable.
(5) The advocate shall be appointed by the court, upon application by the
police at the earliest convenient movement, but in order to ensure that victims
were questioned without undue delay, advocates would be authorized to act at the

27 Id. at 18-19, para 13.

28 Id. at 20, para 14.

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police station before leave of the court was sought or obtained.
(6) In all rape trials anonymity to the victims must be maintained, as for
as necessary.
(7) It is necessary, having regard to the Directive Principles contained
under Article 38(1) of the Constitution of India to set up Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board. Rape victims frequently incur substantial financial loss. Some,
for example, are too traumatized to continue in employment.
(8) Compensation for victims shall be awarded by the court on conviction
of the offender and by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board whether or not
a conviction has taken place. The Board will take into account pain, suffering and
shock as well as loss of earnings due to pregnancy and the expenses of child birth
if this occurred as a result of the rape.
The learned Judge held that in the present situation, the National Commission
for women such scheme as to wipe out the tears of such unfortunate victims.
Such a scheme shall be prepared within six months from the date of this judgment.
Thereupon, the Union of India will examine the same and shall take necessary
steps for the implementation of the scheme at the earliest.
Thus, the Supreme Court, with a view to assisting rape victims, has laid
down various broad guidelines. These guidelines include the legal assistance,
anonymity, compensation and rehabilitation to rape victims. The National
Commission for Women was directed to evolve a scheme for providing adequate
safeguards to these victims.
It is submitted that the decision recognize the right of the victim to
compensation by providing that it shall be awarded by the court on conviction of
the offender subject to the finalization of the Scheme by the Central Government.
If the court trying offences of rape has jurisdiction to award the compensation at
the final stage, there is no reason to deny to the court the right to award interim
compensation which should also be provided in the Scheme.

VII. Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms of Persons Suffering from Hunger:
The Apex Court of the country has declared various social rights such as
right to means of livelihood, right to adequate health care, right to housing, right to
education as aspects of ‘Right to Life’ guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution
of India29. In People’s Union for Civil Liberties case30, an action regarding
fundamental right to food was arisen out of starvation death in certain parts of the

29 Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746, Bandhua Mukti Morcha
v. Union of India, ( 1984) 4 SCC 161, Chameli Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1996 S.C. 1051;
Samatha v. State of A.P., AIR 1997 SC 3297, Unni Krishanna v. State of A.P., AIR 1993
SC 2178, State of Punjab v. M.S. Chawla, AIR 1997 SC 495.
30 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCALE 484.

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State of Orissa gave rise to a claim that right to food should be recognized a
human right and fundamental freedom. The Apex Court has issued certain directions
to the State government from time to time to take preventive and curative measures
to avoid starvation deaths and provide for adequate food supply to the needy
people.
In People’s Union for Civil Liberties case31, a petition was filed seeking
a direction for the enforcement of Famine Code and immediate release of food
grains lying in the stocks of the Government. The petitioners were also sought
requiring the Government of India to frame fresh schemes of Public Distribution
for the Scientific and Reasonable Distribution of food grains.
The Highest Court of the country remarked that despite the fact that plenty
of surplus food grains were lying in the stocks of the Union of India or drought
affected areas, people were dying of starvation. The Court pointed out that between
2001 and 2003 it had issued various directions to see that food was provided to the
aged, infirm, disabled and destitute men and women who were in danger of
starvation, pregnant and lactating women and destitute children especially in cases
where they or members of their family did not have sufficient funds to get food. It
was unfortunate that plenty of food was available but distribution of the same was
among the very poor and destitute was scarce leading to starvation, malnutrition
and other related problems. Mere schemes without implementation were of no
use. The Court strongly remarked32:
Article 21 of the Constitution protects for every citizen a right to live
with human dignity. Would the very existence of life of those families,
which are below poverty line not come under danger for want of
appropriate schemes and implementation thereof, to provide adequate
aid to such families? Reference can also be made to Article 47 which
inter alia provides that the State shall regard the raising of level of
nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement
of public health as among its primary duties.
In its report of January 17, 2003, the National Human Rights Commission stated
that right to food should be declared as a guaranteed fundamental right33:
By way of public interest litigation the matter of denial of human right to
food and means of livelihood was brought to the attention of the Apex Court by
way of public interest litigation in Kapila Hingorani case34. The Public interest
litigation came out of a newspaper report that due to non-payment of salary for a
long time resulting in starvation of an employee of Bihar State Agro-Industries

31 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, 2003(9) SCALE 835 and 840.
32 Id. at 836.
33 National Human Rights Commission Order January 17, 2003, Case No. 37/3/97: Coram:
Justice J.S. Verma, Chairperson, Justice Sujata V. Manohar and Sri Virendra Dayal.
34 Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar, (2003) 6 SCC 1.

44
Development Corporation, the employee tried to immolate himself. This employee
later succumbed to burn injuries suffered by him. It was also reported that apart
from the employees of public sector undertakings, even the teaching and non-
teaching staff of unaided schools, madarsas, and colleges had been facing the
similar fate. It was reported that about 250 employees died due to starvation or
committed suicide owing to acute financial crisis resulting from non-payment of
salary to them for a long time.
It was held that corporate entities are liable to respect the life and liberty of
all citizens in terms of Article 21 and also their own employees. The Court came
to conclusion that food, clothing, and shelter are core human rights in a civilized
society. The State of Bihar made itself liable to mitigate the suffering of the
employees of the public sector undertakings and government companies. The
Court issued directions to the State of Bihar to deposit Rupees 50 crores with the
High Court for disbursement of salaries to the employees of the corporations. The
Court pointed out that hunger was a violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Further, the State has an obligation to satisfy basic human needs.
To deal with the problem of foodgrains rotting in godowns, in the leading
case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,35 the Supreme
Court on August, 12, 2010 asked the Government of India to consider distributing
them at “very low cost” or “no cost” as a short term measure. A Division Bench
consisting of Justices Dalveer Bhandari and Deepak Verma passed the order,
taking on record the affidavit filed by the Centre in response to the suggestions
made by the Apex Court on July 27, 2010. While dealing with the problem of food
grains, “which is rotting”, the government could consider increasing the quantum
of food supply to the population Below Poverty Line (BPL), opening the fair price
shops for all the thirty days in a month and distribute food grains to the deserving
population at a very low cost or no cost.
The Apex Court made it clear that the Centre must ensure food security of
the country. In view of the record procurement which the Centre was not able to
properly store and preserve, it would be appropriate that the Centre might take
some long term and short measures to solve the problem. It said, “Permanent
solution lies in constructing adequate storage facilities. The Union of India may
consider constructing at least one large Food Corporation of India gowdown in
every State and consider the possibility of construction of one godown in every
division if not in every district of the State”.
Further, on August, 31, 2010, the Supreme Court made it clear that it had
ordered free distribution of food grains to the poor instead of allowing it to rot in
gowdowns. It was not a suggestion as made out by Agriculture Minister Sharad
Pawar. The Court made it clear that, “It was not a suggestion. It is there in our
order. You tell the Minister”. The Court told the advocate of Government of India.

35 The Hindu, New Delhi, August 13, 2010 at p. 13.

45
The Supreme Court had on August 12, 2010 asked the Union Government to
consider free distribution of food grains to the poor instead of allowing it to rot in
Food Corporation of India gowdowns.
In a public interest litigation filed by civil rights groups the People’s Union
for Civil Liberties (PUCL) on rampant corruption in Public Distribution System
(PDS) besides rotting of food grains in Food Corporation of India gowdowns.
Following this, Minister for Agriculture in Centre Mr. Sharad Pawar had stated
that it was not possible to implement the “suggestion” of the Apex Court for free
distribution.
On August, 31, 2010, the Supreme Court, a Division Bench consisting of
Justices Dalveer Bhandari and Deepak Verma referred to newspaper reports
quoting Pawar that the Supreme Court had only made a suggestion and it was not
an order. The Court stated “it was not a suggestion. It is there in our order. You tell
your Minister. Let him not misunderstand our order”. Justice Verma told Additional
Solicitor General Mohan Parasan36.
The Court directed the Government to conduct a fresh survey of the BPL/
ABPL/AAY beneficiaries on the basis of the figures available for 2010 and said
the authorities cannot rely on a decade-old data to extend the benefits. The Bench
further said the Government must take urgent steps to prevent further rotting of
food grains while maintaining that it must procure only that much quantity which it
can preserve. The Apex Court reiterated its earlier order that persons above poverty
line shall not be entitled to subsidized food grains but if the Government was
determined to extend the benefit, the same shall be given to those families whose
annual income is below Rs. Three lakh37. Thus, the Court directed the Centre to
consider increasing quantum of food to BPL population. It directed to the Centre
to distribute food grains at very low or no cost. The Court passed the order, taking
on record affidavit filed by the Centre.

VIII. Criticism, Contribution and Future Dimensions of Public Interest

Litigation Movement:
Public interest litigation has given beautiful results which were unthinkable
nearly 35 years ago. Tortured, under-trials and women prisoners, humiliated inmates
of protective women’s home, blinded prisoners, degraded bonded labourers,
exploited children, beggars, and many others have been granted relief through
assistance of judiciary. The most important contribution of public interest litigation
has been to extend the responsibility and accountability of the State instrumentalities
towards the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms
of the poor, ignorant, illiterate, humiliated and weaker sections of the society.
It is important to state that there are certain limitations and shortcomings of

36 The Hindu, New Delhi, September 1, 2010 at p. 1.

37 The Times of India, Lucknow, September 1, 2010.

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public interest litigation. Sometimes public interest litigation actions may give rise
to the problem of competing rights. For instance, when a Court gives directions to
close a polluting industry38, the interests of the workmen and their families who
are deprived of their livelihood is not considered. The construction of a dam to
provide water to the public at large may deprive other citizens their human right to
shelter39. A court order for the closure of a polluting abattoir may deprive the
means of subsistence of the butchers40. In brief, it may be stated that judicial
activism will not automatically achieve the aims and objectives of social justice
and social empowerment. It is considered that public interest litigation emphasizes
litigation as a means of social change. Thus, it widens the dependency of the poor,
ignorant, illiterate and victim groups on the non-governmental organizations and
voluntary organizations. It does not provide any effective participation of these
groups who remain passive depending upon the efforts of others. Judicial activism
interrogates power. It tries to make the Courts as people’s Court.
Human rights and fundamental freedoms of the of the poor, helpless,
ignorant, illiterate, disadvantaged groups and weaker section of the society will be
better protected and promoted by subjecting public interest litigation to discipline
and control that should be limited only to the cases focusing on hapless victims of
domination and inactions of State instrumentalities. The misuse of public interest
litigation for every conceivable public interest might dilute the original commitment.
The public interest litigation proceedings must be utilized only for the protection
and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the poor, helpless,
ignorant, illiterate, and victimized, the disadvantaged groups and weaker section
of the society.

IX. Concluding Observations:

In the modern era of globalization and universalization social action litigations
has become the household word for judicial involvement for the protection and
promotion of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the poor, oppressed
and weaker sections of the society. In the last few years, extensive literature has
come into picture on the role of public interest litigation in the direction of social
justice, social change and social empowerment. With the leading role of non
governmental organizations, voluntary organizations, active assistance of social
activists and human rights leaders public interest litigation activism aims at innovative
remedial measures for the vindication of constitutional commitments for the welfare
and relief of the deprived, marginalized and disadvantaged groups.
In brief, the public interest litigation has become an effective method for
seeking protection of human rights, promotion of rule of law and preservation of

38 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1997) 11 SCC 227, 312, 327.

39 Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664.
40 Buffalo Traders Welfare Association v. Maneka Gandhi, 199 4 Supp (3) SCC 448.

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democracy. It holds the State and its instrumentalities within the limits of
constitutionalism and provides redress to citizens against the governmental
repression, lawlessness and misuse of power. The most important contribution of
public interest litigation has been to enlarge the accountability of the State and its
instrumentalities towards the protection and promotion of human rights and
fundamental freedoms of the poor, oppressed and weaker sections of the society.
The judiciary is playing an activist role through public interest litigation. It has
become more assertive and responsive to the new challenges of the modern times.
Public interest litigation has widened the legitimacy and prestige of the judiciary. It
has brought the higher courts closer to the people of India. The expanding horizons
of public interest litigation are resented by the bureaucracy as also the politicians
because it exposes their actions or inactions to public accountability. The public
interest litigation has emerged as a weapon to the deprived, marginalized and
weaker sections of the society for whom justice was considered beyond reach.
Public activism interrogates power. It makes the Courts as people’s Court. The
public interest litigation makes the Supreme Court the people’s court.

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