KRR 1st Unit
KRR 1st Unit
Symbolic structures it has invented --- for representing knowledge and to the computational
processes it has devised for reasoning with those symbolic structures.
A similar story can be told about a sentence like “Ram hopes that Shiva will come to the party.”
The same proposition is involved, but the relationship Ram has to it is different.
Verbs like “knows,” “hopes,” “regrets,” “fears,” and “doubts” all denote
propositional attitudes, relationships between agents and propositions.
In all cases, what matters about the proposition is its truth: If Ram hopes that Shiva will come to
the party, then Ram is hoping that the world is one way and not another, as classified by the
proposition. Of course, there are sentences involving knowledge that do not explicitly mention.
Representation
The concept of representation is as philosophically vexing as that of knowledge. Very roughly
speaking, representation is a relationship between two domains,
where the first domain, the representor, is more concrete, immediate, or accessible in
some way than the second.
For example, a drawing of a milkshake and a burger on a sign might stand for visible fast food
restaurant; the drawing of a circle with a plus below it might stand for the much more abstract
concept at restaurant.
what the symbols represent. In some cases, a word like “John” might stand for something quite
concrete; but many words, like “love” or “truth,” stand for abstractions.
Knowledge representation, is the field of study concerned with using formal symbols to
represent a collection of propositions believed by some putative agent. As we will see, however,
we do not want to insist that these symbols must represent all the propositions believed by the
agent. There may very well be an infinite number of propositions believed, only a finite number
of which are ever represented. It will be the role of reasoning to bridge the gap between what is
represented and what is believed.
Reasoning:-
It is here that we use the fact that symbols are more accessible than the propositions they
represent:
It is useful here to draw an analogy with arithmetic. We can think of binary addition as being a
certain formal manipulation: We start with symbols like “1011” and “10,” for instance, and end
up with “1101.” The manipulation in this case is addition, because the final symbol represents
the sum of the numbers represented by the initial ones. Reasoning is similar: We might start
with the sentences “Ram loves Shiva” and “Shiva is coming to the party,” and after a certain
amount of manipulation produce the sentence, “Someone Ram loves is coming to the party.”
We would call this form of reasoning logical inference because the final sentence represents a
logical conclusion of the propositions represented by the initial ones, as we will discuss later.
According to this view (first put forward, incidentally, by the philosopher Gottfried
Leibniz in the seventeenth century), reasoning is a form of calculation, not unlike arithmetic,
but over symbols standing for propositions rather than numbers.
Sentences in the language are constructed according to formal rules and relationships.
A semantics identifies the formal meaning of any sentence.
An inference method allows new sentences to be generated from existing sentences.
Propositional logic
`It is humid': Q
`If it is humid, then it is hot': Q P
`If it is hot and humid, then it is raining': (P Q) R
Truth tables
A truth table shows how truth values combine under the relevant relationship.
Modus ponens
P Q
P
Q
Modus Tolens
P Q
Q
P
Semantics
A semantics maps sentences to facts in the world; e.g., the mapping determines which
objects in the world are referenced by which objects in the language. This is called
a referential semantics.
The way one fact follows another should be mirrored by the way one sentence
is entailed by another.
First-order logic
First-order logic (FOL) (also known as first-order predicate calculus or FOPC) adds
We can capture generalisations by asserting that any instance of a given class has the
relevant property. For example
More examples
Usually, there are several ways to render a sentence in FOL. There's no `one right
answer'.
Consider these
Examples cont.
But its expressiveness complicates the derivation of inferences. (It gets easier if we
exliminate existential quantification and assume `negation by failure'.)
Also, in FOL you cannot construct sentences which make assertions about other
sentences. For example, you cannot say things like `there exists a property such that...'
Special-purpose logics
For example
This affects all varieties of knowledge representation but is particularly apparent where
evaluation is in terms of truth, and rules are used to define the results of actions.
Suppose we have
paint(X, C) color(X, C)
move(X, P) position(X, P)
paint(tony, blue).
move(tony, garden).
The most obvious way to protect against the frame problem is to add rules which capture
the non-effects of actions.
For example
asserts the fact that moving an object will not affect its colour.
Since most actions do not affect most properties of a situation, in a domain comprising
actions and properties, we are going to need approximately frame axioms.