FMEA in Clin Lab
FMEA in Clin Lab
5,800
Open access books available
143,000
International authors and editors
180M Downloads
154
Countries delivered to
TOP 1%
most cited scientists
12.2%
Contributors from top 500 universities
Abstract
1. Introduction
All medical cares, including clinical laboratories, carries an intrinsic risk of errors
that can result in harm, disability, and even death so today their activities have seen
a significant increase in monitoring [1]. In the past, laboratory processes performed
in clinical laboratories focused only on results, while today, they focus on issues
related to reliability, safety and effectiveness. It is very important in health world,
being aware of the error rate attributable to health system that has great impact on
patients [2]. Currently, some strategies are proposed to analyze and to see how you
can decline the rate of preventable errors. In order to guarantee reliable results and
improved data consistency, while operating with reduced funding, laboratories
need to acquire a new culture of management, more tools and specific training [3].
Research management founded on a quality approach is emerging as an essential tool
to ensure valuable, vigorous and dependable consequences, within a framework of
the best practice. Risk management has been disseminated in clinical laboratories
only for the last years, although it has been applied in healthcare since the 80s. That
was partly due to constant inspections during the cycle of laboratory examination,
rework, removal of any defects and adjustment after the identification of possible
causes of flaws or errors. One of the instruments used in risk management is the
analysis of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). The FMEA model has been
applied in various medical fields, including clinical laboratory activities to improve
1
Contemporary Topics in Patient Safety - Volume 1
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) which was first developed in the 1940s
is a systematic technique for identifying all possible errors in a system or process.
Adoption of this analysis by National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) in relation with aerospace missions in mid-1960s made its practical applica-
tion possible. Since then, this analysis has been widely used in diverse industries
such as oil and gas, food and automotive and electronics systems. In recent years
FMEA has been also successfully applied in the health system as an effective tool for
improving patient safety and performance in hospitals. Today, The FMEA is emerg-
ing as a tool for assessing the risk of clinical trial processes and clinical analytical
methods. However, there are still too few reports about this last use and even fewer
data are available on the application of the methodology in clinical laboratories
[5–8]. The risk assessment in this technique involves identification of potential
errors, determining the severity (S), occurrence (O) and effects of each error and
reviewing the control actions implemented to prevent or detect (D) errors [9]
(Figure 1). In the traditional FMEA, to measure these criteria, a numeric scale of 1
to 10 is used (Table 1). Thus, each failure mode is been ranked by a scale called Risk
Priority Number (RPN) characterized by multiplying the numbers of three criteria
(S, O, D) together. Therefore, the higher the RPN value, the more important the
error is and its correction has more priority. So, RPN is so beneficial to identify high
risk failures modes requiring priority functions [10, 11].
Prevention, reducing or excluding of errors and their risk is an essential
requirement in clinical analytical tests which is been established by the laboratory
according to RPN limit. The laboratory decided the assessing scale of frequency, the
severity and errors detection which is being different for each test. There are three
main categories of errors [12, 13]:
I. Critical errors – Mainly through request for analysis, if not identified and
corrected early, have serious consequences for the patient’s health
II. Major errors – resulting from the inappropriate application of the sampling
method
III. Minor errors – considered so, because of the low probability of occurrence,
the high probability of detection or low/absent severity. These errors are
taken into account only with the purpose to review the method and the
technical instruction
2
Control of Clinical Laboratory Errors by FMEA Model
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.97602
Figure 1.
FMEA elements.
Severity scale (scale 1 [least severe] to 10 [most severe] for each effect)
Minor (1) Low (2,3) Moderate (4-6) High (7,8) Very high (9,10)
The minor Because of Failure can Dissatisfaction This failure affects safety or
nature of this this failure, lead to patient with the nature increases mortality. This may
failure will the patient dissatisfaction, of the failure endanger the patient’s life
not have a experiences which may leads to serious
significant only a minor include disruption
effect on the injury or discomfort or and risk to the
patient or a minor failure patient’s health
the choice of discomfort
treatment
(I)
Probability scale (scale 1 [least frequent] to 10 [most frequent] for the occurrence)
Remote (1) Very low (2) Low (3,4,5) Moderate (6,7) High (8,9) Very high
(10)
Failure is Only a few Isolated failures Occasional minor Failure is often Failure
unlikely; separates have been failures have been encountered is almost
This failure failures have encountered encountered inevitable
was never ever been
observed observed or
reported
(II)
Detection scale for occurrence (scale 1 [always detected] to 10 [never detected] for each occurrence)
Very high High (3,4) Moderate (5,6) Low (7,8) Very low (9) No
(1,2) detection
(10)
It is almost There is a One may detect There is a poor One probably The
certain to good chance the existence of chance of will not detect existence of
detect the of detecting the failure mode detecting the the existence the failure
failure mode the failure existence of the of the failure mode will
mode failure mode mode not or
cannot be
detected
(III)
Table 1.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Scale for Severity, Probability, and Detection. (I): Severity score (S): 1 to
10 scales from least to most severe (II) Probability score (P): 1 to 10 scales from least to most probable
(III) Detectability score (D): 1 to 10 scales from most to least detectable.
3
Contemporary Topics in Patient Safety - Volume 1
Incorrect tube for sampling Discrepancies in the results of Introducing incorrectly the results in
or incorrect storage the internal control the system
Improper or prolonged Delay in analyzing the Lack of information about the limits
transport conditions samples concerning the results’ interpretation
Table 2.
Potential errors occurred in the clinical laboratory processes.
the most critical and the most difficult ones to control due to involving of various
specialists, sections and centers [16]. Clinical laboratory process map is shown in
Figure 2. The processes map together with the risk map can give us an overview of
the failures distribution in each of the processes [3].
Like any analytical method, FMEA should be thoroughly understood prior to
being introduced in laboratory practice. There are five stages in its implementation
which will be explained in more detail in the methodology [17–19].
FMEA assessment resulted in actions to address the root causes, determining the
following situations:
• immediate removal of the risk source when the pieces of equipment were
increased;
• change in the probability of certain risks when the selection process for new
employees was initiated;
• sharing the risk with other staff members when the clinical emergency staff
was involved in the potential problem.
4
Control of Clinical Laboratory Errors by FMEA Model
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.97602
Figure 2.
Processes map of clinical laboratory.
time and team input is limited, and within a process that was considered to have few
obstacles [1–4]. Former study showed that FMEA can effectively reduce errors in
clinical chemistry laboratories [20].
Woodhouse et al. showed applying FMEA for identified processes in a hemo-
therapy service, can reduced the possibility of error occurrence and increased the
probability of detection [21]. Momenizadeh et al. concluded that implementing
FMEA can significantly reduce laboratory errors [22]. Molavi-Taleghani et al. argued
that FMEA method is very effective in identifying the possible failure of treatment
procedures, determining the cause of each failure mode, and proposing improve-
ment strategies [23]. Applying the FMEA risk assessment tool to laboratory processes
can increase effectiveness, efficiency and reproducibility of the results [24]. Risk
management in the clinical laboratory by FMEA can decrease the possibility of errors
occurrence and ensures the accuracy of results and patient’s safety. Risk management
guidelines recommended that the clinical laboratories must have a proactive and indi-
vidualized role in reducing the potential errors by developing an appreciate Quality
5
Contemporary Topics in Patient Safety - Volume 1
Control Plan (QCP). The laboratories must create their own analytic process to
identify the weakness of each testing stage. As errors and their risks were identified,
the laboratories select the appropriate control processes to detect and to prevent the
occurrence of errors. All errors and control processes are mentioned in the QCP [25].
3. Methodology
4. Analysis of hazards;
6
Control of Clinical Laboratory Errors by FMEA Model
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.97602
Gathering specialists with different levels and types of training, with specific
knowledge and experience of the selected process. A team head can lead team
members through the process, and can help ensure that team members complete
each step and record the results of FMEA [17–19].
In this step the assembled team creates an accurate diagram of potential failure
modes of each listed activity using focus laboratory staff activities and reaching a
common conclusion and recording it on FMEA form (Table 3) [17–19].
This step including identifying failure modes in each step, determining the
potential effect of each failure mode, ranking the severity of failure mode effects,
ranking the probability and detectability of each failure mode and identifying the
critical failure modes [17–19].
Recommended actions
Potential failure mode
Component
Probability
Detection
Function
Severity
Critical
System
RPN
Table 3.
FMEA form.
7
Contemporary Topics in Patient Safety - Volume 1
determine the underlying cause of each critical failure so that appropriate actions
can be taken. Once the root causes of critical failures have been identified, the team’s
aim is to eliminate the risk of failures, reduce the likelihood of failure or mitigate the
effects of failure should it affect the patient [17–19].
4. Discussion
5. Conclusion
Clinical laboratories are inseparable part of health care system as they help
in appropriate diagnosis of patient’s health. Their working process is a complex
8
Control of Clinical Laboratory Errors by FMEA Model
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.97602
procedure which may associate with certain errors. Improvement of the patients’
safety by reducing the errors and their risks in clinical laboratories is a great chal-
lenge. High-quality clinical laboratories ensure that they perform standard tasks,
monitor, and improve their performance, creating a culture of transparency,
defining responsibilities, and optimizing patients’ safety. FMEA is very effective
and successful technique in preventing errors, improving quality and safety of
tests, identifying potential errors, and prioritizing clinical laboratory improvement
strategies. FMEA had a multidisciplinary approach and its complex configuration
processes involvement facilitated the management of errors. As compared to other
prospective risk analysis methods, FMEA analysis provides a good solution for
high risk failure modes in clinical laboratories. Therefore, FMEA is a suitable and
efficient tool to identify most clinical laboratory errors to improving the quality of
laboratory processes and ensuring the accuracy of obtained results and maintaining
patient health and safety. The overall purpose of this paper is to encourage clinical
laboratories to assess and monitor their own. In addition, it should be possible to
identify and monitor error rates to improve upon the process on the basis of objec-
tive and desirable quality specifications.
Conflict of interests
Author contributions
All authors contributed equally to this manuscript, and approved the final
version of manuscripts.
Ethical declarations
Not applicable.
Financial support
None to be declared.
9
Contemporary Topics in Patient Safety - Volume 1
Author details
© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
10
Control of Clinical Laboratory Errors by FMEA Model
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.97602
References
[1] Kalra, J. (2011). Medical errors and [9] Chiozza, M. L., & Ponzetti, C.
patient safety: strategies to reduce and (2009). FMEA: a model for reducing
disclose medical errors and improve medical errors. Clinica chimica acta,
patient safety (Vol. 1). Walter de Gruyter. 404(1), 75-78.
[5] Sharma, K. D., & Srivastava, S. [13] Marin, A. G., Rivas-Ruiz, F., del Mar
(2018). Failure mode and effect analysis Pérez-Hidalgo, M., & Molina-Mendoza,
(FMEA) implementation: a literature P. (2014). Pre-analytical errors
review. J Adv Res Aeronaut Space Sci, 5, management in the clinical laboratory: a
2454-8669. five-year study. Biochemia medica, 24(2),
248-257.
[6] Banduka, N., Veža, I., & Bilić, B.
(2016). An integrated lean approach to [14] Plebani, M. (2006). Errors in clinical
Process Failure Mode and Effect laboratories or errors in laboratory
Analysis (PFMEA): A case study from medicine. Clinical Chemistry and
automotive industry. Advances in Laboratory Medicine (CCLM), 44(6),
Production Engineering & 750-759.
Management, 11(4).
[15] International Organization for
[7] Yusof, M. B., & Abdullah, N. H. B. Standardization/Technical
(2016). Failure mode and effect analysis Specification. (2008). Medical
(FMEA) of butterfly valve in oil and gas Laboratories-Reduction of Error
industry. J. Eng. Sci. Technol., 11, 9-19. Through Risk Management and
Continual Improvement. ISO/TS
[8] Goel, A., & Graves, R. J. (2007, May). 22367: 2008.
Using failure mode effect analysis to
increase electronic systems reliability. In [16] International Organization for
2007 30th International Spring Seminar Standardization. (2012). Medical
on Electronics Technology (ISSE) (pp. laboratories: requirements for quality and
128-133). IEEE. competence. ISO.
11
Contemporary Topics in Patient Safety - Volume 1
[17] Schmittner, C., Gruber, T., G., Di Carlo, M., ... & Kisslinger, A.
Puschner, P., & Schoitsch, E. (2014, (2020). A failure mode and effect
September). Security application of analysis (FMEA)-based approach for
failure mode and effect analysis risk assessment of scientific processes in
(FMEA). In International Conference on non-regulated research laboratories.
Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security Accreditation and Quality Assurance,
(pp. 310-325). Springer, Cham. 25(5), 311-321.
[18] Moradi, L., Emami Sigaroudi, A., [25] Eliza, D. R., & Minodora, D. (2015).
Pourshaikhian, M., & Heidari, M. Risk Management in Clinical
(2020). Risk Assessment of Clinical Laboratory: from Theory to Practice.
Care in Emergency Departments by Acta Medica Marisiensis, 61(4), 372-377.
Health Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis. Journal of Holistic Nursing and [26] Tosheska-Trajkovska, K.,
Midwifery, 30(1), 35-44. Bosilkova, G., Kostovska, I., Labudovikj,
D., Brezovska Kavrakova, J.,
[19] Thornton, E., Brook, O. R., Cekovska, S., ... & Marija, K. (2019).
Mendiratta-Lala, M., Hallett, D. T., & Risk management in the clinical
Kruskal, J. B. (2011). Application of laboratories-use of the Failure Modes
failure mode and effect analysis in a and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Journal of
radiology department. Radiographics, Morphological Sciences.
31(1), 281-293.
[27] Stravitz, P. E., Cibas, E. S., & Heher,
[20] Jiang, Y., Jiang, H., Ding, S., & Liu, Y. K. (2019). Targeting specimen
Q. (2015). Application of failure mode misprocessing safety events with failure
and effects analysis in a clinical modes and effects analysis. Cancer
chemistry laboratory. Clinica Chimica cytopathology, 127(4), 213-217.
Acta, 448, 80-85.
[28] Mendes, M. E., Ebner, P. D. A. R.,
[21] Woodhouse, S., Burney, B., & Coste, Romano, P., Pacheco Neto, M.,
K. (2004). To err is human: improving Sant’anna, A., & Sumita, N. M. (2013).
patient safety through failure mode and Practical aspects of the use of FMEA
effect analysis. Clinical leadership & tool in clinical laboratory risk
management review: the journal of management. Jornal Brasileiro de
CLMA, 18(1), 32-36. Patologia e Medicina Laboratorial, 49(3),
174-181.
[22] Momenizadeh, E., Riahi, L., &
Nazarimanesh, L. (2019). The effect of [29] David, R. E., & Dobreanu, M. I. N.
controlling clinical laboratory errors on O. D. O. R. A. (2015). Failure modes and
patients' safety in Markazi province effects analysis (FMEA)-An assessment
laboratories. Razi Journal of Medical tool for risk management in clinical
Sciences, 26(9), 102-111. laboratories. Acta Medica Transilvanica,
20(4), 130-34.
[23] Molavi-Taleghani, Y., Ebrahimpour,
H., & Sheikhbardsiri, H. (2020). A [30] Potts, H. W., Anderson, J. E.,
Proactive Risk Assessment Through Colligan, L., Leach, P., Davis, S., &
Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Berman, J. (2014). Assessing the validity
Analysis in Pediatric Surgery of prospective hazard analysis methods:
Department. Journal of Comprehensive a comparison of two techniques. BMC
Pediatrics, 11(3). health services research, 14(1), 1-10.
[24] Mascia, A., Cirafici, A. M., [31] Corpuz, R. S. A. (2020). ISO 9001:
Bongiovanni, A., Colotti, G., Lacerra, 2015 Risk-based Thinking: A Framework
12
Control of Clinical Laboratory Errors by FMEA Model
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.97602
13