THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY

A RE-EXAMINATION
David B. Clark

I f the concept of community is dead, it stubbornly refuses to lie

down. Recent years have seen writers so frustrated by the apparent
'myth of community studies'^ that they have sought to despatch
the term once and for all. The case for this execution is usually based
on Hillery's unearthing, some years ago, of ninety-four different defini-
tions of community;^ such seeming confusion and little subsequent
clarification of the term leading Stacey to write it off as a 'non-con-
cept''^ and Pahl to comment that 'the word "community" serves more
to confuse than illuminate the situation in Britain today.'*
Yet as fast as the attempt is made to thrust the concept of com-
munity into limbo, it as obstinately emerges again; of late in such
notable titles as 'community relations' and 'community development',
to name but two. It would seem, therefore, that rather than turning
one's back on the term, it would be useful to examine with a little
more care how it has been employed in the past and to make some
positive suggestions regarding its future application. What follows is
intended as a starting point for the re-instatement of the concept of
community. The discussion is based on a wide range of material which
Reissman has usefuly termed 'the empirical', 'the ecological' and 'the
theoretical' approaches to the subject.^

Community as Locality
'Many contemporary sociologists tend to underrate the importance
of locality', writes Pahl;*^ a mistake easy to make even with regard to the
study of community. For Maclver and Page, however, locality is one
of the fundamental 'bases' of community,^ a view implicit or explicit
in a good number of community studies. For example, amongst em-
piricists, Williams in his study of Ashworthy asks for attention to be
paid to 'the spatial and environmental aspects' of communal life,^
whilst Pahl in examining the influence of London on the metropolitan
fringe of Hertfordshire stresses the close links between the sociology
of community and social geography.^ The ecologists, from Park on-
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 David B. Clark
wards, have made a major contribution to the study of community in
emphasizing the effect of the physical environment on social relation-
ships," and amongst more theoretically oriented writers, Tonnies goes
so far as to claim that *the metaphysical character of the clan, the
tribe, the village and town community is, so to speak, wedded to the
land in a lasting union.'^^ Though few today would adopt Tonnies's
view without many qualifications, it must be accepted that there has
been a certain neglect of the influence of place on community. Grow-
ing awareness of this fact has led to some effort to re-examine how,
for example, buildings of historic note, well known local landmarks,
traditional gathering places and so on become what Herbert calls 'fixes',
physical points identifiable as symbolic of a common life, past and
present. ^^
Nevertheless to argue that place influences community is a very
different matter from assuming that certain geographical units or areas
are synonymous with it. Stacey rightly points out that confusion has
arisen because the term community has been applied to places rang-
ing from the small neighbourhood to the entire nation. ^^ WiUiams,
for example, in his study of Gosforth, has a chapter on 'Community'
which obviously pitches the concept at the level of the village,^*
whilst Willmott calls his survey of Dagenham (with a population of
90,000 and described by the author as 'the biggest housing estate
in the world') The Evolution of a Community.^^ Homans's comments
on the New England settlement (population 1,000) he investigated
are very apt here: 'Because Hilltown still has a name, geographical
boundaries, and people who live within the boundaries, we assume
that it is still a community and therefore judge that it is rotten. It
would be wiser to see that it is no longer, except in the most trivial
sense, a community at all.'^^ It would thus seem quite pointless to
attempt to tie down the term community to any particular geographi-
cal entity.
Despite this there has remained an extraordinarily tenacious belief
that community is a phenomenon which can be physically engineered;
what Pahl calls the pursuit of the doctrine of 'architectural deter-
minism'." The later was especially prominent in relation to the vogue
for the so-called 'neighbourhood unit', originally conceived by Perry
in the late ipzos.^" Its popularity reached its height during the opti-
mistic era of post-war reconstruction—White at this time asserting
that 'all the evidence suggests that there are certain fairly well-defined
limits of size, population, and density within which neighbourliness
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 The Concept of Community: A Re-examination
is easily fostered, and outside which the community tends to dis-
integrate,'^® Unfortunately 'the evidence' does not, or at least no longer
continues to, support White, as those striving to create community
within neighbourhoods have found to their cost. Differences, even
relatively minor, of social class have confounded many such attempts
and even in very homogeneous areas residents have still proved very
reluctant to make more than superficial contact with community
facilities provided for their entertainment and edification. The con-
clusion reached by Morris and Mogey, that the main attractions of the
Berinsfield (Oxfordshire) community centre 'were undoubtedly the
jumble sales and the bingo drives',^" can hardly be said to be of great
inspiration to those concerned with the establishment of community
at any real depth, though this is not to underrate the value of such
activities for some people. Thus one must agree with Herbert after his
very thorough examination of the subject that 'in terms of a concept
which sees society as intricate and involved, the idea of the neighbour-
hood unit must be regarded as an over-simplification, to say the least',^^
and with Kuper, on a broader plain, that 'there is obviously no simple
mechanical determination of social life by the physical environment.'^^

Community as Social Activity

In recent years there has been a move to relate the investigation of
community to specific types of social activity, in part as a reaction
against the 'raw empiricism'" of those studies which, though informa-
tive and vivid in style, remain theoretically superficial (an approach
initially typified by the Lynds' first description of Middletown in the
I92os^*). Frankenberg, for example, has argued that a detailed des-
cription and analysis of 'dramatic occurrences' (special events, cere-
monials or customs) can reveal a great deal about communal life.^^
One of the few examples of a full examination of the dramatic
event occurs in Frankenberg's own book Village on the Border/^ in
which he describes at length the circumstances which led to football
being replaced by the local carnival as the external symbol of village
unity. Falling within the category of ceremonial (and at times custom),
Frankenberg suggests such dramatic occurrences as '(a) Ceremonials
surrounding individual and family life crises—such as christenings,
weddings and funerals and (b) reactions to individual tragedies such
as "whiprounds" after fire, fiood, and accident, (c) Perennial occurr-
ences such as Christmas, Easter, bank holidays, holidays in general,
elections and meetings, (d) Occasional celebrations such as Corona-
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 David B. Clark
tions, victory parades, etc.'^^
This approach to the study of community opens up a fresh and
interesting means of enquiry and may well provide a more penetrating
understanding of what is actually happening within the group, especi-
ally in regard to group attitudes and motives, than more traditional
methods allow. But there could be a tendency to lay too much stress
on actions witnessed or views expressed when group members are
obviously tense (dramatic event) or acting in accordance with com-
munal traditions (dramatic ceremonial or custom). The question
raised is the extent to which these occasions accurately represent the
'real' sentiments of the group. Social drama could well be just another
name for what Sumner calls 'conventionalization'. The latter 'creates
a set of conditions under which a thing may be tolerated which would
otherwise be disapproved and tabooed . . . This intervention of con-
ventionalization to remove cases from the usual domain of the mores
into a special field, where they can be protected and tolerated by codes
and standards modified in their favour, is of very great importance.
It accounts for many inconsistencies in the mores.'^^ The study of
dramatic occurrences could thus lead to a wholly misleading under-
standing of current and 'genuine' norms.
Two other major problems can be mentioned here. One is the
difficulty of deciding the criteria for the selection of the dramatic
occurrences studied. For example, Davies and Rees criticise Franken-
berg himself, in his study of Glynceiriog, for being too concerned with
football, the village carnival and local government when in fact the
chapel and its functions would be of at least equal importance to
Welshmen.^® The other difficulty is how such incidents, which are
often spontaneous and periods of intense activity, physical and verbal,
can be recorded with sufficient accuracy to stand up to detailed analy-
sis at a later date. Indeed all these factors taken together make it rather
hard to accept that 'the analysis of a cycle of dramatic incidents within
their historical and geographical setting seems . . . to be the way for-
ward for British community studies.'^"

Community as Social Structure

The study of community has perhaps most often been approached
via an examination of the social structure of the group, especial pro-
minence being given to the study of institutions and of the concepts
of role, status and social class. Typical here is Stacey's case-study of
Banbury, where social class was the key analytical tool, though the
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 The Concept of Community: A Re-examination
enquiry also revealed the two equally important categories of the
'traditional'and'non-traditional' resident. ^^ On a wider plane, Franken-
berg's survey of Communities in Britain concludes with a summary
of the main features of rural and urban life styles in dominantly
structural terms.^^
Those adopting the structural approach have been most prominent
in suggesting that the word 'community' be dropped altogether and
replaced with such a phrase as 'the local social system'.^^The latter
focuses attention on the 'social network as the meaningful arena for
social relationships'.'** Fully to understand this, Stacey argues, com-
munity studies should give pride of place to an examination of such
phenomena as the degree of inter-relation between institutions and
the amount of 'multiplex role playing',^'^ whilst Benson adds that men
can only be said to experience a common life 'to the extent that there
exists among them a consensus about the rules that define the various
roles that individuals can occupy.''"^
There is of course nothing wrong in all this so far as it goes. It is
true that those stressing structure (in contrast to those emphasising
social activity, are inclined to place community within a rather static
framework, but their approach is usually orderly, clear and descrip-
tively valuable. On the other hand, it does seem that a fundamental
question has been begged: can one by structural analysis alone come
to discover whether any particular social aggregate is more or less of
a community?
The major problem here is that so frequently community has, with-
out much thought, been taken as synonymous with certain broad
patterns of social relationships. Even the classic study of the theoreti-
cian Tonnies can at this point be called into question. Tonnes de-
scribes and analyses the social system by means of the ideal types
Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association)." Heberle
pinpoints the problem here when he writes, 'If one should, e.g., define
the family as a Gemeinschaft, the road to sociological understanding
would thereby be barred; it is the peculiar task of the sociologist to
find out how far the family in a concrete situation (e.g., the wage
earner's family in a great city) approaches more nearly to the type of
Gesellschaft than a family in another situation (e.g. on a farm).'^**
Tonnies, at least in his earlier writings, appears to fall into just this
trap. He so reifies his types that the distinct impression is left that on
the empirical level Gesellschaft excludes Gemeinschaft. For example,
Tonnies writes that 'as the town lives on within the city, elements of
401
 David B. Clark
the life in Gemeinschaft, as the only real form of life, persist within
the Gesellschaft, although lingering and decaying'.^® 'The entire cul-
ture', he states, 'has been transformed into a civilization of state and
Gesellschaft, and this tranrformation means the doom of culture it-
self if none of the scattered seeds remain alive and again bring forth
the essence and idea of Gemeinschaft, thus secretly fostering a new
culture amidst the decaying one.'*"
From Tonnies onwards there has been little attempt to understand
community as anything other than an exclusive property of the
Gemeinschaft type of social structure, ranging from Glynceiriog to
Bethnal Green. As a result community easily becomes a concept that
is historically dated—with all the consequent nostalgia—or culturally
conditioned.^^ If there is a real desire to get rid of the kind of socio-
logical sentimentalism often associated with Gemeinschaft than there
is an urgent need to look not only at the structural expression of com-
munity, which as noted begs many questions as to its intensity, but
at its essential nature. For Stacey to assert that 'our concern as socio-
logists is with social relationships'*^ is too simple. For whether those
studying the sociology of community like it or not, their work involves
them not only in an examination of social forms but in how people
regard them. Some writers forget, states Mann, that 'what is perhaps
one of the most important factors in the analysis of urbanism is the
distinction that must be made between the overall social structure and
the social structure as seen and felt by the individual.'*^ Any percep-
tive study of community, therefore, must take into account not only
the usual pattern of social behaviour as it appears outwardly, but the
attitudes of people towards the normative order as a whole.

Community as Sentiment
It is believed that the reinstatement of the concept of community
must begin where Maclver began half a century ago in his major work
on Community. He writes, 'Life is essentially and always communal
life. Every living thing is bom into community and owes its life to
community.'** Simpson, in another notable examination of the subject
a few years later, adds, 'Without the presence of community men
could not will associational relations.'*^ Here are initial definitions that
point in the direaion of a phenomenon that is universal and enduring.
But what is the essential nature of this phenomenon? Simpson con-
tinues : 'It should now be obvious that community is no circumscribed
sphere of social life, but rather the very life-blood of social life. Com-
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 The Concept of Community: A Re-examination
munity is not simply economiCj nor simply political, nor simply
territorial, nor simply visceral. Nor is it all these special elements added
together. Ultimately, it is a complex of conditioned emotions which
the individual feels towards the surrounding world and his fellows . . .
It is to human beings and their feelings, sentiments, reactions, that all
look for the fundamental roots of community.'**^ Or, as Maclver and
Page state more directly, 'Community is . . . sentiment.'^^ It is so
regarded in what follows.
There are other terms besides 'sentiment' which might be employed
to sum up the nature of community, but most lay too much stress
on the activity of the mind (such as 'attitude') or on the emotions
(such as 'feeling'). The word 'sentiment' seems to be the best available
to describe the phenomenon under consideration. It will be seen later
that all the relevant sentiments, out of the complex Simpson refers to
above, appear to converge into, and be subordinate to, two absolutely
basic ones.
It might be suggested that in treating community in this way a
psychological rather than a sociological point of view is being adopted.
This is partly true in that community sentiment is in one respect
amongst what Homans calls the various 'internal states of the human
body'.^** But this criticism reveals an artificial simplification of the em-
pirical situation and indeed Homans regarded 'sentiment' as an
essential concept for his own study of The Human Group. The psy-
chological and sociological aspects of the study of human behaviour
are for ever complementing each other and, in the field of community
studies, it is necessary to bring the two as close together as possible.
Merton's comments regarding the concept of anomie apply equally to
community; both need to be examined 'as subjectively experienced'
and 'as an objective condition of group life'.*^ Both facets of the whole
must be kept in mind if any investigation is to prove adequate.
There are of course dangers in this approach. As Klein notes in her
comments on the work of Mogey and of Stacey, one can easily con-
fuse the psychological and sociological levels of analysis.'^" But this
need not be so. It is quite possible to keep clearly in mind what
Maclver and Page term the 'psychological configuration' of com-
munity'^^—as they use it a corporate not an individualistic phenome-
non—whilst distinguishing this form from its more obviously socio-
logical expression through social activity and social struaure. In fact
a great deal more confusion seems to have arisen as a result of
researchers concentrating all their attention on the social expression
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 David B. Clark
of community without having first clearly defined its essential nature.

The Essential Elements of Community

The two fundamental communal elements of any social system are
a sense of solidarity and a sense of significance.
A sense of solidarity is a sentiment very much akin to what Maclver
and Page call 'we-feeling', which they define as 'the feeling that leads
men to identify themselves with others so that when they say "we"
there is no thought of distinction and when they say "ours" there is
no thought of division.'^^ Solidarity is by far the most commonly
accepted ingredient of community and it is this sentiment which
writers have in mind when they refer to social unity, togetherness,
social cohesion or a sense of belonging. It encompasses all those
sentiments which draw people together (sympathy, courtesy, gratitude,
trust and so on), a river into which many tributaries fiow. Solidarity
is a sentiment very highly prized especially in this country, and is
commended not only in many community studies but, for example,
in that series of post-war films typified by Whisky Galore, The Titfield
Thunderbolt, Passport to Pimlico and The Galloping Major.^^
Unfortunately preoccupation with solidarity has led to the neglect
of the second essential communal element: a sense of significance. The
latter is very similar to what Maclver and Page term 'role-feeling',
defined by them as 'the sense of place or station' experienced by group
members 'so that each person feels he has a role to play, his own
function to fulfil in the reciprocal exchanges of the social scene."'*
That significance must stand side by side with solidarity is emphasized
by Klein when she states, 'Not infrequently in practice people want a
show of appreciation more than they want affection.'^"^ Again signific-
ance is made up of a complex of subordinate sentiments, such as a
sense of achievement or a sense of fulfilment, all contributing to the
larger whole.
A search for further essential communal elements reveals only one
other possibility: a sense of security. Maclver and Page in fact include
this in their definition of community sentiment and call it 'dependency-
feeling'. They write, 'Closely associated with role-feeling is the individ-
ual's sense of dependence upon the community as a necessary condition
of his own life. This involves physical dependence, since his material
needs are satisfied within it, and a psychological dependence, since
community is the greater "home" that sustains him, embodying all that
is familiar at least, if not all that is congenial to his life."^*^ Two objec-
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 The Concept of Community: A Re-examination
tions arise here. On the one hand, it is by no means clear that physical
dependence always leads to a sense of solidarity; for example, prisoners
of war rarely feel attached to the enemy authorities who provide them
with food and shelter. As mentioned later, obligatory interaction does
little to increase any sense of belonging. On the other hand, a sense of
solidarity can be very strong even when, or indeed just because, a
group is materially or physically in very dire straits. No more telling
example of this can be quoted than the sense of solidarity shown by
the people of Biafra, many of them starving, during the Nigerian civil
war.^^ Such was their communal strength that vital relief supplies were
refused from 'unfriendly' countries. If social security, or 'psychological
dependence', as Mclver and Page call it, is considered, the association
with a sense of solidarity seems so close that a separate category is
uncalled for. As Goldman underlines in his comments on the basic
needs of children: 'Emotionally, a child needs to be secure, and the
roots of this need lie in the experience of love. A child therefore needs
to feel he belongs, first of all, to an intimate family, then to a com-
munity which cares for him.'^^ A sense of security is born out of a
sense of solidarity rather than vice versa.

Solidarity and Significance in Community Studies

The two essential components of community described above have
emerged as the result of an examination of a wide range of com-
munity studies. Here it is only possible to refer briefly to some of the
leading writers in this field amongst empiricists, ecologists or theoreti-
cians.
Of the empiricists, Jennings comes as near as any to recognizing
clearly what constitute the essential communal elements, perhaps be-
cause she herself worked for so long among the people of Barton Hill,
Bristol, about whom she writes. At the outset of her book she states
that 'the important question for the sociologist is not only that of
individual happiness, but even more that of the effects of change on
the maintenance of the social bond on which the very existence and
quality of society itself depends. What in the past has made individuals
and groups feel that they "belonged" and had a part to play?'^® In
these last few words Jennings at once puts her finger on the two funda-
mental components of communal life. These features are emphasized
throughout her book but it will perhaps be best to illustrate her under-
standing of the nature of community from her valuable summary.
In connection with solidarity, she writes that 'at the turn of the
405
 David B. Clark
twentieth century the inhabitants of the old (Barton Hill) area were
bound together in a local society which was unified by the twin factors
of place and class.'®" A self-contained and common place of residence
was the context of a sense of solidarity achieved through localized
social activity, extended kinship ties and strong links between neigh-
bours. At the same time 'the "working class" was a defined and recog-
nised entity with the solidarity induced by common interests and
aims.'"
A sense of significance was present because people in Barton Hill
felt that they counted. They were given the opportunity to choose the
site and type of house they liked, even if accommodation were rented;
they could achieve recognized status as skilled workers if they had the
desire; and virtually all could experience a sense of significance in in-
formal ways. Referring to the latter, Jennings notes that 'the racey
storyteller in the "local", the darts or football player, the key worker
in the mission or social club, the successful pigeon club member or
allotment-holder were all known outside their specialized field of
association. Within the streets, the careful housewife who had special
skills in cookery or as a dressmaker for her children, the good husband
with special abilities in house decoration and repairs, and the
organizers of street festivities or entertainments were accorded gener-
ous recognition. Prestige was attached to persons as such, and often
through them to their families also, rather than solely to income and
occupation, which formed only one element in the composite picture.'*^
In her conclusion Jennings writes that from all the factors mould-
ing the old area of Barton Hill there 'emerged a society in which
individuals counted (significance) and the social bond was strong
(solidarity) and found expression in the wider society. Such a com-
parison (of the way the old Barton Hill developed in relation to the
new estate at "Mossdene") offers hope for the future. Yet some new
factors seem to demand explicit recognition and purposive action if
the old ideal of individual significance, social imity (solidarity) and
effective democracy (significance) are to be given new and appropriate
forms of expression. First, the traditional ties with defined localities
may be increasingly threatened by the conquest of space and by the
fragmentation of interests and bonds (lack of soHdarity) resulting partly
from new types (^ economic organization. Secondly, there is a danger
that the individual may come to count for less (lack of significance) if
the tendency to large-scale organization and administration continues.
Thirdly, the growth of powerful and specialized and professionalized
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 The Concept of Community: A Re-examination
corporate bodies within the state may tend to make the man in the
street less able to play an effective part (lack of significance) in the
shaping of society. It may be that another age of discovery demands
a rethinking of the aims, machinery and functions of corporate society
in relation to the individual and to organized groups.'^^
The attempt of the classical ecologists to focus attention on the
physical and structural organization of life is not very closely related,
in their theoretical endeavours at least, to what are regarded here as
the communal elements of the social system. Park, however, does touch
on the importance of solidarity and significance when writing about
the level of human living he designates 'societal', and notes that society
'always includes something more than competitive co-operation and
its resulting economic interdependence. The existence of a society pre-
supposes a certain amount of solidarity, consensus, and common pur-
pose.'^* Referring especially to significance he adds: 'This world of
communication and of "distances", in which we all seek to maintain
some sort of privacy, personal dignity and poise, is a dynamic world,
and has an order and a character quite its own. In this social and moral
order the conception which each of us has of himself is limited by the
conception which every other individual, in the same limited world
of communication, has of himself, and of every other individual. The
consequence is—and this is true of any society—every individual finds
himself in a struggle for status: a struggle to preserve his personal
prestige, his point of view, and his self-respect. He is able to maintain
them, however, only to the extent that he can gain for himself the
recognition of everyone else whose estimate seems important; that
is to say the estimate of everyone else who is in his set or in his
society. From this struggle for status no philosophy of life has yet dis-
covered a refuge. The individual who is not concerned about his status
in some society is a hermit, even when his seclusion is a city crowd.
The individual whose conception of himself is not at all determined
by ± e conceptions that other persons have of him is probably in-
sane.'®^
On the whole the theoreticians have been more concerned with the
phenomenon of solidarity than significance, probably the consequence
of a certain preoccupation with the Gemeinschaft or folk type of
human grouping. Of their number the one who comes as near as any
to appreciating the need for both solidarity amongst and significance
for members of the social aggregate is Simpson, who underlines the
communal necessity of both major sentiments in relation to the quali-
407
 David B. Clark
ties of the primary group. He states that the problem facing man-
kind is that 'of communalizing those who are to conflict. That is a
large problem. It is the problem of carrying over the ideals of the
primary or face-to-face group which is most easily communalized, to
the larger groups, and ultimately to nations and international action.
The ideals of the primary groups are shaped by symbiotic behaviour,
the feeling of interdependence (solidarity), and the need for fulfil-
ment (significance; though it is doubtful whether Cooley really
stressed this aspect in connection with the primary group). There has
latterly been much discussion of the need for a return to primary
groups. But what is needed is a return to the ideals of the primary
group in such a shape and so adjusted as to be capable of application
to cosmopolitan conditions. Otherwise, a sort of return to the com-
munal womb is being urged, a nostalgia for the infantile."^*^ Simpson
again stresses the element of solidarity when he comments that 'in
community men's deepest desires for love, fellowship, understanding,
sympathy, solidarity, are realized.'*^'^
In connection with significance, Simpson argues that 'what men
are now failing to realize is that the individual must be made signifi-
cant in a new type of community."^^ 'An individual', he continues,
'becomes communally important either negatively, when his actions
are restricted in order that certain customs, conventions, and laws
may remain intact; positively when his labours are necessary to the
further vitality of other men. . . . Within community, the individual
is positively significant if the foundation upon which community rests
can remain firm through the interaction of individuals as responsible
human beings.'^^

The Relation Between Solidarity and Significance

The two essential components of community—solidarity and signi-
ficance—are closely linked. No person can feel a sense of belonging
to a group without thereby gaining some sense of significance. To the
outsider it may seem that in certain situations (as in a monastic order,
an army regiment or a totalitarian state) individuality is completely
lost in the whole. That this is by no means always the case is under-
lined by Klein when she quotes Zweig's discussion of the worker's
relation to his union: 'The mass-organization gives the worker his
individuality, his freedom, his self-esteem, his self-confidence. A
middle-class man has no such experience and cannot understand it; it
seems to him rather like a contradiction in terms. A worker does not
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 The Concept of Community: A Re-examination
lose his individuality in his trade-union; it is quite the other way
round. By identifying himself with the union he gains status and
strength in his own eyes and in everyone else's.'^"
In a similar manner no person can experience a sense of significance
without feeling some sense of solidarity with those who make this
possible. Klein writes, 'The individual's assurance of his worth de-
pends on group-membership.'^^ Whatever role is played some sense
of attachment to the rest of the cast is virtually inevitable.
This close relationship between solidarity and significance merely
emphasizes the fact that community, though made up of a complex
of sentiments, is a phenomenon which, however analyzed, must in the
end be treated as an entity.
Nonetheless, though numerous groups exist within which people
experience both a strong sense of solidarity and significance, it is not
true that these two essential elements of community are always present
to the same extent. There are numerous situations where the group
that provides members with a strong sense of solidarity does not give
them a sense of significance of the same intensity, and vice versa. For
example, some people discover a very strong degree of solidarity with-
in the nuclear family whilst not finding that it gives them the chance
to attain a fully adequate sense of significance. Some people derive a
very strong sense of significance from their work whilst not experienc-
ing a very strong sense of attachment to fellow workers. It is there-
fore crucial in any study of community that solidarity and significance
should be treated as analytically distinct phenomena and not be
assumed to vary in direct proportion to one another.
If it is accepted that a sense of solidarity and a sense of significance
are the two essential communal indicators, then the following work-
ing definition can be suggested: the strength of community within
any given group is determined by the degree to which its members
experience both a sense of solidarity and a sense of significance within
it.
Such a definition taken seriously means a considerable re-orientation
of approach to the study of community which has dominated the
scene for a number of decades. It means that, despite all the potential
dangers, what has deprecatingly been termed 'community-in-the-
mind'" must in fact be the springboard for any realistic examination
of the phenomenon. It is how the members of the group themselves
feel that is the basic concern. The investigator must not be misled be-
cause a particular group does not seem to him to be one in which he
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 David B. Clark
himself would experience a very strong sense of belonging or of
significance; it is how the participants view the situation that counts.
The point is stressed by Becker in a somewhat similar context. Out-
lining a sequence of types of social aggregate based on attitudes of
people to innovation and change, he states that 'a sacred society is one
that elicits from or imparts to its members, by means of sociation, an
unwillingness and/or inability to respond to the culturally new as the
new is defined by those members in terms of the society's existing
culture/^^ Just as the definition of what is 'new' must be determined
by the society under investigation, so it is with the intensity of solid-
arity or significance. The overt expression of these sentiments, verbally
or in other ways, especially when spontaneous, is a key indicator of the
strength of community present within the group. Gans's views are
pertinent here when he writes of the area he studied: 'If Levittowners
report that they find their community satisfying, as they do, their
opinion ought to be respected. Although the suburban critics insist
that these satisfactions are spurious and self-deceptive, they offer no
valid evidence, so that their charge only indicates their differing
standards for the good life.... The observer always sees more than
anyone else, if only because that is his job, but if he evaluates what he
alone sees, he must still do so by the standards of the people whom
he is observing.'^^

Communities of Interest
Investigation thus begins not with a special kind of locality, nor
with particular patterns of social activity, nor with certain types of
social relationships taken as synonymous with community, but begins
with community as sentiment. Because of this a good deal more
attention needs to be given to such phenomena as beliefs, values and
attitudes than has hitherto been the case.^^ For example, it is a note-
worthy feature of social life that strangers with religious beliefs
in common can experience what is undoubtedly a strong sense of
solidarity after only relatively short acquaintance. The importance of
attitudes, having considerable bearing on a person's sense of signi-
ficance, is stressed by Frankenberg when he distii^uishes between
'role-commitment and role-attachment',^^ the former being a role
accepted without deep feeling as something of a routine obligation,
the latter being a role played out with total concern and often enthus-
iasm.
To begin here—to attempt to stand first where people themselves
410
 The Concept of Community: A Re-examination
stand and to appreciate their sentiments and concerns—brings into
prominence what Pons calls 'communities of interest'"; those groups
which gather first and foremost because of shared beliefs, values and
concerns rather than because of proximity of residence or because of
established patterns of social relationships. The exploration of such
communities of interest is no soft option. As Maclver demonstrated
some years ago the classification of interests needs careful considera-
tion,^^ though he himself eventually reduced his earlier complex
analysis to two major interests, 'common' and 'like'.^® But such an
empirical starting point would give a new dimension to community
studies, though it must still be remembered that communities of
interest also reveal difEering intensities of community sentiment
according to the degree of solidarity and significance experienced by
participants.
To focus more attention on communities of interest would under-
score once and for all that man in modern society finds solidarity and
significance within numerous groups, none in itself self-suflBicient, but
many overlapping and interpenetrating one another. It would assist
in sorting out just what communities of interest, and for whom, were
contained within the locality, and which were found within wider
geographical contexts.*" It would reveal more clearly that community
is not being eclipsed but that its expression is shifting from a 'local'
to a 'cosmopolitan' form of activity and social relationship^.''^ Further-
more with communities of interest as the empirical springboard the
phenomenon of community fostered through secondary groupings
(such as the trades union, the professional association, the church
and the nation) or indirect contact (such as the mass media) takes on
a new importance. Community thus spontaneously engendered
amongst virtual strangers—as is often typical of the youth scene today
—gives added weight to the need for a new point of departure. At the
same time such an approach, by concentrating on and demonstrating
the variety and diversity of interest communities to which people be-
long, reveals with greater force how one community can come to
oppose another community and how, because the sentiments involved
are so powerful and so basic, often intense conflicts can

Other Indices of Community

The need to stand where people stand and the value of beginning
one's study of community by investigating interest groups and the
sentiments participants experience therein is not to argue that other
411
 David B. Clark
more general sociological indices are of no consequence. Much work
has already been done on what Merton termed, as noted earlier, the
objective conditions of group life and their relation to solidarity and
significance.
For example, referring to a sense of solidarity, Klein writes, 'The
more interaction, the more positive is the sentiment towards others
in the group and towards those who interact frequently in partic-
ular.'^^ The degree of interaction thus seems a useful index of the
intensity of solidarity existing among members of any given social
aggregate. But there are exceptions. One is that interaction which is
felt (note again the importance of sentiment) to be obligatory rarely
strengthens a sense of belonging.*** Another is the case 'where inter-
action does not give information about personalities . . . (or about) the
sentiments of other members.'^^ This may occur, for example, in a
work situation where people fail to talk much about themselves or their
families.
In relation to a sense of significance, Homans, putting the point
negatively, states that 'as the norms of a group decline in the degree
to which they are clear to, and held in common by, all members of
the group, so the ranking of members of the group will become less
definite.'^^ As ranking becomes less definite, so it becomes ever more
difficult for people 'to know where they stand' and to attain a sense
of significance.
The investigation of such indices must continue and where shown
to reveal the strength of solidarity and significance, or their weakness,
be fully employed. In this article, however, the point stressed is that
the investigation of community must begin where people are experi-
entially and not proceed on the assumption that patterns of social
activity, norms, roles and status systems can, unrelated to sentiments,
reveal the full or even the major part of the picture.

From Sociology to Ideology

The assumption, without very careful examination of how people
feel about their social situation, that particular kinds of social activity
or social relationships are synonymous with a very strong sense of
community has often led to the use of the word 'community' as an
ideological tool. To accept that the strength of community within any
given social aggregate can only be decided by the degree to which the
group members themselves experience both a sense of solidarity and
a sense of significance may be infuriating for social, political or re-
412
 The Concept of Community: A Re-examination
ligious reformers. But if this criterion is set aside in favour of what the
outside observer deems best for others, however altruistic his motives
may be, then it is not sociological but ethical, philosophical and theo-
logical judgments that are being made.^^ This is of course an area of
quite proper and indeed vital debate, for the 'quality' of community
life is something which concerns all of us, but here the sociologist as
sociologist withdraws. It is hoped that his contribution will then have
been to have shown where sociology ends and ideology begins.
London.

' M. Stacey: 'The Myth of Community Studies', British Journal of Socio-

logy, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1969, pp. 134-147.
2 G. A. Hillery: 'Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement', Rural
Sociology, Vol. 20, 1955.
^ Stacey: op. cit., p. 137.
"* R. E. Pahl: Patterns of Urban Life, Longmans, London, 1970, p. 107.
•'• L. Reissman: The Urban Process, The Free Press, New York, 1964.
** Pahl: op. cit., p. n o .
' R. M. Maclver and C. H. Page: Society, Macmillan, London, 1961,
p. 9.
^' W. M. Williams: A West Country Village: Ashworthy, Routledge and
Kegan Paul, London, 1963, p. xix.
^ R. E. Pahl: Urbs in Rure, London School of Economics Monograph,
London, 1964.
'° For example, R. E. Park: Human Communities, The Free Press, New
York,i952; E. W. Burgess (ed.): The Urban Community, University of
Chicago Press, 1926; L. Wirth: On Cities and Social Life, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964; and E. W. Burgess and D. J. Bogue (eds.):
Contributions to Urban Sociology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1964.
^1 F. Tonnies: Community and Association (translated and supplemented
by C. P. Loomis), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1955, p. 240.
^2 G. Herbert: 'The Neighbourhood Unit Principle and Organic Theory',
The Sociological Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1963, p. 202.
^•'' Stacey: op. cit., p. 135.
1 * W. M. Williams: Gosforth, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1956.
'•'' P. Willmott: The Evolution of a Community, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1963, p. 4.
"•' G. C. Homans: The Human Group, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1951, p. 367.
' ' Pahl: op. cit., 1970, p. 106.
 David B. Clark
1* C. Perry: 'The Neighbovirhood Unit', Neighbourhood and Community
Planning, Monograph i, Vol. 7 of Regional Survey of New York and its
Environs, 1929.
' ^ L. E. White: Community or Chaos, National Council of Social Service,
London, 1950, p. 41.
2" R. N. Morris and J. Mogey: The Sociology of Housing, Routledge and
Kegan Paul, London, 1965, p. 71.
2' Herbert: op. dt., p. 195.
22 L. Kuper et al.: Living in Towns, Cresset Press, London, 1953, p. 177.
2'' J. Madge: The Origins of Scientific Sociology, Tavistock, London,
1962, p. 130.
2^ R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd: Middletown, Constable, London, 1929.
-•'' R. Frankenberg: 'British Community Studies: Problems of Synthesis',
in M. Banton (ed.): The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, Tavi-
stock, London, 1966a, pp. 123-154.
2^ R. Frankenberg: Village on the Border, Cohen and West, London,
1957.
2' Frankenberg: loc. dt., 1966a, p. 146.
2« W. G. Sximner: Folkways, Dover Publications, New York, 1959, pp.
68 and 69.
'^ D. Jenkins et ah: Welsh Rural Communities, University of Wales,
Cardiff, i960, p. xi.
^" R. Frankenberg: Communities in Britain, Penguin, Harmondsworth,
1966b, p. 293.
•"'' M. Stacey: Tradition and Change, Oxford University Press, London,
i960.

•^- Frankenberg: op. dt., 1966b, pp. 286-292.

••'••' Stacey: op. dt., 1969, p. 135 ff; and Pahl: op. dt., 1970, pp. 107ff.
•'**' Pahl: op. cit., 1970, p. 105.
••'^ Stacey: op. dt., 1969, p. 142.
2^ J. Benson: 'The Concept of Community', in L. Bright and S. Clements
(eds.): The Committed Church, Darton, Longman and Todd, London, 1966,
p. 38.
•''" Tonnies: op. dt.
^^ R. Herberle: 'The Sociology of Ferdinand Tonnies', American Socio-
logical Review, Vol. 2, No. i, 1937, p. 15.
3® Tonnies: op. dt., p. 265.
•*" Ibid., p. 270.
414
 The Concept of Community: A Re-examination
4' Ca T. Stewart, Jnr.: 'The Urban-Rural Dichotomy: Concepts and
Uses', American Journal of Sociology, VoL 64, NOa 2, 1958, ppa I52-I58a In
relation to cioltural conditioning, Stewart argues that certain elements (e.ga
density of population) taken for granted as typical of rural-urban differences
in the Western World cannot be transposed without further thought to other
parts of the globe (e.g. the Far East).
42 Stacey: op. dt., 1969, p. 136.
'*•'' Pa Ha Mann: An Approach to Urban Sociology, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London, 1965, pa 113a
4^ Ra Ma Maclver: Community, Macmillan, London, 1924, pa 209a
4' Ga Simpson: Conflict and Community, Simpson, New York, 1937,
Pa Ila

*^ Ibid., ppa 97 and 71.

'^'^ Maclver and Page: op. dt., p. 291a
*** Homans: op. dt., ppa 37-38a
'*^ Ra Ka Merton: Social Theory and Social Structure (revised edition).
The Free Press, New York, 1957, Pa 165a
•'*" Ja Klein: Samples from English Cultures, Vol. i, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London, 1965, ppa 238 S. and ppa 306 ffa
'•' Maclver and Page: op. dt., p. 291a
•^2 Ibid., p. 293.
•^' Gluckman in Frankenberg: op. dt., 1957, p. 7.
•'^ Maclver and Page: op. dt., p. 293.
•''•' J. Klein: The Study of Groups, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1956, Pa 118 footnote.
•^" Maclver and Page: op. dt., p. 293.
•^' Ga Wilce: Together We Live, The Highway Press, London, 1972, pa 36a
•*'** Ra Goldman: Readiness for Religion, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1965, p. 67.
•'^ Ha Jennings: Societies in the Making, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1962, pp. 6-7.
«" Ibid., Pa 208a
'•' Ibid., Pa 209.
*•'- Ibid, p . 2l0a
••'•' Ibid., ppa 224-225 (the words in brackets have been added)a
•^* Park: op. dt., p. 181.
''•'' Ibid., Pa 176-177.
*'*' Simpson: op. cit., pa 39 (the words in brackets have been added)a
«" Ibid., p. 33.
 David B. Clark
«8 Ibid., p. 88.
^^ Ibid., p. ioi.
^^ Klein: op. cit., 1965, p. 206.
''^ J. Klein: Working with Groups, Hutchinson, London, 1963, p. 57.
^2 Pahl: op. cit., 1970, p. 102.
^••^ H. Becker: 'Sacred and Secular Societies', Social Forces, Vol. 28, No. 4,
1950, p. 363.
^* H. J. Gans: The Levittowners, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London,
1967, p. xxvi.
''-"' For a useful introduction to this aspect of the subject see T. M. Mills:
The Sociology of Small Groups, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1967.
76
Frankenberg: op. cit., 1966b, p. 242.
^^ V. Pons: 'The Community in Modern Society', in P. Worsley (ed.):
Introducing Sociology, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1970, p. 271.
'"^ Maclver: op. cit., p. 108.
^^ Maclver and Page: op. cit., p. 32.
**" D. B. Clark: Community and a Suburban Village, University of Shef-
field, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1969, Chapters III, VII (10) and VIII (10).
81 See Merton: op. cit., pp. 387-420. Also D. B. Qark: 'Local and Cosmo-
politan Aspects of Religious Activity in a Northern Suburb', in D. Martin
and M. Hill (eds.): A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, Vol. 3,
S.C.M. Press, London, 1970, pp. 45-64.
**^ See the valuable discussion of 'communal' and 'non-communal' conflict
in Simpson: op. cit.
**•' Klein: op. cit., 1956, p. 106.
^'^ See Klein: op. cit., 1965, p. 155.
**•' Klein: op. cit., 1956.
^^ Homans: op. cit., p. 365.
^^ On the latent ideology behind community development see M. J. Hill:
'Community Concepts and Applications', New Community, Vol. i. No. 2,
1972, pp. 106-111. On aspects of community in relation to theology see D. B.
Clark: 'Commtonity, Membership and the Church', in J. Kent and R. Murray
(eds.): Membership and Intercommunion: A Downside Symposium, Darton,
Longman and Todd, London, 1973-

416