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2.semester 2-2022

calcutta university question paper 20202

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31 views9 pages

2.semester 2-2022

calcutta university question paper 20202

Uploaded by

janasayantan54
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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(CC- ‘S(2nd Sm.)-Economl 2022 ECONOMICS Paper : VI (CC 6) (Microeconomics 11) Full Marks : 40, The figures in the margin indicate full marks. Candidates are required to give their answers in their own words as far as practicable. ‘Answer question no. Land any two other questions. AB Three oligopolists operate in a market with inverse demand P(Q) = a ~ Q, where O= 41 + G2 * 4 ‘Assume that the cost of firm i is C, (g,) = c9, The firms choose their quantities as follows : (1) firm 1 choose q, 2 0; (2) firms 2 and 3 observe q, and then choose their own outputs simultaneously, What is the subgame perfect outcome? How would the outcome change if all three operated simultaneously? Clearly explain who has an advantage in each case. 10 Or, (6) Suppose an employer has to offer a job contract to a worker for a project which may yield a high etm (Rjy~ 200) or a Tow return (R= 50). It yields a high return with probability 0.6 ifthe worker puts in high effort (e = 2) and a low return with probability 0.6 if the worker puts in low effort wages), derive the (e= 1). If the worker’s utility function is given by uC, €)= vw—(e - 2)Qv: optimal contract offered when (i) the effort is observed and (i) the effort level isn't observable and the employer wants to elicit high effort. Compare the two situations. 446 Lo Differentiate between (i) static and dynamic games (fi) dynamic games of perfect information and dynamic games of imperfect information (fii) games of complete information and games of incomplete information. (b) Find the backwards induction outcome and the Nash equilibrium of the following game. Explain clearly the difference between strategy and action in this case. GHQ+4+3) a (0,2) A ae 4, b (3,3) 7 —— Please Turn Over Q) ;plain non credible threats and promises. Consider the following simultaneous move game with 2 unique Nash equilibrium. If the game is repeated for two stages, fnd the SPIYE. Can any credible threat or promise be used to obtain the payoff (9, 9) in the first stage? Explain your answer. Player IL Ne C Nc[ 2,2 [10,0 c [o,10 [9,9 (gf Tethis came is repeated for infinite periods witha trigger strategy and a discount rate S, under what jireumstances may (C,C) be attained? GH4e142)45 he fa) How would you represent a Bayesian game in the normal form? In this context, explain the fheepts of the type of a player and the belief. ‘Suppose there are 2 firms in the Coumot duopoly model. Let g; be the quantity produced by the ith firm, such that = 9, + 2. Let P be the market clearing price such that P(Q) = a ~ 0 (assuming

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