Middle East and Central Asia WB 2023
Middle East and Central Asia WB 2023
REGIONAL
ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
MIDDLE EAST AND
CENTRAL ASIA
Safeguarding
Macroeconomic Stability
amid Continued Uncertainty
2023
MAY
World Economic and Financial Surveys
REGIONAL
ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
MIDDLE EAST AND
CENTRAL ASIA
Safeguarding
Macroeconomic Stability
amid Continued Uncertainty
2023
MAY
ii REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Middle East and Central Asia
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
IMF Library
The Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia is published twice a year, in the spring and
fall, to review developments in the Middle East and Central Asia. Both projections and policy consider-
ations are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,
or IMF Management.
Contents
Acknowledgments.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Country Groupings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
1. Regional Developments and Economic Outlook: Safeguarding Macroeconomic Stability amid Continued
Uncertainty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1. Uncertain Global Prospects amid Increased Financial Stability Risks…. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2. Middle East and North Africa and Pakistan: Muddling through amid Headwinds…. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3. Caucasus and Central Asia: One Year into the War, Short-Term Benefits with Longer-Term Risks. . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4. ME&CA Outlook: Downside Risks Remain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5. Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
References.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2. Monetary Policy: Where Does the Middle East and Central Asia Stand?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1. Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2. Monetary Policy Instruments and Recent Actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3. Assessing the Monetary Policy Stance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4. The Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism in ME&CA.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5. Policy Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
References.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
BOXES
1.1. The Growing Financial Footprint of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Middle East and North Africa and
Pakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2. Unexpected Spillovers from the War in Ukraine amid Heightened Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3. The Impact of Global Financial Turmoil on the Middle East and Central Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
FIGURES
Figure 1.1. MENA: Real GDP Growth, 2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 1.2. MENA: Headline Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Figure 1.3. MENA: Change in Primary Balance Excluding Grants, 2021–22. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 1.4. MENA: Contributions to Changes in Gross Public Debt.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 1.5. MENA: Change in Spreads since October 2022 and Bond Yields. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 1.6. MENA: Real GDP Growth, 2022–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 1.7. MENA: Cumulative Contributions to Changes in Gross Public Debt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 1.8. Current Account Components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Figure 1.9. Real GDP Growth, 2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Figure 1.10. Wages, Credit, and Depreciation, 2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Figure 1.11. Change in Primary Balance, 2021–22.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Figure 1.12. CCA: Real GDP Growth, 2022–23. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Box Figure 1.1.1. MENA and Pakistan: Inward Direct Investment Position. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Box Figure 1.1.2. MENA and Pakistan: Remittances: Main Sources and Recipients, 2021. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Box Figure 1.2.1. CCA: Nonresident Deposits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Box Figure 1.2.2. CCA: Trade with Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Box Figure 1.3.1. Equity Markets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Figure 2.1. ME&CA Central Banks’ Instruments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Figure 2.2. ME&CA: Change in Policy Interest Rates and Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Figure 2.3. Central Banks’ Net Claims on Central Government and Claims on
Public Nonfinancial Corporations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Figure 2.4. Nominal Policy Interest Rates.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 2.5. Difference between Actual and Rule-Based Policy Interest Rate Changes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Figure 2.6. ME&CA: Financial Conditions Indices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure 2.7. Peak Effect of a 100 bps Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock on Inflation, Real GDP, and the
Exchange Rate in ME&CA Countries.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Figure 2.8. Peak Effect of a 100 bps Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock on Inflation in ME&CA Countries. 27
Figure 2.9. Impact of Monetary Policy Tightening on Effective Interest Rates and Credit Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Figure 2.10. Estimated Impacts of Higher Policy Rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
TABLES
ME&CA: Selected Economic Indicators, 2000–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
MENA: Selected Economic Indicators, 2000–24.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
CCA: Selected Economic Indicators, 2000–24.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Acknowledgments
The Middle East and Central Asia Regional Economic Outlook is prepared each spring and fall by the IMF’s
Middle East and Central Asia Department (MCD). The report’s analysis and projections form integral elements of
the department’s surveillance of economic developments and policies in member countries. It draws primarily
on information gathered by MCD staff through consultations with member countries.
The analysis in this Regional Economic Outlook was coordinated under the general supervision of Jihad Azour
(MCD Director). The project was directed by Taline Koranchelian (Deputy Director, MCD), S. Pelin Berkmen
(Chief, MCD Regional Analytics and Strategy Division), Yasser Abdih (Deputy Chief, MCD Regional Analytics and
Strategy Division), and Cesar Serra (Deputy Chief, MCD Regional Analytics and Strategy Division).
The primary contributors to this report were Will Abel, Mohamed Belkhir, Olivier Bizimana, Vizhdan Boranova,
Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu, Filippo Gori, Bashar Hlayhel, Thomas Kroen, Troy Matheson, Jeta Menkulasi, Christine
Richmond, and Sahra Sakha.
Vizhdan Boranova and Roy Randen compiled the statistical appendix and managed the database. Research
assistance was provided by Azhin Ihsan Abdulkarim, Roy Randen, and Subi Velkumar.
Bronwen Brown edited the report. Cheryl Toksoz led COM’s editorial team and managed report production in
collaboration with Lorraine Coffey. Gintare Gedrimaite provided production support. Mohamed Belkhir, Kady
Synthia Keita, Thomas Kroen, Nia Sharashidze reviewed the translations and collaborated on the content with
Noha ElShalkany (Arabic), Benjamin Corbel, Jean-Yves Lestienne, Monica Nepote-Cit (French), and Alexandra
Akchurin and Mikhail Surin (Russian), with coordination support from Tine Levine (Translation Coordination
Centre)—all from Language Services, Corporate Services and Facilities Department.
Country Groupings
The May 2023 Regional Economic Outlook (REO): Middle East and Central Asia covers countries and territories
in the Middle East and Central Asia Department (MCD) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) referred to as
ME&CA countries and territories. It provides a broad overview of recent economic developments and prospects
and policy issues for the medium term. To facilitate the analysis, the 32 ME&CA countries and territories covered
in this report are divided into three (nonoverlapping) groups, based on export earnings and level of develop-
ment: (1) Oil Exporters (OE), (2) Emerging Market and Middle-Income Countries (EM&MI); and (3) Low-Income
Developing Countries (LIC). Additional analytical and regional groups provide more granular breakdown for
analysis and continuity. The country and analytical group acronyms and abbreviations used in some tables and
figures are included in parentheses.
ME&CA OE include Algeria (ALG), Azerbaijan (AZE), Bahrain (BHR), the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRN), Iraq (IRQ),
Kazakhstan (KAZ), Kuwait (KWT), Libya (LBY), Oman (OMN), Qatar (QAT), Saudi Arabia (SAU), Turkmenistan
(TKM), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
ME&CA EM&MI include Armenia (ARM), Egypt (EGY), Georgia (GEO), Jordan (JOR), Lebanon (LBN), Morocco
(MAR), Pakistan (PAK), Syrian Arab Republic (SYR), Tunisia (TUN), and the West Bank and Gaza (WBG).
ME&CA LIC include Afghanistan (AFG), Djibouti (DJI), the Kyrgyz Republic (KGZ), Mauritania (MRT), Somalia
(SOM), Sudan (SDN), Tajikistan (TJK), Uzbekistan (UZB), and Yemen (YEM).
Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
CCA OI include Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) includes Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
MENA OE include Algeria, Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates.
MENA OI include Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab
Republic, Tunisia, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
MENA EM&MI include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and the West Bank
and Gaza.
Arab World includes Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, the
West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
Arab World OE include Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates.
The Non-GCC oil-exporting countries are Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, and Libya.
North Africa countries include Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia.
Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) include Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, the
Syrian Arab Republic, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
Conflict-affected countries include Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Yemen.
In tables, ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and 0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor discrep-
ancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.
An en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2011–12 or January–June) indicates the years or months
covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between years or months
(for example, 2011/12) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY (for example, FY 2012).
“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
“Basis points (bps)” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to
¼ of 1 percentage point).
As used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as
understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are
not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.
The boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information shown on the maps do not imply, on the part
of the International Monetary Fund, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or
acceptance of such boundaries.
1
Simple average of prices of U.K. Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil.
Despite some easing of headline inflation in the last months of 2022, core inflation has remained persistently
high. The moderation in global inflation is partly attributable to declining commodity prices—particularly for
energy—but also to the sharp and synchronized monetary policy tightening since last year, which has started
to dampen demand and contain price pressures. Average petroleum spot prices are estimated at $74.20 per
barrel in 2023 and $70 in 2024 (down from $85.50 and $80.20, respectively, in October 2022). Oil futures curves
point to prices decreasing toward $62.70 by 2028. While food commodity prices are expected to decline by 4.9
percent in 2023 and 2.5 percent in 2024 (compared with October’s forecast of declines of 5.8 and 2.0 percent,
respectively), they are expected to remain well above pre-pandemic levels.
1
Prepared by Olivier Bizimana (lead), Filippo Gori, Jeta Menkulasi (lead), and Sahra Sakha with excellent research assistance from Roy
Randen and Subi Velkumar.
2
This report does not include the April 2023 OPEC+ oil production cuts.
Figure 1.1. MENA: Real GDP Growth, 2022 1.2. Middle East and North
(Percent change, year over year)
Africa and Pakistan: Muddling
10
Oct. 2022 WEO
Revision
through amid Headwinds
8 Apr. 2023 WEO
Economic activity proved resilient last year despite
6 a large negative terms-of-trade shock, increased
4
food insecurity, tight financing conditions and
debt vulnerabilities in most emerging market and
2 middle-income economies (EM&MIs), and high
volatility in energy prices. However, the MENA
0
economies and Pakistan are expected to go through
–2 a soft patch this year, reflecting tight policies in
many countries to restore macroeconomic stability,
–4
OPEC+-related curbs in oil production, and the
WBG
JOR
TUN
MAR
MRT
DJI
SOM
YEM
SDN
SAU
KWT
IRQ
UAE
OMN
QAT
BHR
ALG
IRN
EGY
Several factors explain the relative strength of domestic demand. Tourism rebounded, and hotel occupancy
rates recovered, surpassing their pre-pandemic levels in many countries (Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia).
Remittance flows remained strong in mid-2022 in most EM&MIs (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan). Lending to
the private sector (nonfinancial firms and households) continued to expand in real terms in some EM&MIs, with
double-digit growth in some countries (approximately 10 percent in Egypt), partly reflecting the prevalence
of subsidized lending initiatives in the second half of 2022. Labor market conditions stopped deteriorating in
2022, although structural factors, such as labor and product market rigidities (October 2021 Regional Economic
Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia) hampered a meaningful recovery, especially in EM&MIs. Employment
growth in EM&MIs remained lackluster in the second half (Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia) but continued to rise at a
healthy pace in GCC countries (Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia), partly reflecting rebounding migrant employment
(Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia). Unemployment rates inched up or remained broadly steady in most EM&MIs,
staying above pre-pandemic levels in many countries in late 2022 (Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia).
50
40
30
20
10
0
PAK EGY TUN MAR JOR WBG MRT DJI IRN ALG IRQ QAT SAU KWT OMN
EM&MI LIC OE
Inflationary Pressures Remain Elevated Despite Tentative Signs of Plateauing for Oil Exporters
Headline inflation showed signs of peaking at the end of 2022, although it remains persistently high for EM&MIs
and LICs (Figure 1.2). Headline and core inflation in many oil-exporting countries (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia) remain relatively lower than elsewhere—as subsidies and caps on certain products, the
strengthening of the US dollar (to which many of the countries peg their currencies), and limited share of food
in the consumer price index basket have helped to offset imported inflationary pressures—and appear to have
peaked in the last months of 2022. By contrast, headline inflation continued trending upward in most EM&MIs
(Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia, but not Jordan because of its peg to the US dollar and temporary fuel
subsidies), partly reflecting the impact of past exchange rate depreciations and persistently elevated food
prices, but also broadening price pressures (including on services) as underscored by the rise in core inflation
amid loose monetary policy (Egypt, Pakistan, Tunisia).
Fiscal positions in the region were mixed. For GCC countries, non-oil primary balances (as a percentage of
non-oil GDP) remained broadly unchanged in 2022 relative to 2021 (Figure 1.3). Despite a substantial increase
in oil revenues (about 4 percentage points of GDP on average), primary current expenditures remained broadly
stable, indicating that most countries avoided procyclical spending (except for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, entirely
reflecting higher capital expenditures). By contrast, non-GCC oil exporters (Iraq, Libya) ran a procyclical fiscal
policy as in the past, with a significant deterioration in the non-oil primary balance. Overall, oil exporters have
Figure 1.3. MENA: Change in Primary Balance Figure 1.4. MENA: Contributions to Changes in
Excluding Grants, 2021–22 Gross Public Debt
(Percent of GDP; non-oil balances for oil exporters) (Percent of GDP)
15 Revenue excl. grants Primary current expenditure 20 Interest rate Inflation
Capital expenditure Primary balance excl. grants Real growth Primary deficit excl. grants
15
10
10
5 5
0
0
–5
–5 –10
–15
–10 Grants Residual
–20 FX depreciation Gross debt change
–15 –25
2022 2022 2022 2022 2022
DJI
JOR
MAR
MRT
SOM
BHR
OMN
QAT
UAE
SAU
KWT
ALG
TUN
EGY
YEM
IRN
IRQ
SDN
increased their buffers, as evidenced by improved fiscal balances in 2022. Some countries repaid public debt
(Kuwait, Oman), while others raised their international reserves or assets, including in their sovereign wealth
funds. For oil importers, primary fiscal deficits (excluding grants) improved on average in most MENA EM&MIs
(except for Egypt) in 2022 relative to 2021, reflecting higher tax revenues partly offset by the policy response
to mitigate the impact of rising commodity prices, while interest expenses remained broadly stable (about 4
percent of GDP on average). By contrast, Pakistan undertook a sizable fiscal expansion. In LICs, primary fiscal
positions deteriorated in most countries because of higher commodity prices.
Higher inflation was the main factor in containing public debt in most MENA EM&MIs and Pakistan in 2022
(Figure 1.4). Debt ratios declined slightly in Egypt and Jordan as higher nominal GDP growth more than offset
interest costs. By contrast, public debt-to-GDP ratios continued to rise in Pakistan and Tunisia, reflecting the
combination of still-large overall fiscal deficits and the impact of exchange rate depreciations, offsetting the
eroding effect of high inflation.
LBN
TUN
MAR
JOR
KWT
SAU
UAE
QAT
BHR
OMN
EMBIG
EGY
PAK
to 4.6 percent of GDP), reflecting rising import
bills because of higher commodity prices. MENAP OI GCC
The relatively stable current account deficit
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.
in LICs (9 percent of GDP on average in 2022) Note: Government bond yields are calculated as the difference
reflects improvements in Sudan (because of between EMBIG spreads and the 10-year US Treasury bond yield.
Country abbreviations are International Organization for Standardiza-
a compression of imports), which was offset tion country codes. EMBIG = Emerging Market Bond Index Global;
by deteriorations elsewhere. By contrast, oil GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council; MENAP = Middle East, North Africa,
Afghanistan, Pakistan; OI = oil importer.
exporters registered large current account
surpluses amid high hydrocarbon prices.
The slight easing of financial pressures across the MENA region and Pakistan since October 2022 was reversed
by the tightening of global financial conditions in March amid global banking turmoil. However, strong differ-
entiation remains across the risk spectrum. Sovereign bond spreads have widened, and borrowing costs have
increased sharply on net in many EM&MIs (Lebanon, Pakistan, Tunisia) relative to October 2022 (Figure 1.5). By
contrast, despite a widening in the wake of the banking turmoil, spreads in Jordan and Morocco are still lower
than in October 2022, in line with emerging markets more broadly. Overall, government bond yields across the
region are higher than at the end of 2021 (by about 130 to 3,000 basis points). Capital flows had reversed even
before the recent financial turmoil, with portfolio fund inflows to the MENA region and Pakistan reaching $1.2
billion in the first two months of 2023 (after a record $4.5 billion in outflows in 2022). Except for Morocco and
Jordan, which issued $2.5 billion and $1.25 billion, respectively, the region’s EM&MIs did not take advantage of
the respite in the Eurobond market in early 2023 like other emerging market economies (see April 2023 Global
Financial Stability Report). Egypt also issued $1.5 billion sukuks in late February. Pressures on exchange rates
and international reserves remain significant, with sharp depreciations in some EM&MIs (Egypt, Pakistan) since
October 2022. However, they have receded modestly in others (especially Morocco, which benefited from a
two-year Flexible Credit Line arrangement in April).
Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, more than half of Yemen’s population (about 19 million people)
and one-third of Somalia’s (about 6 million people) are estimated to have experienced acute food insecurity
in 2022.
Elevated Fiscal and External Vulnerabilities for EM&MIs, Solid Buffers for Most Oil Exporters
Fiscal positions are expected to improve across the region over the next two years and the medium term as
further consolidation measures are required to lower elevated public debt levels, especially in EM&MIs.
Most oil exporters are expected to continue consolidating their public finances. However, some countries will
remain highly exposed to oil price volatility and may switch to overall fiscal deficits over the medium term as their
breakeven fiscal prices are projected to be above
the April 2023 World Economic Outlook oil price
forecasts by 2025 (Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq). Figure 1.7. MENA: Cumulative Contributions to
Changes in Gross Public Debt
MENA EM&MIs (especially Egypt, Jordan, and (Percent of GDP)
Tunisia) and Pakistan are expected to undertake
80 Interest rate Inflation Real growth
meaningful fiscal consolidation, including subsidy Primary deficit Residual Gross debt change
reforms (Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia), with 60 excl. grants
primary fiscal deficits projected to decline by about
40
3 percentage points of GDP on average between
2022 and 2025, in the context of IMF-supported 20
programs for some countries (Egypt, Pakistan)
0
or announced programs (Tunisia). However,
tighter financial conditions will partly offset this –20
fiscal effort, with interest expenses for EM&MIs –40
projected to increase by about 1 percentage point
of GDP on average over the same period. Overall, –60
public debt-to-GDP ratios should decline in the –80
medium term in most EM&MIs, further reflecting
2016–19
2022–25
2016–19
2022–25
2016–19
2022–25
2016–19
2022–25
2016–19
2022–25
Public gross financing needs are forecast to decrease slightly from about $520 billion over 2021–22 to about
$470 billion over 2023–24, reflecting lower primary deficits and relatively smaller domestic amortization that will
offset higher interest payments. These still-high financing needs for EM&MIs are expected to be covered mainly
through domestic bank financing (except in Tunisia); external financing should contribute a small portion (about
12 percent of total sources on average). The continued reliance on domestic financing will risk exacerbating the
sovereign-bank nexus further, given the very high exposure of banks to sovereign debt in some MENA EM&MIs
and Pakistan (more than 50 percent of bank assets at the end of 2022).
Oil exporters’ current account surpluses are set to decline by about $250 billion (about 8 percentage points of
GDP) between 2022 and 2024, reflecting lower hydrocarbon output and prices. Still, they will remain relatively
large at about 4.7 percent of GDP in 2024. By contrast, lower commodity prices, rebounding tourism, resilient
remittances, and fiscal consolidation are expected to narrow the current account deficits for MENA EM&MIs
from 5.1 percent of GDP in 2022 to about 4 percent of GDP in 2024 on average. LICs’ aggregate current account
deficit is projected to widen from 9 percent of GDP in 2022 to about 11 percent of GDP in 2023, mainly reflecting
a slump in Yemen’s goods exports (following attacks on oil export facilities in October 2022) and normalization
in Sudan’s imports (after last year’s compression).
External vulnerabilities remain elevated in the region’s EM&MIs, underscored by large current account deficits
and dwindling foreign exchange reserves in some countries in 2022. External financing needs for MENA EM&MIs
and Pakistan are projected to stay large, though declining from about $132 billion in 2022 to $123 billion in 2023
(about 212 percent and 171 percent of gross international reserves, respectively). With many EM&MIs facing
reduced access to international markets because of high public debt levels and other domestic vulnerabilities,
GCC governments have stepped in to meet some of these external financing needs, including through direct
budget and balance of payment supports, grants, loans, and foreign direct investment (Box 1.1).
1.3. Caucasus and Central Asia: One Year into the War,
Short-Term Benefits with Longer-Term Risks
Recent developments in CCA countries reflect two parallel currents: a continued post-pandemic rebound and
spillovers from the war in Ukraine, including its impact on global commodity prices. A milder-than-expected
contraction of the Russian economy and large inflows of income, capital, and migrants from Russia to neigh-
boring countries and increased transit trade affected growth positively in 2022. Higher energy commodity prices
contributed positively to oil-exporting countries’ external balances. A better-than-expected harvest in Russia also
contributed to sustained food imports, mitigating food security concerns. However, given their high share of
food imports from Russia, the ruble appreciation has generated substantial imported food inflation in most CCA
countries. Overall, inflation remained in the double digits because of elevated global commodity prices and wage
pressures. Growth in 2023 is expected to slow as the spillovers of 2022 subside. Nonetheless, the war has intro-
duced immense uncertainty to the economic outlook. Given the small relative size of recipient CCA economies,
a reversal of inflows, worse-than-projected Russian growth, supply chain disruptions, or lower remittances could
imply a negative shock to CCA economies down the road.
Figure 1.8. Current Account Components Figure 1.9. Real GDP Growth, 2022
(Percent of GDP; 2022:Q1–Q3 year-over-year change) (Percent change, year over year)
25 14
Goods trade Apr. 2022 growth
Services Oct. 2022 revision
20 Income 12 Jan. 2023 revision
CA (2022–21) Actual growth
15 10
10 8
5 6
0 4
–5 2
–10 0
–15 –2
AZE UZB KAZ GEO TJK ARM ARM GEO TJK KGZ UZB AZE KAZ TKM
Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
Note: Country abbreviations are International Organization for Note: Country abbreviations are International Organization for
Standardization country codes. CA = current account. Standardization country codes.
rather than lending in foreign exchange domestically (Armenia, Georgia) to hedge against foreign exchange
risks if sudden reversals were to occur. However, net foreign direct investment inflows rose across the region by
about 1 percentage point of GDP on average from 2021, more than offsetting portfolio outflows.
CCA economies grew by 4.8 percent in 2022, with growth rates ranging from 12.6 percent in Armenia to 3.2
percent in Kazakhstan (reflecting oil production disruptions) and 1.8 percent in Turkmenistan (Figure 1.9). In
most cases, growth was spurred by sharply higher private transfers and migrant inflows from Russia. A continued
rebound in post-pandemic tourism (Armenia, Georgia) supported exports, whereas real wage growth (Armenia,
Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan) supported domestic demand. Robust growth led to a sharp reduction
in unemployment rates in many countries, but unemployment remained high in Armenia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan
partly for structural reasons.
While benefiting from the decline in global food and energy prices, the slowdown in inflation observed in
Armenia and Georgia also reflects currency appreciation and moderate private credit growth as the transmis-
sion of tighter monetary policy and macroprudential measures started to take hold. However, core inflation is
proving more persistent, reflecting strong domestic demand and rising rental prices because of migrant inflows.
Similarly, the sharp disinflation in Tajikistan reflects currency appreciation, tight monetary policy, and other
measures such as the release of strategic food reserves, a 3 percentage point reduction in the value-added tax
rate, and strong domestic agricultural production.
The continued rise in inflation in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic and stubborn inflation in Azerbaijan is
broad-based, with a significant imported inflation component, reflecting the high share of imports from Russia
and 20–30 percent depreciation versus the ruble in 2022 (Figure 1.10). Other factors include rapid wage growth
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic), demand pressures from migrants from Russia (the Kyrgyz
Figure 1.10. Wages, Credit, and Depreciation, Figure 1.11. Change in Primary Balance, 2021–22
2022 (Percent of GDP; non-oil balances for oil exporters)
30 6
Nominal wage growth
Depreciation versus the ruble
25 Nominal private credit growth 5
Inflation
20 4
15 3
2
10
1
5
0
0
–1
–5
–2
–10 AZE KAZ GEO ARM UZB KGZ TJK
KAZ KGZ AZE GEO UZB ARM TJK
OE EM&MI LIC
Sources: Information Notice System database; and IMF staff Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
calculations. Note: Country abbreviations are International Organization for
Note: Country abbreviations are International Organization for Standardization country codes. EM&MI = emerging market and
Standardization country codes. middle-income economies; LIC = low-income country; OE = oil
exporter.
Republic), strong consumer lending despite substan-
tial monetary tightening (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan), and
import supply-chain disruptions (Kazakhstan).
Wages are a key driver of CCA inflation dynamics. Nominal wage growth has surpassed inflation in most
countries, pointing to potential price-wage spirals, which would increase inflation persistency and complicate
monetary policy. Empirical estimates suggest that wage rises have a persistent impact on core inflation in CCA
countries, with about a 50 percent pass-through peaking at 11 quarters following the shock, implying continued
inflationary pressure.3
In response to continued inflationary pressures, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan have tightened monetary
policy further since August 2022 by raising policy rates. By contrast, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan lowered rates—Tajikistan after a decline in inflation—and others remained on hold. The monetary
stance is assessed to be appropriately tight or neutral in most CCA countries (Chapter 2).
3
Staff estimates refer to a panel vector autoregression with two endogenous variables (wages and core consumer price index inflation)
and one exogenous variable (employment). Identification is recursive with the following order: wages and core consumer price index.
Countries included are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan. The panel is unbalanced, and data start
from 2015 at a quarterly frequency.
CCA Outlook
A range of global and domestic factors—notably projected growth in main trading partners (including Russia) and
private transfers and migrant inflows from Russia—shape the outlook for CCA countries. Other factors include
faster monetary tightening in advanced economies, the lagged impact of domestic tightening, and the decline in
global energy prices.
GDP growth is projected to decelerate to 4.2 percent in 2023 before a slight rebound to 4.5 percent in 2024. The
deceleration in 2023, expected to be sharp in Armenia and Georgia, reflects the decline in the initial spillovers
from the war in Ukraine (Figure 1.12). The projected slowdown in LICs reflects easing remittance flows amid
slowing gold and agricultural production. Similarly, non-oil activity is projected to decelerate in oil exporters
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan) as domestic demand cools. Nonetheless, overall growth in Kazakhstan is expected to
accelerate to 4.3 percent from 3.2 percent in 2022 as oil production normalizes and the expansion of the Tengiz
oil field becomes operational.
Sharper Disinflation for Emerging Markets and Persistent Inflation for Others
Inflation is projected to ease in 2023 and 2024, slowing to 11.8 percent and 8.5 percent from 13 percent in 2022,
but the decline will be heterogeneous across countries. For CCA emerging markets, inflation is expected to
decelerate sharply—to 6.4 and 4.0 percent in 2023 and 2024, respectively, from 10.5 percent in 2022—reflecting
easing global commodity prices, the lagged impact of monetary tightening, and continued appreciation. Both
Armenia and Georgia are expected to reach their inflation target by 2025. For LICs, inflation is set to remain at
11 percent in 2023 before declining to 9.3 percent in 2024 as persistent pressures in the Kyrgyz Republic and
Uzbekistan (because of strong wage growth) offset lower inflation in Tajikistan. Inflation in oil exporters is set to
ease only slowly—to 13 percent and 8.7 percent in 2023 and 2024, respectively, from 14.3 percent in 2022—as
price pressures remain elevated in Kazakhstan, reflecting high wage growth.
Global financial sector instabilities could intensify, and contagion take hold, affecting the region adversely
through several channels. Financial sector instabilities in advanced economies could depress global growth
and thus ME&CA’s external demand, including by contributing to more volatile oil prices. Increased volatility
in financial markets would add pressures to borrowing costs and exacerbate sovereign debt sustainability
concerns in many MENA EM&MIs. Structural vulnerabilities in the financial sector, such as the tight sover-
eign-bank nexus, could exacerbate domestic financial stability risks, whereas impairment of the banks’ ability
to issue credit would weaken credit recovery.
Tighter-for-longer global financial conditions and debt distress risks. Further tightening of financial conditions
could prompt investors to reassess debt sustainability in many MENA EM&MIs, pushing the most vulner-
able economies to the brink of debt distress. This could spur a flight to safety and capital outflows, fueling
exchange rate depreciation pressures and leading to financial stress. At the same time, the pass-through to
domestic borrowing rates would weigh on credit to the private sector and growth, and ultimately raise fiscal
pressures further.
An escalation of the war in Ukraine could lead to high volatility in commodity markets, shortages, and renewed
price increases for energy, food, and fertilizers, fueling additional inflationary pressures across ME&CA.
More entrenched inflation expectations. Renewed commodity price pressures and supply-chain disruptions
could fuel further headline inflation and spread to other goods and services, particularly in the region’s EM&MIs
and LICs, where inflation is already high. Persistently high core inflation and price-wage spirals could de-anchor
inflation expectations, prompting more monetary policy tightening—further dampening economic activity and
leading to a significant slowdown in growth and financial stress.
Climate change–related risks. The risks associated with climate change have increased significantly in the region,
with changing weather patterns resulting in adverse weather events such as severe heat waves, droughts (North
Africa), and floods (Pakistan, Sudan). Further climate-related events can have a meaningful impact on agricul-
tural output and overall activity and worsen food security and poverty, especially in LICs and FCS (Anderson and
others 2022; Duenwald and others 2022).
Food security and increased social tensions. MENA LICs and EM&MIs with limited fiscal space and a high depen-
dency on energy and food imports remain vulnerable to further deteriorations in food security, including from
renewed increases in food prices, persistent drought, and further disruptions to food supplies. This could
stoke social tensions and weigh negatively on growth, especially in LICs and FCS, where food insecurity is
already elevated.
For the CCA region, a sharper-than-forecast contraction of the Russian economy, a bad harvest, a reversal in
foreign exchange inflows, and lengthy disruptions of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline and regional
supply chains could hamper economic activity. However, the outlook is also subject to upside risks, including
resilient and rising inflows to CCA economies. The continued influx of highly skilled migrants from Russia and
foreign exchange could boost demand—potentially raising overheating risks in the near term—but also lift
productivity growth across the CCA region. Changing regional trade patterns, and renewed efforts to diversify
trade routes, present additional opportunities.
Delays and backtracking in reform implementation, especially in EM&MIs, could weaken growth prospects in the
medium term, exacerbate ongoing scarring from the pandemic, and worsen vulnerabilities. Stalling reforms with
respect to the state footprint in the economy would delay private sector development.
Deepening fragmentation could exacerbate these risks by leading to more restrictions on cross-border flows of
labor and capital (April 2023 Global Financial Stability Report) and international payments, supply disruptions,
rising input costs, and financial instability and could hamper multilateral efforts to address global economic
challenges faced by the region’s vulnerable emerging and developing market economies.
1.5. Policies
Because growth is expected to moderate while inflation pressures persist amid heightened uncertainty from
global financial stress, striking the right balance of policies will be critical. Policymakers in the region should stay
the course to safeguard macroeconomic stability through tight monetary and fiscal policies while being mindful
of financial stability risks. At the same time, they should accelerate structural reforms to bolster potential growth
and enhance resilience and inclusion.
In countries where inflationary pressures continue and the stance is loose, a tighter monetary policy should be
considered (Egypt, Pakistan, Tunisia).
Where the stance is tight or neutral and inflation has peaked, central banks should remain data dependent
and not start loosening prematurely until there are clear signs that core inflation is on a downward trajectory.
Currently, communicating the policy direction is more critical than ever. Policymakers will need to focus on
enhancing communication strategies and increasing the transparency of monetary operations, including the
range of additional instruments (reserve requirements), to anchor market expectations. In addition, across
all countries, strengthening monetary policy frameworks and central bank independence will be critical to
bolstering central bank credibility, activating the relatively weak bank lending channel, and, more broadly,
effective policy transmission (Chapter 2). Reforms to deepen the financial sector should allow for a greater role
of the policy rate as the key transmission instrument by strengthening the lending channel and relying less on
exchange rate management.
Oil exporters should manage oil revenue carefully, avoid expanding current expenditures, and improve
budget transparency. Fiscal efforts should address the challenges posed by climate change, the energy tran-
sition, and economic diversification by continuing non-oil revenue mobilization with reforms to increase the
efficiency of tax collections and wage bill rationalization.
Fiscal consolidation in EM&MIs should continue to be anchored on a downward debt path, supported by
revenue mobilization (including removing tax exemptions) and expenditure containment measures such as
refraining from untargeted subsidies and wage bill expansions. CCA countries need to maintain a prudent
fiscal stance to build buffers, given the risk of a sudden reversal in war-related positive spillovers. Improving
fiscal institutions—particularly budget process transparency—and adopting credible medium-term fiscal
frameworks, including fiscal rules, can ease the burden of adjustment, facilitate access to external financing,
and reduce fiscal vulnerabilities on a lasting basis (October 2019 Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and
Central Asia).
The lack of fiscal space to protect the vulnerable in LICs and FCS demands of the international community’s
support and global cooperation to prevent a humanitarian crisis in many countries as acute food insecurity
and poverty persist.
Bolster private sector development reforms to maximize potential growth and attract much-needed invest-
ment and facilitate job creation. GCC countries are progressively investing in the MENA region and Pakistan in
energy infrastructure, renewable energy, health care, and agriculture (Box 1.1). Although only a few countries
have received investments to date, reforms to make the private sector more investment-friendly—for example,
reducing state-owned enterprises’ outsize role in the economy, leveling the playing field across all economic
agents, lifting red tape, and liberalizing the labor market—would improve investment prospects in these areas
and foster employment.
Rethink trade policy to improve resilience. Exposure to climate change with its impact on agriculture produc-
tion and geopolitical fragmentation risks have highlighted the vulnerabilities of a non-diversified product and
destination trade structure (IMF, forthcoming). In the CCA region, the dislocation of trade routes and supply
chain disruptions that followed the war in Ukraine highlight the importance of continuing efforts that actively
pursue partner diversification to strengthen resilience to future adverse shocks. A parallel effort should be
made to reduce trade restrictions that prove distortive and exacerbate global price pressures.
Ramp up diversification and decarbonization. Countries can invest public resources in renewable energy
sources and climate-resilient infrastructure and enact measures that raise the effective carbon rate (including
by phasing out subsidies). Cross-country cooperation can support the effectiveness of a country’s climate
policy, but international cooperation is crucial to address binding capacity and funding bottlenecks (Anderson
and others 2022; Duenwald and others 2022).
IMF Support
The IMF remains a steadfast partner of ME&CA through policy advice, financing, and capacity development.
Since January 2020, the IMF has approved $29.3 billion of new financing for ME&CA countries, including recent
programs for Armenia (Stand-By Arrangement), Egypt (Extended Fund Facility), Mauritania (Extended Credit
Facility and Extended Fund Facility), and Morocco (Flexible Credit Line). The IMF has also recently established the
Resilience and Sustainability Trust to support low-income and vulnerable middle-income countries in addressing
longer-term challenges, including climate change through the Resilience and Stability Facility. In addition, to
help address the ongoing food crisis facing the IMF’s most vulnerable members, the IMF has enhanced its
emergency lending toolkit with the newly approved Food Shock Window that allows easier financial access
for countries facing food-related balance of payment pressures. The IMF has also increased its presence in the
field by expanding Resident Representative offices, reopening its Middle East Regional Technical Assistance
Center, and setting up a new regional office in Riyadh, which will strengthen the partnership with the region. The
upcoming IMF–World Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakech in the fall of this year will also provide a platform for
wide-ranging policy discussions on challenges facing the region and the world.
References
Anderson, Gareth, Jiayi Ma, Tokhir Mirzoev, Ling Zhu, and Karlygash Zhunussova. 2022. “A Low-Carbon
Future for the Middle East and Central Asia: What are the Options?” IMF Departmental Paper 22/018,
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Duenwald, Christoph, Yasser Abdih, Kerstin Gerling, Vahram Stepanyan, Lamiae Agoumi, Abdullah Al-Hassan,
Gareth Anderson, and others. 2022. “Feeling the Heat: Adapting to Climate Change in the Middle East and
Central Asia.” IMF Departmental Paper 22/008, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Forthcoming. “Trade Integration in Africa: Unleashing the Continent’s
Potential in a Changing World.” IMF Departmental Paper, Washington, DC.
Box 1.1. The Growing Financial Footprint of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the
Middle East and North Africa and Pakistan
Building on their long-standing history supporting the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and
Pakistan, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have expanded and diversified their financial ties
with the region in recent years through official financing (deposits and loans), investment, and remittances.
During 2018–22, GCC countries provided about $54 billion1 in balance of payments and budget financing
to MENA emerging market and middle-income economies (EM&MIs) and Pakistan, with additional support
planned. They have also supported the region’s low-income countries and fragile and conflict-affected
states through debt relief, including under the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative and the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. GCC debt relief to MENA countries (Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia) and
Pakistan totaled about $1.3 billion at the end of 2022. In response to higher international food prices,
GCC members committed humanitarian support to countries facing food insecurity, including through a
$10 billion package launched by the Arab Coordination Group. They have also expanded their financial
support by contributing to multilateral institutions, including IMF loan facilities (Poverty Reduction and
Growth Trust) and partnerships between the World Bank and GCC bilateral and multilateral financial insti-
tutions. As more financial support is channeled through or in collaboration with multilateral institutions,
GCC financing is expected to support economic reforms in recipient countries.
Prepared by the Gulf Cooperation Council division, Olivier Bizimana, and Sahra Sakha.
1
These numbers are from a survey of IMF country teams and are likely an underestimate of the actual support given limited
information available to IMF staff.
2
These figures reflect total FDI from GCC countries, including flows from GCC countries to other GCC countries.
Box 1.2. Unexpected Spillovers from the War in Ukraine amid Heightened Risks
Over the past two decades, Russia and Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) countries have experienced
synchronous growth, mainly reflecting their strong trade and financial ties. Nonetheless, Russia’s contrac-
tion in 2022 did not drive a downturn in economic growth in CCA economies. Instead, most CCA countries
experienced a substantial boost from unexpected positive externalities. Understanding the nature and
durability of these spillovers is important to assess potential risks and inform future policy.
Private inflows rose significantly. Net money transfers from Russia to Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan
increased more than fivefold year over year in 2022, reaching 17, 8, and 3 percent of GDP, respectively.
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also saw a doubling of net remittances, with the increase ranging from 13 to
23 percent of GDP. By contrast, net remittances inflows to the Kyrgyz Republic, historically dependent on
migrant workers’ remittances from Russia, declined by about 6 percentage points of GDP in 2022. The
scale of these inflows is macro-critical for some countries, and uncertainty over their future size and pace
constitutes a risk.
Given their size, the channeling of private transfers via the banking system also has financial stability
implications and will require close monitoring. Nonresident deposits have increased by 4 to 8 percentage
points of GDP in Armenia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan, reaching 6 to 18 percent of GDP and similar values
as a percent of total banking system assets (Box Figure
1.2.1). So far, banks have followed a prudent approach by
Box Figure 1.2.1. CCA: Nonresident
Deposits boosting liquidity buffers and hedging against a potential
(Share of GDP) flight risk rather than intermediating these funds into
20 ARM AZE GEO domestic lending.
KAZ KGZ UZB
18
War-related immigrant inflows, while boosting demand,
16
have increased price pressures in rental and property
14 markets. Migrants from Russia relocating to CCA countries
12 (mainly Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan)
10 range between 50,000 and 150,000, comprising up to 5
8 percent of the host country’s population. This has strained
6 rental markets in Georgia and Kazakhstan, with rental
4 prices rising by more than 20 percent year over year in real
2
terms by the end of 2022, raising pressures in already high-
inflation environments.
0
Mar. Dec. Sep. June Mar. Dec.
2019 19 20 21 22 22 Sanctions against Russia and the dislocation of trade
routes have created complex incentives, resulting in closer
Sources: IMF, Integrated Monetary Database; and
IMF staff calculations. ties between Russia and some CCA countries (Armenia,
Note: Country abbreviations are International Georgia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; Box Figure 1.2.2). The
Organization for Standardization country codes.
share of Kyrgyz Republic exports to Russia has doubled,
rising from 14 percent of total exports in 2021 to 34 percent
in the first nine months of 2022. Sanctions have destabilized traditional trade (rail) routes between China
and the European Union, diverting trade routes away from Russia toward neighboring countries. This
35
30
25
20
15
10
Jan. 2021
Mar. 21
May 21
July 21
Sep. 21
Nov. 21
Jan. 22
Mar. 22
May 22
July 22
Sep. 22
Nov. 22
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
Note: Trade shares are total exports and imports
with Russia as a percent of total exports and
imports with the world. Country abbreviations are
International Organization for Standardization
country codes.
Box 1.3. The Impact of Global Financial Turmoil on the Middle East and Central Asia
Countries in the Middle East and Central Asia (ME&CA) have been affected by the turbulence in global
financial markets and increased policy uncertainty, although direct exposure to US and European banks
is limited. Further bouts of financial turbulence would reinforce strains, particularly in countries with large
debt burdens.
Transmission channels of contagion are varied. While direct spillovers to ME&CA banks have been
marginal, reflecting no direct exposure to Silicon Valley Bank and only a limited one to Credit Suisse, there
is uncertainty over potential capital losses given the prevalence of hold-to-maturity portfolios. However,
such a risk is mitigated by the large reliance of ME&CA banks, with a few exceptions, on customer deposits
and long-term funding, including sizable government deposits (particularly in Gulf Cooperation Council
countries). ME&CA economies could be indirectly impacted
Box Figure 1.3.1. Equity Markets through a deeper deceleration of global economic growth
(Index points; percent change since from tighter global lending standards and its impact on oil
SVB’s collapse)
price volatility.
2
So far, financial markets in the region have moved in line with
1
global trends, though countries with large debt burdens
0
have seen a larger impact. Equity markets have declined
–1 across most of the region, with Egypt, Jordan, Oman,
–2 Pakistan, and Qatar experiencing the largest declines. Bank
–3
equities were most affected in Egypt, Gulf Cooperation
Council financial hubs, and Pakistan (Box Figure 1.3.1). Bond
–4
spreads widened significantly for Pakistan, Tunisia, and to a
–5 lesser extent in Egypt, and currencies have broadly gained
–6 on US dollar weakness, while some Central Asian currencies
–7
(Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic) have weakened with the
Bank equities Russian ruble.
–8 Overall equities
2.1. Introduction
Restoring price stability remains a key policy challenge for ME&CA countries. Inflation surged over the past
two years, reflecting a combination of demand and supply factors, including a rise in food prices and disrup-
tions to global supply chains (April 2022 Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia). Inflation
may have peaked in several countries (see Chapter 1), but food and energy prices are still high relative to their
pre-pandemic levels, inflation is above target in most countries that have a target, and core inflation remains
stubbornly elevated.
This chapter assesses what central banks should do next to restore or maintain price stability. Central banks have
responded to rising inflation with a series of monetary policy actions, including increasing policy interest rates.
Whether this tightening was sufficient to control inflation depends on various factors, including how the increase
in nominal rates has translated into increases in real rates, the level of the natural rate of interest, monetary policy
transmission lags, and the effectiveness of monetary transmission. Furthermore, the appropriateness of the
monetary policy stance depends on factors beyond policy interest rates (for example, on financial conditions
more broadly, including longer-term interest rates and net capital inflows). Several standard methods are used
to assess the monetary policy stance and estimate its impact on inflation, the strength of its main transmission
channels, and the lags with which monetary policy operates.2
1
Prepared by Will Abel, Mohamed Belkhir, Vizhdan Boranova, Rodrigo García-Verdu (lead), Filippo Gori, Bashar Hlayhel, Thomas Kroen,
Troy Matheson (lead), and Christine Richmond, with excellent research assistance from Azhin Abdulkarim.
2
Because of data limitations, this chapter does not cover some important aspects of monetary policy, including the inflation expectations
channel of monetary policy. Also, the evolution of nominal and real wages and measures of labor market slack, which are important
determinants of inflation, are not analyzed.
In addition to raising policy rates and reserve requirements, over the past two years, most of the region’s
central banks have acted to mop up excess liquidity, including by issuing their own securities, selling govern-
ment securities, engaging in reverse repurchase agreements, and intervening in foreign exchange markets by
selling foreign currency (Online Annex 1). However, they have made limited use of macroprudential tools (about
half of central bank actions were related to unwinding pandemic-related measures). On the communications
front, almost two-thirds of central banks publish a communiqué after a monetary policy decision, while only
a few provide forward guidance on interest rates. Lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies
Figure 2.1. ME&CA Central Banks’ Instruments Figure 2.2. ME&CA: Change in Policy Interest
Rates and Inflation
(Percent, January 2021 to latest)
14 30
Floating
Managed peg
ALG TUN Pegged 25
MRT BHR* 12
Policy Rate Domestic Reserve Changes in inflation (right scale)
IRQ* IRN
MAR Requirements 20
JOR LBY 10
KWT ARM GEO▲ AZE*▲ 15
KAZ TJK* UZB▲
8
KGZ
SAU QAT OMN 10
LBN
UAE PAK* SDN*▲ 6
EGY* TKM 5
4
0
2 –5
Foreign Reserve
Requirements
WBG 0 –10
PAK
EGY
OMN
UAE
BHR
QAT
JOR
SAU
MRT
KWT
TUN
MAR
ALG
IRQ
KGZ
KAZ
ARM
GEO
AZE
TJK
UZB
3
See Poghosyan and others (forthcoming) for a more complete characterization of monetary policy frameworks in the Caucasus and
Central Asia, including the legal and accountability framework of central banks in the region.
4
Egypt’s decision to raise the required reserve ratio from 14 percent to 18 percent in September 2022 was for monetary policy purposes.
10
2.3. Assessing the
Monetary Policy Stance 0
Natural rates are useful to gauge the monetary policy stance, but their estimates are subject to significant
uncertainty.6 The natural rate refers to the interest rate that neither stimulates nor contracts the economy and is
consistent with output at potential and stable inflation. However, natural rates are notoriously difficult to measure
in real time because they are unobservable, differ across countries, and are subject to short-term volatility. This
chapter defines two different measures of natural rates: a short-term rate and a long-term rate. The short-term
rate—the natural policy rate—is defined as the real natural rate plus one-year-ahead inflation expectations from
World Economic Outlook databases; this indicates where nominal rates should be to stabilize inflation in the
short term.7 The long-term rate—the terminal rate—is defined as the real natural rate plus five-year-ahead inflation
expectations from World Economic Outlook databases; this is an estimate of where nominal rates will eventually
converge when inflation is at its long-term desired level. Natural rates are estimated using two methods: a small
5
Fiscal dominance is defined as subordination to fiscal policy of monetary policy and its primary goal of maintaining price stability,
generally with the objective of contributing to financing the fiscal deficit. It may be difficult to measure, depending on the form it takes.
See Online Annex 1 for a discussion on some of the forms it can take.
6
The uncertainty surrounding natural rate estimates has implications for the conduct of monetary policy. See Online Annex 2 for a
discussion.
7
In other words, it is the policy rate required to prevent changes in real interest rates. Monetary policy is contractionary or tight when
the policy rate is higher than the natural policy rate and expansionary or easy when the policy rate is lower than the natural policy rate.
TJK
GEO
ARM
AZE
TUN
JOR
BHR
QAT
SAU
OMN
UAE
KWT
KGZ
MAR
Policy Tightening Compare with
Source: IMF staff calculations. Peers and Earlier Responses?
Note: The ranges around the natural policy rate estimates reflect one
standard deviation confidence intervals based on the estimated The analysis in the previous section sought to
model and one-year-ahead inflation forecast errors from World determine whether current policy interest rates are
Economic Outlook databases. Country abbreviations are International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. The cutoff date above their natural levels and thus disinflationary.
for the policy rate changes is March 31, 2023. TVP-VAR = time-varying This section focuses on assessing the reaction of
parameter vector autoregressions.
central banks to price pressures to characterize
how monetary policy has tightened with respect
to coincident and expected price dynamics.
To do so, the policy reaction of ME&CA central banks was benchmarked using a historical and cross-country
comparison. Simple reactive interest rate rules were identified using two different monetary policy reaction
benchmarks—the monetary policy reaction of ME&CA countries over the last two decades as estimated by
a monetary policy rule, and the corresponding reaction of a subset of emerging market central banks that
engaged in the early and relatively successful adoption of inflation-targeting regimes—the emerging market and
developing economy (EMDE) benchmark (see Online Annex 3).
The exercise shows positive monetary rule residuals since 2021 for countries with an inflation-targeting regime
and conventional peggers,10 suggesting that these countries increased policy interest rates more than when
facing previous shocks of comparable magnitude (Figure 2.5). In countries with an inflation-targeting monetary
policy framework (all in the Caucasus and Central Asia), the rise in policy interest rates was also consistent
with the EMDE benchmark. This suggests that their monetary policy response to the recent inflation surge was
consistent with a steadfast commitment to fighting inflation pressures; it also reflects improvements in their
monetary policy frameworks relative to the past. Conversely, countries with other monetary frameworks (Egypt,
Tunisia) increased interest rates consistent with their historical norms and less than the EMDE benchmark,
suggesting that they are less reactive to inflation developments than other peers, likely because the trade-offs
in these countries between higher interest rates and debt sustainability are critical.
8
See Online Annex 2 for model details and estimation results.
9
See the section titled “The Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism in ME&CA” for estimated impacts on inflation from higher policy
rates.
10
For countries with a conventional peg exchange rate framework, changes in interest rates reflect the uncovered interest rate parity
condition (see Online Annex 3 for more details).
Percent
evolution of domestic financial conditions at a 3
The relationship between increases in policy interest rates and tighter financial conditions is positive but
dispersed across the region (Figure 2.6, panel 2). A widely diverse reaction of financial conditions to changes in
policy interest rates partially reflects ME&CA central banks’ use of different instruments to tame recent inflation
pressures. However, it is also consistent with relatively large heterogeneity in the monetary transmission channel,
including the magnitude and timing of interest rate pass-through.
11
The impact of financial conditions on inflation is determined by various factors, including market structure and price frameworks
(including the presence of administrative prices or price subsidies). The overall impact of interest rates on prices is covered in the next
section on monetary policy transmission channels.
1. FCIs Changes and Contributions 2. FCIs Change versus Policy Rate Change
(January 2021 to latest) (January 2021 to latest)
4.5 External factors Exchange rates 4.0
Stock and bond markets Credit
4.0 SAU
Risk premiums Monetary aggregates PAK 3.5
JOR
Interest rates
3.5 OMN
FCIs change
3.0
(Jan. 2021–latest) QAT
3.0
FCIs change
TUN
(Jan. 2021–Dec. 21) 2.5
2.5
FCIs change
FCIs change
EGY
ARM KAZ
2.0 2.0
GEO
1.5
1.5
MAR KGZ
1.0
KWT 1.0
0.5
0.5
0.0
UZB
–0.5 0.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
SAU
PAK
OMN
QAT
TUN
ARM
KAZ
GEO
EGY
KWT
MAR
UZB
KGZ
JOR
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Haver Analytics; IMF, International Financial Statistics database; national authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Data on policy rates are as of March 31, 2023. The latest data point for FCIs is December 2022 except for Egypt and Morocco (January
2023), Tunisia and Uzbekistan (February 2023), and the Kyrgyz Republic (October 2022). Country abbreviations are International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) country codes. FCIs = financial conditions indices; ME&CA = Middle East and Central Asia.
12
Estimates in this section are based on the model described in Online Annex 2. See Online Annex 7 for results based on structural vector
autoregressions.
13
The relatively low impact of interest rates on inflation among currency peggers may also reflect a prevalence of price subsidies in these
countries over the sample period examined. For an analysis of the evolution of price subsidies in the Middle East and North Africa
region, see the October 2022 Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia.
Figure 2.7. Peak Effect of a 100 bps Contractionary Figure 2.8. Peak Effect of a 100 bps Contractionary
Monetary Policy Shock on Inflation, Real GDP, and Monetary Policy Shock on Inflation in ME&CA
the Exchange Rate in ME&CA Countries Countries
(Percentage points) (Percentage points)
0.0 0.0 12
10
–0.5 –0.5
8
–1.0 –1.0
6
–1.5 –1.5
–2.0 –2.0
2
–2.5 –2.5 0
Inflation GDP ER Inflation GDP ER Inflation GDP Without ER With ER Without ER With ER
channel channel channel channel
F MP CP
Peak inflation response Peak quarter (quarters,
(percentage points) right scale)
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: Circles represent the median peaks, and the error bars show
Source: IMF staff calculations.
the ranges across countries. Inflation is quarter-over-quarter
Note: The figure shows the peak effect of a 100 basis point contrac-
annualized percentage rates. Real GDP and exchange rates are in
tionary MP shock on quarter-over-quarter inflation in countries with a
percent. Note that for CP, the monetary tighening is a 100 basis point
statistically significant response of inflation, estimated using Jordà’s
increase in foreign interest rates with an equivalent increase in
(2005) local projections method. Circles represent the median peaks,
domestic rates. bps = basis points; CP = conventional pegger;
and the error bars show the ranges across countries. “Without ER
ER = exchange rate; F = floater; ME&CA = Middle East and Central
channel” points to the impulse response of inflation when the
Asia; MP = managed pegger.
exchange rate channel is muted. “With ER channel” measures the
inflation response when the nominal effective exchange rate
analysis is consistent with the exchange rate being appreciates by one standard deviation simultaneously with a
monetary policy tightening. bps = basis points; ER = exchange rate;
a key channel for magnifying the effect of monetary ME&CA = Middle East and Central Asia.
policy on inflation in the region. In a structural vector
autoregression framework, estimates show that on
average, 40 percent of the peak impact on inflation from monetary policy shocks is driven by the exchange rate
(see Online Annex 7). Similarly, local projection estimates, based on Jordà (2005), suggest that in countries with
flexible or managed exchange rate regimes, inflation tends to decline by a larger magnitude when the exchange
rate also appreciates following a contractionary monetary policy shock (Figure 2.8). Transmission lags also tend
to be shorter under the amplifying effect of the exchange rate.
In countries with fixed exchange rates, at the peak, a 100 basis point US monetary tightening leads to 81 basis
points higher asset rates (a proxy for effective lending rates), 66 basis points higher liability rates (a proxy for
effective deposit rates), and a reduction of 3.2 percent in real credit growth (Figure 2.9, panel 1).14 Yet the trans-
14
The sample of peggers consists of Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
Figure 2.9. Impact of Monetary Policy Tightening on Effective Interest Rates and Credit Growth
1. Maximum Impulse Responses to a 100 bps Monetary 2. Oil-Exporting ER Peggers: Response of Interest Rates and
Policy Shock Credit Growth to a 100 bps Monetary Policy Shock,
Depending on Oil Price
160 0.0 80 –4.0
Pass-through at $65/bl
Pass-through at $82/bl
140 –1.0 70 –3.5
120 60 –3.0
–2.0
Percentage change
Percentage change
100 50 –2.5
Basis points
–3.0
Basis points
80 40 –2.0
–4.0
60 30 –1.5
–5.0
40 20 –1.0
20 –6.0 10 –0.5
0 –7.0 0 0.0
F MP CP F MP CP F MP CP Asset rates Liabilities rates Loan growth
(right scale)
Asset rates Liabilities rates Real credit
growth
(right scale)
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Notes: Panel 1 shows peak response from local projection estimation for country groups, sorted by exchange rate regime. Panel 2 shows how the
peak response in exchange rate peggers depends on the level of the oil price. According to the World Economic Outlook database, $65 is the
current medium-term projection for the oil price; $82 was the prevailing oil price in the week of January 18, 2023. bl = barrel; bps = basis points;
CP = conventional pegger; ER = exchange rate; F = floater; MP = managed pegger.
mission of higher US policy rates into domestic banks’ asset and liability rates operates with sizable lags. In the
year following a 100 basis point tightening, asset and liability rates rise by approximately 30 basis points on
average. The peak responses are reached after eight to 10 quarters (see Online Annex 6).15
In this context, the level of the oil price is a critical determinant of monetary transmission in oil-exporting
countries. When liquidity is ample because of high oil revenues, the transmission of US monetary policy into
domestic financial conditions is dampened. Quantitatively, the pass-through of a 100 basis point US interest rate
rise into domestic asset and liability rates is more than 20 basis points stronger at an oil price of $65 per barrel
(consistent with medium-term projections) compared with an $82 oil price (the prevailing price in the week of
January 18, 2023; Figure 2.9, panel 2). Higher oil prices also attenuate the pass-through into real credit growth.
With oil prices expected to revert to their 2019 levels over the next five years, spillovers from US monetary policy
will likely strengthen, increasing the need for macroprudential buffers.
Monetary policy transmission to bank asset and liability rates is weaker on average in countries with a managed
peg or floating exchange rate regime,16 partly reflecting their lower level of financial development compared
with ME&CA peggers and emerging markets in general, largely due to the high level of development among
Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Asset and liability rate pass-through peaks at 60 and 34 basis points for
floaters (28 and 22 basis points for managed peggers), respectively, for a 100 basis point rise in the policy
interest rate; the response of credit growth is economically small and statistically insignificant for all countries
except for Pakistan. There is significant heterogeneity across the region, with pass-through stronger in countries
15
Such long lags reflect the use of effective asset and liability rates instead of marginal interest rates.
16
The sample of managed peggers based on the 2021 Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions consists of
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Since then, Egypt has de jure transitioned to a floating exchange rate arrangement. The sample of floaters
consists of Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan.
1. Impact of Higher Policy Rates on Inflation 2. Projected Impact of End of 2022 Policy Rates on Inflation
(Average percentage, 2021–22) (Average percentage, 2023; deviation from baseline
projections)
14 0.0
Estimated inflation without higher
policy rates
–0.5
12 Average inflation (deviation from
estimated target)
–1.0
10 –1.5
–2.0
8
–2.5
6
–3.0
4 –3.5
–4.0
2
–4.5
0 –5.0
F MP CP F MP CP
with a smaller footprint of state-owned banks (see Online Annex 6). These results suggest that the banking sector
may be playing only a limited role in monetary transmission to the real economy for exchange rate floaters and
managed peggers in the region on average, particularly for countries where state-owned banks are dominant.
The high level of policy interest rates relative to terminal rates at the end of 2022 can be expected to continue
putting downward pressure on inflation throughout 2023 (Figure 2.10, panel 2). The extent to which policy rates
need adjustment in the short term will be determined by the evolution of inflation and inflation expectations,
considering the impact of past policy changes and domestic and global economic conditions.
Where to next? Heightened uncertainty requires close vigilance. Calibrating and communicating monetary
policy in a data-dependent manner will be essential to prevent inflation expectations from becoming de-
anchored. Specifically:
Where the policy stance is tight or neutral, and inflation appears to have peaked (for example, Armenia and
Georgia), central banks should remain data dependent and not start loosening until there are clear signs that
core inflation is on a downward trajectory.
Countries with a currency peg should continue following US monetary policy and consider the use of additional
macroprudential policies (for example, lower loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios) in case of significant
asset price appreciation or if financial conditions remain loose or loosen.
Where the policy stance is loose and inflationary pressures persist, tighter monetary policy should be consid-
ered to stabilize inflation and inflation expectations (for example, in Egypt, Pakistan, and Tunisia).
Where there is a lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policy or where there is fiscal dominance,
policymakers will need to address fiscal imbalances so that monetary policy can become an effective tool to
stabilize inflation. Until then, monetary policy will need to be tightened more than if fiscal policy were acting
in coordination.
Where high oil prices dampen the bank-lending channel (energy exporters), the policy rate will need to be
complemented with other monetary or macroprudential tools.
Across the region, and in countries that will tighten monetary policy further in particular, central banks should
be mindful of financial stability risks and closely monitor financial system vulnerabilities that could arise from
increasing interest rates.
In parallel, further efforts are needed to improve monetary policy frameworks and monetary policy transmission
in the region. Given that inflation expectations data are not available in most countries in ME&CA, policymakers
need to develop surveys of inflation expectations. The strong estimated response of inflation to monetary policy
shocks and the short time lag with which it responds in countries with a floating or managed exchange rate—and
the bank-level data evidence that the lending channel is weak—suggest that the exchange rate is a key transmis-
sion channel for many countries.
Strengthening the lending channel would also require developing the financial sector, including by promoting
well-functioning and highly liquid interbank markets for reserves and secondary markets for government secu-
rities with a broad range of maturities, and by promoting measures to de-dollarize those financial systems with
a high degree of dollarization. This would subsequently facilitate greater exchange rate flexibility, allowing the
exchange rate to act as a shock absorber to better isolate economies from shocks and improve the efficiency
of monetary policy.
All countries could benefit from closer coordination of monetary policy with financial and fiscal policies. For
example, state-owned commercial banks should operate on a level playing field with private banks, and the
use of state-owned banks for monetary or fiscal purposes should be avoided (for example, through phasing
out quasi-fiscal activities and subsidized lending).
The use of macroprudential measures in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes can help strengthen
the link between changes in the policy rate and financial conditions, which is particularly important now for
Caucasus and Central Asia countries that are experiencing large capital inflows and for Gulf Cooperation
Council countries that are experiencing rapid asset price appreciation (for example, in equity or housing
markets).
Monetary policy frameworks should be improved by enhancing central bank communications and increasing
the transparency of monetary operations and foreign exchange interventions.
References
Jordà, Òscar. 2005. “Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projections.” American Economic
Review 95 (1): 161–82.
Poghosyan, Tigran, Klakow Akepanidtaworn, Maria Atamanchuk, Ezequiel Cabezon, Selim Cakir, Mariarosaria
Comunale, Omer Faruk, Vahid Khatami, Marina Conesa Martinez, and Filiz D. Unsal. Forthcoming.
“Strengthening Monetary Policy Frameworks in the Caucasus and Central Asia.” IMF Departmental Paper,
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.5 –2.7 4.6 5.3 2.9 3.5
of which non-oil growth 5.3 –2.7 5.3 4.5 3.2 3.7
Current Account Balance 5.8 –3.0 3.3 7.5 3.6 2.1
Overall Fiscal Balance 1.4 –7.9 –2.5 1.4 –1.5 –2.2
Inflation (year average; percent) 7.2 10.4 12.8 14.3 15.9 12.0
ME&CA oil exporters
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.5 –3.9 4.7 5.4 3.2 3.2
of which non-oil growth 5.6 –3.7 5.8 4.0 3.7 3.5
Current Account Balance 8.9 –2.8 6.5 12.5 6.5 4.3
Overall Fiscal Balance 3.3 –8.5 –1.0 4.3 0.2 –0.6
Inflation (year average; percent) 6.7 8.7 11.0 13.6 12.1 8.7
ME&CA emerging market and middle-income countries1
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.2 –0.8 4.6 5.6 2.4 4.1
Current Account Balance –3.6 –3.1 –3.5 –4.8 –3.5 –3.5
Overall Fiscal Balance –5.4 –7.3 –6.3 –6.2 –6.6 –7.2
Inflation (year average; percent) 7.1 8.2 7.8 11.5 21.5 17.1
ME&CA low-income developing countries2
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.4 –1.4 4.3 3.1 3.5 4.3
Current Account Balance 1.0 –5.1 –6.8 –4.8 –6.8 –6.4
Overall Fiscal Balance –2.0 –3.8 –2.8 –2.7 –2.7 –2.5
Inflation (year average; percent) 13.9 38.9 67.0 38.1 24.7 19.4
Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff calculations and projections.
1
2011–24 data exclude Syrian Arab Republic.
2
2021–24 data exclude Afghanistan.
Notes: Data refer to the fiscal year for the following countries: Afghanistan (March 21/March 20) until 2011, and December 21/December 20
thereafter, the Islamic Republic of Iran (March 21/March 20), and Egypt and Pakistan (July/June).
The 32 ME&CA countries and territories are divided into three (nonoverlapping) groups, based on export earnings and level of develop-
ment: (1) Oil Exporters
(ME&CA OE), (2) Emerging Market and Middle-Income Countries (ME&CA EM&MI); and (3) Low-Income Developing Countries (ME&CA LIC).
ME&CA OE include Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Turkmenistan, and the United Arab Emirates.
ME&CA EM&MI include Armenia, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and the West
Bank and Gaza.
ME&CA LIC include Afghanistan, Djibouti, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan; and Yemen.
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.2 –3.1 4.3 5.3 3.1 3.4
of which non-oil growth 5.2 –3.0 5.2 4.0 3.6 3.7
Current Account Balance 6.8 –3.3 4.2 9.0 4.5 2.7
Overall Fiscal Balance 1.6 –8.4 –2.0 2.5 –1.0 –1.7
Inflation (year average; percent) 7.1 10.9 13.9 14.8 14.8 11.1
MENA oil exporters
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.3 –4.1 4.7 5.7 3.1 3.0
of which non-oil growth 5.5 –3.9 5.9 3.8 3.7 3.5
Current Account Balance 9.6 –2.9 7.2 13.0 6.9 4.6
Overall Fiscal Balance 3.3 –8.9 –0.8 4.6 0.4 –0.5
Inflation (year average; percent) 6.6 9.0 11.3 13.5 12.0 8.7
MENA emerging market and middle-income countries1
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.1 –0.5 3.6 5.1 3.4 4.4
Current Account Balance –4.0 –3.7 –4.7 –5.1 –4.1 –4.1
Overall Fiscal Balance –5.8 –7.4 –6.6 –5.6 –6.9 –7.1
Inflation (year average; percent) 7.1 6.8 7.1 11.2 19.1 14.9
MENA low-income developing countries
Real GDP (annual growth) 2.2 –4.1 0.6 –0.6 1.3 2.9
Current Account Balance –3.5 –12.0 –8.4 –8.8 –10.5 –9.8
Overall Fiscal Balance –3.2 –3.8 –0.2 –1.7 –2.1 –1.8
Inflation (year average; percent) 17.1 92.1 175.9 83.2 45.9 35.0
MENA excl. conflict-affected countries
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.3 –2.7 3.9 5.6 2.9 3.3
of which non-oil growth 5.3 –2.7 5.2 4.2 3.4 3.6
Current Account Balance 6.8 –3.2 4.3 9.1 4.6 2.7
Overall Fiscal Balance 1.6 –8.2 –2.2 2.5 –1.1 –1.8
Inflation (year average; percent) 7.1 10.9 14.1 14.9 15.0 11.2
MENA excl. fragile states and conflict-affected countries
Real GDP (annual growth) 3.9 –1.7 3.9 5.7 2.9 3.3
of which non-oil growth 5.1 –1.4 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.6
Current Account Balance 7.6 –2.3 4.4 9.5 4.9 3.4
Overall Fiscal Balance 1.9 –7.9 –2.4 2.3 –0.9 –1.5
Inflation (year average; percent) 6.8 8.4 9.6 12.6 13.9 10.7
Projections
Average
2000–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
MENAP 1,2
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.3 –2.8 4.5 5.4 2.7 3.4
of which non-oil growth 5.2 –2.7 5.3 4.3 3.1 3.7
Current Account Balance 6.4 –3.0 3.8 7.8 3.9 2.3
Overall Fiscal Balance 1.3 –8.2 –2.4 1.6 –1.5 –2.3
Inflation (year average; percent) 7.1 10.8 13.2 14.4 16.4 12.5
Gulf Cooperation Council
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.2 –4.7 3.5 7.7 2.9 3.3
of which non-oil growth 5.9 –4.1 5.2 4.9 4.2 3.9
Current Account Balance 12.8 –1.1 8.6 15.2 8.6 6.5
Overall Fiscal Balance 6.0 –8.0 0.0 6.0 2.4 1.6
Inflation (year average; percent) 2.3 1.3 2.2 3.3 2.9 2.3
Arab World 1
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.5 –4.5 4.2 5.9 3.3 3.7
of which non-oil growth 5.5 –4.2 5.4 4.4 3.9 4.0
Current Account Balance 7.4 –3.5 4.3 9.4 4.8 2.8
Overall Fiscal Balance 2.4 –8.6 –1.8 3.1 –0.5 –1.2
Inflation (year average; percent) 4.8 6.1 9.1 8.9 9.9 7.7
Arab World oil exporters
Real GDP (annual growth) 4.7 –6.5 4.7 6.7 3.4 3.4
of which non-oil growth 6.0 –6.1 6.4 4.2 4.2 3.9
Current Account Balance 11.3 –3.2 7.7 14.0 7.6 5.0
Overall Fiscal Balance 4.8 –9.2 –0.3 5.7 1.2 0.3
Inflation (year average; percent) 3.0 1.3 3.2 4.2 3.9 2.8
Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff calculations and projections.
1
2011–24 data exclude Syrian Arab Republic.
2
2021–24 data exclude Afghanistan.
Notes: Data refer to the fiscal year for the following countries: Afghanistan (March 21/March 20) until 2011, and December 21/December 20
thereafter, the Islamic Republic of Iran (March 21/March 20), and Egypt and Pakistan (July/June).
MENA: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
MENA oil exporters: Algeria, Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates.
MENA emerging market and middle-income countries: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and the West
Bank and Gaza.
MENA low-income developing countries: Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.
MENA excl. fragile states and conflict-affected countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.
MENAP: MENA, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Arab World oil exporters: Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.