29.05.2017 Order
29.05.2017 Order
Versus
AND
Versus
DIRECTOR OF INCOME-TAX
(INVESTIGATION)-I& ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Rahul Kaushik, Sr.Standing
Counsel for Revenue.
Mr.Ateev Mathur, Advocate with
CORAM:
JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR
JUSTICE CHANDER SHEKHAR
JUDGMENT
% 29.05.2017
Dr. S. Muralidhar, J.:
1. These two writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
arise from a common set of facts and seek similar reliefs. They are,
accordingly, being disposed of by this common judgment.
The parties
2. The eight Petitioners in W.P.(C) No.1180/2017 are all companies: (1)
Strategic Credit Capital Pvt. Ltd. („SCCPL‟), (2) Land Energy and
Resources Ltd. („LERL‟), (3) Land Industrial and Infrastructure Ltd.
(„LIIL‟), (4) Participation Finance and Holding India Pvt. Ltd. („PFHIPL‟),
(5) Empell Fortitus Pvt. Ltd. („EFPL‟), (6) Lionforge Intertrade Pvt. Ltd.
(„LIPL‟), (7) Principal Land Reality and Development Pvt. Ltd.
(„PLRDPL‟), (8) Exsto Foundation Enterprises and Reserves Ltd.
(„EFERL‟). It is significant that all these 8 Petitioners have the same address
i.e., A-49, Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area, New Delhi – 110044.
3. The Respondents in this petition are Ratnakar Bank Ltd. („RBL‟) andthe
Income Tax Department („the Department‟) (Respondents 1 and 2
respectively).
6. The case of the Department is that during search and survey proceedings,
incriminating documents and evidences (including digital evidences such as
emails, phone data, hard drives etc.) were found and seized. Before
7.2The averments in this petition are that survey proceedings were carried
out in respect of 3 companies – Lionforge Logistics Pvt. Ltd., Halcyon Asia
Business Development Pvt. Ltd.and Halcyon Asia Management Strategies
Pvt. Ltd. as well as Mr.Mukkar. The 8 Petitioners state that the they are not
named in the survey. In para 5 of the petition,it is averred that “the said
entities have no relation to Mr.Mohnish Mohan Mukkar in his personal
capacity, and Mr.Mukkar is neither a shareholder nor a Director in the said
companies”. It is then averred in para 6 that Mr. Mukkar was subjected to a
search on 11th January, 2017 pursuant to which a restraint order under
Section 132(3) of the Act was issued directing RBL to not release the bank
accounts of 16 persons including the 8 Petitioner companies.
7.3 In para 7 of the writ petition, it is averred that certain letters dated 20th
January, 2017 were written by the Petitioner companies to the Department
requesting that the restraint order be lifted. It is then averred that “[i]t was
clarified that the said entities had no relation to Mr.Mohnish Mohan Mukkar
in his personal capacity and that the said person is neither a shareholder nor
a Director in the said companies."
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 4 of 54
7.4 It is submitted that “no action could have been initiated under Section
132(3) without there being any action initiated under Section 132.” It is
averred that no liability has been established against the Petitioners with
there being no tax demand upon them and that even a Show Cause Notice
(„SCN‟) has not been issued.
7.5 It is averred in para 9 that on the evening of 7th February 2017, the
Petitioners came to know through messages from the Bank (RBL) that their
accounts had been debited by Rs.37,66,842.50 as per income tax notice and
net balance was Re.0. There was another message debiting Rs.7,93,478.
Further demand drafts („DDs‟) in favour of the Department were prepared. It
is pointed out that on 7th February, 2017 itself, the Petitioners through their
counsel wrote to RBL requesting it not to honour the DDs. It is stated that
the Petitioners owe monies to other entities in respect of the loans availed by
the Petitioners and that it was not open to the Department to have debited
their accounts. It is averred that the said monies were “proceeds of the loans
taken from other entities”.
7.6 In para 11, the Petitioners have listed out the account numbers of the
Petitioner companies from which the amounts were debited. Para 12 of the
writ petition sets out the grounds. The essence of these grounds is that the
action of the Department is arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional and that on
the mere asking of the Department, without issuing an SCN or a demand of
assessment being served, debiting the accounts of the Petitioners with a total
of Rs.23,14,64,825.30 without instructions was “expropriatory and has no
sanction in law”. It is further stated that no opportunity of hearing was
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 5 of 54
granted to the Petitioners and the impugned actions were “in violation of the
principles of natural justice”. It is averred that in the past several days, the
representatives of the Petitioners have been attempting to meet the officials
of the Department but to no avail. It is averred that the monies belonging to
the Petitioners have been expropriated by the Department in “one shot” and
“without complying with any semblance of law and procedures”. It is stated
that the Petitioners “are engaged in legitimate business, and their entire
business activities have been brought to a standstill.”
7.8 This writ petition came up for hearing on 9th February, 2017. While
directing notice to issue in the petitions, an interim order was passed
restraining the Department from encashing the DDs until the next date of
hearing to the extent of the amounts having been appropriated from the
Petitioners‟ accounts. On that date itself, the Reserve Bank of India,
Respondent No.3, was deleted from the array of parties. The petition was
then adjourned to for 19th April, 2017.
7.9 On 19th April, 2017, while recording the statement of the counsel for the
Respondents that they would be filing their replies by 25th April, 2017, the
Court directed the Petitioners in their rejoinder to disclose if they had
regularly been filing their Income Tax Returns („ITRs‟) and, if so, to enclose
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 6 of 54
copies of the latest ITRs with the rejoinder. Mr.Zoheb Hossain, the learned
Senior Standing Counsel in the Department, stated that on 13th April, 2017, a
representation has been received by the Department from the Petitioners
under the proviso to Section 132B of the Act. He stated that the said
representation would be examined and appropriate orders would be filed not
later than 2 weeks from that date. The Court directed that a copy of the said
decision to be placed on record before the next date and adjourned the case
to 17th May, 2017. The interim orders were directed to continue till the next
date.
7.10 On 17th May, 2017, the counsel for the Department informed the Court
that the above representation of the Petitioners had been disposed of. The
counter-affidavits had already been filed by the Department. The Petitioners
were permitted to file a rejoinder by the next date. The Court, while
directing the interim orders to continue, adjourned the case to 25th May,
2017.
Stand of RBL
8.1 RBL has filed a separate counter-affidavit in W.P. (C) 1180 of 2017
confirming that the companies had opened accounts with it. It is pointed out
that the impleadment of RBL was misconceived and unwarranted since the
grievance of the Petitioners was against the Department. RBL, without
prejudice to the foregoing submissions, stated that “the Petitioner in the writ
petition has averred that Mr. Mohnish Mukkar has no concern with the said
accounts, which statement/averment is false to the knowledge of the
Petitioner. It is submitted that at the time of opening of accounts, the
9.2 It is stated, however, that in his statements made on oath during the
search and survey proceedings, Mr. Mukkar gave false and misleading
statements by denying that he had no active role in the day-to-day
management of the Petitioner companies. It is further stated that during the
search and survey proceedings, Mr. Mukkar as well as the other key
associates had claimed that the web of companies were ultimately held by
Elfington Trusts and/or Independent Trustees and Executors Private Limited
(hereinafter referred to collectively as „Trusts‟) which were for the benefit of
Mr.Jeh Mukkar, who is the minor son of Mr. Mukkar. However, they had
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 9 of 54
failed to produce any documents to that end (like incorporation of trusts,
names and addresses of the Trustees) nor did they reveal where the trusts
were located in spite of being given sufficient opportunity and time.
9.3. Thus, it is stated that this delaying tactic was to mislead the Department
as during the course of search and on perusal of email records, credible
evidence in the hands of the Department indicated that Elfington goes by the
name of „Elfington Limited‟ registered in British Virgin Islands. In spite of
specifically being asked under oath whether any of his family members held
any foreign assets, Mr. Mukkar failed to make any revelations about the
existence of a Trust or company or entities in the British Virgin Islands. It is
stated that evidence has also been found regarding the existence of various
companies in Hong Kong in which Ms.Veena Singh (key associate of Mr.
Mukkar) was a Director. Investigations are stated to be underway to
establish the ownership and other credentials of these off-shore companies
and the implications that may arise from the point of view of the Black
Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax
Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as „the Black Money Act‟).
9.7 Ms.Veena Singh is supposed to have volunteered during the search and
survey proceedings to the Department that a major part of the cash was
received from Deccan Chronicle Holdings Limited („DCHL‟) who paid cash
in tranches for the services rendered to them by and as per the agreements
(September and October 2012) between (PFHIPL) and DCHL for providing
services like restructuring plan, introducing them to buyers etc. It was stated
by her that the said cash was subsequently extended as advances to other
companies for the ongoing transactions.
9.8 It was disclosed by Mr. Mukkar in his statement to the Department that
the money was received from DCHL. However, neither he nor Ms. Singh
could produce any documents in support of this claim. It is explained that in
9.11 The Department states that the letters of the Petitioner companies
requesting lifting of the restraint order was received on 23rd January, 2017
and 24th January, 2017. These letters also contained 3 undated „Fund
Confirmation Letters‟ signed by Mr. Shakti Singh Jadaun, Director of
PFHPL certifying that the advance in cash of Rs.7.5 crores, Rs.5 crores and
Rs.2.5 crores were extended during the Financial Year („FY‟) 2015-16 to
LIIL, LERL and LIPL. It is stated that the ADIT asked the AR to furnish
further documents relating to the above transactions involving DCHL and
PFHPL and evidence to show that the accounts that were put under restraint
were duly disclosed in the books of accounts as well as ITRs.
9.12 The Department states that on examination of the request letters for
lifting the restraint on the bank accounts, it was observed that the Power of
Attorney („PoA‟) that was submitted by the AR of the Petitioner Companies
(Kumra Bhati & Co., Chartered Accountants) was given to the AR by
Mr.Praveen Kumar Pandey, an advocate, who in turn held the General
Power of Attorney („GPA‟) for the 9 companies, which included the 8
Petitioner companies, on behalf of 2 Directors of these companies – Mr.
9.13 The Department‟s counter-affidavit then proceeds to list out the names
of the Directors of the Petitioner Companies on whose behalf letters were
submitted to the Department. It says that Mr. Jadaun, Mr. Pachauri and
Ms.Padmavathy are shown to be the Directors of LIIL and LERL,
Mr.Jadaun, Mr.Pachauri, Mr.Happy Passi are the Directors of LIPL, Mr.
Jadaun and Mr.Ashwani Sehgal are the Directors of EFPL, Mr. Jadaun and
Ms.Padmavathy are the Directors of EFERL, Mr. Jadaun and Mr. Pachauri
are the Directors of Jemma Consultants and Advisors Pvt. Ltd. („JCAPL‟),
Mr. Pachauri and Mr. Sehgal are the Directors of Perpetual Care and
Servicing Pvt. Ltd., Mr. Jadaun and Mr. Sehgal are the Directors of PRDPL,
and Mr. Jadaun and Ms.Padmavathy are the Directors of SCCPL.
9.14 Since the address mentioned in the PoA for both Mr. Jadaun and Mr.
Pachauri was H-II, Madangir, New Delhi, summons under Section 131(1A)
of the Act were issued on the above address and field enquiries were also
made. This address was found to be incomplete andthe correct address was
House No.309, H-II, Madangir, New Delhi. Thereafter, submissions were
recorded of both Mr. Pachauri and Mr. Jadaun between 27th January, 2017
and 30th January, 2017.
9.16 As far as Mr. Jadaun is concerned, he was 22 years old, he, too, was
employed by Mr. Raj Kumar Sehgal at Rs.12,000/- per month to sign as
Director for various companies. He, too, could only sign his name in English
and denied his working understanding of the language. He got a statement
recorded in Hindi. He, too, did not know activities and operation details of
the companies; denied signing the PoA on 19th January, 2017; did not know
the other Directors of the Company except Mr. Pachauri who was his
childhood friend. He also did not know either Mr. Praveen Kumar Pandey or
Kumra Bhatia & Co. and was not aware of the bank accounts in the name of
the companies in RBL. He denied having knowledge of the „Fund
Confirmation Letters‟ bearing his signatures which were submitted to the
Department on behalf of the three Petitioner Companies. He denied having
9.18 The counter-affidavit of the Department further refers to the fact that on
3rd February, 2017, Mr. Nair appeared and filed belated ITRs for seven of
the Petitioner companies. On analysing the data base of the Department it
was revealed that the said Petitioner companies had defaulted in filing the
ITRs. They had filed them only after the search and survey was conducted
by the Department. The details of the filing of the ITRs of the 8 Petitioner
companies for the AY 2015-16 onwards have been set out as Table No. 7 in
the counter-affidavit. The gross total income of 5 of the companies is Rs.0.
PRDPL is shown to have filed no returns. PFHIPL filed a return for AYs
2015-16 and 2016-17 on 14th February, 2017 disclosing a grand income of
Rs. 2,06,46,794 and SCCPL on 2nd February, 2017 for the aforementioned
AYs showing a total income of Rs.20,29,344 and Rs.16,32,462 respectively.
From the Ministry of Corporate Affairs database it was revealed that the
Petitioner companies had also defaulted on a regular basis in filing their
9.20 The Department states that the bank records at RBL showed that Mr.
Mukkar was the beneficial owner of the bank account of the companies
including the Petitioner companies. On the basis of the statements made and
evidence gathered, it was sufficiently established that Mr. Mukkar was the
key person controlling the companies and their bank accounts at RBL. The
Directors of these companies were only dummies and “there is a deliberate
attempt to disprove that the real control and management of these companies
lies with Mr. Mohnish Mohan Mukkar.” A reference was also made to the
amendment to The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act,
2016 and the amended definition of „Benami Transactions‟. It is stated that a
separate satisfaction note was drawn and separate warrants were issued
against each of the Petitioner companies‟ bank accounts for the seizure of
money along with the beneficial owners in these companies‟ bank accounts.
9.21 It is pointed by the Department out that the Petitioner has deliberately
suppressed the fact that they were provided sufficient opportunity and time
to furnish proof regarding the nature and source of funds; that the
Companies‟ Directors, Mr. Pachauri and Mr. Jadaun, were themselves
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 18 of 54
unaware of the request letter seeking lifting of the restraints or even of the
bank accounts. It is stated that at no point in time was the opportunity of
hearing denied to the Petitioner companies. It is stated that “none of these
facts have been placed on record by the Petitioner, thus, disentitling the
Petitioner from any discretionary relief from this Hon'ble Court.”
9.22 With specific reference to the averments in para 5.7 of the Writ Petition
(C) No. 1180 of 2017 in the para-wise reply contained in the Department‟s
counter-affidavit, the Department has stated that the Petitioner had
suppressed the fact that the request letters for lifting of restraint were written
on behalf of the Directors of the Petitioner companies (Mr. Jadaun and Mr.
Pachauri) who, under oath, denied having any knowledge of the said letters
or even the existence of the bank accounts or of the Companies‟ activities. It
is contended that the Petitioners having approached the Department under
Section 132B of the Act for lifting of the restraint, the writ petition was not
maintainable. According to the Department, since the Directors of the
Companies had denied signing the GPA in favour of Mr. Praveen Pandey,
the deponent of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the very
authenticity and veracity of the said writ petition was in question.
10.2 The Petitioners in their rejoinder decide that offence is the best form of
defence. In para 4c, the Petitioners state:
“In the entire counter affidavit, almost the entire energy of the
Department has been diverted to proving the role of Mr. Mohnish
Mukkar in these companies. Without prejudice, and assuming that to
be so, the question is then what? Merely because Mr. Mohnish
Mukkar may be involved, does not entitle the Department to seize the
bank accounts and bring the business to a standstill. The entire
counter affidavit has been unable to suggest even a reasonable
estimate of what the undisclosed income is, or what the assessable
amount could be?"
10.3 It is claimed that the Petitioners being separate legal entities, the
Department cannot seize their bank accounts without the authority of law.
According to the Petitioners, the question whether the money lying in the
bank account would constitute cash in terms of Section 132 of the Act and
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 20 of 54
whether it could be seized is an important question and the Department has
no answer to it. It is submitted that Sections 132 and 132B of the Act do not
confer power to seize the money lying in a bank account. It is submitted that
a bank account, which is a debt owed by the bank towards the account
holder, is an actionable claim in the hands of the account holder and cannot
be seized. According to the Petitioners, the credit standing in a bank account
is not 'money' or 'cash' but rather is a debt owed by the Bank to the
customer. It is contended that there is no power under Section 132B to even
issue a garnishee order.
10.4 It is stated that only under Section 281B of the Act can a restraint order
can be passed by way of attachment, but then again, not for “actual
realization.” Attachment does not mean that a direction can be passed
directing the Bank to pay off the debt to a third party. Further, it is submitted
that the manner of attachment and sale of a person‟s property has been
provided in Part 2 of the II Schedule which is to be read with Rule 20
(which requires issuance of a warrant defining the sum to be realized, which
is absent in the present case). In terms of Rule 26(1)(c)(i), a debt can be
attached only by way of a written order prohibiting the creditor from
recovering the debt and the debtor from making payment thereof until
further orders of the Taxing recovery Officer. It is stated that there is no
power for an actual debit to the bank account and realization of the debt by a
third party such as the Department.
10.6 The rejoinder then sets out the details of the (i) the nature of the
activities of the Petitioner and the revenue stream; (ii) relevant facts leading
to the deposit of cash and search and seizure of relevant documents; (iii)
cooperation extended by Petitioners during and post search; and (iv)
question of law regarding competence of the Department in directing RBL
to issue DDs without an ascertained tax demand against the Petitioners.
10.7 While these details need not be discussed at this stage, it is significant
that for the first time the Petitioners disclose that they can be divided into
two groups of companies i.e., non-banking financial companies („NBFCs‟)
and Special Purpose Vehicles („SPVs‟). It is disclosed again for the first
time in para 1.2 that:
"With the increase of the NPAs in the Banking Sector and in an effort
to attract foreign capital to industries in need of financial and
operational turnaround, in 2015 the Participation Group floated the
SPVs under Emppel Fortitus Private Limited (the Emppel Group) for
and on behalf of a foreign investor, Elfington Limited, with the intent
of having a dedicated platform which would eventually be sold to
Elfington Limited…
The Emppel Group and the Participation were to receive sweat equity
between December of 2016 and January of2017 from Elfington
Limited in Elfington Limited, which was cancelled upon the
discovery by Elfington Limited of the search & seizure action against
Mr. Mohnish Mukkar."
10.9 The rejoinder sets out elaborately the past business relationship with
DHCL and the litigation involving it and seeks to explain the source of the
cash of Rs. 15 crores in cash which was received by Petitioner No.4
(PFHIPL), out of which Rs. 13.43 crores was made available by it to
Petitioner Nos. 2 (LERL), 3 (LIIL) and 6 (LIPL). In para 8 of the rejoinder
as regards Mr. Mukkar, attention is drawn to “ground h of the writ petition,
10.10 It should be recalled at this stage that para 4.6.2.II of the Department's
counter-affidavit sets out in Table 5 the details obtained from RBL showing
that Beneficial Owner No.1 of the accounts of the Petitioners is Mr.
Mohnish Mohan Mukkar and Beneficial Owner No.2 is Kiran Shiv Mukkar.
The Authorised Signatory No.1 in all accounts is Ms. Veena Singh. This
table also shows that there are two accounts for SCCPL. The ninth account
is of EFPL where Beneficial Owner No.1 is Kiran Shiv Mukkar and
Beneficial Owner No.2 is Mr. Mohnish Mohan Mukkar. In para 17 of the
rejoinder it is stated as follows:
"That the averments made in Paragraph 4.6.2.II.,that it was during the
course of survey proceedings that it was discovered that the account
in which cash was deposited had Mr. Mohnish Mohan Mukkar as the
beneficial owner, are denied. The table no. 5 as produced at pg. no. 23
of the counter affidavit merely depicts the cash balance and is in fact
misleading as it portrays Mr. Mohnish Mohan Mukkar as the
beneficial owner and which is factually incorrect in terms of Rule 9-
A(l) of the Prevention of Money Laundering (Maintenance of Record
etc.) Rules, 2005."
10.11 Significantly, the averment of the Department that the said details
were with RBL and provided by RBL to the Department is not denied by the
Petitioners.
10.13. The Petitioners have not filed a rejoinder to the counter-affidavit filed
by RBL. The averments in that affidavit, therefore, remain uncontroverted.
11.2 It is stated that since RBL had placed limits on the amounts that could
be deposited in a single day, funds were deposited on different dates i.e.,
10th, 11th, 12th and 13th November, 2016. It is clear that “appropriate
disclosures regarding the cash deposits were made in a timely fashion on the
online portal established by the Income Tax Department for this purpose and
the Petitioners No. 2, 3 and 6 received e-verification confirmations.”
Therefore, according to Petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and 6, there was no question of
undisclosed income at their hands as they had met their initial and only
substantial burden i.e., disclosure of the party they received cash from.
11.3 The rest of the paragraphs are devoted to demonstrating how the
balances in the accounts of these three Petitioners could not be said to be
undisclosed income and that no warrants of authorisation had been issued
against these companies. It is, accordingly, submitted that an additional
affidavit filed with the ADIT should be rejected.
11.4 Another reply to the Department's additional affidavit has been filed on
behalf of Petitioners 1, 5, 7 and 8. The attempt in this affidavit is to
demonstrate, therefore, that the funds in their accounts “are the proceeds of a
transaction with Religare Finvest Limited” which were made available by it
to enable a “large ticket restructuring.” The fund flow statement confirming
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 26 of 54
the bank statements of Petitioner Nos. 1, 5 and 7 is enclosed. These
Petitioners protest against “lumping all Petitioners and clouding the issue”
by the Department. It is stated that no action under Section 132 was initiated
against these companies; that Petitioner No. 1 was involved in restructuring
related actions and the Petitioners, jointly, have over other 18 litigations
pending at various stages. This reply dated 23rd May, 2017 is also supported
by the affidavit of Mr. Praveen Pandey.
11.5 A separate reply has been filed by Petitioner No.4 (again supported by
the affidavit of Mr. Praveen Pandey). Here, it is stated that at the end of
March 31st, 2015, DCHL owed Petitioner No.4 Rs. 15 crores “which amount
was paid in cash in various instalments in the financial year 2015-2016 and
was set aside to be utilized for another restructuring transaction that
involved payments to labours and contractors that were ordinarily paid in
cash.” In para 6 of this reply, it is stated that “Mr. Shakti Singh by a sworn
affidavit realistically contextualizes his responses to the ADIT and provides
further documentation regarding the account confirmation(s) pertaining to
the cash deposit. Which, evidence, interestingly has already been provided
to ADIT in charge on numerous occasions, but, has not been taken on
record. Annexure.” There is in fact no such Annexure. In para 7 of this
rejoinder statement, it is averred that DCHL had clearly “evaded the
question posed by the Department in order to avoid other sanctions or re-
open a criminal case, which they desperately want closed.”
11.7 Another reply to the additional affidavit of Respondent No.2 has been
filed on behalf of the Petitioners where it is denied that the Petitioners are
„Shell Companies‟. It is stated that they are SPVs involved in transactions
for the purposes of restructuring; that over the past 10 years they have, at
times material to their operations, managed, for their own debt recoveries
and third party actions, a substantial number of entities, which term includes
companies incorporated under the Companies Act and Trusts.” Some
illustrations have been given to show the kind of restructuring that is
undertaken.
11.8 Annexure-1 enclosed with this reply is a copy of the authorisation and
12.2 She states in para 2.5 that her AR filed a series of letters providing
information to the ADIT pursuant to the summons issued to her on 25 th
January, 2017. It is further stated by revocation order dated 6th February,
2017 issued by the ADIT that restraint from 10 out of the 16 bank accounts
was lifted with a direction to RBL to make DDs for the balance available in
the Petitioner‟s accounts in favour of the Department. Pursuant thereto, RBL
debited the accounts of the 9 companies and prepared the DDs amounting to
Rs. 23.14 crores. The information of debit of account of the 9 companies
was received through SMS by the companies. She refers to the fact that
W.P.(C) No. 1180 of 2017 was filed by the companies (in fact there are only
8 companies which filed the writ petition. One of them, SCCL, has two bank
accounts). A reference is also made to the interim order passed by this Court
on 9th February, 2017.
12.3 Ms. Singh states that on 2nd March, 2017, her premises was searched,
the almirah was opened, the contents thereof (cash of Rs. 6,02,000/-) was
12.4 Para 3 of the writ petition sets out the grounds. These are more or less
on the same lines as in W.P.(C) No. 1180 of 2017. Here, additionally, it is
urged that the actions of the Respondents are arbitrary, perverse, malafide,
unreasonable and also in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution of
India. It is stated that restraint was placed on the Petitioner's account when
the object of the search was the undisclosed income of Mr. Mukkar.
12.5 The prayer in W.P. (C) 2375 of 2017 filed on 14th March, 2017, is that
the Court should quash and set aside the actions of the Department,
countermand the DDs and re-credit the funds in the account of the
Petitioner. Interim orders are prayed for in this writ petition as well.
12.6. W.P. (C) 2375 of 2017 was listed first on 14th March, 2017. While
directing notice to issue to the Respondents, the Court on that date restrained
the Department from encashing the DDs till the next date of hearing to the
extent of the amount that had been appropriated from the Petitioner‟s
account. The Petitioner was permitted to operate the account subject to the
above orders. This petition was heard along with W.P.(C) No. 1180/2017 on
19th April, 2017 and since then. The interim orders have continued.
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 32 of 54
Department's counter affidavit in W P (C) 2375 of 2017
13.1 In the reply filed to the Writ Petition (C) No. 2375 of 2017, it is pointed
out by the Department that apart from what has been stated in the counter-
affidavit in response to the petition by the companies, during the search of
Ms. Veena Singh it was found that she had her own account at RBL and had
received Rs.2 crores from an account in the name of EFERL (Petitioner No.
8 in W.P. (C) 1180 of 2017) on 30th August, 2016. When the said account of
EFERL was examined, the source of Rs.2 crores that were transferred to Ms.
Veena Singh was a sum of Rs. 22 crores received from PFHIPL (Petitioner
No. 4 in W.P. (C) 1180 of 2017) on 26th May, 2016. When PFHIPL‟s
account was examined, it was seen that on the same date it had received Rs.
22 crores from EFPL (Petitioner No. 5 in W.P. (C) 1180 of 2017). A
diagrammatic representation of the source of transactions is set out in the
counter-affidavit.
13.2 It is further pointed out that money lying in the bank account of Ms.
Veena Singh was from the same companies whose accounts had been
seized. She was issued summons on 25th January, 2017 asking to disclose
details such as source of deposits etc. and several opportunities on various
dates were provided to her thereafter. It was found that she had wilfully
suppressed information about her financial interest and
directorship/shareholdings in several companies based in Hong Kong and
British Virgin Islands as well as her role in managing these companies and
her authorised signatory status for some of the bank accounts located in
Singapore. These details were withheld by her in her statement recorded on
13.3 The Department states that her AR submitted that Rs.2 crores were
received as a personal loan from EFERL. However, this was not supported
by any documents like a Loan Agreement etc. The confirmation on behalf of
EFERL was signed by Mr. Praveen Pandey as AR. The Directors of EFERL
were Ms. Padmavathy and Mr. Jadaun. Mr. Jadaun had in his statement on
30th January, 2017 denied signing any GPA in favour of Mr. Pandey. The
confirmation of having given the loan to her was signed by Mr. Pandey.
Since the source of money lying in the account of EFERL, PFHIPL and
EFPL could not be satisfactorily explained by those companies, the money
was seized; and the money lying in Ms. Singh‟s account was nothing but
part of the unexplained money in the above accounts. These companies were
controlled by Mr. Mukkar and that is how her account was also seized.
14.2 Each and every legal argument made in the rejoinder of the Petitioners
in W.P. (C) No. 1180 of 2017 has been repeated verbatim by Ms. Veena
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 34 of 54
Singh in her rejoinder. It is submitted that “only money lying as actual cash,
gold etc. can be seized which is available during the search.” It is stated that
the money lying in the bank account is a debt owed by the bank towards the
account holder i.e., an actionable claim in the hands of the account holder
and cannot, therefore, be seized. It is stated that the credit standing in a bank
account is not „money‟ or „cash‟ but rather is a debt owed by the bank to the
customer.
14.3 In her rejoinder, Ms. Veena Singh states that she furnished all the
information and made complete and full disclosure to the Department in
response to the summons issued to her and has enclosed copies of the replies
furnished by her to the various queries raised by the Department. In the
parawise reply, she now submits that “it has never been the case of the
Petitioner that she is not associated with either the Companies or Mr.
Mohnish Mohan Mukkar.” She claimed to have furnished a full disclosure
as regards Rs. 2 crores received by her from EFERL – this was personal loan
given to her by banking channels and that since this pertained to 2016-17
i.e., the ongoing financial year, the relevant declaration “under appropriate
head would be provided in the due course.” She claims that an opportunity
given must be real and effective and not merely notional.
16. Mr Kaushik also referred to the fact that the statement of Mr. Jadaun and
Mr. Pachauri denying that they had signed a GPA authorising Mr. Pandey
raised serious doubts whether Mr. Pandey could have sworn to the affidavit
in support of the petition. He pointed out that it was now sought to be
projected that Mr. Praveen Pandey was authorised by the GPA dated 18th
January, 2017 and a board resolution dated 8th February, 2017. Although the
stamp paper is dated 19th May, 2017, the document has been signed by Mr.
Jadaun on 18th May, 2017.
18. On merits, Mr. Kaushik referred to the decisions in Lan Eseda Steels
Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (1994) 209 ITR 901 (AP)
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 36 of 54
and Sardar Santosh Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2001) 248
ITR 532 (Jharkand) and stated that unexplained bank deposits constitute
income and hence a valuable article was within the meaning of Section
132(1)(c) of the Act. Referring to Section 132(3) of the Act and Section
2(11) of the Black Money Act, he submitted that a bank account is also
recognised as an asset. He submitted that once unaccounted money is
deposited in bank account, it could not be held to be immune from seizure.
The very purpose of Section 132 would be defeated if it was held that
money deposited in account was immune to seizure.
20. It is pointed out that the Petitioners have correctly stated that Mr.
Mohnish Mohan Mukkar is neither a shareholder nor a director and that the
two parent companies i.e., EFPL and EPHIPL are held by Trusts.
22. Mr. Lakshmikumaran, learned counsel appearing for Ms. Veena Singh,
reiterated the stand taken by her in the writ petition and in her rejoinder. He
sought to urge the fact that Ms. Singh mentioning nothing at all in the
petition in the first instance about being an associate of Mr. Mukkar cannot
be construed as suppression of a material fact. In “the factual submissions”
tendered on 26th May, 2017, apart from stating that she renders professional
services to EFPL, Ms. Singh admitted that she was also an authorised
signatory of the bank accounts of each of the Petitioners in W.P. (C) No.
23. The Petitioners in W.P. (C) 1180 of 2017 have also tendered written
submissions after the arguments concluded. Therein it is stated that Mr.
Mukkar was not permitted to be a shareholder or Director but his son, Mr.
Jeh Mohnish Mukkar, is the 100% beneficial owner under the Trusts,
however, under the custody of Mrs. Kiran Shiv Mohan, Mr. Jeh Mukkar‟s
mother. It is stated that the Petitioner companies, whose bank accounts are
the subject matter of restraint, are subsidiaries of EFPL and EPHIPL which
at the top tier are held by the four family trusts, namely, “Sovereign Trustee
& Custodians, Foundation Fiduciaries and Nominees, Elfington FinCorp and
Elfington Holdings, sole beneficiary of which is Master Jeh Mohnish
Mukkar (minor) under the guardianship of Ms. Kiran Shiv Mohan
(grandmother).”
24. In para 12 of the written submissions, the stand of the Department that
the companies could be the benami of Mr. Mukkar is sought to be rejected
since the duly audited accounts of the companies are stated to have been
filed with the Registrar of Companies. It is further stated in para 13 of the
written submissions that “[i]t is also a matter of record that none of these
bank accounts are operated by Mr. Mohnish Mukkar; no moneys have been
deposited therein by Mr. Mohnish Mukkar nor any moneys withdrawn
therefrom for his benefit. The authorized signatory (ies) of the aforesaid
bank accounts as per the bank records are persons other than Mr. Mohnish
Mukkar. In the conspectus of the aforesaid undisputed facts, the Petitioner
26. The attempt in this note of factual submissions is to show that the bank
accounts of the Petitioners cannot be regarded as benami of Mr. Mukkar and
that each of these companies has a separate legal existence and that Mr.
Mukkar has no personal ownership interest nor is he in charge of the affairs
of the Petitioners in a fiduciary or advisory capacity. It is stated that he has
not conducted “any affairs of the Petitioners in his personal capacity.” An
alternative prayer is made that at least the funds of EFERL which are the
proceeds of the joint venture for debt restructuring with Religare Finvest
28. In the first place, it requires to be noticed that both, the 8 Petitioners
companies as well as Ms. Veena Singh have approached this Court claiming
an identical relief viz., the restraint placed by the Department on their
respective bank accounts should be lifted. This restraint, admittedly, was
placed pursuant to the search, seizure and survey undertaken under Sections
132 and 133 of the Act on 11th January, 2017 and 4th February, 2017 at the
various residences and business premises of Mr. Mohnish Mohan Mukkar
and his associates, employees etc. It is not in dispute that the search
authorization was issued in the name of Mr. Mukkar.
29. Section 132(1) of the Act envisages that a person could be in possession
of undisclosed income not only in his or her own bank account but in the
bank account of someone else. Therefore, it could be parked in somebody
else's account. The legislature has deliberately prefaced the words „safe‟,
„locker‟, „place‟, „books of account‟ etc. with the word „any‟ and not „his‟ or
„her‟ or „its‟. Section 132(1) of the Act requires the satisfaction note in the
case of Mr. Mukkar to reflect the Department's “reason to believe” that Mr.
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 41 of 54
Mukkar's undisclosed income is in the bank accounts of the Petitioner
companies and of Ms Veena Singh. In such event, it is not necessary that
there must be a separate search warrant in the names of the Petitioner
companies and Ms. Veena Singh for there to be search and seizure of their
respective bank accounts.
31. As far as the 8 Petitioner companies in W.P. (C) No. 1180 of 2017 are
concerned, they asserted in paras 5 and 7 of the writ petition that “the said
entities have no relation to Mr. Mohnish Mohan Mukkar in his personal
capacity, and Mr. Mukkar is neither a shareholder nor a Director in the said
companies”. The Petitioners presumed they were being clever by using the
words „personal capacity‟ and adding that Mr. Mukkar was neither a
shareholder nor a Director in their companies. That these disclaimers were
made with a view to mislead the Court into believing that the Petitioner had
nothing to do with Mr. Mukkar is apparent in light of the details provided by
RBL to the Department which show that in the nine accounts maintained
with RBL of these 8 companies, Mr. Mukkar is Beneficial Owner No.1 in
eight of them and his mother in the ninth account.
33. Also, the Petitioners have not filed any rejoinder to deny the assertion by
RBL in its separate counter-affidavit that: “the Petitioner in the writ petition
has averred that Mr. Mohnish Mukkar has no concern with the said
accounts, which statement/averment is false to the knowledge of the
Petitioner. It is submitted that at the time of opening of accounts, the
Petitioner had given a categorical declaration that Mr. Mohnish Mukkar is
the beneficial owner of the accounts of the Petitioner and now, for the
reasons best known to the Petitioner, the Petitioner has made the false
averment. Thus, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed for
concealment of material facts.”
34. On the contrary, in their written submissions tendered to the Court, the
Petitioners have confirmed the following statement in RBL's counter-
affidavit: “It is further submitted that on 15.05.2017, the Answering
Respondent has received a request from the Petitioner Companies to update
35. The above facts, which were material facts in the context of the search of
Mr. Mukkar by the Department, were in the knowledge of the Petitioners
and yet they persisted with the false and misleading statement that they have
no relation with Mr. Mukkar “in his personal capacity”. The fact that he may
neither be a shareholder nor a Director in any of them is of little significance
when in fact he is Beneficial Owner No.1 in their bank accounts. Their mere
dismissal of the details available in the records of RBL as being „incorrect‟
is without basis and cannot enable them to escape the consequences of
making false and misleading statements on affidavit on more than one
occasion in these proceedings.
36. The brazenness of the conduct of the Petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 1180 of
2017 is even more evident when they pose the query in their rejoinder –
“Without prejudice, and assuming that to be so, the question is then what?”
If this is the understanding of a litigant of the duty they owe to the Court,
then they require to be reminded that there is no excuse for a litigant not to
be utterly truthful and place before it all the facts within their knowledge.
This attempt by the Petitioners to obtain interim orders by speaking half-
38. The fact that pursuant to the search authorization issued in the name of
Mr. Mukkar, the bank accounts of the Petitioner companies were frozen
necessitated them having to make a full and complete disclosure of all the
material facts within their knowledge concerning Mr. Mukkar in the petition
filed in this Court. However, the Petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 1180 of 2017
have miserably failed to do. They have deliberately suppressed material
facts and have persisted in that conduct even after the facts were brought to
light by the Department in its counter-affidavit.
39. The case of Ms. Veena Singh, the Petitioner in W. P. (C) No. 2375 of
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 45 of 54
2017, is equally inexcusable. In her petition as originally filed, she is silent
about her being authorised signatory No.1 of the 9 bank accounts maintained
by the 8 Petitioner companies in W.P. (C) 1180 of 2017, Beneficial Owner
No.1 of eight of them being Mr. Mukkar. She has no convincing explanation
for suppressing this material fact which had a direct bearing on the action of
the Department in attaching her bank account.
41. Ms. Singh admits to being associated with at least one of the companies
in her professional capacity. She should be aware of the consequences of
suppressing the fact that she is authorized signatory No.1 of the bank
accounts of all 8 companies with RBL. And in these bank accounts, Mr.
Mukkar is Beneficial Owner No.1. The suppression of these material facts,
which were within her knowledge, in her petition is, therefore, not
excusable.
43. The suppression of material facts by both Petitioners in W.P. (C) 1180 of
2017 and 2375 of 2017 cannot but be viewed as deliberate. The Court is
satisfied that the Petitioners have not come to Court with clean hands and do
not deserve to be granted any of the reliefs prayed for by them.
44. The Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Unless there are extenuating circumstances that render the
statutory remedies illusory or inefficacious or ineffective for various
reasons, the Court is slow to entertain writ petitions that challenge the
exercise of statutory powers. Having the jurisdiction to entertain a writ
petition is one thing but the actual exercise of the jurisdiction to entertain it
is another. Nevertheless, every litigant seeking to persuade the Court to
exercise its writ jurisdiction, or for that matter in any other jurisdiction, must
be prepared to state the full facts within the knowledge of such litigant. This
is a non-compromisable bare minimum requirement that must be fulfilled if
the Court should exercise its jurisdiction to grant relief to a litigant.
45. The consequences of not making a clean breast of all facts within the
knowledge of a litigant before a Court has serious consequences. In S. P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath AIR 1994 SC 853, the Supreme Court
reminded:
46. In S.J.S. Enterprises v. State of Bihar (2004) 7 SCC 166,it was held:
48. In the present case, both Petitioners not only suppressed material facts in
their petitions in the first place, but after this was pointed out in the
Department‟s counter-affidavit, the Petitioners were most casual in their
49. The above findings by themselves are sufficient to dismiss both petitions
with exemplary costs. Nevertheless, since the issue regarding the powers of
the Department to require RBL to prepare DDs for the amounts in the
accounts that were frozen has been argued at length, the Court proceeds to
discuss the issue.
51. There is a fallacy as to the presumption of the Petitioners in both the writ
petitions that monies lying in their bank accounts cannot possibly belong to
Mr. Mukkar in whose name the search authorization had been issued. Prima
facie there appears to be a strong case made by the Department that the
money in the said bank accounts is, in fact, the undisclosed income of Mr.
Mukkar. There appears to be sufficient justification at this stage for the
Department to proceed to attach the bank accounts.
53. For the purposes of the present petitions, the emphasis would be on the
expression “any money” and “other valuable article or thing”. The context in
which these words occur cannot possibly exclude money in a bank account.
The contention that this could only mean „cash‟ and not money in a bank
account may be an attractive argument but not in the context in which the
above expression occurs. It is certainly a valuable thing. In other words, a
sum in a bank account is not outside the ambit of Section 132(1) of the Act
and can be subject to search and seizure.
55. The second proviso to Section 132(1) read with Section 132(3) permits
the Department to require the bank in which the account that is subject to
search is located to freeze it since it may not be possible “to take physical
possession" immediately of such “valuable article or thing and remove it to a
safe place.”Section 132B deals with the powers of the authorised officer to
deal with the valuable thing which has been so seized and the conditions on
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 51 of 54
which the restraint placed may be lifted.
56. It requires to be also noted at this stage that the rejection of the
Petitioners‟ representations under the proviso to Section 132B of the Act has
not yet been challenged. It will be open to the Petitioners to seek appropriate
remedies in that regard.
57. The assertion by both sets of Petitioners that this is „realization‟ of the
debt owed by the bank to the Petitioners and that the amount therein cannot
be transferred to the Department is based on an incorrect understanding of
the legal position under Section 281B of the Act. The said provision states
that in order to protect the interests of the Revenue, it may be necessary to
go in for a provisional attachment. Therefore, the direction issued to RBL by
the Department does not mean that the money is finally taken over by the
Revenue. It will undoubtedly be kept in a suspense account like a PD
Account to await the final orders in the assessment proceedings and the
issues raised as a consequence thereof. For this purpose, as already
observed, the argument that this does not constitute „assets‟ or „money‟
within the meaning of Section 132(1) read with Section 133 of the Act has
not merit.
58. The decisions citied by learned counsel for the Petitioners do not appear
to have discussed the purport of Section 281B of the Act which has a direct
bearing in this case. The Department has been able to demonstrate at this
stage that the monies in these bank accounts were essentially the undisclosed
income of the 'key person' i.e. Mr. Mukkar. The restraint order under Section
132(3) of the Act passed in this case was but a logical corollary of the search
W.P.(C) 1180/2017& W.P.(C) No.2375/2017 Page 52 of 54
action and permissible under the Act. Consequently, even on merits, not
even a prima facie case has been made out by either of the Petitioners.
59. The Court, however, clarifies that the above observations on merits is
only in order to deal with the submissions made by the Petitioners at this
stage and is not intended to influence the further proceedings in the matter
including the assessment proceedings and thereafter. Those will be decided
on merits uninfluenced by the above prima facie observations.
Conclusion
60. For the aforementioned reasons, the interim order dated 9th February,
2017 passed by this Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1180 of 2017 and the
interim order dated 14th March, 2017 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2375 of
2017 which have continued thereafter are hereby vacated. Both these writ
petitions are dismissed with costs of Rs. 1 lakh each which will be paid by
the Petitioners to the Department within four weeks from today.
(i) Both sets of Petitioners i.e., the 8 companies who are Petitioners in W.P.
(C) 1180 of 2017 as well as their authorised representative, Mr. Praveen
Pandey, who is the deponent in support of the petitions and rejoinders and
replies filed by them, and Ms. Veena Singh, the Petitioner in W.P. (C) 2375
of 2017 have given false affidavits in the present proceedings before this
62. The Court is satisfied that both sets of Petitioners i.e., the 8 Petitioners in
W.P. (C) 1180 of 2017 as well as their AR, Mr. Praveen Pandey and Ms.
Veena Singh, the Petitioner in W.P. (C) 2375 of 2017, have made deliberate
false statements on oath and have also suppressed material facts in the
pleadings before this Court with a clear attempt to mislead the Court.
Having regard to the impact this has on the administration of justice, the
Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for a complaint being
filed against the above persons to be prosecuted under Section 193 IPC.
63. The Court, therefore, directs the Registrar General of this Court to
forthwith file, on the basis of this judgment, a written complaint before the
concerned appropriate Court against the aforementioned persons under
Section 340 read with Section 197 Cr PC thereof.
S. MURALIDHAR, J
CHANDER SHEKHAR, J
MAY 29, 2017
‘anb’/dn/rk