Country Risk: Determinants, Measures and Implications – The 2015

Edition

Updated: July 2015

Aswath Damodaran
Stern School of Business
adamodar@stern.nyu.edu
 Country Risk: Determinants, Measures and Implications – The 2015
Edition

Abstract
As companies and investors globalize, we are increasingly faced with estimation
questions about the risk associated with this globalization. When investors invest in
China Mobile, Infosys or Vale, they may be rewarded with higher returns but they are
also exposed to additional risk. When Siemens and Apple push for growth in Asia and
Latin America, they clearly are exposed to the political and economic turmoil that often
characterize these markets. In practical terms, how, if at all, should we adjust for this
additional risk? We will begin the paper with an overview of overall country risk, its
sources and measures. We will continue with a discussion of sovereign default risk and
examine sovereign ratings and credit default swaps (CDS) as measures of that risk. We
will extend that discussion to look at country risk from the perspective of equity
investors, by looking at equity risk premiums for different countries and consequences
for valuation. In the final section, we will argue that a company’s exposure to country
risk should not be determined by where it is incorporated and traded. By that measure,
neither Coca Cola nor Nestle are exposed to country risk. Exposure to country risk should
come from a company’s operations, making country risk a critical component of the
valuation of almost every large multinational corporation. We will also look at how to
move across currencies in valuation and capital budgeting, and how to avoid
mismatching errors.
 Globalization has been the dominant theme for investors and businesses over the
last two decades. As we shift from the comfort of local markets to foreign ones, we face
questions about whether investments in different countries are exposed to different
amounts of risk, whether this risk is diversifiable in global portfolios and whether we
should be demanding higher returns in some countries, for the same investments, than in
others. In this paper, we propose to answer all three questions.
In the first part, we begin by taking a big picture view of country risk, its sources
and its consequences for investors, companies and governments. We then move on to
assess the history of government defaults over time as well as sovereign ratings and credit
default swaps (CDS) as measures of sovereign default risk. In the third part, we extend
the analysis to look at investing in equities in different countries by looking at whether
equity risk premiums should vary across countries, and if they do, how best to estimate
these premiums. In the final part, we look at the implications of differences in equity risk
premiums across countries for the valuation of companies.

Country Risk
Are you exposed to more risk when you invest in some countries than others? The
answer is obviously affirmative but analyzing this risk requires a closer look at why risk
varies across countries. In this section, we begin by looking at why we care about risk
differences across countries and break down country risk into constituent (though inter
related) parts. We also look at services that try to measure country risk and whether these
country risk measures can be used by investors and businesses.

Why we care!

The reasons we pay attention to country risk are pragmatic. In an environment

where growth often is global and the economic fates of countries are linked together, we
are all exposed to variations in country risk in small and big ways.
Let’s start with investors in financial markets. Heeding the advice of experts,
investors in many developed markets have expanded their portfolios to include non-
domestic companies. They have been aided in the process by an explosion of investment
options ranging from listings of foreign companies on their markets (ADRs in the US
markets, GDRs in European markets) to mutual funds that specialize in emerging or
foreign markets (both active and passive) and exchange-traded funds (ETFs). While this
diversification has provided some protection against some risks, it has also exposed
investors to political and economic risks that they are unfamiliar with, including
nationalization and government overthrows. Even those investors who have chosen to
stay invested in domestic companies have been exposed to emerging market risk
indirectly because of investments made by these companies.
Building on the last point, the need to understand, analyze and incorporate
country risk has also become a priority at most large corporations, as they have
globalized and become more dependent upon growth in foreign markets for their success.
Thus, a chemical company based in the United States now has to decide whether the
hurdle rate (or cost of capital) that it uses for a new investment should be different for a
new plant that it is considering building in Brazil, as opposed to the United States, and if
so, how best to estimate these country-specific hurdle rates.
Finally, governments are not bystanders in this process, since their actions often
have a direct effect on country risk, with increased country risk often translating into less
foreign investment in the country, leading to lower economic growth and potentially
political turmoil, which feeds back into more country risk.

Sources of country risk

If we accept the common sense proposition that your exposure to risk can vary
across countries, the next step is looking at the sources that cause this variation. Some of
the variation can be attributed to where a country is in the economic growth life cycle,
with countries in early growth being more exposed to risk than mature companies. Some
of it can be explained by differences in political risk, a category that includes everything
from whether the country is a democracy or dictatorship to how smoothly political power
is transferred in the country. Some variation can be traced to the legal system in a
country, in terms of both structure (the protection of property rights) and efficiency (the
speed with which legal disputes are resolved). Finally, country risk can also come from
an economy’s disproportionate dependence on a particular product or service. Thus,
countries that derive the bulk of their economic output from one commodity (such as oil)
or one service (insurance) can be devastated when the price of that commodity or the
demand for that service plummets.

Life Cycle

In company valuation, where a company is in its life cycle can affect its exposure
to risk. Young, growth companies are more exposed to risk partly because they have
limited resources to overcome setbacks and partly because they are far more dependent
on the macro environment staying stable to succeed. The same can be said about
countries in the life cycle, with countries that are in early growth, with few established
business and small markets, being more exposed to risk than larger, more mature
countries.
We see this phenomenon in both economic and market reactions to shocks. A
global recession generally takes a far greater toll of small, emerging markets than it does
in mature markets, with biggest swings in economic growth and employment. Thus, a
typical recession in mature markets like the United States or Germany may translate into
only a 1-2% drop in the gross domestic products of these countries and a good economic
year will often result in growth of 3-4% in the overall economy. In an emerging market, a
recession or recovery can easily translate into double-digit growth, in positive or negative
terms. In markets, a shock to global markets will travel across the world, but emerging
market equities will often show much greater reactions, both positive and negative to the
same news. For instance, the banking crisis of 2008, which caused equity markets in the
United States and Western Europe to drop by about 25%-30%, resulted in drops of 50%
or greater in many emerging markets.
The link between life cycle and economic risk is worth emphasizing because it
illustrates the limitations on the powers that countries have over their exposure to risk. A
country that is still in the early stages of economic growth will generally have more risk
exposure than a mature country, even it is well governed and has a solid legal system.

Political Risk

While a country’s risk exposure is a function of where it is in the growth cycle,

that risk exposure can be affected by the political system in place in that country, with
some systems clearly augmenting risk far more than others.
 a. Continuous versus Discontinuous Risk: Let’s start with the first and perhaps
trickiest question on whether democratic countries are less or more risky than
their authoritarian counterparts. Investors and companies that value government
stability (and fixed policies) sometimes choose the latter, because a strong
government can essentially lock in policies for the long term and push through
changes that a democracy may never be able to do or do only in steps. The
cautionary note that should be added is that while the chaos of democracy does
create more continuous risk (policies that change as governments shift),
dictatorships create more discontinuous risk. While change may happen
infrequently in an authoritarian system, it is also likely to be wrenching and
difficult to protect against. It is also worth noting that the nature of authoritarian
systems is such that the more stable policies that they offer can be accompanied
by other costs (political corruption and ineffective legal systems) that overwhelm
the benefits of policy stability.
The trade off between the stability (artificial though it might be) of
dictatorships and the volatility of democracy makes it difficult to draw a strong
conclusion about which system is more conducive to higher economic growth.
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) provide a summary of the studies through 1993
on the link between economic growth and democracy and report mixed results.1
Of the 19 studies that they quote, seven find that dictatorships grow faster, seven
conclude that democracies grow at a higher rate and five find no difference. In an
interesting twist, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silane and Shleifer (2004) argue
that it is not political institutions that create growth but that economic growth that
allows countries to become more democratic.2
b. Corruption and Side Costs: Investors and businesses have to make decisions
based upon rules or laws, which are then enforced by a bureaucracy. If those who
enforce the rules are capricious, inefficient or corrupt in their judgments, there is a
cost imposed on all who operate under the system. Transparency International

1 Przeworski, A. and F. Limongi, 1993, Political Regimes and Economic Growth, The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, v7, 51-69.
2 Glaeser, E.L., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silane, A. Shleifer, 2004, Do Institutions cause Growth?, NBER
Working Paper # 10568.
 tracks perceptions of corruption across the globe, using surveys of experts living
and working in different countries, and ranks countries from most to least corrupt.
Based on the scores from these surveys,3 Transparency International also provides
a listing of the ten least and most corrupt countries in the world in table 1 (with
higher scores indicating less corruption) for 2014. The entire table is reproduced
in Appendix 1.
Table 1: Most and Least Corrupt Countries – 2014
Least Corrupt Most corrupt
Country Score Country Score
Denmark 92 Korea (North) 8
New Zealand 91 Somalia 8
Finland 89 Sudan 11
Sweden 87 Afghanistan 12
Norway 86 South Sudan 15
Switzerland 86 Iraq 16
Singapore 84 Turkmenistan 17
Netherlands 83 Eritrea 18
Luxembourg 82 Libya 18
Canada 81 Uzbekistan 18
Source: Transparency International
In business terms, it can be argued that corruption is an implicit tax on income
(that does not show up in conventional income statements as such) that reduces
the profitability and returns on investments for businesses in that country directly
and for investor s in these businesses indirectly. Since the tax is not specifically
stated, it is also likely to be more uncertain than an explicit tax, especially if there
are legal sanctions that can be faced as a consequence, and thus add to total risk.
c. Physical violence: Countries that are in the midst of physical conflicts, either
internal or external, will expose investors/businesses to the risks of these
conflicts. Those costs are not only economic (taking the form of higher costs for
buying insurance or protecting business interests) but are also physical (with
employees and managers of businesses facing harm). Figure 1 provides a measure
of violence around the world in the form of a Global Peace Index map generated

3 See Transperancy.org for specifics on how they come up with corruption scores and update them.
 and updated every year by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The entire list is
provided in Appendix 2.4
Figure 1: Global Peace Index in 2014

Source: Institute for Peace and Economics

d. Nationalization/Expropriation risk: If you invest in a business and it does well, the
pay off comes in the form of higher profits (if you are a business) or higher value
(if you are an investor). If your profits can be expropriated by the business (with
arbitrary and specific taxes imposed just upon you) or your business can be
nationalized (with you receiving well below the fair value as compensation), you
will be less likely to invest and more likely to perceive risk in the investment.
Some businesses seem to be more exposed to nationalization risk than others,
with natural resource companies at the top of the target list. An Ernst and Young
assessment of risks facing mining companies in 2012, lists nationalization at the
very top of the list of risk in 2012, a stark contrast with the list in 2008, where
nationalization was ranked eighth of the top ten risks.5

4 See http://www.visionofhumanity.org..
5 Business Risks facing mining and metals, 2012-2013, Ernst & Young, www.ey.com.
Legal Risk

Investors and businesses are dependent upon legal systems that respect their
property rights and enforce those rights in a timely manner. To the extent that a legal
system fails on one or both counts, the consequences are negative not only for those who
are immediately affected by the failing but for potential investors who have to build in
this behavior into their expectations. Thus, if a country allows insiders in companies to
issue additional shares to themselves at well below the market price without paying heed
to the remaining shareholders, potential investors in these companies will pay less (or
even nothing) for shares. Similarly, companies considering starting new ventures in that
country may determine that they are exposed to the risk of expropriation and either
demand extremely high returns or not invest at all.
It is worth emphasizing, though, that legal risk is a function not only of whether it
pays heed to property and contract rights, but also how efficiently the system operates. If
enforcing a contract or property rights takes years or even decades, it is essentially the
equivalent of a system that does not protect these rights in the first place, since neither
investors nor businesses can wait in legal limbo for that long. A group of non-
government organizations has created an international property rights index, measuring
the protection provided for property rights in different countries.6 The summary results,
by region, are provided in table 2, with the ranking from best protection (highest scores)
to worst in 2014:
Table 2: Property Right Protection by Region
Legal
Overall Property Physical Intellectual
Region property rights rights Property rights Property rights
North America 5.23 4.95 5.76 4.98
Western Europe 5.19 4.91 5.73 4.92
Central/Eastern
Europe 4.78 4.64 5.47 4.22
Asia & Oceania 4.77 4.42 5.44 4.44
Middle East &
North Africa 4.76 4.61 5.42 4.26
Latin America 4.57 4.23 5.23 4.25
Africa 4.53 4.26 5.17 4.16

6 See the International Property Rights Index, http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/ranking

Source: International Property Rights Index

Based on these measures, property right protections are strongest in North America and
weakest in Latin America and Africa. In an interesting illustration of differences within
geographic regions, within Latin America, Chile ranks 24th in the world in property
protection rights but Argentina and Venezuela fall towards the bottom of the rankings.

Economic Structure

Some countries are dependent upon a specific commodity, product or service for
their economic success. That dependence can create additional risk for investors and
businesses, since a drop in the commodity’s price or demand for the product/service can
create severe economic pain that spreads well beyond the companies immediately
affected. Thus, if a country derives 50% of its economic output from iron ore, a drop in
the price of iron ore will cause pain not only for mining companies but also for retailers,
restaurants and consumer product companies in the country.
In a comprehensive study of commodity dependent countries, the United National
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) measures the degree of dependence
upon commodities across emerging markets and figure 2 reports the statistics.7 Note the
disproportional dependence on commodity exports that countries in Africa and Latin
America have, making their economies and markets very sensitive to changes in
commodity prices.

7 The State of Commodity Dependence 2014, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/suc2014d7_en.pdf
 Figure 2: Commodity Dependence of Countries

Why don’t countries that derive a disproportionate amount of their economy from
a single source diversify their economies? That is easier said than done, for two reasons.
First, while it is feasible for larger countries like Brazil, India and China to try to broaden
their economic bases, it is much more difficult for small countries like Peru or Angola to
do the same. Like small companies, these small countries have to find a niche where
there can specialize, and by definition, niches will lead to over dependence upon one or a
few sources. Second, and this is especially the case with natural resource dependent
countries, the wealth that can be created by exploiting the natural resource will usually be
far greater than using the resources elsewhere in the economy. Put differently, if a
country with ample oil reserves decides to diversify its economic base by directing its
resources into manufacturing or service businesses, it may have to give up a significant
portion of near term growth for a long-term objective of having a more diverse economy.

Measuring country risk

As the discussion in the last section should make clear, country risk can come
from many different sources. While we have provided risk measures on each dimension,
it would be useful to have composite measures of risk that incorporate all types of
country risk. These composite measures should incorporate all of the dimensions of risk
and allow for easy comparisons across countries

Risk Services

There are several services that attempt to measure country risk, though not always
from the same perspective or for the same audience. For instance, Political Risk Services
(PRS) provides numerical measures of country risk for more than a hundred countries.8
The service is commercial and the scores are made available only to paying members, but
PRS uses twenty two variables to measure risk in countries on three dimensions: political,
financial and economic. It provides country risk scores on each dimension separately, as
well as a composite score for the country. The scores range from zero to one hundred,
with high scores (80-100) indicating low risk and low scores indicating high risk. In the
July 2015 update, the 15 countries that emerged as safest and riskiest are listed in table 3:
Table 3: Highest and Lowest Risk Countries: PRS Scores (July 2015)
Riskiest Countries Safest Countries
Composite PRS Composite PRS
Country Score Country Score
Syria 35.3 Switzerland 88.5
Somalia 41.8 Norway 88.3
Sudan 46.8 Singapore 85.8
Liberia 49.8 Luxembourg 84.8
Libya 50.3 Brunei 84.5
Guinea 50.8 Sweden 84.5
Venezuela 52.0 Germany 83.5
Yemen, Republic 53.8 Taiwan 83.3
Ukraine 54.0 Canada 83.0
Niger 54.3 Qatar 82.3
United
Zimbabwe 55.3 Kingdom 81.8
Korea, D.P.R. 55.8 Denmark 81.3
Korea,
Mozambique 55.8 Republic 81.0
Congo, Dem.
Republic 56.0 New Zealand 81.0
Belarus 57.5 Hong Kong 80.8
Source: Political Risk Services (PRS)

8 See http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx#RiskForecasts for a discussion of the factors

that PRS considers in assessing country risk scores.
In addition to providing current assessments, PRS provides forecasts of country risk
scores for the countries that it follows. Appendix 3 provides a grouped summary of how
countries score on the PRS risk score in July 2015.
There are other services that attempt to do what PRS does, with difference in both
how the scores are developed and what they measure. Euromoney has country risk
scores, based on surveys of 400 economists that range from zero to one hundred.9 It
updates these scores, by country and region, at regular intervals. The Economist
developed its own variant on country risk scores that are developed internally, based
upon currency risk, sovereign debt risk and banking risk. The World Bank provides a
collected resource base that draws together risk measures from different services into one
database of governance indicators.10 There are six indicators provided for 215 countries,
measuring corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality,
rule of law and voice/accountability, with a scaling around zero, with negative numbers
indicating more risk and positive numbers less risk.

Limitations

The services that measure country risk with scores provide some valuable
information about risk variations across countries, but it is unclear how useful these
measures are for investors and businesses interested in investing in emerging markets for
many reasons:
• Measurement models/methods: Many of the entities that develop the methodology
and convert them into scores are not business entities and consider risks that may
have little relevance for businesses. In fact, the scores in some of these services
are more directed at policy makers and macroeconomists than businesses.
• No standardization: The scores are not standardized and each service uses it own
protocol. Thus, higher scores go with lower risk with PRS and Euromoney risk
measures but with higher risk in the Economist risk measure. The World Bank’s
measures of risk are scaled around zero, with more negative numbers indicating
higher risk.

9 http://www.euromoney.com/Poll/10683/PollsAndAwards/Country-Risk.html
10 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators
 • More rankings than scores: Even if you stay with the numbers from one service,
the country risk scores are more useful for ranking the countries than for
measuring relative risk. Thus, a country with a risk score of 80, in the PRS
scoring mechanism, is safer than a country with a risk score of 40, but it would be
dangerous to read the scores to imply that it is twice as safe.
In summary, as data gets richer and easier to access, there will be more services
trying to measure country risk and even more divergences in approaches and
measurement mechanisms.

Sovereign Default Risk

The most direct measure of country risk is a measure of default risk when lending
to the government of that country. This risk, termed sovereign default risk, has a long
history of measurement attempts stretching back to the nineteenth century. In this section,
we begin by looking at the history of sovereign defaults, both in foreign currency and
local currency terms, and follow up by looking at measures of sovereign default risk,
ranging from sovereign ratings to market-based measures.

A history of sovereign defaults

In this section, we will examine the history of sovereign default, by first looking
at governments that default on foreign currency debt (which is understandable) and then
looking at governments that default on local currency debt (which is more difficult to
explain).

Foreign Currency Defaults

Through time, many governments have been dependent on debt borrowed from
other countries (or banks in those countries), usually denominated in a foreign currency.
A large proportion of sovereign defaults have occurred with this type of sovereign
borrowing, as the borrowing country finds its short of the foreign currency to meet its
obligations, without the recourse of being able to print money in that currency. Starting
with the most recent history from 2000-2014, sovereign defaults have mostly been on
foreign currency debt, starting with a relatively small default by Ukraine in January 2000,
followed by the largest sovereign default of the last decade with Argentina in November
2001. Table 4 lists the sovereign defaults, with details of each:
 Table 4: Sovereign Defaults: 2000-2014
Default
Date Country $ Value of Details
Defaulted
Debt
Defaulted on DM and US dollar
January Ukraine $1,064 m denominated bonds. Offered exchange for
2000 longer term, lower coupon bonds to
lenders.
Missed payment on Brady bonds.
September Peru $4,870 m
2000
Missed payment on foreign currency debt
November Argentina $82,268 m in November 2001. Debt was restructured.
2001
Missed payment on bond but bought back
January Moldova $145 m 50% of bonds, before defaulting.
2002
Contagion effect from Argentina led to
May 2003 Uruguay $5,744 m currency crisis and default.
Debt exchange, replacing higher interest
July 2003 Nicaragua $320 m rate debt with lower interest rate debt.
Defaulted on debt and exchanged for new
April 2005 Dominican $1,622 m bonds with longer maturity.
Republic
Defaulted on bonds and exchanged for
December Belize $242 m new bonds with step-up coupons
2006
Failed to make interest payment of $30.6
December Ecuador $510 m million on the bonds.
2008
Completed a debt exchange resulting in a
February Jamaica $7.9 billion loss of between 11% and 17% of
2010 principal.
Defaulted on Eurobonds.
January Ivory Coast $2.3 billion
2011
US Judge ruled that Argentina could not
July 2014 Argentina $13 billion pay current bondholders unless old debt
holders also got paid.

Going back further in time, sovereign defaults have occurred have occurred frequently
over the last two centuries, though the defaults have been bunched up in eight periods. A
survey article on sovereign default, Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2007) summarizes
defaults over time for most countries in Europe and Latin America and their findings are
captured in table 5:11

Table 5: Defaults over time: 1820-2003

1824- 1867- 1890- 1911- 1931- 1976- 1998-
34 82 1900 1921 40 89 2003
Europe
Austria 1868 1914 1932
Bulgaria 1915 1932
Germany 1932
Greece 1824 1893
Hungary 1931
Italy 1940
Moldova 2002
Poland 1936 1981
Portugal 1834 1892
Romania 1915 1933 1981
Russia 1917 1998
Serbia-
Yugoslavia 1895 1933 1983
Spain 1831 1867
Turkey 1976 1915 1940 1978
Ukraine 1998

Latin America
Argentina 1830 1890 1915 1930 1982 2001
Bolivia 1874 1931 1980
Brazil 1826 1898 1914 1931 1983
Chile 1826 1880 1931 1983
Columbia 1826 1879 1900 1932
Costa Rica 1827 1874 1895 1937 1983
Cuba 1933 1982
Dominica 2003
Dominican
Republic 1869 1899 1931 1982
Ecuador 1832 1868 1911, '14 1931 1982 1999
El Salvador 1827 1921 1931

11 J.C. Hatchondo, L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza, 2007, The Economics of Sovereign Default, Economic
Quarterly, v93, pg 163-187.
 Guatemala 1828 1876 1894 1933
Honduras 1827 1873 1914 1981
Mexico 1827 1867 1914 1982
Nicaragua 1828 1894 1911 1932 1980
Panama 1932 1982
Paraguay 1827 1874 1892 1920 1932 1986
Peru 1826 1876 1931 1983
Uruguay 1876 1892 1983 2003
Venezuela 1832 1878 1892 1982

While table 5 does not list defaults in Asia and Africa, there have been defaults in those
regions over the last 50 years as well.
In a study of sovereign defaults between 1975 and 2004, Standard and Poor’s notes
the following facts about the phenomenon:12
1. Countries have been more likely to default on bank debt owed than on sovereign
bonds issued. Figure 3 summarizes default rates on each:
Figure 3: Percent of Sovereign Debt in Default

Note that while bank loans were the only recourse available to governments that wanted
to borrow prior to the 1960s, sovereign bond markets have expanded access in the last

12 S&P Ratings Report, “Sovereign Defaults set to fall again in 2005, September 28, 2004.
few decades. Defaults since then have been more likely on foreign currency debt than on
foreign currency bonds.

2. In dollar value terms, Latin American countries have accounted for much of
sovereign defaulted debt in the last 50 years. Figure 4 summarizes the statistics:
Figure 4: Sovereign Default by Region

In fact, the 1990s represent the only decade in the last 5 decades, where Latin
American countries did not account for 60% or more of defaulted sovereign debt.

Since Latin America has been at the epicenter of sovereign default for most of the last
two centuries, we may be able to learn more about why default occurs by looking at its
history, especially in the nineteenth century, when the region was a prime destination for
British, French and Spanish capital. Lacking significant domestic savings and possessing
the allure of natural resources, the newly independent countries of Latin American
countries borrowed heavily, usually in foreign currency or gold and for very long
maturities (exceeding 20 years). Brazil and Argentina also issued domestic debt, with
gold clauses, where the lender could choose to be paid in gold. The primary trigger for
default was military conflicts between countries or coups within, with weak institutional
structures exacerbating the problems. Of the 77 government defaults between 1820 and
1914, 58 were in Latin America and as figure 5 indicates, these countries collectively
spent 38% of the period between 1820 and 1940 in default.

Figure 5: Latin America - The Sovereign Default Epicenter

The percentage of years that each country spent in default during the entire period is in
parentheses next to the country; for instance, Honduras spent 79% of the 115 years in
default.

Local Currency Defaults

While defaulting on foreign currency debt draws more headlines, some of the
countries listed in tables 2 and 3 also defaulted contemporaneously on domestic currency
debt.13 A survey of defaults by S&P since 1975 notes that 23 issuers have defaulted on
local currency debt, including Argentina (2002-2004), Madagascar (2002), Dominica

13 In 1992, Kuwait defaulted on its local currency debt, while meeting its foreign currency obligations.
(2003-2004), Mongolia (1997-2000), Ukraine (1998-2000), and Russia (1998-1999).
Russia’s default on $39 billion worth of ruble debt stands out as the largest local currency
default since Brazil defaulted on $62 billion of local currency debt in 1990. Figure 6
summarizes the percentage of countries that defaulted in local currency debt between
1975 and 2004 and compares it to sovereign defaults in foreign currency.14
Figure 6: Defaults on Foreign and Local Currency Debt

Moody’s broke down sovereign defaults in local currency and foreign currency debt and
uncovered an interesting feature: countries are increasingly defaulting on both local and
foreign currency debt at the same time, as evidenced in figure 7.

14 S&P Ratings Report, “Sovereign Defaults set to fall again in 2005, September 28, 2004.
 While it is easy to see how countries can default on foreign currency debt, it is
more difficult to explain why they default on local currency debt. As some have argued,
countries should be able to print more of the local currency to meet their obligations and
thus should never default. There are three reasons why local currency default occurs and
will continue to do so.
The first two reasons for default in the local currency can be traced to a loss of
power in printing currency.
a. Gold Standard: In the decades prior to 1971, when some countries followed the gold
standard, currency had to be backed up with gold reserves. As a consequence, the
extent of these reserves put a limit on how much currency could be printed.
b. Shared Currency: The crisis in Greece has brought home one of the costs of a shared
currency. When the Euro was adopted as the common currency for the Euro zone, the
countries involved accepted a trade off. In return for a common market and the
convenience of a common currency, they gave up the power to control how much of
the currency they could print. Thus, in July 2015, the Greek government cannot print
more Euros to pay off outstanding debt.
The third reason for local currency default is more intriguing. In the next section, we will
argue that default has negative consequences: reputation loss, economic recessions and
political instability. The alternative of printing more currency to pay debt obligations also
has costs. It debases and devalues the currency and causes inflation to increase
exponentially, which in turn can cause the real economy to shrink. Investors abandon
financial assets (and markets) and move to real assets (real estate, gold) and firms shift
from real investments to financial speculation. Countries therefore have to trade off
between which action – default or currency debasement – has lower long-term costs and
pick one; many choose default as the less costly option.
An intriguing explanation for why some countries choose to default in local
currency debt whereas other prefer to print money (and debase their currencies) is based
on whether companies in the country have foreign currency debt funding local currency
assets. If they do, the cost of printing more local currency, pushing up inflation and
devaluing the local currency, can be catastrophic for corporations, as the local currency
devaluation lays waste to their assets while liabilities remain relatively unchanged.

Consequences of Default

What happens when a government defaults? In the eighteenth century,

government defaults were followed often by shows of military force. When Turkey
defaulted in the 1880s, the British and the French governments intervened and appointed
commissioners to oversee the Ottoman Empire to ensure discipline. When Egypt
defaulted around the same point in time, the British used military force to take over the
government. A default by Venezuela in the early part of the 20th century led to a
European blockade of that country and a reaction from President Theodore Roosevelt and
the United States government, who viewed the blockade as the a threat to the US power
in the hemisphere.
In the twentieth century, the consequences of sovereign default have been both
economic and political. Besides the obvious implication that lenders to that government
lose some or a great deal of what is owed to them, there are other consequences as well:
a. Reputation loss: A government that defaults is tagged with the “deadbeat” label for
years after the event, making it more difficult for it to raise financing in future rounds.
b. Capital Market turmoil: Defaulting on sovereign debt has repercussions for all capital
markets. Investors withdraw from equity and bond markets, making it more difficult
for private enterprises in the defaulting country to raise funds for projects.
c. Real Output: The uncertainty created by sovereign default also has ripple effects on
real investment and consumption. In general, sovereign defaults are followed by
economic recessions, as consumers hold back on spending and firms are reluctant to
commit resources to long-term investments.
d. Political Instability: Default can also strike a blow to the national psyche, which in
turn can put the leadership class at risk. The wave of defaults that swept through
Europe in the 1930s, with Germany, Austria, Hungary and Italy all falling victims,
allowed for the rise of the Nazis and set the stage for the Second World War. In Latin
America, defaults and coups have gone hand in hand for much of the last two
centuries.
In short, sovereign default has serious and painful effects on the defaulting entity that
may last for long periods.
It is also worth emphasizing is that default has seldom involved total repudiation
of the debt. Most defaults are followed by negotiations for either a debt exchange or
restructuring, where the defaulting government is given more time, lower principal and/or
lower interest payments. Credit agencies usually define the duration of a default episode
as lasting from when the default occurs to when the debt is restructured. Defaulting
governments can mitigate the reputation loss and return to markets sooner, if they can
minimize losses to lenders.
Researchers who have examined the aftermath of default have come to the
following conclusions about the short and long term effects of defaulting on debt:
a. Default has a negative impact on real GDP growth of between 0.5% and 2%, but the
bulk of the decline is in the first year after the default and seems to be short lived.
b. Default does affect a country’s long term sovereign rating and borrowing costs. One
study of credit ratings in 1995 found that the ratings for countries that had defaulted
at least once since 1970 were one to two notches lower than otherwise similar
countries that had not defaulted. In the same vein, defaulting countries have
 borrowing costs that are about 0.5 to 1% higher than countries that have not
defaulted. Here again, though, the effects of default dissipate over time.
c. Sovereign default can cause trade retaliation. One study indicates a drop of 8% in
bilateral trade after default, with the effects lasting for up to 15 years, and another one
that uses industry level data finds that export oriented industries are particularly hurt
by sovereign default.
d. Sovereign default can make banking systems more fragile. A study of 149 countries
between 1975 and 2000 indicates that the probability of a banking crisis is 14% in
countries that have defaulted, an eleven percentage-point increase over non-defaulting
countries.
e. Sovereign default also increases the likelihood of political change. While none of the
studies focus on defaults per se, there are several that have examined the after effects
of sharp devaluations, which often accompany default. A study of devaluations
between 1971 and 2003 finds a 45% increase in the probability of change in the top
leader (prime minister or president) in the country and a 64% increase in the
probability of change in the finance executive (minister of finance or head of central
bank).
In summary, default is costly and countries do not (and should not) take the possibility of
default lightly. Default is particularly expensive when it leads to banking crises and
currency devaluations; the former have a longstanding impact on the capacity of firms to
fund their investments whereas the latter create political and institutional instability that
lasts for long periods.

Measuring Sovereign Default Risk

If governments can default, we need measures of sovereign default risk not only
to set interest rates on sovereign bonds and loans but to price all other assets. In this
section, we will first look at why governments default and then at how ratings agencies,
markets and services measure this default risk.

Factors determining sovereign default risk

Governments default for the same reason that individuals and firms default. In
good times, they borrow far more than they can afford, given their assets and earning
power, and then find themselves unable to meet their debt obligations during downturns.
To determine a country’s default risk, we would look at the following variables:
1. Degree of indebtedness: The most logical place to start assessing default risk is by
looking at how much a sovereign entity owes not only to foreign banks/ investors but also
to its own citizens. Since larger countries can borrow more money, in absolute terms, the
debt owed is usually scaled to the GDP of the country. Table 6 lists the 20 countries that
owe the most, relative to GDP, in 2014.15
Table 6: Debt as % of Gross Domestic Product
Country Government Debt as % of GDP
Japan 227.70%
Zimbabwe 181.00%
Greece 174.50%
Lebanon 142.40%
Italy 134.10%
Jamaica 132.00%
Portugal 131.00%
Cyprus 119.40%
Ireland 118.90%
Grenada 110.00%
Singapore 106.70%
Belgium 101.90%
Eritrea 101.30%
Barbados 101.20%
Spain 97.60%
France 95.50%
Iceland 94.00%
Egypt 93.80%
Puerto Rico 93.60%
Canada 92.60%
Source: The CIA World Factbook
The list suggests that this statistic (government debt as percent of GDP) is an incomplete
measure of default risk. The list includes some countries with high default risk
(Zimbabwe, Lebabon) but is also includes some countries that were viewed as among the
most credit worthy by ratings agencies and markets (Japan, France and Canada).
However, the list did also include Portugal, Greece and Italy, countries that had high
credit ratings prior to the 2008 banking crisis, but have gone through repeated bouts of

15 The World Factbook, 2015, Central Intelligence Agency.

debt worries since. As a final note, it is worth looking at how this statistic (debt as a
percent of GDP) has changed in the United States over its last few decades. Figure 8
shows public debt as a percent of GDP for the US from 1966 to 2014:16

Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

At 102% of GDP, federal debt in the United States is approaching levels not seen since
the Second World War, with much of the surge coming after 2008. If there is a link
between debt levels and default risk, it is not surprising that questions about default risk
in the US government have risen to the surface.
2. Pensions/Social Service Commitments: In addition to traditional debt obligations,
governments also make commitments to their citizens to pay pensions and cover health
care. Since these obligations also compete for the limited revenues that the government
has, countries that have larger commitments on these counts should have higher default
risk than countries that do not.17

16 The statistic varies depending upon the data source you use, with some reporting higher numbers and
others lower. This data was obtained from usgovernmentspending.com.
17 Since pension and health care costs increase as people age, countries with aging populations (and fewer
working age people) face more default risk.
3. Revenues/Inflows to government: Government revenues usually come from tax receipts,
which in turn are a function of both the tax code and the tax base. Holding all else constant,
access to a larger tax base should increase potential tax revenues, which, in turn, can be used to
meet debt obligations.
4. Stability of revenues: The essence of debt is that it gives rise to fixed obligations that have to
be covered in both good and bad times. Countries with more stable revenue streams should
therefore face less default risk, other things remaining equal, than countries with volatile
revenues. But what is it that drives revenue stability? Since revenues come from taxing income
and consumption in the nation’s economy, countries with more diversified economies should
have more stable tax revenues than countries that are dependent on one or a few sectors for their
prosperity. To illustrate, Peru, with its reliance on copper and silver production and Jamaica, an
economy dependent upon tourism, face more default risk than Brazil or India, which are larger,
more diversified economies. The other factor that determines revenue stability is type of tax
system used by the country. Generally, income tax based systems generate more volatile
revenues than sales tax (or value added tax systems).
5. Political risk: Ultimately, the decision to default is as much a political decision as it is an
economic decision. Given that sovereign default often exposes the political leadership to
pressure, it is entirely possible that autocracies (where there is less worry about political
backlash) are more likely to default than democracies. Since the alternative to default is printing
more money, the independence and power of the central bank will also affect assessments of
default risk.
6. Implicit backing from other entities: When Greece, Portugal and Spain entered the European
Union, investors, analysts and ratings agencies reduced their assessments of default risk in these
countries. Implicitly, they were assuming that the stronger European Union countries –
Germany, France and the Scandinavian countries – would step in to protect the weaker countries
from defaulting. The danger, of course, is that the backing is implicit and not explicit, and
lenders may very well find themselves disappointed by lack of backing, and no legal recourse.
In summary, a full assessment of default risk in a sovereign entity requires the assessor to
go beyond the numbers and understand how the country’s economy works, the strength
of its tax system and the trustworthiness of its governing institutions.
Sovereign Ratings

Since few of us have the resources or the time to dedicate to understanding small
and unfamiliar countries, it is no surprise that third parties have stepped into the breach,
with their assessments of sovereign default risk. Of these third party assessors, bond
ratings agencies came in with the biggest advantages:
(1) They have been assessing default risk in corporations for a hundred years or more
and presumably can transfer some of their skills to assessing sovereign risk.
(2) Bond investors who are familiar with the ratings measures, from investing in
corporate bonds, find it easy to extend their use to assessing sovereign bonds.
Thus, a AAA rated country is viewed as close to riskless whereas a C rated
country is very risky.
In spite of these advantages, there are critiques that have been leveled at ratings agencies
by both the sovereigns they rate and the investors that use these ratings. In this section,
we will begin by looking at how ratings agencies come up with sovereign ratings (and
change them) and then evaluate how well sovereign ratings measure default risk.

The evolution of sovereign ratings

Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch’s have been rating corporate bond
offerings since the early part of the twentieth century. Moody’s has been rating corporate
bonds since 1919 and starting rating government bonds in the 1920s, when that market
was an active one. By 1929, Moody’s provided ratings for almost fifty central
governments. With the great depression and the Second World War, investments in
government bonds abated and with it, the interest in government bond ratings. In the
1970s, the business picked up again slowly. As recently as the early 1980s, only about
fifteen, more mature governments had ratings, with most of them commanding the
highest level (Aaa). The decade from 1985 to 1994 added 35 companies to the sovereign
rating list, with many of them having speculative or lower ratings. Table 7 summarizes
the growth of sovereign ratings from 1975 to 1994:
Table 7: Sovereign Ratings – 1975-1994
Year Number of newly rated Median rating
sovereigns
Pre-1975 3 AAA/Aaa
1975- 79 9 AAA/Aaa
1980-84 3 AAA/Aaa
1985-1989 19 A/A2
1990-94 15 BBB-/Baa3

Since 1994, the number of countries with sovereign ratings has surged, just as the market
for sovereign bonds has expanded. In 2015, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch had ratings
available for more than a hundred countries apiece.
In addition to more countries being rated, the ratings themselves have become
richer. Moody’s and S&P now provide two ratings for each country – a local currency
rating (for domestic currency debt/ bonds) and a foreign currency rating (for government
borrowings in a foreign currency). As an illustration, table 8 summarizes the local and
foreign currency ratings, from Moody’s, for Latin American countries in July 2015.
Table 8: Local and Foreign Currency Ratings – Latin America in July 2015
ForeignCurrency LocalCurrency
Sovereigns
Rating Outlook Rating Outlook
Argentina Caa1 NEG Caa1 NEG
Belize Caa2 STA Caa2 STA
Bolivia Ba3 STA Ba3 STA
Brazil Baa2 NEG Baa2 NEG
Colombia Baa2 STA Baa2 STA
Costa Rica Ba1 STA Ba1 STA
Ecuador B3 STA - -
El Salvador Ba3 STA - -
Guatemala Ba1 NEG Ba1 NEG
Honduras B3 POS B3 POS
Mexico A3 STA A3 STA
Nicaragua B3 STA B3 STA
Panama Baa2 STA - -
Paraguay Ba1 STA Ba1 STA
Peru A3 STA A3 STA
Uruguay Baa2 STA Baa2 STA
Venezuela Caa3 STA Caa3 STA
Source: Moody’s
For Ecuador and Panama, there is only a foreign currency rating, and the outlook on each
country provides Moody’s views on potential ratings changes, with negative (NEG)
reflecting at least the possibility of a ratings downgrade. For the most part, local currency
ratings are at least as high or higher than the foreign currency rating, for the obvious
reason that governments have more power to print more of their own currency. There are,
however, notable exceptions, where the local currency rating is lower than the foreign
currency rating. In March 2010, for instance, India was assigned a local currency rating
of Ba2 and a foreign currency rating of Baa3. The full list of sovereign ratings, by
country, by Moody’s, is provided in Appendix 4.
Do the ratings agencies agree on sovereign risk? For the most part, there is
consensus in the ratings, but there can be significant differences on individual countries.
These differences can come from very different assessments of political and economic
risk in these countries by the ratings teams at the different agencies.
Do sovereign ratings change over time? Yes, but far less than corporate ratings
do. The best measure of sovereign ratings changes is a ratings transition matrix, which
captures the changes that occur across ratings classes. Using Fitch ratings to illustrate our
point, table 9 summarizes the annual probability of ratings transitions, by rating, from
1995 to 2008.
Table 9: Annual Ratings Transitions – 1995 to 2008

This table provides evidence on how little sovereign ratings change on an annual basis,
especially for higher rated countries. A AAA rated sovereign has a 99.42% chance of
remaining AAA rated the next year; a BBB rated sovereign has an 8.11% chance of being
upgraded, an 87.84% chance of remaining unchanged and a 4.06% chance of being
downgraded. The ratings transition tables at Moody’s and S&P tell the same story of
ratings stickiness. As we will see later in this paper, one of the critiques of sovereign
ratings is that they do not change quickly enough to alert investors to imminent danger.
There is some evidence in S&P’s latest update on transition probabilities that sovereign
ratings have become more volatile, with BBB rated countries showing only a 57.1%
likelihood of staying with the same rating from 2010-2012.18
As the number of rated countries around the globe increases, we are opening a
window on how ratings agencies assess risk at the broader regional level. One of the
criticisms that rated countries have mounted against the ratings agencies is that they have
regional biases, leading them to under rate entire regions of the world (Latin America and
Africa). The defense that ratings agencies would offer is that past default history is a
good predictor of future default and that Latin America has a great deal of bad history to
overcome.

What goes into a sovereign rating?

The ratings agencies started with a template that they developed and fine tuned
with corporations and have modified it to estimate sovereign ratings. While each agency
has its own system for estimating sovereign ratings, the processes share a great deal in
common.
è Ratings Measure: A sovereign rating is focused on the credit worthiness of the
sovereign to private creditors (bondholders and private banks) and not to official
creditors (which may include the World Bank, the IMF and other entities). Ratings
agencies also vary on whether their rating captures only the probability of default or
also incorporates the expected severity, if it does occur. S&P’s ratings are designed to
capture the probability that default will occur and not necessarily the severity of the
default, whereas Moody’s focus on both the probability of default and severity
(captured in the expected recovery rate). Default at all of the agencies is defined as
either a failure to pay interest or principal on a debt instrument on the due date
(outright default) or a rescheduling, exchange or other restructuring of the debt
(restructuring default).
è Determinants of ratings: In a publication that explains its process for sovereign
ratings, Standard and Poor’s lists out the variables that it considers when rating a
country. These variables encompass both political, economic and institutional
variables and are summarized in table 10:

18 Standard & Poor’s, 2013, Default Study: Sovereign Defaults And Rating Transition Data, 2012 Update.
 Table 10: Factors considered while assigning sovereign ratings

While Moody’s and Fitch have their own set of variables that they use to estimate
sovereign ratings, they parallel S&P in their focus on economic, political and institutional
detail.
 è Rating process: The analyst with primary responsibility for the sovereign rating
prepares a ratings recommendation with a draft report, which is then assessed by a
ratings committee composed of 5-10 analysts, who debate each analytical
category and vote on a score. Following closing arguments, the ratings are
decided by a vote of the committee.
è Local versus Foreign Currency Ratings: As we noted earlier, the ratings agencies
usually assign two ratings for each sovereign – a local currency rating and a
foreign currency rating. There are two approaches used by ratings agencies to
differentiate between these ratings. In the first, called the notch-up approach, the
foreign currency rating is viewed as the primary measure of sovereign credit risk
and the local currency rating is notched up, based upon domestic debt market
factors. In the notch down approach, it is the local currency rating that is the
anchor, with the foreign currency rating notched down, reflecting foreign
exchange constraints. The differential between foreign and local currency ratings
is primarily a function of monetary policy independence. Countries that maintain
floating rate exchange regimes and fund borrowing from deep domestic markets
will have the largest differences between local and foreign currency ratings,
whereas countries that have given up monetary policy independence, either
through dollarization or joining a monetary union, will see local currency ratings
converge on foreign currency ratings.
è Ratings Review and Updates: Sovereign ratings are reviewed and updated by the
ratings agencies and these reviews can be both at regular periods and also
triggered by news items. Thus, news of a political coup or an economic disaster
can lead to a ratings review not just for the country in question but for
surrounding countries (that may face a contagion effect).

Do sovereign ratings measure default risk?

The sales pitch from ratings agencies for sovereign ratings is that they are
effective measures of default risk in bonds (or loans) issued by that sovereign. But do
they work as advertised? Each of the ratings agencies goes to great pains to argue that
notwithstanding errors on some countries, there is a high correlation between sovereign
ratings and sovereign defaults. In table 11, we summarize S&P’s estimates of cumulative
default rates for bonds in each ratings class from 1975 to 2012:
Table 11: S&P Sovereign Foreign Currency Ratings and Default Probabilities- 1975 to
2012

Time  Horizon  
 
Rating   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   15  

AAA   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%  

AA+   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%  

AA   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%  

AA-­‐   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%  

A+   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   1.9%   3.7%   3.7%   3.7%   3.7%   3.7%   3.7%   3.7%  

A   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.8%   1.8%   3.0%   4.3%   4.6%   5.2%   6.9%   8.6%   8.6%   8.6%   8.6%   8.6%  

A-­‐   0.0%   0.0%   0.9%   1.0%   1.0%   1.0%   1.0%   1.0%   1.0%   1.0%   1.3%   5.1%   6.2%   6.2%   6.2%  

BBB+   0.0%   0.3%   0.6%   0.6%   0.6%   0.6%   0.6%   0.6%   0.6%   0.6%   0.6%   0.6%   0.6%   0.6%   0.6%  

BBB   0.0%   0.7%   2.0%   3.4%   3.4%   3.4%   3.4%   3.4%   3.4%   3.4%   3.4%   3.4%   6.3%   7.4%   7.4%  

BBB-­‐   0.0%   0.8%   1.7%   2.8%   5.0%   7.2%   7.9%   7.9%   7.9%   7.9%   7.9%   7.9%   7.9%   9.6%   12.6%  

BB+   0.1%   1.3%   1.3%   1.3%   1.3%   1.4%   2.9%   4.6%   6.4%   6.9%   6.9%   6.9%   6.9%   6.9%   6.9%  

BB   0.0%   0.9%   1.9%   2.9%   3.6%   4.6%   5.0%   5.0%   5.0%   5.0%   5.5%   8.3%   11.7%   13.6%   13.6%  

BB-­‐   1.7%   4.0%   6.1%   6.6%   9.8%   13.0%   16.5%   19.3%   19.9%   19.9%   21.0%   21.0%   21.0%   21.0%   21.0%  

B+   0.6%   1.7%   3.4%   6.6%   8.0%   10.9%   15.4%   20.6%   22.4%   25.3%   26.9%   26.9%   26.9%   30.8%   39.8%  

B   2.4%   6.1%   9.8%   14.3%   19.4%   23.1%   25.6%   28.2%   31.6%   35.1%   35.8%   35.8%   35.8%   35.8%   35.8%  

B-­‐   7.4%   11.7%   14.6%   17.5%   19.7%   21.3%   23.7%   24.8%   25.9%   25.9%   25.9%   25.9%   25.9%   25.9%   NA  

CCC+   19.6%   24.7%   33.1%   38.5%   50.7%   68.7%   82.1%   91.0%   91.0%   91.0%   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA  

CCC   39.6%   66.0%   66.0%   66.0%   66.0%   66.0%   66.0%   66.0%   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA  

CCC-­‐   77.8%   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA  

CC   100.0%   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA  

Investment  grade   0.0%   0.1%   0.4%   0.6%   0.9%   1.2%   1.4%   1.5%   1.6%   1.7%   1.9%   2.0%   2.2%   2.4%   2.5%  

Speculative  grade   2.7%   5.1%   7.1%   9.1%   11.3%   13.6%   16.1%   18.4%   19.7%   20.6%   21.2%   21.8%   22.6%   23.5%   24.8%  

All  rated   0.9%   1.8%   2.5%   3.3%   4.2%   5.0%   5.9%   6.5%   6.9%   7.3%   7.5%   7.7%   8.0%   8.3%   8.6%  

Source: Standard and Poor’s

Fitch and Moody’s also report default rates by ratings classes and in summary, all of the
ratings agencies seem to have, on average, delivered the goods. Sovereign bonds with
investment grade ratings have defaulted far less frequently than sovereign bonds with
speculative ratings.
Notwithstanding this overall track record of success, ratings agencies have been
criticized for failing investors on the following counts:
1. Ratings are upward biased: Ratings agencies have been accused of being far too
optimistic in their assessments of both corporate and sovereign ratings. While the
conflict of interest of having issuers pay for the rating is offered as the rationale
for the upward bias in corporate ratings, that argument does not hold up when it
comes to sovereign ratings, since the issuing government does not pay ratings
agencies.
2. There is herd behavior: When one ratings agency lowers or raises a sovereign
rating, other ratings agencies seem to follow suit. This herd behavior reduces the
value of having three separate ratings agencies, since their assessments of
sovereign risk are no longer independent.
3. Too little, too late: To price sovereign bonds (or set interest rates on sovereign
loans), investors (banks) need assessments of default risk that are updated and
timely. It has long been argued that ratings agencies take too long to change
ratings, and that these changes happen too late to protect investors from a crisis.
4. Vicious Cycle: Once a market is in crisis, there is the perception that ratings
agencies sometimes over react and lower ratings too much, thus creating a
feedback effect that makes the crisis worse.
5. Ratings failures: At the other end of the spectrum, it can be argued that when a
ratings agency changes the rating for a sovereign multiple times in a short time
period, it is admitting to failure in its initial rating assessment. In a paper on the
topic, Bhatia (2004) looks at sovereigns where S&P and Moody changed ratings
multiple times during the course of a year between 1997 and 2002. His findings
are reproduced in table 12:
Table 12: Ratings Failures
Why do ratings agencies sometimes fail? Bhatia provides some possible answers:
a. Information problems: The data that the agencies use to rate sovereigns generally
come from the governments. Not only are there wide variations in the quantity
and quality of information across governments, but there is also the potential for
governments holding back bad news and revealing only good news. This, in turn,
may explain the upward bias in sovereign ratings.
b. Limited resources: To the extent that the sovereign rating business generates only
limited revenues for the agencies and it is required to at least break even in terms
of costs, the agencies cannot afford to hire too many analysts. These analysts are
then spread thin globally, being asked to assess the ratings of dozens of low-
profile countries. In 2003, it was estimated that each analyst at the agencies was
called up to rate between four and five sovereign governments. It has been argued
by some that it is this overload that leads analysts to use common information
(rather than do their own research) and to herd behavior.
c. Revenue Bias: Since ratings agencies offer sovereign ratings gratis to most users,
the revenues from ratings either have to come from the issuers or from other
business that stems from the sovereign ratings business. When it comes from the
issuing sovereigns or sub-sovereigns, it can be argued that agencies will hold back
on assigning harsh ratings. In particular, ratings agencies generate significant
revenues from rating sub-sovereign issuers. Thus, a sovereign ratings downgrade
will be followed by a series of sub-sovereign ratings downgrades. Indirectly,
therefore, these sub-sovereign entities will fight a sovereign downgrade, again
explaining the upward bias in ratings.
d. Other Incentive problems: While it is possible that some of the analysts who work
for S&P and Moody’s may seek work with the governments that they rate, it is
uncommon and thus should not pose a problem with conflict of interest. However,
the ratings agencies have created other businesses, including market indices,
ratings evaluation services and risk management services, which may be lucrative
enough to influence sovereign ratings.
Market Interest Rates

The growth of the sovereign ratings business reflected the growth in sovereign
bonds in the 1980s and 1990s. As more countries have shifted from bank loans to bonds,
the market prices commanded by these bonds (and the resulting interest rates) have
yielded an alternate measure of sovereign default risk, continuously updated in real time.
In this section, we will examine the information in sovereign bond markets that can be
used to estimate sovereign default risk.

The Sovereign Default Spread

When a government issues bonds, denominated in a foreign currency, the interest
rate on the bond can be compared to a rate on a riskless investment in that currency to get
a market measure of the default spread for that country. To illustrate, the Brazilian
government had a 10-year dollar denominated bond outstanding in July 2015, with a
market interest rate of 4.5%. At the same time, the 10-year US treasury bond rate was
2.47%. If we assume that the US treasury is default free, the difference between the two
rates can be attributed (2.03%) can be viewed as the market’s assessment of the default
spread for Brazil. Table 13 summarizes interest rates and default spreads for Latin
American countries in July 2015, using dollar denominated bonds issued by these
countries, as well as the sovereign foreign currency ratings (from Moody’s) at the time.
Table 13: Default Spreads on Dollar Denominated Bonds- Latin America
Moody’s Rating Interest rate on $ 10-year US
denominated bond (10 Treasury Bond
Country Year) Rate Default Spread
Mexico Baa1 3.92% 2.47% 1.45%
Brazil Baa2 4.50% 2.47% 2.03%
Colombia Baa3 4.05% 2.47% 1.58%
Peru Baa2 3.93% 2.47% 1.46%

While there is a strong correlation between sovereign ratings and market default spreads,
there are advantages to using the default spreads. The first is that the market
differentiation for risk is more granular than the ratings agencies; thus, Peru and Brazil
have the same Moody’s rating (Baa2) but the market sees more default risk in Brazil than
in Peru. The second is that the market-based spreads are more dynamic than ratings, with
changes occurring in real time. In figure 9, we graph the shifts in the default spreads for
Brazil and Venezuela between 2006 and the end of 2009:

Figure 9: Default Spreads for $ Denominated Bonds: Brazil vs Venezuela

In December 2005, the default spreads for Brazil and Venezuela were similar; the
Brazilian default spread was 3.18% and the Venezuelan default spread was 3.09%.
Between 2006 and 2009, the spreads diverged, with Brazilian default spreads dropping to
1.32% by December 2009 and Venezuelan default spreads widening to 10.26%.
To use market-based default spreads as a measure of country default risk, there
has to be a default free security in the currency in which the bonds are issued. Local
currency bonds issued by governments cannot be compared to each other, since the
differences in rates can be due to differences in expected inflation. Even with dollar-
denominated bonds, it is only the assumption that the US Treasury bond rate is default
free that allows us to back out default spreads from the interest rates.
The spread as a predictor of default
Are market default spreads better predictors of default risk than ratings? One
advantage that market spreads have over ratings is that they can adjust quickly to
information. As a consequence, they provide earlier signals of imminent danger (and
default) than ratings agencies do. However, market-based default measures carry their
own costs. They tend to be far more volatile than ratings and can be affected by variables
that have nothing to do with default. Liquidity and investor demand can sometimes cause
shifts in spreads that have little or nothing to do with default risk.
Studies of the efficacy of default spreads as measures of country default risk
reveal some consensus. First, default spreads are for the most part correlated with both
sovereign ratings and ultimate default risk. In other words, sovereign bonds with low
ratings tend trade at much higher interest rates and also are more likely to default.
Second, the sovereign bond market leads ratings agencies, with default spreads usually
climbing ahead of a rating downgrade and dropping before an upgrade. Third,
notwithstanding the lead-lag relationship, a change in sovereign ratings is still an
informational event that creates a price impact at the time that it occurs. In summary, it
would be a mistake to conclude that sovereign ratings are useless, since sovereign bond
markets seems to draw on ratings (and changes in these ratings) when pricing bonds, just
as ratings agencies draw on market data to make changes in ratings.

Credit Default Swaps

The last decade has seen the evolution of the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market,
where investors try to put a price on the default risk in an entity and trade at that price. In
conjunction with CDS contracts on companies, we have seen the development of a
market for sovereign CDS contracts. The prices of these contracts represent market
assessments of default risk in countries, updated constantly.

How does a CDS work?

The CDS market allows investors to buy protection against default in a security.
The buyer of a CDS on a specific bond makes payments of the “spread” each period to
the seller of the CDS; the payment is specified as a percentage (spread) of the notional or
face value of the bond being insured. In return, the seller agrees to make the buyer whole
if the issuer of the bond (reference entity) fails to pay, restructures or goes bankrupt
(credit event), by doing one of the following:
a. Physical settlement: The buyer of the CDS can deliver the “defaulted” bond to the
seller and get par value for the bond.
b. Cash settlement: The seller of the CDS can pay the buyer the difference between par
value of the defaulted bond and the market price, which will reflects the expected
recovery from the issuer.
In effect, the buyer of the CDS is protected from losses arising from credit events over
the life of the CDS.
Assume, for instance, that you own 5-year Colombian government bonds, with a
par value of $ 10 million, and that you are worried about default over the life of the bond.
Assume also that the price of a 5-year CDS on the Colombian government is 250 basis
points (2.5%). If you buy the CDS, you will be obligated to pay $250,000 each year for
the next 5 years and the seller of the CDS would receive this payment. If the Colombian
government fails to fulfill its obligations on the bond or restructures the bond any time
over the next 5 years, the seller of the CDS can fulfill his obligations by either buying the
bonds from you for $ 10 million or by paying you the difference between $ 10 million
and the market price of the bond after the credit event happens.
There are two points worth emphasizing about a CDS that may undercut the
protection against default that it is designed to offer. The first is that the protection
against failure is triggered by a credit event; if there is no credit event, and the market
price of the bond collapses, you as the buyer will not be compensated. The second is that
the guarantee is only as good as the credit standing of the seller of the CDS. If the seller
defaults, the insurance guarantee will fail. On the other side of the transaction, the buyer
may default on the spread payments that he has contractually agreed to make.

Market Background
J.P. Morgan is credited with creating the first CDS, when it extended a $4.8 billon
credit line to Exxon and then sold the credit risk in the transaction to investors. Over the
last decade and a half, the CDS market has surged in size. By the end of 2007, the
notional value of the securities on which CDS had been sold amounted to more than $ 60
trillion, though the market crisis caused a pullback to about $39 trillion by December
2008.
You can categorize the CDS market based upon the reference entity, i.e., the
issuer of the bond underlying the CDS. While our focus is on sovereign CDS, they
represent a small proportion of the overall market. Corporate CDS represent the bulk of
the market, followed by bank CDS and then sovereign CDS. While the notional value of
the securities underlying the CDS market is huge, the market itself is a fair narrow one,
insofar that a few investors account for the bulk of the trading in the market. While the
market was initially dominated by banks buying protection against default risk, the
market has attracted investors, portfolio managers and speculators, but the number of
players in the market remains small, especially given the size of the market. The
narrowness of the market does make it vulnerable, since the failure of one or more of the
big players can throw the market into tumult and cause spreads to shift dramatically. The
failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008, during the banking crisis, threw the CDS market into
turmoil for several weeks.

CDS and default risk

If we assume away counter party risk and liquidity, the prices that investors set
for credit default swaps should provide us with updated measures of default risk in the
reference entity. In contrast to ratings, that get updated infrequently, CDS prices should
reflect adjust to reflect current information on default risk.
To illustrate this point, let us consider the evolution of sovereign risk in Greece
during 2009 and 2010. In figure 10, we graph out the CDS spreads for Greece on a
month-by-month basis from 2006 to 2010 and ratings actions taken by one agency (Fitch)
during that period:
 Figure 10: Greece CDS Prices and Ratings

While ratings stayed stagnant for the bulk of the period, before moving late in 2009 and
2010, when Greece was downgraded, the CDS spread and default spreads for Greece
changed each month. The changes in both market-based measures reflect market
reassessments of default risk in Greece, using updated information.
While it is easy to show that CDS spreads are more timely and dynamic than
sovereign ratings and that they reflect fundamental changes in the issuing entities, the
fundamental question remains: Are changes in CDS spreads better predictors of future
default risk than sovereign ratings or default spreads? The findings are significant. First,
changes in CDS spreads lead changes in the sovereign bond yields and in sovereign
ratings.19 Second, it is not clear that the CDS market is quicker or better at assessing
default risks than the government bond market, from which we can extract default
spreads. Third, there seems to be clustering in the CDS market, where CDS prices across

19Ismailescu, I., 2007, The Reaction of Emerging Markets Credit Default Swap Spreads to Sovereign
Credit Rating Changes and Country Fundamentals, Working Paper, Pace University. This study finds that
CDS prices provide more advance warning of ratings downgrades.
groups of companies move together in the same direction. A study suggests six clusters
of emerging market countries, captured in table 14:
Table 14: Clusters of Emerging Markets: CDS Market

The correlation within the cluster and outside the cluster, are provided towards the
bottom. Thus, the correlation between countries in cluster 1 is 0.516, whereas the
correlation between countries in cluster 1 and the rest of the market is only 0.210.
There are inherent limitations with using CDS prices as predictors of country
default risk. The first is that the exposure to counterparty and liquidity risk, endemic to
the CDS market, can cause changes in CDS prices that have little to do with default risk.
Thus, a significant portion of the surge in CDS prices in the last quarter of 2008 can be
traced to the failure of Lehman and the subsequent surge in concerns about counterparty
risk. The second and related problem is that the narrowness of the CDS market can make
individual CDS susceptible to illiquidity problems, with a concurrent effect on prices.
Notwithstanding these limitations, it is undeniable that changes in CDS prices supply
important information about shifts in default risk in entities. In summary, the evidence, at
least as of now, is that changes in CDS prices provide information, albeit noisy, of
changes in default risk. However, there is little to indicate that it is superior to market
default spreads (obtained from government bonds) in assessing this risk.

Sovereign Risk in the CDS Market

Notwithstanding both the limitations of the market and the criticism that has been
directed at it, the CDS market continues to grow. In July 2015, there were 61 countries
with sovereign CDS trading on them. Figure 11 captures the differences in CDS spreads
across the globe (for the countries for which it is available) in July 2015:
 Figure 11: CDS Spreads by Country – July 2015

Not surprisingly, much of Africa remains uncovered, there are large swaths in Latin
America with high default risk, Asia has seen a fairly dramatic drop off in risk largely
because of the rise of China and Southern Europe is becoming a hotbed for default risk,
at least according to the CDS market. Appendix 5 has the complete listings of 10-year
CDS spreads as of July 2015.

Country Equity Risk

While sovereign default risk is widely measured and studied, it is a relevant
measure of risk for those investing in sovereign debt or bonds of a country. But what if
you are an investor or a business that is considering investing in equity in the same
country? In this section, we begin by looking at whether we should be adjusting the risk
premiums for equity in different countries for variations in country risk and follow up by
examining measures of country equity risk.

Should there be a country equity risk premium?

Is there more risk in investing in a Malaysian or Brazilian stock than there is in

investing in the United States? The answer, to most, seems to be obviously affirmative,
with the solution being that we should use higher equity risk premiums when investing in
riskier emerging markets. There are, however, three distinct and different arguments
offered against this practice.
1. Country risk is diversifiable
In the risk and return models that have developed from conventional portfolio
theory, and in particular, the capital asset pricing model, the only risk that is relevant for
purposes of estimating a cost of equity is the market risk or risk that cannot be diversified
away. The key question in relation to country risk then becomes whether the additional
risk in an emerging market is diversifiable or non-diversifiable risk. If, in fact, the
additional risk of investing in Malaysia or Brazil can be diversified away, then there
should be no additional risk premium charged. If it cannot, then it makes sense to think
about estimating a country risk premium.
But diversified away by whom? Equity in a publicly traded Brazilian, or
Malaysian, firm can be held by hundreds or even thousands of investors, some of whom
may hold only domestic stocks in their portfolio, whereas others may have more global
exposure. For purposes of analyzing country risk, we look at the marginal investor – the
investor most likely to be trading on the equity. If that marginal investor is globally
diversified, there is at least the potential for global diversification. If the marginal
investor does not have a global portfolio, the likelihood of diversifying away country risk
declines substantially. Stulz (1999) made a similar point using different terminology.20
He differentiated between segmented markets, where risk premiums can be different in
each market, because investors cannot or will not invest outside their domestic markets,
and open markets, where investors can invest across markets. In a segmented market, the
marginal investor will be diversified only across investments in that market, whereas in
an open market, the marginal investor has the opportunity (even if he or she does not take
it) to invest across markets. It is unquestionable that investors today in most markets have
more opportunities to diversify globally than they did three decades ago, with
international mutual funds and exchange traded funds, and that many more of them take
advantage of these opportunities. It is also true still that a significant home bias exists in
most investors’ portfolios, with most investors over investing in their home markets.
Even if the marginal investor is globally diversified, there is a second test that has
to be met for country risk to be diversifiable. All or much of country risk should be

20 Stulz, R.M., Globalization, Corporate finance, and the Cost of Capital, Journal of Applied Corporate
Finance, v12.
country specific. In other words, there should be low correlation across markets. Only
then will the risk be diversifiable in a globally diversified portfolio. If, on the other hand,
the returns across countries have significant positive correlation, country risk has a
market risk component, is not diversifiable and can command a premium. Whether
returns across countries are positively correlated is an empirical question. Studies from
the 1970s and 1980s suggested that the correlation was low, and this was an impetus for
global diversification.21 Partly because of the success of that sales pitch and partly
because economies around the world have become increasingly intertwined over the last
decade, more recent studies indicate that the correlation across markets has risen. The
correlation across equity markets has been studied extensively over the last two decades
and while there are differences, the overall conclusions are as follows:
1. The correlation across markets has increased over time, as both investors and
firms have globalized. Yang, Tapon and Sun (2006) report correlations across
eight, mostly developed markets between 1988 and 2002 and note that the
correlation in the 1998-2002 time period was higher than the correlation between
1988 and 1992 in every single market; to illustrate, the correlation between the
Hong Kong and US markets increased from 0.48 to 0.65 and the correlation
between the UK and the US markets increased from 0.63 to 0.82.22 In the global
returns sourcebook, from Credit Suisse, referenced earlier for historical risk
premiums for different markets, the authors estimate the correlation between
developed and emerging markets between 1980 and 2013, and note that it has
increased from 0.57 in 1980 to 0.88 in 2013.
2. The correlation across equity markets increases during periods of extreme stress
or high volatility.23 This is borne out by the speed with which troubles in one
market, say Russia, can spread to a market with little or no obvious relationship to
it, such as Brazil. The contagion effect, where troubles in one market spread into

21 Levy, H. and M. Sarnat, 1970, International Diversification of Investment Portfolios, American

Economic Review 60(4), 668-75.
22 Yang, Li , Tapon, Francis and Sun, Yiguo, 2006, International correlations across stock markets and
industries: trends and patterns 1988-2002, Applied Financial Economics, v16: 16, 1171-1183  
23Ball, C. and W. Torous, 2000, Stochastic correlation across international stock markets, Journal of
Empirical Finance. v7, 373-388.
 others is one reason to be skeptical with arguments that companies that are in
multiple emerging markets are protected because of their diversification benefits.
In fact, the market crisis in the last quarter of 2008 illustrated how closely bound
markets have become, as losses rolled across markets not only geographically but
in different asset classes.
3. The downside correlation increases more than upside correlation: In a twist on the
last point, Longin and Solnik (2001) report that it is not high volatility per se that
increases correlation, but downside volatility. Put differently, the correlation
between global equity markets is higher in bear markets than in bull markets.24
4. Globalization increases exposure to global political uncertainty, while reducing
exposure to domestic political uncertainty: In the most direct test of whether we
should be attaching different equity risk premiums to different countries due to
systematic risk exposure, Brogaard, Dai, Ngo and Zhang (2014) looked at 36
countries from 1991-2010 and measured the exposure of companies in these
countries to global political uncertainty and domestic political uncertainty.25 They
find that the costs of capital of companies in integrated markets are more highly
influenced by global uncertainty (increasing as uncertainty increases) and those in
segmented markets are more highly influenced by domestic uncertainty.26
2. A Global Capital Asset Pricing Model
The other argument against adjusting for country risk comes from theorists and
practitioners who believe that the traditional capital asset pricing model can be adapted
fairly easily to a global market. In their view, all assets, no matter where they are traded,
should face the same global equity risk premium, with differences in risk captured by
differences in betas. In effect, they are arguing that if Malaysian stocks are riskier than
US stocks, they should have higher betas and expected returns.

24 Longin, F. and B. Solnik, 2001, Extreme Correlation of International Equity Markets, Journal of
Finance, v56 , pg 649-675.
25 Brogaard, J., L. Dai, P.T.H. Ngo, B. Zhuang, 2014, The World Price of Political Uncertainty, SSRN
#2488820.
26 The implied costs of capital for companies in the 36 countries were computed and related to global
political uncertainty, measured using the US economic policy uncertainty index, and to domestic political
uncertainty, measured using domestic national elections.
 While the argument is reasonable, it flounders in practice, partly because betas do
not seem capable of carry the weight of measuring country risk.
1. If betas are estimated against local indices, as is usually the case, the average beta
within each market (Brazil, Malaysia, US or Germany) has to be one. Thus, it would
be mathematically impossible for betas to capture country risk.
2. If betas are estimated against a global equity index, such as the Morgan Stanley
Capital Index (MSCI), there is a possibility that betas could capture country risk but
there is little evidence that they do in practice. Since the global equity indices are
market weighted, it is the companies that are in developed markets that have higher
betas, whereas the companies in small, very risky emerging markets report low betas.
Table 15 reports the average beta estimated for the ten largest market cap companies
in Brazil, India, the United States and Japan against the MSCI.
Table 15: Betas against MSCI – Large Market Cap Companies
Country Average Beta (against local Average Beta (against
index) MSCI)
India 0.97 0.83
Brazil 0.98 0.81
United States 0.96 1.05
Japan 0.94 1.03
a
The betas were estimated using two years of weekly returns from January 2006 to December
2007 against the most widely used local index (Sensex in India, Bovespa in Brazil, S&P 500 in
the US and the Nikkei in Japan) and the MSCI using two years of weekly returns.

The emerging market companies consistently have lower betas, when estimated
against global equity indices, than developed market companies. Using these betas
with a global equity risk premium will lead to lower costs of equity for emerging
market companies than developed market companies. While there are creative fixes
that practitioners have used to get around this problem, they seem to be based on little
more than the desire to end up with higher expected returns for emerging market
companies.27

27 There are some practitioners who multiply the local market betas for individual companies by a beta for
that market against the US. Thus, if the beta for an Indian chemical company is 0.9 and the beta for the
Indian market against the US is 1.5, the global beta for the Indian company will be 1.35 (0.9*1.5). The beta
for the Indian market is obtained by regressing returns, in US dollars, for the Indian market against returns
on a US index (say, the S&P 500).
3. Country risk is better reflected in the cash flows
The essence of this argument is that country risk and its consequences are better
reflected in the cash flows than in the discount rate. Proponents of this point of view
argue that bringing in the likelihood of negative events (political chaos, nationalization
and economic meltdowns) into the expected cash flows effectively risk adjusts the
cashflows, thus eliminating the need for adjusting the discount rate.
This argument is alluring but it is wrong. The expected cash flows, computed by
taking into account the possibility of poor outcomes, is not risk adjusted. In fact, this is
exactly how we should be calculating expected cash flows in any discounted cash flow
analysis. Risk adjustment requires us to adjust the expected cash flow further for its risk,
i.e. compute certainty equivalent cash flows in capital budgeting terms. To illustrate why,
consider a simple example where a company is considering making the same type of
investment in two countries. For simplicity, let us assume that the investment is expected
to deliver $ 90, with certainty, in country 1 (a mature market); it is expected to generate $
100 with 90% probability in country 2 (an emerging market) but there is a 10% chance
that disaster will strike (and the cash flow will be $0). The expected cash flow is $90 on
both investments, but only a risk neutral investor would be indifferent between the two. A
risk-averse investor would prefer the investment in the mature market over the emerging
market investment, and would demand a premium for investing in the emerging market.
In effect, a full risk adjustment to the cash flows will require us to go through the
same process that we have to use to adjust discount rates for risk. We will have to
estimate a country risk premium, and use that risk premium to compute certainty
equivalent cash flows.28

The arguments for a country risk premium

There are elements in each of the arguments in the previous section that are
persuasive but none of them is persuasive enough.
• Investors have become more globally diversified over the last three decades and
portions of country risk can therefore be diversified away in their portfolios.

28 In the simple example above, this is how it would work. Assume that we compute a country risk
premium of 3% for the emerging market to reflect the risk of disaster. The certainty equivalent cash flow
on the investment in that country would be $90/1.03 = $87.38.
 However, the significant home bias that remains in investor portfolios exposes
investors disproportionately to home country risk, and the increase in correlation
across markets has made a portion of country risk into non-diversifiable or market
risk.
• As stocks are traded in multiple markets and in many currencies, it is becoming
more feasible to estimate meaningful global betas, but it also is still true that these
betas cannot carry the burden of capturing country risk in addition to all other
macro risk exposures.
• Finally, there are certain types of country risk that are better embedded in the cash
flows than in the risk premium or discount rates. In particular, risks that are
discrete and isolated to individual countries should be incorporated into
probabilities and expected cash flows; good examples would be risks associated
with nationalization or related to acts of God (hurricanes, earthquakes etc.).
After you have diversified away the portion of country risk that you can, estimated a
meaningful global beta and incorporated discrete risks into the expected cash flows, you
will still be faced with residual country risk that has only one place to go: the equity risk
premium.
There is evidence to support the proposition that you should incorporate additional
country risk into equity risk premium estimates in riskier markets:
1. Historical equity risk premiums: Donadelli and Prosperi (2011) look at historical risk
premiums in 32 different countries (13 developed and 19 emerging markets) and
conclude that emerging market companies had both higher average returns and more
volatility in these returns between 1988 and 2010 (see table 16)

Table 16: Historical Equity Risk Premiums (Monthly) by Region

Region Monthly ERP Standard deviation
Developed Markets 0.62% 4.91%
Asia 0.97% 7.56%
Latin America 2.07% 8.18%
Eastern Europe 2.40% 15.66%
Africa 1.41% 6.03%
 While we would be cautious about using historical risk premiums over short time
periods (and 22 years is short in terms of stock market history), the evidence is
consistent with the argument that country risk should be incorporated into a larger
equity risk premium.29
2. Survey premiums: Fernandez et al (2014) surveyed academics, analysts and
companies in 88 countries on equity risk premiums. The reported average premiums
vary widely across markets and are higher for riskier emerging markets, as can be
seen in table 17.30
Table 17: Survey Estimates of Equity Risk Premium: By Region
Region Number Average Median
Africa 11 10.14% 9.85%
Developed
Markets 20 5.44% 5.29%
Eastern Europe 15 8.29% 8.25%
Emerging Asia 12 8.33% 8.08%
EU Troubled 7 8.36% 8.31%
Latin America 15 9.45% 9.39%
Middle East 8 7.14% 6.79%
Grand Total 88 7.98% 7.82%
Source: Fernandez, Linares & Acin (2014)
Again, while this does not conclusively prove that country risk commands a premium, it
does indicate that those who do valuations in emerging market countries seem to act like
it does. Ultimately, the question of whether country risk matters and should affect the
equity risk premium is an empirical one, not a theoretical one, and for the moment, at
least, the evidence seems to suggest that you should incorporate country risk into your
discount rates. This could change as we continue to move towards a global economy,
with globally diversified investors and a global equity market, but we are not there yet.

Measures of country equity risk

If country risk is not diversifiable, either because the marginal investor is not
globally diversified or because the risk is correlated across markets, you are left with the

29 Donadelli, M. and L. Prosperi, 2011, The Equity Risk Premium: Empirical Evidence from Emerging
Markets, Working Paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1893378.
30 Fernandez, P., P. Linares and I.F. Acin, 2014, Market Risk Premium used in 88 countries in 2014, A
Survey with 8228 Answers, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2450452.
task of measuring country risk and estimating country risk premiums. How do you
estimate country-specific equity risk premiums? In this section, we will look at three
choices. The first is to use historical data in each market to estimate an equity risk
premium for that market, an approach that we will argue is fraught with statistical and
structural problems in most emerging markets. The second is to start with an equity risk
premium for a mature market (such as the United States) and build up to or estimate
additional risk premiums for riskier countries. The third is to use the market pricing of
equities within each market to back out estimates of an implied equity risk premium for
the market.

Historical Risk Premiums

Most practitioners, when estimating risk premiums in the United States, look at
the past. Consequently, we look at what we would have earned as investors by investing
in equities as opposed to investing in riskless investments. Data services in the United
States have stock return data and risk free rates going back to 1926,31 and there are other
less widely used databases that go further back in time to 1871 or even to 1792.32 The
rationale presented by those who use shorter periods is that the risk aversion of the
average investor is likely to change over time, and that using a shorter and more recent
time period provides a more updated estimate. This has to be offset against a cost
associated with using shorter time periods, which is the greater noise in the risk premium
estimate. In fact, given the annual standard deviation in stock returns33 between 1926 and
2012 of 19.88%, the standard error associated with the risk premium estimate can be
estimated in table 18 follows for different estimation periods:34

31 Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Yearbook (SBBI), 2011 Edition, Morningstar.
32 Siegel, in his book, Stocks for the Long Run, estimates the equity risk premium from 1802-1870 to be
2.2% and from 1871 to 1925 to be 2.9%. (Siegel, Jeremy J., Stocks for the Long Run, Second Edition,
McGraw Hill, 1998). Goetzmann and Ibbotson estimate the premium from 1792 to 1925 to be 3.76% on an
arithmetic average basis and 2.83% on a geometric average basis. Goetzmann. W.N. and R. G. Ibbotson,
2005, History and the Equity Risk Premium, Working Paper, Yale University. Available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=702341.
33 For the historical data on stock returns, bond returns and bill returns check under "updated data" in
http://www.damodaran.com.
34 The standard deviation in annual stock returns between 1928 and 2011 is 20.11%; the standard deviation
in the risk premium (stock return – bond return) is a little higher at 21.62%. These estimates of the standard
error are probably understated, because they are based upon the assumption that annual returns are
 Table 18: Standard Errors in Historical Risk Premiums
Estimation Period Standard Error of Risk Premium Estimate
5 years 20%/ √5 = 8.94%
10 years 20%/ √10 = 6.32%
25 years 20% / √25 = 4.00%
50 years 20% / √50 = 2.83%
80 years 20% / √80 = 2.23%
Even using all of the entire Ibbotson data (about 85 years) yields a substantial standard
error of 2.2%. Note that that the standard errors from ten-year and twenty-year estimates
are likely to be almost as large or larger than the actual risk premium estimated. This cost
of using shorter time periods seems, in our view, to overwhelm any advantages
associated with getting a more updated premium.
With emerging markets, we will almost never have access to as much historical
data as we do in the United States. If we combine this with the high volatility in stock
returns in these markets, the conclusion is that historical risk premiums can be computed
for these markets but they will be useless because of the large standard errors in the
estimates. Table 19 summarizes historical arithmetic average equity risk premiums for
major non-US markets below for 1976 to 2001, and reports the standard error in each
estimate:35
Table 19: Risk Premiums for non-US Markets: 1976- 2001
Weekly Weekly standard Equity Risk Standard
Country average deviation Premium error
Canada 0.14% 5.73% 1.69% 3.89%
France 0.40% 6.59% 4.91% 4.48%
Germany 0.28% 6.01% 3.41% 4.08%
Italy 0.32% 7.64% 3.91% 5.19%
Japan 0.32% 6.69% 3.91% 4.54%
UK 0.36% 5.78% 4.41% 3.93%
India 0.34% 8.11% 4.16% 5.51%
Korea 0.51% 11.24% 6.29% 7.64%
Chile 1.19% 10.23% 15.25% 6.95%
Mexico 0.99% 12.19% 12.55% 8.28%
Brazil 0.73% 15.73% 9.12% 10.69%

uncorrelated over time. There is substantial empirical evidence that returns are correlated over time, which
would make this standard error estimate much larger. The raw data on returns is provided in Appendix 1.
35 Salomons, R. and H. Grootveld, 2003, The equity risk premium: Emerging vs Developed Markets,
Emerging Markets Review, v4, 121-144.
Before we attempt to come up with rationale for why the equity risk premiums vary
across countries, it is worth noting the magnitude of the standard errors on the estimates,
largely because the estimation period includes only 25 years. Based on these standard
errors, we cannot even reject the hypothesis that the equity risk premium in each of these
countries is zero, let alone attach a value to that premium.

Mature Market Plus

In this section, we will consider three approaches that can be used to estimate
country risk premiums, all of which build off the historical risk premiums estimated in
the last section. To approach this estimation question, let us start with the basic
proposition that the risk premium in any equity market can be written as:
Equity Risk Premium = Base Premium for Mature Equity Market + Country Risk
Premium
The country premium could reflect the extra risk in a specific market. This boils down
our estimation to estimating two numbers – an equity risk premium for a mature equity
market and the additional risk premium, if any, for country risk.

Mature Market Premium

To estimate a mature market equity risk premium, we can look at one of two
numbers. The first is the historical risk premium that we estimated for the United States,
which yielded 4.60% as the geometric average premium for stocks over treasury bonds
from 1928 to 2014. If we do this, we are arguing that the US equity market is a mature
market, and that there is sufficient historical data in the United States to make a
reasonable estimate of the risk premium. The other is the average historical risk premium
across 20 equity markets, approximately 3.2%, that was estimated by Dimson et al (see
earlier reference), as a counter to the survivor bias that they saw in using the US risk
premium. Consistency would then require us to use this as the equity risk premium, in
every other equity market that we deem mature; the equity risk premium in January 2013
would be 4.20% in Germany, France and the UK, for instance. For markets that are not
mature, however, we need to measure country risk and convert the measure into a country
risk premium, which will augment the mature market premium.
Estimating Country Risk Premium (for Equities)
How do we link a country risk measure to a country risk premium? In this
section, we will look at three approaches. The first uses default spreads, based upon
country bonds or ratings, whereas the latter two use equity market volatility as an input in
estimating country risk premiums.
1. Default Spreads
The simplest and most widely used proxy for the country risk premium is the
default spread that investors charge for buying bonds issued by the country. This default
spread can be estimated in one of three ways.
a. Current Default Spread on Sovereign Bond or CDS market: As we noted in the last
section, the default spread comes from either looking at the yields on bonds issued by the
country in a currency where there is a default free bond yield to which it can be compared
or spreads in the CDS market.36 With the 10-year US dollar denominated Brazilian bond
that we cited as an example in the last section, the default spread would have amounted to
1.70% in January 2015: the difference between the interest rate on the Brazilian bond and
a treasury bond of the same maturity. The netted CDS market spread on the same day for
the default spread was 2.86%. Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2014) break down
the sovereign bond default spread into four components, including global economic
conditions, country-specific economic factors, sovereign bond liquidity and policial risk,
and find that it is the political risk component that best explain money flows into and out
of the country equity markets.37
b. Average (Normalized) spread on bond: While we can make the argument that the
default spread in the dollar denominated is a reasonable measure of the default risk in
Brazil, it is also a volatile measure. In figure 12, we have graphed the yields on the dollar
denominated ten-year Brazilian Bond and the U.S. ten-year treasury bond and highlighted
the default spread (as the difference between the two yields) from January 2000 to

36 You cannot compare interest rates across bonds in different currencies. The interest rate on a peso bond
cannot be compared to the interest rate on a dollar denominated bond.
37 Bekaert, G., C.R. Harvey, C.T. Lundblad and S. Siegel, 2014, Political Risk Spreads, Journal of
International Business Studies, v45, 471-493.
January 2015. In the same figure, we also show the 10-year CDS spreads from 2005 to
2015,38 the spreads have also changed over time but move with the bond default spreads.

Figure  12:  Brazil  -­‐  Bond  Default  Spread  vs  Sovereign  CDS  
0.16  

0.14  

0.12  

0.1  

0.08   CDS  Spread  

0.06   Bond  Default  Spread  

0.04  

0.02  

0  

Note that the bond default spread widened dramatically during 2002, mostly as a result of
uncertainty in neighboring Argentina and concerns about the Brazilian presidential
elections.39 After the elections, the spreads decreased just as quickly and continued on a
downward trend through the middle of last year. Since 2004, they have stabilized, with a
downward trend; they spiked during the market crisis in the last quarter of 2008 but have
settled back into pre-crisis levels. Given this volatility, a reasonable argument can be
made that we should consider the average spread over a period of time rather than the
default spread at the moment. If we accept this argument, the normalized default spread,
using the average spreads over the last 5 years of data would be 1.65% (bond default
spread) or 1.99% (CDS spread). Using this approach makes sense only if the economic
fundamentals of the country have not changed significantly (for the better or worse)

38 Data for the sovereign CDS market is available only from the last part of 2004.
39 The polls throughout 2002 suggested that Lula Da Silva who was perceived by the market to be a leftist
would beat the establishment candidate. Concerns about how he would govern roiled markets and any poll
that showed him gaining would be followed by an increase in the default spread.
during the period but will yield misleading values, if there have been structural shifts in
the economy. In 2008, for instance, it would have made sense to use averages over time
for a country like Nigeria, where oil price movements created volatility in spreads over
time, but not for countries like China and India, which saw their economies expand and
mature dramatically over the period or Venezuela, where government capriciousness
made operating private businesses a hazardous activity (with a concurrent tripling in
default spreads). In fact, the last year has seen a spike in the Brazilian default spread,
partly the result of another election and partly because of worries about political
corruption in large Brazilian companies.
c. Imputed or Synthetic Spread: The two approaches outlined above for estimating the
default spread can be used only if the country being analyzed has bonds denominated in
US dollars, Euros or another currency that has a default free rate that is easily accessible.
Most emerging market countries, though, do not have government bonds denominated in
another currency and some do not have a sovereign rating. For the first group (that have
sovereign rating but no foreign currency government bonds), there are two solutions. If
we assume that countries with the similar default risk should have the same sovereign
rating, we can use the typical default spread for other countries that have the same rating
as the country we are analyzing and dollar denominated or Euro denominated bonds
outstanding. Thus, Bulgaria, with a Baa2 rating, would be assigned the same default
spread as Brazil, which also has Baa2 rating, and dollar denominated bonds and CDS
prices from which we can extract a default spread. For the second group, we are on even
more tenuous grounds. Assuming that there is a country risk score from the Economist or
PRS for the country, we could look for other countries that are rated and have similar
scores and assign the default spreads that these countries face. For instance, we could
assume that Cuba and Cameroon, which fall within the same score grouping from PRS,
have similar country risk; this would lead us to attach Cuba’s rating of Caa1 to Cameroon
(which is not rated) and to use the same default spread (based on this rating) for both
countries.
In table 20, we have estimated the typical default spreads for bonds in different
sovereign ratings classes in January 2015. One problem that we had in obtaining the
numbers for this table is that relatively few emerging markets have dollar or Euro
denominated bonds outstanding. Consequently, there were some ratings classes where
there was only one country with data and several ratings classes where there were none.
To mitigate this problem, we used spreads from the CDS market, referenced in the earlier
section. We were able to get default spreads for 65 countries, categorized by rating class,
and we averaged the spreads across multiple countries in the same ratings class.40 An
alternative approach to estimating default spread is to assume that sovereign ratings are
comparable to corporate ratings, i.e., a Ba1 rated country bond and a Ba1 rated corporate
bond have equal default risk. In this case, we can use the default spreads on corporate
bonds for different ratings classes. The table compares the spreads in January 2015 in the
corporate and sovereign bond markets.
Table 20: Default Spreads by Ratings Class – Sovereign vs. Corporate in January 2015
Moody's rating Sovereign Bonds/CDS Corporate Bonds
Aaa/AAA 0.00% 0.42%
Aa1/AA+ 0.40% 0.60%
Aa2/AA 0.50% 0.78%
Aa3/AA- 0.60% 0.87%
A1/A+ 0.70% 0.96%
A2/A 0.85% 0.97%
A3/A- 1.20% 1.10%
Baa1/BBB+ 1.60% 1.36%
Baa2/BBB 1.90% 1.67%
Baa3/BBB- 2.20% 2.22%
Ba1/BB+ 2.50% 2.61%
Ba2/BB 3.00% 2.97%
Ba3/BB- 3.60% 3.33%
B1/B+ 4.50% 3.74%
B2/B 5.50% 4.10%
B3/B- 6.50% 4.45%
Caa1/ CCC+ 7.50% 4.86%
Caa2/CCC 9.00% 7.50%
Caa3/ CCC- 10.00% 10.00%

Note that the corporate bond spreads, at least in January 2015, were slightly larger than
the sovereign spreads for the higher ratings classes, converge for the intermediate ratings

40 There were thirteen Baa2 rated countries, with ten-year CDS spreads, in January 2015. The average
spread across the these countries is 2.68%. We noticed wide variations across countries in the same ratings
class, and no discernible trend when compared to the January 2014 averages. Consequently, we decided to
use the same default spreads that we used last year.
and widen again at the lowest ratings. Using this approach to estimate default spreads for
Brazil, with its rating of Baa2 would result in a spread of 1.90% (1.67%), if we use
sovereign spreads (corporate spreads). These spreads are down from post-crisis levels at
the end of 2008 but are still larger than the actual spreads on Brazilian sovereign bonds in
early 2014.
Figure 13 depicts the alternative approaches to estimating default spreads for four
countries, Brazil, China, India and Poland, in early 2015:
Figure 13: Approaches for estimating Sovereign Default Spreads
Estimating a default spread for a country
or sovereign entity

Market Based estimates Rating/Risk score based estimates

Step 1: Find a sovereign rating (local currency)
for the country (on Moody's or S&P)
Sovereign Bond spread CDS Market Step 2: Look up the default spread for that
1. Find a bond issued by the 1. Find a 10-year CDS rating in the lookup table below:
country, denominated in US$ or for the country (if one
Euros. exists) Moody's rating Sovereign Bonds/CDS
2. Compute the default spread by 2. Net out US CDS Aaa/AAA 0.00%
comparing to US treasury bond 2. This is your default Aa1/AA+ 0.40%
(if US $) or German Euro bond (if spread. Aa2/AA 0.50%
Euros). Aa3/AA( 0.60%
A1/A+ 0.70%
A2/A 0.85%
Sovereign( Default( CDS(Spread( A3/A( 1.20%
Country( Bond(Yield Currency Risk(free(rate Spread (net(of(US) Baa1/BBB+ 1.60%
Brazil 3.87% US.$ 2.17% 1.70% 2.86% Baa2/BBB 1.90%
China NA NA NA NA 1.47% Baa3/BBB( 2.20%
India NA NA NA NA 2.33% Ba1/BB+ 2.50%
Poland 1.70% Euro 0.50% 1.20% 1.15% Ba2/BB 3.00%
Ba3/BB( 3.60%
B1/B+ 4.50%
B2/B 5.50%
B3/B( 6.50%
Caa1/ CCC+ 7.50%
Caa2/CCC 9.00%
Caa3/ CCC- 10.00%

Country Moody's,Rating Default,Spread

Brazil Baa2 1.90%
China Aa3 0.60%
India Baa3 2.20%
Poland A2 0.85%

With some countries, without US-dollar (or Euro) denominated sovereign bonds or CDS
spreads, you don’t have a choice since the only estimate of the default spread comes from
the sovereign rating. With other countries, such as Brazil, you have multiple estimates of
the default spreads: 1.70% from the dollar denominated bond, 3.17% from the CDS
spread, 2.86% from the netted CDS spread and 1.90% from the sovereign rating look up
table (table 20). You could choose one of these approaches and stay consistent over time
or average across them.
 Analysts who use default spreads as measures of country risk typically add them
on to both the cost of equity and debt of every company traded in that country. Thus, the
cost of equity for an Indian company, estimated in U.S. dollars, will be 2.2% higher than
the cost of equity of an otherwise similar U.S. company, using the January 2015 measure
of the default spread, based upon the rating. In some cases, analysts add the default
spread to the U.S. risk premium and multiply it by the beta. This increases the cost of
equity for high beta companies and lowers them for low beta firms.41
While many analysts use default spreads as proxies for country risk, the evidence
for its use is still thin. Abuaf (2011) examines ADRs from ten emerging markets and
relates the returns on these ADRs to returns on the S&P 500 (which yields a conventional
beta) and to the CDS spreads for the countries of incorporation. He finds that ADR
returns as well as multiples (such as PE ratios) are correlated with movement in the CDS
spreads over time and argues for the addition of the CDS spread (or some multiple of it)
to the costs of equity and capital to incorporate country risk.42
2. Relative Equity Market Standard Deviations
There are some analysts who believe that the equity risk premiums of markets
should reflect the differences in equity risk, as measured by the volatilities of these
markets. A conventional measure of equity risk is the standard deviation in stock prices;
higher standard deviations are generally associated with more risk. If you scale the
standard deviation of one market against another, you obtain a measure of relative risk.
For instance, the relative standard deviation for country X (against the US) would be
computed as follows:
Standard Deviation Country X
Relative Standard Deviation Country X =
Standard Deviation US
If we assume a linear relationship between equity risk premiums and equity market
standard deviations, and we assume that the risk premium for the US can be computed
(using historical data, for instance) the equity risk premium for country X follows:

41 In a companion paper, I argue for a separate measure of company exposure to country risk called lambda
that is scaled around one (just like beta) that is multiplied by the country risk premium to estimate the cost
of equity. See Damodaran, A., 2007, Measuring Company Risk Exposure to Country Risk, Working Paper,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=889388.
42 Abuaf, N., 2011, Valuing Emerging Market Equities – The Empirical Evidence, Journal of Applied
Finance, v21, 123-138.
 Equity risk premium Country X = Risk Premum US *Relative Standard Deviation Country X

Assume, for the moment, that you are using an equity risk premium for the United States
of 5.75%. The annualized standard deviation in the S&P 500 in two years preceding
January 2015, using weekly returns, was 10.85%, whereas the standard deviation in the
Bovespa (the Brazilian equity index) over the same period was 22.25%.43 Using these
values, the estimate of a total risk premium for Brazil would be as follows.
22.25%
Equity  Risk  Premium!"#$%& = 5.75% ∗   = 11.77%  
10.85%
The country risk premium for Brazil can be isolated as follows:
Country  Risk  Premium!"#$%& = 11.77% − 5.75% = 6.02%  
Table 21 lists country volatility numbers for some of the Latin American markets and the
resulting total and country risk premiums for these markets, based on the assumption that
the equity risk premium for the United States is 5.75%. Appendix 4 contains a more
complete list of emerging markets, with equity risk premiums and country risk premiums
estimated for each.

Table 21: Equity Market Volatilities and Risk Premiums (Weekly returns: Feb 13-Feb
15): Latin American Countries
Total
Country
Standard deviation Relative Volatility (to Equity
Country risk
in Equities (weekly) US) Risk
premium
Premium
Argentina 35.50% 3.27 18.78% 13.03%
Brazil 22.25% 2.05 11.77% 6.02%
Chile 13.91% 1.28 7.36% 1.61%
Colombia 16.00% 1.47 8.46% 2.71%
Costa Rica 8.78% 0.81 4.64% -1.11%
Mexico 14.81% 1.36 7.83% 2.08%
Panama 6.18% 0.57 3.27% -2.48%
Peru 16.15% 1.49 8.54% 2.79%
US 10.87% 1.00 5.75% 0.00%
Venezuela 40.03% 3.68 21.18% 15.43%

43 If the dependence on historical volatility is troubling, the options market can be used to get implied
volatilities for both the US market (14.16%) and for the Bovespa (24.03%).
While this approach has intuitive appeal, there are problems with using standard
deviations computed in markets with widely different market structures and liquidity.
Since equity market volatility is affected by liquidity, with more liquid markets often
showing higher volatility, this approach will understate premiums for illiquid markets and
overstate the premiums for liquid markets. For instance, the standard deviations for
Panama and Costa Rica are lower than the standard deviation in the S&P 500, leading to
equity risk premiums for those countries that are lower than the US. The second problem
is related to currencies since the standard deviations are usually measured in local
currency terms; the standard deviation in the U.S. market is a dollar standard deviation,
whereas the standard deviation in the Brazilian market is based on nominal Brazilian
Real returns. This is a relatively simple problem to fix, though, since the standard
deviations can be measured in the same currency – you could estimate the standard
deviation in dollar returns for the Brazilian market.
3. Default Spreads + Relative Standard Deviations
In the first approach to computing equity risk premiums, we assumed that the
default spreads (actual or implied) for the country were good measures of the additional
risk we face when investing in equity in that country. In the second approach, we argued
that the information in equity market volatility can be used to compute the country risk
premium. In the third approach, we will meld the first two, and try to use the information
in both the country default spread and the equity market volatility.
The country default spreads provide an important first step in measuring country
equity risk, but still only measure the premium for default risk. Intuitively, we would
expect the country equity risk premium to be larger than the country default risk spread.
To address the issue of how much higher, we look at the volatility of the equity market in
a country relative to the volatility of the bond market used to estimate the spread. This
yields the following estimate for the country equity risk premium.
! σ $
Equity
Country Risk Premium=Country Default Spread*## &&
σ
" Country Bond %
To illustrate, consider again the case of Brazil. As noted earlier, the default spread for
Brazil in January 2015, based upon its sovereign rating, was 1.90%. We computed
annualized standard deviations, using two years of weekly returns, in both the equity
market and the government bond, in early March 2015. The annualized standard
deviation in the Brazilian dollar denominated ten-year bond was 11.97%, well below the
standard deviation in the Brazilian equity index of 22.25%. The resulting country equity
risk premium for Brazil is as follows:
22.25%
Brazil  Country  Risk  Premium = 1.90% ∗   = 3.53%
11.97%
Unlike the equity standard deviation approach, this premium is in addition to a mature
market equity risk premium. Thus, assuming a 5.75% mature market premium, we would
compute a total equity risk premium for Brazil of 8.22%:
Brazil’s Total Equity Risk Premium = 5.75% + 3.53% = 9.28%
Note that this country risk premium will increase if the country rating drops or if the
relative volatility of the equity market increases.
Why should equity risk premiums have any relationship to country bond spreads?
A simple explanation is that an investor who can make 1.90% risk premium on a dollar-
denominated Brazilian government bond would not settle for a risk premium of 1.90% (in
dollar terms) on Brazilian equity. Playing devil’s advocate, however, a critic could argue
that the interest rate on a country bond, from which default spreads are extracted, is not
really an expected return since it is based upon the promised cash flows (coupon and
principal) on the bond rather than the expected cash flows. In fact, if we wanted to
estimate a risk premium for bonds, we would need to estimate the expected return based
upon expected cash flows, allowing for the default risk. This would result in a lower
default spread and equity risk premium. Both this approach and the last one use the
standard deviation in equity of a market to make a judgment about country risk premium,
but they measure it relative to different bases. This approach uses the country bond as a
base, whereas the previous one uses the standard deviation in the U.S. market. This
approach assumes that investors are more likely to choose between Brazilian bonds and
Brazilian equity, whereas the previous approach assumes that the choice is across equity
markets.
There are two potential measurement problems with using this approach. The first
is that the relative standard deviation of equity is a volatile number, both across countries
(ranging from 4.04 for India to 0.48 for the Philippines) and across time (Brazil’s relative
volatility numbers have ranged from close to one to well above 2). The second is that
computing the relative volatility requires us to estimate volatility in the government bond,
which, in turn, presupposes that long-term government bonds not only exist but are also
traded.44 In countries where this data item is not available, we have three choices. One is
to fall back on one of the other two approaches. The second is to use a different market
measure of default risk, say the CDS spread, and compute the standard deviation in the
spread; this number can be standardized by dividing the level of the spread. The third is
to compute a cross sectional average of the ratio of stock market to bond market volatility
across countries, where both items are available, and use that average. In 2015, for
instance, there were 26 emerging markets, where both the equity market volatility and the
government bond volatility numbers were available, at least for 100 trading weeks; the
numbers are summarized in Appendix 5. The median ratio, across these markets, of
equity market volatility to bond price volatility was approximately 1.88.45 We also
computed a second measure of relative volatility: equity volatility divided by the
coefficient of variation in the CDS spread.
σEquity / σBond σEquity / σCDS
Number of countries 26 46
with data
Average 1.86 2.11
Median 1.88 0.97
Maximum 4.04 23.49
Minimum 0.48 0.51
Looking at the descriptive statistics, the need to adjust default spreads seems to be
smaller, at least in the cross section, if you use the CDS spread as your measure of the
default spread for a country; the median ratio is close to one.

44 One indication that the government bond is not heavily traded is an abnormally low standard deviation
on the bond yield.
45 The ratio seems to be lowest in the markets with the highest default spreads and higher in markets with
lower default spreads. The median ratio this year is higher than it has been historically. On my website, I
continue to use a multiple of 1.50, reflecting the historical value for this ratio.
Choosing between the approaches
The three approaches to estimating country risk premiums will usually give you
different estimates, with the bond default spread and relative equity standard deviation
approaches generally yielding lower country risk premiums than the melded approach
that uses both the country bond default spread and the equity and bond standard
deviations. Table 22 summarizes the estimates of country equity and total risk premium
using the three approaches for Brazil in March 2014:
Table 22: Country and Total Equity Risk Premium: Brazil in January 2013
Approach Mature Market Brazil Country Risk Total Equity Risk
Equity Premium Premium Premium
Country Bond 5.75% 1.90% 7.65%
Default Spread
Relative Equity 5.75% 6.02% 11.77%
Market Standard
Deviations
Melded Approach 5.75% 1.90%*1.86 = 9.28%
(Bond default 3.53%
spread X Relative
Standard
DeviationBond)
Melded Approach 5.75% 3.37% *1.87= 12.05%
(CDS X Relative 6.30%
Standard
DeviationCDS)

The CDS and relative equity market approaches yield similar equity risk premiums, but
that is more the exception than the rule. In particular, the melded CDS approach offers
more promise going forward, as more countries have CDS traded on them. With all three
approaches, just as companies mature and become less risky over time, countries can
mature and become less risky as well.
One way to adjust country risk premiums over time is to begin with the premium
that emerges from the melded approach and to adjust this premium down towards either
the country bond default spread or the country premium estimated from equity standard
deviations. Thus, the equity risk premium will converge to the country bond default
spread as we look at longer term expected returns. As an illustration, the country risk
premium for Brazil would be 3.53% for the next year but decline over time to 1.90%
(country default spread) or perhaps even lower, depending upon your assessment of how
Brazil’s economy will evolve over time.
Appendix 6 provides a listing of the equity risk premiums globally, built upon the
premise that the implied equity risk premium of 5.81% for the S&P 500 on July 1, 2015,
is a good measure of the premium of a mature market and that the additional country risk
premium is best estimated using the melded approach, where the default spread for each
country (based on its rating) is multiplied by a scaling factor (of 1.5) to adjust for the
higher risk of equities. Note that only countries for which there is either an S&P or a
Moody’s sovereign rating are included on this list.

Market-based Equity Risk Premiums

The perils of starting with a mature market premium and augmenting it with a
country risk premium is that it is built on two estimates, one reflecting history (the mature
market premium) and the other based on judgment (default spreads and volatilities). It is
entirely possible that equity investors in individual markets build in expected equity risk
premiums that are very different from your estimates. In this section, we look at ways in
which we can use stock prices to back into equity risk premiums for markets.

Implied Equity Risk Premium

There is an alternative to estimating risk premiums that does not require historical
data or corrections for country risk, but does assume that the market, overall, is correctly
priced. Consider, for instance, a very simple valuation model for stocks:

Expected Dividends Next Period

Value =
(Required Return on Equity - Expected Growth Rate)
This is essentially the present value of dividends growing at a constant rate. Three of the
four inputs in this model can be obtained externally - the current level of the market
(value), the expected dividends next period and the expected growth rate in earnings and
dividends in the long term. The only “unknown” is then the required return on equity;
when we solve for it, we get an implied expected return on stocks. Subtracting out the
riskfree rate will yield an implied equity risk premium. We can extend the model to allow
for dividends to grow at high rates at least for short periods. The model has two
limitations: (a) it assumes that companies pay out their residual cash flows in dividends,
when the reality is that many companies either use other forms of returning cash (stock
buybacks, in the US) or hold on to the cash and (b) its presumption that companies
collectively are in stable growth. Both assumptions, though, can be relaxed, with alternate
measures of cash flow (dividends plus buybacks or free cash flow to equity) replacing
dividends and two-stage models, where you can assume higher growth for an initial
period before stable growth sets in. In a companion paper on equity risk premiums, I use
this approach to compute the implied equity risk premium for the S&P 500 every year
from 1960 to 2015.
Emerging Markets
The advantage of the implied premium approach is that it is market-driven and
current, and does not require any historical data. Thus, it can be used to estimate implied
equity premiums in any market, no matter how short its history, It is, however, bounded
by whether the model used for the valuation is the right one and the availability and
reliability of the inputs to that model. Earlier in this paper, we estimated country risk
premiums for Brazil, using default spreads and equity market volatile. To provide a
contrast, we estimated the implied equity risk premium for the Brazilian equity market in
September 2009, from the following inputs.

• The index (Bovespa) was trading at 61,172 on September 30, 2009, and the
dividend yield on the index over the previous 12 months was approximately 2.2%.
While stock buybacks represented negligible cash flows, we did compute the
FCFE for companies in the index, and the aggregate FCFE yield across the
companies was 4.95%.
• Earnings in companies in the index are expected to grow 6% (in US dollar terms)
over the next 5 years, and 3.45% (set equal to the treasury bond rate) thereafter.
• The riskfree rate is the US 10-year treasury bond rate of 3.45%.
The time line of cash flows is shown below:
3210 3, 402 3, 606 3,821 4, 052 4, 052(1.0345)
61, 272 = + + + + +
(1+ r) (1+ r) (1+ r) (1+ r) (1+ r) (r −.0345)(1+ r)5
2 3 4 5

These inputs yield a required return on equity of 9.17%, which when compared to the
treasury bond rate of 3.45% on that day results in an implied equity premium of 5.72%.
For simplicity, we have used nominal dollar expected growth rates46 and treasury bond
rates, but this analysis could have been done entirely in the local currency.
One of the advantages of using implied equity risk premiums is that that they are
more sensitive to changing market conditions. The implied equity risk premium for
Brazil in September 2007, when the Bovespa was trading at 73512, was 4.63%, lower
than the premium in September 2009, which in turn was much lower than the premium
prevailing in September 2014. In figure 14, we trace the changes in the implied equity
risk premium in Brazil from September 2000 to September 2014 and compare them to the
implied premium in US equities:

Figure 14: Implied Equity Risk Premium - Brazil

9.00%

8.00% 0.69%

7.00%
0.65%
4.00%
4.31% 1.34%
1.87%
6.00% 3.70% 2.43%
Risk Premium

3.23% 0.70%
2.28% 0.86%
5.00% 3.15%
4.06% 0.82% Brazil Country Risk
4.00% 7.64%
6.35% US premium
3.00% 5.59%
5.10%
4.86% 5.28%
4.12% 4.55%
2.00% 3.51%4.05% 3.95% 4.04%
3.95%
3.88%
2.50%
1.00%

0.00%

Implied equity risk premiums in Brazil declined steadily from 2003 to 2007, with the
September 2007 numbers representing a historic low. They surged in September 2008, as
the crisis unfolded, fell back in 2009 and 2010 but increased again in 2011. In fact, the
Brazil portion of the implied equity risk premium fell to its lowest level in ten years in

46 The input that is most difficult to estimate for emerging markets is a long-term expected growth rate. For
Brazilian stocks, I used the average consensus estimate of growth in earnings for the largest Brazilian
companies which have ADRs listed on them. This estimate may be biased, as a consequence.
September 2010, a phenomenon that remained largely unchanged in 2011 and 2012.
Political turmoil and corruptions scandals have combined to push the premium back up
again in the last year or two.
Computing and comparing implied equity risk premiums across multiple equity
markets allows us to pinpoint markets that stand out, either as over priced (because their
implied premiums are too low, relative to other markets) or under priced (because their
premiums at too high, relative to other markets). In September 2007, for instance, the
implied equity risk premiums in India and China were roughly equal to or even lower
than the implied premium for the United States, computed at the same time. Even an
optimist on future growth these countries would be hard pressed to argue that equity
markets in these markets and the United States were of equivalent risk, which would lead
us to conclude that these stocks were overvalued relative to US companies.
One final note is worth making. Over the last decade, the implied equity risk
premiums in the largest emerging markets – India, China and Brazil- have all declined
substantially, relative to developed markets. In table 22, we summarize implied equity
risk premiums for developed and emerging markets from 2001 and 2013, making
simplistic assumptions about growth and stable growth valuation models:47
Table 22: Developed versus Emerging Market Equity Risk Premiums

Start   Cost  of   Cost  of  

of   PBV   PBV   ROE   US   Equity   Equity   Differential  
year   Developed   Emerging   ROE  (Dev)   (Emerg)   T.Bond     (Developed)   (Emerging)   ERP  
2004   2.00   1.19   10.81%   11.65%   4.25%   7.28%   10.63%   3.35%  
2005   2.09   1.27   11.12%   11.93%   4.22%   7.26%   10.50%   3.24%  
2006   2.03   1.44   11.32%   12.18%   4.39%   7.55%   10.11%   2.56%  
2007   1.67   1.67   10.87%   12.88%   4.70%   8.19%   10.00%   1.81%  
2008   0.87   0.83   9.42%   11.12%   4.02%   10.30%   12.37%   2.07%  
2009   1.20   1.34   8.48%   11.02%   2.21%   7.35%   9.04%   1.69%  
2010   1.39   1.43   9.14%   11.22%   3.84%   7.51%   9.30%   1.79%  

47 We start with the US treasury bond rate as the proxy for global nominal growth (in US dollar terms), and
assume that the expected growth rate in developed markets is 0.5% lower than that number and the
expected growth rate in emerging markets is 1% higher than that number. The equation used to compute
the ERP is a simplistic one, based on the assumptions that the countries are in stable growth and that the
return on equity in each country is a predictor of future return on equity:
PBV = (ROE – g)/ (Cost of equity –g)
Cost of equity = (ROE –g + PBV(g))/ PBV
2011   1.12   1.08   9.21%   10.04%   3.29%   8.52%   9.61%   1.09%  
2012   1.17   1.18   9.10%   9.33%   1.88%   7.98%   8.35%   0.37%  
2013   1.56   1.63   8.67%   10.48%   1.76%   6.02%   7.50%   1.48%  
2014   1.95   1.50   9.27%   9.64%   3.04%   6.00%   7.77%   1.77%  
2015   1.88   1.56   9.69%   9.75%   2.17%   5.94%   7.39%   1.45%  

The trend line from 2004 to 2012 is clear as the equity risk premiums, notwithstanding a
minor widening in 2008, have converged in developed and emerging markets, suggesting
that globalization has put “emerging market risk” into developed markets, while creating
“developed markets stability factors” (more predictable government policies, stronger
legal and corporate governance systems, lower inflation and stronger currencies) in
emerging markets. In the last two years, we did see a correction in emerging markets that
pushed the premium back up, albeit to a level that was still lower than it was prior to
2010.

The Bottom Line

Both market and survey data indicate there is strong evidence that equity risk
premiums vary across countries. The debate about how best to measure those equity risk
premiums, though, continues, since all of the approaches that are available to estimate
them come with flaws. The default spread approach, either in its simple form (where the
default spread is used as a proxy for the additional equity risk premium in a country) or in
its modified version (where the default spread is scaled up to reflect the higher risk of
stocks, relative to bonds) is more widely used, largely because default spread data is
easier to get and is available for most countries. As stock price data becomes richer, it is
possible that market-based approaches will begin to dominate.

Valuing Country Risk in Companies

If we accept the proposition that country risk in not diversifiable and commands a
premium, the next question that we have to address relates to the exposure of individual
companies to that risk. Should all companies in a country with substantial country risk be
equally exposed to country risk? While intuition suggests that they should not, we will
begin by looking at standard approaches that assume that they are. We will follow up by
looking at ways in which we can bring in differences across companies in country risk
exposure into equity risk premiums and cost of equity estimates. In this section, we will
look at how to incorporate exposure to country risk, when doing valuation and corporate
finance. Finally, we will look at how to deal with currency choices in the analysis.

Measuring Company Exposure to Country Risk

The question of how best to deal with country risk comes up not only in the context of
valuing companies that may be exposed to it, but also within companies, when assessing
hurdle rates for projects in different countries. There are three broad approaches to
dealing with country risk. The first and simplest is to base the country risk assessment on
where the company is incorporated. Thus, all Brazilian companies are assumed to be
exposed to only Brazilian country risk and US companies to US country risk. The second
and more sensible (in my view) approach is to base the country risk exposure on where a
company operates rather than where it is incorporated. The third approach requires us to
estimate a relative emeasure of company exposure to country risk, akin to a beta, that we
will term lambda.

I. Country of Incorporation ERP

The easiest assumption to make when dealing with country risk, and the one that
is most often made, is that all companies that are incorporated in a country are equally
exposed to country risk in that country. The cost of equity for a firm in a market with
country risk can then be written as:
Cost of equity = Riskfree Rate + Beta (Mature Market Premium) + Country Risk
Premium
Thus, for Brazil, where we have estimated a country risk premium of 3.57% from the
melded approach, each company in the market will have an additional country risk
premium of 3.57% added to its cost of equity. For instance, the costs of equity for
Embraer, an aerospace company listed in Brazil, with a beta48 of 1.07 and Embratel, a
Brazilian telecommunications company, with a beta of 0.80, in US dollar terms would be

48 We used a bottom-up beta for Embraer, based upon an unleverd beta of 0.95 (estimated using aerospace
companies listed globally) and Embraer’s debt to equity ratio of 19.01%. For more on the rationale for
bottom-up betas read the companion paper on estimating risk parameters.
as follows (assuming a US treasury bond rate of 2.50% as the risk free rate and an equity
risk premium of 5.80% for mature markets):
Cost of Equity for Embraer = 2.50% + 1.07 (5.80%) + 3.57% = 12.28%
Cost of Equity for Embratel = 2.50% + 0.80 (5.80%) + 3.57% = 10.71%
In some cases, analysts modify this approach to scale the country risk premium by beta.
If you use this modification, the estimated costs of equity for Embraer and Embratel
would be as follows:
Cost of Equity for Embraer = 2.50% + 1.07 (5.80%+ 3.57%) = 12.53%
Cost of Equity for Embratel = 2.50% + 0.80 (5.80%+ 3.57%)= 10.00%
With both approaches, we are treating all Brazilian companies as exposed to only
Brazilian country risk, even though their operations may extend into other markets
(mature and emerging).

II. Operation-weighted ERP

For those investors who are uncomfortable with the notion that all companies in a
market are equally exposed to country risk or that a company is exposed only to its local
market’s risk, the alternative is to compute a country risk premium for each company that
reflects its operating exposure. Thus, if a company derives half of its value from Brazil
and half from Argentina, the country risk premium will be an average of the country risk
premiums for the two countries. Since value is difficult to estimate, by country, the
weighting has to be based on more observable variables such as revenues or operating
income. In table 23, we estimate the equity risk premium and country risk premium
exposure for Ambev, a Brazil-based company with revenues across the Americas, in
2011 (with a mature market premium of 6%):
Table 23: ERP and CRP for Ambev in 2011
Revenue Weighted Weighted
Country Revenues Weight ERP CRP ERP CRP
Argentina $19.00 9.31% 15.00% 9.00% 1.40% 0.84%  
Bolivia $4.00 1.96% 10.88% 4.88% 0.21% 0.10%  
Brazil $130.00 63.73% 8.63% 2.63% 5.50% 1.67%  
Canada $23.00 11.27% 6.00% 0.00% 0.68% 0.00%  
Chile $7.00 3.43% 7.05% 1.05% 0.24% 0.04%  
Ecuador $6.00 2.94% 18.75% 12.75% 0.55% 0.38%  
 Paraguay $3.00 1.47% 12.00% 6.00% 0.18% 0.09%  
Peru $12.00 5.88% 9.00% 3.00% 0.53% 0.18%  
Total $204.00 100.00% 9.28% 3.28%  

Note that while Ambev is incorporated in Brazil, it does get substantial revenues from not
only from other Latin American countries but also from Canada. Once the weighted
premium has been computed, it can either be added to the standard single-factor model as
a constant or scaled, based upon beta. Thus, the estimated cost of equity for Ambev, at
the end of 2011, using the two approaches would have been as follows (using a beta of
0.80 for Ambev , a US dollar risk free rate of 3.25% and a 6% equity risk premium for
mature markets):
The constant approach: 3.25% + 0.80 (6.00%) + 3.28% = 11.33%
The scaled approach: 3.25% + 0.80 (6.00%+ 3.28%) = 10.67%
Note that the approaches yield similar values when the beta is close to one, but can
diverge when the beta is much lower or higher than one. When we use the latter
approach we are assuming that a company's exposure to country risk is proportional to its
exposure to all other market risk, which is measured by the beta.
With this approach, you can see that the exposure to country risk or emerging
market risk is not restricted to emerging market companies. Many companies that are
headquartered in developed markets (US, Western Europe, Japan) derive some or a large
portion of their revenues from emerging or riskier markets and will therefore have higher
composite equity risk premiums. For instance, we estimate the composite equity risk
premium for Coca Cola in 2012 in table 24:
Table 24: Coca Cola – Equity and Country Risk Premium
Equity  Risk   Country  Risk  
Region   Revenues   Premium   Premium  
Western  Europe   19%   6.67%   0.67%  
Eastern  Europe  &  
Russia   5%   8.60%   2.60%  
Asia   15%   7.63%   1.63%  
Latin  America   15%   9.42%   3.42%  
Australia  &  NZ   4%   6.00%   0.00%  
Africa   4%   9.82%   3.82%  
North  America   38%   6.00%   0.00%  
Coca  Cola  (Company)   100%   7.17%   1.17%  
As with Ambev, we would use the weighted equity risk premium for the company to
compute its overall cost of equity. For valuing regional revenues (or divisions), we would
draw on the divisional equity risk premium; thus, the equity risk premium used to value
Coca Cola’s Latin American business would be 9.42%. Note that rather than break the
revenues down by country, we have broken them down by region and attached an equity
risk premium to each region, computed as a GDP-weighted average of the equity risk
premiums of the countries in that region. We did so for two reasons. First, given that
Coca Cola derives its revenues from almost every country in the world, it is more
tractable to compute the equity risk premiums by region. Second, Coca Cola does not
break down its revenues (at least for public consumption) by country, but does so by
region.
The focus on revenues can sometimes lead to misleading assessments of country
risk exposure for some companies and it is worth exploring alternative weighting
mechanisms for these companies. For mining and oil companies, for instance, the true
risk lies in where their reserves lie rather than in where they sell the commodities that
they produce. If you can get a geographic breakdown of reserves, you can use it to derive
a weighted average equity risk premium.

III. Lambdas

The most general approach, is to allow for each company to have an exposure to
country risk that is different from its exposure to all other market risk. For lack of a
better term, let us term the measure of a company’s exposure to country risk to be lambda
(λ). Like a beta, a lambda will be scaled around one, with a lambda of one indicating a
company with average exposure to country risk and a lambda above or below one
indicating above or below average exposure to country risk. The cost of equity for a firm
in an emerging market can then be written as:
Expected Return = Rf + Beta (Mature Market Equity Risk Premium) + λ (County Risk
Premium)
Note that this approach essentially converts the expected return model to a two-factor
model, with the second factor being country risk, with λ measuring exposure to country
risk.

Determinants of Lambda
Most investors would accept the general proposition that different companies in a
market should have different exposures to country risk. But what are the determinants of
this exposure? We would expect at least three factors (and perhaps more) to play a role.
A. Revenue Source: The first and most obvious determinant is how much of the revenues
a firm derives from the country in question. A company that derives 30% of its revenues
from Brazil should be less exposed to Brazilian country risk than a company that derives
70% of its revenues from Brazil. Note, though, that this then opens up the possibility that
a company can be exposed to the risk in many countries. Thus, the company that derives
only 30% of its revenues from Brazil may derive its remaining revenues from Argentina
and Venezuela, exposing it to country risk in those countries.
B. Production Facilities: A company can be exposed to country risk, even if it derives no
revenues from that country, if its production facilities are in that country. After all,
political and economic turmoil in the country can throw off production schedules and
affect the company’s profits. Companies that can move their production facilities
elsewhere can spread their risk across several countries, but the problem is exaggerated
for those companies that cannot move their production facilities. Consider the case of
mining companies. An African gold mining company may export all of its production but
it will face substantial country risk exposure because its mines are not moveable.
3. Risk Management Products: Companies that would otherwise be exposed to substantial
country risk may be able to reduce this exposure by buying insurance against specific
(unpleasant) contingencies and by using derivatives. A company that uses risk
management products should have a lower exposure to country risk – a lower lambda –
than an otherwise similar company that does not use these products.
Ideally, we would like companies to be forthcoming about all three of these factors in
their financial statements.
Measuring Lambda
The simplest measure of lambda is based entirely on revenues. In the last section,
we argued that a company that derives a smaller proportion of its revenues from a market
should be less exposed to country risk. Given the constraint that the average lambda
across all stocks has to be one (some one has to bear the country risk), we cannot use the
percentage of revenues that a company gets from a market as lambda. We can, however,
scale this measure by dividing it by the percent of revenues that the average company in
the market gets from the country to derive a lambda.
% of Revenue in country Company
Lambdaj =
% of Revenue in countryAverage company in market
Consider again the two Brazilian companies that we looked earlier: Embraer and
Embratel. In 2012, Embraer generated only 6% of its revenues in Brazil, whereas the
€
average company in the Brazilian market obtained 75% of its revenues in Brazil.49 Using
the measure suggested above, the lambda for Embraer would be:
LambdaEmbraer = 6%/ 75% = 0.08
In contrast, Embratel generated 90% of its revenues from Brazil, giving it a lambda of
LambdaEmbraer = 90%/ 75% = 1.20
Following up, Embratel is far more exposed to country risk than Embraer and will have a
much higher cost of equity.
The second measure draws on the stock prices of a company and how they move
in relation to movements in country risk. Sovereign bonds issued by countries offer a
simple and updated measure of country risk; as investor assessments of country risk
become more optimistic, sovereign bonds go up in price, just as they go down when
investors become more pessimistic. A regression of the returns on a stock against the
returns on a country bond should therefore yield a measure of lambda in the slope
coefficient. Applying this approach to the Embraer and Embratel, we regressed monthly

49 To use this approach, we need to estimate both the percent of revenues for the firm in question and for
the average firm in the market. While the former may be simple to obtain, estimating the latter can be a
time consuming exercise. One simple solution is to use data that is publicly available on how much of a
country’s gross domestic product comes from exports. According to the World Bank data in this table,
Brazil got 23.2% of its GDP from exports in 2008. If we assume that this is an approximation of export
revenues for the average firm, the average firm can be assumed to generate 76.8% of its revenues
domestically. Using this value would yield slightly higher betas for both Embraer and Embratel.
stock returns on the two stocks against monthly returns on the ten-year dollar
denominated Brazilian government bond and arrived at the following results:
ReturnEmbraer = 0.0195 + 0.2681 ReturnBrazil $ Bond
ReturnEmbratel = -0.0308 + 2.0030 ReturnBrazil $ Bond
Based upon these regressions, Embraer has a lambda of 0.27 and Embratel has a lambda
of 2.00. The resulting dollar costs of equity for the two firms, using a US dollar risk free
rate of 2.5%, a mature market equity risk premium of 5.80% and a country equity risk
premium of 3.57% for Brazil are:
Cost of Equity for Embraer = 2.50% + 1.07 (5.80%) + 0.27 (3.57%) = 9.70%
Cost of Equity for Embratel = 2.50% + 0.80 (5.8%) + 2.00 (3.57%) = 14.28%
What are the limitations of this approach? The lambdas estimated from these regressions
are likely to have large standard errors; the standard error in the lambda estimate of
Embratel is 0.35. It also requires that the country have bonds that are liquid and widely
traded, preferably in a more stable currency (dollar or euro).
In general, as the number of countries a company derives its revenues from
increases, the lambda approach gets less and less practical, since you have to estimate
lambdas for each market.50 Thus, we would not even attempt to use this approach for
Ambev or Coca Cola. It is designed more for a company that is exposed to risk in only
one or two emerging markets (with the balance of its revenues coming from developed
markets) and even in those markets, the estimation stars have to align for lambda
estimates to be meaningful.

Currency Choices

When analyzing companies that operate in foreign markets, the questions of how
best to deal with different currencies and the potential risk exposure that comes from
unexpected currency movements (up or down) have to be answered. In this section, we
will first look at how to shift from one currency to another consistently and how this
consistency leads to currency invariance, where the value of a company or project will
not be a function of the currency chosen to analyze it. We will follow it up by looking at

50 Damodaran, A,, 2003, Estimating Company Exposure to Country Risk, Journal of Applied Finance, v pg
64-78.
exchange rate changes over time and whether these changes translate into higher risk that
has to be accounted for in valuation and capital budgeting.

Currency Consistency

One of the fundamental tenets in valuation is that the cash flows and discount
rates in any discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis (valuation or capital budgeting) have to
be denominated in the same currency; US dollar cash flows have to be discounted at a US
dollar discount rate and Indian rupee cash flows have to be discounted at an Indian rupee
discount rate. Keeping this principle in mind allows us to develop estimation mechanisms
for dealing with different currencies.

The Importance of Inflation

Stripped down to basics, the only reason that the currency in which you choose to
do your analysis matters is that different currencies have different expected inflation rates
embedded in them. Those differences in expected inflation affect both our estimates of
expected cash flows and discount rates. When working with a high inflation currency, we
should therefore expect to see higher discount rates and higher cash flows and with a
lower inflation currency, both discount rates and cash flows will be lower. In fact, we
could choose to remove inflation entirely out of the process by using real cash flows and
a real discount rate.

Effects on Discount Rates

If discount rates, when working with higher inflation currency, should be higher
than discount rates for the same company, when working with a lower inflation currency,
how do you put this principle into practice? You have two choices. One is to use risk free
rates that reflect these expected inflation differences and build off that rate; higher
inflation currencies will have higher risk free rates and higher discount rates. The other is
to compute a discount rate in a base currency (say US dollars) and then adjust that dollar
discount rate for differential inflation to make it a discount rate in an alternate currency.
1. Risk Free Rates
The risk free rate in a currency should, at least in theory, incorporate both the
expected inflation in that currency and an expected real return for investors. Thus, the
risk free rate in a high inflation currency should also be high, and estimating and using
that risk free rate as the base should bring in the higher inflation into the discount rate.
That is easier said than done, for two reasons. First, estimating a risk free rate requires
that we able to observe market prices and interest rates on traded bonds issued by
governments. That is, after all, the rationale that we use for using the US Treasury bond
rate as the risk free rate in US dollars. Second, even if a government bond rate is
observable, that government has to be viewed as default free for the rate to be a risk free
rate. Thus, if we assume that Aaa sovereign ratings from Moody’s signify default free
governments, the risk free rates in the respective currencies on June 30, 2015, is in table
25:
Table 25: Risk free rates in Currencies with Aaa Rated Government Issuers
Moody’s
Rating for Government Bond Rate
Currency
issuing (6/30/15)
Governement
Swiss Franc Aaa 0.16%
Euro (German) Aaa 0.92%
Swedish Krona Aaa 1.03%
Danish Krone Aaa 1.15%
Canadian $ Aaa 1.86%
Norwegian Krone Aaa 1.92%
US $ Aaa 2.47%
Singapore $ Aaa 2.72%
Australian $ Aaa 3.07%
New Zealand $ Aaa 3.38%

But what do we do with governments that have default risk? In a companion paper on
risk free rates51, I develop a simple process of estimating the default spread for the
government, using either the sovereign rating or the CDS market, and then subtracting
that default spread from the government bond rate to get to a risk free rate. Table 26
summarizes the default-spread adjusted risk free rates in currencies, where the issuing
governments are rated below Aaa (in local currency terms) by Moody’s.
Table 26: Risk free Rates in Currencies with non-Aaa Rated Government Issuers
Currency   Government  Bond   Default  Spread  based  on   Risk  free  Rate  in  

51 Damodaran, A., 2010, Into the Abyss! What if nothing is risk free?, SSRN Working Paper,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1648164
 Rate  (6/30/15)   Local  Currency  Rating   Currency  
Brazilian  Reai   12.58%   1.90%   10.68%  
British  Pound   2.18%   0.40%   1.78%  
Bulgarian  Lev   3.15%   1.90%   1.25%  
Chilean  Peso   4.63%   0.60%   4.03%  
Chinese  Yuan   3.62%   0.60%   3.02%  
Colombian  Peso   7.22%   1.90%   5.32%  
Croatian  Kuna   3.26%   2.50%   0.76%  
Czech  Koruna   0.92%   0.70%   0.22%  
Hong  Kong  $   1.85%   0.40%   1.45%  
Hungarian  Forint   3.93%   2.50%   1.43%  
Iceland  Krona   7.10%   2.20%   4.90%  
Indian  Rupee   7.85%   2.20%   5.65%  
Indonesian  Rupiah   8.31%   2.20%   6.11%  
Israeli  Shekel   2.39%   0.70%   1.69%  
Japanese  Yen   0.45%   0.70%   -­‐0.25%  
Kenyan  Shilling   13.02%   4.50%   8.52%  
Korean  Won   2.48%   0.60%   1.88%  
Malyasian  Ringgit   4.03%   1.20%   2.83%  
Mexican  Peso   6.12%   1.20%   4.92%  
Nigerian  Naira   14.15%   3.60%   10.55%  
Pakistani  Rupee   10.05%   7.50%   2.55%  
Peruvian  Sol   6.38%   1.20%   5.18%  
Phillipine  Peso   4.38%   1.90%   2.48%  
Polish  Zloty   3.24%   0.85%   2.39%  
Romanian  Leu   4.00%   2.20%   1.80%  
Russian  Ruble   11.14%   1.90%   9.24%  
South  African  Rand   8.30%   1.90%   6.40%  
Taiwanese  $   1.51%   0.60%   0.91%  
Thai  Baht   2.97%   1.60%   1.37%  
Turkish  Lira   9.14%   2.20%   6.94%  
Venezuelan  Bolivar   12.25%   7.50%   4.75%  
Vietnamese  Dong   6.79%   4.50%   2.29%  

Thus, if you were estimating the costs of equity for a Brazilian company, you would
replace the risk free rate in US dollars with a risk free rate in $R to get the $R cost of
equity.
There are two dangers with this approach. The first is that the government bond
rates, which are the starting point for these risk free estimates, may not reflect market
expectations in many countries, where the government bond markets are not deep and
sometimes manipulated. The second is that almost all of the risk premiums that we have
talked about in this paper come from dollar-based markets and may need to be adjusted
when working with higher inflation currencies. Take, for instance, our estimate of an
equity risk premium of 8.66% for Brazil in July 2015. While that may be the right
premium to use in US dollar cost of equity computation (with a US dollar risk free rate of
close to 2.5%) for a company that is investing in Brazil, it may need to be increased,
when working with nominal $R, where the risk free rate is closer to 10.7%.
2. Differential Inflation
The second approach to dealing with different currencies is to go back to inflation
fundamentals. If the differences between currencies lies in the fact that there are different
expectations of inflation embedded in them, you should be able to use that differential
inflation to adjust discount rates in one currency to another. Thus, if the cost of capital is
computed in US dollars and you intend to convert it into a nominal $R cost of capital,
you could do so with the following equation:
(!!!"#$%&$'  !"#$%&'("  !"#$  !"  $")
Cost  of  Capital  in  $R = 1 + Cost  of  Capital  in  US$ ∗ (!!!"#$%&$'  !"#$%&'("  !"#$  !"  !"  $)-1

There are two advantages to this approach. First, to use it, you only need an expected
inflation rate in a currency, not a government bond rate, and that should be easier to
obtain, especially if you use past inflation as a proxy. The second advantage is that it
automatically scales up risk premiums for higher inflation, as evidenced in the
comparison in table 27, where we estimate the cost of equity for an average-risk (beta =1)
Brazilian company, using both the $R risk free rate approach and the differential inflation
approach. Note that the differential inflation approach results in a higher cost of equity, as
the equity risk premium is also scaled up for higher inflation.
Table 27: Cost of Equity Comparison
Risk  free  Rate  Approach   Differential  Inflation  
Risk  free   Expected  
    rates   ERP   Cost  of  Equity   Inflation   Cost  of  Equity  
2.47%+8.66  %  
US  $   2.47%   8.66%   =11.13%   1.50%   11.13%  
10.68%+8.66%   (1.1113)(1.095/1.015)-­‐1  
$R   10.68%   8.66%   =19.34%   9.50%   =19.89%  
 The weakest link in the approach is measuring expected inflation in secondary
currencies. Past inflation rates are often not only noisy, but are also manipulated by
governments to make inflation look tamer than it is. The good news, though, is that even
if the expected inflation rates are misestimated, the effect on value will be minimal if the
same “wrong” number is used in both generating cash flows and in estimating discount
rates.

Effects on Expected Exchange Rates

If consistency requires that the cash flows be estimated in the same currency as
the discount rat, it is a given that you will have to convert cash flows from one currency
to another. Thus, if you decide to value a Brazilian company in US dollars, you will have
to take expected cash flows in $R and convert them into US dollars using $R/US$
exchange rates. While there are some analysts who use today’s exchange rate to make
this conversion for all future years, we will argue that this is a recipe for mismatches and
large valuation errors. In fact, we will argue that if your intent is to preserve consistency,
you have to use the same differential inflation that you used to get discount rates to
estimate expected exchange rate.
1. Current Exchange Rates- The Inconsistency Problem
Some analysts use the argument that the only way to avoid exchange rate
speculation in valuation is to use the current exchange rate to convert all future cash
flows from one currency to another. While that argument sounds alluring, it is wrong, and
especially so when the expected inflation rates are different across the currencies. In fact,
using the current exchange rate to convert future cash flows from a currency with higher
inflation (say pesos or $R) into a currency with lower inflation (say Euros or US dollars)
will result in an over valuation. Reversing that process and converting lower inflation
currencies into higher inflation currencies at today’s exchange rate will under value an
asset.
The reason is simple. If you use today’s exchange rate to convert future cash
flows from a base currency to a converted currency, you are in effect leaving the
expected inflation rate in the cash flow at the base currency’s level, while switching the
expected inflation rate in the discount rate to the converted currency’s level. Thus, using
today’s exchange rate to convert $R to US $ and discounting those cash flows back at a
US $ discount rate, if the inflation rate is 9.5% in Brazil and 1.5% in the US, will result in
the former being incorporated into the cash flows and the latter into the discount rate.
2. Forward Market Exchange Rates
Using exchange rates from the forward and futures markets is less perilous than
using a current exchange rate, since the forward market presumably builds in the
currency depreciation that can be expected in the higher inflation currency. Here again,
though, there may be a consistency problem. If the discount rate is estimated using a
current risk free rate in the currency and this rate implies an inflation rate that is different
from the one in the forward currency markets, you can still end up mismatching expected
inflation in the cash flows and the discount rate.
3. Purchasing Power Parity Exchange Rates
Since the key sin to avoid in valuation is mismatching inflation in the cash flows
and the discount rate, there is a strong argument to be made that the safest way to
estimate expected future exchange rates is to use the same differential inflation rate used
to estimate the discount rate.
(!!!"#$%&$'  !"#$%&'("  !"#$ )
Expected Exchange Rate C1, C2 = Spot Exchange Rate C1, C2(!!!"#$%&$'  !"#$%&'("  !"#$!! )
!!

In the $R example, using the same 9.5% inflation in $R and 1.5% inflation rate in US$ on
the current exchange rate of $R3.15/US $ (on July 1, 2015), this would yield the expected
exchange rates for the next five years in table 28.
Table 28: Expected $R/US $ Exchange Rates
Year Expected Exchange Rate ($R/US$)
Current R$ 3.15
1 R$ 3.15*(1.095/1.015) = R$ 3.40
2 R$ 3.15*(1.095/1.015)2 =R$ 3.67
3 R$ 3.15*(1.095/1.015)3 =R$ 3.96
4 R$ 3.15*(1.095/1.015)4 =R$ 4.27
5 R$ 3.15*(1.095/1.015)5 =R$ 4.60

If these expected exchange rates are used to compute $R cash flows in future years, the
effect of switching to $R from US $ on value should cancel out, since the discount rate
effect will be exactly offset by the cash flow effect. In fact, using any other set of
expected exchange rates, no matter how highly regarded the source, will bring currency
views (optimistic or pessimistic) into your valuation.
Currency Risk

When working with cash flows in a foreign currency, it is understandable that

analysts worry about currency risk, though their measurement of and prescriptions for
that risk are often misplaced. First, it is not the fact that exchange rates change over time
that creates risk, it is that they change in unexpected ways. Thus, if the Brazilian Reai
depreciates over the next five years in line with the expectations in table 28, there is no
risk, but if it depreciates less or more, that is risk. Second, even allowing for the fact that
there is currency risk in investments in foreign markets, it is not clear that analysts should
be adjusting value for that risk, especially if exchange rate risk is diversifiable to
investors in the companies making these investments. If this is the case, you are best
served forecasting expected cash flows (using expected exchange rates) and not adjusting
discount rates for additional currency risk.
It is true that currency and country risk tend to be correlated and that countries
with high country risk also tend to have the most volatile currencies. If so, the discount
rates will be higher for investments in these countries but that augmentation is
attributable to the country risk, not currency risk.

Conclusion
As companies expand operations into emerging markets and investors search for
investment opportunities in Asia and Latin America, they are also increasingly exposed
to additional risk in these countries. While it is true that globally diversified investors can
eliminate some country risk by diversifying across equities in many countries, the
increasing correlation across markets suggests that country risk cannot be entirely
diversified away. To estimate the country risk premium, we consider three measures: the
default spread on a government bond issued by that country, a premium obtained by
scaling up the equity risk premium in the United States by the volatility of the country
equity market relative to the US equity market and a melded premium where the default
spread on the country bond is adjusted for the higher volatility of the equity market. We
also estimated an implied equity premium from stock prices and expected cashflows.
 Appendix 1: Corruption Score

Corruptio Country Country / Corruptio Country Corruptio Country

Country / Territory n Score Rank Territory n Score Rank Country / Territory n Score Rank
Afghanistan   12   172   Ghana   48   61   Oman   45   64  
Albania   33   110   Greece   43   69   Pakistan   29   126  
Algeria   36   100   Guatemala   32   115   Panama   37   94  
Angola   19   161   Guinea   25   145   Papua  New  Guinea   25   145  
Guinea-­‐
Argentina   34   107   Bissau   19   161   Paraguay   24   150  
Armenia   37   94   Guyana   30   124   Peru   38   85  
Australia   80   11   Haiti   19   161   Philippines   38   85  
Austria   72   23   Honduras   29   126   Poland   61   35  
Azerbaijan   29   126   Hong  Kong   74   17   Portugal   63   31  
Bahamas   71   24   Hungary   54   47   Puerto  Rico   63   31  
Bahrain   49   55   Iceland   79   12   Qatar   69   26  
Bangladesh   25   145   India   38   85   Romania   43   69  
Barbados   74   17   Indonesia   34   107   Russia   27   136  
Belarus   31   119   Iran   27   136   Rwanda   49   55  
Saint  Vincent  and  the  
Belgium   76   15   Iraq   16   170   Grenadines   67   29  
Benin   39   80   Ireland   74   17   Samoa   52   50  
Bhutan   65   30   Israel   60   37   Sao  Tome  and  Principe   42   76  
Bolivia   35   103   Italy   43   69   Saudi  Arabia   49   55  
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina   39   80   Jamaica   38   85   Senegal   43   69  
Botswana   63   31   Japan   76   15   Serbia   41   78  
Brazil   43   69   Jordan   49   55   Seychelles   55   43  
Bulgaria   43   69   Kazakhstan   29   126   Sierra  Leone   31   119  
Burkina  Faso   38   85   Kenya   25   145   Singapore   84   7  
 Corruptio Country Country / Corruptio Country Corruptio Country
Country / Territory n Score Rank Territory n Score Rank Country / Territory n Score Rank
Korea  
Burundi   20   159   (North)   8   174   Slovakia   50   54  
Korea  
Cambodia   21   156   (South)   55   43   Slovenia   58   39  
Cameroon   27   136   Kosovo   33   110   Somalia   8   174  
Canada   81   10   Kuwait   44   67   South  Africa   44   67  
Cape  Verde   57   42   Kyrgyzstan   27   136   South  Sudan   15   171  
Central  African  Republic   24   150   Laos   25   145   Spain   60   37  
Chad   22   154   Latvia   55   43   Sri  Lanka   38   85  
Chile   73   21   Lebanon   27   136   Sudan   11   173  
China   36   100   Lesotho   49   55   Suriname   36   100  
Colombia   37   94   Liberia   37   94   Swaziland   43   69  
Comoros   26   142   Libya   18   166   Sweden   87   4  
Congo  Republic   23   152   Lithuania   58   39   Switzerland   86   5  
Costa  Rica   54   47   Luxembourg   82   9   Syria   20   159  
Côte  d´Ivoire   32   115   Madagascar   28   133   Taiwan   61   35  
Croatia   48   61   Malawi   33   110   Tajikistan   23   152  
Cuba   46   63   Malaysia   52   50   Tanzania   31   119  
Cyprus   63   31   Mali   32   115   Thailand   38   85  
Czech  Republic   51   53   Malta   55   43   The  FYR  of  Macedonia   45   64  
Democratic  Republic  of  the  
Congo   22   154   Mauritania   30   124   Timor-­‐Leste   28   133  
Denmark   92   1   Mauritius   54   47   Togo   29   126  
Djibouti   34   107   Mexico   35   103   Trinidad  and  Tobago   38   85  
Dominica   58   39   Moldova   35   103   Tunisia   40   79  
Dominican  Republic   32   115   Mongolia   39   80   Turkey   45   64  
Ecuador   33   110   Montenegro   42   76   Turkmenistan   17   169  
 Corruptio Country Country / Corruptio Country Corruptio Country
Country / Territory n Score Rank Territory n Score Rank Country / Territory n Score Rank
Egypt   37   94   Morocco   39   80   Uganda   26   142  
El  Salvador   39   80   Mozambique   31   119   Ukraine   26   142  
Eritrea   18   166   Myanmar   21   156   United  Arab  Emirates   70   25  
Estonia   69   26   Namibia   49   55   United  Kingdom   78   14  
Ethiopia   33   110   Nepal   29   126   United  States   74   17  
Finland   89   3   Netherlands   83   8   Uruguay   73   21  
France   69   26   New  Zealand   91   2   Uzbekistan   18   166  
Gabon   37   94   Nicaragua   28   133   Venezuela   19   161  
Gambia   29   126   Niger   35   103   Vietnam   31   119  
Georgia   52   50   Nigeria   27   136   Yemen   19   161  
Germany   79   12   Norway   86   5   Zambia   38   85  
Zimbabwe   21   156  
           
 Appendix 2: Global Peace Index Scores
Scor Rankin Scor Rankin Scor Rankin Scor Rankin
Country e g Country e g Country e g Country e g
Afghanistan   3.427   160   El  Salvador   2.263   123   Macedonia  (FYR)   1.944   71   Slovakia   1.478   23  
Equatorial  
Albania   1.821   52   Guinea   1.987   81   Madagascar   1.911   67   Slovenia   1.378   15  
Algeria   2.131   104   Eritrea   2.309   127   Malawi   1.814   51   Somalia   3.307   157  
Angola   2.02   88   Estonia   1.677   38   Malaysia   1.561   28   South  Africa   2.376   136  
Argentina   1.865   60   Ethiopia   2.234   119   Mali   2.31   128   South  Korea   1.701   42  
Armenia   2.028   91   Finland   1.277   6   Mauritania   2.262   122   South  Sudan   3.383   159  
Australia   1.329   9   France   1.742   45   Mauritius   1.503   25   Spain   1.451   21  
Austria   1.198   3   Gabon   1.904   66   Mexico   2.53   144   Sri  Lanka   2.188   114  
Azerbaijan   2.325   132   Georgia   1.973   79   Moldova   1.942   70   Sudan   3.295   156  
Bahrain   2.142   107   Germany   1.379   16   Mongolia   1.706   43   Swaziland   2.102   101  
Bangladesh   1.997   84   Ghana   1.84   54   Montenegro   1.854   57   Sweden   1.36   13  
Belarus   2.173   110   Greece   1.878   61   Morocco   2.002   86   Switzerland   1.275   5  
Belgium   1.368   14   Guatemala   2.215   118   Mozambique   1.976   80   Syria   3.645   162  
Benin   1.958   77   Guinea   2.214   117   Myanmar   2.323   130   Taiwan   1.657   35  
Bhutan   1.416   18   Guinea-­‐Bissau   2.235   120   Namibia   1.784   48   Tajikistan   2.152   108  
Bolivia   2.025   90   Guyana   2.029   92   Nepal   1.882   62   Tanzania   1.903   64  
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina   1.839   53   Haiti   2.074   98   Netherlands   1.432   20   Thailand   2.303   126  
Botswana   1.597   31   Honduras   2.21   116   New  Zealand   1.221   4   The  Gambia   2.086   99  
Brazil   2.122   103   Hungary   1.463   22   Nicaragua   1.947   74   Timor-­‐Leste   1.86   58  
Bulgaria   1.607   32   Iceland   1.148   1   Niger   2.32   129   Togo   1.944   71  
Burkina  Faso   1.994   83   India   2.504   143   Nigeria   2.91   151   Trinidad  and  Tobago   2.07   97  
Burundi   2.323   130   Indonesia   1.768   46   North  Korea   2.977   153   Tunisia   1.952   76  
Cambodia   2.179   111   Iran   2.409   138   Norway   1.393   17   Turkey   2.363   135  
Cameroon   2.349   134   Iraq   3.444   161   Oman   1.947   74   Turkmenistan   2.138   106  
 Scor Rankin Scor Rankin Scor Rankin Scor Rankin
Country e g Country e g Country e g Country e g
Canada   1.287   7   Ireland   1.354   12   Pakistan   3.049   154   Uganda   2.179   111  
Central  African  Republic   3.332   158   Israel   2.781   148   Panama   1.903   64   Ukraine   2.845   150  
Chad   2.429   140   Italy   1.669   36   Papua  New  Guinea   2.064   96   United  Arab  Emirates   1.805   49  
Chile   1.563   29   Jamaica   2.153   109   Paraguay   2.023   89   United  Kingdom   1.685   39  
United  States  of  
China   2.267   124   Japan   1.322   8   Peru   2.029   92   America   2.038   94  
Colombia   2.72   146   Jordan   1.944   71   Philippines   2.462   141   Uruguay   1.721   44  
Costa  Rica   1.654   34   Kazakhstan   2.008   87   Poland   1.43   19   Uzbekistan   2.187   113  
Cote  d'  Ivoire   2.133   105   Kenya   2.342   133   Portugal   1.344   11   Venezuela   2.493   142  
Croatia   1.55   27   Kosovo   1.938   69   Qatar   1.568   30   Vietnam   1.848   56  
Republic  of  the  
Cuba   1.988   82   Kuwait   1.626   33   Congo   2.196   115   Yemen   2.751   147  
Cyprus   1.924   68   Kyrgyz  Republic   2.249   121   Romania   1.542   26   Zambia   1.846   55  
Czech  Republic   1.341   10   Laos   1.7   41   Russia   2.954   152   Zimbabwe   2.294   125  
Democratic  Republic  of  the  
Congo   3.085   155   Latvia   1.695   40   Rwanda   2.42   139  
     
Denmark   1.15   2   Lebanon   2.623   145   Saudi  Arabia   2.042   95  
Djibouti   2.113   102   Lesotho   1.891   63   Senegal   1.805   49        
     
Dominican  Republic   2.089   100   Liberia   1.963   78   Serbia   1.768   46  
     
Ecuador   1.997   84   Libya   2.819   149   Sierra  Leone   1.864   59  
     
Egypt   2.382   137   Lithuania   1.674   37   Singapore   1.49   24  
     
 Appendix 3: PRS Scores for Country Risk in Groups (Higher numbers represent less risk
PRS  Score   Country   PRS  Score   Country   PRS  Score   Country   PRS  Score   Country  
Syria   Serbia     Azerbaijan   70-­‐75   Lithuania  
<45  
Somalia   Burkina  Faso   Jordan   Belgium  
Sudan   Togo   Kazakhstan   Israel  
Liberia   Angola   Paraguay   Trinidad  &  Tobago  
Libya   Cameroon   Thailand   Oman  
Guinea   Gambia   Congo,  Republic   Chile  
45-­‐55  
Venezuela   Ecuador   65-­‐70   Estonia   Poland  
Yemen,  Republic   60-­‐65   Kenya   Gabon   Bahamas  
Ukraine   Lebanon   Bahrain   Australia  
Niger   Papua  New  Guinea   Peru   Czech  Republic  
Zimbabwe   Guyana   Cuba   United  States  
Korea,  D.P.R.   Algeria   Bulgaria   Austria  
Mozambique   Mongolia   Romania   United  Arab  Emirates  
75-­‐80  
Congo,  Dem.  Republic   Myanmar   India   Iceland  
Belarus   Nicaragua   Suriname   Netherlands  
Iraq   Brazil   Jamaica   Botswana  
55-­‐60   Uganda   Indonesia   Bolivia   Finland  
Nigeria   Bangladesh   Slovakia   Ireland  
Egypt   Colombia   Vietnam   Japan  
70-­‐75  
Haiti   Tunisia   France   Kuwait  
65-­‐70  
Ethiopia   Iran   Uruguay   Hong  Kong  
Malawi   Sri  Lanka   China,  Peoples'  Rep.   Korea,  Republic  
Tanzania   El  Salvador   Hungary   New  Zealand  
Pakistan   Honduras   Italy   Denmark  
60-­‐65  
Mali   Argentina   Latvia   United  Kingdom  
PRS  Score   Country   PRS  Score   Country   PRS  Score   Country   PRS  Score   Country  
Moldova   Greece   Dominican  Republic   Qatar  
Turkey   Guatemala   Namibia   Canada  
Russia   Mexico   Spain   Taiwan  
Ghana   Albania   Panama   Germany  
Armenia   Morocco   Costa  Rica   Brunei  
Cote  d'Ivoire   Slovenia   Saudi  Arabia   Sweden  
Guinea-­‐Bissau   South  Africa   Philippines   Luxembourg  
Sierra  Leone   Croatia   Portugal   Singapore  
Madagascar   Zambia   Malaysia   >80   Norway  
Senegal   Cyprus   Malta   Switzerland  
 Appendix 4: Sovereign Foreign Currency (FC) & Local Currency (LC) Ratings for Countries (Moody’s)
FC   LC   FC   LC   FC   LC   FC   LC  
Sovereign   Rati Rati Sovereign   Rati Rati Sovereign   Rati Rati Sovereign   Rati Rati
ng   ng   ng   ng   ng   ng   ng   ng  
Abu  Dhabi   Aa2   Aa2   Czech  Republic   A1   A1   Kenya   B1   B1   Qatar   Aa2   Aa2  
Democratic  Republic  of  the  
Albania   B1   B1   Congo   B3   B3   Korea   Aa3   Aa3   Republic  of  the  Congo   Ba3   Ba3  
Angola   Ba2   Ba2   Denmark   Aaa   Aaa   Kuwait   Aa2   Aa2   Romania   Baa3   Baa3  
Argentina   Caa1   Caa1   Dominican  Republic   B1   B1   Latvia   A3   A3   Russia   Ba1   Ba1  
Armenia   Ba3   Ba3   Ecuador   B3   -­‐   Lebanon   B2   B2   Saudi  Arabia   Aa3   Aa3  
Australia   Aaa   Aaa   Egypt   B3   B3   Lithuania   A3   A3   Senegal   B1   B1  
Austria   Aaa   Aaa   El  Salvador   Ba3   -­‐   Luxembourg   Aaa   Aaa   Serbia   B1   B1  
Azerbaijan   Baa3   Baa3   Estonia   A1   A1   Macao   Aa2   Aa2   Sharjah   A3   A3  
Bahamas   Baa2   Baa2   Ethiopia   B1   B1   Malaysia   A3   A3   Singapore   Aaa   Aaa  
Bahrain   Baa3   Baa3   Fiji   B1   B1   Malta   A3   A3   Slovakia   A2   A2  
Bangladesh   Ba3   Ba3   Finland   Aaa   Aaa   Mauritius   Baa1   Baa1   Slovenia   Baa3   Baa3  
Barbados   B3   B3   France   Aa1   Aa1   Mexico   A3   A3   South  Africa   Baa2   Baa2  
Belarus   Caa1   Caa1   Gabon   Ba3   Ba3   Moldova   B3   B3   Spain   Baa2   Baa2  
Belgium   Aa3   Aa3   Georgia   Ba3   Ba3   Mongolia   B2   B2   Sri  Lanka   B1   -­‐  
Belize   Caa2   Caa2   Germany   Aaa   Aaa   Montenegro   Ba3   -­‐   St.  Maarten   Baa1   Baa1  
St.  Vincent  &  the  
Bermuda   A1   A1   Ghana   B3   B3   Morocco   Ba1   Ba1   Grenadines   B3   B3  
Bolivia   Ba3   Ba3   Greece   Caa2   Caa2   Mozambique   B1   B1   Suriname   Ba3   Ba3  
Bosnia  and  
Herzegovina   B3   B3   Guatemala   Ba1   Ba1   Namibia   Baa3   Baa3   Sweden   Aaa   Aaa  
Botswana   A2   A2   Honduras   B3   B3   Netherlands   Aaa   Aaa   Switzerland   Aaa   Aaa  
Brazil   Baa2   Baa2   Hong  Kong   Aa1   Aa1   New  Zealand   Aaa   Aaa   Taiwan   Aa3   Aa3  
Bulgaria   Baa2   Baa2   Hungary   Ba1   Ba1   Nicaragua   B3   B3   Thailand   Baa1   Baa1  
Cambodia   B2   B2   Iceland   Baa3   Baa3   Nigeria   Ba3   Ba3   Trinidad  and  Tobago   Baa2   Baa2  
 FC   LC   FC   LC   FC   LC   FC   LC  
Sovereign   Rati Rati Sovereign   Rati Rati Sovereign   Rati Rati Sovereign   Rati Rati
ng   ng   ng   ng   ng   ng   ng   ng  
Canada   Aaa   Aaa   India   Baa3   Baa3   Norway   Aaa   Aaa   Tunisia   Ba3   Ba3  
Cayman  Islands   Aa3   -­‐   Indonesia   Baa3   Baa3   Oman   A1   A1   Turkey   Baa3   Baa3  
Chile   Aa3   Aa3   Ireland   Baa1   Baa1   Pakistan   B3   B3   Uganda   B1   B1  
China   Aa3   Aa3   Isle  of  Man   Aa1   Aa1   Panama   Baa2   -­‐   Ukraine   Ca   Ca  
Papua  New  
Colombia   Baa2   Baa2   Israel   A1   A1   Guinea   B1   B1   United  Arab  Emirates   Aa2   Aa2  
Costa  Rica   Ba1   Ba1   Italy   Baa2   Baa2   Paraguay   Ba1   Ba1   United  Kingdom   Aa1   Aa1  
United  States  of  
Côte  d'Ivoire   B1   B1   Jamaica   Caa2   Caa2   Peru   A3   A3   America   Aaa   Aaa  
Croatia   Ba1   Ba1   Japan   A1   A1   Philippines   Baa2   Baa2   Uruguay   Baa2   Baa2  
Cuba   Caa2   -­‐   Jordan   B1   B1   Poland   A2   A2   Venezuela   Caa3   Caa3  
Cyprus   B3   B3   Kazakhstan   Baa2   Baa2   Portugal   Ba1   Ba1   Vietnam   B1   B1  
Zambia   B1   B1  
                 
 Appendix 5: CDS Spreads by Country
CDS   CDS   CDS  
Moody's   CDS   Moody's   CDS   Moody's   CDS  
Country   Spread  adj   Country   Spread  adj   Country   Spread  adj  
rating   Spread   rating   Spread   rating   Spread  
for  US   for  US   for  US  
Abu  Dhabi   Aa2   0.97%   0.56%   India   Baa3   2.37%   1.96%   Portugal   Ba1   2.71%   2.30%  
Australia   Aaa   0.61%   0.20%   Indonesia   Baa3   2.60%   2.19%   Qatar   Aa2   1.01%   0.60%  
Austria   Aaa   0.57%   0.16%   Ireland   Baa1   1.13%   0.72%   Romania   Baa3   1.73%   1.32%  
Bahrain   Baa3   3.21%   2.80%   Israel   A1   1.06%   0.65%   Russia   BA1   3.59%   3.18%  
Belgium   Aa3   0.85%   0.44%   Italy   Baa2   2.03%   1.62%   Saudi  Arabia   Aa3   0.93%   0.52%  
Brazil   Baa2   3.32%   2.91%   Japan   A1   0.84%   0.43%   Slovakia   A2   0.99%   0.58%  
Bulgaria   Baa2   2.26%   1.85%   Kazakhstan   Baa2   2.88%   2.47%   Slovenia   Baa3   1.78%   1.37%  
Chile   Aa3   1.04%   0.63%   Korea   Aa3   0.84%   0.43%   South  Africa   Baa2   2.73%   2.32%  
China   Aa3   1.52%   1.11%   Latvia   A3   1.43%   1.02%   Spain   Baa2   1.73%   1.32%  
Colombia   Baa2   2.32%   1.91%   Lebanon   B2   4.03%   3.62%   Sweden   Aaa   0.36%   0.00%  
Costa  Rica   Ba1   3.78%   3.37%   Lithuania   A3   1.39%   0.98%   Switzerland   Aaa   0.31%   0.00%  
Croatia   Ba1   3.25%   2.84%   Malaysia   A3   2.01%   1.60%   Thailand   Baa1   1.64%   1.23%  
Cyprus   B3   5.15%   4.74%   Mexico   A3   1.93%   1.52%   Tunisia   Ba3   3.33%   2.92%  
Czech  Republic   A1   0.94%   0.53%   Morocco   Ba1   2.29%   1.88%   Turkey   Baa3   2.81%   2.40%  
Denmark   Aaa   0.44%   0.03%   Netherlands   Aaa   0.41%   0.00%   United  Kingdom   Aa1   0.41%   0.00%  
Egypt   B3   3.70%   3.29%   New  Zealand   Aaa   0.65%   0.24%   United  States  of  America   Aaa   0.41%   0.00%  
Estonia   A1   0.88%   0.47%   Norway   Aaa   0.31%   0.00%   Vietnam   B1   2.90%   2.49%  
Finland   Aaa   0.53%   0.12%   Pakistan   B3   4.95%   4.54%  
France   Aa1   0.76%   0.35%   Panama   Baa2   1.98%   1.57%          
       
Germany   Aaa   0.41%   0.00%   Peru   A3   2.01%   1.60%  
Hong  Kong   Aa1   0.70%   0.29%   Philippines   Baa2   1.55%   1.14%          
       
Hungary   Ba1   2.16%   1.75%   Poland   A2   1.30%   0.89%  
       
 Appendix 6: Equity Risk Premium (ERP) by Country: Melded Default Spread (with S&P 500 implied premium as mature market
premium)
Country ERP Country ERP Country ERP
Abu Dhabi 6.56% Ethiopia 12.56% New Zealand 5.81%
Albania 12.56% Fiji 12.56% Nicaragua 15.56%
Andorra (Principality of) 8.21% Finland 5.81% Nigeria 11.21%
Angola 10.31% France 6.41% Norway 5.81%
Argentina 17.06% Gabon 11.21% Oman 6.86%
Armenia 11.21% Georgia 11.21% Pakistan 15.56%
Aruba 8.21% Germany 5.81% Panama 8.66%
Australia 5.81% Ghana 15.56% Papua New Guinea 12.56%
Austria 5.81% Greece 19.31% Paraguay 9.56%
Azerbaijan 9.11% Guatemala 9.56% Peru 7.61%
Bahamas 8.66% Guernsey (States of) 6.41% Philippines 8.66%
Bahrain 9.11% Honduras 15.56% Poland 7.09%
Bangladesh 11.21% Hong Kong 6.41% Portugal 9.56%
Barbados 15.56% Hungary 9.56% Qatar 6.56%
Belarus 17.06% Iceland 9.11% Ras Al Khaimah (Emirate of) 7.09%
Belgium 6.71% India 9.11% Romania 9.11%
Belize 19.31% Indonesia 9.11% Russia 9.56%
Bermuda 6.86% Ireland 8.21% Rwanda 14.06%
Bolivia 11.21% Isle of Man 6.41% Saudi Arabia 6.71%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 15.56% Israel 6.86% Senegal 12.56%
Botswana 7.09% Italy 8.66% Serbia 12.56%
Brazil 8.66% Jamaica 19.31% Sharjah 7.61%
Bulgaria 8.66% Japan 6.86% Singapore 5.81%
Burkina Faso 15.56% Jersey (States of) 6.41% Slovakia 7.09%
Country ERP Country ERP Country ERP
Cambodia 14.06% Jordan 12.56% Slovenia 9.11%
Cameroon 14.06% Kazakhstan 8.66% South Africa 8.66%
Canada 5.81% Kenya 12.56% Spain 8.66%
Cayman Islands 6.71% Korea 6.71% Sri Lanka 12.56%
Cape Verde 14.06% Kuwait 6.56% St. Maarten 8.21%
Chile 6.71% Latvia 7.61% St. Vincent & the Grenadines 15.56%
China 6.71% Lebanon 14.06% Suriname 11.21%
Colombia 8.66% Liechtenstein 5.81% Sweden 5.81%
Congo (Democratic Republic of) 15.56% Lithuania 7.61% Switzerland 5.81%
Congo (Republic of) 11.21% Luxembourg 5.81% Taiwan 6.71%
Cook Islands 12.56% Macao 6.56% Thailand 8.21%
Costa Rica 9.56% Macedonia 11.21% Trinidad and Tobago 8.66%
Côte d'Ivoire 12.56% Malaysia 7.61% Tunisia 11.21%
Croatia 9.56% Malta 7.61% Turkey 9.11%
Cuba 19.31% Mauritius 8.21% Turks and Caicos Islands 8.21%
Curacao 7.61% Mexico 7.61% Uganda 12.56%
Cyprus 15.56% Moldova 15.56% Ukraine 9.11%
Czech Republic 6.86% Mongolia 14.06% United Arab Emirates 6.56%
Denmark 5.81% Montenegro 11.21% United Kingdom 6.41%
Dominican Republic 12.56% Montserrat 9.11% United States of America 5.81%
Ecuador 15.56% Morocco 9.56% Uruguay 8.66%
Egypt 15.56% Mozambique 12.56% Venezuela 20.81%
El Salvador 11.21% Namibia 9.11% Vietnam 12.56%
Estonia 6.86% Netherlands 5.81% Zambia 12.56%