Ethnic Diversity in the Recruitment of Diplomats: Why

MFAs Take the Issue Seriously

Christian Lequesne, Gabriel Castillo, Minda Holm, Walid Jumblatt Bin
Abdullah, Halvard Leira, Kamna Tiwary, Reuben Wong

To cite this version:

Christian Lequesne, Gabriel Castillo, Minda Holm, Walid Jumblatt Bin Abdullah, Halvard Leira, et
al.. Ethnic Diversity in the Recruitment of Diplomats: Why MFAs Take the Issue Seriously. Hague
Journal of Diplomacy, 2019, 15 (1), pp.1 - 23. �10.1163/1871191X-15101062�. �hal-03380895�

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 The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 15 (2019) 1-23 -1X
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brill.com/hjd 1X
2
3
Ethnic Diversity in the Recruitment of Diplomats: 4
5
Why MFAs Take the Issue Seriously 6
7
Christian Lequesne,a,1 Gabriel Castillo,a Minda Holm,b Walid Jumblatt 8
Bin Abdullah,c Halvard Leira,b Kamna Tiwaryd and Reuben Wonge 9
a Sciences Po (CERI), Paris, France 10
b Norwegian Institute of International Relations (NUPI), Oslo, Norway 11
c Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 12
d Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India 13
e National University of Singapore, Singapore 14
christian.lequesne@sciencespo.fr; gabriel.castillo@sciencespo.fr; 15
minda.holm@nupi.no; hl@nupi.no; walid@ntu.edu.sg; polwonggr@nus.edu.sg; 16
kamna.tiwary@gmail.com 17
18
Received: 12 March 2019; revised: 4 July 2019; accepted: 31 July 2019 19
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21
Summary 22
23
Diversity and its management have become an issue in all organisations. Ministries 24
of foreign affairs (MFAs) do not escape the issue. In the 2000s, states decided to con- 25
sider more ethnic diversity in the recruitment of their diplomats. In some countries, 26
this new goal requires affirmative action programs. This article is based on three case 27
studies. The first case study analyses two Western countries — France and Norway — 28
where MFAs have to reflect the diversity of immigration in their societies. The sec- 29
ond case study analyses the case of Brazil, a country where the legacy of slavery still 30
causes discrimination in the recruitment of diplomats. The third case study analyses 31
ethnic diversity in the MFAs of India and Singapore, which recognise multicultural- 32
ism or multiracialism. The study draws five comparative conclusions to generalise 33
on why MFAs in the world cannot escape the challenge of ethnic diversity in their 34
recruit­ment policy. 35
36
37
38
39
1 The authors thank Jan Melissen and four anonymous reviewers for their useful comments. 40X
41
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© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/1871191X-15101062 43

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-1X 2 Lequesne et al.
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1X Keywords
2
3 affirmative action – foreign services – diplomats – diplomatic practice – ethnic
4 diversity – ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) – public diplomacy
5
6
7 1 Introduction
8
9 In recent years, diversity and its management have become topics for debate in
10 all kind of organisations. As the editors of the Oxford Handbook of Diversity in
11 Organisations write, ‘Diversity management practices have spread around the
12 globe focusing on the organising and management of inclusion and exclusion
13 of different genders, sexualities, ethnicities, ages, classes, and (dis)abilities’.
14 They add that ‘practicing diversity management and dealing with diversity in
15 organisations is never without controversy’.2
16 As state organisations, ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) do not escape the
17 challenge of diversity. Before the Second World War, a vast majority of diplo-
18 mats in Europe and the United States were mostly white males with aristocrat-
19 ic or middle-class backgrounds.3 In the United States, it was after the Second
20 World War that African Americans began to criticise the Department of State
21 for its ‘nearly all white composition, [and] pushed for the use of more African-
22 Americans in the diplomatic field’.4 In Western Europe, the second part of the
23 20th century saw a progressive change in the recruitment of diplomats as a re-
24 sult of migrations. The issue became salient as well for MFAs in Asia, Africa and
25 Latin America. In Brazil, improving the representation of African Brazilians in
26 the MFA by means of affirmative action became an issue of public debate in
27 the 2000s. In India, the low representation of Muslims in public services came
28 into light in 2006 when after a government committee submitted a critical re-
29 port on their status. Ethnicity can, of course, be considered as a multifaceted
30 term. In this study, ethnicity is defined as a category of people who identify
31 with each other on the basis of presumed ancestries or on similarities as a
32 common language, culture or religion.
33 The study of ethnic diversity has preceded the study of gender diversity
34 in diplomatic services, even if the second has now produced a larger body of
35 literature than the first.5 Seminal books include Michael L. Krenn’s study of
36
37
2 Bendl et al. 2016, 1.
38 3 David Cross 2007.
39 4 Krenn 1999, 18.
40X 5 Cassidy 2017.
41
42
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African American diplomats in the US State Department between 1945-1949.6 1X
Going beyond diplomatic services, there is a broader literature on the role of 2
ethnicity and race in foreign policy,7 including the use of ethnicity and race by 3
Western diplomats during the colonial rule.8 However, some studies on MFAs 4
still do not mention a single word on the issue, even while their empirical 5
scope concerns multicultural or multiracial states.9 6
This article is based on a case study approach. It starts from concrete cases 7
including strong narratives to deduce explanatory variables and finally draws 8
comparative analytical conclusions. The three case studies, corresponding to 9
five national experiences, are very different but the authors assume, following 10
Carsten Anckar’s observations, that comparisons can be made from ‘units of 11
research, which are as different as possible’.10 The reason for the case study ap- 12
proach is that there is no ‘grand theory’ for researching diversity in MFAs, as for 13
diversity studies in general.11 The most relevant method consists of interpret- 14
ing how diplomatic institutions and MFAs produce ethnic diversity, how they 15
experiment with it and how they tell about what they produce. The authors’ re- 16
search methods are eclectic. They collected material such as official reports of 17
the MFAs and public bodies (as parliaments or state agencies), interventions in 18
public debates (including the press) and interviews. However, interviews were 19
not possible in all of the MFAs. The authors were able to conduct interviews 20
with the Directorate for Human Resources of the MFAs in France, Norway and 21
Brazil, but not in India and Singapore. In India, it is not in the habit of diplo- 22
mats of the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) to give time to academics investigat- 23
ing their organisation. In Singapore, there is another reason: Ethnic diversity 24
is officially a non-issue in the MFA and no diplomat is really prepared to talk 25
about it with scholars. 26
This study is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the case of two Western 27
countries — France and Norway — where MFAs are facing the challenge of 28
reflecting the diversity of immigration in their societies. Section 3 analyses 29
the case of Brazil, a country where the legacy of slavery still causes discrimi- 30
nation in the recruitment of diplomats. Section 4 analyses the case of ethnic 31
minorities in the MFAs of two countries, India and Singapore, which officially 32
recognise multiculturalism or multiracialism as state policies. Finally, the au- 33
thors draw five comparative conclusions from their case studies to answer the 34
35
6  Krenn 1999. 36
7  DeConde 1992. 37
8  Okoth Opondo 2010.
9  Rana 2009.
38
10 Anckar 2008, 390. 39
11 Bendl et al. 2016, 3. 40X
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1X research question: What explains the contemporary interest of MFAs in the
2 world to manage ethnic diversity in the recruitment of the diplomats?
3
4
5 2 Reflecting on Societies of Immigration: MFAs in France and Norway
6
7 With democratisation and educational changes, the public administrations of
8 Western European countries, which include MFAs, strive to become and re-
9 main representative of their citizenship. As the ethnic makeup of their popula-
10 tion shifts due to migration flows, new challenges arise. This section analyses
11 the extent to which children of migrants or even first-generation migrants are
12 represented in the MFAs of Western European countries. This case study analy-
13 ses France and Norway, which illustrate both similarities and differences in
14 how the issue has developed.
15
16 2.1 The Narrative
17 France and Norway differ in a number of relevant ways. France, which traces a
18 story of statehood back to the 9th century, developed one of the first and most
19 respected foreign services of the world, and conquered and maintained a colo-
20 nial empire from the beginning of the 16th century until decolonisation in the
21 1960s. Norway on the other hand was part of multinational polities ruled from
22 Copenhagen and Stockholm from the 14th century until independence in 1905.
23 It had no foreign service (although some Norwegians served as consuls and
24 ministers) and its involvement in European colonialism was largely indirect.
25 The different histories of France and Norway, combined with different eco-
26 nomic structures, have led to different relationships to migration. France, as a
27 colonial power and an industrial country, became a destination for migrants
28 from the 19th century while Norway did not have any significant long-distance
29 immigration until the 1960s.
30 For the MFAs of the two countries, these different backgrounds produced
31 different recruitment patterns for diplomats. In Norway, as Iver B. Neumann
32 and Halvard Leira document, all diplomats had typical Norwegian names until
33 the 1970s, and the first candidate with a non-traditional Norwegian name to be
34 admitted to the diplomatic trainee programme was in 2003.12
35 In France, recruitment to the MFA was socially homogeneous from 1880
36 (date of the first exam to enter the career) to the Second World War. Most of the
37 candidates came from the French bourgeoisie and aristocracy.13 The situation
38
39 12 Neumann and Leira 2005.
40X 13 Baillou 1984; Dasque 2005.
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began to change after the Second World War. A diversification in the exam 1X
procedures allowed the Quai d’Orsay to recruit candidates with more diverse 2
backgrounds. Special exams were organised in 1945 to recruit candidates who 3
had been active in the French Resistance or had joined the Free French during 4
the Second World War.14 Some of them became famous French figures due to 5
their parallel literary talent or political commitment: Roman Kacew (Romain 6
Gary in literature), a son of Lithuanian Jewish parents, was born Russian in 1914 7
and was naturalised as a French citizen in 1935; Stéphane Hessel, the son of a 8
German anti-Nazi writer and translator, was born German in 1917 and natu- 9
ralised French in 1937. 10
During the Cold War, the Quai d’Orsay recruited several sons and daugh- 11
ters of Russian and East European émigrés in France. After the decolonisation 12
process in the 1960s, the French MFA also recruited French citizens with North 13
African or Asian family backgrounds, as attested by the names in the ministry 14
directory — the Annuaire Diplomatique et Consulaire — published every year.15 15
Most of these French diplomats with a migrant background, however, did not 16
enter the Quai d’Orsay through the generalist exam of the Ecole Nationale 17
d’Administration (also created in 1945). Rather, they entered through the spe- 18
cialised concours d’Orient requiring the knowledge of ‘scarce’ languages such as 19
Russian, Chinese, Arabic or Vietnamese. 20
Actual recruitment procedures differ somewhat between the two countries. 21
In France, there are at least five different types of exams to become a diplo- 22
mat, while in Norway there is only one.16 In both countries, entry is limited 23
to around fifteen people per year. In the Norwegian state apparatus, all posi- 24
tions are announced with a specific formula where minorities are encouraged 25
to apply. In France, only the striving for gender balance can be underlined. 26
In both countries, it is forbidden for MFAs to ask candidates in the intake 27
exams if they belong to an ethnic, religious or sexual minority. For this very 28
reason, research on the ethnic origins of diplomats (or civil servants more 29
generally) cannot lean on statistics and quantitative studies. In France, eth- 30
nic statistics are even strictly forbidden. In Norway, however, there is a volun- 31
tary question in the first and anonymous step of the recruitment process that 32
can be filled out if candidates consider themselves as belonging to a minority. 33
A number of candidates do define themselves as belonging to an ethnic minor- 34
ity. However, it is interesting to note that at the next stage, when applications 35
are de-anonymised, many applicants with non-traditional Norwegian names 36
37
14 Baillou 1984.
38
15 Annuaire Diplomatique et Consulaire 2017. 39
16 Neumann 2012; Lequesne 2017; Lequesne and Heilbronn 2012. 40X
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1X do not tick the box.17 In France, such a voluntary question is not put to the
2 candidates.18 Even if there are institutional desires in both countries to en-
3 sure more diversity, and the French MFA is even audited by the certification
4 agency Association française de normalisation (AFNOR) on its achievement
5 on defined goals,19 individual rights not to be classified as an ethnic minority
6 make it difficult to assess the results.20
7 Diplomats with migrant backgrounds have therefore become a reality in
8 the MFAs of both countries. Most of them are children or grandchildren of
9 migrants. If we look at the ministry directory in 2017, diplomats with North
10 African and Asian names, indicating the foreign origin of at least the father’s
11 family, are the most visible groups. The General Consul to Beirut has a North
12 African name, the Ambassador to Cambodia has a Vietnamese name and the
13 Ambassador to Fiji has a Cambodian name.21 The ministerial directory shows
14 many other French diplomats having foreign names: Armenian, Egyptian,
15 Iranian, Turkish. Names originally from sub-Saharan Africa are less numerous,
16 and the reintroduction of two African languages, Mandingo and Hausa, at the
17 concours d’Orient in 2017 is expected by the MFA to attract more candidates
18 with a sub-Saharan African background.22
19 Some first-generation migrants do enter the French MFA, as the story of a
20 diplomat born in India shows. This diplomat arrived in France when he was
21 twenty years old with only a basic knowledge of French to study English
22 and political science. He succeeded in the public examination to become an
23 English teacher for eight years, and finally at the age of 34 passed the examina-
24 tion to become a conseiller d’Orient, with Hindi and Tamil as foreign languages.
25 After serving two French Embassies abroad, he was appointed diplomatic ad-
26 viser to France’s Minister of Environment in 2017. In Norway, recruiting diplo-
27 mats with a foreign background has been a trend since the turn of the 2000s.
28 In recent intakes, trainees with one or two foreign parents can be found, but no
29 first-generation migrants.23 Some ethnic minorities are more represented than
30 others at the entrance exams, for several reasons. First, differences in social
31 integration exist among migrant communities, where relatively less integrated
32
33 17 Interview, Norwegian MFA, 24 August 2018.
34 18 Interview, French MFA, 11 September 2018; Interview, Councillor, French MFA, 28 Sep­
35 tember 2018 (telephone).
36 19 Interview, French MFA, 11 September 2018.
20 Interview, AFNOR Executive, 14 September 2018 (telephone).
37 21 Annuaire Diplomatique et Consulaire 2017.
38 22 Interview, Councillor, French MFA, 28 September 2018 (telephone).
39 23 Interview, Norwegian MFA, 24 August 2018.
40X
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communities, such as Somalis, see fewer members apply to the MFA. Second, 1X
in some integrated ethnic communities, becoming a diplomat is not particu- 2
larly prestigious and young people might prefer to become lawyers, engineers 3
or medical doctors rather than diplomats.24 Finally, the strict procedure of se- 4
curity clearance can be an obstacle to becoming a diplomat in Norway. The 5
procedure requires that a candidate is ‘traceable’ for ten years, which means 6
basically having lived in Norway or in countries that exchange security intel- 7
ligence with Norway. Some candidates with a foreign background cannot fulfil 8
these demanding criteria and do not obtain a security clearance. 9
10
2.2 Analysis 11
Two explanatory variables stand out to explain why ethnic diversity has be- 12
come a concern on the agenda of MFAs in Western Europe. 13
1 The first variable is the legitimacy of MFAs vis-à-vis their domestic 14
society. In France and Norway, MFAs are still caricatured as corpo­ 15
ratist fortresses dominated by white men from wealthy families. 16
Today, women hold ever more senior posts and the social back- 17
ground of diplomats is more diverse, due to the democratisation of 18
education and the increase of social mobility in Western societies. 19
The lack of ethnic diversity comes as an additional concern to gen- 20
der issues in countries where social integration of migrants is dis- 21
cussed with controversial terms in the public sphere. These societal 22
debates, in turn, trigger concerns inside the MFAs on how to change 23
their existing image as being aloof from the reality of society. 24
2 The second variable is the image that Western states endeavour to 25
project in the international system. If France and Norway as liberal 26
states want to retain some influence in an international system, 27
which is less and less Eurocentric, they have an incentive to stress 28
the multi-ethnic nature of their societies. As a Norwegian senior 29
diplomat says about the Norwegian MFA: ‘We can’t all be blond 30
French-speaking girls’.25 Having MFAs with diverse ethnic back- 31
grounds helps consolidate the image of a country as open to the 32
‘other’. In this case, the issue of ethnic diversity is directly linked to 33
the priority of public diplomacy based on making a good fit with 34
global perceptions. 35
36
37
24 Interview, Norwegian MFA, 24 August 2018. 38
25 Interview, Norwegian MFA, 24 August 2018. 39
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1X There are, however, limits to what MFAs are prepared to do in Western
2 Europe with diplomats coming from ethnic diversity.
3 1 A first limit concerns the reluctance to send diplomats to countries
4 of family origin for legal reasons. Double nationality, for instance,
5 does not allow diplomats to benefit from diplomatic immunity in a
6 posted country where they also are a citizen. They can be arrested
7 and judged in the country of posting, whereas diplomats benefiting
8 from diplomatic immunity cannot be prosecuted and will just be
9 expelled in case of problems.26
10 2 A second limit is the reluctance to send diplomats to coun-
11 tries of family origin because of the relationship of diplomacy to
12 ‘estrangement’.27 As Sasson Sofer writes, in the practical world of di-
13 plomacy, the diplomat has to ‘be a stranger to others and estranged
14 from himself’. This estrangement is supposed to be ‘an inherent part
15 of the diplomatic practice and beneficial to the accomplishment of
16 the diplomat’s mission’.28 MFAs thus do not like to post diplomats in
17 countries where they have strong family connections because they
18 suspect a risk that they will not stay strangers. As the French diplo-
19 mat with Indian origins says, ‘I am fluent in Hindi, but I may prob-
20 ably never be posted in the subcontinent, because I am considered
21 too close to the society of the host countries’.29 A diplomat with a
22 migrant background, who is a stranger due to their personal experi-
23 ence of diversity, is paradoxically suspected of being a strong native.
24 Here is a contradiction between assuming the importance of more
25 ethnic diversity in the recruitment of diplomats and an established
26 practice of diplomacy, which remains based on the belief of cul-
27 tural distance and separateness.
28
29
30 3 Assuming the Legacy of Slavery: Brazil’s MFA
31
32 Countries with a history of slavery, such as the United States, Brazil as well as
33 Colombia, are still confronted with ethnic inequalities of a strong degree. This
34 section considers the implication of such a legacy on the recruitment of diplo-
35 mats into Brazil’s MFA, the Itamaraty.
36
37
26 Behrens 2017.
38 27 Sofer 1997; Sharp 2009.
39 28 Sofer 1997, 179.
40X 29 Interview, Councillor, French MFA, 28 September 2018 (telephone).
41
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3.1 The Narrative 1X
In Brazil, the notion of ethnic diversity essentially revolves around the social 2
integration of the descendants of black African slaves, called Afrodescendentes, 3
which composed at least half of the population in 2019. Within the MFA, 4
African Brazilian diplomats constituted less than 1 percent of the career staff 5
when left-wing President Luiz Inàcio Lula da Silva was elected in 2003, despite 6
the narrative of a multiracial democracy conveyed in the official state ideology. 7
Prior to 1972, there had been no minorities whatsoever: Brazil’s MFA was uni- 8
formly white. It was in this context that President Jânio Quadros appointed in 9
1961 the first non-career black Ambassador, journalist Raimundo Sousa Dantas, 10
to represent Brazil in Ghana. President Quadros felt that it would raise Brazil’s 11
credibility not only as a multiracial state, but also as a natural ally of postco- 12
lonial Africa. Ambassador Sousa Dantas had to struggle with his assignment; 13
his deputy in Accra did not relinquish the official residence and staff dragged 14
their feet, often forgetting to send back telegrams to Brasília.30 Ambassador 15
Sousa Dantas blamed this in part on established racism inside Brazil’s diplo- 16
matic service.31 17
The nature of the entrance examination for the diplomatic service is the 18
main explaining factor of the Itamaraty’s resilient whiteness. The Concurso 19
de Admissão à Carreira de Diplomata is one of Brazil’s hardest public service 20
examinations. It requires preparation in private institutes, which are expen- 21
sive. This affects African Brazilian families, which are generally poorer than 22
their white counterparts. Contrary to countries such as France, there have 23
never been multiple paths in Brazil to enter diplomacy but a single entrance 24
examination completed with training at the Brazilian Diplomatic Academy, 25
the Instituto Rio Branco. Entrance has grown more competitive over time, as 26
shown by the increase in the ages of entrants from 24 years old in 1970 to over 27
27 years old in 2010.32 Competition is fierce, and most applicants do not pass 28
on their first try. 29
In accordance with President Lula da Silva’s platform of making hitherto 30
insulated bureaucracies more representative of Brazil’s overall population, a 31
policy of moderate affirmative action was launched in 2003, in which equal- 32
ity of outcome was left unchanged with efforts concentrated on equality of 33
opportunity. Scholarships were offered to self-identifying African Brazilians 34
for the preparation of the Itamaraty entrance examination. The scholar- 35
ship bore the costs of preparation in private institutes. The amount of the 36
37
30 Dávila 2011.
38
31 Sousa Dantas 1965. 39
32 Interview, Brazilian MFA, 1 March 2018. 40X
41
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1X awards — 25,000 Brazilian reals (5,765 euros), increased to 30, 000 Brazilian
2 reals (6,920 euros) in 2016 — closely matched costs of preparation. Scholarships
3 were coupled with changes in the examination itself: Insufficient English
4 scores ceased to be grounds for elimination, and the need to master French
5 and Spanish was no longer as critical.33 A second phase of affirmative action,
6 based this time on difference of opportunity, was introduced in 2011 after the
7 election of another left-wing President, Dilma Rousseff. A quota policy was
8 established in the entrance examination of the Itamaraty, initially applying
9 only to the first phase of the selection process to pre-empt internal resistance
10 at perceived meddling in what was seen as a rite of passage among Brazilian
11 diplomats. From a 10 percent first-phase quota in 2011, the policy expanded to a
12 steady 20 percent quota across the entire examination process in 2014.34
13 But difficulties arose as a result of the implementation of quotas.35 The sub-
14 jective nature of African descent in a mixed society like Brazil effectively al-
15 lows for applicants to register for the less-competitive quota spots (25 percent
16 of the annual intake: five out of nineteen for 2018) by means of self-identi-
17 fication.36 Due to the competitive nature of the selection process, there was
18 a strong incentive for applicants to look for an easier way in, and some were
19 eventually admitted despite looking white. The Brazilian MFA subsequently
20 had to deal with African Brazilian non-governmental organisations alleging
21 that white candidates had essentially stolen their minority spots. In response,
22 the Itamaraty switched gears in the span of two years from self-identification
23 to external determination. Shortly after the entry into force of the affirmative
24 action law for the public service in 2014, the use of ad hoc commissions was
25 rendered mandatory. These commissions judged applicants according to a
26 public list of phenotypical criteria such as the shape of the nose or the lips.37
27 Accusations of implementing a racial tribunal were immediately rife,38 lead-
28 ing the Itamaraty to tackle the issue in subsequent editions of the entrance
29 examination with a committee of ‘heteroidentification’ (Comissão de heteroin­
30 tenficação). The new system was offered a reprieve with a favourable decision
31 in 2017 from Brazil’s highest court, the Supremo Tribunal Federal, wherein the
32 use of such criteria is deemed legitimate, provided that they ‘respect human
33 dignity and the right to due process’.39 However, overriding subjective racial
34
35 33 Folha de São Paulo 2005.
36 34 CACD 2018.
37 35 Nassif 2010.
36 Ministério das Relaçoes Exteriores 2018.
38 37 Época 2011.
39 38 Interview, Brazilian MFA, 1 March 2018.
40X 39 Supremo Tribunal Federal 2017.
41
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identities with purportedly scientific criteria only stresses the imprecise na- 1X
ture of ethnicity in Brazil. 2
Affirmative action procedures have produced modest results on the recruit- 3
ment of African Brazilian diplomats. It allowed nineteen black applicants 4
to enter the MFA from 2002-2012, raising the proportion of blacks within the 5
Itamaraty from 0.65 percent (1997-2002) to 2.76 percent (2003-2010).40 It was 6
only at the end of Foreign Minister Celso Amorim’s tenure, in 2010, that the first 7
black Ambassador coming from the career rose through the ranks. Benedicto 8
Fonseca Filho was chosen to head the Science and Technology Department 9
inside the MFA, a relatively minor assignment. While arguably limited in its 10
effects, affirmative action at the Itamaraty does open a window of change in a 11
half-black country, which had no black diplomat before 2003. 12
13
3.2 Analysis 14
Two explanatory variables stand out to explain why ethnic diversity has be- 15
come a concern for Brazil’s MFAs. 16
1 The first variable is the role of domestic party politics. It was under 17
the presidencies of left-wing leaders, Lula da Silva and Rousseff, 18
that affirmative action plans were implemented inside the Brazilian 19
MFA. As the candidates of the poorest groups among the popula- 20
tion, which are mainly black, Lula da Silva and Rousseff decided 21
to confront the consequences of slavery legacy on social inequali- 22
ties. It is in this context that the rules of recruitment were changed 23
at Itamaraty, which has historically been dominated by the white 24
upper class. It reminds us that MFAs are constituent parts of the 25
state and cannot leave their organisation life outside domestic 26
politics. 27
2 The second variable concerns Brazil’s strategic priorities in foreign 28
policy. One policy choice after 2003 was developing more coopera- 29
tive relationships with Africa, with the Itamaraty opening a series 30
of new embassies in Africa. A foreign policy towards Africa would 31
have problems of legitimacy if Brazil, where half of its inhabitants 32
are black, cannot provide any African Brazilian diplomat in its em- 33
bassies. In 2004, then Councillor Benedicto Fonseca Filho heard 34
from African (and also Caribbean) diplomats at the United Nations 35
that he was the first African Brazilian they had seen representing 36
Itamaraty.41 The change in the recruitment procedures had then to 37
38
40 de Camargo Lima and Silva Nunes de Oliveira 2008. 39
41 Folha de São Paulo 2011. 40X
41
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1X be analysed not only regarding the domestic political context but
2 also Brazil’s foreign policy choices.
3 There are, however, limits to the promotion of ethnic diversity inside Bra­zil’s
4 MFA.
5 1 A first limit is the slow turnover inside the Itamaraty, with a com-
6 pulsory retirement age of 70 years old. Kept at the same level, ethnic
7 quotas can be expected to take 50 years to completely work their
8 way through.
9 2 A second limit is again party politics. The policies of affirmative
10 action for the recruitment of diplomats were introduced by left-
11 wing presidents, whose party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores was
12 clearly defeated in the 2018 presidential election. In 2019, the en-
13 trance exam to the diplomatic career continues to propose a quota
14 of 20 percent for the African Brazilian candidates (four of twenty
15 posts).42 But debates go on in Brazil about the upholding by new
16 right-wing populist President Jair Bolsonaro and his Minister of
17 Foreign Affairs, Ernesto Araujo, of the quota system for the recruit-
18 ment of the African Brazilian candidates, as their ideology is not
19 inclined to support affirmative action. Therefore, in the future, will
20 Itamaraty continue the efforts introduced under Lula da Silva’s and
21 Rousseff’s administrations to diversify its ethnic composition?43
22 This kind of question demonstrates how party politics is an impor-
23 tant variable to be taken into consideration to analyse ethnic diver-
24 sity inside MFAs.
25
26
27 4 Multiculturalism as State Policies: MFAs in India and Singapore
28
29 This section deals with a third case study concerning MFAs in countries where
30 ethnic diversity is officially recognised by multicultural or multiracial states.
31 The two countries chosen to illustrate this are India and Singapore.
32
33 4.1 The Narrative
34 India officially identifies six ethnic minorities on the basis of religious prac-
35 tice next to the majoritarian Hindus group. They are Muslims, Christians,
36 Buddhists, Sikhs, Parsees and Jains. Muslims comprise the largest minority
37 group with 172 million inhabitants in 2011 (14. 2 percent of the population).
38
39 42 Istituto Rio Branco 2019.
40X 43 Interview, scholar Gaspard Estrada, Paris, 3 July 2019.
41
42
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Indian politics is heavily influenced by the situation of a Muslim minority. The 1X
latter faces the legacy of the politics of hate and violence entrenched in India 2
since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 into India and Pakistan.44 In 3
Singapore, a city-state of 5.6 million inhabitants in 2017, and a sovereign state 4
since 1965, the notion of ethnic diversity is officially recognised as ‘race’ fol- 5
lowing the British colonial practice and censuses. Race is stamped on citizens’ 6
birth certificates and national identity cards. It also affects political participa- 7
tion in national elections via Group Representation Constituencies.45 Under 8
the Constitution of Singapore, differences among the citizenry are simplified 9
into three main racial groups plus one residual group: Chinese, Malays, Indians 10
and Others.46 The Others include Eurasian Singaporeans and everyone else. 11
In 2017 Singaporeans classified as Chinese formed the largest ethnic group of 12
the country, comprising 74.3 percent of the resident population while Malays 13
comprised13.3 percent and Indians 9.1 percent. 14
Recruitment procedures to access the diplomatic career differ widely in 15
India and Singapore. With a total of only 900 officers working in Delhi head- 16
quarters and in embassies and consulates abroad in 2018, the Indian Foreign 17
Service is a small administration compared to the size of the country.47 The 18
recruitment of Indian diplomats happens through a prestigious and competi- 19
tive examination called the Indian Civil Service Examination conducted annu- 20
ally by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). The UPSC recommends 21
the candidates who are to be recruited for the Indian Administrative Services, 22
the IFS and the Indian Police Services, the three topmost services. IFS got 32 23
new recruits in 2014, 45 in 2015, 45 in 2016.48 Some Indian academic circles 24
and think tanks regularly call for the necessity to recognise IFS as a special- 25
ised service and hold a separate competitive examination to recruit only for- 26
eign service officers.49 The governments of India have never accepted such a 27
change, but have opened up positions in the IFS for recruiting higher posts 28
under a lateral entry method. The procedure has been subject to criticism from 29
IFS officers who, as most career diplomats in the world, want to keep control 30
on the access to higher posts. Contrary to India, there is no general exam in 31
Singapore to become a diplomat.50 Candidates apply to become foreign ser- 32
vice officers and have the choice between two career tracks after they clear 33
34
44 Shaban 2016. 35
45 Elections Department Singapore 2017. 36
46 Chua 2003; Rocha 2011. 37
47 Levaillant 2016.
48 Department of Personnel and Training 2019a.
38
49 ‘Shashi Tharorr for IFS Test’ 2017. 39
50 Rana 2009. 40X
41
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-1X 14 Lequesne et al.
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1X admission tests: political and economic diplomacy or functional and corporate
2 diplomacy. New officers then have to follow the Foreign Service Basic Program
3 organised by the Diplomatic Academy of Singapore to learn basic diplomatic
4 skills before starting their job at the MFA. According to their qualifications and
5 per the MFA’s needs, about 30 are recruited each year. The number seems high
6 for the size of the country, but the attrition rate is also high. Many Singaporean
7 diplomats leave the career after some years in office to go into the private sec-
8 tor for higher-paying jobs.
9 Affirmative action procedures exist in India to enter the public service while
10 they do not in Singapore. In India the Constitution provides safeguards for the
11 promotion of less-privileged groups inside the majoritarian Hindus group, on
12 the basis of social, educational and geographical backwardness. The groups
13 are the Scheduled Castes (SCs), the Scheduled Tribes (STs) and the Other
14 Backward Classes (OBCs).51 SCs are referred to as Untouchables (Dalits in
15 Hindi), the lower castes from amongst the Hindus majoritarian group. STs are
16 unprivileged due to geographical isolation (e.g., residence in hilly areas and
17 forested areas). OBCs consist of those economically, socially and educationally
18 backward groups who are not included in the SCs or STs group. For candidates
19 belonging to any one of the three groups, the exam procedure provides a re-
20 laxation in the qualifying marks and a lowering of the standard of evaluation
21 to enable entry into the public service. In 2016, out of 45 IFS officers selected
22 through the UPSC, 26 belonged to the General Category, 12 were selected in
23 OBCs, 6 in SCs and 1 in STs.52 Statistics show at the same time that officers be-
24 longing to SCs, STs and OBCs are less well represented at the higher echelons
25 of the IFS, particularly at the level of Ambassador and High Commissioner.
26 Contrary to depressed social classes among the majoritarian Hindus group,
27 religious minorities (considered as ethnic minorities in this study) do not
28 enjoy relaxation or extra attempts to sit for the Civil Service Examination in
29 India. Forms of affirmative action, however, have been introduced with ef-
30 forts concentrated on the equality of opportunity. The Ministry of Minority
31 Affairs offers financial support to about 200 candidates from religious minori-
32 ties annually who are able to clear the first stage of the Indian Civil Service
33 Examination. This scholarship scheme, called the Nayi Undaan Scheme, is
34 based on the population data of the religious minorities under the Census of
35 India 2011. The distribution is as follows: 146 for Muslims, 24 for Christians,
36 16 for Sikhs, 7 for Buddhists, 6 for Jains and 1 for Parsees.53 However, as data for
37
38 51 Garg 2010.
39 52 Department of Personnel and Training 2019b.
40X 53 Ministry of Minority Affairs 2019.
41
42
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the years 2013 to 2016 show, the scheme has not been very successful at enlarg- 1X
ing the recruitment pool.54 2
Muslim minority representation falls short of enough recruitment through 3
competition, and its members who manage to reach high posts mostly do so 4
as promoted candidates. Among the notable Ambassadors belonging to the 5
Muslim community is Syed Akbaruddin, who is the Permanent Representative 6
of India to the United Nations in 2019. In Singapore, the recruitment of dip- 7
lomats inside the MFA does not consciously take into consideration the eth- 8
nic background of candidates. If the Singapore society places an emphasis 9
on racial representation in daily social relationships, many Singaporeans also 10
believe in the ideology of individual meritocracy and do not clamour for cor- 11
rective measures based on ethnicity to enter the public service. Concretely, this 12
meritocratic recruitment works in favour of Chinese and Indians, and against 13
the Malays, because of a general disadvantage of the latter ethnic group in 14
educational achievement, specifically in university graduation numbers. Of 15
the 110 Ambassador and High Commissioner appointments made between 16
1965 and 1980, 72 bore Chinese names, 21 Indian names and only 7 Malay 17
names.55 Contrary to other segments in the Singapore public service, and es- 18
pecially the army, there have not been demonstrations or controversial public 19
debates about discrimination of Malays in the MFA.56 But Singapore is also a 20
country where an authoritarian state knows how to suppress public debate on 21
sensitive issues. 22
23
4.2 Analysis 24
This article analyses the extent to which the issue of diversity is important 25
in the diplomacy of both India and Singapore. The interest of this case study 26
comes out of a radically different explanation of the strategic use of ethnic 27
diversity by MFAs in the two Asian multicultural states. 28
1 Ethnic proximity is used as a strategic goal for diplomacy in India. 29
It appears when we look at the appointment of Ambassadors. The 30
Indian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, since the very first mission, 31
has always been a Muslim diplomat.57 In the United Arab Emirates, 32
statistics suggest that out of the fourteen Ambassadors posted by 33
India to date since 1973, four have been Indian Muslim diplomats.58 34
35
36
54 Ministry of Minority Affairs 2006. 37
55 National Heritage Board 2006.
56 Yap 2012.
38
57 Embassy of India to Saudi Arabia 2019. 39
58 Embassy of India to UAE 2019. 40X
41
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-1X 16 Lequesne et al.
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1X In 2018, Muslim Ambassadors were representing India in Muslim or
2 partly Muslim states as Lebanon, Turkmenistan and Oman.59 The
3 choice to appoint Muslim Ambassadors in these countries was a ra-
4 tional attempt by the IFS to favour trust through ethnic proximity
5 in the diplomacy with the host country.
6 2 Ethnic detachment is used as a strategic goal for diplomacy in
7 Singapore. Singapore’s High Commissioner to Malaysia is never
8 Malay, but always from the Indian or Chinese community and the
9 High Commissioner to India is usually from the Chinese commu-
10 nity. Ethnic proximity would be considered as a point of contention
11 in Singapore’s diplomacy because of its specific relation with China.
12 A veteran Singapore diplomat, Tommy Koh, explains that the ma-
13 jority of Singaporeans being ethnic Chinese not only is an asset
14 but also a liability for the bilateral relations between Singapore
15 and mainland China. It is a ‘liability because it has given rise to un-
16 reasonable expectations on the part of China towards Singapore.
17 Many friends in China mistakenly perceive Singapore as a Chinese
18 nation’.60 For Singapore’s MFA, ethnic detachment supports the
19 country’s diplomacy of independence in a geopolitical context
20 where China could use the argument of belonging to the same eth-
21 nic group as a resource to dominate its smaller neighbour.
22 The comparison of India and Singapore demonstrates that the different status
23 of the states regarding the international system and the regional geopolitical
24 context also explains the way (proximity or detachment) that ethnic diversity
25 is used as a diplomatic resource by the MFAs in two multicultural states
26
27
28 5 Conclusion
29
30 The three case studies allowed the authors to select, for each of them, a series
31 of explanatory variables to answer their research question: What explains the
32 interest of MFAs in the world to manage ethnic diversity in the recruitment of
33 the diplomats? This article now moves a step forward and draws five compara-
34 tive conclusions from the case studies.
35 First, the three case studies demonstrate that the issue of ethnic diver-
36 sity in the recruitment of diplomats has different historical legacies: mass
37
38
39 59 Levaillant 2016.
40X 60 Koh 2016.
41
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 Ethnic Diversity in the Recruitment of Diplomats 17 -1X
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immigration in France and Norway, slavery in Brazil and postcolonial multi- 1X
culturalism in India and Singapore. 2
Second, in all countries except one — Singapore — MFAs are prepared to 3
consider that ethnic difference and discrimination in the societies must be 4
corrected with direct or indirect forms of affirmative action in the recruitment 5
of diplomats. National legal frameworks provide MFAs with different margins 6
of manoeuvring to organise affirmative action in the recruitment of diplomats. 7
In Brazil and India, the national legal frameworks allow the MFAs to organ- 8
ise explicit affirmative action programs. In France, with affirmative action on 9
ethnic grounds being forbidden, the MFA can use only indirect policy instru- 10
ments, such as introducing West African languages in the exam program, to 11
attract more candidates with West African family backgrounds. 12
Third, the concrete results of affirmative action remain limited in all the 13
countries in terms of the number of diplomats recruited. In general, all MFAs 14
are still dominated by a majoritarian ethnic group: white in Brazil, France 15
and Norway; Hindus in India; ethnic Chinese in Singapore. But a dynamic of 16
change about this has existed in all MFAs since the 2000s. 17
Fourth, a series of explanatory variables emerge from the comparison of 18
the different case studies to explain the relevance of ethnic diversity in MFAs. 19
A first comparative explanatory variable is the growing necessity for MFAs to 20
be in tune with domestic debates about diversity: on integration of migrants 21
(France and Norway), on racial discrimination (Brazil), on religious discrimi- 22
nation (India). This is the proof that MFAs cannot behave as worlds of their 23
own, escaping domestic political debates. The second comparative explana- 24
tory variable has to do with ethnic diversity becoming an international norm,61 25
which has an influence on the making of diplomacy.62 States perceive an inter- 26
est in having the image of being respectful of this international norm of ethnic 27
diversity. It primarily concerns MFAs because they are responsible for the mak- 28
ing and diffusion of diplomacy. The third comparative explanatory variable 29
concerns the conduct of foreign policy in specific regional contexts. Ethnic 30
diversity is a resource used by MFAs to increase the legitimacy of their for- 31
eign policies in certain regions of the world, as having a Muslim Ambassador 32
in Saudi Arabia for India or being represented by black diplomats in African 33
countries for Brazil. 34
Fifth, the comparison of case studies also leads to identifying common limits 35
in the use of ethnic diversity by MFAs to conduct diplomacy. A first limit is the 36
crucial role that ‘estrangement’ still plays in the practice of MFAs. French and 37
38
61 Bouden 2015. 39
62 Fan 2010. 40X
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-1X 18 Lequesne et al.
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1X Norwegian MFAs are reluctant to send diplomats to countries where they have
2 family roots because they could be tempted to ‘go native’. Such a fear validates
3 the still dominant belief inside MFAs that a ‘good’ diplomat remains somebody
4 who cultivates a form of cultural distance vis-à-vis their host country. A second
5 limit is the specific pursuit of foreign policy interests. If Singapore’s MFA uses
6 ethnic detachment in the appointment of Ambassadors in the Asian region, it
7 is because systematising the appointment of Chinese ethnic candidates could
8 diminish the independence of Singapore as a diplomatic actor vis-à-vis main-
9 land China.
10 This article is an invitation to continue further research on the relation be-
11 tween ethnic diversity and diplomacy. A number of questions raised in this
12 study can be put on the research agenda. First, multiculturalism defined as the
13 presence of, or support for the presence of several distinct ethnic groups within
14 a society, has become a widespread phenomenon in the Global North as well as
15 in the Global South. Foreign policy analysis scholars have produced a number
16 of relevant studies on the impact of ethnicity (ethnic groups, diaspora move-
17 ments) on foreign policy decisions.63 It is now the turn of diplomatic studies
18 to devote more work to the consequences of multiculturalism on diplomatic
19 processes, in particular representation and negotiation. Second, it is in the in-
20 terest of the states of the Global North to show that their bureaucracies respect
21 the norm of ethnic diversity as they respect the norm of gender diversity.64
22 MFAs are no exception in this evolution which raises, however, a question for
23 research: Does this pressing need for diversity correspond to structural change
24 towards more pluralism in the societies of the Global North or is it a cosmetic
25 attempt on the surface to convince liberal elites that it is the case? Third, how
26 do states of the Global South really assess the efforts towards ethnic diversity
27 introduced in the diplomacies of the Global North? The outside perception of
28 ethnic diversity in diplomacy is an understudied topic. Does ethnic diversity in
29 the countries of the Global North increase the legitimacy of their diplomacy in
30 the Global South, breaking with the perception of a neocolonial legacy but also
31 a white-dominant international system?65 Finally, the consequences on diplo-
32 macy of the contest of ethnic diversity by nationalist and supremacist leaders,
33 in both the Global North and the Global South, must be researched in more
34 depth. Does the election of such leaders make a difference in the operational
35 modes of diplomacies, reinforcing the power of dominant groups to the detri-
36 ment of minority groups in diplomatic processes? This research agenda, which
37
38 63 Shain 1994-1995; Hill 2007; Aggestam and Hill 2008.
39 64 Aggestam and Towns 2018.
40X 65 Okoth Opondo 2010.
41
42
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requires an ‘evidence-based approach to integrate knowledge’ on the practice 1X
of diversity at the individual, team and organisational levels, should be a new 2
input to diplomatic studies and also to diversity studies.66 3
4
5
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-1X 22 Lequesne et al.
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1X Christian Lequesne
2 is Professor of Political Science, Sciences Po (CERI), Paris, and a Regular Visiting
3 Professor at Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali (LUISS)
4 University, Rome, and Diplomatic Academy, Vienna. He was formerly Sciences
5 Po-LSE Professor at the European Institute of the London School of Economics
6 and Political Science (LSE). He is also the Co-Editor-in-Chief of the European
7 Review of International Studies. He has published and edited twenty books on
8 European Union politics and is now working on the sociology of diplomatic
9 practices. His last book published in France was an ethnographic research on
10 the practices of French diplomats.
11
12 Gabriel Castillo
13 received an MA from the University of São Paulo and is a PhD candidate at
14 Sciences Po (CERI), Paris. His doctoral thesis deals with the role of the Brazilian
15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the presidency of Luiz Inàcio Lula da Silva.
16
17 Minda Holm
18 is a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI),
19 Oslo. She is also affiliated with the Danish Institute of International Studies
20 and is completing her PhD at the University of Copenhagen. Her research deals
21 with questions related to global order, international ideology, security politics
22 and sovereignty. At NUPI, she leads a three-year research project funded by the
23 Ministry of Defence that looks at the international visions of the national right
24 in Russia, Europe and the United States. She has published on major interna-
25 tional relations in peer-reviewed journals.
26
27 Walid Jumblatt Bin Abdullah
28 is an Assistant Professor at the School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological
29 University, Singapore. He received his PhD under a Joint Degree Program be-
30 tween the National University of Singapore and King’s College, London. He
31 works on state-Islam relations, and political parties and elections, with a par-
32 ticular focus on Singapore and Malaysia. He has published in international
33 peer-reviewed journals.
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35 Halvard Leira
36 is a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International
37 Relations (NUPI), Oslo. He received a PhD from the University of Oslo on ‘The
38 Emergence of Foreign Policy: Knowledge, Discourse, History’. His main areas
39 of research are foreign policy and diplomacy with a special emphasis on the
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Norwegian varieties. He also has a special interest in historical international 1X
relations and international thought. 2
3
Kamna Tiwary 4
is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, 5
India. She received a PhD from JNU dealing with nuclear politics. 6
7
Reuben Wong 8
is the Jean Monnet Professor in European Integration and Foreign Policy at the 9
School of Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, Singapore. He re- 10
ceived a PhD in international relations from the London School of Economics 11
and Political Science (LSE), and served as a diplomat for Singapore before 12
joining the university. His research interests include identity in foreign policy 13
and the European Union’s relations with the Association of Southeast Asian 14
Nations and China. He has published several books and articles in internation- 15
al peer-reviewed journals. 16
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