Brahma Sūtra

(or Vedānta Sūtra) of Bādarāyaṇa

A sūtra is a short aphorism and the term means that is already a thread of few words,
as agains a single term which is supposed to have a defined meaning. T.M.P. Mahadevan in
his foreword to the translation of "Brahma sūtras bhāṣyas of Ṡaṅkarācārya" by Swami
Gambhirananda (Advaita Ashrama publication, 1965) advises us that the meaning of a word
in these sūtra is often not that in ordinary usage but that dictated by the context. An example
noted by myself is the word dharma, which is never understood by commentators of Brahmā
sūtras as: what sustains cosmic order, morale, religion. Often a sūtra ends with a word in
ablative case, either for indicating the correlation with previous one, the existence of a
reasoning or for suggesting to remember a passage of the Vedas. Past commentators
obviously privileged the last possibility. Compilations of sūtras of many kinds have been
composed in saṁskṛit: dharma sūtras, yoga sūtras, artha sūtras… The compilation named
"Brahma sūtras" is supposed to have been composed by Bādarāyaṇa (named in sūtra 1.3.33,
whose name would means: the one who used to go under the jujube tree) whom tradition
identifies with Vyāsa: it is well known that Vyāsa wrote everything worth to be read as he
stated himself in his introduction of Mahābhārata. These Brahma sūtras are known mainly in
their version commented /interpreted by Adi Ṡankara-ācarya (the teacher by the name of the
Auspicious) many centuries later, who acknowledge their writing by Vyāsa and consider them
as indisputable since Vyāsa is an aṁṡa of the Allmighty and the compiler of the Vedas.
However, it is obviously not exactly the same version mentioned in the Gītā (ṡloka 13.5),
since it includes a criticism of Bhāgavata school of thought. This version of the Brahma
sūtras, whose official purpose is Brahma jijñāsana (first sūtra), has been renamed Vedānta
sūtras, since it upholds the monist point of view of the Hindu faith with this name. Note that
Ṡankara (supposed to be born between 680 and 800 AC) may even have never existed; like
Vyāsa he could be an emblematic author credited for a type of writing: in Ṡankara's case to
propose a doctrinal version of Hindu religion for counteracting Tantrism, Bhuddism and
Islamism.
Comments (bhāṣyas) written by Ṡankara are often casuist, focusing on grammar or
ambiguous meaning of a term, with lot of contradictions and erratic wanderings (vibhranta
manas- would say Arjuna). For instance, at the beginning, he emphasizes that Brahman
cannot be the object of a meditation (what he calls "the you" in a dualistic relationship) then
he writes that the knowledge of Brahman is desired. The form of these bhāṣyas appears at first
that of an honest discussion between the vedāntin and an opponent from another school of
metaphysics: namely the school of Jaimini's Purva Mimānsa school (3rd-1st century BC),
believing in the reality of the self (i.e. his individual personality) and in the dependence of his
fate essentially on the obedience to dharma-ṡastras. Contrarily to the Brahma sūtras which
aimed to summarize the Upaniṣads and define the truth about Existence (therefore named
Uttara mimānsa –ultimate deep reflection), the Purva Mimānsa (meaning previous deep
reflection) of Jaimini aimed to sort among the rituals commanded by the smṛitis and ṡrutis on
basis of a proper analysis of their authority ("Indian Philosophy", chapter 6, S.
Radhakrishnan, Oxford India Paperbacks). But the comments of this opponent (named
vṛittikāra: follower of a prescribed mode of life) are imagined by the vedāntin himself for
having the opportunity to support his own point of view and criticizing, sometimes to say
only: "your point of view is non-sense and full of contradictions (in second adhyāya
especially). The comments written about 3 centuries later by Ramanuja (who was a bhākta)
are naturally oriented with the purpose of contradicting the philosophers of Advaita-Vedānta
school (Adi Ṡankara former comments), in addition to the followers of Purva Mimānsa. S.
Radhakṛiṣṇan (1888-1975) made the useful effort of summarizing the bhāṣyas of these two
commentators, but his own comments are very few and strongly influenced by Greek
philosophers and Christian culture. He defended a thesis of philosophy about the ethics of the
Vedānta school then spent his life defending Hindu schools of philosophy against the
criticism of British Christian professors: consequently he became influenced by them (just
like Ramanuja was influence by Ṡankara in his reading of the sūtras). Considering that the
individualism of these western schools of thought is odd/ incompatible with the concept of
Brahman, even the vocabulary used in Radhakṛiṣṇan's comments writen in english language
(the confusion of reality with truth being the most obvious) sounds odd and his ideas
disappointing.
My opinion about these bhāṣyas is that all these philosophers are not enough open-
minded and prefer grammar argumentation (the liking for argumentation being a typically
Indian guṇa would probably say Amartya Sen). Ramanuja is able to discuss during 20 pages
of a particular grammatical equation, so that often this reader could not remember what was
initially the topics of discussion which arose this grammatical dissection. Beside that,
Ramanuja says in the introduction of his comments that "one should discard the direct
meaning of words for understanding their implied meaning (lakṣana: symbol)", about what I
disagree completely. He is speaking like Kant, the defender of reasoning! The meaning of
many words has changed over centuries with for result that some concepts expressed in pure
saṁskṛit are no more understood, and for this reason precisely it is so important to remember
what was the ancient meaning for not altering the thought of sages in vedic times. My
experience of Upaniṣads and their translations is that one can understand them only by
reading with great care the saṁskṛit version of these texts. So many English versions have
been translated using Google without discrimination! The Upaniṣads and Brahma-sūtras are
expressed with words (ṡabda) which are shapes (rupa) moulding what we are conscious of
(cit), like a body (deha) is moulding (dih) ourself (ātman). How to express what is avyakta,
acintya, ascarya (Gītā)? We are obliged to use images (murti) which are imperfect, just as
images of God with a human body. The "flowery words of the Vedas" (dixit Kṛiṣṇa) and their
puns are designed for impressing the mind with a picture. The Gītā itself and other Upaniṣads
are full of poetry and puns to arise the meditation (dhī pracud – sic Gāyatrī) of the reader.
There are no contradictions in the Upaniṣads, only different points of view within a same
culture and sometimes argumentations between ṛiṣis which are figures of style for promoting
the meditation. As says Kṛiṣṇa in Gītā: you are free to worship me in unity, in duality or in
diversity as you prefer (Gītā 9.15). Instead of focusing on apparent contradictions due to the
misunderstanding of words, the commentators should have tried to understand the imagery
and how it enriched the meditation. In fact S. Radhakṛiṣṇan in his chapter about Vedānta
Sūtra in "Indian Philosophy, vol.2, ch. 7, p. 399) agree with me that: "the sūtras are
unintelligible by themselves, and leave everything to the interpreter. … They develop their
interpretation in the light of their own preconceived opinions and sometimes (for not saying
most of the time) overlook the literal and the obvious sense of the words in the effort to force
the text to bear testimony to the truth of their own philosophic theory." But himself he does no
question the free translation of Ṡankara and the obvious alterations of these sūtras in the
course of time for promoting the Vedānta school of thoughts. So, why do I comment again on
the same. That gives an opportunity to meditate on the Upaniṣads texts and their various
interpretations. Now I apologize if sometimes I qualify myself Ṡankara of dishonest and his
comments of non-sense, as he used to do with respect to others.
 According to Radhakṛiṣṇan, each sūtra is supposed to refer to a given sentence in the
Upaniṣads. For instance the second "janmādi asya yataḥ" states more or less the same than
Taittirya Upaniṣad, Brighuvallī first anuvāka: "from That creatures are born, they live and
into That they enter after death." It is followed immediately by a sentence corresponding to
the first aphorism: "Tat vijijnāsasva" - Desire to know That. My opinion is that a sūtra does
not refer to a particular verse in Upaniṣads, but to their content as a whole, and it must be
interpreted taking into account its context (as stated by Mahadevan –see above). Indeed it
often adds to what is said in previous one. This is corroborated by the ablative case used in so
many of them: " Ṡāstrayonitvāt ||3"
All commentators consider that the Brahma sūtras are composed of four parts
(adhyāya) and each one is composed of four sections (pāda).

First adhyāya: samanvaya

The topics of the first adhyāya deals with the coherent interpretation (samanvaya) of the
Upaniṣads. (see p 24 of S. Radhakrishnan introduction) . In Vedānta sūtras the adhikarana
(syllogisms) are 1) visaya, 2) samshaya, 3) purvapaksha, 4) siddhanta, 5) saīgati.

First section (pāda)

ॐ अथातो मिज ासा ॐ ॥ १.१.१॥
(see web site sanskritdocuments.org)
Athāto brahmajijñāsā ||1.1.1
In what follows hereafter the desire to know Brahman.
Several commentators point out that this aphorism can also be understood as a vow to
understand the Brahman and consequently avoid any activity which may hamper this
knowledge: From now I will focus on the knowledge of Brahman. But how one may expect to
understand the Brahman, taking that Upanishads state that Brahman is beyond knowledge,
non manifest, sat and asat, neti neti? Ramanuja underlines that the word atha indicates that
this investigation should follow a previous reflection (purva mīmānsā) on purposeful
activities following the dharma, under guidance of the compilation of sūtras written by
Jaimini (to be distinguished from the various dharma smriti written around same time). This
compilation starts by similar words: hence hereafter an inquiry into dharma. One cannot reach
perfection by discarding action, considering it as a whole as a source of sin and by practising
exclusively dhyana-yoga. The practice of karma-yoga is essential, as stated by the Gītā: all
action results in knowledge and a pious action contributes to the purification of the self.
Moreover the desire to know the Brahman will come more naturally after having observed
that the results of purposeful activities (meritful as well as sinful) are deceitful and don’t last
(are impermanent). Nevertheless Ramanuja argues that once the desire to know the Brahman
has come into existence, dhārmika activities (yajna, dāna, tapas, svādhyāya) may be
considered as an obstruction to the peace of mind required to achieve that more fundamental
purpose. At least the work of reading the Upanishads is required before meditating on Brahma
sūtras since each aphorism is supposed to be a memento. Ramanuja refers among other
Upanishad statements to: "ātmā vā are draṣtavyaḥ ṡrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo"- "the
Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on" (Bṛihadāryanaka Up.
4.5.6, ibid 2.4.5); "so'nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ" – that (Self) we must search out, that we
must try to understand' (Ch. Up. 8.7.1).
Follows an interesting discussion about consciousness, knowledge and the various methods of
cognition, including direct perception, testimony of books and teaching of mentors (ācaryas,
gurus), reasoning and inference, revelation through yoga, in answer to plausible arguments of
a follower of Jaimini school. Ramanuja emphasizes that meditation and understanding are
based more on direct perception or insight, or recognition by the memory (direct
consciousness) than on reasoning. He underlines that consciousness is usually supposed to
have an object. Brahman (or the Puruṣottama in the case of Ramanuja whose faith is of
dualistic type) is known by the direct consciousness described above (or by the words
"atmanam atmanā atmani" in Gītā). Therefore, since Brahman is pure Being and also
Consciousness, being is the main object of consciousness and being consists in consciousness.
Does also consciousness consist in being? "Cogito ergo sum" said Descartes. No, there is
relationship but not of cause and effect. But the mistake is understandable because
consciousness cannot be inferred or proven from something else: it proves by itself:
svayamprakāṡa. The later formula is very good, because consciousness is light, knowledge,
and can hardly be defined. I would say that it is the essence of knowledge, the awareness of
onseself and whatever is existing, without involving the trap of formulating definition of the
object of cosnciousness (when defined it becomes thought). The empirical world exists only
through our consciousness of it (as individual beings as well as aṁṡa of the Puruṣottama or
Brahman). That's why we can say: the universe is the expression of Brahman. And with
Descartes we can also say: that exists because I am aware of it. On basis of such
considerations, advaitists conclude that nothing else than Brahman exists and whatever we
may observe and which seems different from Brahman is simply an impermanent illusion
(like the rope appearing as a snake). Moreover since consciousness is self-evident (proves by
itself), how one could conceive a state of non existence preceding consciousness? In other
words, how the non existence of consciousness could be apprehended without consciousness?
Consciousness is necessarily eternal. Casuistry? One should be aware that in saṁskṛit texts
waking, dreaming, slumber and samādhi are different states of consciousness. Moreover the
consciousness of a person, which is the essence of self (ātma), is not properly individual. The
individual substrate (ahaṁkāra) is temporal (asat), i.e. not purely existing, contrarily to the
self or its essence, consciousness. So how consciousness could be individual? How could it
differ from another consciousness and be the object of the later? To the advaitists who argue
that nothing else exists than the Brahman, that differences between this and that are pure
illusion, that Brahman is featureless, Ramanuja answer with good sense that the fact of
describing the Brahman as pure Existence, Consciousness, Knowledge, Eternity, Immensity,
in itself is a recognition of the existence of Brahman's attributes. Is there any need of words
(including Brahma sūtras) for describing what differs from nothing? How to perceive
something which differs from nothing? Casuistic arguments for sure, which nervertheless
account for the need to agree that differences are existing. Pursuing this interesting
questioning about what is existence, Ramanuja tests the following idea which found the
agreement of Buddhists: if existence is what lasts forever, then experience, which lasts
through samsara, may be existence itself. But Ramanuja's discussion is not faultless, because
his vocabulary is not enough rigorous and he is betrayed by words such as "perception",
which in the actual world is based on proofs provided by the senses of the presence of
something at a given time and place (rather than of its existence), or as "experience" which
usually means a progress in knowledge whereas the eternal knowledge of Brahman is perfect.
Does also the fact that something is perceived means that it truly exists (like the rope
mistaken for a snake)? Are other forms of knowledge such as memory, inference, revelation,
yogic experience, more reliable than perception? This intricate discussion about
consciousness, knowledge, "intelligence" (in quoted text: vijnana, vidyā), experience, without
defining all these terms, leads only to deny each of these terms successively to be relevant for
qualifying the Brahman or the Adhyātmā. The Brahman is one with multiple aspects,
excluding inexistence and ignorance (avidyā, which is inexistent if defined as a lack of
knowledge – where there is knowledge there cannot be also ignorance). Next, who is this
knower whom we call "I" or self (ātman): the body, the mental or the divine spark of
consciousness? Note that even the Gītā contributes to the confusion when stating for instance
that the jīva-bhuta is an higher form of Prakṛiti (7.5), since jīva is usually another name for
dehin / jīva-ātman: life is the divine spark lighted or injected (tad ātmanam srijami aham) in
the body (deha).
Then follows in the "Ṡrī-Bhāshya" of Ramanuja an account of evidences for a multiplicity of
individual selves, quoting mainly the Gītā and the Viṣṇu Puraṇa, or well known passages in
the Upanishads such as: "Bahu syām" (let's be many –literally: I should be many) in the
Chandogya (6.2.3) and the story of the 2 birds in the Muṇḍaka (3.1.1). As regards sentences
such as "Tat tvam asi" which seem to contradict the multiplicity of selves, Ramanuja says the
word "Tat" points out to the Brahman under the form of the individual self in this sūtra.
Moreover there is no contradiction because the individual selves (beings) have the Brahman
for their Self. Krishna says in Gītā 13.3: "Learn Arjuna that I am the knower of the field of
activities (kshetra-jna) in all creatures because I know in each of them as well the field as the
(individual) knower of the field." Nevertheless the reason for a dual eternal existence, namely
of Prakṛiti and the Purush inside the Brahman is difficult to explain: if the Brahman is sat and
knowledge and Prakṛiti is asat and ignorance how can she be part of the Brahman? One must
admit, in agreement with the Gītā and Taittirya (II.6.1) that the Brahman is also the asat. For
purists who are reluctant to agree with that, the appearance of ignorant things inside the
Brahman is only the effect of a temporal transformation (non-existing forms) decided by the
Puruṣa; Brahman is the intelligent cause (mahat) of such an effect.

Janmādyasya yataḥ||1.1.2
From which first the birth of this.
From which the origin, persistence and dissolution (adi meaning first, implies etc… : adi stithi
pralaya or adi madhyam anta) of this universe here around. This sūtra remembers to Shankara
of Taittirīya Upanishad because in Bhṛiguvallī (3rd part of this Upanishad) Bhṛigu ask to his
father what is Brahman and Varuna answers "That from which beings are born". Having
thought only a little to this enigma, Bhrigu concludes: that must be food (anna), because
creatures are born of food, live with food and become food after their death! Thereafter, after
further meditation (what the Upanishad calls tapas), he will conclude that Brahman is life-
breath (prāna), mind (manas), understanding (vijnāna), and finally bliss (ānanda) which is
lack of fear linked to full knowledge and indifference. In fact he repeats what is already said
in previous parts of the same Upanishad about ātman. "The body is food. Breath is the life of
creatures; it is the soul (ātman) of their body. Inside there is mind perceiving all parts of the
body and having the shape of a person (thinking of all parts as a person); it is the soul of the
body…" (Taittirīya 2.2 and 2.3). Ramanuja translates by "(the Brahman is that) from whom
(proceed) the creation etc…. of this (universe)", considering that asya is the genitive case of
the masculine pronoun ayam denoting the Supreme Person (Purushottama). It could as īwell
be the genitive case of the neutral pronoun idam. He quotes the same passage of Taittirīya
(3.1.1), emphasizing that Brahman is not characterized by this single attribute: creation is not
what defines the Brahman, nor is it an accidental attribute. But in fact is'nt obvious that
creation, persistence and destruction proceeds from existence? More disturbing for Ramanuja
is the idea that one may conclude: Brahman is that from whom proceeds the illusion of
creation, i.e. avidyā. So he adds: The Person of Brahman is endowed with the luminosity of
knowledge and He is the witness only of this ignorance.

Ṡāstrayonitvāt ||1.1.3
From that as a womb of precepts.
Owing to the fact that the Brahman is the womb of precepts. Shankarācārya and Ramanuja
read on the contrary: (that the Brahman is the cause of creation etc… follows altogether from
the scriptures) because the scriptures form the source (of the knowledge relating to Him). But
the ṡāstras are not scriptures about pure knowledge like Upanishads; they are rules,
commands (literally weapons from the verb ṡas: to cut, to kill, to slaughter): dharma-ṡāstra,
artha-ṡāstra for instance. Such rules are the first thing emitted (srishta) by Brahmā as a
prelude to the creation of creatures. "Together with the creatures, Brahmā created the
sacrifice", states the Gītā "and said: may this sacrifice provide you with prosperity". This
origin of the word ṡāstra is not taken into account by Shankara, Ramanuja and other
commentators, who all read sruti. But the scriptures cannot be the means of proving the
existence of the Brahman states Ramanuja (despite the fact that in other parts of his comments
he considers revelation as the best means of knowledge). Beside that the word yonis means
the womb in which a grain (bijam) gives birth to a creature : "etad-yonini bhūtani sarvāni iti"
(Gītā 7.6) – from this womb (of Prakriti) are born all creatures, "mama yonir mahad brahma
tasmin garbham dadhāmi aham"– my womb is the Supreme intelligence (mahat) of the
Brahman, in this womb I set the embryo (Gītā 14.3); the embryo is covered by the womb
(Gītā 3.38). How the scriptures could be the womb of Brahman, the source of procreation of
Knowledge itself? My opinion is that them meaning of this sūtra is: Brahman is the womb of
dharma, i.e. what supports an intelligence in the creation, contrarily to what assert the asuras
"asatyam apratitstham tad jagad ahur anishvaram.." – they say that this universe has no truth
no basis, no creator (Gītā 16.8). The existence of Brahman / Person of Brahman / as a source
of creation is one of these self-evidences which prove by themselves and don’t need to be
attested by scriptures.

Tattu samanvayāt ||1.1.4

Though from the correlation (of the ṡāstras) to That.
The existence of moral rules is an indication of their origin. If we were not motivated by some
ideal, some belief in an existence transcending materiality, the moral rules would be limited to
the rudimentary law: don’t do to others what you would not like they do to you, which is
dictated by self-preservation. Sam-anv-i means to follow, to ensue as a consequence, or to be
correlated. Radhakrishnan and Shankara interpret this correlation as an harmony and translate
by: from the harmonious interpretation of scriptures the knowledge of Brahman (including
Greco-roman, Christian, Mahometan scriptures according to Radhakrishnan). Ramanuja
reads: however, (the scriptures are the source of knowledge) because their purport is the
Brahman. The object of scriptures is to inspire with meditation. Whatever the meaning of the
word ṡāstra for the author of the sūtras (scripture or rule), their purpose is obviously to
express and justify the dharma. Let recall the extensive meaning of the sanskrit word dharma :
the effect of what is expressed by the verb dhṛi (to keep, hold, maintain), like karma is the
effect of what is expressed by the verb kṛi (to do). Dharma is the result of what supports the
universe, of natural laws, of morality, dharma is religion, and the cause of all these things is
Brahman. Advaitists argue that un-embodiment is the essential state of the Self and
consequently merits acquired by means of good actions cannot result in his release, no more
than a bath can contribute to his purification. Maybe, replies Ramanuja. In fact release from
the bondage of samsāra results from the knowledge of Brahman: he who knows Him
transcends death (Svet. 3.8), he who know the Brahman becomes the Brahman (Mundaka
3.2.9) (some shlokas in Gītā also). Whatever contributes to the purification of the mind, either
meritorious work, reflection or meditation helps to acquire knowledge. But again arises in the
mind of Ramanuja the doubt about the indivisibility of the Brahman (concept of advaita),
which constitutes the leitmotiv of his bhāshya: how the Self could be affected by ignorance?
Should we admit that the understanding of that part of the Self which is embodied is limited
through the use of the mind so that this "conditioned" part becomes an individual self,
different from the unconditioned Self of the Brahman? The alternative (proposed by the
Chārvakas who are considered as atheist) is that the individual self is intrinsically different
from the Brahman and ignorant by nature.

Īkṣaternāṡabdam ||1.1.5
From one having insight there is no absence of word.
One who is seeing inside himself" (verb īkṣ, present participe īkṣat) speaks of That, for
instance in Upanishads. But all commentators consider that aṡabda (absence of word) refers to
what is not referred to in scriptures as the cause of the world: Prakṛiti (f) or Pradhāna (n),
words which mean respectively what puts forward activity, what puts forward a container/ a
womb, i.e. the Reality, Nature. Usually Pradhāna refers to the substance from which arise the
elements and the universe after insemination by the Creator. Pradhāna is considered to be non
manifest contrarily to Prakṛiti which refers to Nature provided with the cosmic intelligence by
this divine seed. "Ahaṁ hi viṡvasya carācarasya bījaṁ pradhānaṁ prakṛtiṁ pumāṁṡ-ca" - Je
suis la graine, la substance, la réalisation et la personne-hôte de cet univers mobile et
immobile, dit cette Personne Suprême en conclusion du Brahmā samhita.
is Shankara says that what is not mentioned in the scripture is not the cause of what is "seen
inside" / what is conceived or thought. Existence and knowledge are not material. Now,
according to the Samkhya theory, the three qualities (guns) responsible for differentiation in
the actual universe are present in a state of equilibrium in un-manifest Prakriti before each
creation, and therefore someone may object that there is no need to search for another cause
than what presents the effects in another state of evolution (than the state of equilibrium). This
conclusion is not appropriate answers Ramanuja: Prakriti is ignorant whereas the Chandogya
Upanishad (6.2.2.) expresses an inner sight using the verb iksh: "tada ekshata bahu syām
prajāyeya iti" – then He meditated: "I should be many, I should procreate".

Gauṇaṡcennātmaṡabdāt ||1.1.6
Even so it is not secondary because of the word ātman.
Gauṇa expresses what is relative to the guṇas, i.e. a consequence of a quality or something
figurative. The ability of thinking might be attributed to a non–intelligent thing in a figurative
expression, says Ramanuja: for instance in Chandogya section 6.2 "Sat" thinks let's be many
and his meditation produces heat (tejas), then this heat thinks also lets be many and creates
water, which thinks let's be many and creates food. But what is thinking is the self of heat,
water or food as indicated in section 6.3 of the Chandogya: tad deva ekshata ..jivena-ātmana-
anupraviṡya –this divinity thought let's enter in (what I have created) with this living soul.
Shankarācarya proposes another interpretation of this sūtra: the fact of seeing is not a
consequence of this word ātman. Is the issue the comparable importance of the two words
Brahman and ātman? I dont know.

Tannishṭhasya mokshopadeṡāt ||1.1.7

Owing to the indication of liberation of one who is established in That.
One who is established (nishṭha) in Brahman, qualified therefore a brahma bhuta, is by the
fact already liberated from the bond of materiality - from the "conditioning" mentioned by
Ramanuja - before leaving this world. Those who are established Prakriti and who maintain
that It is the cause of whatever exits don’t believe in liberation (muktī or moksha).

Heyatvāvacanāt ||11..8
Owing to the absence of statement or speech (vacana) about the discarding (heya), the
abandonment (of that which is the cause of existence). The passive / effective release (muktī),
the wish of release (moksha) and the resulting no-return (nirvana), mentioned in Upanishads
and Gītā don't concern the existence itself, contrarily to the belief of Buddhists, but only
activity (kṛiti, vṛitti). Existence cannot be discarded.

Svāpyayāt ||1.1.9
Taking that it merges in itself.
Whatever the grammatical analysis: sva + past participe ap-ī + yat or sva + past participe āp
+ yat the meaning is the same. To say that the ātman merges in the Brahman is equivalent to
say that it merges in itself (the Self: Parama-ātman). Individuality (ahamkara) vanishes as one
identifies himself with the whole and himself (sva) he becomes Brahman. Shankara and
Radhkrishnan continue to discuss about pradhāna, claiming that the self cannot be absorbed in
pradhāna (as supposed by Jains or samkhya philosophers). Ramanuja relates this sūtra to what
is stated in Chandogya 6.8.1 (and also in Praśna 4, Brihad 2-1, 3-2, 4-3 and 4-4, Brahmo 20-
23, Kaushika 4-19 and 4-20, Parabrahma 2.), namely that during deep sleep the individual self
merges in the Self.

Gatisāmānyāt ||1.1.10
That proceeds from their similarity.
sam-ā-nī is a verb meaning to come together, samana means identical and samatva means
equality, indifference. Sāmana and sāmanya are vriddhi forms meaning similarity. The vedic
hymns (sāma) are not involved in what is stated here. Gati(s) is a female word derived from
the verb gam (to go), with for direct meaning motion, progression, movement, or as evocating
expression for obtaining, acquiring (as a result teaching). Therefore one can also translate the
sūtra by: from the teaching of their similarity. Ramanuja considers that the similarity evoked
here concerns the initial topics: in many other passages of the Upanishads the cause of the
universe is Ȋṡa, Ȋṡvara, Nārāyana, Prabhū, Deva.

Ṡrutatvāt ||1.1.11
Owing to what has been heard (in Veda).
But at this stage of the teaching process it is not clear if the topics is still Brahman or ātman.
What is stated in the ṡrutis? Is it that Brahman is the source of all existence? (as supposed by
Shankara and Ramanuja) or that it is of same nature than ātman? that ātman is absorbed in
Brahman? in itself?

Ānandamayo'abhyāsāt ||1.1.12
Owing to practice one is full of bliss/ on account of the repetition that It (or He) is full of
bliss.
The word abhy-āsa may stem from abhi-as (to excel, reign over, also to repeat, to exercise (to
practice) or from abhi-aṡ (to obtain, dominate, pervade). Shankara, Ramanuja and
Radhakrishnan in the present context translate this word by repetition. Owing to the repetition
of the attribute (bahuvrīhi compound-name ānandamayaḥ) meaning "the blissful one". The
commentator has the choice to complete the sentence by indicating whom or what is full of
bliss" between the Brahman, the Supreme Self (so often qualified as Sat-cit-ānanda) or the
individual self merging in the Supreme Self by practising yoga/meditation. In fact the
Brahma-bhūya sthiti (as for instance in Gītā 18.53) is the bliss of merging in universal
impersonal spirituality. A very simplistic description of this state is given in following
example: one is not affected by the pleasure of the tiger eating the goat nor by the pain of the
goat, both being complementary. There is one well known occurrence of the repetition of the
word blissfulness in the ṡrutis: in Taitttirīrya Upanishad section 2. In paragraph 2.5.1. it is
stated that the blissfulness of the person / self results from understanding the Brahman. It is
worth noting that previous paragraphs of section 2 deal with a description of the nature of a
person (purusha). Of what is made (maya) this person? Remembering the vyārhṛti (Bhūr
bhuvaḥ svaḥ) accounting for the triple nature of the universe – matter, energy and spirit - and
how the Person of Brahman evolves this universe by producing five elements, making of
them his body and becoming their essence (rasa, ātman). He evolves successively space, air,
fire, water, earth, herbs, food, semen then a living person, therefore concludes the philosopher
(muni) with the typical humour of Upanishads: the essence of a person is food (annam). Of
what else indeed is made the body when deprived of life breath? Now, it happens that inside
this piece of meat the Lord instilled life-breath (prāna), then the living creature was endowed
with thought (manas), then understanding (vijnāna) and finally bliss (ānanda). But the
progression does not ends at this stage: section 2.8 relates a gradation of bliss which may
correspond to the abhyāsa mentioned in this sūtra: bliss of the sādhu, of the gandharva, of the
pitṛi in upper spheres, of the deva, of Prajāpati, of Brahman and of any person who has
discarded desire (kāmahataḥ). Disregarding the last item of the list, Ramanuja sees in this
progression a proof that the individual self is not equal (sama) to the Supreme Self. Indeed the
former is not able to create (in some respect he can), his intelligence is blinking because of
karma (but karma is not his essence), he is associated (sakta) to evil and ignorance.
Nevertheless his true nature (essence) is the same as that of Brahman: Tat tvam asi
(Chāndogya 6.8.7). Therefore when he understands that he becomes free of association
(asakta) and blissfull.

Vikāraṡabdānneti cenna prācuryāt ||1.1.13

That is not said (na iti) from the word variety but not (cet na) from abundance.
The repetition or progression (abhyāsa) does not imply a variety (vikāra) or a multitude
(prācurya). By definition Brahman is wholeness, indivisibility (advaita), oneness. Gītā says
(18.20+ 18.21): "sarvabhūteshu yenaikam bhāvam avyayam ikshate avibhaktam vibhakteshu
taj jnānam viddhi sāttvikam || pṛitakvena tu yaj jnānam nānābhavān pṛitakvidhān vetti
sarveshu bhūtesu taj jnānam viddhi rājasam ||". Diversity is a conception of the universe
resulting directly from the consciousness of oneself as an individual (ahamkara) and it leads
surely to the will of possessing everything else. According to Shankara the suffixe made of
(maya) in anandamaya may be interpreted as a modification by an objector, similar to that of
food of which is made the body. "Not so" (the words cet na opposing to preceding terms and
not to the following one), answers the vedāntin, "it must be interpreted as an abundance
(prācurya)". Ramanuja explains that there is abundance of bliss for the Supreme Self (or
Brahman) but that He cannot be modified.

Taddhetuvyapadeṡāt ||1.1.14
Because everything points at That (Brahman) as the cause (of bliss).
The Brahman or the Supreme Self is a cause of bliss when attained by the individual self.
(Taittirya 2.7.1)

Māntravarṇikameva ca gīyate ||1.1.15

What is described is the same than what is sung in the māntras.
The Taittirya Upanishad is constituted of metric māntras and prosodic brāhmanas. In section
2.1 for instance there is this māntra: "satyam jnānam-anantam Brahma". Then it is followed
by an explanation. The person (individual self) who finds bliss in the knowledge of Brahman
is of same nature than the Brahman, explains Ramanuja.

Netaro'nupapatte ||1.1.16
Not the other, because this conclusion would not be convincing.
Upapatti (from upa-pad) is what takes place near, what is happening, what is the conclusion
of some thinking. The point is not to contradict another (itara) conclusion, because the
pronoun is in masculine nominative case (itaraḥ) and the word conclusion in feminine
ablative case. The "other" is the individual self, whom it would not be appropriate to qualify
of full of an abundance of bliss, cause of bliss and who is not sung in māntras. Ramanuja even
rejects the idea, proposed in section 2.8 of the Taittirya, that the person who has discarded
desire (kāmahataḥ), has reached the same level of knowledge and bliss than the Brahman.

Bhedavyapadeṡāt ||1.1.17
And owing to the indication of difference.
An objector would say: what about statement in Upanishads such as "the Self has to be
searched for", "there is no higher bliss than reaching the Self"… For sure answers Shankara,
but common people identify the self with their body or their intelligence. Ramanuja
underlines that the self qualified of ānandamaya in the Taittirya is higher than intermediate
selves which are considered successively in the Upanishads, made of food (annamaya) , of
life breath (prānamaya), of mind (manamaya).

Kāmācca nānumānāpekshā ||1.1.18

And owing to (the expression) of desire (kāma), no expectation (āpekshā) based on inference
(anumāna).
Truth is self-evident and rarely reached by reasoning. In present case what could be
conjectured by reasoning, but which is contradicted by the expression of wish, is that Prakriti
be the cause of creation. He wishes to be many and to become the self of food, life-breath,
mind and the conscious person.

Asminnasya ca tadyogam ṡāsti ||1.1.19

Within this and of this That rules the union.
What is called "That" with neutral gender (with nominative and accusative forms tat in
sanskrit) and which is far from us refers usually to the Brahman: Om Tat Sat, Tat tvam asi. In
fact one could argue that the Brahman is far and close as well, but he could not point at the
Brahman. Respectively the pronoun "this" is used for pointing to something which is close
and in present case which has male or neutral gender, whereas the used pronouns would be
asyām and asyā if referring to Prakṛiti who is female. As already stated, the verb ṡās means to
rule, control, punish, what makes the ṡāstra. Yoga means undoubtedly the service of this
(asya) within this (asmin) and the later may be only the Brahman or Supreme Self, who is
referred to by "this" because He was mentioned in previous sūtra. Shankara and Ramanuja
interpret the verb ṡāsti (3rd person singular) as "the scripture teaches" and associates the
pronoun tat to yoga "that union" (tat may also be the accusative of masculine pronoun that –
the nominative form being sah). Let's agree that is the scripture (sruti, ṡruti or smriti) which
commands (ṡāsti) the yoga of the individual self in the universal Self. But the word yoga has
never been mentioned before, therefore how to explain that the author of the sūtras (sūtrakāra)
adds a useless pronoun? The word ānanda is masculine. So what else than "satyam jnānam-
anantam Brahma" (all of neutral gender) may rule this union? Shankara might have taken
advantage of this sūtra for underlining the indivisibility (advaita) of That which is knowledge,
bliss and spiritual existence, unifying the self to the Self.

antastaddharmopadeṡāt ||1.1.20
Owing to the indication of dharma inside (antaḥ).
Why not to read simply what is written instead of speculating about the antaryāmin and
translating dharma by quality, as does Shankara? "The one inside (is God) because his
qualities are taught". Why Ramanuja feels obliged to refer to the same text than Shankara?
"He who is within (the sun and the eye of Brahman) because his attributes are declared."
Because Ramanuja is less interested by the meaning of the sūtras than by discussing with
Shankara! The quoted text is a passage of the Chandogya Upanishad (1.6.6) describing the
Supreme Self as "a golden person within the sun with golden beard and golden hair". This
poetic text (part of Sāma Veda) aims at explaining the word udgītha, which express the
raising of a sound (Aum) from inside the chest and which is uttered before praising the Person
in the sun who lights our intelligence. Undoubtedly that Person who is in the sun (Aditya,
Savitṛi) would not argue (like Ramanuja) whether he is the same or different from the
Supreme Self, because He knows that the sun is a form. And what about dharma? He may be
qualified of dhatṛi (Gītā 8.9 –same root dhṛit than dharma) but even Buddhist know that the
sanskrit word dharma means what they call dhamma in prakrit langage. Dharma is expressed
under the form of shāstras (rules).

bhedavyapadeṡāccānyaḥ ||1.1.21
Owing to the indication of a splitting there is also another.
The verb upadish in previous aphorism means to show (dish) upon or close by (upa) and is
reinforced by antaḥ. Here something is shown completely outside (vi+apa) and is split,
separated (bhid). Obviously there is a splitting since an union of this within this occurs, as
ruled by that (sūtra 19). Of course Ramanuja has no other choice than to pursue his formal
discussion about the difference between the Sun and the Supreme Self.

ākāṡas talliṅgāt ||1.1.22

That (Brahman) is the space on account of the symbol (of a splitting).
Ākāshaḥ (masculine nominative) is the name given to the space which had to be created first
of all (i.e. at the beginning of each creation) for containing the other elements and for
propagating the tanmatra of sound. Lingam is a sign, a symbol, a mark, which here is the
splitting, the multiplicity of persons, a also of names and forms, inside the Brahman. In
Taittirya (2.1), the Person who says "bahu syām" creates first the form of ākāṡa: "tasmāt
etasmād-ātmana ākāṡaḥ saṁbhūtaḥ." This is the first material form having for inner essence
(ātmā) the sound. Everything arises out of and ends in ākāsha; ākāsha is udgītha which
invokes the Brahman (Chāndogya 1.9).

ata eva prāṇaḥ ||1.1.23

Hence even the vital breath.
From space the air, from air the fire, then water, earth, semen, body, vital breath…(same
Taittirya and Chandogya). Prāṇa here may refer as well to air (vāyu) than to the manifestation
of life (breath). Two other Upanishads (one is Brihadāranyaka section 6) state that prāna is the
most essential characteristics of becoming (bhava). Prāṇaḥ is particularly essential as the
source of speech (next sūtra). Some Panini's ṡikṣa (teaching of art or skill) states that speech
starts as an intention of expressing oneself and it promotes the exhalation of air in the lungs
etc... The used expression is very poetic: "the self elaborating a project with intelligence
engages the mind to wish to speak. The mind strikes the fire of the body (like for reviving
embers), which in turns drives the winds (maruts). The maruts moving inside the lungs
generate the pleasant sound expressing the self." The pleasant sound (mandra) is human voice
and the expression of the self (svara) is also the word used for the musical tone or the vowel.
The later is thereafter modulated with the throat in a, e, i or u and articulated using the tongue
to form consonants.

jyotiṡcaraṇābhidhānāt ||1.1.24
 Because of speech as a mean of motion the light.
The verb abhi-dhā means to position toward, to establish, to give a name. Carana is the means
of motion, and the word is usually interpreted as a foot, taking that cara-bhūta move using
their feet. In the context of Upanishads, motion is also synonym of action and speech is the
first expression of action. "At the beginning there was speech" says the Bṛihadāranyaka, as
also the Bible. Having said "bahu syām" and made space for this purpose, next he put some
light in this space for showing the forms of what will come next. On a spiritual point of view
light means understanding and the Gāyatrī mantra expresses the wish to be enlighted by the
divine wisdom symbolized by the sun. By rising each morning the sun allows us to see and
understand the universe around us. By encompassing the universe Vishnu gives it a cosmic
intelligence. Curiously, Shankara and Ramanuja refer also to the Gāyatrī which is composed
of 3 feets (pada) of eight syllabes. These feets are preceded by a fourth foot (Om bhūr bhuvar
svar) of 6 syllabes as commented in the Chāndogya section 3.12, of which main topics is:
Gāyatrī is everything, speech, earth, wind, light, body, a cosmic Person whose 1 foot is on
earth in creatures and 3 feets are in the sky.

chando'bhidhānānneti cenna tathā ceto'rpaṇanigadāttathā hi darṡanam ||1.1.25

If (cet) it is not said (na iti) through mention (abhidhāna) in vedic hymns (chandas), then
(tathā) from the fixing (arpaṇa) of the mind (cetas) by recitation (nigada) then certainly (tathā
hi) its perception (sight -darṡana).
If the light referred to in previous sūtra is not named in vedic texts the recitation of the
Gāyatrī mantra can enable us to perceive this light: the Gāyatrī is the best chanda and its
topics is divine light. Moreover the preliminary mantra "Om bhūr bhuvar svar" encompass the
manifestations or expressions of the Brahman. But where leads this discussion about the
number of feet (pada) in the Gāyatrī mantra and the number of feet of the Brahman or the
Purushottama, as well in the Chāndogya Upanishad as in the bhāshyas?

bhūtādipādavyapadeṡopapattesh'caivam ||1.1.26
And even from the occurence (upapatti) of the designation (vyapadeṡa) of that as the initial
seat (ādi-pada) of the creatures.
The word ādi is important and its meaning is clear: Ādipurusha is the original person. Here it
qualifies the ambiguous word pada which means as well the foot used for walking, a
settlement (like in "param padam" or in the verbe upa-pad), as also the metre in poetry. Of
course the initial foot cannot be a creature (bhūta) or an element of nature (mahabhūta),
contrarily to the assertions of Shankara or Ramanuja. The Ādipadam is Brahman, designed by
Krishna in Gītā as His "mahat yonir". This fact is remembered in the mantra "Om bhūr bhuvar
svar" : Om invokes the ādipadam of bhūr bhuvar and svar. Radhakrishna see in this sūtra a
reference to the Rig Veda verse speaking of the organs of the Virata: his mouth is the
brāhmana, his arms the kshatriya, his belly the vaishya and his feet the shudra.

upadeṡabhedānneti cennobhayasminnapyavirodhāt ||1.1.27

If indeed it is said (iti cet) "this is not what is teached owing to a difference", it is not so
owing the lack of contradiction between both (in both: ubhayasmin).
Contrarily to vyapadeṡa which is a very definitive designation, upadeṡa is a reference to
something, an instruction, a teaching. The word bheda (difference) is in ablative case:
something is indicated from a difference, owing to a difference, this is not an indication of a
difference. The word virodha (from verb vi-rudh) means an opposition, an hindrance, a
contradiction. If it is indicated that there is no difference, the non-duality is not contradicted.
According to all commentators ubhayasmin refer to two mentions in previous sūtras of the
Brahman which seem contradictory. What exactly? In Chāndogya Upanishad 3.12.6 it is said
that: All creatures are one fourth of the Ultimate Person (Purushottama) and three fourth are
the immortal in the sky. His feet of are in the space and out of the space, His light is inside
and behind. But there is no contradiction since verses 3.12.7-9 state that the Brahman as space
is inside each person and outside. Verse 3.13.7 also states that: "The light which shines higher
than this heaven behind everything, higher than everything else, is the same as the light in the
heart of a person." Anyway the Purushottama is greater than Brahman asserts Ramanuja. But
what difference is there between a thing and the essence of this thing? See for instance the
usual comparison between a pot and clay which is the essence of the pot. Another apparent
contradiction which nobody tries to explain is the assertion that Gayatri is four footed and
sixfold (Chāndogya 3.12.5) instead of three footed and eightfold. Chāndogya may be quite
enigmatic because of its poetry,

prāṇastathā'nugamāt ||1.1.28
Thus life breath as a consequence (of what precedes).
Shankara and Radhakrishnan conclude: from what precedes life is Brahman. They refer to the
teaching of Citrā to Gautama in Kaushītaki Upanishad (2.14) telling a similar story than
Brihadaranyaka Upanishad section 6, about the life functions leaving the body one by one and
discovering that the body lives only when prāna is present. Prātardana (conqueror of early
morning – who is called inner agnihotra because he initiates the speech by pushing the winds
in the lungs– see Pānini ṡikshā) asks to Indra to give him as a boon what is the best for a man.
Indra answers "worship me because I am prāṇa", which (or who because in sanskrit prāṇa is
male) is essential. Indra is the master of the senses (indriyani), generally identified with the
mind, but since the body lives only when prāna is present in the body prāṇa is considered to
be the master. Prātardana concludes in Kaushītaki that prāṇa must be ātman since that is the
essential for a man. What is considered as essential (most important) in any thing is indeed
called its essence. Note that same thought also comes to the partridges in Taittirīya (after
thinking that is food and before coming to mind, intelligence, bliss). Above sutra 23 states
also that prāṇa is the signature of life. When Krishna in Gītā declares that He is the essence of
whatever is existing and gives important examples, He says that concerning the creatures He
is their life: "jivanam sarva-bhūteshu" (shloka 7.9). But one can argue that everything is
Brahman: "brahm arpanam brahm havir brahm agnau brahmana hutam..." One may also
consider that, since preceding sutras recall what is the purpose of life, the present one simply
concludes: so in these conditions life takes place. Since the aim of Ramanuja is principally to
take position against advaitists, he refers to the same passage of the Kaushītaki Upanishad, for
arguing again that this Being referred to as Prāṇa or Indra is the Purushottama, the Self of the
Brahman.

na vakturātmopadeṡāditi cedadhyātmasambandhabhūmā hyasmin ||1.1.29

Even (cet) the self of the speaker (vaktṛi-ātmā) is not the topics (na iti) in this teaching
(upadeshāt); here indeed (hi asmin) the topics is the Adhyātman binding together
(sambandha) the aggregate of existing things (bhūman).
First, the speaker or teacher in this text is Indra. He is not speaking of himself as the king of
the devas (sva-bhāva or ahamkara) and the object of worship (murti) for Prātardana, but as a
spark of the Adhyātman. Nor is it said that Brahman is the living self of Prātardana, despite
the trend to translate adhi-ātman by inner self, as if there was also an outer self. No, Brahman
or the Person presiding the Brahman (adhi-stitha) is the unifying self. The true definition of
adhyātman is that of Gītā: "aksharam brahma paramam svabhāvo'dhyātmam ucyate (shola
8.3). Ramanuja translates "adhyātmasambandhabhūmā" as multitude of attribute belonging to
the Inner Self, referring to what is teached in Kaushītaki 3.8 and 3.9. This Prāna is indeed the
object of worship, consciousness, life, intelligence (prajna), the enjoyer of sensations,
eternally young and immortal, the impeller of activities, the guardian of the worlds.
"Consequently it is the Supreme Self Himself who is denoted by the words Indra and Prāna"
concludes Ramanuja. He could have added the word Adhyātman. My opinion is that he
missed a strong point in the talk of Indra for arguing with advaitists: "let a man not want to
know the speech but the speaker, not sight but the seer, not pleasure and pain but the knower
of pleasure and pain… (3.9)" – not kshetra but the kshetra-jnā for using the same words as
Krishna in Gītā.

ṡāstradṛṣṭyā tūpadeṣo vāmadevavat ||1.1.30

But the teaching (becomes clear) when considering (drishtyā) these instructions in the
scriptures (ṡāstra) like those of Vāmadeva.
Vāma means lovely and here Vāma-deva is not Vāmana the child brāhmana born of Aditi, but
a pseudonym of the rishi Gautama. Gautama is speaking in several Upanishads among which
the Kaushītaki and the Brihadāranyaka. The suffixe vat means acting like, in the same state
as, here than Vāmadeva. In Brihadaranyaka (1.4.10) Gautama says: "I am Brahman.
(Therefore) I was Manu, I was Sūrya." Someone becoming conscious of the true nature of the
self, when in samādhi state, understands that he is all, he "becomes the self of other creatures
self" (bhutātma bhūtātma -Gītā). In same state of samādhi as Vāmadeva, he can say: I am
Brahman. "Tat tvam asi" tells the Chāndogya 6.9.4. As stated above, the self is not individual
(sva: own), he is bounding together everything (sambhanda): "mayi sarvam idam protam"
says Krishna.

jīvamukhyaprāṇaliṅgānneti cennopāsātraividhyādāṡritatvādiha tadyogāt ||1.1.31

If that is not said (cet na iti) owing to the mark (liṅgam) of the life-breath (prāṇa) being in the
mouth (mukhya) of the living person (jīva), nor also the worship (upāsā) owing to the three-
fold (trai-vidhā) refuge (āshritatva) through union (yoga) to That in this world (iha).
Trai-vidhyāt is the ablative case of the adjective trai-vidhā qualifying the name āshritatva
which is in ablative case (āṡritatvāt), as also the name yoga (yogāt). Trai-vidhā is derived
from tri-vidhā like trai-gunya is derived from tri-guna: it means made of three parts, situated
in three parts. Upāsā is derived from same verb upa-ās, which is used by Indra in Kaushītaki.
But Shankara and Radhakrishnan interpret upāsā as meditation, considering that one sits at the
feet of (upa-ās) a guru for receiving his teaching and meditating on it. The three topics of
meditation would be either (i) ātman, prāṇa and Brahman or (ii) prāṇa (life), consciousness
and bliss, i.e. sat-cit-ananda. Taking that they are advocating for monism throughout all their
comments and search in the sutras some answers to arguments for dualism, therefore they
read: If the life-breath and the living soul are not indicating (a mark of) the Brahman, that
cannot be since that would lead to a three-fold meditation. Because of the acceptance
(aṡraditvat) (elsewhere) this is a mark of Brahman. As in comments about previous sūtras 28
and 30 they refer to the Kaushītaki Upanishad involving the rishi Gautama who asks some
teaching (kushita – wise, acute explanation –like kusha grass) to Citrā, son of Gārgya. But
there is no mention of these 3 topics of meditation in the Kaushītaki. So let's try to find
another explanation in the Kaushītaki. The topics of the first section of this Upanishad is what
makes that a person is reborn (that he takes the path of the moon: svarga) or that he goes to
the Brahman (takes the path of the sun). Some persons worship the moon, for obtaining good
health, crop and progeny and consequently they are reborn. This may be the 3-fold worship
mentioned in the sūtra, and consequently it would be an invocation of 3-fold agni-vidyā of
Naciketā in Kathopanishad 1.14-17. But without developing further this idea, let pursue with
the teaching of Citrā in Kaushītaki: Brahman which is prāṇa (2.2) shines through speech,
sight, hearing, thinking (2.13). The "all conquering kaushītaki" (who will not be reborn)
worships the rising sun, the sun at high noon, and the setting sun, because the sun scatters the
faults or sins (pāpa) (2.7). This may also correspond to the 3-fold worship mentioned in the
sūtra. Upanishads are supposed to stimulate meditation, so it may be worth to remember the
meaning of this 3-fold worship. The sun is prabhā: He brings (pra) light (bhā). Like breath
rising in the throat for emitting udgitha, Om, and other sounds, the sun rises. Like the five
life-breaths filling the body (the origin of the word prāṇa is the verb prā: to fill), the light of
the sun covers the world: tat savitur varenyam. One is also entitled to search for a fancy origin
of the word prāṇa in pra-a-ṇaṡ (this verb is not used) which would mean to bring non-death.
So, the light of the sun covers or fills the world and allow us to know it; therefore the light of
the sun is likened to the light of understanding (pra-jña). The purpose of Gāyatrī is precisely
to wish that the Sun (who is God's light) stimulates our thoughts (dhī): dhiyo yo na
pracodayat. Indeed understanding scatters ignorance, which is darkness (tamas) of the
intelligence and the origin of faults (pāpas). The knower of the body, of the universe, or of the
field of activity, is the soul: Aham kshetra-jña says Krishna. It is a common thread (sūtra) of
the Upanishads connecting all these ideas: the soul is consciousness (cit, cetas or cetana),
which is the spark lightening knowledge (jñanam), which is the purpose of being involved in
activity (as stated also in Gītā) and life (jivanam, prāṇa )is the means of this activity. In other
words, this spark of spiritual energy, consciousness or divinity is lightening life-breath on first
day of life and wakefulness each morning; then it fills the body like Vishnu fills the universe.
This idea is found for instance in the Pānini ṡikshā, in the Mundaka Upanishad (3.1.9), in the
Chāndogya and many others.
For Ramanuja if there is no mention of multiple attributes of the Inner Self in previous sūtras,
it cannot be for this reason that the worship of the Brahman (or Inner Self) has a 3-fold nature.
This worship would consist in a meditation on Brahman as the cause of the world, as the
source of enjoyers (individual selves), as the enjoyable things. If these are indeed 3 good
topics of meditation relative to the Brahman, Ramanuja gives no reference. Then he adds that
one can meditate on Brahman as Sat, Cit, Ananta, Ananda.

~
Second section (pāda)
Here according to the various commentators starts the second section (pāda) of the first
adhyāya. Ramanuja tells us that the 3 next padas discuss of the individual soul, which seem to
differ from the main topics of Vedānta texts, i.e. the Brahman. Yet the topics is in fact the
same and commentators –Shankara and Ramanuja - argue uselessly about whom is dwelling
in the cave of the heart.
sarvatra prasiddhopadeshāt ||1.2.1
Owing to the indication of accomplishment everywhere.
Taking that effective success (pra-siddha) generally arises notoriety in the human society, the
word gets this second meaning. Therefore Shankara as well as Ramanuja read: owing that
which is well known is mentioned everywhere. According to them the sūtra refers to
Chāndogya III.14.1, starting with: "Sarvam khalvidam brahma" - Indeed everything is
Brahman . The Chāndogya is the most lyrics of Upanishads, making part of Sāma Veda, as
indicated by its name. Chapter III of the Chāndogya deals with the worship of the sun, how
the Sun is satisfying the various kind of devas through his various rays from the east, the
west, the south the north, above and in the middle, for coming back to the starting point of the
Upanishad which was Om and the Gāyatrī. To the five above mentioned directions (excluding
the middle) correspond also the five doors of the body which invedic texts is a personal
universe. The sixth door inside is the heart, which is the seat of the soul. Section III.13.7
states that the light which shines in heaven and the light inside the heart (soul) are the same
and section III.14.3 will establish that this individual soul is the same as Brahman. Now,
remarks the speaker of the Upanishad, a person is distinguished from another by his purpose:
"kratu-maya purusha" (III.14.1). (In Gītā it is said that a person is distinguished by what he
believes in, his faith.) Then continues the speaker (III.14.2): "this purposeful person is made
of mind (manomaya), his body is life (prāṇa), his form is light (bhā), his project (samkalpa) is
truth, his self (ātmā) is space (ākāsha) and he contains all works, desires, perfumes (essences)
of the objects of the senses and all other unnamed things". He recalls us that the words manu,
manushya, manīshin are issued from the verb man (to think) like manas (mind) and purposes
are conceived in mind. We have seen before that the noun person refers to a complex entity
including flesh, life breath, mind, intelligence, soul. But the materialistic opponent (vṛittikāra)
of the vedāntin in Shankara's bhāshya concludes: these are the characteristics of the individual
soul. Shankara disagrees: that is definitely mind. There are some writing supporting his
assertion. Indeed sūtra 11 below speaks also of two selves abiding in the heart. Beside that,
both Taittiriya (1.6.1) and Aitareya (1.2.4) speak of a person consisting of the mind, namely
the Moon god (manomayaḥ puruṣaḥ - candramā mano bhūtvā) entering in the heart. The heart
is indeed also the seat of the mind invedic culture and many others (Confucianism and Greek
philosophy for instance). Nevertheless one may argue with Shankara: How could manas,
being only 1 of the 24 materialistic by-products of Prakriti, be identical with Brahman? Is the
body of mind the life breath, its form light, its self space? How could this mind be "bigger
than earth" (III.14.3)? What is smaller than a seed and bigger than earth, extending
everywhere like ākāsha is the self. Now is it necessary to ask again (Ramanuja) if it the
individual or the Universal Self? Both have this faculty: "nityam sarva gatam sthanur
acalo'yam sanatana" (Gītā section 2). Both the individual self and the Brahman are
(qualitatively) the same states Chāndogya III.14.3. Even activities, desires, "perfumes", have
their essence in Brahman.

vivakshitaguṇopapattesca ||1.2.2
And of what is produced is the meaning of the word guṇa
It has been said before that upapatti is an argument, a proof, the conclusion of a reasoning,
but it is also what is taking place (literal meaning of upa-pad), what is produced, visible.
Vivakshita is what was desired to be said or meant. A more elaborate translation, consistent
with the translation of prasiddha by accomplishment is: "one argument for this
accomplishment everywhere is the expression of what is called the guṇas", the characteristic
qualities of any material thing or creature. Shankara has a problem with the word vivakshita
which expresses clearly a wish (vivaksh is the desiderative form of vac), because Brahman
which is impersonal has no wish. So he is obliged to admit that Brahman's Self has a will and
a purpose or a desire. One uses to say about an argument that "it fits with what one wants to
demonstrate. No wonder that his translation is: "the qualities meant to be expressed fit with
(Brahman)". For him indeed, the meaning of all sūtras is always the same: the Upanishads
speak of Brahman.
anupapattestu na ṡārīra ||1.2.3
But being not produced (or not a valid argument), not the embodied
The embodied (that with quality of a solid support, a frame: ṡarira) is also dehi (with the
quality of a mould: deha) and jīva (with the quality of life), i.e. the soul inside. This self of a
person is not material, not produced. All commentators proceed with their idea that guṇa is
any of the qualities mentioned in Chāndogya 3.14.3 (consisting of mind, whose form is light,
whose project is truth, whose self is space, greater than earth, …) and therefore translate:
"because it does not fit, not the embodied". Why then this same statement of the Chāndogya
(3.14.3) contains 2 times the words : eṣa ma ātmā-antar hṛdaye? "This is my-self within the
heart, smaller than a grain of rice. This is my-self within the hearth, greater than earth, greater
than space, greater than these worlds"?
 karmakartṛvyapadeṡācca ||1.2.4
Also owing to the (separate) indication of an author of action
It is not appropriate to translate by "the indication of an author and an action or of a subject
and an object", because the words are not in dual case. According to Monier-Williams
dictionary the verb vy-apa-diṡ means to point out, to indicate, almost like upa-diṡ or diṡ
whereas vi-diṡ points out to an intermediate quarter of the compas. But the prefix apa
modifies usually the meaning of the verb by adding away or off: vy-apa-gam means to go
away, retreat, escape, disappear. So vyapadeṡa may be a fraud, a fake indication, an excuse, or
as suggested by Radhakrishna, the prefix vy-apa may add the nuance of separate indication:
"owing to the indication that action and actor are separated". According to Shankara,
Ramanuja and Radhakrishnan the involved action is meditation, the author is the individual
self and the object the Supreme Self, the Brahman. They refer to the next statement in
Chāndogya (3.14.4): "eṣa ma ātmā-antar hṛidaye etad brahma etam itaḥ
pretyābhisambhavitāsmi-iti". This is my self in the heart, this is Brahman, and when I will be
dead it is what I will become." We have here a good example of the oriented interpretation of
these sūtra. Knowledge and intelligence also are under the influence of guṇas (Gītā 18.20-22
and 30-32) and wise people know that our mood, our addictions and our intellectual
obsessions affect our understanding (of the world as also of sūtra). The present sūtra and
probably the 2 preceeding ones don’t refer to Chāndogya section 3.14.

ṡabdaviṡeṣāt ||1.2.5
Owing to the difference of words
Shankarācarya argues about the case ending of words karma and kartṛi in other texts
(Ṡatapatha Brāhmana). Why not? He could also refer to "ātmanam ātmanā ātmani yukta" in
the Gītā. Definitely karma (noun) is the result of what is done (krita, past participle of verb)
and kartṛi (noun whose nominative is karta) is the one who does (kṛi).

smṛteṣca ||1.2.6
From what is remembered also
What is remembered (smṛiti) is the teaching of ṛiṣis, to be distinguished from what is heard
from the Vedas (ṡruti). Among so many ṡlokas of the Gītā dealing with the karta, the karma,
and the witness of action, why do these commentators choose to refer to ṡloka 18.61 speaking
of the Lord staying in the heart of creatures and operating them through His māyā? He uses 2
times the word bhuta in this ṡloka, but no name of the individual person (purusha, puman or
jīva), nor kṛi, karta or karma. It seems that their purpose is only to refer to Gītā as a smṛiti
whereas other Upanishads are considered as ṡrutis. But they also anticipate the topics of
following sūtras: hṛideṣa.

arbhakaukastvāttadvyapadeṡācca neti cenna nicāyyatvādevam vyomavacca ||1.2.7

From that indication (tat vyapadeṡāt) of what constitutes (tvāt) the small (arbhaka) dwelling
place (okas), then/even (ced) from meditation (nicāyya) about this state indeed (tvāt evam) it
is not said (na iti) this is spacious like heaven (vyoma-vat).
Shankarācārya: if it is objected that the Supreme Self is not indicated here in such terms, then
we answer: no for this is done for the sake of contemplation and analogous to space. Follows
the usual discussion about the subtleness of the Supreme Self (Brahman) who, like space, can
enter in a tiny cavity for purpose of being the object of a meditation. Such minuteness does
not however belong to the true nature of the Supreme Self clarifies Ramanuja, because He is
greater than earth and heaven…

sambhogaprāptiriti cenna vaiṡeṣyāt ||1.2.8

The experience/ obtaining (pra-āptiḥ) complete enjoyment (sambhoga), is not said indeed (ced
na iti) because of the distinction/difference (viṡeṣa)
There are two persons in the heart, one enjoying pleasures and pains and the other observing
(Mundaka Upanishad 3.1.1). But it is said "Tat tvam asi", objects the opponent to the vedāntin
in Shankaracarya comments. Not as long as the individual soul is attracted by pleasure and
fears pain, answers the vedāntin. To be of Brahman essence does not mean that you are the
Brahman.
attā carācaragrahaṇāt ||1.2.9
The eater (attā) is defined by the seizure (graha) of what is moving (cara) or motionless
(acara)
The bird who is enjoying food in Mundaka Upanishad (3.1.1.) is the individual soul whereas
the other bird (the antaryamin or Supreme Self) is watching without eating. Nevertheless
Shankaracarya considers that the sutra refers to Supreme Self devouring everything under the
form of death (Kathopanishad), the same referred to as Time and Viṡvarupa in Gītā.
Ramanuja adds everything (sarva) before carācaragraha. But in present context seizing and
eating mean enjoying (sambhoga).

prakaraṇācca ||1.2.10
Also because of topics
Prakaraṇa is creation, production (from pra-kṛ) and in other context the topics of a discussion.
The topics seems to be the enjoyment of the embodied while seizing and devouring the
objects of senses. Nevertheless Shankarācārya, Ramanuja and Ramakrishna argue that the
person in question is the Supreme Self. From here all of them start to refer to Katha
Upanishad, whose topics is the nature of the self: once we are dead do we exit or not?

guhaṁ pravaṣṭāvātmanauhi taddarṡanat ||1.2.11

Owing to the insight of two Selves residing in the heart
Guha (masc. or guhā fem.) is a secret place where to hide oneself or something and the term is
commonly used instead of hṛid, the heart which itself is inside the chest, i.e. a safe place for
hiding things. For instance, in Kaṭha Upanishad which will be quoted hereafter by Shankara,
Yama says to Naciketa:
- the sacrificial fire opening the door of heaven is settled in the secret place - anantalokāptim
agniṁ nihitaṁ guhāyām (1.1.14).
- the two (selves) having settled in the secret place drink the juice of good deeds - ṛtam
pibantau sukṛtasya guhām praviṣṭau | one is the glowing fire and the second its shade say
those who know the Brahman - chāyāt-tapau brahma-vido vandanti. (1.3.1)
Both individual Self and Supreme Self are infinitely small (anoraniyaṁsam – Gītā ṡloka 8.9)
(ātmā na prakāṡate… sūkṣma – Katha 1.3.11) since they are immaterial and reside in the
small place of the heart (sutra 7). "Ishvaraḥ sarva bhūtānām hṛid-deṣe 'rjuna tiṣṭhati" –the
Lord of all creatures resides in their heart, Arjuna (Gītā 18.61). That is why during meditation
one's mind should be turned toward the heart whereas the breath is turned towards the top of
the head (ūdāna) as recommended in ṡloka 8.12 of Gītā. In fact, wherever they may "go",
without even moving ("sarva gataḥ sthanur acalo'yam sanatana "– Gītā 2.24), the two birds
of the Mundaka Upanishad are always together. In the Kaṭha Upanishad they enjoy the juice
of good deeds, which are sacrifices offered to the Supreme Self by his shade. What a beautiful
image!
Nor Shankarācārya nor Ramanuja comment about the duality of the Selves residing in the
heart. How strange taking that the main purpose of commenting the sūtras for Shankara was
to convince his audience of the relevance of indivisibility (advaita –ekatva) concept! In fact
he is often contradicting: "the individual self indentified with the intellect or the mind and the
Supreme Self are spoken of here"; "both are of same nature". For him the individual self is
identified with the mind because he considers that meditation is the same as thinking.

viṡeṣaṇācca ||1.2.12
and because of (their) distinction
The comments deal with the identical or different nature of the two birds in the Mundaka third
section, what are sattva and kshetrajña.

antara upapatteḥ ||1.2.13

Because of this evidence, the soul inside.
Upapatti (ablative: upapatteh) is a substantive meaning occurring, happening, which event
may be considered as a proof, an evidence of something (see above sūtra 2 and 3). Antara is
an adjective meaning inside (here obviously in nominative case). Used as a noun antara refers
to the antar-yāmin, the soul abiding inside the body, observing and restraining (yāma) the
course of events (yāma also, from verb yam). Here Shankara remembers to have read in
Chandogya (4.15.1) that a person is seen in the eye. He is the Self, he is Brahman, the light of
the world and at the time of death he goes away in the flames of the pire. The vedāntin and his
opponent argue again: is this person the Purushottama or the individual person?

sthānādivyapadeṡācca ||1.2.14
and from separate argument of the position (or state, condition) mentioned at the beginning
(ādi)
We can be certain that the text refers to the Brahman, tells Shankara, because of the words "ya
eṣaḥ puruṣaḥ" indicating that he is the same person who was spoken of in previous sections of
this Upanishad. The argument is very specious since the word Brahman is pronounced in
verse 4.15.1 itself. The person who is seen in the eye is the owner of this eye and whoever he
believes himself to be. People say: the eye is the mirror of the soul. Krishna also says in Gītā
(ṡloka 17.2): the nature of a person is according to his beliefs (faith), because in fact a person
is made of beliefs, not of bones and flesh. But if the owner of the eye believes that he is made
of flesh, that is what can be read in his eye.

sukhaviṡiṣṭābhidhānādeva ca ||1.2.15
also because this person is herein presented as being happy
Abhi-dhāna is the appellation/ the name given to something, literally how this thing is
presented. What is particular (viṡiṣṭa) to this person, as indicated by the given name is that he
is happy. Shankara and Ramanuja refer to Chandogya verse 4.10.5.: "kam brahma kham
brahma" Brahman is pleasure, Brahman is space … The word ka has same meaning as kāma
and refers to the desire of material pleasure, or pleasure itself named properly sukha. It is
more usual to describe the Brahman as "sat cit ananda". An important point noted by
Ramanuja is that the characteristic of space is to be unlimited and unlimited pleasure is called
bliss.

ṣrutopaniṣatkagatyabhidhānācca ||1.2.16
and because of this presentation (abhidhāna) his destination/path (gati) is that of a person
who has (suffixe ka) heard (ṣruta) the upanishad
The knower of Brahman goes to Brahman (Gītā 8.24). In fact one could add that one who has
heard the teaching of this Upanishad sees the Brahman or the Purushottama in the eye,
consequently he is happy and is himself a Brahma bhūta. Somebody looking in his eye would
also see the Brahman.
 anavasthiterasambhavācca netaraḥ ||1.2.17
from non residence (an-avasthiti) and non manifestation (a-sambhava) no other (na-itara)
Shankara interprets quite freely avasthiti as meaning permanence and sambhava as possibility
and Ramanuja follows him. The latter points out that the Bṛihadāranyaka also refers to the
Supreme Self as the one who dwells in the eye (3.7.18). But the context is somewhat
different. Aruṇi explains to Yajnāvalkya who is the inner controller (antaryamin): the One
who dwells in the elements and whom the elements don’t know, who dwells in the senses and
whom the senses (eye included) don’t know. So according to Shankara the person in the eye
may not be the individual person (self) because this one is impermanent. Indeed he identifies
the individual self with the intellect and argues that he may be of same nature as the Supreme
Self, nevertheless mortality is superimposed on the former because of ignorance. Ṡloka 2. 12
and 2.25 of the Gītā tell exactly the contrary: never any person is non existing (na jatu nāsa)
and he may not be changed (avikāryaḥ). No other than the self who knows the Brahman (sūtra
16) is residing (avastha) and manifest (sambhava) in the eye.

antaryāmyadhidaivādiṣu taddharmavyapadeṣāt ||1.2.18

Considering the indication of that status (dharma) starting from (ādi) that of Inner-controller
and One who transcends (adhi) the devas.
Dharma is the effect of supporting (dhṛi) as karma is the effect of acting (kṛi) and kāma is the
effect of desiring (kam), etc.. The effect of supporting the universe, instead of leaving Nature
in random state, has for cause the existence of laws maintaining it in order. Dharma is
religion, rightness, justice, virtue, morality (ārya), and sva-dharma is the particular duty of
each person given his position in the society. Sva-dharma for the Supreme Self dwells in
many roles starting with those of antaryāmin, adhideva, adhibhūta, adhiyajña, adhyātma. To
be superior to the devas means to control them, i.e. the elements such as the earth and inside
the body the senses such as the eye. Therefore this sūtra remembers us the teaching of
Brihadāranyaka section 3.7. mentioned above. The vṛittikāra (one engaged in material
activities) arguing with the vedāntin in Shankarācarya bhāṣya is ignorant. He does not know
the antaryāmin and says: how the Supreme Self can exercise a control without having a body?
At least He should be a divine being indentifying himself with the things which he is
controlling. No need, answers Shankara, being inside everything he has their property. As
already stated in Taittirīya section insistently debated in first pada, He is the essence, the
concept of whatever exists.
Note that the Kaṭha Upanishad does not use the word antaryāmin and the control of the senses
is evoked through the parable of the body likened to a car (ratha) of which the senses are the
horses, intelligence the driver (sārathi, sūta), mind the reins and the ātmā enjoying the ride.
Nor does it use the word adhideva but the primal God hidden in the heart (guhāhitam
puranam devam) is seen by approaching Him (adhi-gamena) through yoking oneself with the
Upper Self (adhyātma-yogāt – verse 1.2.12).

na ca smārtamataddharmābhilāpāt ||1.2.19
From what is declared (abhilāpāt) not this status (atad dharma) is not what is remembered
(smārtam)
"What is remembered" (male or neutral) refers to what is mentioned in the smṛitis: that may
be Pradhāna since this word is neutral, contrarily to Prakṛiti (female). One may think that
Nature rules the senses including the mind and their activities, since they are material, and
this is indeed what state all Upanishads and the Gītā. But Nature is not antar-yāmin. The later
may only be the self who takes control of them through yoga of the intellect (buddhi-yoga).

ṡārīraṡcobhaye'pi hi bhedenainamadhīyate ||1.2.20

 This embodied self in the pair is definitely understood to be with a difference
Ṡarīra (neutral) is to the body its frame whereas deha is its shape and ṡārīraḥ (masculine) the
soul inside his cage, dehin the same manifested by the shape. Ubhaye is not the adjective ubha
(which is declined only in dual case: ubhau, ubhayo) but the locative of the substantive: the
pair. Bheda is the breaking, splitting, cleaving or difference. The verb adhī (3rd person present
active: adhyeti or adhīyati, passive adhīyate) means to understand. It is worth noting that this
verb is not derived form dhī (a thought, an idea, and as a verb to perceive, to think – 3rd
person present dīdhīte), but from the verb ī (to go). As usual, when that suits his fancy,
Shankara decides that a negation na is missing before ṡārīraḥ. But this negation is not
necessary since the instrumental case of the word bheda (bhedena) indicates that in the pair of
selves, the embodied is the one with a difference. Therefore it should not be understood that
the embodied soul is the inner controller (antaryāmin). How is it possible that two witnesses
dwell in same body ask the vṛittikāra to the vedāntin? The answer is typical of Shankara's
style (as clear as the sūtras): "the same one is mentioned as two owing to conditioning
factors", the latter being the sāttvika, rājasa or tāmasa nature affecting the embodied (ṡārīraḥ),
otherwise of same essence as the inner controller. Ramanuja speaks of two schools of
philosophers who "both" speak of the inner controller and the individual soul as different.
Why not however admit that the Supreme Self is the inner controller of the universe (cosmic
body) and that He remains a witness (sākshin –an eye observing) of the activities of the
individual self conditioned in a body (therefore called embodied), as long as the later is not
connected by yoga. He becomes an adviser, a well wisher (suhṛid) of the yogin, under the
name of Parama-ātman.

adṛṡyatvādiguṇako dharmokteḥ ||1.2.21

From the said attributes the one with the quality (guṇa) of invisibility (adṛiṡyatva) among
others (adi).
Both Shankara and Ramanuja connect immediately invisibility to immutability,
indestructibility and conclude the possessor of such attributes is Brahman. But the used word
is invisibility. Who is not seen? Particularly in the eye. The one observing, who is indeed the
same Supreme Self suggested by Shankara and Ramanuja. The author of the sūtras considers
that the antaryāmin is the Supreme Self.

viṡeṣaṇabhedavyapadeṡābhyaṁ ca netarau ||1.2.22

from the distinction (visheshana) of the difference (bheda) of both designations (vyapadesha,
dual ablative, from diṡ: show, exhibit, point out, assign) and not from the two others (itara in
dual ablative case)
The characteristics here mentioned are those of Brahman and not those of the two others, i.e.
the individual soul and the Nature, because of their difference (dixit Shankara). According to
him only the Supreme Person is transcendental and unborn. That does not apply to the
individual soul.
rupopanyāsācca ||1.2.23
Because of the mention (upanyāsa) of the form (rupa)
Shankara mentions the Mundaka Upanishad (2.1.4) about this form: "The Fire is His head, the
Sun and the Moon His eyes, the quarters His ears, the Vedas His voice, Vāyu His life-breath,
the Universe His heart. Earth is issued from His feet. He is the inner Self of all creatures."

vaiṡvānara sādhāraṇaṡabdaviṡeṣāt ||1.2.24

From the distinction by the word (ṡabda) common support (sā-dhārana) it refers to the
Universal All-pervading Person (viṡvā-nara)
Sādhāraṇa-ṡabda-viṡeṣāt is a compound word: the distinction consisting in the word
sādhārana used to qualify the topics under discussion. Shankara, disregarding the grammar
and supposing that "though" is missing: (though) the words (ātmā and viṡvānara) denote many
things there are the same Universal Person. He quotes the Chandogya concerning the
meditation about the Universal Self (vaiṡvānara ātmā – 5.11 to 5.18). Then the materialistic
opponent (vṛittikāra) asks if "vaiṡvānara" does not refer to the internal fire of digestion, which
is also qualified of "vaiṡvānara agni" because it dwells in all persons. Indeed the adjective
vaiṡvānara is used to qualify many things, including the Self dwelling in all beings and
supporting them together (sādhāraṇa, word formed from the prefix sā –together – and the
substantive for "the means to support" stemed from the verb dhṛi).

smaryamāṇamanumānaṁ syāditi ||1.2.25

What is being remembered (smaryamāṇam) under this name (iti) should be (syāt) conjectured
(anumānam)
What is being remembered should be what is written in the smṛitis, suggests Shankara. The
word iti denotes that preceding words are a quotation, a given name. Anumānam - what is
finally thought (from anu-man) - is either what is assented or guessed, inferred, concluded
from reasoning.

ṡabdādibhyo'ntaḥpratiṣṭhānācca neti cenna tathā dṛṣṭyupadeṡādasambhavātpuruṣamapi

cainamadhīyate ||1.2.26
Starting from the used words (ṡabdādibhyaḥ) and from his stay inside (antar-pratiṣthanāt) if it
is not said (cet iti) then not (na tathā) from indication (upadeṡāt) through insight (dṛiṣṭi), or
from non appearance (asambhavāt), it is understood (adhīyate) this person (enam puruṣam).
Ena puruṣa is in accusative case because it is the object of understanding by someone.
Starting from (adi) means: among other items of same nature. The non-occurrence, non-
becoming or non-appearance (asambhava) in question may results from the non-manifest
nature (avyakta) of the object under discussion or from its impossibility. The word dṛiṣṭi is
also used with the meaning of mental sight and the compound word dṛiṣṭy-upadeṡa may be
interpreted as a revelation, an insight. Ramanuja and Shankara interpretation: "Should it be
said that the text does not speak of the Supreme Person because the word vaiṡvānara and
considerations of same nature do not fit nor his residence inside the body, we say no because
the instruction is to see it that way and the contrary is impossible, since the text speak of a
person."

ata eva na devatā bhūtaṁ ca ||1.2.27

Hence (ataḥ) even not a divinity (devatā) nor any creature (bhūta)
The adjective vaiṡvānara does not applies to divinities who control the elements (mahabhūta),
the senses or are the spiritual essences of defined concepts, starting from dharma. As
underlined by Shankara, a divinity may be fire or wind but may not have for head fire and for
feet earth (Chandogya 5.18).

sākṣādapyavirodhaṁ jaiminiḥ ||1.2.28

Owing to the ability Jaimini no contradiction.
This argument in telegraphic style without syntax may mean that the "Purva Mimansa Sūtra"
of Jaimini muni (see introduction) does not contradict previous statements. I have no opinion
because these Mimansa sūtra supposed to be based on logics (nyaya) are very obscure:
volume 10 of "sacred books of the Hindus", Mahamahopadhyaya pandit Ganganath Jha, 1915.
It indicates that the Brahma sūtra was appended by several authors over centuries.
Shankaracarya considers that this statements has for purpose to prove that there si no
contradiction between the presence of Vaiṡvānara in the heart of the puruṣa and Vaiṡvānara
Agni in his stomach, i.e. the writer of the Brahma sūtra anticipated the argument of Shankara
opponent (vṛittikāra)! Why not? Vyāsa himself tells the following joke in Mahābhārata : this
statement is true because Vyāsa told it.

abhivyakterityāṡmarathyaḥ ||1.2.29
of what gives evidence (abhivyakta) indeed Āṡmarathya
This Aṡmarathya would be a muni of the past, who is not mentioned in any Upanishad or
Purana. Shankar gives no information. His name is about a car made of stone.

anusmṛterbadariḥ ||1.2. 30
of what is remembered Bādari
Ibid . Nobody remembers today what said this muni named from jujube tree. Most probably
this Bādari considered that the teaching of elders was the best of proofs, whereas Āṡmarathya
gave more weight to material evidences and Jaimini to logical arguments. None of them could
contradict the presence of Paramātman in the heart of a person.

sampatteriti jaiministathā hi darṡayati ||1.2. 31

of what is accomplished also Jimini shows (demonstrates)
Shankar refers to Ṡatapata brāhmaṇas, which is a bhāṣya about the ṡukla ayurveda of
Yajñavalkya. The topics of paragraph 10.6.1.11 is nyāya: Vaiṡvānara is the sun in the eyes of
a person, the air in his breath, etc…

āmananti cainamasmin ||1.2. 32

and they think that this one is inside this (place)
"They" is supposed to refer to the students of Jābāla, one of the followers of Yajñavalkya
(according to Shankar).

Third section (pāda)

dyubhvādyāyatanaṁ svaṡabdāt ||1.3.1
Owing to own word (sva-ṡabd) the resting place (āyatana) starting from (ādi) sky (dyu) to
earth
The adjective yata means controlled and āyata means confined, extended (within some
borders), then āyatana is the dwelling place, the place over which something extends. Svaṡabd
is the specific (sva) word for designing the topics under discussion. Obviously here this topics
is Brahman since its name means what has for property to extend. It extends everywhere from
sky to earth and any other places.

muktopasṛpyavyapadeṡāt ||1.3.2
Owing to the statement (vyapadeṡa) that one who is freed goes toward (upasṛp) this place.

nānumānamatacchabdāt ||1.3.3
No inference/conclusion (anumāna) from lack of words for that (a-tat-ṡabd)
According to Shankar acarya there is no word proving the existence of Pradhāna.

prāṇabhṛcca ||1.3.4
The supporter of life also
Prāṇa-bhṛt is one of the names of Viṣṇu: the One supporting the life breath. But Shankar
reads: a living creature also. This creature is not the repository of heaven.
 bhedavyapadeṡāt ||1.3.5
Owing to the statement of difference
One may fancy anything from such statement. In fact it appeared in previous sections already.

prakaraṇāt ||1.3.6
From production of means.
Karaṇa is the cause of action, the tool, the means and the prefix pra adds the idea of producing
like in pradhāṇa. First verse of Brahma saṁhita states : Govind sarva karaṇa karaṇam –
Govind is the cause of every causes. Shankar reads: from context (about Supreme Self) and
refers to the verses of Mundaka Upanishads (3.1.1.) speaking of the two birds in the vedic
tree.

sthityadanābhyaṁ ca ||1.3.7
Because of both acts of standing (sthiti) and eating (adana)

bhūmā samprasādādadhyupadeṡāt ||1.3.8

From supreme instruction (adhi-upadeṡa) and divine grace (samprasāda), the universe
(bhūma)
Bhūman, bhūmat, neutral word in nominative case bhūmā, means literally what is in the state
of becoming, the sum of all existing things in the material world and the female word bhūmi
is the usual name of earth. Samprasāda (m) is perfect peace, serenity, divine grâce and by
extension one who is in this state. The word may also refer to one who is in deep sleep,
because then one reaches the 4th state of consciousness: the perfect peace. Shankara feels
allowed to invert the words and read adhi-samprasādāt: superior with respect to grace/or
peace. Moreover he considers that "bhūman is Supreme Self since he is taught to be superior
to grace." Then he gives a fanciful etymology of bhūman deriving from bahu because Panini
stated that bhūyan means becoming more. Then he relates the sūtra to Chāndogya section 6.3:
"bahu syām". What can be read in Chāndogya correlated to this sūtra is: "yo vai bhūma tat
sukham" (7.23) and "yatra nānyat paṡyati nānyacchṛṇoti nānyadvijānāti sa bhūma | ... kasmin
pratiṣṭhita iti | sve mahimni " (7.24.1). The word manhiman (locative mahimni) is used in
sūtra 16 below. "Indeed that infinite is happiness." "Where one sees nothing else, hears
nothing else and understand nothing else which is not inside that is the infinite… On what is it
established? on its own greatness." Nevertheless Shankara is not wrong because in next
section of the upaniṣad (7.25. 1 and 2), the teacher (Sanatkumara) says: "I am all these things.
The self is the whole world". The term samprasāda is found in sentence 8.3.4: "atha ya eṣa
samprasādo'smāc-charīrāt samutthāya paraṁ jyotir upasampadya svena
rūpenābhiniṣpadyate". "Now that serene being (who is in the heart) rising out of the body and
reaching the supreme light become established under his own form." Then the teacher adds:
"eṣa ātmeti etad brahmeti" – "This serene being is called ātman, it is what is called Brahman."

dharmopapatteṡca ||1.3.9
Also because of the argument of dharma

akṣaramambarāntadhṛteḥ ||1.3.10
From the support inside (or up to the end) of what is surrounding by the unalterable
(Brahman)
Ambara, like ambā, derives from verb amb (to sound) and Ambā is the name of the mother,
Nature. Ambara may refer to the sky, ether, space or sometimes a cloth because a cloth is
surrounding the body. Now anta means as well the end than the inside. The Brahman (akṣara)
has no end but the universe is often supposed to be enclosed in an egg. One aspect of dharma
is that Brahman holds the universe.

sā ca praṡāsanāt ||1.3.11
She also from instruction
The verb ṡas means to punish, to rule, from which comes ṡastra and pra-ṡas means to give
instruction, to order. Pra-ṡasana is the means to order: a rule. The pronoun sā is female.
Therefore it refers to bhūmi, Ambā or Pradhāna. Nature is involved in the process of creation
from instruction of Brahman or Supreme Person.

anyabhāvavyāvṛtteṡca ||1.3.12
And separated as another presence (another manifestation) / and another presence being
excluded

ikṣatikarmavyapadeṡāt saḥ||1.3.13
Owing to indication He sees the action
Shankara reads ikṣaṇa: sight and translate karma by object. "Owing to the mention of what is
seen as an object, He is meant". One may also suppose that He, the Supreme Puruṣa, sees
what is done by Her according to His instructions. The saṁdhi between ikṣati and karma is
odd a difficult to explain.

dahara uttarebhyaḥ ||1.3.14

Of above (statements) the small cavity of the heart
The word dahra, dahara of doubtful origin (dabhra according to Monier-Williams, having
exactly same meaning) is an adjective meaning small, as a substantive it refers to a mouse or
the cavity of the heart. The adjective uttara is the comparative form of ud: upwards, above,
upon, and uttara means higher, superior, latter, subsequent, concluding or to the north. The
involved statements are sūtra 1 and 2 or subsequent statements in the upaniṣad referred to by
this series of sūtras. Shankar translation is: the small cavity in the heart due to subsequent
reasons. The subsequent reasons are to be found in section 8 of Chandogya Upanishad: the
space within the heart is as wide as the space outside. Indeed this section starts with:"hariḥ
aum | atha yad idam asmin brahmapure daharam puṇḍarīkam veṡma | daharo'sminn-
antarākāṡaḥ | tasmin yad antaḥ | tad anveṣṭavyam | tad vā va vijijñāsitavyam". "Hari Aum.
Here in this city of Brahman is an abode, a lotus house, inside this small abode is an inner
space. What is inside this space has to be investigated and to be desired to be known. "The
words antar-ākāṡah suggest that this inner space is the infinite heaven. Then it is added that
inside one can find the earth, th esun and the moon and all that exists.

gatiṡabdābhyaṁ tathā hi dṛṣṭaṁ liṅgaṁ ca ||1.3.15

From both the destination and the used word, thus indeed the sign is shown also
Ṡabdābhyam is a dual form associating ṡabd to gati. Gati refers to upasṛipya in sūtra 2 and
ṡabd to sūtra 1.
dhṛteṡca mahimno'syāsminnualabdheḥ ||1.3.16
of the conception/ final obtaining (upa-labdhi) of the majesty (mahiman) of the one inside
(asya-asmin) who is supporting (dhṛita) also
Shankara interpretation is: the glory of holding the universe is conceived as pertaining to
Him, the Supreme Lord.

prasiddheṡca ||1.3.17
From accomplishment also
 At the end of this section 8 of Chandogya Upanishad Brahmā teaches to Indra to search his
self inside the cavity of the heart and Indra says: I have obtained glory. I will never be old,
toothless and white.

itaraparāmarṡāt sa iti cennāsambhavāt ||1.3.18

from consideration (āmarṡa) of the other (itara) distant (para) if this is the argument (cet iti)
not him (sa) from impossibility (asambhava)
Amarṡa is impatience, intolerance (from mṛiṡ: to permit, to not notice) and āmarṡa is
consideration, touching, similarity. If one considers that the living, individual soul (jīva) is
another different and distant, that cannot be him who is the topics of the preceding sūtras. But
he is also in the cavity. What is impossible is only that he be referred to as glorious and the
source of the universe.

uttarāccedāvirbhūtasvarūpastu ||1.3.19
if (cet- understood: there is objection) from following (uttara –understood: statements) but
(tu) his own form (sva-rupa) is revealed (āvirbhūta)
The particle āvir (āvis, āvid) means which can bee seen, obvious, openly manifest. Therefore
the verbe avirbhū means to become manifest, to be revealed. One think to the person seen in
the eye, mentioned in Chandogya 4.15.1 (see comment of sūtra 13 above) and again in
Chandogya 8.7.4: "tau ha prajāpatir uvāca | ya eṣo'kṣiṇi puruṣo dṛṡyata eṣa ātmeti | hovāca |
etad amṛtam abhayam etat brahmeti " – "Prajāpati (Brahmā) said : this person who is seen in
the eye is what is called ātman, he said: that is the immortal, fearless Brahman." The upaniṣad
emphasizes again that the ātman and Brahman are of the same nature. The own form of ātman
is Brahman. Any argument about the individuality of ātman is useless. Brahman is the essence
of being and the essence of consciousness. The word Brahman in this text may refer to the
Supreme Person, but the latter is the sum of all others and more. "Bahu syām". (Chāndogya
6.2.3) "Tattvamasi" (Chāndogya 6.9.4).

anyārthaṡca parāmarṡaḥ ||1.3.20

The consideration (of jīva) as somebody else is for another purpose.
This purpose is clear when reading the whole section 8 of Chāndogya. When the living soul
(jīva) is peaceful (samprasāda) he becomes established under his own form which is
Brahman.
alpaṡruteriti cettaduktam ||1.3.21
But the mention in Vedas (ṡrutis) of its (his) smallness has already been said.
Jīva is small but Sanatkumara says: I am the whole world. So what is small? the cavity in the
heart. (Chāndogya 8.1.1 and sūtra 14) Nevertheless the upaniṣad states also: "the space in the
heart is as large as the whole space outside (Chāndogya 8.1.3). "This is my self within the
heart smaller than a grain of rice … and greater than this world" (Chāndogya 3.14.3)

anukṛtestasya ca ||1.3.22
And it has also been said that he is acting accordingly.
According to Shankara, the nature of this action accordingly to the model of the other Person
present in the cavity is shining.

api ca smaryate ||1.3.23

That is also written in smṛitis.
Shankara quotes section 15 of Bhagavad-Gītā because he considers that this text is a smṛiti
and not the speech of the Supreme Person, referred to as ṡruti or veda, including upaniṣads.
 ṡabdādeva pramitaḥ ||1.3.24
measured on basis of used word
Shankara interpretation is that: "from the used word the measured one is the Supreme Self
(Brahman)" because it has been written that his size is that of a thumb and it resides in the
small cavity of the heart. Maybe the sūtra aims to remember only the size of the cavity, not
that of the dweller. Both have the size of what they are conscious of (what they are
conceiving). Some people focus their mind on atom or some particular task to perform, some
are conscious of their body which they want to enjoy and some other try to embrace Brahman.

hṛdyapekṣayā tu manuṣyādhikāratvāt ||1.3.25

But considering the location in the heart, owing to the jurisdiction of human being.
The literal meaning of verb apekṣ is to look away, around (not inside) and the figurative
meaning to consider, to regard to. Adhikara is the authority, the jurisdiction:
"karmanyevādhikara te ma phaleṣu kadāchan" (Gītā 2.47) - "the accomplishment of actions is
under your jurisdiction but not the enjoyment of their fruits". The suffix tva adds only that this
authority is a quality proper to the noun it qualifies: here human being. The cavity where
dwells both the Supreme Self and jīva is the heart because it is under jurisdiction of the latter.
Shankara points out that the heart of human being has the size of a thumb and the sūtras are
written for human beings. Maybe.

taduparyapi bādarāyaṇassambhavāt ||1.3.26

From the manifestation (or possibility) of Bādarāyaṇa (the author of these sūtras) above even
(or also)
This might be an humoristic statement, in the style of Kṛṣṇa Dvaipayana Vyāsa, who likes to
quote himself in Mahābhārata: "this is true since Vyāsa told it". In such context upari-api
would mean: above all. Shankara prefers to consider that: the Self is located in the heart of
creatures who are above/higher than human being (devas, asuras, gandharvas, apsaras,
yakṣas….) also because that is possible according to Bādarāyaṇa. Is he not located in the heart
of cows, elephants and dogs? Gītā says: "Iṡvara sarva bhūtanām hṛddeṣe tiṣṭhati" (18.61) and
vīdyāvinayasampanne brāhmaṇe gavi hastini ṡuni caiva ṡvapake ca paṇḍitāḥ samadarṡanaḥ
(5.18) – "The all-mighty is present in the heart of all creatures." "The well read person sees
the same in the intelligent and modest brāhmaṇa, the cow, the elephant, the dog and the
barbarian cooking dogs."

virodhaḥ karmaṇīti cennānekapratipatterdarṡanāt ||1.3.27

There is no conflict/ obstruction in (ritual) activities if objected (iti cet) from sight (darṡana)
of multiple (aneka) perception (pratipatti).
Prati-pad means literally to return and settle and in figurative sense to perceive, to become
aware. Virodha (m) is obstruction, hindrance, prevention, complete control resorting to force,
like in "dharmavirrudho bhūteṣu kamo'smi " (Gītā 7.11) – "I am sexual desire in creature kept
under control of morality." Controlled activities are implicitly of religious nature. The
presence of two persons in the cavity of the heart is not an obstruction to rituals. Or:
considering ritual activities no conflict arises from the fact that multiple conceptions of these
rituals are observed. Another possible interpretation proposed by Shankara is that the
observance of rituals to many devas or by many devotes is not a contradiction in the matter of
rites.

ṡabda iti cennātaḥ prabhavātpratyakṣānumānābhyām ||1.3.28

 But the word indeed (ṡabda iti cet) not from this (cet na ataḥ - ablative of pronoun tat)
origin/creation (prabhava - male with ablative suffix āt) from direct evidences (pratyakṣa) and
inferences (anumāna)
As a rule "kiṁcit iti" (something / any word followed by iti) means something is said, this
word is pronounced in such circonstance, such or such a thing is called by this name. Now
ṡabda is a sound, a pronounced word before being the word concept and here it refers to the
word which has been heard: the ṡruti, the Vedas. What is called Vedas has not been created
according to some evidences and inferences. But this is not the meaning of this sūtra. The
creation (prabhava Shankara reads: "ataḥ prabhavati" – from this "it" appears (the universe).
The universe including gods and humans arises fromvedic words. There are indeed many
instances invedic texts of Prajāpati or another deva pronuncing a word and having named an
entity it becomes apparent (Bṛihadāraṇyaka 1.2): "tan mano 'kuruta ātmanvi syam iti". (1.2.1)
"sa tayā vācā tenātmanedaṁ sarvam asṛjata" (1.2.5) – with that speech, with that self (speech
being a second form of Him), he created all that exists." This interpretation of the sūtra is not
obvious (pratyakṣa).

ata eva ca nityatvam ||1.3.29

From this also eternity.
Logical inference made by Shankara: the Vedas are eternal because they have no known
author.

samānanāmarūpatvāccāvṛttāvapyavirodho darṡanāt smṛteṡca ||1.3.30

From equivalence (samāna adjective) of the state (suffix tva in ablative case) of name (nāma)
and form (rūpa) in what revolves (āvṛittau) also (api) no contradiction (avirodhaḥ) from
sight/direct evidence and from smṛiti.
vṛitta adjective means circular and vṛitti means course, rolling, āvṛitti means repetition,
revolving, revolution of creation or birth. Both are female and should give vṛittyām in locative
case. The male declension of this word in locative case (vṛittau) indicates a bahuvrīhi word:
something male which revolves (sarga, prabhava). Shankara reads: there is no contradiction
since similar names and forms are repeated in the cycles of creation as can be seen from ṡrutis
and smṛitis. But the similarity of entities as conceived or named and as they appear after being
effectively created is stated several times in upaniṣads. For instance the first tale of creation in
Bṛihadarāyaka second brāhmana (1.2) says: he divided himself for creating consciousness and
speech, from their union he created time ("the year" which is a cycle) and elements (water,
fire, air,earth). Then he built a body for Himself with vital breath and senses. In the second
tale (1.4): "In the beginning there is only the self who says I. " evāgra uktvā athānyan nāma
prabrūte yad asya bhavati" – "Even to this day when someone says I he adds a name and
what is named becomes". Then in 1.4.7: "taddhedam tarhyavyākṛtamāsit |
tannāmarūpābhyām eva vyākriyata | asau nāma ayam idam rūpa iti." - At that time universe
was not differentiated. It became differentiated by name and form; this has such a name such
a shape."
To become conscious of anything gives it existence. The following steps consist to name that
thing for providing it an identity (ahamkara) then to produce a form, a colour, a smell and a
taste to this thing for providing it material presence (bhāva).

madhvādiṣvasambhavādanadhikāraṁ jaiminiḥ ||1.3.31

Starting from the honey-teaching (madhu-ādiṣu) Jaimini tells the incompetence/ non-
jurisdiction (an-adhikara) from lack of origin / or impossibility (asambhava)
The madhu vidyā is a knowledge teached by Dadhyan unto Aṡvins in Atharva Veda and it
constitutes section 2.5 of the Bṛihadarānyaka Upaniṣad (which makes part of Yajur Veda) and
in section 3.1-5 of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (which makes part of Sāma Veda). Briefly it tells
that all existing things and living beings are interdependent like honey and bees and Brahman
is the Self of all. Typical verse in Bṛihad: "This air is honey to all beings and all being are
honey to this air. This shining immortal person who is in this air and who, higher than oneself
(adhyātman) in this body is the life breath, He is ātma, It is immortal, It is Brahman, It is all."
For Shankara what is impossible is that the devas be the authors of madhu vidyā and others
teaching of the Upaniṣads because of their incompetence. Shankara purpose throughout his
biased translation and comments defends the monist point of view of existence. He bases his
argumentation on Chāndogya (3.1-5) which tells: " The sun is the honey of the devas. Its rays
are honey cells consisting in the hymns of Rk Veda, the formulas of Yajur Veda, the songs of
Sāma Veda…Vedas are the flowers producing honey and waters are the nectar of immortality
(probably the flowers are lotus since they are in the waters of immortality). Then I section
3.6-10): "Verily the devas neither eat nor drink the nectar. They are satisfied by seeing it. The
sun is their lord." His interpretation is consistent with this text.
Now why Jaimini was not believing in the competence of devas? He was often preferentiating
nyāya (inferrence) in any kind of discussion, except concerning dharma: "Perception and
inferrence (pratyakṣa-anumāna in above sūtra 28) are not appropriate means to understand
the dharma, only revelation in Vedas" (Purva Mimansa 1.5)

jyotiṣi bhāvācca ||1.3.32

Owing also to appearance/ presence (bhāva) in the light (jyotis – understood of this sun)
I have not understood the arguments of Shankara and Jaimini about "the occurrence of words
concerning the sphere of light." The meaning is obvious.

bhāvaṁ tu bādarāyaṇo'sti hi ||1.3.33

But for the presence there is Bādarāyana
The word bhāva is male and becomes bhāvaṁ only in accusative case. Shankara reads: "But
Bādarāyana upholds the existence of devas competences for requirement of their competences
exists (asti)." In 21th century language: But Bādarāyana likes contrarily to Jaimini. Here it
may be useful to note that these sūtras have been revised many times over the centuries. What
are the evidences in Bādarāyana's writing that he consider the gods to be competent. They
know the Brahman, as stated in Chāndogya 3.6-10. But the allegory ofvedic devas trying to
fight the Brahman (Kena Upanishad section 3) denies their competence. Shankara quotes
Bṛihadāraṇyaka 1.4.10: "brahma vā idam agra āsīt | … tat sarvam abhavat | tad yo yo
devānām pratyabuddhyata | sa eva tad abhavat ||" "At the beginning there was this Brahman.
It became all. Whoever among the gods understood that became that (Brahman)." Follows a
long discussion about the manifestation of gods in some bodies. Let extract only one
sentence: "common beliefs should not be dismissed as baseless as long as there is some
probablity."

ṡugasya tadanādaraṡravaṇāttadādravaṇāt sūcyate hi ||1.3.34

The shining/ or pain of this one (ṡuc asya) due to hearing (ṡravana) of disrespect (anādara). It
is pointed out indeed (sucyate hi) from that running (tat ādravan) (understood : of him).
ṡuc: (verb) to shine and to suffer. One should suffer for looking beautiful. "Warriors on battle
field of Kurukṣetra were looking beautiful like kiṁṡuka trees (holding large red flowers)
when shot through by many arrows." (name, f): heat, flame, pain.
sūc: to manifest, point out, indicate, reveal.
anādara: indifference, neglect, disrespect. ṡravana: the act of hearing. (ā)dravan: running.
Now Shankara refers to section 4.1-2 of Chāndogya. It tells the story of a king named
Jānaṡritu, son of Janaṡruta (known among people), who hears to swans teasing him: "Look
brother how this Jānaṡruti is shining. Take care to not be burned by his light." The other ask if
this Jānaṡruti is wiser than Raikva (the descendant of Ṛikva, one who is praising), the wise
man who is sleeping under a cart. Taking care of this advice, Jānaṡruti looks for Raikva and
ask him to teach him religion (become his guru). But since Raikva is sleeping under a cart, he
has little opinion of him and offers him 600 cows, then a necklace, a car, then his daughter.
Raikva, to humble Jānaṡruti, tells him: keep your cows, ṡūdra (servant)."

kṣatriyatvagateṡcottaratra caitrarathena liṅgāt ||1.3.35

The condition of kṣatriya (kṣatriyatva) being gone (gata) also thererafter (uttaratra) with a
descendant of Citraratha from a sign.
In following section 4.3 of Chāndogya, Raikva tells to Jānaṡruti the story of a brahmacārī
begging for food when Ṡaunaka (by the name a teacher, a brāhmana) and Kākṣaseni (by the
name obviously a kṣatriya, descendant of rajarṣi Kākṣasena in the line of Yadu and
Citraratha) were at table and receiving no food from them. (In fact he should have waited until
they finish). He tells them: you have not offered food to the great god who is the gardian of
the world, who swallows four others and to whom this food belongs. Ṡaunaka concludes that
he claims to be the Supreme Person "for whom everything is food" and command to give him
food. But in fact the god who swallows four others in upaniṣads is the life breath, Vāyu, who
swallows the gods of sight, speech, hearing and thought: the other senses of Virāt
(Bṛihadarānyaka 1.3 and Chāndogya 5.1). Note that these active senses don’t correspond to
those associated to elements (mahābhūta) in saṁkhya analysis of the universe. Vāyu is the
god of element air which has the faculty of touch, Āditya is the god of light which has the
faculty of sight, Indra is the god of thought controlling other senses, Sarasvatī is the goddess
of speech but not of taste which is the faculty of earth, Varuṇa is the god of water which has
the faculty of taste.

saṁskāraparāmarṡāttadabhāvābhilāpācca ||1.3.36
From the consideration of purification ritual and absence of declaration.
Verb āmṛṡ meaning to touch gives parāmarṡha: seizing, injury, attack, but also consideration,
inferrence, conclusion. Saṁskara has many different meanings associated to the death:
preparation to perfection, death rituals, purification ceremony, transmigration (which is also a
purification process).
Verb lap: to chatter, tweet like birds, also whisper, weep, lament, gives ābhilapa is an
expression, a declaration.
The interpretation on basis of a lack of purificatory rites upon death of ṡūdras by Shankara
makes little sense because there is no mention of such thing in Chāndogya. There is also
nothing in Yajñavalkya smṛitis. The topics is treated in chapter 5 of Manu smṛitis: "A
brāhmana shall be pure after ten days, a kṣatriya after twelve, a vaisya after fifteen, and a
ṡūdra is purified after a month. [v.5.83.]. It is true that most rituals are forbidden to ṡūdras
according to several purāṇas. Not any of these texts explains clearly the necessity of
purificatory rites for close relatives when somebody dies. My personal feeling is that these
rites, consisting mainly in tapas (no cooking, bath, shaving of hair), help to cure the pain of
the loss.

tadabhāvanirdhāraṇe ca pravṛtteḥ ||1.3.37

that absence of specification also of active life
nirdhāraṇa (n): specifying, defining, ascertaining.
Shankara quote the story of Satyakāma Jābāla told in section 4.4. of Chāndogya. But it seems
that he muisunderstood the story. Satyakāma is the son of a maid who wants to become a
brahmacārin and he asks his mother to which family he belongs, because he knows that is the
first question the teacher will ask him. She says: I don’t know. Tell your name. When the guru
asks him the traditional question, Satyakāma answers "I don’t know sir of which family I am
and my mother told me that she got me when she was maid servant and to tell you my name."
The guru says: you are a brāhmaṇa because you tell the truth. He knows from the name that
Satyakāma is of mixed caste (same as Vidura) but he don’t mind because Satyakāma is
honest.
ṡravaṇādhyyanārthapratiṣedhāt smṛteṡca ||1.3.38
Because of the prohibition (pratiṣedha) of concern (ārtha) in hearing and reading (knowledge
from a teacher for ṡūdras) in smṛitis.

kampanāt ||1.3.39
Owing to vibration (shake, tremble)
The topics of sūtras 34 to 38 was a disgression (probably added later) by another author than
Bādarāyana. Before that the topics was the awareness of the Almighty by devas. One
evidence is life breath (prāṇa) which is is a pulsation and maybe likened to a vibration. The
assigning of life to breath is the topics of many upaniṣads and is confirmed by modern
science. But a more notorious kind of vibration is speech and kampala means thrilling
pronunciation. AUM is not a vibration, only a sound rising (udgītha) from the lungs and
expanding (viharan) as emphasized by Chāndogya (chapter 1) and Gītā (ṡloka 8.13).
Chāndogya tells also that the udgītha is the essence of breath.

jyotirdarṡanāt ||1.3.40
Owing to the sight of light

ākāṡo'rthāntaratvādivyapadeṡāt ||1.3.41
Owing to the purpose (ārtha) of a distance/ interval the space (akaṡa) and so on (ādi) from
statement (vyapadeṡa)
If the story of Satakāma was not a disgression, after having received teaching from his guru,
he goes in country side for taking care of cows and he receive additional teaching from a bull,
the fire, swans and other birds concerning the four feet of Brahman (four feet like the four
gods of sight, speech, hearing and thought. The four quarters (diṡ, dik) are the four feet (pada)
of the shining Brahman tells the bull. Now, the quarters are the materialization of space/ether,
which is named ākāṡa or kha (cavity). Ākāṡa is confusing because it is also the atmosphere,
more specificallly named antarikṣa: "yathākāṡastitho nityam vāyuḥ sarvatrago mahān" (Gītā
ṡloka 9.6) – "like the mighty wind going everywhere always in the atmosphere". Ākāṡa is the
vehicle of life and of sound. In the body also breath is the vehicle of life and sound.
Then the fire teaches to Satykāma: the earth is one foot, the atmosphere (antarikṣa) another,
the sky (dyu) a third one and the ocean the fourth foot of the endless Brahman. The swan
tells: one foot is the fire, the second is the sun, the third is the moon and the lightning is the
fourth foot of the luminous Brahman. The diver-bird says: breath is one foot, eye another, ear
the third and mind is the fourth foot of Brahman having a resting place. I don’t know why the
four quarters are shining and not endless. Satyakāma would read in Gītā about the Brahman
(ṡloka 13.14): "sarvataḥ pāṇipādaṁ tat sarvato 'kṣiṡiromukham sarvataḥ ṡrutimalloke
sarvam āvṛitya tiṣṭhati" – That has hands and feet everywhere as also eyes and mouths, that is
listening everywhere in the world, covering everything."

suṣuptyutkrāntyorbhedena ||1.3.42
 With difference (bheda) of/in both deep sleep (suṣupti) and passing away (utkranti)
The different states (avasthāṇa) of consciousness (antakaraṇa, cetana) are wakefulness
(jāgrata), dream (svapna), deep sleep (suṣupti, supti), pure spirituality called "4th state"
(turīya): praśna upaniṣad section 4, bṛihadarānyaka 2.1, 3.2, 4.3 and 4.4, brahmo 20-23,
kaushika 4.19 and 4.20, paingalla. When the person enters in deep sleep and retires in the
cavity of the heart, he becomes fully happy (ananda) like a child, an emperor or a brāhmana
(bṛihadarānyaka brāhmana 2.1. ṣruti 19 ). He is conscious only of himself. But, when the body
dies, prāṇa urges jīva to enters in another.
The synthax is odd because the 2 names suṣupti and utkranti are associated as a dvanda
compound, with suffixe oḥ in genitive and locative cases and bheda is in instrumental case.
Shankarācarya quotes bṛihad 4.3.7, in which the word svāpna is used with the meaning of
sleep (and become happy because svap = su-āp): "sa hi svapno bhūtvā imam lokam atikrāmati
mṛtyo rūpāṇi" – indeed having becomed asleep he overcomes the world and the forms of
death. According to many other sections of the upaniṣads during dreaming state , also named
svāpna, he is enjoying all the pleasures which he could taste during waking state and some
forbidden also (praṡna upaniṣad question 4, bṛihad 4.3.13). During deep sleep (the "desired
sleep" suṣupti) the soul enjoys himself (bṛhad 4.3.14), he is conscious of nothing else (bṛihad
4.3.22-32), he has no desire and sees no dream (bṛhad 4.3.19), he is free from evils and free
from fear (4.3.21), his desire is fulfilled because the self is his desire (4.3.21). Now when "the
person in the eye turns away for going down in the heart and stops knowing forms" (4.4.1) he
becomes alone. But all the senses come around him (4.3.38). As a catterpillar or a leech he
goes at the end of the blade of grass and draws himself to another (4.4.3). He carries with
himself the senses and the smells of previous life (Gītā). He is Brahman (says bṛihad 4.4.5)
including understanding, senses, elements and he becomes what he conceives. According as
one acts, as one behaves, so does he becomes. Other says that, because he is made of desires,
he becomes what he desires.

patyādiṡabdebhyaḥ ||1.3.43
From these speeches (ṡabda) he is the master (pati) and so on (ādi).
Obviously. When he has no desire, the senses dont come with him (bṛihad 4.46) and he don’t
go to another blade of grass. He becomes Brahman. "The great unborn self consisting of
knowledge who is dwelling in the heart does not become greater by good works nor smaller
by evil works. He is the controller of all, the lord of all."

Fourth section (pāda)

ānumānikamapyekeṣāmiti cenna ṡarīrrūpakavinyastagṛhīterdarṡayati ca ||1.4.1
If it is said (iti cet) that the inferred entity (anumanikam) even (api) one of these (eka eshām),
no (because), being placed inside (vi-ni-asta) a body (ṡarir) having a form (rūpaka), it is
caused to see (darṡyati) the seizure (gṛhiti).
Shankara and others consider that the entity which is inferred should be non manifest
(avyakta). That cannot be Pradhāna which is considered by the followers of Sāṁkhya
materialist theory as the cause of all causes and called avyakta (for instance in Gītā and in
Katha Upaniṣad 1.3.11): "Beyond the senses, the mind, the intelligence, cosmic intelligence
(mahat) there is what is avyakta and beyond the avyakta there is the Supreme Person." For
serving his purpose Shankara translate vinyasta by simile (image, illustration): "If it is said
that the inferred entity is revealed to the members of one of these sects (Sāṁkhya), no
because it is cognized in a simile illustrating the body." He refers to the parable of the car in
section 1.3 of Katha upaniṣad. Together with the Supreme inspiring him intelligence, jīva is
travelling in the body compared to a car (ratha): jīva is the traveller/ user (rathi), intelligence
is the driver* (sārathi), mind is the reins (pragraha), senses are the horses, senses objects are
the destination / pasture (gocara) and life is the road (Kaṭha 1.3.1-4). Jīva is placed inside the
body and is caused to consider it as his dwelling place (gṛhīterdarṡayati). Gṛha is the house
and gṛihastha is the condition of householder.
Some other verses are still more relevant to be quoted:
-verse 2.1.1. of same upaniṣad: "the Selfborn Brahmā (Svayambhūḥ) caused the apertures of
the senses to be pierced for looking outside, not the self inside (antarātman). The wise
desiring immortality sees the self with his eyes turned inward."
-verse 2.2.9 and 2.2.10. "like Agni or Vayu having enterred a living dwelling place (bhuvana)
with this or that shape becomes of same shape, similarly the inner self (antarātman) entering
a living dwelling place takes same shape and (exists) outside also."
This antarātman is jīva: "ya imam madhvadam veda ātmānam jīvam antikāt" – "he who
knows this self as the living entity close at hand and enjoying to eat sweets" (verse 2.1.5).
Nevertheless, according to this upaniṣad, the same is also: "īṡānam bhūtabhavyasa" – "the
lord of the past and the future" (2.1.5), "He who was born of old from austerity" (2.1.6), Aditi,
Agni, the resting place of all gods (2.1.7-9) and the controler of all: "eko vaṡi
sarvabhūtāntarātmā" (verse 2.2.12). There is only One Person: "What is here is also there.
Whoever perceives that as being multiple goes from death to death" (2.1.10). This Person is
staying in the self and pervading all (2.2.12, 2.2.13, 2.3.8).
*During vedic times warriors were not driving their car since they had to hold their bow,
arrows and other weapons. They were accompanied by a driver, like Arjuna by Kṛṣṇa on the
battle field of Kurukṣetra.

sūkṣmaṁ tu tadarhatvāt ||1.4.2

Though (tu) its venerability (arhatva) that (which is inferred) is subtle.
The words arhat and arhatva (or arhattva), quality of desserving respect and praise, worth,
ability, venerability, are used by Jainas and Buddhists for designing superior beings in their
spiritual universe. Here Shankara speaks of "subtle body": the body in causal state, made of
the potential qualities of sight, touch, hearing, smelling, tasting (tanmātras), as a proper
dwelling place for a given personnality (ahamkāra). Bhaktas like to believe that they will
always remain a separate person worshiping the Supreme Person and that spiritual persons
(ātman) have a spiritual subtle body. The purpose of this subtle body is to be able to enjoy
sight, hearing, touch … of the worshiped deity and to remain a separate entity when the
universe is destroyed. Strange that an advocate of monism trend invokes such a concept!

tadadhīnatvādarthavat ||1.4.3
From this state of dependence/subjection that serves some purpose
According to Shankara, this subtle state of being is required before God provides cosmic
intelligence to Pradhāna and creates the universes. Else how to explain that individual ātmans
are never born? Incredible Indians, who can conceive the difference between being (sat) and
becoming (bhava) and subtle entities (tanmātra) with a single function, being more primordial
than the 5 elements, and who nevertheless need to believe in a substrate for holding the
identity of ātman! His translation is: that (which is inferred and non manifest) being
dependent on the Supreme Person serves some purpose of the later.
In fact the adjective adhīna means resting upon, like the adhyātman, and may be interpreted as
well as being dependent or on the contrary subjecting the entity on which one is resting. The
sūtra does not refer to the significance (arthatvattva) of jīva subjection to the Parama-ātma but
to the purposeful (arthavat) nature of jīva. It is subjected precisely because it is purposeful.
Purposefulness itself is a bond.
 jñeyatvāvacanācca ||1.4.4
And because it is not said (avacana) to be an object to be known (jñeyatva)
Brahman, ātman, puruṣa, pradhāna are not manifests and they are objects of meditation, to be
known (jñeya). What is not considered as an object to be known, in this upaniṣad at least, is
Pradhāna, says Shankara.

vadatīti cenna prājño hi prakaraṇāt ||1.4.5

If it is said that it (the upaniṣad) speaks of that, no. The wise (prajñaḥ) indeed from the topics
of discussion (prakaraṇa)
"eṣa sarveṣu bhūteṣu gūdho'tmā na prakāṡate | dṛṡyate tvagryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā sūkṣma-
darṡibhiḥ ||" "The self concealed in all beings is not shining. He is seen by the seers of what is
subtle through their high and subtle intelligence." (Katha 1.3.12). Moreover, in the next verse
of Katha upaniṣad the seer is called prajñaḥ. No doubt that the topics to be known is this
ātman concealed in all beings.

trayāṇāmeva caivamupanyāsaḥ praṡnaṡca ||1.4.6

The explanation/ or juxtaposition (upanyāsa) of the three even and the question (praṡna).
According to Shankara the three entities which are juxtaposed in this upaniṣad are the fire, the
individual soul and the Supreme Soul and the question is the last asked by Naciketas (extra
boon of Yama– 1.2.14): "tell me what is beyond dharma and adharma, beyond what has to be
done and not done, beyond past and future." The answer is Brahman.

mahadvacca ||1.4.7
(that which is inferred) being great
What is qualified as great (mahat) in sāṁkhya analysis of the universe is the cosmic
intelligence: "mama yonir mahat brahma" – my matrix is the intelligence of Brahman (in Gītā
ṡlola 14.3), "beyond the senses are their objects, and beyond these objects the mind, beyond
the intelligence and beyond all the "mahān ātmā" (in Katha ṡloka 1.3.10). "However beyond
this great self there is the non manifest and beyond the non manifest the Supreme Person
(puruṣaḥ paraḥ). Beyond him nothing" (Katha ṡloka 1.3.11). Shankara points out that the
word mahat is never used alone with the meaning of cosmic intelligence in the Upaniṣads.

camasavadaviṡeṣāt ||1.4. 8
from lack of difference that wich is like a cup
Shankara bhāṣya deals with the fact that Pradhāna is ajā. I don’t know why. His opponent
refers to the bowl of the skull mentioned in Bṛihadarānyaka 2.2.3. Indeed camasa is a tool for
eating or sipping, often fit with a handle and made of wood. It may be a cup or a bowl for
drinking soma or a ladle. Camasavat means what has the characteristics of a bowl or cup. This
section of the Bṛihadarānyaka speaks of the inner controler resting in the heart during sleep,
carrying with him the intelligence of sense organs (or life symptoms called prāṇa). Then the
main doors of the senses (eyes, ears, nostrils, mouth) numbering 7 are compared to the seven
ṛiṣis attending the inner controler (called the glorious, the renowned: yaṡaḥ) under the cover
of the skull, which is like a bowl with mouth down and bottom upward: "arvāgbilaṡcamasa
ūrdhvabudhṇaḥ tasmin yaṡo nihitam viṡvarūpam | tasyāsata ṛṣayaḥ saptatīre vāgaṣṭamī
brahmaṇā saṁvidāna iti". The saptaṛṣis are conversing with Brahman.

jyotirupakramā tu tathā hyadhīyata eke ||1.4.9

As the approach of light (jyotiḥ-upakramā hi) in that manner indeed (tu tatha) someone (eke)
understand/learn (adhīyate)

kalpanopadeṡācca madhvādivadavirodhaḥ ||1.4.10

From the indication (upadeṡa) of an image (kalpana) starting with (ādi) what is like honey
(madhu-vat) there is no incompatibility (avirodha)
Disregarding the fancyful translation of Shankaracarya, his reference to Chandogya 3.1 is
relevant: Āditya is depicted as the honey of the gods, his rays as the honeycomb, the Vedas as
the flowers producing the honey and waters reflecting the rays as the nectar. Kalpana is the
making of a feasible project (kalpa), the image or form taken by this project in the mind.
There is no incompatibility between Brahman and jīva dwelling in each creature.
Nevertheless the meaning of this section of the Chandogya dealing with meditation about the
meaning of the sun is not clear for me nor the relationship with present topics of dsicussion.

na saṁkhyopasaṁgrahādapi nānābhāvādatirekācca ||1.4.11

not from the full conception by means of analysis, from an excess with respect to the multiple
manifestations
The sūtra refers obviously to Prakṛiti with her multiple realisations (nānā-bhāva), numbered to
24 in the saṁkhya analysis, including Pradhāna the avyakta. Nor jīva nor the adhyātman, or
the puruṣa, are of course included in these bhāva. They are in excess. Shankarācārya searches
if there is a reference to the number 25 of entities in the analysis of the universe, including the
puruṣa. He found one in verse 4.4.17 of Bṛihadāranyaka: "yasmin panca-pancajanāḥ"
referring to five groups of five tribes dwelling in Brahman. One of them is these group is the
spiritual entities (deva, daitya, gandharva, pitṛi, yaksha), another group the tanmatras or the
elements materializing them, another the sense organs, another the action organs and another
the praṇas. Another verse mentioning manifold offsprings of Prakṛiti is found in Ṡvetāṡvatara
Upaniṣad 4.5: "the one (female) unborn red white and black who produces manifold offspring
of same form (than her), there lies one (male) unborn delighting, another (male) unborn
having enjoyed gives her up." This last quotation is really relevant in the present context.
Both jīva and the Paramātman are not "of same form" as Prakṛiti; they are in excess in the
sāṁkhya analysis. One is enjoying guṇas and the other is a witness as stated in following
verse of Ṡvetāṡvatara and in Mundaka 3.1.1. The red black and white colours of Prakṛiti in
this Ṡvetāṡvatara verse are supposed to be those of fire earth and water.

prāṇādayo vākyaṡeṣāt ||1.4.12

starting from the vital breath and the rest of the statement
The following verse of Bṛihadāranyaka lists: "they who know the life breath of life breath the
eye of eye the ear of ear and the mind of mind have realized Brahman." There is no life breath
nor sight nor earing nor smelling nor tasting nor thinking without Brahman.

jyotiṣaikeṣāmasatyanne ||1.4.13
one beam (eka-īṣā) of the light (jyotis) when food (anna) is absent (asati)
It is question of the light of the sun or of Brahman. Bṛihadāranayaka belongs to ṡukla Yajur
Veda and in one version of the text food is not mentioned in the list of 5 items following
prāṇa. Those who don’t follow this version can meditate on light (Bṛihadāranayaka 4.4.16).
That is the explanation given by Shankarācārya. Food is the lowest form in which Brahman is
manifested. Food is also earth, what is solid, what has sme ll and taste.

kāraṇatvena cākāṡādiṣu yathāvyapadiṣṭokteḥ ||1.4.14

 By the cause (kārāna) and in the elements starting from space (akaṡa-ādi) as (yatha) said
(ukta) and established fully (vyapadiṣṭa) (in Upaniṣads)
The materialist (vṛittikāra) opponent of the vedāntin points out rigthly that Pradhāna is
nowhere the topics of discussion in Upanishads and there are several versions of creation
which seem contradictory. They differ as regard the order of creation agrees the vedāntin but
not about the cause. The most perturbing statement is probably that of Taittirīya Upaniṣad
2.7: "asad vā idam agra āsīt | tato vai sad ajāyata | tad ātmānam svayam akuruta | tasmāt tat
sukṛtam ucyate." – "At first this (universe) was not existing. Then certainly it was born. That
(Brahman) did itself by itself. Therefore it is called well done." The words "tad ātmānam
svayam akuruta" must be interpreted of course like the "tat ātmānam srijami'ham" in Gītā.
Brahman was ever existing, but at that time it was not manifest and it became manifest. The
BṛihadAranyaka says (1.4.7): "taddhedaṁ tarhy avyākṛitam āsīt | tannāmarūpābhyām eva
vyākriyata." "At that time this (universe) was not developed. It became differentiated by name
and form."

samākarṣat ||1.4.15
from synthesis
The verb sam-ākṛ means to bring together, collect and obviously the sūtra recommand to
make a synthesis of the various versions.

jagavācivāt ||1.4.16
The moving (universe) from expressing state
The word jagat means literally what is moving and is commonly used to name the universe.
Here it is particularly appropriate. Motion is the expression of activity and the sūtra may have
a double meaning: i) the person expresses his will to move then do it; ii) Īṡan says "lets be
many" to enjoy action and, by the simple means of His will, He creates the universes. "At the
beginning was the word" it is said in John gospel.

jīvamukhyaprāṇaliṁgānneti cettad vyākhyātam ||1.4.17

If it is said that life breath is not the main sign of the presence of the embodied that is fully
explained
Mukhya mukhya means leading, heading and probably qualifies lingam instead of prāna.
Where is it explained? In former sūtra 1.1.31 starting also with: jīvamukhyaprāṇaliṁgānneti.

anyārthaṁ tu jaiminiḥ praṡnavyākhyānābhyāmapi caivameke ||1.4.18

But Jaimini holds that the question and the explanation have an other purpose than in this one
(former sūtra)
The purpose here to search a proof of the presence of jīva in life breath would be that while
sleeping it seems absent. The topics is often discussed in Upanihads and Shankar refers to
Brāhmaṇa Upaniṣad 4.19, where Ajātaṡatru (Yudhiṣṭhira) adress a person who is asleep and
remains silent. Where is he, ask the king? The following and last section (4.20) of the
Upaniṣad answers: in this state the self of life breath, the self of each sense and the self of
mind have all become one with the self of the body. When Indra understands this he becomes
the lord of all devas and asuras animating the universe. The same story is told in
Bṛihadāranyaka (2.1.15-20). Which self of the body? The Supreme Self according to
Shankar. But the question is irrelevant. What is called Self is a quality, not a quantity. During
deep sleep ((sushupta) and in fourth state of consciousness (turya), they become one: Praśna
Upaniṣad 4, Bṛihad 2.1, 3.2, 4.3 and 4.4, Brahmo 20-23, Kaushika 4.19 and 4.20, Parabrahma
2.…
 vākyānvayāt ||1.4.19
according to a correlation of statements
Shankar considers again if the inferred entity is the individual self or the Supreme Self and
refers to Bṛihad 2.4.12, 2.4.14, 4.5.13, 4.5.15. "When this great being (idam mahad bhūtam)
has departed from the body there is no more knowledge" (2.4.12 and 4.5.13). Indeed "where
there is duality, one sees, smells, hears.. another. But where everything has become the Self,
then what and whom should one smell? What should know the knower?" Vijñātāram are kena
vijānīyād iti" (2.4.14 and 4.5.15). Brahman is absolute knowledge and consequently what else
is to be known than Brahman? If one knows Brahman he knows everything. For grasping
something the best way is to grasp its cause: for instance, for grasping the sound of a drum
one should grasp the drum itself and the beater. Similarly for grasping knowledge one should
try to grasp Brahman (Bṛihad 4.5.7-12). Someone who knows the cause behind (adhi) the
various effects which he can observe around himself sees also the cause with intelligence-
eyes: for him only the cause is existing.

pratijñāsiddheliṁgamāṡmarathyaḥ ||1.4.20
(Here) the assertion (pratijñā) by (the teacher named) Āṡmarathya of a sign of achievement/
perfection (siddhi)
"All these things are the Self" says Bṛihad (4.5.7). "Vāsudeva sarvam iti" says Gītā (7.19).
When someone has understood this through meditation, he has purified his intelligence and
reached perfection.

utkramiṣati evambhāvādityauḍulomiḥ ||1.4.21

His state (bhāva) being such (evam) he will pass over (utkram) says (iti) Auḍulaumi
The teacher Audulaumi thinks that the individual self starts by identifying himself with the
Universal Self then he departs from his body. Shankar refers to Chāndogya 8.13: shaking off
the body, I, accomplished self, take place in the uncreated world of Brahma. In same
Upanishad (6.9.4) one can read: "sa ya eṣo'ṇimā aitadātmyam idaṁ sarvam | tat satyam| sa
ātmā | tattvamasi". That (or he because saḥ is the male pronoun referring to ātmā) which is
the subtlest (animā) is the self of all. That is truth and that you are. Shankar refers also to
Muṇḍaka 3.2.8: "as flowing river disappear in the ocean, casting off their name and shape,
even so the knower attains the divine person who is higher than the high". Of course one
could quote also several ṡloka of the Gītā telling the same.

avasthiteriti kāṡākṛtsnaḥ ||1.4.22

Because he is installed inside (avasthita) says Kāṡākṛitsna
There are two possible interpretations: either he will not come back in impermanent world
because he has become part of Brahman, or by meditating on his identity he found the
Supreme Self installed inside himself. "sarvabhūteṣu yenaikam bhāvamavyayamikshate" (Gītā
18.20). Shankar refers to Chāndogya 6.3.2, in which the Supreme Person having decided to
become many and created devas says: let me enter into these divinities as their living
principle and like this develop names and forms.
According to Shankar these two gurus Kāṡākṛitsna and Auḍulaumi had different point of
views. Audulaumi considers that the individual self is able to realize his identity with the
Supreme Self only when he has been purified through meditation. But Kāṡākṛitsna considers
that the Supreme Self "does not change" when part of Him become the living principle of a
bhūta. How is it possible, ask the materialist to the vedāntin? The Bṛihadāranyaka section
2.4.12 states: "Once salt has dissolved in water, only salted water remains and the existence of
salt can no more be known. Similarly the Great Being when impregnating everything
becomes "nothing else but knowledge" (vijñāna-ghana), and when He departs from them, they
vanish and there is no more knowledge." Only the knowledge of differentiated things (effects)
vanishes rectifies the vedāntin.

prakṛtiṡca prātijñādṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt ||1.4.23

The Materiality/Nature (Prakṛiti) also since there is no contradiction (an-uparodha) with the
conclusion (anta) of observation (dṛṣṭa) and assertion (prātijñā)
Prakṛiti is the manifest form of Pradhāna). This sūtra asserts that Brahman is also Prakṛiti
since the later is the material cause of the universe and Brahman is the absolute, the source of
everything. The vedāntin emits a doubt: how is it possible? In what consists the causality of
Brahman? Indeed confirms his materialistic opponent (vṛittikāra): Brahman (understood the
Supreme Person of Brahman) creates deliberatly the universe but "He is pure, quite, inactive,
irreprochable, inactive, without fault", quoting Ṡvetasvatara Upaniṣad 6.19. There should be a
material cause apart, tainted with tamas. Brahman is the material cause as well as the efficient
cause, retorts the vedāntin, quoting Chāndogya section 6.1: "Tell me that by which the
unperceivable becomes perceived, the unknowable becomes known… Just as whatever is
made of clay is known once knowing what is a clod of clay." The meaning is that once
something is conceived, giving it a name and a form follows without difficulty. Brahman is
knowledge, the Supreme Person of Brahman is the knower and Prakṛiti is the basic material,
even more simple than clay.

abhidhyopadeṡācca ||1.4.24
As indicated by the intention (to create)
Abhi-dhī means to think about something and the topics of this meditation (dhyana) may be
as well to satisfy a desire or to understand the purpose of life. There are many passages in the
Upaniṣads expressing the will of the Supreme Person to create: "Bahu syām" (Chāndogya
6.2.3)
sākṣāccobhayāmnānāt ||1.4.25
Both being mentioned directly
Sa-aksa : with eyes, in ablative case "from eyes", in front of eyes, visibly, directly, openly.
The verb mnā is originally identical to man (to think) and āmnā means to mention, to utter.
The word both (ubha) does not refers to Prakṛiti and Puruṣa as causes of creation, but to
creation and dissolution, because of the following sūtra.

ātmakṛteḥ pariṇāmāt ||1.4.26

From evolution (parināma) done (kṛita) by itself (Brahman)
The verb nam means originally or turn towards and is used mainly in the sense of to bow in
front of a superior being, to show respect. The prefix pari adds the idea of turning back or
aside, to be modified, to evolve.

yoniṡca hi gīyate ||1.4.27

It is praised as matrix indeed
"Mama yonir mahat brahma" says Kṛiṣṇa (Gītā 14.3). Shankara quotes the Mundaka 1.1.7 and
3.1.3, both irrelevant: "when a seer sees the creator of golden hue, the Lord, the Person, the
source of Brahmā (brahma-yonim), then being a knower, shaking good and evil, he attains
equality with the Lord." Brahmā is born from the lotus sprouted from the navel of Narāyāna,
like from a yonir, a material source. On the contrary in Gītā, the yonir is the cosmic
intelligence afforded to chaotic Pradhāna.

etena sarve vyākhyātā vyākhyātāḥ ||1.4.28

By this one all are explained fully
Khya: to relate, to tell, to make known, to explain, vy-ā-khya: in detail, completely.
Sarva is in nominative masculine plural mode. What does it refers to? Theories according to
Shankar.

Second adhyāya: avirodha

According to Shankara the topics of second adhyāya is to prove that smṛitis, which are based
on reasoning, are not in contradiction (virodha) with Brahman as the cause of all causes and
the Self of all. But the aim of sūtras is to contradict ideas of the Sāṁkhyas, Nyāyās,
Vaibhāṣikas, Buddhists, Jains and Bhāgavatas.
First section
smṛtyanavakāṡadoṣaprasaṅga iti cennānyasmṛtyanavakāṡadoṣaprasaṅgāt ||2.1.1
If it is said (cet iti) that a fault (doṡā) (should be) associated (prasaṅga) to the lack of
relevance (an-ava-kāṡa) of some teaching of a sage (smṛiti), there is no fault due to a lack of
relevance associated to other smṛitis.

The word ākāṡa used for designating the sky does not have the meaning of space, emptyness.
In fact it comes from kāṡ: to appear, be visible and ākāṡa is what is appearant, the blue sky.
Ava-kāṡa is literally what is inside the appearance but it came to mean the place, the room, the
occasion, opportunity, or here scope, relevance.
Doṡa-prasaṅga is an attachment or an association with a fault (doṡa), i.e. the fact of making
something erroneous, incorrect, misleading.
The assertion that the Brahman is the cause of all causes is untainable says the vṛittikāra
because everybody acknowledges the teaching of Kapila (sāṅkhya). People of little
understanding turns to the smṛitis of reputed teachers for comprehending the message of
Upanishads and they will not accept that they be questioned. No, retorts the vedāntin, if some
smṛitis contradicts the assertion that the Supreme Person is the cause of all causes, then other
smṛitis become erroneous: among them the Gītā (especially section 7). When a smṛitis
contradicts a vedic text, then it is not reliable. The Vedas should be considered as the absolute
truth.
The modern reader may question this point of view. But he should remember that logical
reasoning is the tool used by any merchant for convincing the customer that he is telling the
truth and everybody knows that a merchant is always lying. The author(s?) of sāṅkhya theory
admits that Pradhāna cannot be the single cause of everything. Besides one should admit the
existence of the Puruṡa for explaining mahat because Pradhāna is not intelligent (Sāṁkhya, by
N. Sinha, published in the series "the sacred books of the hindus", volume 11, Allahabad,
1915).

itareṣāṁ cānupalabdheḥ ||2.1. 2

and from non perception of others
The others are precisely mahat and some entities which are not material such as the object of
the sixth sense: conceiving ideas, wishes, feelings…

etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ ||2.1.3

By this (argument) yoga is refuted
The verb prativac means to answer or refute. The practice of yoga itself cannot be "answered
or refuted" by the valididity or erroneous nature of a theory, nor is it refuted or answered by
vedic texts. There are even several yoga upanishads and it is stated in Gītā that the Truth
maybe attained either by sāmkhya or by yoga. For instance Kaṭha Upaniṣad (2.3.11) teaches
that: "tām yogam iti manyante sthirām indriyadhāraṇām" – "they (who know the Supreme
Person: avyakta para puruṣa evoked in verse 2.3.8) consider that the steady control of the
senses is what is called yoga." Shankara does not contest the relevance of self-control and
meditation, but he considers that yoga as a philosophy is a dualist concept in contradiction
with the monist main trend of Upaniṣads. He quotes Ṡvetāṡvatara Upaniṣad 6.13 for
demonstrating that sāṅkhya and yoga are only means to apprehend the Supreme, but they are
useless independently of vedic wisdom: "nityo nityānāṁ cetanas cetanānām eko bahūnāṁ yo
vidhādati kāman | tat kāraṇaṁ sāṁkhyayogādhigamyaṁ jñātvā devam mucyate sarvapāṡaiḥ"
–"He who is the eternal of all eternal entities, the consciousness of all consciousnesses, the
unity of multiplicity, who grants the desires, who is that cause apprehended through sāṅkhya
and yoga, knowing this God one is liberated from all snares."
Indeed sāṅkhya and yoga are means to understand and reach the Brahman or the Supreme
Person. They are not the goal to reach for becoming happy. Nevertheless, at my opinion this
sūtra is misinterpreted.

na vilakṣaṇatvādasya tathātvaṁ ca ṡabdāt ||2.1. 4

Not (na) because of various different characters (vilakṣana) in the state (tva) of this (asya) and
it is so (tathātva) because of what is said in Vedas (ṡabdha)
One should be careful to not translate by: "it is so, not because … nor because of…" The
negation "na" denies only "vilakṣanāt asya". Then it is asserted: it is so (tathātvam), because
of what is said in Vedas (ṡabdāt). What is asserted by Vedas is that Brahman is the cause of
all causes.
What is denied tells the vṛittikara is that Brahman is the material cause of the universe,
because Brahmna is of another essence than materials. Consciousness is the material cause of
the universe: it is the master and materials are servants, answers the vedāntin.. Without
consciousness materials are insentient. Well, retorts the vṛittikara, but Taittirya tells us that ;
having decided to be many he created the sentient and the insentient and became both
(Tai.2.6). Sometimes also the elements or the sense organs are speaking in the Vedas, retorts
the vedāntin (Ch 6.2.3 or Bṛ 6.1.7, Bṛ 1.3.2)
In fact the used words in Taittirya 2.6 are: "tat anupraviṡya sac-ca tyac-ca abhavat" - he
entered that and became that indeed. Respectively the vedāntin seems to forget that each
entity is presided by a deva "who has entered inside and became that" as says the Taittirya.
Pure rethorics.

abhimānivyapadeṡastu viṡeṣānugatibhyām ||2.1. 5

But reference (vyapadeṡa) to the one who claims (to be the cause - abhimānin) because of the
difference (viṡeṣa) and inherence (anugati)
The vedix texts refer to the presiding deities of elements, vital functions or other material
entities because the formers are the actual causes and they are not material. For instance
Aitareya I.2.4 teaches that: Agni, the deity of Fire, entering the mouth became speech, Vāyu,
that of Air, entering the nostrils became breath, Āditya entering the eyes became sight, Diṡa,
deity of quarters, entering the ears, became hearing, Candramas, deity of the Moon, entering
the heart became mind, Mṛityu, deity of Death entering the navel became the expiration.
Sometimes these deities, having high opinion of themselves (māna), claim to be the main
cause and argue together (Chāndogya 5.1, Bṛihad. 6.1, Kauṣītaki 2.14).

dṛṡyate tu ||2.1. 6
But it is seen
Shankara explains that the inherent cause of everything can only be seen (with spiritual sight)
and in no case be demonstrated with logical arguments. Brahman reveals itself: "tat sṛṣṭvā tad
evānuprāviṡat tad anupraviṡat tad anupraviṡya sacca tyacca abhavat" (Taittirīya 2.6). The
deities and the ṛiṣis don't know me says Kṛiṣṇa (Gītā 7.3 and 10.2). But unto them who are
always engaged in devotional service I give the understanding by which they come to me
(Gītā 10.10). For whoever sees me everywhere in everything I am never lost and he is never
lost to me (Gītā 6.30). Therefore the sūtra may refer instead to the material evidences of the
Brahman: "etad vai brahma dīpyate yad vācā vadati | athaitan mriyare yan na vadati…" –
"This Brahman shines who speaks, rather when saying nothing it dies… likewise with sight,
hearing, thinking, breathing… All deities however, though they die when having entered vital
breath, do not perish completely. They come forth again" (Kauṣītaki 2.13).

asaditi cenna pratiṣedhamātratvāt ||2.1. 7

If it is said that is non-existent (asat) that is no more nor less than denial
The verb sidh has several conjugations: one as class 4 verbs (sidhyati or sādhyati) meaning to
go straight, to succeed, one as class 1 verbs (sedhati) meaning to move and to repel, to drive
off. From the latter derives pratiṣidh: to prevent, to prohibit. Mātra is a measure, a size and a
raw element and the expression mātrata or mātratva would means: no more nor less than
anything. Therefore pratiṣedha-mātratva is no more nor less than prohibiting.
What is declared non-existent is the spatio-temporal universe. Shankar argues that before the
universe be created denying its existence is meaningless and after it has been created one
should see only the cause behind as existing. My opinion is that the effect exists as long as the
cause is conscious of its existence. An idea is something existing.

apītau tadvatprasaṅgādasamañjasam ||2.1. 8

In dissolution (apīti) likewise (tatvat) because absurdity (asamañjasa) is associated (prasaṁga)
When the universe is dissolved to state that Brahman is the existent cause of all effects is no
more understandable (from verb samājñā).
Here the vṛittikara points out that this term "dissolution" of the effect in the cause suggests
that the cause becomes tainted with the effects attributes. Moreover its occurrence raises
another question: how the same effects can be produced again upon next creation if nothing
remains of these attributes. How also jīva can be reborn with particular preferences if he has
been unified with Brahman during dissolution? Therefore he suggests that complete
dissolution never occurs.

na tu dṛṣṭāntabhāvāt ||2.1.9
But not owing to the presence (bhāva) of a supporting illustration
The "end of what is seen" (dṛṣṭa-anta) is an illustration, an allegory, a comparison.
Shankaracarya focus on retorting this idea that the cause might be contaminated with the
properties of the created effects when they merge into their cause. Why doesn't he point out
simply that cause and effects are not of same nature? On the contrary he keeps in mind the
comparison to a vase: it is only clay. He argues that a vase does not transmit to clay its shape
when broken and reduced in powder. The illutration is not supporting the suggestion of his
opponent. Resorption would be impossible if the peculiarities of the effect should persist in
the cause.
The confusion arises from statements such as: all this is Brahman, all this is but the self
(Bṛihad 2.4.6, Chāndogya 7.25.2 and 3.14.1). A similar difficulty is underlined by Kṛiṣṇa in
Gītā (9.5 and 9.6): "na matsthāni bhūtani …bhūtabṛnna ca bhūtastho mamātmā
bhūtabhāvanaḥ | yathākāṡastitho nityaṁ vāyuḥ sarvatrago mahān tathā sarvāṇi bhūtāni
matsthāni."
Similarly the self is never affected by the delusion of the world that he has produced himself
during the consciousness stages (avasthā) of wakefulness (jāgrata) and dream (sapna). The
distinctions which he is wearing like clothes disappear during the third stage of deep sleep
(sushupta) and vanish completely when he reaches the fourth stage called turya. (praśna
upnanishad 4, brihad 2-1, brihad 3-2, brihad 4-3 et 4-4, brahmo 20-23, kaushika 4-19 et 4-20,
parabrahma 2).

svapakṣadoṣācca ||2.1. 10
Because also of the fault of one's own (sva) point of view (pakṣa)
Shankara interprets the sūtra by adding the word equally: If someone argues that Pradhāna is
the cause of everything instead of Brahman because of the different essence of the latter, a
fault is attached equally to his own point of view. Indeed Pradhāna is devoid of material
characters like sound, colour, contact, taste or smell.

tarkāpratiṣṭhānādapyanyathā'numeyamiti cedevamapyavimokṣaprasaṅgaḥ ||2.1. 11

If (cet) also (api), because of perseverance (pratiṣṭhana) in speculation (tarka), it is said to be
inferred (anumeya) otherwise (anyathā), thus (evam) association (prasaṅga) of incomplete
release (avimokṣa).
If someone considers that when a reasoning fails to challenge the Vedas, another reasoning
has to be employed for proving one's own point of view, that is wrong. (It is the usual position
of non believers). Conjecture has no limit and whatever is demonstrated by someone's
argumentation may be contradicted next by another reasoning. Nobody can rely on arguments
as conclusive. "Inconclusiveness of reasoning is established by reasoning itself" says
Shankara. He quotes Manu smṛiti (12.106): "He alone, and no other man, knows the sacred
law, who explores the (utterances) of the sages and the body of the laws, by means of
reasoning that does not contradicts the Veda-lore."
Now, the knowledge of the cause of the universe leading to liberation, absence of liberation
(avimokṣa) would be the fate of someone who stands on inference. He may argue until the
end of times.

etena ṡiṣṭāparigrahā api vyākhyātāḥ ||2.1. 12

by this are explained (vyākyhāta) non acceptances (aparigraha) by who is educated (ṡiṣta)
The verb ṡas means to rule, contrôle, chastize, instruct of laws and the participe ṡiṣta to be
disciplined, educated of rule, but not really wise or learned in the sense of ṛiṣi, muni, pandit. If
someone demonstrates by means of logics that a rule teached by the Vedas is not relevant, the
demonstration should not be accepted since the contrary could as well be demonstrated.
Logics itself is not relevant in this domain.

bhoktrāpatteravibhāgaṡcet syāllokavat ||2.1. 13

If (cet) no distinction (avibhāga) of the experiencer (bhoktṛ) from a condition he has entered
(āpatti) (is argued) that would be (syāt) wordly (lokavat)
The experiencer/enjoyer of life receive his share (bhāga) of events in this world and enjoying
life make him forget who he is. Vibhāga means as well distribution, division as distinction.
He forgets the distinction between jīva who is enjoying experiments (bhuj), or struggling with
experiments (kṛiṣ) according to the Gītā (15.7), and his body, including mental and senses,
which is only a material means.
Shankar reads on the contrary: the distinction "can exist" (syāt) "as seen commonly" (
lokavat). "Having created the universe, the Lord entered into that and became that", as tell
Taittīrya 2.6. Nevertheless the Experiencer (bhoktṛi) remains distinct from the experienced
bodies.

tadananyatvamārambhaṇaṡabdādibhyaḥ ||2.1. 14
 This lack of difference (ananyatvam) from what is said (ṡabda - in Vedas) about the
undertaking (ārambhaṇa) at the beginning (ādi - at the time of creation).
But, because of synthax, probably should we read: there is no difference because of several
reasons starting from (ādibhyaḥ) what is said of the enterprise of creation.
Shankara thinks that this sūtra refers to the origin of the ustensils made of clay which are
"nothing but clay". They become existent only in name when their creator says: this is a pot, a
plate or a jar. In fact they remain clay. The undertaking / creation here consists merely in the
speech.
Now, why to use this word ārambha instead of sṛṣṭi (creation) for instance? Because that is
the word used in the ṡruti 6.1.4 of Chāndogya: "yathā saumya ekena mṛtpindena sarvaṁ
mṛṇmayaṁ vijñātam syāt | vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam | mṛttiketyeva satyam ||" –
Just as, my dear, everything made of clays may be known with one clod of clay, the
modification which consists (only) in a name lies in the undertaking of speech. The truth is
that it is clay." Why also this etc… implied by the word "ādi"? All passages of the Upaniṣads
stating that everything is Brahman are invoked, says Shankara: Chāndogya 6.8., Chāndogya
6.4.1, Chāndogya 7.25.2, Bṛihad 2.4.6, Mundaka 2.2.11… In fact that is also the purpose of
section 6.1 of the Chāndogya. Section 6.2 answers to the question what was existing at the
beginning: "In the beginning there was this Being only. Some people say that there was
nothing and from that "non-being" being was produced. But how could it be thus, my dear?
On the contrary, in the beginning there was Being alone, one only without a second." When
having learned that, one knows that nothing else than Brahman exists.
The vrittikara argues smartly: If everything is one, direct perception which accounts for
multiplicity in the creation is not a valid means of knowledge. Similarly the ṡastra which
prohibit and command to do this instead of that are meaningless. Liberation also has no
purpose.
Like the activities of a person during a dream remain real as long as he does not awaken, what
is perceived, allowed or forbidden remain valid as long as the oneness of the Self has not been
realized, answers Shankara.
Then the discussion between them continues, based on quiproquos about what is real and
what is true and how true knowledge can arise from real but untrue experiences like dreams.
In fact these vṛittikāra and vedāntin are nothing else but argumentative persons.
Shnakara ends this discussion by appropriate quotations of the Gītā concerning the delusion
of creatures and their actions (5.14+5.15, 18.61).

bhāve copalabdheḥ ||2.1. 15

and (next) because of obtention/ or perception when it is present
Obviously something is perceived when it is present and also when its source is present: if
there si no clay how one could see a pot? Is it the meaning if this sūtra? Shankara don't
suggest any other.

sattvāccāvarasya ||2.1.16
and because of the existence (sattva) of the one inferior/ or posterior (avara)
There is no difference between the cause and effects because the effect existence is latent in
the cause says Shankara. If it is the meaning of this sūtra, it seems more relevant to read it:
"sattvāt ca āvarasya". The adjectif āvara issued from āvṛ (to cover) means the contrary of
avara: the one which is covering, enclosing, preceding, i.e. the cause.

asadvyapadeṡānneti cenna dharmāntareṇa vākyaṡeṣāt ||2.1. 17

 If (ced) non existence (asat) is said (iti) because of its indication (vyapadeṡa), then it is not so
because of the remaining part of the speech (vākya-ṡeṣa) with internal (antara) established
law/support.
If someone argues that some ṡruti, such as Chāndogya 3.19.1, state that "this (the effect, the
universe) was not existing in the beginning", the statement is incomplete. Indeed this ṡruti
describing the creation of the cosmic egg says exactly: "asad evedam agra āsīt | tat sad āsīt |
tat samabhavat | tad āṇḍaṁ niravartata |…" - "This indeed was not existent at the beginning
but That was existent. That became revealed. That took the form of an egg." Then the egg
burst open and the lower part becomes the earth, the upper part the sky. Therefore inside That
which is eternal there is this consciousness of the universe pre-existing and from this
consciousness the cycle of creation proceeds (nivṛt). This is the internal law.

yukteḥ ṡabdāntarācca ||2.1.18

In connection on account of internal voice
Grammatically yukteḥ cannot be the past participe yukta, only the genitive of yukti: the union,
connection, correlation. The latter maybe the conclusion of some reasoning or a suitability in
some ciconstances. Antara is also a noun, of ambiguous meaning since it designates as well
the interior, the heart, the soul, or on the contrary the interval, the distance (which is inside
between two things). Like in previous sūtra, Shankara translate distance by difference and he
speaks of another text and also of a reasoning. Again he quotes Chāndogya 6.2.1-2. How
reasoning may be a proofs, after what has been said in previous sūtras? The reasoning of
Shankara's is pure rhetorics of little interest. Now I must agree that I don’t know which
correlation is invoked if it is not question of yoga. The internal voice might by that of ātman
telling: I believe that what I observe with my eyes is existing.

padavacca ||2.1.19
And it is endowed with a stand point (padavat)
Shankara who likes to translate dharma by stand point (like in previous sūtra 17) sees here an
anology (vat) with a cloth. Pada origination from the verb pat (to fall, to take place) may be a
position or a step, a foot, a group of syllabes in poetry, the imprint of a foot or any another
kind of imprint, the abode, home. But in which text is this word used for cloth and why?
According to Shankara cause and effects are hardly recognizable when they are rolled up like
a piece of cloth. But he don’t quote any text.

yathā ca prāṇādi ||2.1.20

Also as the life breath etc…
All the internal flows of energy (heat), combustible (food) and combustive (air), information
(electricity) in the living body are called prāṇas in Upaniṣads, starting from the outbreath
which is prāṇa, as opposed to apāna, upāna, samāna, vyāna et udāna (see Praśna Upaniṣad
section 3, Ṡandilya section 4, Yogacūḍāmaṇi verses 22-32, Triṡikhī-brahmaṇa 2.77 – 2.88).
The life symptom provided to the inert flesh by jīva is prāṇa: prāṇa is the cause of life and all
other evidences of life enumerated in ṡlokas 5.8 and 5.9 ogf Gītā are the effects: "paṡyañ-
ṡṛṇvanspṛṡañ-jighrann-aṡnan-gacchan-svapañ-ṡvasan| pralapan-visṛjan-gṛhṇann-unmiṣan-
nimiṣann-api | seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, eating, going, dreaming, breathing,
talking, emitting, accepting, opening, closing, the senses are roaming in their objects conclude
the sage but I am doing nothing.

itaravyapadeṡāddhitākaraṇādidoṣaprasaktiḥ ||2.1.21
From designation (vyapadeṡa) of the other (itara), it is established (hita) that, to the absence of
action (akaraṇa), first (ādi) there is association (prasakti) of a fault (doṡa) etc...
Karaṇa is action as an instrument for producing a result and the result is called karma. When
the instrument is considered as a cause it becomes kāraṇa, the topics of previous sūtras. The
other (itara) is the 25th element (puruṣa, ātmā, jīva) not included in sāṁkhya analysis of the
universe. He is designated everywhere as the responsible of everything and that is a good
opportunity to quote the famous sentence of Chāndogya 6.8.7. "What is the root of all this
activity?" ask Āruṇi to his son Ṡvetaketu, and he answers: "sa ya eṣo'ṇimā aitad ātmyam idaṁ
sarvam | tat satyam | sa ātmāḥ tat tvam asi |" – "He who is the subtle essence, the self of all
this world. He is the truth, He is the self, That you are." Therefore the sūtra means: If
smoenone argues that the One who is of other essence is not responsible of the creation, that
is wrong because he is designed in texts.
The vṛittikara argues that the Self who is existence and consciousness should not be the cause
of embodiment in a body bringing evil events such as birth, ageing, sickness and death.
Beside that, if he can be the cause of inauspicious effect he should be able also to withdraw
them. On account of the following stages of the discussion between him and the vedāntin it is
difficult to say if the fault lies in these effects or in their attribution to the Brahman or Self.

adhikaṁ tu bhedanirdeṡāt ||2.1. 22

But (that is) transcendental on account of indication of difference (bheda)
There are several references to the omnipresent Self differing from the individual self and
transcendantal, in Gītā and Katha Upaniṣad for instance. "ekovaṡi sarvabhūtāntarātmā ekam
bījam bahudhā yaḥ karoti | ātmastham ye'nupaṡyanti dhīras|… " – This One subjecting all
creatures as their inner Soul, staying in their soul, these wise people who see Him", to them
etzrnal peace and bliss. (Kaṭha 2.3.12 and 2.3.13) . "ṛtam pibantau sukṛtasya loke guhām
praviṣṭau parama parārdhe " – They are two drinking the fruit of karma in the world of good
deeds, both staying in the most secret and supreme place." (Kaṭha 1.3.1)
How can they be different ask the vṛittikara since it is writen: tat tvam asi? They differ as long
as one has dualisitic interest answers the vedāntin. "dvāvimau purushau loke | kṣayaḥ sarvāni
bhūtāni akṣayaḥ kutastha " (Gītā 15.16).

aṡmādivacca tadanupapattiḥ ||2.1. 23

That non-occurence (an-upapatti) like stone (aṡma) etc…
The verb upapad already used in sūtra 1.2.3 means to fall into, to occur, to happen to someone
or something. Solid minerals (considered as made of the element named earth in ancient texts)
take the shape of stones but remain earth. According to Shankara: that analogy to a stone or
another object is not relevant (impossible: anupapatta). The Self does not become because he
is not material and he is not affected by defects.

upasaṁhāradarṡanānneti cenna kṣīravaddhi ||2.1. 24

If someone says that there is no (ced na iti) sight (darṡarna) of destruction (upasaṁhāra), then
no, like milk (kṣīravat).
Upasaṁhāra may be the withdrawal of something (to carry together away) or a conclusion, a
destruction. Kṣīravat means like milk, milky. What is the particularity of milk? It may
transform by itself into something else: curd, butter, cheese. Therefore here upasaṁhāra
means destruction.
The vrittikara argues that for making a pot, the potter takes clay. How the Brahman may
create anything without raw material? Even curd is made from milk with help of heat. Curd is
only milk answers the vedāntin: the transformation into curd is inherent to milk. Likewise
Brahman is liable to transform in everything.

devādivadapi loke ||2.1. 25

 Like/ in the condition (vat) of a deva and others (ādi) also (api) in the world (loke)
Unlike the potter, the gods and other beings in this world are able to create something without
transforming an already existing material, claims the vedāntin.

sattvāccāvarasya ||2.1. 26
On account of the existence (sattva) of inferior (avara) beings also.
It has already been stated that avara (literally: non covering) designates an effect, something
inferior, unimportant or something appearing later, posterior. I think this argument has
already been used in a previous sūtra. A proof of the creativity of Brahman lies in the
observation of the world. Shankara interpretation is that the world was already exiting in its
cause (Chāndogya 6.2.1): the Brahman. Everything is only the Brahman like all pots are only
clay.

ṡrutes tu ṡabdamūlatvāt ||2.1. 27

Then/ especially (tu) because the Vedas are the original source (mulatva) (of all knowledge).
The question debatted by commentators is: if Brahman is a whole as said in many ṡrutis, is he
wholy altered by a transformation in a material universe? "pūrṇam adaḥ pūrṇam idam pūrṇāt
pūrṇam udacyate pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya pūrṇam evāvaṡiṣyate" (Bṛihad 5.1.1) – "That is
full, this is full, from fulness fulness proceeds, and having taken fulness from fulness even
fulness remains." Having taken many universes from Brahman, Brahman remains unaltered:
akṣara. "yathorṇanābhiḥ sṛijate gṛhṇate ca | yathā pṛthivyāmoṣadhayassambhavanti | yathā
sataḥ puruṣāt keṡalomāni | tathākṣarāt sambhavatīha viṡvam || " (Muṇḍaka 1.1.7) – "Like the
spider emits then draws back (its thread), like herbs are formed on the earth and hair on the
body of a person, similarly everything here is formed from this unalterable Brahman."
Ramanuja adds: the universe was already existing in its subtle form (Pradhāna) inside the
Brahman.

ātmani caivam vicitrāṡ ca hi ||2.1. 28

And this is in the Self and variegated (vicitras)
All these variegated things constituting the universe are in the consciousness of the Self.
"Yathākaṡasthitho nityaṁ vāyuḥ sarvatrago mahān | tathā sarvāṇi bhūtāni mayi sthānīti
upadhāraya" (Gītā 9.6) – "Like the mighty wind blowing everywhere stays in the sky,
similarly all the creatures stay in me, understand that." Wind is an activity, a transformation
taking place in the athmosphere. It does not change the atmosphere. The atmosphere does not
share the attributes of the wind.

svapakṣadoṣācca ||2.1. 29
And because there is a fault in owns point of view
Sva-pakṣa which is the "own-side" may be interpreted as own point of view, own opinion or
interest. "Existence may be interpreted as one and indivisible on the sāttvika (spiritual) point
of view or as many and of variegated nature on the rājasa (individualistic) point of view" says
Kṛṣṇa (Gītā 18. 20). Similarly this sūtra may express that considering the pot, the cobweb, the
hair on the head of the person, the grass on the earth or the wind as existing and significant is
the individualistic point of view. They are transcient appearances in the landscape only. Even
Pradhāna is not changed by the local changes of composition more or less rich in sattva, rajas,
and tamas.

sarvopetā ca taddarṡanāt ||2.1. 30

Everything came into (upa-ita) (the Brahman) as it can be seen (in vedic texts)
"sarvam khalvidaṁ brahma |tajjalāniti ṡanta upāsītā |" (Chāndogya 3.14.1) – Everything
indeed is Brahman, from That is comes and in That it will return when extinguished. "etad
vai tad akṣaram | asthulam ananu ahrasvam adīrgham alohitam asnehan acchāyam atamaḥ
avāyu anākaṡam asaṅgam arasam agandham acakṣuṣkam aṡsrotam avāk amanaḥ atejaskam
aprāṇam amukham amātram anantaram abāhyam |…| etasya vā akṡarasya praṡāsane
sūryācandramasau vidhṛtau tiṣṭhataḥ | etasya vā akṡarasya praṡāsane dyvāpṛthivyau vidhṛte
tiṣṭhataḥ | etasya vā akṡarasya praṡāsane nimeṣā muhūrtā … tiṣṭhataḥ | (Bṛihad 3.8 8 and 9)
– That verily is unalterable, neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, neither red (like
fire) nor unctuous (like water), neither shadow nor obscurity, neither air nor atmosphere (or
space for completing the list elements), unattached, without taste, nor smell, nor eyes, nor
ears, nor voice, nor mental, nor radiating energy, nor breath, nor mouth, nor dimension, nor
end nor outside. And verily at the command of That unalterable the sun and the moon, the
earth and the sky all stand in their position, as also the instants, the hours, days and nights,
months and years…"

vikaraṇatvān neti cet tad uktam ||2.1. 31

If it is said that is not, on account of the lack of means for acting/senses (karaṣa), (answer) has
been told.
The answer is given in sūtras 1.2.18-20, 2.1.4. "Without feets nor hands the Supreme Person
is swift and grasping, without eyes He sees, without ears he hears." (Ṡvetaṡvatara 3.19)

na prayojanavattvāt ||2.1. 32
Not because of motivation.
Pra-yojana, from verb yuj, means what prepare to the harnessing to a task, i.e. another term
for the motive, the cause, the object of activity. The Brahman's Person does not undertake to
create the universe because of a motivation.

lokavat tu līlā kaivalyam ||2.1. 33

Only for the sport (līlā) as population of the world (loka-vat)
The living creatures are enjoying (bhuj) activities in the world or are struglling (kṛish - Gītā
15.7). The opinions diverge and may change acording to circonstances (adhiṣṭhana),
nervertheless that is their wish. They are part of Him and one may suppose that He enjoys this
sport (līlā) without consequences for Him. Nobody knows.

vaiṣamyanairghṛṇye na sāpekṣatvāt tathā hi darṡayati ||2.1. 34

Nor in spirit of injustice (vaiṣamya) or cruelty (nairghṛnya) on account of respect (sāpekṣa-
tva) , thus (tathā) it shows (cause to see: darṡaya).
Viṣa is service and vaiṣamya a difference in status, by extension injustice. Sa-pekṣa means
with consideration/regard and the suffixe tva adds the notion that the topics of dsicussion is
done in this state. Differences beween the living conditions of creatures are linked to the
potentialities of their bodies and the fate of each individual soul is a result of previous
activities and expectations. "puṇyo vai puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati pāpaḥ pāpeneti" Bṛihad
3.2.13) – One becomes good by performing good actions and sinful by performing sins. One
may refer also to several shlokas of the Gītā: 4.11, 14.18, 16.20 …

na karmāvibhāgāditi cennānāditvāt ||2.1. 35

If it is said that should not be (ced iti na) because there is no difference in share (avibhāga)
due to past actions (karma), not so due to the lack of beginning (an-āditva).
Someone may argue that Upaniṣads say: at the beginning there was only hunger, or existence
or inexistence… That is the description of the beginning of a cycle of life. But there is no
beginning to existence. "natvevā'haṁ jātu nāsaṁ na tvaṁ neme janādhipā" (Gītā 2.12) – "I
have never been non existent nor you nor any of these kings". "najāyate mriyate vā
vipascin…" (Kaṭha 1.2.18 and Gītā 2.20)

upapadyate cāpyupalabhyate ca ||2.1. 36

It is taking place and it is obtained
The sūtra may means that this conclusion can be reached, is suitable, possible (upapad) and it
can also been obtained from scriptures. The reasoning consists to state: if there was a
beginning, then inequalities would be unjustified but God is impartial.

sarvadharmopapatteṡca ||2.1. 37
From the argument (upapatti) of all dharma.
Should we translate like sūtra 3.9: "because of the argument of dharma"? For Shankara or
Radhakrishna dharma is always an attribute relative to a state of being and they argue that
Brahman cannot be unfair by nature. But their translation of dharma cnnot be relevant
especially here sinc eit is question of sarva-dharma, which expression evokes sva-dharma like
in Gītā 1.33 or 3.35: the right activities according to one's own condition.

Second section
racanānupapatteṡca nānumānam ||2.2.1
On account of the impossibility/ non occurence (anupapatti) of production (racana) also there
is no inference (anumāna)
Most verbs starting with syllable ra are related to motion and action; rac (racayati) means to
produce, to build, to cause and the existence of a production plan is more or less implied.
According to Shankara and Radhakṛiṣṇa the meaning is: "Because of the impossibility of the
orderly management of the world (racana), that which is inferred by the sāṅkhya theory (i.e.
that Pradhāna be the ultimate cause of the universe) cannot be." The topics of this section is
the refutation of sāṅkhya arguments, which are considered to be incompatible with the
Vedānta point of view. Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the creation and "ordely
management" of the world because It is not intelligent. Radhakṛiṣṇa's caricature of the
sāṅkhya theory summarizes in: according to this theory the cause of the pot is only clay. But
pots, palaces and philosophy books are not produced of their own accord, without a conscious
being planning their creation. Of course he is right, and that must be emphasized nowadays
because of the disastrous popularity of Darwinism. But there are some good thoughts in
sāṅkhya theory, like the 5 tanmātras and the 3 guṇas. Darwin made also some useful
contributions to the understanding of evolution. Nevertheless, his philosophy, like many
others, is meaningless.

pravṛtteṡca ||2.2. 2
On account of the involvement in activity also
The followers of sāṅkhya theory agree that the existence of a potter involved in this activity is
necessary to produce the pot.
From the translation and comments of "sāṁkhya karika" by N. Siṅha, published in the series
"the sacred books of the Hindus", volume 11, Allahabad, 1915 - the karika 15 says:
"sanghāta-para-artha-tvāt tri-guṇa-adi-viparyayāt adhiṣthānāt puruṣo'sti bhoktṛ-bhāvāt
kaivalyārtham pravritteḥ ca." Because the guṇas associate to form anything else, there should
be a person presiding (adhisthana) to their imbalance (viparyaya), a presence (bhāva), an
enjoyer (bhoktṛ) and the purpose of his involvement in activity is detachment from
materiality/ to become alone (kevala) again. Of course there is a paradox in his purpose
(artha), at the root of many stories about Lord Ṡiva in the purāṇas. At first the purusa is
motivated by kāma, krodha and lobha, then meditating on the consequences of passions his
goal becomes purification.
Materialistic people (lokayātika) argue that intelligence is always associated to a body and
they are right. Modern scientists would add that a large part of animal's intelligence is genetic.
They also attempt to identify poles of reasoning and passions in the brain and to correlate the
surges of passions to hormonal emissions. Again they forget that the potter is presiding to
intelligence and he alone takes the decisions. Intelligence is affected by passions and has to be
purified for escaping the animal conditioning.
Shankara discuss with a follower of sāṁkhya about the impossibility for a merely sentient
creature devoided of volition to involve itself in activity (pravṛit). Both agree that
volition/wilfulness is the attribute of the living sentient being associated with a body and that
the pure lokayātika, who believes that sentience alone is the cause of action, is wrong. In
other words they agree that life is an attribute of the soul/ self.

payo'mbuvaccettatrāpi ||2.2. 3
Here (tatra) also (api) even (cet) that is comparable (vat) to milk and water.
First note that the word payas refers to any fluid carrying energy, like milk or semen, whereas
ambu refers to neutral water (unlike āpas which name means active - Bṛihad 1.2.1). After
having created the tanmātras (subtile principles like taste, smell, colour, sound, contact or
motion) and the mahābhūtas (elements), Nārāyana is lying in cosmic waters (as indicated by
His name) and He instils His māyā in the universe. Shankara quotes again Bṛihad 3.8.9 : at
His command the sun and the moon, earth and water …. stand in their position." I think that
this quotation is not really proper because the sūtra evokes two entities: one with a potential
of activivity and the other purely passive. In fact, he refers also to sūtra 2.1.24 comparing the
Brahman to milk able to transform itself into something else like curd or butter, for adding
that the last words "cettatrāpi" (even there) mean: even if milk can transform itself that is the
will of God.

vyatirekānavasthiteṡcānapekṣatvāt ||2.2.4
Since it is irrelevant (anapekṣatva) there is separate existence (vyatireka) of what is not
abiding inside (anavasthita)
Shankaracarya and Radhakrishna prefer to translate the participe anavasthita by not existing,
i.e. absence, and anapekṣa by independence. According to them, the meaning of this sūtra is:
Since sāṁkhya theory states that there is nothing external to Pradhāna on which the later
depends, promoting the unbalance of guṇas and a cosmic intelligence, the Puruṣa is only a
witness of what occurs inside Pradhāna. Independently of the difference in translation, the
interpretation is the same: if one supposes that there is no external cause, how to explain that
action occurs in Pradhāna?

anyatrābhāvācca na tṛṇādivat ||2.2. 5

Otherwise (anyatra) also because of absence (abhāva) there is nothing like (vat) grass (tṛina)
etc… (ādi)
Anyatra means in another place, elsewhere, and, by extension, in some other conditions,
otherwise. Shankara prefers to give it here its literal meaning of elsewhere and says: if there is
no external cause, how grass is transformed into milk when eaten by a cow and not elsewhere,
i.e. when eaten by a bull?
 abhyupagame'pyarthābhāvāt ||2.2. 6
Also because of the absence (abhāva) of purpose (artha) when accepting this point of view
(abhy-upa-gam: to approach, to assent)
The purpose of action is usually to experience pleasure or avoid pain, or to be freed of both.
These motivations are attributes of the person (puruṣa). According to sāṁkhya theory, one of
the guṇa is the propensity to action (rajas) and another is amorphousness (tamas). It is
possible to imagine that spontaneous unbalance occurs promoting a transformation then its
dissolution. But Pradhāna / Prakṛiti does not feel pleasure, pain, curiosity, anger, greed, nor
wish to be free.

puruṣāṡmavaditi cet tathāpi ||2.2. 7

Even when considering (cet tatha api) that the person (puruṣa) is said to be like a stone (aṡma-
vat)
According to Shankarācārya, even if assuming that jīva inside the body is an insentient,
indifferent witness, Pradhāna cannot be the cause of activity. The Supreme Self is not
concerned by any effect of this activity, nevertheless He is motivated by the urge to create.

aṅgitvānupapatteṡca ||2.2. 8
Because of the impossibility (anupapatti) of subordination (aṅgitva) also
Shankarācārya argues that the different limbs (aṅga) of Pradhāna, which are the 3 guṇas, are
independent of each other. Without external factor exciting them and causing an intelligent
unbalance (mahat), creation is impossible. Then, Shankar imagines that the adept of adherent
to sāṁkhya would contradict him and suppose that guṇas are indeed interdependent (quite
silly). So, answers Shankara, that implies the existence of some intelligence in Pradhāna and
opens the door to the belief in Brahman.

anyathānumitau ca jñaṡaktiviyogāt ||2.2. 9

Otherwise (anyathā) on account of separation (viyoga) from the power (ṡakti) of knowledge
(jña) in the conclusion of previous thoughts (anumiti).
If a metastable unbalance in Pradhāna could occur without external cause and last for a long
time (or for ever), all these reasonings are meaningless.

vipratiṣedhāccāsamañjasam ||2.2. 10
Because of its contradictions (vipratiṣedha), it (the sāṁkhya theory) is incoherent
Shankarācārya put forwards the insincere argument that the number of principles inside
Pradhāna and their list are changing according to the texts: sometimes there are 3 internal
organs (manas, buddhi, cetas), sometimes only one, sometimes the tanmatras are relaced by
the mahabhutas… The same could be said about Upaniṣads. Then he imagines that the
sāṁkhya follower advances a better argument: is there no incoherence in stating that the self
is afflicted by many torments in this world and that the same self is the cause of its
appearance? Shankar denies the existence of such a contradiction: there cannot be a tormentor
and a tormenter in the same self. The living body is tormented and the sentient soul feels
tormented when he considers himself to be associated with the body under the influence of
ignorance.
In connection with that, a section of Ṡanti parva (n°231) is very instructive: manas is to cetas
(or cit) what mahabhutas are to the tanmatras, i.e. their manifestation (vyakti). The attributes
of the self are existence, conciousness and bliss; when housed in a body his conciousness
becomes manifest (vyakta) under the form of thoughts.
 mahaddīrghavad vā hrasvaparimaṇḍalābhyām ||2.2. 11
(From) what is described as (vat) great (mahat) and lasting a long time (dIrgha) or (vā) from
these things which are short (hrasva) and circular (parimaṇḍala).
Now the author undertakes to refute the arguments of the adepts of Vaiṡeṣika philosophical
system, based on the belief in a plurality of atoms, material or immaterial (of time, space,
intelligence or soul) and constituting the universe (Indian Philosphy, vol.2 ch.3, S.
Radhakṛishnan, Oxford India Paperbacks, 1st edition 1923, 5th edition 2011). According to
Radhakṛishnan the vocabulary used in the Vaiṡeṣika sūtras of Kaṇāda presuppose the
knowledge of Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā and Sāṁkhya texts. But since the faith of Mahāvīra (born
around 600 BC), father of the Jain faith, is based for a part on this theory, it gives a late limit
for the creation of the theory. The impulse of Vaiṡeṣika thoughts is in opposition to the
Buddhist idea (or of precursors of Buddhism since the author Bādarāyaṇa is supposed to have
writen this text before the time of Siddharta Gautama Buddha, who lived at same time than
Mahāvīra) that nothing exists except karma. Substances and persons are formed from the
combination of atoms of nine substances (dravya) existing for ever. They form some kind of
molecules with particular properties (the word guṇa is used with another meaning than in
Sāṁkhya system) such as whiteness, softness, sweetness, goodness, truth… Their formation
results from the conjunction (samavāya) of 2 substances in same place at same time or from
karma, which is defined as a motion. Kaṇāda never evoked Iṡvara in his sūtras but anything
which could not be explained without a mysterious inervention, such as cosmic order, was
called adṛṣṭa (unknown). Kaṇāda like all Indian philosophers believed in a cycle of creation
and dissolution of the universe, on account of the evidence that anything which comes into
existence (bhāva) will disappear after some time. The existence of invisible atoms with a very
small but defined size (aṇu) is a quite common idea in all cultures. Kṛṣṇa says in Gītā (shloka
8.9) to Arjuna who wants to know under which form he should remember the Almighty:
"kaviṁ purāṇam anuṡasitāram | aṇor- aṇīyāṁsam anusmaredyaḥ | sarvasya dhātāram
acintyarūpam | āditya varṇam tamasaḥ parastāt" – "One should remember Him as the ancient
inspired person, the controler, smaller than an atom, the founder of everything, of
inconceivable shape, with a solar lustre transcending darkness."
The present sūtra should be considered as a question: is this universe issued from the infinite
and eternal Brahman or from atoms? Note that the first entity is in nominative case whereas
the atoms are in plural ablative case.

ubhayathāpi na karmātas tadabhāvaḥ ||2.2. 12

From either point of view (ubhayathā) (there is) no action and hence (atas) absence (abhāva)
of that (tat)
Tat here is the world or reality. It is a conjonction of atoms which is the cause of its
appearance (bhāva). The conjonction of atoms (inherently existent) implies the existence of a
cause of this action of creation, called adṛṣṭa. For some unclear reason Shankar puts forward
that when the universe is dissolved no creation can happens because ātmā having no body
cannot exert an effort and cause an action. Now if admitting the existence of adṛṣṭa, the
motion of atoms and action cannot be caused by adṛṣṭa which is unsentient (according to
Shankara). His assertion is unfair since adṛṣṭa has been supposed precisely for explaining
some super power responsible of the cosmic order (dharma) and immanent retribution
(karma). But that is the meaning of the present sūtra.

samavāyābhyupagamācca sāmyād anavasthiteḥ ||2.2. 13

On account of the admission (abhyupagama) of conjunctions (samavāya) and of the
unreliability (anavasthita) of their simultaneousness (samyat)
Shankara reads samavāya with its other meaning of a relation of inherence between two
substances, since they are said "to always come together" (sam-ava-i) like smoke and fire. He
is speaking of the creation of defined molecules (the most simple, which are formed by
conjunction of 2 atoms, are called dyads by commentators in english) and imagine that
inherence is an infinite regression but I could not understand his reasoning.

nityam eva ca bhāvāt ||2.2. 14

On account of the fact that it is always present.
One may understand that the presence (bhāva) is permanent or that the same thing always
appears. Possibly at the time of the writing of the Brahma sūtras the idea of cyclic creation
and dissolution was not yet accepted by the Vaiṡeṣikas. Shankara is asking if the atoms are
always active or sometimes inactive. If they are not naturally active one has to admit that
adṛṣṭa is the cause of their conjunction. Modern chemistry teaches us that atoms are naturally
active and the idea that substances are formed from the conjunction of more simple ones
implies that this fact was already known by Kaṇāda. But atoms should indeed be inactive or
disappear during dissolution.

rūpādimattvācca viparyayo darṡanāt ||2.2. 15

Owing to the state of being made (mattva) with a shape (rūpa) and so on (ādi) and of the
observation (darṡana) of a cyclic change (viparyaya).
Shankar don't admit that the atoms may have a colour or another quality permanently.

ubhayathā ca doṣāt||2.2. 16
On account of the defect (doṣa) in both cases (ubayatha).
What are these two cases? According to Shankar either a substance has one quality or several:
here he refers to the Sāmkhya system acknowledging them an increasing number of qualities
(grossness) from space to air, fire, water and finally earth having sound, touch, colour, taste
and smell. If they have an abundance of quality they are probably made of smaller atoms. On
the other hand, if assuming that each substance has a single quality, water should never be
warm nor have a colour.

aparigrahāccātyantamanapekṣā ||2.2. 17
It is disregarded (anapekṣa) definititely (atyāntam) because of non acceptance (aparigraha).
What to say of this impartial argument? Shankar states that is the point of view of any
"worthy person". Then he proposes that the presence of a quality should not depend on that of
a substance: for instance there may be light in some place without the presence of fire. At my
knowledge, smṛitis like Purāṇas describe the creation of elements with an increasing number
of qualities from more simple ones and earth, water which are more complex than fire are
resorbed into fire upon dissolution. I consider his argumentation, based on dubious
comparisons and unfounded assertions (such as: an effect which has not yet comed into
existence has no relationship of inherence with its cause; if an atom has a limited size it must
have as many surfaces as there are directions in space, therefore it is made of parts.),
dishonest. In fact, the single valid argument of Shankar is: this system is in contradiction
withvedic texts. But he does not give any proof of contradiction.

samudāya ubhayahetuke'pi tadaprāptiḥ ||2.2. 18

In the combinated occurence (samudāya) of two (ubha) causes (hetu) there is no achievement/
obtaining (aprāpti) of that (tat)
Next the author undertakes to refute the Buddhist philosophy. According to Shankara, there
are three categories of nihilist philosophers: (i) Sarva-astitva-vādins believing in the existence
(perpetual) of all things; (ii) Vijñana-vādins believing in the existence of consciousness and
knowledge only; (iii) Sarva-ṡunya-vādins believing that nothing exists. The Sarvāstitvavādins
are qualified by Shankar of "realists". Therefore I suppose that he is speaking of the Nyāya
school of thought, interested by the different approachs to reach a conclusion ( ny-ā-i = to go
inside): perception (akṣa), inference (anumāna), intuition (pratyakṣa), comparison (upamāna),
revelation and testimony (ṡabda). Among them he distinguishes: the Sutra-antikas who
believe in the demonstration (anta) of the existence of things by some sūtras; the Vaibhāṣikas
who believe in the existence of alternative options (vibhāṣā). The latter point of view is
denied here. At my opinion the Bhuddist school of thought is tightly bound to the Nyāya
school by the taste of rhetorics and syllogisms, despite their contrary conclusions. See the
Buddhist monks arguing in the yard of their monastery.

itaretarapratyayatvāditi cennotpattimātranimittatvāt ||2.2. 19

The assertion (iti) that this and that other thing (itara itara) are proving each other (pratyaya)
cannot be accepted (cet na) since (each one would be) nothing less (mātra) than the material
cause (nimitta) of their production (utpatti)
Pratyaya is a firm ground towards one wants to return, and in imagery language a firm belief,
some basic proof. Pratyayatva is therefore the consideration of an assertion as a proof. When
two things are proving each other (itara itara) one can say that they are linked by an inherence
relationship. Discussing now with a Buddhist, Shankara argues that an inherence relationship
cannot be accepted if the cause of this relationship is not known. The translation of Shankara
commentaries by Swami Gambhirananda (Advaita Ashram Publication, 1965) uses the word
"nescience" in Shankara's answers to the arguments of the Buddhist.

uttarotpāde ca pūrvanirodhāt ||2.2. 20

Because of the suppression (nirodha) of the former (purva) upon production (utpada) of the
following one (uttara) also (ca)
"No effect can emerge that is not transfused with the essence of the material cause". In other
words the cause should cease to exist when the effect appears, like the caterpillar upon birth
of the butterfly. But, does the fire disappear upon appearance of smoke? According to
Shankarācārya, if the cause does not disappear upon appearance of the effect then the
Buddhist theory of momentariness is wrong. According to a modern text on this topics
(routledge.com: encyclopedia of philosophy): "The fundamental proposition is that everything
passes out of existence as soon as it has originated and in this sense is momentary. As an
entity vanishes, it gives rise to a new entity of almost the same nature which originates
immediately afterwards. Thus, there is an uninterrupted flow of causally connected
momentary entities of nearly the same nature, the so-called continuum (santāna)." That
explains ageing of a person for instance, and confirms the ancient say of Upaniṣads: anything
which appears (is born) must disappear (die). But does it apply to cause and effect? Once
someone falls in a river and get drenched, does the cause of wetness, i.e. the river disappear?
Obviously no, water has flowed downstream and a little bit has been removed but the entity
perceived as a river is still here. Similarly, after giving birth to a child the same person does
not vanish. He/she became a little older and is no more strictly speaking the same person, but
still perceived with same identity by others and may be the cause of other births. If this is
what Bādarāyaṇa intended to say, the sūtra is wrong.

asati pratijñoparodho yaugapadyam anyathā ||2.2. 21

In inexistence (asat) there is obstruction (uparodha) of acknloledgement (pratijñā) else
(anyathā) simultaneousness (yaugapadya)
What is inexistent? Two possibilities: (i) the proof of a correlation between a cause and an
effect; (ii) the vanishing of the cause upon appearance of the effect. The author is obviously
evoking the second possibility since he concludes that they coexist. He considers that is in
contradiction with the Buddhist notion of momentariness. Shankara adds in the comment of
later sūtra 26 that if its cause vanishes, then an observed effect arises from nothing.

pratisaṁkhyā'pratisaṁkh yānirodhāprāptiravicchedāt ||2.2. 22

Becaue there is no interruption (aviccheda) in the occurrence (prāpti) of annihilation (nirodha)
either conscious or unconscious.
This prati-saṁkhya (counting back, reflection about origin), when followed by the word
nirodha is the conciousness of annihilation in Buddhist terminology. Shankara points out that
as long as the flow of appearances/annihilation of a given being is ininterrupted, what is
perceived as this being is not annihilated.

ubhayathā ca doṣāt ||2.2. 23

On account of the defect (doṣa) in both cases (ubayatha).
The sūtra is identical to number 16. Here the two cases concern the conciousness of the
annihilation. Shankara tells us that if the annihilation is conscious (deliberate) it has no cause,
which is impossible. If this annihilation had a natural cause, then the teaching of Buddha is
useless.

ākāṡe cāviṡeṣāt ||2.2. 24

On account of the lack of difference (aviṡeṣa) in ether (ākāṡa) also
A modern physicist may argue that ether is also expanding or compressing, but it would be
useless to practize the same wordly game as Shankara. He pretends that Bhuddist consider
ākāṡā as non existing and eternal at same time. At my knowledge, there is no difference in the
concept of ākāṡa according to Buddhists or Hindus: it is space where events take place (the
karmabhūmi of Premchand) and also a cavity where sound waves propagate. It is considered
as a real substance, even if it is not perceived because its existence is inferred from that of
sound. Now Bhuddist as well as Hindu texts use to say that anything which does not last is
not existing: asat. It appears (saṁbhū) and dissolves (lī). On the other hand, a space free of
obstacle is called emptiness or vacuum in english, but also ākāṡa in Bhuddist texts. Hindu
texts are not more strict in their language since an empty cavity is called sometimes ākāṡa and
sometimes kha, and the word ākāṡa is used with the meaning of air, like for instance in shloka
9.6 of Gītā.

anusmṛteṡca ||2.2. 25
On account of remembrance also
That is a good point. Buddhist don't consider that the embodied soul is eternal. How can we
have a memory if we are dying each instant? I wouls add: how could there be any kind of
knowledge? for which self if he is dying at every moment? The actual speech of Siddharta
Gautama Buddha and contemporary followers concerning their concept of momentariness are
not available at my knowledge. Nowadays all these schools of realistic philosophies are
confused in websites of pseudo-science.

nāsato'dṛṣṭatvāt ||2.2. 26
not from what is not existing (asat) because that is not observable (adṛṣtatva)
As quite commonly in sankrit texts this sūtra states a double negation which Shankara
transaltes by: "something does not comes out of nothing for this does not fit with experience".
Another possibility is to transalte by: not out of nothing (instead) from the lack of
perspicacity.

udāsīnānāmapi caivaṁ siddhiḥ ||2.2. 27

and that is even the accomplishment (siddhi) of indifferent witnesses (udasina)
Shankara disregards the synthax of the sūtra when translating by: success (accomplishment)
should come to the indifferent witness (if something can come out of nothing). The meaning
is more probably that a wise person accomplishes perfection by remaining merely a witness if
events have no cause since there is no need to struggle.

nābhāva upalabdheḥ ||2.2. 28

There is no absence (abhāva) of acquisition (upalabdhi)
Now the author refutes the arguments of Vijñanavādins (called also Buddhists in Shankara
comments). According to these comments, it seems that followers of this school believe that
objects appear when someone becomes conscious of them and someone may be conscious of
something which he has never observed before because of his previous lives. Therefore the
sūtra may means: that is not true; any knowledge has to be acquired. Shankara translates:
"objects are not inexistent because they are perceived", i.e. there is no non-existence of a
perceived object (upalabdhasya instead of upalabdheḥ). For refuting the point of view of the
Vijñanavādin, the vedāntin argues that perception has to be admitted perforce; perception is a
means of knowledge. Maybe, except when a rope is taken for a snake. In fact all Indian
philosophies are tainted with Hinduism: all Upanishads and Purānas tell the story of a creation
issued from the consciousness of Iṡvara and that of the mind-born sons of Brahma. In the
course of their agumentation the vedāntin makes a good mark when stating that several
persons may perceive the same thing.

vaidharmyācca na svapnādivat ||2.2. 29

Because departing from order (vaidharmya) no a state like dream (svapna) etc…
Shankara, who never gives to dharma its proper meaning of "what results from supporting" (
i.e. order, law, morality) throughout his translation of the sūtras ,translates here vidharma by
difference of nature. Things which are surronding us are not fake like in dream state. Within
waking state they are existing (truly). That may be the proper meaning of vidharma in the
present context.

na bhāvo'nupaladheḥ ||2.2. 30
There is no presence (bhāva) of non acquisition (anupalabdhi)
What is the purpose of repeating more or less sūtra 28? Shankara translates by: there is no
existence because of non-perception. According to him, what is not existing, in case there is
no direct perception, is the impression of the experience by the mind. In fact, it is well known
that dreams are the products of experiences in waking state: if not necessarily exactly the
same event, something similar is experienced again.

kṣaṇikatvācca ||2.2. 31
From the momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) also
If one assumes that consciousness is momentary, how could it develop trends, wishes and
projects?

sarvathānupapatteṡca ||2.2. 32
From non occurrence/ irrelevance (anupapatti) in every respect (sarvathā)
In conclusion the doctrines of these different schools of rhetorics are incoherent.
In following sūtras the vedāntin undertakes to contradict to Jain point of view, which I don’t
know in better details than the Buddhist doctrine. Both have evolved a lot since the time of
their prophets (or avatāra), which was 6th century BC, and their teaching has been corrupted.
At least in their original form, both doctrines deny the existence of an intelligent Cause of the
universe. Contrarily to Buddhists, Jains are animist: all living species have a soul (jīva),
eternal but changing of size depending on their host-body and intrinsically altered by qualities
(associated to their body, karma, dharma, knowledge). According to S. Radhakṛiṣṇan (Indian
Philosophy, vol 1 chapter 6), the Jain theory of knowledge differs significantly from that of
the Nyāya (see comment sūtra 2.2.18 above): it includes manaḥparyāya (telepathic reading in
the mind of others) and kevala (literally "one's own, isolated, pure, absolute", which when
qualifying knowledge means full knowledge of all mechanisms of the universe and of one's
own self). Jains believe in the objective existence of reality, independently of consciousness.
An interesting idea, quite contradictory to the vedāntin beliefs, is that truth is relative to the
point of view (naya) of the knower. Radhakṛṣṇan points out that when the Vaiṡeṣika believes
that an effect exists after the cause, the vedāntin believes that it is already potential in the
cause and the Jain concludes: there is a part of truth in both point of view. The Jains consider
Prakṛiti as the eternal and ignorant cause of the universe. This universe is composed of eternal
matter (ajīva: objects not living), itself made of atoms (aṇu) of different substances (dravya)
with given qualities; these atoms of substances combine for producing modifications
(paryāya) of the properties of matter. Beside this matter there are also particles of space
(points in space called pradeṣa), time, dharma, adharma and karma. The particles of dharma
(principle of motion) and adharma (principle of rest) may become associated with atoms of
matter or with a jīva (living being), but are not linked to the ideas of merit or demerit. The
particles of karma, considered as a subtle matter, penetrate in matter or in souls and modify
their properties. The quality of a soul depends on the number of senses possessed by its body,
degree of consciousness and of knowledge. In fact these souls are compounds of atomic souls
and Jains consider that even inorganic objects devoided of life and cosnciousness, like stones,
are embodying a rudimentary soul. The soul is appropriating (upādāna) a material existence
(bhāva) and therefore is said to be the operative cause of the body or object, whereas matter
combined to karma is the instrumental cause (nimitta). The aim of the fully conscious, kaivala
soul, is to get free of rebirth and vanish in nirvaṇa, like for Buddhists. Since all these material
and subtle substances with specific functions and souls are existing from all eternity there is
no place for an Almighty God in Jain universe. The fate of each entity is conditioned by the
combination of time, dharma, karma, dravya and jīva. Nevertheless the Jains, like Buddhists
or Hindus acknowledge a hierarchy of souls depending on their knowledge and purity; the
best are god-like (if they have not avyakta in nirvana).

naikasminnasambhavāt ||2.2. 33
not in one (eka) because of non-occurrence / impossibility.
The saptabaṅghī (seven turns or ways of speaking) of the Jains consists to say that, according
to the point of view, a thing: 1) is, 2) is not, 3) is and is not, 4) is unpredicable, 5) is and is
unpredicable, 6) is not and is unpredicable, 7) is and is not and is unpredicable. A same thing
cannot be in all these states simultaneously, answers the vedāntin. If the characteristics of an
entity are indescribable, they cannot be expressed in words. Besides, scriptures and
instructions imparted by a teacher should be clearly defined. One can retort to the vedāntin
that as long as we use words for expressing what is true or untrue, they will deceive us. For
instance it is true that a tree is moving in the wind when considering its branches; but since
the trunk of the tree remains in same place, one may also conclude that the tree is not moving.
Nevertheless the philosopher must remain aware that all these assertions are relative points of
view or relative truths, but the absolute truth is a whole including all these aspects.
Concerning the indescribable nature of things, the term used by Kṛṣṇa about the ātman in the
Gītā is inconceivable (acintya – shloka 2.25).

evaṁ cātmākārtsnyam ||2.2. 34

In this way (evam) also (ca) the self (ātmā) incompletely (akārtsnyam)
Shankara understands that the embodied soul is not all pervasive (abhyaṡa, vibhu) but has a
defined dimension according to the Jains. How is it possible, does he ask, when the body
grows from childhood to youth?

na ca paryāyādapyavirodho'vikārādibhyaḥ ||2.2. 35
There is no opposition to cyclic evolution (paryāya) also on account of transformations
(vikāra) etc…
This sūtra is interesting on linguistic point of view since it juxtaposes the proper term
meaning transformation (vikāra) with paryāya, of which proper meaning is going round (parī-
i). At the time of Mahavira and Buddha, classical saṁskṛit was already strongly corrupted,
especially among the social classes of their followers and in the area corresponding to modern
state of Bihar.
Shankara translates "na avirodha" by: contradiction cannot be avoided; and "paryāya" by:
sequences of increase and decrease in size. That leads him to deny the possibility for the soul
to adjust to the size of the body. A vedāntin cannot admit that the soul undergoes
modifications. The Vedas and smṛitis are very clear on this point: the ātman is indescribable,
inconceivable, going everywhere and pervading everything, yet it cannot be altered (avikarya,
akṣara, avyaya, acchedya, adāhya, akledya, aṡoṣya… Gītā 2.24, 2.25, 4.6 and others). The part
of a person which is everlasting and immutable is the ātman and it recovers freedom when the
appendices of a body and of karma are removed like clothes. If the original soul was
corrupted by addition of some parts and removal of some others during the process of rebirth
and under the effect of karma, how to distinguish which part was original and eternal? How to
be sure that it has not been removed? By admitting that the ātman may be altered one
undermines the basis of the Hindu religion: "mam-aiva-aṁṡo jīva-loke | jīva-bhūtaḥ
sanātanaḥ" (Gītā 15.7).

antyāvasthiteṡcobhayanityatvādaviṡeṣaḥ ||2.2. 36
There si no difference (aviṡeṣa) from the stability (avasthiti) of the last (antya) also (ca)
because of the permanence (nityatva) of both (ubhaya)
Ubhaya-nityatva is a compound word (else it would write ubhaya nityatva or ubhayānityatva
meaning the contrary). Therefore the permanence qualifies the terme both and not the
contrary. The word both refers to the size of the jīva abiding in successive bodies. Shankara
considers that the word antya means "the ultimate" (before liberation from rebirth). The idea
originates from the Hindu concept that the ātman/ jīva is covered by sheets of personal
dispositions confusing the consciousness of his true nature. The latter are dissolved by the
purification process of life habits until reaching liberation.

patyurasāmañjasyāt ||2.2. 37
Because of improper knowledge (asāmañjasya) of the Lord (pati)
Sāmañjasya is the property of what is samañjasa: correct, true, consistent, well understood
(sam-jñā). The topics of discussion changes again and deals with the monistic as against the
dualistic conception of existence. The Vedantin is highly concerned by the monistic point of
view: Brahman is the Absolute, both sat and asat, spiritual and material. The Almighty is not
only the "efficient" cause bringing things into being from chaotic nature. He is as well their
material cause of existence, He is Existence itself. This stands against the feeling of sāṁkhyas
and bhāgavata / yogins. The sūtra might even be read: because of improperty of lorship.
Shankara suggest that the Lord cannot have a purpose for creating the universe nor decide the
creation of different grades of creatures, notwithstanding the "bahu syām" of Chandogya
(6.2.3), the hunger of Bṛihadāranayaka (1.2), the "prakṛitim svam adhistaya", "mama yonir
mahat brahma" and other ṡlokas of the Gītā.
sambandhānupapatteṡca ||2.2. 38
Owing to the non occurence / impossibility of a relationship (sambandha) also
Why also? According to Shankara the relationship would be one of inherence, if God was
creating the nature and the souls. That is impossible because all of them are eternal. Shankara
refers to the Ṡvetasvatara Upaniṣad, known as a theistic upaniṣad identifying Prakṛiti with
"deva-ātma-ṡakti"(1.3): "te dhyāna-yogānugatā apaṡyan devātmaṡāktiṁ svagunair nigūdhām |
yaḥ kāraṇāni nikhilāni tāni kālātmayuktānyadhitiṣṭhatyekaḥ ||" – "those who seeked after
contemplation through yoga saw the divine power of the Self hidden by his own qualities (of
sattva, rajas and tamas). He is the One presiding these complete causes yoked to Him
including time and souls."

adhiṣṭhānānupapatteṡca ||2.2. 39
Owin gto the impossibility of presiding (adhiṣṭhna) also
So it appears that this sūtra contradicts the above verse of Ṡvetasvatara Upaniṣad. The
argument of Shankara is that

karaṇavaccenna bhogādibhyaḥ ||2.2. 40

Nor should He (or She) be considered as (cet na) a means (karaṇa) on account of (the implied
enjoyement (bhoga) and so on (adi)
The prime motive of this series of sūtra being to deny that the Supreme Person or the
impersonal Brahman is not the efficient cause, at first one may think that the term karaṇa
qualifies this Person. Such a stand is opposite to that of Bhāgavatas who define Him as
"sarva-karaṇa karaṇām" (Brahmā saṁhitā 1st ṡloka). But the point of view of the vedāntin is
in fact that Prakṛiti should not be considered as a means for the Supreme Person to enjoy his
creation. She may be a means of enjoyement for jīva, the aṁṡa of this Person. The Kaṭha
Upaniṣad says of Him (2.2.13): "yo vidadhāti kāmān"; and Kṛiṣṇa is qualified of bhoktṛi,
Kṣetra-jñā, Hṛiṣīkeṡa in Gītā, which means that He knows everything about the enjoyement of
jīva. No doubt that the present Vedānta sūtras are not those invoked by Ṡṛī Kṛiṣṇa in ṡloka
13.5 of the Gītā or they have been some additions, as usual in many texts of Hinduism.

antavattvamasarvajñatā vā ||2.2. 41
Otherwise He would be limited (anta-vat-tva) or (vā) not omniscient (a-sarva-jñata)
The rethorics of Shanhara consists to say that enumerating entities Prakṛiti, jīva, Bhagavan
implies that they are limited. "vedāham etaṁ puruṣaṁ mahāntam | … vṛikṣa iva stabdho divi
tiṣṭhati ekas" says Ṡvetāṡvatara Upaniṣad (3.8-9). "sarvabhūteṣu yenaikam bhāvam avyayam
ikṣate | abibhaktam vibhakteṣu" (Gītā 18.20) " mayi sarvam idaṁ protaṁ sūtre maṇigaṇa iva"
(Gītā 7.7). So many quotations contradict this wrong argument.

utpattyasambhavāt ||2.2. 42
Because of the non-occurence (asambhava) of an origin (utpatti)
Now the vedāntin denies that there is a Supreme Person, an Almighty God who is as the well
the material than the efficient cause. Shankara uses as a pretext the writing in Bhāgavata
Puraṇa that this Supreme Person with name Vāsudeva takes the form of Saṅkarṣaṇa (the One
Contracting, Ṡeṣa) when the universe is not manifest, Pradyumna (the Almighty, the Thought,
the Desire) when desiring to create the universe, and Aniruddha (the Unobstructed, the Will,
the Individuality) when undertaking to do it. These four vyāha have various other symbolic
meanings such as: the one who creates mahat (Karaṇodakaṡāyi Viṣṇu), next the one who
enters in the egg universe (Garbhodakaṡāyi Viṣṇu), the one who enters in the heart of
creatures (Kṣirodakaṡāyi Viṣṇu). I don’t deny that Nārāyana who is the Supreme Self and
who is superior to Nature has divided Himself into many forms" says Shankara. I deny that a
soul named Saṅkarṣaṇa is created by another soul named Vāsudeva. OK. Let it be (svasti). He
is not created, but another form of the same. That remembers me the say of Muslims: He has
no other name than Allah. Too bad that Viṣṇu and Ṡiva have 1008 names. It is worth to note
that until here the existence of guṇas has been aknowledged in the comments of Shankara (see
2.2.8) but never in the sūtras themselves and the use of the term mahat with the meaning of
cosmic intelligence has been questionned in the comments of sūtra 1.4.7. Of course the word
māyā, which is the result of guṇas has never been used: "daivī hyeṣā guṇamayī mama māyā
duratyayā" (Gītā 7.14). Kṛiṣṇa acknowledges clearly in this ṡloka and others that the
bewilderment of jīvas by their association with a material body is the effect of his māyā. It
does not means that serves a purpose for him, only a natural consequence of the association.

na ca kartuḥ karaṅam ||2.2. 43

Nor the means (karaṇa) of the one acting (kartṛi)
One has never seen an agent of action (kartṛi) creating his tool (karaṇa) argues the vedāntin.

vijñānādibhāve vā tad apratiṣedhaḥ ||2.2.44

Or there is no prohibition of that (tat): the advent (bhava) of intelligent knowledge (vijñāna)
etc (adi).
From sidh (to accomplish), pratiṣidh means to keep back, to restrain, to prohibit. The meaning
may be: if the Supreme Person creates other forms of Himself, he may as well acquire
omniscience.

vipratiṣedhācca ||2.2. 45
Owing to contradiction also
The verb vipratiṣidh is never used, but according to Monier-Williams dictrionnary the
difference between pratiṣedha and vipratiṣedha is that the later is complete, i.e. restriction
becomes contradiction. Shankara objects to the description of Kṛiṣṇa as handsome, strong,
bold, heroïc or any other quality. One should not make pictures of God.

Third section
The purpose is to clarify the content of Upaniṣads about creation. There would be some
contradictions.
na viyadaṡruteḥ ||2.3. 1
Vi-i (never used) would mean to go in various direction and viyā is used in the sense of going
through. Viyat is what is going apart, in various direction, and get dissolved, i.e. air,
according to Monier-Williams, and it is space (kha: the cavity, room) according to Shankara,
since space allows to go in every directions and if space was not existing it would be
impossible to be present somewhere nor to go anywhere. But here the sūtra tells that it is not
heard of space in the Vedas. As usually, the vedāntin reads textually the Upaniṣads. In
Bṛihadāranyaka (1.2.1) Desire, who is Hunger or Death, starts by thinking "ātmanvi syām"
(lets have a self, i.e. be manifest), then he sings or praise (arc), which is a form of energy,
consequently the sun or the fire (arka). The meaning is that speach is the most fundamental
form of energy. In Chandogya also (6.2.3), after having said "bahu syām", he produces energy
which is fire: "tat tejo'sṛjata" At the beginning there was verb tells the Gospel. So He did not
creates time, then space, and after air, and after fire, as often read in many texts.

asti tu ||2.3. 2
But that is.
"tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāṡās sambhūtaḥ ākāṡād vāyuḥ vāyor agniḥ agner āpaḥ
adbhyaḥ pṛthivī… " tells the Taittirīya (2.1.1)- "From that (Brahman), id est from this Self,
was produced space, from space wind, from wind fire, from fire waters, form waters earth.
The political vedāntin after criticizing others for their lack of logics, tells us: there is no
contradiction. This creation of space and air, as described in Taittirīya, was understood
(unsaid) in Chāndogya.
Here I would like to quote another Upaniṣad, the Aitareya section 1.1, for drawing the
attention on the proper meaning of the word ambhas, usually tranlated as "cosmic waters"
"ātmā vā ekā evāgrā āsīt | nānyat kiñcana miṣat | sa aikṣata lokān nu sṛjā iti || sa
imāṁllokānasṛjata | ambho marīcīrmaram apo'do'mbhaḥ pareṇa divam | dyauḥ pratiṣṭhā |
antarikṣam marīcayaḥ | pṛthivī maro ya adhastāt tā āpaḥ || " – "The Self was alone in the
beginning. Nothing else was opening eyes. Now he considered: let me create the worlds. He
created thse worlds: "what is sounding" (from verb ambh), what is shining (marīcī: the light
ray, something that hurts, from verb mṛc), what is dying (mara, from verbe mṛ) and the
waters. What is sounding is etheral (diva) and above, it stays in the sky (dyu). What is shining
is between (antar) in the atmosphere (antarikṣa). What is dying is in the earth (pṛithivī: what is
large) and the waters (āpaḥ) are below (adhas). Varuṇa, the lokapala of waters in modern
times, was at first the lord of skies (what is covering: vṛ) invedic times. Wha tis dying means
of course what is inert, material. The first three correspond to "bhūḥ bhuvaḥ svaḥ" in reverse
order.

gauṇyasambhavāt ||2.3. 3
Because it is not a secondary product of guṇas
Of course Shankara does not use the word guṇa since he discards sāṁkhya concepts, and
asambhava (non-occurrence, non-birth, non-production) becomes impossibility in his
language. "The mention of the creation of space in the Upaniṣads has a secondary meaning
because its creation is impossible." Difficult to decide if his gibberish about inherent, non-
inherent causes is serious or ironical. "The existence of nothing else can be conceived in the
absence of space." The word space must be understood in the secondary sense of room, place
where some event mentioned in the text occurs, but not in the sense of an element like air,
fire, water or earth.

ṡabdācca ||2.3. 4
According to the Vedas also
Shankara, Ramanuja and Radhakṛiṣṇan quote the Bṛihadāranyaka section 2.3. discussing of
what is truly existing and what is actually existing. Brahman is compared to an atmosphere
(antarikṣa) and to the wind in this atmosphere (vāyu), which is also a symbol of life and
activity (bhuva). Whatever "form" (mūrti) produced from this is mortal (2.3.2), whereas
formless (amūrta) antarikṣa and vāyu are immortal (2.3.3). "This is the immortal, the
formless, the moving, this Divine Person, the essence of truth." These words are used here
with a secondary sense as pointed out by Shankara. Kṛiṣṇa also in the ṡloka "yathākāṡa sthito
nityam vāyu sarvatrago mahan tatha sarvāni bhūtani mayi stanīti" compares Himself to ākāṡa
(in the sense of atmosphere). Some modern authors speak of the sea of Brahman and compare
themselves to waves of this sea. Here again it is difficult to decide if Shankara is serious when
extracting sūtras from Taittīrya such as: Space is the body of Brahman, space is the self .
These words are used as images of speech in a text about the contemplation of the Supreme
Person residing in the space of the heart: "sa ya eṣo'ntarhṛdaya ākāṡaḥ tasmin ayam puruṣa.."
(1.6.1). Then, speaking of this Supreme Person, it is said that: "He attains splendor in the sun,
greatness in Brahman… Ce Brahman has for body space, for self truth, for delight life, for
mind bliss… Contemple-le ainsi, O Prācinayogya." In other words contemplate this true
Brahman under Its actual form, the universe.

syācchaikasya brahmaṡabdavat ||2.3. 5

And what has the nature of Brahma word (brahma-ṡabda-vat: Veda) may be (syāt) of a single
(eka)
The translation proposed by Shankara neglects the synthax: A same (single) word may have a
double meaning like the word of Brahman. Why the adjective eka is in genitive case and the
other adjective brahma-ṡabda-vat in nominative case? The missing word is probably sambhūti
(creation production). In fact, Shankara proposes a reference abounding in this sense
(Taittirīya 2.1.1 –see above): "From Self arises ether, from ether air, from air fire, from fire
water, from water earth." The Self is this Eka.
After having pretended that passages of the Upaniṣads like Taittiriya's 2.3.3 (ether is
immortal) or Taittirīya 3.3.1 (Brahman is food) should be read literally, now Shankara
aknowledges that their meaning is symbolic.

pratijñāhāniravyatirekācchabdebhyaḥ ||2.3. 6
There is no abandonment (a-hāni) of admitted statement (pratijñā) due to a lack of distinction
(avyatireka) on account ofvedic texts (ṡabda)
According to Shankara, the lack of distinction in statements refered to in this sūtra would be
the formula often found invedic texts: "Knowing That (Brahman or Self) whatever else
becomes known" (Chandogya 6.1.3, Bṛihad 6.5.6, Muṇḍaka 1.1.3…). All this has That alone
for its Self (Chandogya 6.8.7). Knowing the cause, all effects are known. Now, if ākāṡa has
no origin, it cannot be known when knowing the Brahman. Moreover there seems to be in
contradiction with Taittirīya (2.1.1.) or Muṇḍaka (2.2.11): "all this is nothing else than the
immortal Brahman." But why to continue this discussion?

yāvad vikāraṁ tu vibhāgo lokavat ||2.3. 7

now (tu), as long as (yāvat) there is modification (vikāra) there is also diversity (vibhāga) out
of/in the world (loka)
This sūtra remembers me the wonderul formula of Gītā 18.20: "sarvabhūteṣu yenaikaṁ
bhāvamavyayamīkṣate | avibhaktaṁ vibhakteṣu tajjñānaṁ viddhi sāttvikam || "This
conception of all creatures as One Existence unchangeable and undividable in their diversity,
this is true knowledge." That is the good conclusion (anta) of this discussion. Of course, I
aknowledge that the sūtra more probably aims to contradict the point of view of the
Vaiṡeṣikas (see 2.2.11).

etena mātariṡvā vyākhyātaḥ ||2.3. 8

By this (idam) the air (mātariṡvan) is explained (vyākhyāta)
Mātariṡvan is a name of Agni or of Vāyu, the one growing in the mother, which consists in
fire sticks for the former and the atmosphere or space for the later. By this (instrumental etena
from pronoun idam) refers to the lack of distinction, the many passages of Upaniṣads stating
that everythings originates from Brahman.
Now Vāyu is not passive atmosphere; he is wind, vital breath, life, activity, force. Therefore,
when Shankara refers to Bṛihadāranaya 1.5.22 as an argument to prove that the element air
has no origin, I think that is not proper. The element air (antarikṣa) is associated to the sense
of touch because it is the simplest of the 3 states of mater having the property to excite the
touch feeling. But this section of the Upaniṣad tells the story of the competition between the
devas of senses, mental and life breath. One can live without seeing, smelling, hearing,
tasting, speaking, walking, holding, thinking but not without breathing. "He is the greatest,
therefore all will be called praṇa after him.Vāyu is the divinity who never sets." –
"saiṣānastatamitā devatā yad vāyuḥ". It does not tell that Vāyu is never created. Like all
others devas he dies at the end of each kalpa and is created again. His immortality is relative,
as acknowledges Shankara himself. He points out that air has another property: it is the most
subtle of all (gas molecules interact little together) and permeates everything, like the soul.
"Vāyur vāva saṁvargaḥ | yadā vā agnir udvāyati vāyum evāpyeti…" – Air indeed is absorbing
everything; when fire goes out, it goes into air, ibid for the sun, the moon, that is for the
devas. Similarly breath is absorbing everything; when one sleeps, speech, sight, hearing, mind
go into the breath, that is for vital functions." (Chandogya 4.3.1-2). Such statements may be
wrongly interpreted by people of little understanding. They only mean that duirng the
devolution process of creation or of conciousness, air and breath go out last.

asambhavastu sato'nupapatteḥ ||2.3. 9

There is no origin (asambhava) of what is existing permanently (sat) because of impossibility
(anupapatti)
I have translated sambhava by origin because of the context, but a more straightforwad
translation is birth, production, appearance. Just as the famous ṡloka: "nāsato vidyate bhāvo
nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ" - of what is not permanently existing, there is no future advent and of
what is existing there is no disappearing (Gītā section 2.16) - without a proprer interpretation
this sūtra seems to be a truism. That which exists permanently is Brahman or the Self. By
definition Brahman is Existence. Bhāgavata say of the Almighty Lord: "īṡvaraḥ paramaḥ
kṛiṣṇaḥ sac-cid-ānanda-vigrahaḥ anādir ādir govindaḥ sarva-kāraṇa-kāraṇam" – He is
existence consciousness and bliss, without beginning and the beginning of everything else, the
cause of all causes (Brahmā saṁhita ṡloka 1). Shankara tells us that this sūtra was required
because some people may consider that: since some passages in thevedic texts tell us that
ether and air are permanent and some other passages that they arise from Brahman, maybe
also. Brahman arises from something, or from non-existence. Chandogya 6.2.1-2: "Some
people say that in the beginning there was non-existence only. From this non-existence
existence was produced. How is it possible?"

tejo'tas tathā hyāha ||2.3. 10

Similarly (tathā) from this (atas) blazing energy (tejas) it is said (ah)
Tejas is the illuminating property of energy whereas tapas is the burning property. Since
thousand years Hindus worship Fire and use it in ritual sacrifices. Therefore the word tejas is
often translated by fire which provides both light and heat during the night. Nevertheless tejas
means here the object of sight: colour and shape. This section of the Brahma sūtras lists the
elements in the order of sāṁkhya theory: air is created before light because air has no colour
nor shape. "Brahman whose shape is light" – bhārūpaḥ (Chandogya 3.14.2). Consequently,
some apparent contradictions discussed by the vedāntin and his vṛittikāra opponent are only
apparent at my opinion. In most quoted texts tejas is synonimous of ṡakti, such as: "tad
aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeyeti tat tejo'sṛjataḥ | tad teja aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeyeti tad
apo'sṛjata ..."- "It (He) meditated: I should be many, I should procreate, then It emitted
energy. This energy meditated: I should be many, I should procreate, then it emitted
waters…" (Chandogya 6.2.3). Because water is the matrix of life and the Upaniṣad is
concerned more by the creation of life (I should be many) than by the creation of matter. The
next step in the Upaniṣād is the creation of food and after creatures which are eating
(proceeding from) this food. This text declares clearly that fire originates from Brahman,
points out the vṛittikāra. No, retorts the vedāntin: "it should be conceived that after creating
space and air the Brahman assuming the form of air creates fire". Saying that, he
supposes/"assumes" a personification of Brahman, which is quite pleasant on his behalf. Lets
note that the Existence, then the Energy, then the Waters, which are meditating "I should be
many and procreate" are obviously personifications of these concepts.

āpaḥ ||2.3. 11
(Similarly) the waters (āpas)

pṛthivyadhikārarūpaṡabdāntarebhyaḥ ||2.3. 12
Earth (pṛittivi) has the prerogative (adhikāra) of shape (rūpa) from the content (antara) ofvedic
texts (ṡābda)
Adhikāra is the privilege of action: "karmaṇyevādhikāraste mā phaleṣu kadācan" – the
execution of actions is your share but in not any case their fruit" (Gītā 2.47). The meaning is
obvious: solid matter has among other properties a shape, contrarily to fluids like water and
air. But polarized on Chāndogya section 6.2, Shankara reads: "the word food means earth on
ths strength of the topics, colour, and othervedic texts." So the invoked text says: "tā āpa
aikṣanta bahvyaḥ syāma prajāyemahīti tā annam asṛjnata | tasmād yatra kva ca varṣati tad
eva bhūyiṣṭham annam bhavati | adbhya eva tad adhyannādyam jāyate (Ch. 6.2.4). "teṣām
khalveṣām bhūtānāṁ trīnyeva bījani bhavanti…" (Ch. 6.3.1) – These waters meditated: "we
should be many, we should procreate", and they emitted food. That is why wherever it rains
food appears. Consequently food originates from water alone. (6.2.4) Now of these creatures
there are indeed three kinds of seeds… The purpose of the Chāndogya is to underline the
importance of food in the existence of creatures and the sacrifice involved in the food cycle.
"sahayajñāḥ prajāḥ sṛṣṭvā purovāca prajāpatiḥ" (Gītā 3.10) "annādbhavanti bhūtani
parjanyādannasambhavaḥ | yajñādbhavati parjanyo yajñaḥ karmasamudbhavaḥ || (Gītā 3.14)
– In the past Prajāpati procreated creatures together with sacrifice (…saying them: be
prosperous with this sacrifice). Indeed creatures originate from food, food from rain, rain
from sacrifice and sacrifice from action.
Shankara justifies his free interpretation of the sūtra by stating: the creation of earth was
omitted/ understood in this passage of Chāndogya. Morover earth is often dark and food also.
No, answers the vṛittikāra, since milk is white. Let's add that rice and flour also. This
discussion is childish. It is true that solid materials are often opaque whereas liquids are
transparent even when tainted, because of the higher density of solids.

tadabhidhyānādeva tu talliṅgāt saḥ ||2.3. 13

But from meditation (abhidhyāna) about that, He (is indicated) through that sign (liṅga).
The vedāntin and the vṛittikara argue about the authorship of creation: is it waters which
create food or the Almighty as the self of the Waters? Shankara says that we should translate
this sūtra by: "He only created all this by meditating on it, as indicated by His mark". The sign
or mark is a statement in the Upaniṣad of His autoship. The waters or the earth don't know,
says the vedāntin, as testified by various passages of the Upaniṣads, such as Bṛihadāranyaka
3.7.3: "yaḥ pṛthivyāṁ tiṣṭan yam pṛithivī na veda" – He who is staying in earth and whom
earth don't know. He is the Internal Controler (antaryāmin). The refrain of this section (3.7) is
: " yaḥ antaro yamayati, eṣa ta ātmāntaryāmī amṛitaḥ" - He who is eternal, who alone is
knowing everything, controling everything from inside, including you".
 viparyayeṇa tu kramo'ta upapadyate ca ||2.3. 14
But from this (tu atas) the proceeding (krama) occurs (upapad) inversely (viparyaya) also (ca)
(upon dissolution)
Because it is logical, says the vedāntin. He quotes only one passage of the Upaniṣads
(Taittirīya 3.1.1.) in which Varuṇa tells to his son Bhṛigu (in Cakṣu manvantara the sage
Bhṛigu is reborn from Varuṇa): " That from which creatures are born, through which they live
and into which they dissolve (prayā), that is Brahman, wish to know That." There is no
passage telling in which order they dissolve. It is told only in smṛitis.

antarā vijñānamanasī krameṇa talliṇgād iti cennāviṡeṣāt ||2.3. 15

Not indeed (cet na) from that which is called sign (iti tat liṅga) with/while proceeding (krama)
within (antarā) the comprehensive mind (vijñāna-manas) owing to the lack of difference
(aviṡesa)
According to Shankara: If someone considers (cet iti) that intelligence vijñāna) and mind
(manas) find place somewhere in between (antara) in the sequence of creation or dissolution
(krama) on account of some sign, it is wrong because their existence does not make a
difference in the sequence. This translation ignores completely the syntax of the sūtra. The
Vṛittikāra quotes Muṇḍaka 2.1.3: "from That Person divine, formless, without senses are born
life, mind, all the sense organs, all elements." But this statement does not specify in which
order these creations occur. Senses are necessarily formed from elements states the vedāntin.
Not exactly at my opinion. The senses are most probably formed from tanmatras, the subtle
sensations, independently from the support of the sensations which are the elements. The
tanmatra is the sattvic component, the sense is the rajasic component and the element is the
tamasic component of each kind of contact with the reality. Anyway, the vedāntin retorts by a
quotation of the Chāndogya (6.5.4), out of context: "mind consists of food, breath consists of
water and speech consists of heat." Previous sentences in this section of the Chāndogya say:
food (solid matter) is in 3 "forms" (dhā: type, place) in the body and mind is the most subtle
(aniṣṭha) form, likewise water (fluid matter) is in 3 forms in the body and breath is the most
subtle form, heat (energy) is also in 3 forms in the body and speech is the most subtle form.
Beside these subtle forms there are middle (madhyama) forms like the flesh, the blood and the
marrow, and there are broad/dense (sthūra) forms like faeces, urine and bones. The subtle
form in anything is the one moving upwards (6.6). Now the previous section (6.4) tells
another story about the existence of 3 other kinds of "forms" (rūpa: shapes which are in fact
colours) within the fire, the sun and the moon (section 6.4), which are also made of the
elements earth, water and heat. Then the following section (6.7) tells us that if someone fasts
for some time and takes only water, he will remain in life since he saved his breath but he will
no more understand a speech since he is lacking mind and energy. So the teaching of
Chāndogya chapter 6 is the following one:
(1) All created entities are of mixed qualities. Even earth has a taste, a colour, a density and
emits sounds. The breath (prāṇa), which is said to be made of water in this respect that all
fluids in the body are called prāṇas in Upaniṣads, has also qualities of air (vāyu) and
space/cavity (kha). The mind is said to be the subtle form of food in the body because the
brain must be fed. But it is also fluid like water as the deva Chandramas (moon) presides to
reasoning and is associated with all fluids. The mind is also energetic since the deva Sūrya
(sun) who provides light stirs our intelligence (Savitṛi). Speech is manly energy since it
results from an action: the propelling of air from the cavity of the lungs. But it involves breath
which is water and thoughts formed in the mind which is food.
(2) The truth of each entity lies in the sum of its forms ("trīṇi rūpaṇītyeva satyam" 6.4).
(3) The number three refers to sattva, rajas, tamas. One is subtle, another is middle and the
last is rough.
 carācaravyapāṡrayas tu syāt tadvyapadeṡo bhāktāstadbhāvabhāvitvāt ||2.3. 16
The shelter (vyapaṡraya) of whatever is moving (cara) or motionless (acara) would be that
name (vyapadeṡa) since becoming necessarily (bhāvitva) in that state (tat bhāva) as assigned
(bhākta)
Vyapadeṡa is a "localisation", i.e a representation, a name and the later option seems
appropriate in correlation with the previously quoted section 6.4 of Chāndogya
(vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāma-dheyam – the modification being only a name).
According to Shankara: the indication (vyapadeṡa) of that (birth and death) is in relation with
(taking shelter in - vyapaṡraya) the moving and the motionless; it should be (syāt) used in a
secondary sense (bhākta) when a body (bhāva) is available (bhāvitva). The purpose would be
to correct the misconception that a person is born or dead; her (his) name is mentioned only in
correlation with a body existing at the time of a tale. In fact the two tranlations have same
meaning. Whatever has becomed transformed from the basic state of earth, water and energy
in a more complex creature moving or unmoving acquires a given name (transformation is a
change of name: vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāma-dheyam), whichis meaningful onely in this
transformed state. Still the same chapter 6 of Chāndogya states that (6.11.3): "jīvāpeta vāva
kiledaṁ mriyate na jīvo mriyata" – that from which life has departed die, not the living entity.
One could quote half the ṡlokas of Gītā section 2 and of the Katha Upaniṣad on this topics.

nātmāṡṛuter nityatvācca tābhyaḥ ||2.3. 17

Not the self according to the Vedas (ṡruti) because of his eternity (nityatva) according to the
the same ṡṛutis.
Tābhyaḥ: from them, female plural ablative of tat, refers to the ṡrutis and ṡruteḥ to the same
but in singular ablative case. (?)
The Vrittikāra emits the doubt that jīva may be created by Brahman together with the
elements etc…, since jīva is limited, has pious and impious activities and is separate in each
body. This point of view is hardly credible on his behalf. The deliberate confusion of
Brahman with jīva-ātma in all Upaniṣads is a fundamental point of the Hindu faith. He quotes
two passages of Bṛihad (2.1.30) and Muṇḍaka (2.1.1) with close meanings: "Like spikes
originate from a fire, from That Unalterable (akṣara) originate a multitude of temporary
existences (bhāvāḥ) and they return to It." This verse may indeed be confusing because jīva is
usually considered as a spark, a particle or a ray (aṁṡa) of the Unalterable Brahman shining
like a sun, but this Sun only is truly existing and the rays or particles remain part of It. That
which is all, is one by definition even when it appears like a multitude of sparks. To the
argument of the vṛittikara the vedāntin retorts only passages of the Upaniṣads liable to
entertain the confusion between Self and self (adhyātman and jīvātman), or to sustain the truth
of unicity (ekatva), depending on the personal interpretation of each believer. The uncertainty
originates in the identification with a temporary presence (a name). Once jīva has freed
himself from this identification, the identity (name or so called personality in modern
language) disappears definitely upon death of the body. Shnakara quotes this beautiful
passage 4.5.13 of Bṛihadāranyaka: "As this salt which is like a condensation of the sea is
without inside and outside, its essence being fully that of taste (of the sea: kṛtsna rasa-ghana),
similarly that ātmā is without inside and outside, its essence being fully a condensation of
intelligence (kṛtsnaḥ prajñāna-ghana). After exiting from these creatures, they vanish and
there is no more recognition (conciousness) of them after their departure. Bṛihad 4.5.15:
"Indeed where there is duality, someone sees the other, but where everything has become the
self (oneself), by what and whom should one see? "

)jño'ta eva ||2.3. 18

 The one knowing (jñaḥ) precisely (eva) for this reason (atas)
The discussion between the vedāntin and the vṛittikara come back on the topic of the
definition of consciousness (sūtra 1.1 and 1.3.42). Does it require that an object be available?
Or is it a permanent state of awareness/ knowledge of the self? The answer is clear for the
vedāntin who acknowledge only the existence of One Self: "vijñānam ānandam brahma"
(Bṛihad. 3.9.28); "satyam jñānam anantam brahma yo veda" (Taittirya 2.1.1) – "he who
knows the Brahman as truth knowledge and infinity". As regard the permanence of the
consciousness or knowledge of the individual self, it is said in Bṛihad 4.3.30: "na hi vijñātur
vijñāter viparilopo vidyate avināṡitvāt" – "there is no destruction of the knowlede of the
knower because he never vanishes / is permanent." Awareness and perception or thought are
2 different things. During deep sleep one does not perceive light, smells, sounds, and
nevertheless he is conscious.

utkrāntigatyāgatīnām ||2.3. 19
(There is) departure (utkrānti) of those going (gati) and coming back (āgati)
The meaning is unclear, the verbs utkram (to go or walk out, away) and gam (to go, to move,
to pass) being more or less synonimous. The topics of Bṛihadāranyaka's section 4.3 was the
wandering of the immortal outside of the body during dream and deep sleep. During deep
sleep he forgets all material aspirations and problems and he become full of bliss. At the end
of the section and in next section 4.4, it is question of the departure of the same upon death:
he is tired, his senses and vital fluids (prāṇa) are waiting for him like a king (4.3.36-38), they
gather around him for leaving, he takes them inside himself and departs alone, if possible
through the eye (the proper hole for light) or the top of the head, or another aperture of the
body (4.4.1). He becomes pure consciousness, intelligent, knowledgeable with his experience
of life (4.4.2). Then the immortal soul is compared to a caterpillar heaving itself up from a
leaf to another leaf: he moves into another matrix of his choice and build another body at his
convenience (4.4.3, 4.4.4). He is Brahman Itself (sa vā ayam ātmā brahma), constituted
(mayaḥ) of intelligence, knowledge, senses, elements, desire, anger, fear, dharma, and he
becomes what constitutes him: his past actions and desires (4.4.5). Someone having no desire,
no attachement, no fruit of past action to collect, goes to Brahman (4.4.6).

svātmanā cottarayoḥ ||2.3. 20

(The occurrence) of the latter two with one own self (sva-ātman)
The latter two (the adjective uttara is in dual number genitive case) are obviously gati and
āgati. At my opinion the author wants to emphasize that the person leaving a body and
entering another is exactly the same. But Shankara considers that the atomic size of the ātman
is invoked by this sūtra (the word aṇu comes in next sūtra). Moreover it is often mentioned
that the ātman goes in tight places like the eye or other holes, the heart…

nāṇuratacchruteriti cennetarādhikārāt ||2.3. 21

If not (cet na) of what is heard of in Vedas (atas ṡruti) as being of minute size (aṇu iti), then
not because of the prerogative (adhikāra) of the other (itara)
Itara-adhikāra being a compound word, the adhikāra is related to the other (itara: among two
items of same nature). Adhikāra is usually the presidence over (adhi) something done (kṛita) ,
the ownership, the right to rule; but in grammar that is also the heading of a paragraph and
Shnakara prefers this particular meaning. Nevertheless that leads him to the same
interpretation: the other of the two is the parama-ātman or Brahman. The latter is all
pervasive, infinite. I don’t understand the importance given to the size of an immaterial entity
who don’t need any kind of space (kha) nor time for existing. Ask to Einstein: he will tells
you that space, time and substance are related by his equation in material world. Both jīva and
parama-ātman are sitting together in the heart (sūtra 1.2.11).

svaṡabbdonmānābhyāṁ ca ||2.3. 22
Owing to mentions (ṡabda) of infinitesimality (unmānā) by Himself in Vedas (sva) also (ca)
According to some texts unmāna (a name with neutral gender) is a particular unit of area,
equal to 32x32 cubits=1024 sq.yds=l/9 bigha =0.15 acre. In some other texts it is a unit of
volume since it is comparable to a droṇa. Here the word is female (unmānā). Radhakṛṣṇan,
quoting someone named Ṡrīnivāsa, tells that is a measure distinct of all gross measures by its
minuteness. Among other sva-ṡabda, Shankara quotes the Svetasvatara Upaniṣad .5.8-9 and
the Muṇḍaka 3.1.9.

avirodhaṡcandanavat ||2.3. 23
There is no opposition (avirodha) , being like (vat) sandal (candana)
According to Radhakṛṣṇan a drop of sandal paste applied on a small area of the body provides
an agreeable sensation to the whole body. If it is the case, the warriors of Mahābhārata were
fighting in a state of bliss because they were covering their whole body with sandal paste.
Nowadays sandal trees have almost disappeared because of this extensive use in the past and
synthetic sendal is used in cosmetics or incense sticks. Joke apart, the bliss provided by sandal
or by the presence of the soul extends over the whole body. Radhakṛṣṇan quote Gītā 13.33:
the soul standing in the heart enlightens the whole body.

avasthitivaiṡeṣyāditi cennābhyupagamāddhṛdi hi ||2.3. 24

If (cet) ascribing that (iti + ablative case of following word) to the peculiarity (vaiṡeṣya) of his
position (avasthiti), that is wrong (na) on account of acknowledgement (abhyupagama) it is in
the heart (hṛd) certainly (hi)
If somebody argues that we don’t know in which particular part of the body is staying the
soul, there are many statements in Vedas such as Chāndogya 8.3.3, Bṛhad 4.3.77, and in Gītā
18.61.

guṇādvā lokavat ||2.3. 25

Owing to his quality or like in the world
Owing to the pervasiveness of conciousness or the abiltiy of a small lamp to enlighten a
whole room in the house, the soul is aware of the whole body. The Vṛittikāra objects that a
quality is linked to a substance and he is right: the word guṇa is quite inappropriate.

vyatireko gandhavat ||2.3.26

There is separation (vyatireka) like the smell (gandhavat)
The Vedantin suppose that consciousness separates from the soul like a smell for a flower and
the Vṛittikāra corrects him: the smell is attached to a subtance emanating from the flower.
Their discussion on the topics is out of scope since consciousness is not a material quality.

tathā ca darṡayati ||2.3. 27

In that matter (tathā) it is shown also (dṛṡ)
As usual the verb to see (dṛṡ) is used in the figurative sense of to understand, and its causative
form to show (dṛṡ+i) in the sense of to be revealed invedic texts.

pṛthagupadeṡāt ||2.3. 28
Separatly (pṛtak) account of indication / instruction (upadeṡa)
on
The faculty of understanding (intelligence) is separated (different) from consciousness, as
clearly established in the comparison of the soul to a traveler seating on the car of the body
driven by intelligence holding the reins of the mind.

tadguṇasāratvāt tu tadvyapadeṡaḥ prājñavat ||2.3. 29

But that distinction (vyapadeṡa) as having the faculty (vat) of intelligence (prajña) is made on
account of the strength (sāratva) of that quality (guṇa – i.e. pervasiveness)
Astonishingly sāra, originating from verb sṛi (to flow, like Sarasvati) is used with both
meaning of motion and firmness, strength. Vy-apa-diṡ means to indicate a difference, to
designate as something apart. The vedāntin and the vṛittikāra pursue their argumentation
about the size of the soul and the substance of consciousness. Ramanuja considers that the
important word here is jñā: knowledge, prajñā being etymologically what allows access to
knowledge. On account of his pervasiveness the soul is named (vyapadiṡta) the knower of the
field: kṣetra-jñā.

yāvadātmabhāvitvācca na doṣastaddarṡanāt ||2.3. 30

From this perception (darṡana) no fault (doṣa) as long (yāvat) as ātmā (is submitted to the
obligation of) becoming again (bhāvitva)
In fact, tells the vedāntin, there is no such thing as an individual soul. That which is called
intelligence is acting as a conditioning factor: the Self (the Brahman) is influenced by the
embodiment, by its association with individual intelligence. He identifies with cognition. But
Shankara misinterprets quoted passages (4.3.7, 4.4.5) of the Bṛihadāranyaka. The term used
for qualifying the Self in the both is "made of full knowledge" (vijñānamaya) and sentense
4.4.5 add "made of everything else" (sarvamaya). Intelligence (prajña) is included in the
everything but not mentioned. Moreover, far from stating that the Self has a wrong perception
of itself and the surrounding world (darṡana + doṣa) , the sentense 4.3.7 says exactly:"What is
the Self? That person who (yo'yam puruṣa) consists of full knowledge (vijñānamaya) about
the various life fluids (prāṇeṣu), the light within the heart. Remaining the same (equanimous:
sama), he visits the two worlds (reality and dream, life and after-life) seeming to be
meditating or playing. Becoming asleep he transcends this world and the forms of death
(consisting precisely in the identification to any material state)."

puṁstvādivat tvasya sato'bhivyaktiyogāt ||2.3.31

But (tu) a state (vat) of him (asya) like let say (ādi) manhood (puṁstva) is existing (sataḥ)
because of a link (yoga) with a manifested distinction /personality (abhivyakti)
According to Radhakrishnana and Shankaracarya: if someone argues that in deep sleep there
is no more connection of the soul with the intellect, that is wrong: it is still exsiting because of
the potential manifestation (abhivyakti-yoga) of an individual character like virility etc…

nityopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasaṅgo'nyataraniyamovānyathā ||2.3.32
The control/or limitation (niyama) of either of the two (anyatara) or (vā) otherwise (anyathā)
the permanent (nitya) tendency (pra) to bonding (saṅga) with acquisition/perception
(upalabdhi) or lack of acquisition/perception
According to Shankaracaraya and Radhakrishnan: otherwise (if intelligence was not existing)
there would be a permanent link with perception or non perception or (the power) of the two
(the two being the sense sand the soul) would be limited. If one supposes that the inner organ
(mental + intelligence) is not existing, then perception may only be the act of the soul. But the
sould being changeless, then it would remain aware only of itself, says Shankara. Otherwise
the decision of perceiving or ignoring a sensation is taken by the inner organ, which informs
the soul in former case. Such a reading requires lot of imagination. I agree that perception and
acquisition are "powers" of the senses and of the mental and their analysis involves
intelligence. Ramanuja says that the soul is conscious only when embodied, or it would be
permanently conscious of the whole universe. In fact, he has not understood that
embodiement limits the field of consciousness like some kind of incarceration. The so called
inner organ conditions the consciousness of the soul.

kartā ṡāstrārthavattvāt ||2.3.33

Owing to the puposefulness (arthavat-tva) of the rule (ṡāstra), it/he (the soul) is the doer
(kartṛ)
The rule is decreed by the Vedas with the purpose of helping the soul in its choice. Shankara
says that if they did not establish rules the scriptures would be purposeless. He refers to
Praṡna Upaniṣad (sentence 4.9) for giving a proof of the responsibility of the soul: "eṣā hi
drṣtā spraṣṭā ṡrotā ghrātā rasayitā mantā boddhā kartā vijñānātmā puruṣaḥ sa pare'kṣara
ātmani sampratiṣṭhati " – He verily is the seer, the toucher, the hearer, the smeller, the taster,
the perceiver, the knower, the doer, the comprehensive self, this person who is established in
the higher unalterable Self. Nevertheless one may have a doubt about the identity of the doer
in waking and dreaming states, because this statement is true in a given context, which is
dreamless sleep (suṣupti). Indeed the same Upaniṣad states previously (in 4.2.): during
dreaming state, all the senses become unified in the mind like rays in the setting sun, and the
mind is the ruling god ("tat sarvam pare deve manasyekībhavati"). The person sees not, hears
not, smells not… (4.2). There, in dreaming state (svapna) the fires of life (prānās) alone
remain awake in the city of the body (4.3) and the mind becomes the sacrificer (i.e. the doer –
4.4). The mind-god sees again what had been seen in waking state, hears again what has been
heard…. (4.5). When he (male, who may be ātman, or deva, or puruṣa, but not manas) is
overcome with light, then the god sees no dreams and happiness arises in this body (4.6).
Then everything rest in the supreme Self (tat sarvam para ātmani sampratiṣṭhante): elements,
senses and their objets, mind and what can be perceived, intelligence and what can be
conceived, identity (ahaṁkāṛa) and what can be identified, thought and what can be thought,
light and what can be illuminated, life breath and what can be supported (4.8). However the
doer is jīva-ātman and the mind the active means said in Prāṣna sentence 3.3: "ātmanā eṣa
prāno jāyate | … maṇokṛtena-āyāty-asmin ṡarīre". Brihad (2.1.18) confirms that in all states
of consciousness the doer is the puruṣa: evaiṣā etat prāṇān gṛhītvā sve ṡārīre yathākāmam
parivartate – this puruṣa taking his life breaths with him roams in his body satisfying desires.
That is also the meaning of following sūtra. But that is not the point of view of Gītā: the
puruṣa is the doer as long as he identifies himself with body components listed above in
Praṣna Upaniṣad 4.8 (senses, mind, intelligence, ahaṁkāra) or with the 3 Prakṛiti components,
i.e. the guṇas.

vihāropadeṡāt ||2.3.34
Owing to what is teached (upadeṡā) he is sporting (vihāra)

upādānāt || 2.3.35
Owing to the gift received
The quotations of Shankara are not appropriate. The gifts are the senses, mind, intelligence
and in some respect life breaths (Prāṣna Upaniṣad says that he is life breath).

vyapadeṡācca kriyāyāṁ na cennirdeṡaviparyayaḥ || 2.3.36

And on account of (his designation (vyapadeṡa) in activity (kriyā) even (ced) there is no (na)
contradictory (viparyaya) specification (nirdeṡa)
The vedāntin and his opponent come back to the intelligence mentioned in sūtras 2.3.29,
2.3.30 for pointing out that the doer is not intelligence but the jīvātman.

upalabdhivadaniyamaḥ ||2.3.37
There is no control/limitation (aniyama) in what is like perception (upalabdhi-vat)
Shankara and other tenants of Vedānta read: as in the case of perception there is no limitation
in the performance of actions, and this lack of limitation or control is analysed as an
independence on the information agent, i.e. intelligence. That seems to contradict previous
discussions about sūtras 2.3.28, 2.3.32. If the "mental stuf" (sic Vivekananda) or intelligence
(vijñāna) decides to not inform jīva of some perception, where is the soul independence?

ṡakti viparyayāt || 2.3.38

Because of the reversal (viparyaya of power (ṡakti)
If intelligence was taking the decisions and consequently was the doer, there would be a
reversal of power. Of course this analysis of action is in complete contradiction with the Gītā.

samādhyabhāvācca ||2.3.39
Because of the non occurence (abhāva) of transcendence (samādhī)
Some quotatins about the nature of samādhī: Gītā (2.44, 4.24, 6.20-23). Shankara
quotes the famous ṣutra of Bṛihadāranayaka (2.4.5): "ātmā draṣṭavyaḥ ṡrotavyo mantavyo
nididhyāsitavyaḥ" – ātmā is to be looked for, listened for, reflected upon, meditated upon. He
quotes also Muṇḍaka (2.2.6): "aumityevaṁdhyāyathātmānam svasti va paraya tamasaḥ
parastāt" –meditate on the self as aum and may you transcend ignorance. The same Muṇḍaka
Upanishad (2.2.3) teaches also that one should take the bow of upaniṣads, set on it the arrow
of consciousness (cetas) sharpened by meditation and point it toward the heart where is
dwelling the target consisting in Brahman. Bṛhad uses the same verb upās (pay attention,
revere, be devoted to) as Muṇḍaka verse 2.2.3 for recommending to meditate on breath
(prāṇa). Chāndogya recommend to meditate on Gāyatrī, which itself expresses the wish to be
able to meditate. The purpose of Upaniṣads is indeed to serve meditation. The first section of
Jābāladarṡana Upaniṣad deals also with dhyāna-yoga and samādhī. Paingala Upaniṣad verse
3.4 tells that in samādhī the thinking agent (citta) itself becomes the object of meditation.

yathā ca takṣobhayathā || 2.3.40

As / like that (yathā) one cutting (takṣa) in both cases (ubhayathā)
The condition of doer cannot be in the nature of the soul, says Shankara, else it could never be
free. When it/he associates itself to actions and their fruits it gets the attribute of enjoyer
(Katha 1.3.4); therefore that is not its natural state. Moreover, "intelligent people know that
there is no individual soul": here Shankara refers to the section about the antaryamin in
Bṛihadāranyaka (3.7) – "yaḥ tiṣṭhan xxxx eṣa ta ātmāntaryāmyamṛtaḥ - he who dwell in this
and that, he is yourself, your inner controller immortal."
The tenant of dharma sūtras argues that, if there is no other self dwelling in the body, one
should admit that the Brahman undergoes saṁsara. No answers the vedāntin because when
the individual soul is a doer, it/he is in a state of ignorance and when it(he) is enlightened
there is nobody else than It(him) and no object to be done (Bṛihadāranyaka 2.4.14 about
unicity of existence already quoted several times). My point of view is: the living soul who is
actually existing and being a tiny part of the universal soul, is an individual doer when
considering itself as such and a free witness when considering itself as such. He quotes Vyasa
saying; that is like a carpenter (cutter) being a doer when holding a saw and becoming free
when leaving his saw, without giving the reference.

parāt tu tacchruteḥ || 2.3.41

But that (comes from) the Other who is beyond/superior (para), on account of what is heard in
Vedas (ṡruti)
The question is: does the creature acts independently of the Lord, by its own will or is it
controled? The Lord is the ultimatre cause of all actions says the vedāntin (Kauṣītakī 3.8,
Bṛihad 3.7.3-23): one should not try to understand the senses, their actions and their objects,
but only the intelligent self beyond. All the senses, the mind and the intelligence are
dependant on the self as are the felly and the spokes on the nave of the wheel.
Ramanuja quote Gītā 15.15 and 18.61 about the Lord present in the heart of all creatures,
source of memory and forgivness and conditioning them in their activity through His māyā
(the guṇas). Kṛiṣṇa says also: mama vartma-anuvartante manuṣyāḥ pārtha sarvaṡaḥ (4.11) -
humans folow the path I have established for them in all respects.

kṛtaprayatnāpekṣastu vihitapratiṣiddhāvaiyarthyādibhyaḥ ||2.3.42

But is taken into consideration (apekṣa) the exertion (prayatna) made (kṛta) on account first
(adi) of established (vihita) perception (ave) of what is wise (arthya) or forbiden (pratiṣiddha).
Ramanuja quotes the ṡlokas 10.10, 10.11 of Gītā: I drive the intelligence of these who are
devoted to me and for them I destroy the darkness of ignorance. He quotes also the
condamnation of evil people in section 16 of Gītā ending with ṡloka 16.19: "These vilest
persons, hostile and cruel, I hurl them in a transmigration among evil species."
Shankaracarya, forgetting that he was denying previously the duality of the living soul and
Universal Soul, asserts here that the Lord takes into account the exertion of the living soul in
its/his previous lives in the choice of its fate. God is not a dictator. Good!

aṁṡo'nānāvyapadeṡādanyathā cāpi dāṡakitavāditvamadhīyata eke || 2.3.43

It is a tiny part (aṁṡa) owing to multiple (nānā) indications (vyapadeṡa) otherwise (anyathā)
some people (eka) read (adhī) also (api) in the conditions of amoral barbarians /slaves (dāṡa)
and cheats (kita) etc (ādi)…
"mamaivāṁṡo jiva-loke jīva-bhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ"- "The eternal living creature in the world of
conditioned life is tiny part of Myself" says Kṛiṣṇa (Gītā 15.7).
Shankara reads nānā as different/other (anya), whereas in fact this word means differently, in
various ways when it is used as an adverb, and multiple when it is used as an adjective. He
quotes passages of the Bṛihadanayaka and Chāndogya where is is question of searching the
self or the inner controler as proofs that there are two persons dwelling in each living body
(the term creature is confusing since Kṛiṣṇa qualifies it as eternal). All creatures are tiny parts
of God or tiny rays of This Sun, even the an-āryans (un-just) qualified of dāṡā, the gambler
(kita) or the dog-eaters (ṡva-pāca) as they are called in ṡloka 5.18 of Gītā.

mantravarṇāca||2.3.44
Froms words (varṇa) of mantras also
Varṇa is a colour, a species, a class of men, but also a voyel, a letter, a syllab, a sound, a
word.
I don’t understand in which respect the sentence 8.15.1 of Chāndogya is relevant for defining
what is called a bhūta. This adjective means becomed, i.e. being temporarily and can be used
as well for designing all created things (elements, minerals, herbs or animals) and in other
contexts the host of living bodies.
 api ca smaryate || 2.3.45
That is remembered also
In other words from texts which are not considered as parts of the Vedas. According to
vedāntins the Gītā is not an Upaniṣad. Here everybody quotes the ṡloka 15.7 which I have
mentioned above.

prakāṡādivannaivaṁ paraḥ || 2.3.46

Like what is luminous (prakāṡa-vat) and other qualities (ādi) not even He is superior (paraḥ)
Shankara and Radhakrishnan read: The Supreme Self (paraḥ) is not affected by suffering as
light is not affected by anything. Ramanuja's meditation on this sūtra is more significant: He
(paraḥ is male) is superior to whatever proceeds from Him like light or the individual soul.
The same can be said of the Brahman (in that case neutral: param) which is superior to light,
matter and the individual soul.

smaranti ca || 2.3.47
They remember from texts known as smṛitis also
Radhakṛishnan quotes Muṇḍaka and Katha Upaniṣads (forgetting that an Upaniṣad is a ṡruti
but not a smṛiti) for coroborating the previous interpretation of sūtra 2.3.46: He is not tainted
by the fruits of action more than the lotus leaves by water. He should have referred to Gīṭā
5.10. From their discussion, it is no more clear who, among Shankara and his opponent
Vṛittikāra, is defending the advaita concept: Tat tvam asi (Chāndogya 6.8.7), purnam idam –
that is full… ((Bṛihad 5.1.1). The vṛittikāra asks: how is it possible for the individual soul to
be an aṁṡa of the Supreme Soul since the latter is partless? He misundertand this famous
statement of the Bṛihad, which is: Brahman is not a quantitative entity which can be divided,
and tha tis true also for the Self, who (as indicated by the name) is the self of the self.

anujñāparihārau dehasambandhājjyotirādivat ||2.3.48

Owing to the association (saṁbhanda) with a body (deha), He acts as (vat) the source of light
(jyotiḥ) on that which is assented (anujña) and that which is omitted (parihāra) (or permitted
and prohibited), etc.. (ādi)
Shankara and radhakṛishnan read on the contrary: "injunction and prohibition become
effective owing to the association with a body, just like in the case of light etc…"
Fondamentally there are no obligations. The idea that something is allowed or forbidden is a
misconception owing to the identification with the body. Here theVṛittikāra suggests wisely:
it is precisely someone who knows that he is not the body who is concerned by rules (ṡastras).
The vedāntin disagrees: for him the materialist is concerned bythe rules of scriptures! As
regards the comparison to light, the idea is: one who is enlightened is not concerned by the
rules because he is not associated to actions. But sūtras 2.3.33 and 34 stated that the
individual soul is the doer! Ramanuja underlines the fact that prohibitions and permissions
depend on the nature of the embodiment: for instance it is allowed for a lion to eat meat, but
not for a man if he has access to plenty of wheat, rice, oil and milk products.

asantateṡcāvyatikaraḥ || 2.3.49
There is no reciprocity/or confusion (a-vyatikara) because of the lack of extension/ connection
(asaṁtati).
According to Shankara and Radhakrishnan: on account of the unity of the self, one may think
tha the result of an action could be imparted to somebody else, but that is not true because the
action affect only the soul embodied in the body performing the action. The responsabiltiy
does not extend to others. So the sūtra does not deny the confusion of authorship or extension
of karma between the individual soul and the Universal Soul.

ābhāsa eva ca || 2.3.50

And He is just (eva) splendour (ābhāsa)
The prefix ā underlines the luminous nature (bhāsa), as does also the conjunction eva. But
according to the Monier-Williams dictionary, in the language of vedāntins this word means
the contrary: a fake appearance, a reflection. The individual soul is a mere reflection of the
Universal Soul, as the reflection of the sun at the surface of water. Therefore the result of
actions associated to a fake appearance cannot be ascribed to any other. Moreover, "since a
fake appearance is a creation of ignorance, the transmigration of this appearance is also a
creation of ignorance." The only truth is the identity of the soul with Brahman. Ramanuja
ciriticizes this image, arguing that if the soul is a mere reflection of the Sun , his occultation
means the destruction of the individual soul. Radhakrishnan points out that there are two
kinds of vedāntins: some believe that the soul is ma mere reflection (pratibimba) and some
that he is Brahman fully (avaccheda).

adṛṣṭāniyamāt || 2.3.51
On account of the lack of restriction (a-nyama) of the unseen (adṛṣṭa)
Shankara reads: "since unseen potential results of an action cannot be allocated individually."
Ni-yama which is usually considered as an efficient (ni) restriction, a control (yama) of
oneself is for him a lack of limitation and allocation can be interpreted as a limitation. What
these philosophers call adṛṣṭa is unclear to me. According to them action occurs in Nature and
their results belong to Nature. They are not associated to a soul, who is pure by essence.
Consequently the tenants of Sāṁkhya or of Vaiṡeṣika conclude that one undergoes the results
of action at random. In other words this adṛṣṭa is fate.

abhisandhyādiṣvapi caivam || 2.3.52

And even in junctions etc..
Saṁ-dhyā is a junction or union (from sam-dhā) and can be considered a san agreement (more
properly called saṁdhi). According to Shankara abhi-saṁdhyā is a resolution and this word
does not appear in the dictionnary. The same objection applies to resolves.

pradeṡāditi cennāntarbhāvāt || 2.3.53

If it is said (ced iti) that (the attribution of thr fruits of actions springs) from localization
(pradeṡa), that is not right because the presence (bhāva) is inside (antar)
"If it is said that the result of action is linked to the separate body, it cannot be so because all
the souls are omnipresent in all bodies." says Shankara. He speaks of "two souls sharing a
same experience through a single body" and of "parts of partless soul" (at leadt in my
translation of his comments by Swami Gambhirananda (Advaita Ashrama Publication,
Kolkata1965). Radhakrishnan points ut that this idea of all souls being all pervading was
proposed by the Nyāya school of thought, the point of view of Vedānta school being that
there is only One Self (Brahman). Ramanuja holds that all souls don’t have same connection
with a body (which he calls upādhi: substitute, appearance), else Brahman would suffer pains.
According to Baladeva (a bhakta, follower of Caitanya, who wrote Govindabhāṣya on the
Brahma sūtras), the unseen principle (adṛiṣta) is the cause of the difference between the souls

Fourth section

tathā prāṇāḥ ||2.4.1

 Likewise the life breaths
The third section was dealing with different interpretations of the vedic texts about creation of
space etc… Il fourth section is considered the topics of prāṇas, which is discussed in many
upaniṣads: Praśna 2 and 3 and 6.4, Chāndogya 7.15, Bṛihad 1.3, Kauṣītakī 2.14+3.2+4.20,
Ṡāṇḍilya 4, Prāṇāgnihotra, Mundaka 2.1.8… Worth to note: here the word prāṇaḥ is in plural
mode, later it will be used in the sense of main life breath.

gauṇyasambhavāt ||2.4.2
Because of the lack of an origin (sambhava) as a consequence (gauṇi)
The sūtra is certainly disturbing for people aware of the sāṁkhya theory of guṇas, who hav
elearned to consider the life organs as tāmasa products of Pradhāna. But the vedāntin texts
(1.1.6, 1.2.2) the word guṇa never refers to the 3 fundamental entities existing in Pradhāna.
Therefore this sūtra (whose author is a vedāntin) means, according to Shankaracarya: Because
of the impossibility (other meaning of asambhava) in a figurative/secondary sense. What is
interesting is that this sūtra is the same as sūtra 2.3.3, which was translated by Shankacarya
with a contradictory sense: "(the Upaniṣad texts about the creation of space has) a secondary
sense because of the impossibility of its creation"! Thevedic texts such as Muṇḍaka 2.1.3
don’t speak of prāṇa in a figurative sense: "etasmāj-jāyate prāṇo manaḥ sarvendriyāṇi ca" –
"From him (the puruṣa divine and formless 2.1.2) are born the life breath, the mind and all
sense organs." Despite the contradictory translations of sūtras 2.3.3 and 2.4.2, Shankaracarya
asserts that the meaning is the same, i.e. there cannot be contradictions invedic texts. As said
Kant in "critics of pure reason": one is allowed to give any word the meaning he wants.

tat prāk ṡruteṡca ||2.4.3

That first (prañc) fromvedic ṡrutis also
The argument of Shankaracarya is meaningless: the statement of previous sūtra about the
creation of prāṇa should be understood in the litteral sense because the same verb jāyate is
used for akaṡa elsewhere in Upaniṣads.

tatpūrvakatvād vācaḥ ||2.4.4

Because of the anteriority (pūrvakatva) of (the mention of) speech (vāk)
Shankara quotes Chāndogya 6.5.4: "mind consists of food, breath of water and speech
consists of heat.". A quotation of Bṛihad 1.5.3 would have been more appropriate:
"trīnyātmane kurta iti mano v prāṇam" – "the father of creation (pitā – 1.5.1) made for
himself these three: mind , speech and breath."

saptagaterviṡeṣitatvācca ||2.4.5
Due to the distinction/specification of the seven gates also
But Shankara or Radhakrishnan think that there is a debate about the number of the sense
organs and therefore they interpret viṡeṣitatva by specification in scriptures, instead of
specific purpose. First it is worth noting that the word prāṇa more often indicate a motion of
fluid in the body: prāṇa, apāna, samāna, vyāna and udāna (Praṣna Upaniṣad section 3,
Ṡandilya section 4). Here it is question of gates which are the seven apertures of cognitive
senses in the body, being the eyes, ears, nostrils and mouth. Two others, namely the urethral
orifice and the anus are also used by conative organs and a tenth, the navel, was the main gate
of communication with the mother. The Bṛihadāranyaka adds the mind and indeed call them
prāṇas in a section dealing with the devas presiding to functions of the body (3.9): " katame
rudrā iti | daṡeme puruṡe prāṇāḥ atmaikādaṡaḥ || - "which are the Rudras (the terrible)? they
are ten in a person and with the mind eleven." But the word prāṇa is not used in the section of
Bṛihad 2.4 listing cogniticve and conative organs and in section 4.11 of Praṡna Upaniṣad
listing the 5 elements (mahabhūtas), 5 cognitive senses (indriyas), 5 conative senses
(karmendriyas) and 6 other life functions (manas, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, cittam, tejas and prāṇa)
the word prāṇa has he specific meaning of life breath, contrarily to what is asserted in
Shankara comments.

hastādayastu sthite'to naivam ||2.4.6

But in this respect (tu atas) those located (sthita) in hands (hasta) among others (ādaya), not
even (na evam)
The vṛittikāra quotes section 4.4 of Bṛihadāranyaka for conforting the point of view that there
are only seven prāṇas. I think that he is wrong, since previously (section 3.9) the same Bṛihad
said that they are 11. This section 4.4 speaks of the life breaths gathering around the self in
the heart before departure at the time of death, without specifying their number. As a
conclusion, it happened that, through its improper use, the word prāṇa got some kind of
universal meaning of life function, like ātman got the universal meaning of what is considered
as self (body, mind, soul). What about the stomach (everything is food) or the heart?

aṇavaṡca ||2.4.7
And what is microscopic (aṇu-vat)
The idea is that, since they leave the body together with the jīva, they are subtle principles
which cannot be seen. Kṛiṣṇa in Gītā also says that jīva carry htem with him like winds carry
perfumes. Ramanuja thinks that prāṇas are infinite, quoting Bṛihad 1.5.13, of which meaning
is quite complex. Summarily, Prajapati made as food for himself speech, mind and breath;
they are three worlds (bhūḥ bhuvaḥ svaḥ); they are earth, moon and sun; they are endless like
activity, thought and life. The whole section 1.5 is enigmatic.

ṡreṣṭhasca ||2.4.8
And the best
This refers to next subsection of Bṛihad (1.5.21) and other similar full sections (Bṛihad 1.3
and 6.1, Praśna 2, Chāndogya 5.1, Kauṣītakī 2.14+3.2+4.20) stating that prāṇa is the most
important of all life functions.

na vāyukriye pṛthagupadeṡāt ||2.4.9

On account of instruction (upadeṣa) not (na) differently (prithak) air (vāyu) and activity
(kriyā)
Vāyu-kriyā is a dvandva-compound of two entities placed on same level and Vāyu is the
personification of activity. Touch is the property specific to the element air, the life breath is
motion, the wind is force whereas the fire is energy… The twwo words wind and activiy are
used for each other in many texts: "yathākaṡa stitho nityam vāyu sarvatrago mahan" (Gītā).
Nevertheless the translation of Shankara is: "prāṇa is neither air nor activity because it is
instructed separately. He discards all the passages of Upaniṣads speaking of the 5 kinds of
prāṇas, for considering only the main type which is outgoing breath, and says this main breath
is different from air/wind. He quotes Chāndogya section 3.18: That Brahman has 4 quarters
(catur pad), being speech, breath, sight and hearing (they are the functions). The
corresponding deities are Agni, Vāyu, Āditya and the Diṡaḥ (four directions /cardinal points).
Speech shines (bhā) and warms (tap) with the light (jyotis) of Agni (speech is energy). Breath
shines and warms with the light of Vāyu (breath is force). The eye shines and warms with the
light of the sun Āditya (sight is intelligence). The ear shine sand warms with the light of the 4
Directions (maybe teached knowledge or simply space/time). Therefore the Chandogya does
not teach to distinguish fundamentaly vāyu and prāṇa: the second is the activity of the first.
Shankara quotes also the Muṇḍaka section 2.1: Divine and formless is the Person. He is inside
and outside, unborn, immutable, without life, breath, mind; from Him are born life, breath,
mind, the sense organs and the elements, namely space, air (vāyu), light, waters, earth. Again
they are distinguished formally, but we have seen in the Chāndogya quotation above tha the
name of the organ eye or ear is often used in place of the name of the sense also. In this
respect, the Vrittikara quotes the Bṛihad section 3.1: Verily that which is the eye is the sun,
that which is the breath is the air, that which is the mind is the moon – "tad yo yam prāṇaḥ sa
vāyuḥ" (3.1.7). To that the vedāntin answer: trhe breath is air after it has entered the lungs.
Ok! Radhakrishnan defends the point of view that the 11 functions of the body starting from
thought, sight, etc… mentioned in Muṇḍaka 2.1.3 are forms of activity but not the main
activity: the life breath.

cakṣurādivattu tatsahaṡiṣṭyādibhyaḥ ||2.4.10

But that (mention of sense organs) like the eye (cakṣu) and so on (ādi) (is accompagnied) with
(saha) instructions (ṡiṣṭi) and so on (other reasons) .
Shankara's interpretation of the sūtra is that the life breath is not independent of the soul, just
like organs of vision and so on, because instructions are imparted with them and other
reasons. He quotes no text but the main life breath is mentioned along with other life
functions in texts, including those stating that it is the best (sūtra 2.4.8). It is a tool of the soul
among others. The Vrittikara points out that the life breath does not have a distinct object like
the eye or the ear.

akaraṇatvācca na doṣastathā hi darṡayati || 2.4.11

Since it has not the quality (vat) of a specific tool (karaṇa) thus (tathā it shows (verb dṛṣ in
causative mode) no fault (doṣa).
The life breath does not have an object like the organs used for seeing, hearing, smelling,
touching, tasting, walking, holding, emiting fluids. Therefore the vedic texts don’t associate a
fault to the action of breathing. Is'nt a pleasure however to be alive? Shankara does not
comment the word fault. He quotee here all the sections of Upaniṣads speaking of the primacy
of life breath over sense organs.

pañcavṛttirmanovadvyapadiṡyate || 2.4.12
It is distinguished (vyapadiṡ) from being like (vat) the mind (mano) and the five (pañca)
engagements (vṛitti)
Vyapadiṡa is distinction and a quality of the soul, states sūtra 2.3.29. Vṛitti is proceeding in
activity and one speaks of pravṛitti (engagement in) and nivṛitti (renonciation to activity). The
five cognative organs are the tools of enjoyment and they are serving the mind. Now
Shankara chooses to give this sūtra the opposite meaning: it is taught (vyapadiṡ) that prāṇa
has five "modes" (vṛitti) like the mind (manovat). The five modes of life breath are: prāṇa,
apāna, samāna, vyāna and udāna (Praṣna Upaniṣad section 3, Ṡandilya section 4). The five
modes of the mind are sight, hear, touch, smell and taste. The Vṛittik)āra (highly concerned
by vṛittis) argues that mind has other modes such as remembering the past, wondering about
the future… All right, agrees the vedāntin: let the five modes of the mind be those proposed
by Patañjali in yoga sūtras (1.1.6): right knowledge, error, fake knowledge, sleep and
memory. Radhakṛishnan does not comment this choice. I don’t understand the comparison of
the five kinds of flows in the body: air, heat, energy, electricity and other fluids, to five
engagements in activity.

aṇuṡca || 2.4.13
and it is microscopic
According to Shankara and Radhakrishnan the life breath is minute like the five senses. Is' nt
all pervading ask the Vṛittikāra, quoting a setence of the Bṛihadaranyaka praising the life
breath as the source of speech and chants (1.3.22).

jyotirādyadhiṣṭhānaṁ tu tadāmananāt || 2.4.14

But the light/soul (jyotis) first (ādi) is the presiding entity (adhiṣṭhana) in this mater (tadā)
because of thoughtlessness (amanana) (of these organs)
Manana is an adjective and a substantive, issued from the verb man which means to think, and
meaning itself thoughtful, thought, reflection. But the vedāntin decided that āmanana means
scripture (usually designed by ṡruti, ṡābda, sruti, smṛiti)! Light may also be that of fire.
Shankara and Radhakrishnan interpret the sūtra as a reminder of various passages in the
scriptures about the divinities presiding the senses. "But fire etc… are presiding deities on
account of what is taught in scriptures." They quote the Aitareya Upaniṣad (from the name of
the author Aitareya, son of Itara, who are both unknown from other sources). Chapter 1
describes the creation of the Universe by the Self. Having created the elements and the person
(puruṣa), he broods about the shape he should give to the later: he should have a mouth in
which I will put speech and Agni will preside to speech; he should also have a nose in which I
will put breath and Vāyu will preside to breath; he should have eyes in which I will put sight
and Āditya will preside to sight… Curiouly the verb adhiṣthā is never used in this text, but
simply the verb bhū (to become, be present): "agnirvāgbhūtvā mukham prāviṡadvāyuḥ prāṇo
bhūtvā nāsike prāviṡadādityascakṣurbhūtvākṣini prāviṡad…" – "Fire having become speech
entered in the mouth… (1.2.4). This should be understood as a partial transformation, fire
being present in many energetic forms in the universe.
The vedāntin asks if these divinities are independent and the following sūtra answers to this
question. Personally I wonder why he does not question the exitence of the devas presiding to
elements and senses, since he questions the existence of a Person presiding to Brahman. Is he
simply exhibiting his ability to question everything like philosphers use to do?

prāṇavatā ṡabdāt || 2.4.15

By the one endowed with life breath (prāṇavat) according to scriptures (ṡabdha)
In some respect that is the purpose of following veses of the Aitareya. After having created
the deities of each sense and positionned them in the proper organ he decides to provide them
food (feed the deities and they will ensure that you get food yourself, tells Kṛṣṇa at the
beginning of the section 3 of Gītā: ṡlokas 10-12). The Upaniṣad teaches us that the food is
created from waters (āpaḥ) and not from earth (prithivī and that the organ can be fed only
through apāṇa (1.3.10 of Aitareya). Then he decides to enter in this body which he has created
and called a person in verses 1.1.2. He finds that he can enter only through the hole at the top
of the head, other apertures being already used (1.3.11 and 1.3.12): "sa etam eva sīmānaṁ
vidāryaitayā dvārā prāpadyata." – "Cleaving the suture of the skull (sīman) he entered byhtis
door." Having entered, he became alive and could perceive the creatures. What else? He saw
Brahman all pervading. With this imaged language, the Upaniṣad tells us that the enjoyer is
the ātmā who entered through the aperture in the skulls, not the deities presiding to each
sense.
The vedāntin underlines that the deities perceive only one kind of object (viṣaya): sight, smell,
sound, taste or touch. The sensations are gathered by the mental organ and only the soul
dwelling inside enjoyes all the sensations. The mental organ being a computer is able only to
meditate on sensation but does not draw conclusions about the resulting pleasure or pain. In
Hindu pantheon, he is either Indra as the ruler of senses (indriya) or Candramas, the Moon, as
the shining enjoyer / addicted to sensations (named in Aitareya 1.1.4 as the deity entering in
the heart for seating in the mental organ: manas). Upaniṣads don’t tell us who is seating in this
grey organ contained in the skull.

tasya ca nityatvāt || 2.4.16

And because he is endowed with eternity
Shankara tells us that the soul dwelling in the heart may experiences happiness and sorrow
because, being eternal, he may b affected by virtue and vice. But not the deities!! Are they not
eternal also? Yes they are and they even follow the soul whne he dpearts of the body (Brihad
4.4.2) But according to Shankara, they are seating in their "exalted divine sphere" and enjoy
nothing.

ta indriyāṇi tadvyapadeṡādanyatra ṡreṣṭhāt || 2.4.17

These (te) are the sense organs (indriya), that (tat) is elsewhere (anyatra) than the best
(ṡreṣṭha) on account of indications (vyapadeṡa)
That which is designed by "tat" in this sūtra is not clear. That which is designed by ṣreṣṭha is
the main life breath (see 2.4.8). Now, Shankara and Radhakrishnan translate by: These
(lifebreath) are designed (by the so called indications) as the senses, except the chief life
breath. The others are only modes of breath, suggests the Vrittikara, like apana, samana…
(see 2.4.12). No, threy are different says again the vedāntin, like he already said in 2.4.9
comment.

bheda ṡruteḥ || 2.4.18

From vedic texts there is partition (bheda)
Shankara considers that the life breath is always considered as apart in the vedic texts. That is
not my feeling. But I agree that it should be more clearly separated. The deity presiding prāṇa
is simply ātmā and he is trying to rule all other functions. Or struggling with them (karshati)
says the Gītā (15.7).

vailakṣaṇācca || 2.4.19
And on account of different attributes (lakṣana)
When other organs go to sleep, prāṇa remains awaken. Moreover, the deities presiding to
sense organs are liable to be struck by asuras (Bṛihad 1.3), whereas they have no powers
against prāṇa. A more important difference at my opinion is the fact that prāna is pervading
the body and common to all living species, whereas some of them have only one sense (like
worms) and some other have a better sight than humans.

saṁjñāmūrtikḷptistu trivṛtkurvata upadeṡāt || 2.4.20

But the accomplishment (klṛti) of shape (mūrti) and name (saṁjñā) (is) from Him who is
making (kurvata) three covers/choices (verb vṛ) as indicated (upadeṡa)
Klṛp: to arrange, to manage, to project, to accomplish (like Brahma in dawm of each kalpa)
Saṁjñā: mutual understanding, agreement, name. Shankara and Radhakrishnan tell us that
this sūtra refers to Chāndogya chapter 6. We have learned in a former discussion about this
chapter of the Upaniṣad that at first there was only the "Being" (6.2.1), who after having
decided "lets be many" (6.2.3), created heat/fire, water and food/earth (6.2.3, 6.2.4). An
image proposed by the Chāndogya for this creation is: heat produces perspiration, then water
rains on earth and it produces food. Then this "Being" thought: "hantāham imastisro devatā
anena jīvenātmanānupraviṡya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇīti" - Let me enter into these three
"divinities" by means of living self (jīva ātman) and develop name and shape (6.3.2). Then he
made a threefold entrance into them as living self, shape and name (6.3.3) – "tāsām trivṛtaṁ
trivṛtam ekaikām karavāṇīti". Any entity created in the real world has for self some element
and is transformed into a shape with a given name (section 6.1). We may go farther in this
analysis by stating that the self of anything is a combination of the subtle principles called
tanmātra and its shape a combination of the materials elements called mahabhūta. Each
combination, with a name such as sun or moon, is made of 3 components (sections 6.4 and
6.5). Now, what is the purpose of the sūtra? It is to remember us that the individual soul does
not have the power to create elements, shapes and names. The vṛittikāra argues that jīva-
ātman refers to the individual soul (living). This is not so, answers the vedāntin, since the
Being says: let Me be many, let Me enter. The word "tu" in the sūtra refutes your point of
view. Remember that these sūtras are the speach of Vyāsa and as such are not disputable.
"And there is no such thing as an individual soul absolutly different from God".
Should we consider that "the one endowed with life breath (prāṇavat)" in sūtra 2.4.15 is the
Supreme Being? No, Shankara should be less categoric, because he has accepted earlier in
the discussion that the Supreme Being creates in detail under the form of Brahmā. What
would be the problem if part of Him (aṁṡa) called jīvātmā created a particular body?

māṁsādi bhaumaṁ yathāṡabdam itarayoṡca || 2.4.21

Flesh (māmsa) is made of earth (bhauma) and so on with the two others (ādi itarayoḥ ca) as
told by scriptures (yathā ṡabdha)

vaiṡeṣyāt tu tadvādaṡtadvādaḥ || 2.4.22

But, owing to peculiarity (vaiṡeṣya), this thing has a given designation (vāda) and this other
thing another designation
Different combinations of living self and shape have different names. Shankara and
Radhakrishnan wonder why fire, water and earth have different names since the Chāndogya
(6.3.4) tells us that each one is made of the 3 components. In fact the proportions are not the
same. According to the most sophisticated sāṁkhya theory developed in Puraṇas, the
components are tanmatras which have a single property (sound, contact, light, taste, smell)
and the gross elements space, air, fire, water and earth have different proportions of each:
only earth has a smell but it has also a taste, a colour, is solid and propagates sound.

Third, adhyāya
First section

The content of the third chapter is complex, including transmigration (samsara) and liberation
from it (mokṣa), teaching (praṡas) and regulations (ṡastra), meditation (dhyana). The different
courses of transmigration are explained in the first section.

tadantarapratipattau raṁhati saṁpariṣvaktaḥ praṡnanirūpaṇābhyām || 3.1.1

Upon recovery (pratipatti) of this intermediate state (tat antara) he hastens (raṁh) well
surrounded (saṁpariṣvaj) according to questions (praṡna) and the (given) explanations
(nirūpaṇa) (in scriptures)
Pratipatti deserves some analysis: according to the dictionary the word means simply the fact
of obtaining, the acquired knowledge, but its decomposition in prati (back), pat (to fall, to
take place in) and the suffixe ti designing a state, pratipatti is the recovery of a basic state.
This state is the antara: the interval between two embodiments. Ni-rūpaṇa is also a word liable
to be interpreted different ways since ni-rūpa means without shapen whereas rūpaṇa is a
figurative, metaphorical description. The vedāntin translates nirūpaṇa by explanation.
This question of transmigration is not raised in the Praṡna Upaniṣad. Shankara quotes the
numerous questions asked by king Jaivali of Pañcāla kingdom to the brāhman Ṡvetaketu
Āruneya in Chāndogya section 5.3: "Do you know where procreated ones go from here? Do
you know how they return? Do you know where the paths leading to the domain of the deities
and to that of ancestors separate? Do you know how that other world never becomes full? Do
you know how water poured in the fifth libation comes to be called a person?" Ṡvetaketu does
not know the answer to nay question and is sent back to his father for further instruction.
Aruṇa is the name of one of the devarṣi during the eleventh manvantara (Bhag. Pur. 8.14.25)
and it is also the name of a son of Kaṡyapa and Vinatā. But we know nothing about the Aruṇa
mentioned here nor about his son Ṡvetaketu. Paragraph 5.3.6 of the Chāndogya (as also
Kauṣītaki Upaniṣād 1.1) tells us that they are born in the line of Gautama. Learning about the
questions asked to his son, the father goes to the king who teaches him that life is a sacrifice,
whose fire is the universe, Parjanya the rain cloud god, earth, the person (puruṣa , not
necessarily male –section 5.7) and the woman concerning the sacrifice of procreation (section
5.8). The offering (huta) made by the gods in each of these fires are faith (ṡraddha), the moon,
rain, food and semen; the gifts (prasad) are Soma rājā (the moon god presiding to waters and
enjoyments), rain, food, semen and a foetus. That is called the cycle of offerings (Gītā section
3 ṡlokas 14-16). For this reason the person (puruṣa) is said to be the oblation of water (āhuta
āpaḥ) in the fifth sacrifice ( Chāndogya 5.9.1). He lays in water during 9 month in the matrix.
His opponent, the Vrittikara remembers an imaged description of the transmigration as that of
a catterpillar from a leaf unto another leaf in Bṛihadāranyaka (paragraph 4.4.3) and wonder if
it is compatible with the sacrifice of the Chāndogya. There is no contradiction, answers the
vedāntin. But all other proposals of the Sāṁkhya, Buddhist and Vaiṡāṣika are nonsense. In
fact they are comparable.

tryātmakatvāt tu bhūyastvāt ||3.1.2

On account a nature (tva) of threefold (try) essence (ātmaka) but with a preponderance
(bhūyas) (of one of them).
The essence of man (nara) is water (nārās and āpas).

prāṇagateṡca ||3.1.3
and on account of life breath (prāṇa) going away (gati)
Fourth section (called brāhmana) of fourth chapter of Bṛihadāranayaka describes the exit of
the soul from the body (first paragraph 4.4.1), its procession as a catterpilar to another body
(4.4.3), and its fate according to past deeds (4.4.5 o 4.4.11). First one should remember that
the self (ātman) is as well the body, the mind and the spiritual essence (as recalled in
paragraph 4.4.5). Based on that the word ātman used also in 4.4.1 has a multiple meaning.
"When the self becomes, weak, confused, the (five) life breaths (prāṇa) gather around him."
Prāṇa was used with this meaning in section 2.4 of the Vedānta sūtras (see also comment of
sūtra 2.3.19). That may be also the meaning of the word prāṇa in this context. The ṡloka 15.8
of Gītā says the same in other terms: "When acquiring a body or when leaving a previous
body the embodied grasps "these" (5 kinds of sensations or the 6 senses including mind
mentioned in previous ṡloka 15.7) and carries them away like the wind carries odours from
their seat."

agnyādigatiṡruteriti cenna bhāktatvāt || 3.1.4

As regard the statement in Vedas (iti cet ṡruti) of the exit (gati) as Fire (angi) and other gods
(ādi), it is refuted (na) because it is used in devotional spirit (bhākta-tva).
For instance section 3.2 of the Bṛihadāranyaka Upaniṣad tells us that the nose and other
organs are seizers (graha) used by the eight over-perceivers (aṣṭa atigrahāḥ), which often have
same name as their catch (viṣaya). The text is slightly confusing in this respect. One seizes
smell through inbreath (apāna), name through speech, taste through tongue, forms through
eyes, sounds through ears, desires (pleasures) through mind, action through hands, touch
through skin. Now, when the person leaves the body, the life breaths gather around him and
leave also (3.2.11). Only the name remains with the body (3.2.12). Speech enters into Fire
(Agni), breath (prāṇa) enters into Wind (Vāta), sight into Sun (Āditya), mind into Moon
(Candra), hearing into the Quarters (Diṡas), the body into Earth (Pṛithivī), the self into Ether
(Ākāṡa), the hair into Herbs (Oṣadhī) and Trees (Vanaspati), the semen and blood into Waters
(Apas) (3.2.13). And the person becomes according to his karma (3.2.13-14). The vedāntin
does not accept such a language and tells: "this text must be interpreted in a secondary sense,
beecause it is not possible that the hair of the body becomes herbs and the hair on the head
trees. Is it possible to be so pragmatic and pretend to spirituality? Beside that how can he
accept the idea that "the soul goes elsewhere along with the organs of senses"? Hair cannotfly
but the mouth, the eyes and the ears can do? Paragraphs 4.4.1-2 of the Bṛihadāranyaka
Upaniṣad tells: "When the self comes to weakness and confusion, the prāṇas gather around
him. He takes these particles of light (sources of knowledge) with him in the heart. When the
person in the eye turns away, then he becomes ignorant of forms." (4.4.1) "One says that he is
becoming one (he has absorbed the deities/spirits or lights of the senses). He no more sees, no
more smells, no more taste, nor speak, nor hear, nor think, nor touch, nor know. The tip of his
heart (hṛdasya-agra) becomes luminous (pradyut) and the self departs (niṣkram) either
through the eye or through the (bone junction at the top of the) head or through another
aperture of the body. When he thus departs all the life breaths (sarve prāṇā) depart with him.
He becomes intelligence, he departs as intelligence, he begins using his experience of work
in previous life." So, the important point to underline is : he gathers all the instruments and
the experience of life in himself and he departs as one. Spiritual entities are never definitely
separated, they merge in oneness as soon as they are not trapped in a body.

prathame'ṡravaṇāditi cenna tā eva hyupapatteḥ || 3.1.5

As regard the lack of mention (aṡravaṇa) in the case of that which is preceding (prathama),
they are implied indeed (na tā eva hi) as it likely to happen (upapatti)
I could not understand the argument of the Vrittikara concerning faith and water in
Chāndogya section 5.4). Faith (ṡraddha) is obviously the proper kind of water to offer in the
fire of sacrifice on behalf of devas who are spiritual entities. Water is an usual oblation,
together with ghee. Shankar and Radhakrishnan answer that ṡraddha means water in this text
and gives obscure arguments, such as: "water generates faith".

aṡrutatvāditi cenneṣṭādikāriṇām pratīteḥ || 3.1.6

If ii be said (iti cet) that it is not mentioned in vedic texts (aṡrutatva), that is not true (na) on
account of intelligibility (pratiti) of performers (kāri) of sacrifices (iṣṭa) etc…
Shankara interpretation is: "If it is argued that the soul does not depart enveloped by water
since it is not mentioned in the Vedas, then that is not true, for it is perceived it is conceived
to be so by performers of sacrifices etc… He quotes the following sections of the Chāndogya
chapter 5. In section 5.10 it is said: "Those who meditate on faith and austerity in the forest
(the saṁnyasi) go to the light, from light to the day, from day to the bright half moon, from
bright half moon to uttarāyaṇa (northward motion of the sky in the sky from winter solstice to
summer solstice)" (5.10.1). Other texts say that those who depart in these conditions go to the
sun and from there to Brahma loka. "This is the path leading to the gods" (5.10.2). "But those
who practice sacrifices, meritorious works and almsgiving in the village they pass from
smoke into night then into the dark half of the month then into dakṣināyana (southward
motion of the sun)." (5.10.3) "Thereafter they go to pitṛi-loka (the domain of ancestors), then
to the space, to the moon, who is the "king of soma". That is the food of the gods, what they
eat." (5.10.4) "Having dwelt there as long as lasts their merite, they return to the space, from
space into air, then smoke, mist, cloud, rain,. They are born as rice, herbs and trees…"
(5.10.5-6) He makes a funny interpretation of these paragraphs, speaking of liquid oblations
causing the sacrificer to leave his body enveloped by water. It happens that Candra, the Lord
of the moon, is also named Soma with reference to his lordship on life fluids and enjoyement
of life pleasures. That is why those who depart in a state of ignorance (darkness), return to the
moon and on earth under the form of rain.

bhāktaṁ vā'nātmavittvāt tathā hi darṡayati || 3.1.7

Or (vā) (scriptures) show (dṛṡ-y) (him) as fit for receiving a share of food (bhākta) due to lack
of knowledge of the soul (na ātma-vit-tva)
It has been said above that Chāndogya Upaniṣad 5.10.4 speaks of the person who follows the
path of the sacrifices for enjoying their fruits as of food for the gods. Bhakta is what is shared
and the person who receive the share (m), who is worshipped (m), the share itself (n), wheras
bhākta is someone qualified for a share; but the opposite sense of qualified for becoming a
share of food is conceivable. Now Shankara and Radhakrishnan who don’t wan tṁto hear of
bhakti give to the word a fancy meaning: figurative, metaphorical. What is said in Chāndogya
section 5.10 is metaphorical. Shankara supports his point of view by quoting the same
Upaniṣad section 3.6: "na vai devā aṡnanti na pibantyetadevāmṛtaṁ dṛṣṭvā tṛpyanti." – The
gods neither eat nor drink. They are satisifed by seeing this nectar of immortality (refrain of
1st paragraph in sections 3.6.-3.10). Vedas are the nectar (3.6) and sections 3.1-3.4 describe
the Vedas and their hiden teaching (Brahman) as the flowers producing honey for the gods:
but they speak also of some waters which are the nectar in which grow the flowers: "madhu-
nāḍyo vedā/guhyā evā deṡā madhukṛto veda/brahmaiva puṣpam tā amṛtā āpaḥ". Let's guess
that these waters are the offering in sacrifices. The honey of the gods is the faith of believers
and their perdomance of sacrifices. Why is it so? Because the believer is "anātmavit": he does
not understand the self. The terms used in the Upaniṣad are evidently metaphorical.

kṛtātyaye'nuṡayavān dṛṣṭasmṛtibhyāṁ yathetam anevaṁ ca || 3.1.8

The merits of good actions (kṛta) being exhausted (atyaya), on account of adhering
(anuṡayavat) (to a way of life) (he returns) along the followed path (yathā ita) or otherwise
(anevam) as shown (dṛṣṭa) from smṛtis.
Anu-ṡi means to adhere closely, to sleep with and anuṡayavat si the adhesion to an habit, the
close attachment to any object, the acknowledgment of the consequences. The question
interesting the Vedantin and his opponent is: does he come back after undergoing all the
effects of previous karma or do they come back with some residual karma? The present sūtra
tells that they come back for adhering to a way of life chosen in previous life. The opponent
argues that their activity in their new life is not affected by previous one and he quotes for
proof the Bṛihadāranyaka paragraph 4.4.6: "that which is bond with the acts, that mark
(liṅgam) goes attached to the mind where the later goes | having obtained the consequences of
his acts in this world, he come again from that world to this world for activity | this for the
man who is desiring | but for the man who has no desire, who is freed of it, whose desire is
satisfied, who desires the self, his breath does not depart. Being Brahman he goes to
Brahman." It seems that he has not well read: "eti liṅgam mano yatra niṣaktam asya." The
vedāntin retorts that: "those whose conduct (caraṇa) has been pleasant are expected soon to
come into a pleasant matrix, and those whose conduct was stinking are expected to come back
in a stincking matrix." (Chāndogya 5.10).This indicates that a residual karma remains
attached to the conduct/ behavior or material nature. The good karma is enjoyed in heaven,
the bad habits remained attached to the self upon rebirth. In other words one goes from
heaven to hell for enjoying the results of all his deeds , or the reverse (like Yudhiṣthira in
Mahābhārata) .
 caraṇāditi cennopalakṣaṇārtheti kārṣnājiniḥ ||3.1.9
Kārṣnājini says that it is not owing to the conduct (caraṇa) (itself) but to the aim (artha) of
what is implied (upa-lakṣana)
Radhakrishnan gives a list of commentators of the Vedānta sūtras in his book "Indian
Phylosophy", volume 2, chapter 7: Vedānta sūtra, introduction. Among them , those who are
remebered nowadays are: Ṡaṅkara, Bhāskara, Yādavaprakāṡa, Rāmānuja, Keṡava, Nīlakhaṇṭa,
Madhva, Baladeva, Vallabha, Vijñānabhikṣu. Bādarāyaṇa (the author of the sūtras) himself
quotes other teachers who don't share his interpretation of the Upaniṣads, such as: Bādari
(1.2.30, 3.1.11, 4.3.7, 4.4.10), Auḍulomi (1.4.21, 3.4.45, 4.4.6), Āṡmarathya (1.2.29, 1.4.20),
Kāṡakṛsna (1.4.22), Kārṣnājini (3.1.9), Ātreya (3.4.44) and Jaimini. But their point of view is
reported nowhere.
Upa-lakṣana is what comes close to a mark, what is implied by this mark, suggested by a
mark. So the argument of Kārṣnājini and the vedāntin is that the Upaniṣad uses the term
caraṇa with the meaning of residual karma, but not exactly the conduct, which is a way of
acting. They refer to Bṛihadāranyaka 4.4.5 for the difference: "yathākārī yathācārī tathā
bhavati"- He becomes according to his acts and his behavior. The same paragraph speaks
also of all the features of his material personality, determining this behavior. Ramanuja
considers that the behavior or conduct of a person does not lead to the experience of pleasure
and pain; they result only from direct action.
But now who will explain me what is "residual karma" if not a personal character, a behavior?
One also acts according to his nature according to the Gītā; in what else than a behavior
consists this nature? The Gītā says also that passivity is a bad action, i.e an example of
behavior having a direct influence on the future.

ānarthakyam iti cenna tadapekṣatvāt ||3.1.10

If it be said (iti ced) that (tad- the conduct) is of no value (anarthaka), it is not so because it is
taken into consideration (apekṣā)
The word ānarthakya (neutral) is treacherous (a false friend) since it is the quality of what is
anarthaka: being useless, meaningless. Actions of a person are determined by her conduct.
Shnakaracarya adds that, according to the smṛitis, a person with a bad conduct is not qualified
for performing sacrifices.

sukṛtaduṣkṛte eveti tu bādariḥ || 3.1.11

But Bādari says (tu bādariḥ iti) that it consists only (eva) in good and bad actions (sukṛta-
duṣkṛte).
According to the commentator Bādari, there is no difference between the way of acting
(caraṇa) and what is done (kṛita). The difference berween to act and to do is also subtle in
english, quite similar to the difference between ātmanepada and parasmaipada conjugations of
verbs in saṁskṛit.

aniṣṭādikāriṇām api ca ṡrutam || 3.1.12

Even of those who do not perform sacrifice (an-iṣṭa-kārin) it is stated in vedic text (ṡruta)
People of bad conduct who perform no sacrifice, nor austerity, nor alm-giving, nor worship,
also come back through the channel of the moon, rain cloud… Kauṣītaki Upaniṣād section 1.2
tells us: "yo vai ke cāsmāllokāt prayanti candramasam eva te sarve gacchanti | teṣām prāṇaiḥ
pūrvapakṣa āpyāyate tān aparapakṣeṇa prajanayati |" – Those who depart from this world,
they all go to the moon. The later rises by their life breath (rises to higher spheres) those who
depart during the clear (rising) fortnight and causes those who depart during the dark fortnight
to be procreated again. The following sentences give more details: the moon asks them who
they are and those who answer correctly (because they departed in the light of knowldege) go
to heaven, whereas the others return to the world of procreation through the channel of rain
and become either a worm, an insect, a fish, a bird, a snake, a mammal or a human, according
to their deeds.

saṁyamane tvanubhūyetareṣām ārohāvarohau tadgatidarṡanāt || 3.1.13

Now (tu), from what is shown in vedic texts (darṡana), after the experience (anubhuya) (of a
stay) in the domain of the Controler Yama (saṁyamana), the fate (gati) of these others (itara)
is either an ascent (āroha) or a descent (avaroha).
According to Ṡhankara the word tu must be interpreted strictly as a "but" in this sūtra, i.e
some don’t go to the moon. What is said in previous sūtra and in Kauṣitaki is the point of
view of the Vṛittikāra. It is not proper that evil-doers follow the same path to the moon as
good-doers. He quotes the words of Yamahimself in Kaṭha Upaniṣad (1.2.6): "na
saāmparāyaḥ pratibhati bālam pramāddyantaṁ vittamohena mūdham | ayam loko nāsti para
iti māni punaḥ punarvaṡām āpadyate me" – What lies beyond does not appear to the mind of
the simple-minded careless deluded by what is acquired (pleasure as well as wealth). He is of
the opinion that there is nothing beyond and he falls again and again into my power. But
Yama does not tell that this simple minded person does not transit to the moon after his stay
in hell for following the watery path of rebirth. Other commentators (Nimbarka, Ṡrinivasa)
agree with the point of view that evil-doers ascend to the moon before redescending on earth.

smaranti ca || 3.1.14
These facts are also reported in smṛitis

api ca sapta || 3.1.15

And there are also seven (hells)
The Purāṇas report the exitence of seven hells (naraka) as there are also seven spheres above
them, including the karma bhūmi (starting from bhūḥ bhuvaḥ svaḥ)

tatrāpi ca tadvyāpārādavirodhaḥ || 3.1.16

And in this matter even (tatrā api ca) there is no obstruction (avirodha) from this occupation
(tad vyāpāra)
According to Shankara and Radhakrishnan there is no contradictioon (obstruction) to the
existenc eof seven hells under control of Yama. One can also understand tha t there is no
obstruction to the choice by evil-doer to continue their behavior and visit the seven hells.

vidyākarmaṇoriti tu prakṛtatvāt || 3.1.17

It is said of transcendental knowledge (vidyā) and of action (karman) that they are according
to the natural state (prakṛtatva) (of every one)
Now, the saṁskṛit appropriate term for natural state is in fact prākṛita-tva. The adjective
prakṛita qualifies something accomplished or under process and the state of being under
process (prakṛita-tva) may be interpreted as a topics under discussion, as suggested by
Shankara. The dual compound vidyā-karman probaly refer to the two paths of wisdom (vidyā)
or meritorious action (sacrifice) followed by good-doers in section 5.10 of the Chāndogya
(see above discussion of sūtra 3.1.6). The paragraph 5.10.8 speaks of "a third category of
persons who follow neither of these paths and come back repeatedly as creatures of less
importance (kṣudra bhūta). Of them it is said that they are born and die such that this world
does not become full." The meaning is of course that most persons follow this path and the
statement answers the question asked to Ṡvetaketu in section 5.3 (see discussion of sūtra
3.1.1).
 na tṛtīye tathopalabdhaḥ || 3.1.18
In the case of the third (tṛtīya) (category of persons) thus (tathā) it is not obtained/ learned
(upalabdha)
The prefix upa adds a notion of approach to the participle labdha meaning obtained.
According to Shankara what is not obtained by persons of third category is the human
condition: the fifth oblation of water mentioned in section 5.9.1 of the same Upaniṣad.

smaryate'pi ca loke || 3.1.19

And it is reported in smṛitis (verb smṛ in present passive form) also (to occur) in this world
(loka)
According to Shankara, there is also no fifth oblation for those persons who become
embodied without procreation, like many characters of the Mahābhārata: many devas and
asuras take birth on earth for a great sacrifice decided by Kṛṣṇa) and some are not born in a
human matrix, among them Draupadī and her brother Dhṛiṣtadyumna, as also Droṇa.

darṡanācca || 3.1.20
From observation also.
The ancients were believing that some creatures, such as moskitoes, were sprouting from
moisture, heat and dirt without being procreated.

tṛtīyaṡabdāvarodhaḥ saṁṡokajasya || 3.1.21

There is inclusion (avarodha) in the third (tritya) term (ṡabda of those born from
sweat(saṁṡoka-ja )
Here the three terms are not the three path discussed in Chāndogya section 5.10, but the three
kinds of procreation mentioned in section 6.3.1 of the same upaniṣad: "there are three kinds of
seeds (bīja) of the creatures, those gicing birth inside eggs, inside living beings and in sprouts.
Aitareya Upaniṣad considers the creatures borns of sweat as a forth category. But number
three is somewhat magic in all vedic texts and the creator of Chāndogya section 6.3 creates
things of three colours and three shapes (elements).

sābhāvyāpattirupapatteḥ || 3.1.22
Owing to the possibility (upapatti) together (sa) with the occurrence (āpatti) of being in the
state of becoming (bhavya)
I don’t know how Shankara derives "similarity" from sa-bhava. He refers to the paragraph
5.10.5 of Chāndogya where it is stated that the person who has chosen the path of sacrifice
enters or becomes successively space, than air, then vapour, then cloud and rain.: "gone to
space" (ākāṡam ita), "having becomed air, then vapour, he becomes cloud". (vāyur bhūtvā
dhuma bhūtvā abhram bhavati). "Note that the verb bhū means to become present in
something, but a person never becomes a material body. However, the vedāntin and the
Vrittikara argues about the literal or figurative sense of these terms. It would not be logical
that space becomes transformed into air then in vapour and cloud", says the vedāntin. "A soul
is like space only".

nāticireṇa viṡeṣāt ||3.1.23

On account of some peculiarity (viṡeṣa) not after a long time (na-aticira)
The peculiarity is a specific statement in some upaniṣad, says the vedāntin and he quotes
again the paragraph Chāndogya 5.10.6: after becoming successively a cloud and rain, from
which he is born as rice, a leguminous plant, an herb or a tree – "ato vai khalu
durniṣprapataram yo yo hyannam atti yo retaḥ siñcati tad bhūya eva bhavati" – from then it
become more difficult to exit from this state because whoever eats the food and sows seeds
becomes again like himself. Since it becomes more difficult to exit the cycle of birth among
the three categories of living creatures, one may deduce that previous transformatṣions were
easy. But who worries about time?

anyādhiṣṭhiteṣu pūrvavadabhilāpāt || 3.1.24

From what is declared (abhilāpa) like previously (purva-vat) in other places presided (anya
adhiṣṭhita)
Contrarily to the Vṛittikāra who believes that when being born as rice, a leguminous plant or a
tree one enjoyes the pleasures and pains of these plants, the vedāntin pretedns that "he comes
into contact with them but they are already inhabited by other souls". How does he know that?
Because the Upaniṣad is speaking of the people who follow the path of sacrifice and go to the
moon. It is question of them again in next paragraph 5.10.7, whereas the case of subhuman
creatures (kṣudrani bhūtani) is considered in paragraph 5.10.8. The vedāntin would not like to
be cooked.

aṡuddhamiti cenna ṡabdāt || 3.1.25

If it is said that is impure (aṡuddha), not from vedic texts (ṡabda)
The impurity in question would be about animal sacrifices. One should not injure any
creature, with the exception of sacrifice. Many hymns of the Vedas praise such sacrifices.

reṭaḥsigyogo'tha || 3.1.26
Then (atha) there is connection (yoga) with the inseminator (retaḥ)
This statement concerns again the paragraph 5.10.6 of the Chāndogya (see 3.1.23) and the
vedāntin wonders again if one becomes the giver of seed after having been eaten or only after
reaching adolescence.

yoneḥ ṡarīram || 3.1.27

From the womb (yoni) (comes) a body (ṡarīra)

Second section

saṅdhye sṛṣṭir āha hi || 3.2.1

One says that creation (sṛṣṭi) is in junction (saṁdhya).
• Saṁdhya means any kind of junction, including: 1) the junction between day and night,
morning and afternoon then evening and night again (at which saṁdhya one recites the
Gayatri mantra) and offers agnihotra , 2) the junction between sleep and waking state,
3) the junction between ages... But not the intercourse between sex partners which is
called saṁgama. Therefore sṛṣṭi also should not be translated by procreation, even if
that is the most litteral meaning: emission, discharge (of semen). According to
different commentators, in this section the topics of meditation moves from
transmigration to the different states of consciousness. The vedāntin and his opponent
wonder if creation occurs in dreaming state or if it is illusory. The dreaming state
(svapna) is at the junction between the waking state (jāgara) and deep sleep (suṣupti)
and in Bṛihadāranyaka the deep sleep is compared to death (4.3.7-9): "sa hi svapno
bhūtvā imaṁ lokam atikrāmati mṛtyo rūpāṇi" – On becoming in dreaming state one
goes beyond this world and the forms of death (4.3.7). These "forms of death" mean
inaction. Note that the names of two active states are male whereas the name of the
inactive state is female, which is typical of saṁskṛit. "tasya vā etasya puruṣasya dve
eva sthāne bhavataḥ idam ca paralokasthānaṁ ca | saṅdhyaṁ tṛtīyaṁ savapna
 sthānam | tasmin saṅdhye sthāne tiṣṭhannubhe sthāne paṡyati " – There are two states
of this person whicn are being in this world or in the other world. At the junction is the
third state of dream (or slight sleep). In this condition between life and death one is
conscious of the two states of the person" (4.3.9). Then Bṛihadārayanaka says of
dream that it is the state in which one creates himself what he enjoyes: na tatra rathāḥ
na rathayogaḥ na panthāno bhavanti | atha rathān rathayogān pathaḥ sṛjate | na
tatrānandāḥ mudaḥ pramudo bhavanti | athānandān mudaḥ pramudaḥ sṛjate" – There
cars, animals to be yoked and roads don’t exist, (but) he creates cars, animals to be
yoked and roads. There bliss, pleasure and exultation don’t exist, (but) he creates them
(4.3.10). The upaniṣad speaks of car, yoked animals and roads because of the usual
comparison of the soul to a person seating on a car, of which intelligence is the driver,
yokes are the mind, horses are the senses and the road is life.

nirmātāraṁ caike putrādayaṡca|| 3.2.2

And some (ca eke, nominative plural) (āhur = say?) that he is a creator (nirmātṛ) and son etc..
(putra- ādi, nominative?)
Shankara refers to Katha Upaniṣad (2.2.8) speaking of Brahman as the spirit creating inside
any creature during its sleep: "ya eṣa supteṣu jāgarti kāmam kāmam puruṣo nirmimānaḥ tad
eva ṡukraṁ tad brahma tad evāmṛtam ucyate" – This person who is awaken inside those who
are asleep, creating desire over desire, that is indeed called Brahman pure and immortal. The
following paragraphs of the Upaniṣad explains that the Brahman is in everything as
adhyātman, as the fire or the wind entering with various shapes in various object (2.2.-11).
Then one can read in paragraph 2.2.13 a well known description, corresponding more to what
the Gītā defines as Parama-ātman, the witness and well-wisher staying in the soul of every
one (ṡloka 9.18): nityo'nityānāṁ cetanaṡcetanānām eko bahūnām yo vidadhyati kāmān | tam
ātmastham yenupaṡyanti dhīraḥ…" - the One who is eternal among the transcients, the
consciousness of those who are conscious, the One (uniting) the many, who grants the desires,
those who are clever perceive Him staying inside the self." So, according to Shankara, the son
etc… " are the desired objects", because it is the kind of boon, together with cattle, horses,
elephants and gold (for completing the etc…), which Yama proposes to grant to Naciketas
(Kaṭha 1.1.23).

māyāmātraṁ tu kārtsnyenānabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt || 3.2.3

But this (creation) is merely an illusion (māyā-mātra) because its nature (tva) has a a shape
(rūpatva) not manifested (an-abhi-vyakta) completely (kṛtsna).
Oh! These philosophers like so much to listen themselves speaking for the pleasure of
speaking! The vedāntin argues that is is impossible to create a car inside the head of the
dreamer because there is not enough space and the vṛittikāra that he may exit his head. And
how ould he builds a car without wood and metal? Anyway, everybody agrees with the
Bṛihadāranayka that "there the car, the yoked animal and the road don't exist" (4.3.10). Now
the creation of the whole universe is also māyā: magics of the divine Dreamer lying in the
cosmic waters.

sūcakaṡca hi ṡruterācakṣate ca tadvidaḥ || 3.2.4

From vedic texts (ṡruti) it is indicative (sūcaka) (of the desires) and (ca) one versed in that
(tad-vida) make it known (ācakṣ)
According to Shankara the dream is not indicative of the desires but of the future, i.e. it is an
omen, and it is the deed of the living self only. He quotes a section of the Chāndogya
speaking of a ritual to be perfomed during the new moon night for fulfilling wishes (kāmya
karma), in which it is told that: if while perfoming the rite he dreams of a woman (or is he
dreaming of performing a rite? "yadā karmasu kāmyeṣu striyam svapneṣu paṡyati"), he should
deduce from this vision that his wish will be fulfilled (5.3.8). Concerning the person who is
the auhtor of the dream he quotes the paragraph 4.3.9 of the Bṛihad again, which speaks of
three states of jīva consciousness. If the paragraph 2.2.8 of the Kaṭha Upaniṣads tells that the
person awaken during dream is the Brahman, one should also remember the sentence: tat
tvam asi (Chāndogya 6.8.16).

parābhidhyānāt tu tirohitaṁ tato hyasya bandhaviparyayau || 3.2.5

Then (tatas) his (asya) bondage (bhanda) and the reverse (viparayaya) which is concealed
(tiro-hitam) (in the dream?) (may be discovered?) from meditation (abhydyana) about what is
transcending (para).
Shankara tells us that what is concealed (or litteraly set apart: tiras dhā) is the identity of
essence of the living soul and the Brahman, a ssuggested by this paragraph 2.2.8 of the Kaṭha
Upaniṣad.

dehayogādvā so'pi|| 3.2.6

Or (vā) he (sa) (is concealed) because of the connection (yoga) with the body (deha) also (api)

tadabhāvo nāḍīṣu tacchruterātmani ca || 3.2.7

That absence (tat abhāva) in the pipes of body fluids (nādī) and in the self (ātman) according
to vedic texts (ṡruti)
Tad-abhāva refers to the absence of the person, which is ever death or deep sleep according to
Bṛihadāranyaka 4.3.7-9. But it may also be translated by the absence of that (the dreams), as
suggesdted by Shankara and Radhakṛishnan. The concept of nāḍī covers all channels of body
fluids, including arteries and veins, nerves, those spreading heat, food and air. They are the
channels of the 5 prāṇas and are crossing in cakras. As regards the references in ṡrutis, there
is:
"tadyatraitat suptaḥ samastaḥ samprasannaḥ svapnaṁ na vijānāti āsu tadā nāḍīṣu sṛpto
bhavati | taṁ na kaṡcana pāpmā spṛṡati | tejasā hi tadā sampanno bhavati ||" (Chāndogya
8.6.3) – "Whenever one is sound asleep, compounded, serene and he knows no dream, then he
has slipped into the body channels. Then no evil touches him and he has becomed perfectly
splendid (with energy like the sun or a fire)." Previous paragraphs of the same section speak
of the nāḍīs carrying various subtances tawny, white, dark blue, yellow and red to the heart
and the sun shows same colours (8.6.1). They start from the sun and extend like highways
between villages (8.6.2). In a former section (6.8.1) of Chāndogya it is also said by Āruṇi to
his son Ṡvetaketu: "yatraitat puruṣaḥ svapiti nāma satā saumya tadā sampanno bhavati svam
apīto bhavati |" – "When a person sleeps as it is said, gentle boy, then he becomes excellent,
he has gone to himself."

In Bhṛihadāranyaka (2.1.19) one can read:

"atha yadā suṣupto bhavati | yadā na kasya cana veda | hitā nāma nāḍyo dvāsaptatiḥ
sahasrāṇi hṛdayāt purītatam abhipratiṣṭhante | tābhiḥ pratyavasṛpya purītati ṡete | sa yathā
kumāro vā mahārājo vā mahābrāhmaṇo vātighnīm ānandasya gatvā ṡayīta | evam evaiṣa
atacchete || " – "Now when one becomes asleep, when he knows nothing whatsoever, having
returned through the seventy-two thousands channels named arteries which extend from the
heart to that fortress (tat pura or purītat usually translatted by pericardium), he either as a
child or a maharāja or a great brāhmana, sets there and stands still, reposing in the oblivion of
bliss."
It is also question of the same place in the last two paragraphs of Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad (4.19
and 4.20), where Ajātaṡātru (Yudhishthira) tells to Bālāki): "Where has gone this person here
lying? He has returned through the channels of the person called hitā extending from the heart
to the surrounding purītat, (channels) which are minute as hair, divided thousandfold, tawny,
white, black, yellow and red. In these he remains while asleep and sees no dream." (4.19)
"There he becomes one with life breath (prāṇa ekadhā). Then the speech with all the names
goes to it, the eye with all the forms goes to it, the ear with all the sounds goes to it, the mind
with all the thoughts goe to it. When he awakes (pratibudh –comes back to understanding), as
sparks proceed in all directions from a blazing fire, the life breaths proceed from the self to
their respective stations, and from the life breaths the sense divinities to their respective
worlds."

ataḥ prabhodho'smāt || 3.2.8

From this same state (athaḥ asmāt) the awaking (prabodha)

sa eva tu karmānusmṛtiṡabdavidhibhyaḥ || 3.2.9

But that is himself indeed (sa eva tu) (who comes back) on account of the remembrance of
activities (karma-anusmṛiti) and the injunctions of scriptures (ṡabda-vidhi).
Someone may doubt that the same self comes back after mergence in the Supreme Self during
deep sleep. The answer is of course that the identification with the mind makes one remember
his previous activities: karma-anusmṛiti. As regards the injuctions of the scriptures, the texts
quoted by Shankara or Ramanuja are not very clear. After having explained to his son
Ṡvetaketu that during sleep one goes to his own self and becomes perfect (Chāndogya 6.8.1
quoted above), and explained him in somewhat confused terms (at my opinion) that the root
of everything manifest in this world is being/ existence (sat / sattvam), which is also truth
(satya) and self, he concludes by the formula:"sa ya eṣo'ṇimā aitad ātmyam idam sarvam tat
satyam sa ātmā tat tvam asi" – "That which is the subtle own of everything, that truth, that
self, that you are" (6.8.7, 6.9.4, 6.11.3). "Now all these creatures around you do not know that
they are issued from existence (sat). Whatever they are (bhavanti), tiger, lion, wolf, boar,
worm or moskitoe, they are present as such (ābhavanti)" (6.10.2) This anigmatic verb ābhū
probably means that this form of life is what they consider to be whenever they are awaken.

mugdhe'rdhasampattiḥ pariṡeṣāt || 3.2.10

There is half fulfilment (ardha-sampatti) in one perplexed (mugdha) from what is remaining
(pariṡeṣa)
The verb muh (past participle mugdha) is the most common for expressing the fact of being in
a state (called moha in saṁskṛit) of confusion, ignorance, foolishness, perplexity, error. This
state may be interpreted as a loss of consciousness. Radhakṛishnan and Shankara suggest to
give to this loss of consciousness in present sūtra the particular meaning of a swoon (litteraly
jīvādāna, giving life breath) and to consider it as a half fulfilment (litteraly falling into) of
deep sleep, absence or death. But their description of the swoon as a departure from waking
state with difficult breathing, contrarily to deep sleep (where breath and heart beat are slowed
down) is in contradiction witht his half fulfilment. Shankara argues that in swoon one is half
merged in Brahman. Now what is remaining is probably this difficult breathing. In the more
radical analysis of Ramanuja the swoon is what is remaining of life in this half fulfilment of
death.

na sthānato'pi parasyobhayaliṅgaṁ sarvatra hi || 3.2.11

 There is not a double charateristics (ubhaya-lingam) of the Supreme (para), from the place of
stay (sthānata), indeed It is everywhere (sarvatra).
Shankara and others commentators do not connect this sūtra with the previous considerations
about the mergence with the Self in the heart during deep sleep. It seems that the topics of
discussion in the following sūtras comes back to brahma jijñāsā. Some paragraphs of the
Upaniṣads speak of the attributes of Brahman and some others deny an attribute.

na bhedāditi cenna pratyekamatadvacanāt || 3.2.12

If it is said that is not owing to a difference (bheda), that is not so because there is no
declaration (vacana) of that Brahman (tat) individually (prati-ekam).
Brahman has a double characteristics: he may be described as full of perfections or as
devoided of qualities. There is no contradiction. Some commentators quoted by
Radhakrishnan wonder if the Brahman is contaminated by imperfections jīva. They quote
Chāndohgya 5.10.7 and 8.3.2, Aitareya 3.2.4 concerning the imperfections of the individual
self. But they confuse the goodness or badness of the conduct and consequent matrix of
rebirth (topics of Chandogya 5.10.4) with the quality of the soul. As a spark of Brahman it is
devoid of defects.

api caivam eke || 3.2.13

Some / a few (eke) (texts) even (api) such (evam)
Some paragraphs of vedic texts, including the Gītā, emphasise that the Existence is One.
Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.1.10-11 for instance tells: "if one thinks that there is multiplicity ihe goes
from death to death". The whole Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad tells us that though appearing as many,
existence is one (1.1.7, 2.1.7, 2.1.8, 3.2.7, 3.2.8): "as a spider (urṇanābha: celui qui a de la
laine dans le nombril) emits and catch back, as herbs grow on earth, as hair grow on the head
and the body of a person, similarly the universe arises from the unalterable (akṣara)". The last
word emphasizes that it is remains unchanged in spite of this apparent division.

arūpavadeva hi tatpradhānatvāt || 3.2.14

Being without form (arūpa-vat) indeed (eva hi) that on account of being the chief receptacle
(pra-dhāna-tva)
Dhāna is a container, a receptacle, a grain, and the prefix pra adds the notion of for
production, like in the name of Nature which is aslo Pradhāna or Prakṛitti. Brahman is sat and
asat and the Person of the Brahman presides ("prakṛittiṁ svam adhiṣṭhaya / prakritiṁ svam
avaṣṭabhya" – Gita 4.6-9.8) to the changes of Nature. But Shankara, who don’t like to speak
of Nature, prefers to translate Pradhāna by "dominant base of teaching". Despite that, he
quotes Chāndogya 8.14.1: "ākāṡo vai nāma nāmarūpayornirvahitā te yadantarā tad brahma"
– "What is called space from which flow both name and form, that is within the Brahman."
For illustrating the idea that Brahman is formless, he chooses Bṛihad 2.5.19, speaking of
Dadhyan with the head of a horse who declares that Indra (the Lord) takes many forms and
concludes: "He verily is tens and thousands, many and countless, that is the Brahman,
unprecedented (apurvam), without anything beyong or after (anaparam), without end
(anantam), with nothing outside (abāhyam)."

prakāṡavaccāvaiyarthāt || 3.2.15
Shining like a source of light (pra-kāṡa-vat) also on account of no uselessness (a-vaiyartha)
(of the texts)
Now the verb kāṡ means also to be visible, since by definition what is visible is light.
Consequently, Shankara translates by: Brahman can have appearance like light, so that the
scriptures may not be purportless. But Ramanuja of course emphasizes that light is a symbol
of intelligence, which is the essential characteristics of Brahman.
Brahman may have different appearances, says Shankara, and there is no contradiction
between asserting that It is One and without form and at same time enjoin meditation on some
appearances of the Brahman. Then, is there a contradiction between agreeing that Brahman is
One without shape and worshiping the Brahman as a Person with this or that name?

āha ca tanmātram || 3.2.16

It says (ah) also (ca) merely that (tat-mātra)
The word tanmātra being in the singular here, it does not refer to the subtle elements (sound,
feel, light, taste and odour) but to Brahman as the most subtle essence of everything. Shankara
quotes section 4.5 of the Bṛihad in which Yājñavalkya explains to his wife that nothing else
than the Self worth to be longed for/ aspired to. The Self is the essence of everything. He
quotes especially the conclusion (4.5.13): "The Self without inside without outside
(anantaro'bāhyaḥ) is mere/ gross intelligence (prajñānaghana). Having gone out of creatures,
it merges in them again and when it has departed there is no more consciousness (saṁjñā),
like there is no more taste when salt is removed from food."

darṡayati cātho api smaryate || 3.2.17

And it is also remembered in smṛitis that it shows (dṛṣ)
The sūtra still refers to a single scripture which shows (verb dṛṣ in causative mode) that
Brahman cannot be defined by some characteristics since It is the essence of everything.
Considering the Gīṭā as a smṛiti, Shnakara quotes ṡloka 13.12: "jñeyaṁ yattatpravakṣyami
yajjñātvā'mṛtamaṡnute | anādimatparaṁ brahma na sattannāsaducyate ||" – I will tell you
what has to be known so that you will obtain immortality. Brahman which is benningless and
supreme is said to be neither being nor non-being (nor pure spirituall existence nor material
appearence).

ata eva copamā sūryakādivat || 3.2.18

Hence (ata) even also (eva ca) the comparison (upamā) to being (vat) ressembling the sun
(sūryaka) etc…(ādi)
This sūtra is so redundant: "ata+ eva", "upamā+ ka+ vat"! Shankara proposes for explanation
that sūryakavat should be translated by: "like a reflection of the sun", which is a common
image in many smṛitis. As the sun, though one, appears manyfold when observed in different
tanks of water, or as the atmosphere, though one, appears manifold when enclosed in different
jars, the Universal Self, though one, appears manifold in the creatures. Does it mean that the
self of each creature is a reflection of the Universal Self? Sūtra 2.3.50 already suggested this
question.

ambuvadagrahaṇāt tu na tathātvam || 3.2.19

But there is no such a state (na tathā-tva) since there is no perception (a-grahaṇa) (of the
individual self) as being like water (ambu-vat)
The comparison is not reasonable, says the vṛittikāra, because the self is not material. It
cannot be perceived. The statement is made only for allowing the vedāntin to answer in next
sūtra.

vṛddhihrāsabhāktvam antarbhāvādubhayasāmañjasyādevam || 3.2.20

There is partaking (bhāktva) in growth (vṛddhi) and diminution (hrasa) on account of the
presence inside (antar-bhāva) of both (ubha) on account of correct understanding
(sāmañjasya)
The comparison to the reflection of the sun is perfectly pertinent, retort the vedāntin, because
in a comparison the thing which is compared and the illustration are not identical. They are
comparable in some respect only. Else the comparison would have no object. Now I could not
understand the partaking in growth and decrease of the reflection of the sun with the increase
and decrease of the water. "The image of the sun dilates when the surface of water increases",
says Radhakṛiṣnan. The comments of the vedāntin about sūtras of the first chapter (1.27,
1.3.14) concerning the size of the cavity in the heart and the identity or the difference of the
individual self with the Supreme Self, should be read again for deciding if this comparison to
an image inccreasing or decreasing in size is compatible with former statements. On the
contrary Ramanuja, Nimbārka and Ṡṛinivāsa say that the Supreme Self dwells in all creatures
as their inner controler but does not participate to their imperfections. Should we read: vṛddhi-
hrāsa-abhāktvam?

darṡanācca || 3.2.21
On account also of what is shown/ revealed (darṡana) (in vedic texts)
Commentators quote texts telling that the Suprmee Person enters the body of all creatures,
like Bṛihad 2.5.18, Chāndogya 6.3.2…

prakṛtaitāvattvaṁ hi pratiṣedhati tato bravīti ca bhūyaḥ || 3.2.22

It denies (pratiṣidh) the large quantity (etatvattva) (of statement) already achieved (prakṛita)
then tatas) tells (brū) more (bhūyas)
This sūtra refers evidently to the statement of Yajñavalkya in Bṛihadāranayaka chapters 4,
after having given so many improper (limited) descriptions of the Self / Brahman: "sa eṣa neti
netyātmā agṛhyaḥ na hi gṛhyate|" – The Self is nor this nor this. It (He in samskrit) is
incomprehensible. It is never comprehended (4.4.22). Yajñavalkya pronounces the same
sentence in another context also in paragraph 3.9.26 and Shankara refers to a similar
statement in paragraph 2.3.6: "athāta adeṡaḥ neti neti na hi etasmāditi netyanyat param asti |
atha nāmadheyam satyasya satyam asti." – "Now there is this declaration: it is not this nor
this, for indeed there is nothing else higher than That. Then the appelation for That is truth of
truth". It is not this nor this because It is more (bhūyas / param): the truth of all truths, the
cause of all causes, the existence of all existences ... "That is full" (5.1.1)

tadavyaktamāha hi|| 3.2.23

It says: That is not manifest
Brahman or Self is declared to not be so many things: unborn, unmanifest, unthinkable,
undescribable, unalterable, undestroyable (Gītā 2.24+2.25, Muṇḍaka 1.1.6).

api ca saṁrādhane pratyakṣānumānābhyām || 3.2.24

Also from conclusions of reflections (anumāna) appearing obvious (pratyakṣa) in the state of
complete accomplishment /perfect concentration (saṁrādha)
The verb rādh means to accomplish, to succeed and gives the name of the most succesfull
lady. Now, what is a perfect success, else than a full concentration of consciousness in
samādhi (sama-adhi), state which may be obtained by meditation (dhyana) on ideas (dhī) or
simply by being receptive (open to revelations: pratyakṣa), as suggested by the yoga sūtras.
One can see in himself (Kaṭha 2.1.1, Muṇḍaka 3.1.8, Gītā…).

prakāṡādivaccāvaiṡeṣyaṁ prakāṡaṣca karmaṇyabhyāsāt || 3.2.25

There is no difference (vaiṡeṣya) in what is illuminating by nature (prakāṡa-vat) and the like
(ādi) and the appearance/ illumination (prakāṡa) (occurs) through practice (abhyāsa) in (of)
activity (karma)
Prakāṡa may be an adjective or a name (male) and it express the idea of producing (pra) light
or sight (kās), becoming visible, clear, obvious, or making clear… This light refers to the
rising consciousness of the self, the intelligence of the conscious person, the omniscience of
the Brahman. There is no difference between the individual self and the Universal Self in this
respect: light is more or less bright but that is always the same kind of light. Shankara restrict
the nature of karma to meditation and that of practice to reading in vedic texts: "the luminous
(self) appears different during the activity (of meditation) as in the case of light there is no
difference as evident from repetition in texts". Ramanuja and others having read Shankara's
bhāṣyas follow him in his interpretation of the word karma and say that the intuition of light
as the essential nature of Brahmn arises through meditation. That is consistent with the
mention of meditation in previous sūtra (3.2.24).

ato'nantena tathā hi liṅgam || 3.2.26

Then as a mark (tathā liṅga) with that infinite (ananta)
Ananta is an adjective qualifying the Brahman or the Supreme Person. Shankara says: "then
the individual self becomes united with the infinite for there is such a mark in the upaniṣads".
He quotes Muṇḍaka 3.2.9: "sa yo ha vai tat paramam brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati" – the
one who knows the Brahman becomes the Brahman. His reference to Bṛihad 4.4.6 is less
appropriate, considering the context: Someone who is attached to desire comes back in this
world, but one who is freed of desire, whose desire is the self, being (already) Brahman he
goes to Brahman (brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti). Two ṡlokas of the Gītā express the same
idea: someone who is freed of desire and individuality (nir mamo nir ahamkāra) in this life is
already Brahman.

ubhaya-vyapadeṡāt tu ahikunḍalavat || 3.2.27

But owing to a double (ubha) designation (vyapadeṡa) it is like a coil (kundala-vat) and a
snake (ahi)
None of the texts quoted by Shankara justifies the comparison of the couple Supreme Self+
individual self to a snake and a coil or ring. Radhakrishnan says that the snake is one and it
has several coils. He quotes comments of Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Ṡṛinivāsa and Vallabha
comparing Brahman to a nāga (Ṡeṣa), being the cause of all causes: the coils.

prakāṡāṡrayavad vā tejastvāt || 3.2.28

Being the refuge of light or owing to its effulgence.
But Shankara continues to discuss of the difference and similarity of the indiviudal self and
Supreme Self. He translates systematically vat by like: "like light and its source both being
effulgent". Topics of reflection: what is effulgent? the light or its source?

pūrvavad vā || 3.2.29
Or on account of (what was said) before (pūrva)
Before means sūtra 3.2.25

pratiṣedhācca || 3.2.30
And on account of prohibition (pratiṣedha)
The verb sidh (sedhati- class 1 and not sidhyati –class 4) means to drive off, scare away,
repel, restrain, hinder, to punish, chastise, ordain, but not at my knowledge to deny as
suggested by Shankara and Radhakrihnan. The verb sidh of class 4 (sidhyati or sādhyati)
means to succeed, accomplish, because success depends on restriction of the passions and
control of the self. What is denied? That there are other conscious entities than the Self
(Bṛihad 3.7.23) and the descriptions of the Brahman (neti neti).
 param ataḥ setūnmānasambandhabhedavyapadeṡebhyaḥ || 3.2.31
Higher than this (param atas) on account of designations (vyapadeṡa), differences (bheda),
connections (sambhandha), valuation (unmāna) and playing the role of a dyke or bridge
(setu).
It is said in Chāndogya 8.4.1: "atha ya ātmā sa seturvidhṛtireṣāṁ lokānām asambhedāya |
naitam setum ahorātre taratha | na jarā na mṛtyur na ṡoko na sukṛtam na duṣkṛtam | sarve
pāpmāno 'to nivartante apahatapāpmā hyeṣa brahmalokaḥ || " – This Self is the dyke, the
separation keeping apart these worlds. Over this dyke day and night don’t cross, nor old age
and death, nor sorrow, nor good and bad actions. All evils turn back from it because the
Brahma world is free of evil.

sāmānyāt tu || 3.2.32
But on account of similarity
The Brahman or Self may be considered as a dyke or bridge against materiality, but it is not a
barrier for what is of same nature.

buddhyarthaḥ pādavat || 3.2.33

For the sake of (artha) comprehension (buddhi) it is like having feets (pādavat)
Dharma is often compared to a cow with four feet. But this is irrelevant here. The sūtra refers
to what is state in Chāndogya section 3.18: "tadetaccatuṣpādbrahma vāk pādaḥ prāṇaḥ
pādaṡcakṣuḥ pādaḥ ṡrotraṁ pāda ityadhyātmam | athādhidaivatam agniḥ pādo vāyuḥ pādaḥ
ādityaḥ pado diṡaḥ pāda iti|" – "That Brahman has four feet. On the point of view of the
presiding essence (adhyātman) they are speech, life breath and the abilities of seeing and
hearing. On the point of view of the presiding deities (adhidaivat) they are Agni, Vāyu,
Āditya and the Quarters (3.18.2)." The adhyātman is defined by Kṛiṣṇa as the presence of
Brahman in Gītā: akṣaram paramam brahma svabhāva adhyātmam ucyate. Brahman is sat
and asat and the chapter 3 of the Chāndogya is a meditation about the Brahman as the whole
world (3.14.1), as the self of thought, life, light, truth, desire and activity (3.14.2), a chest of
wealth (3.15). The Gayātrī with its four feets is a meditation on Brahman (3.12). The four
stages of life are the four libations in the sacrifice of life (3.16, 3.17). In paragraph 3.18 the
four feets of Brahman are the means of action of the living person on the subtle elements
(tanmātra), excluding those which appear of secondary importance for the understanding
(taste and smell). Perceiving the world around us is a means to grasp the Brahman
(buddhyartha).

sthānaviṡeṣāt prakāṡādivat ||3.2.34

From the distinction (viṡeṣa) of position (sthāna) as what is a source of ligth (prakāṡa) etc
(ādi) ...
One may distinguish the light perceived as that of the sun from that of the moon or the fire
etc… but light is merely one.

upapatteṡca ||3.2.35
And that is sustained by reality /or logics (upapatti)
When the Chāndogya states "he attains his own self" or "that you are" in section 6.8, it is a
truism on account of the meaning of the word self. Nevertheless the Upaniṣads often speak of
the Universal Self and the individual self. Likewise they speak of space outside the person
and inside the person (notably in the heart) and Chāndogya 3.18 quoted above in comments of
sūtra 3.2.33 suggests to meditate on mind as the adhyātman of space.
 tathānyapratiṣedhāt ||3.2.36
As on account of prohibition or denial (pradeṣa) of another (anya)
See 3.2.30 concerning the ambiguity of pratiṣedha. Shankara says that many vedic texts deny
the existence of anything else than Brahman. But in fact these texts don’t deny the existence
of any entity. They only assert that anything existing is nothing else than Brahman: Brahman
is the cause, Brahman maintain the appearance of things and Brahman absorb everything
again. That which is denied is the difference between one self and another Self.

anena sarvagatatvam āyāmaṡabdādibhyaḥ || 3.2.37

By this (anena instrumental case of pronoun idam) (denial) the all- pervadingness /
omnipresence (sarva-gata-tvam) (of Brahman or Self) on account of what is said (ṡābda) in
vedic texts and others (ādi) of its extension (āyāma).
Everybody knows that the name Brahman itself means "what is extending". Shankara quotes
Chāndogya 3.14.3 and 8.1.3: "this self smaller than a mustard seed and greater than heaven",
"this same self extending over the cavity in the heart and containing the whole space from
earth to heaven." "Yathākāṡa sthito nityam vāyu sarvatrago mahān" (Gītā 9.6).

phalam ata upapatteḥ || 3.2.38

Hence/ from Brahman (ata) the fruit (phalam) (of action) on account of evidence (upapatti)
The vṛittikāra defends the idea that the consequences of an action are produced automatically
and when the fruit is ripe the (potential of the) action itself is destroyed. Astonishingly the
vedāntin is of the opinion that there should be a conscious agent producing the effect: God,
the Person of Brahman. But he does not propose actual evidences or, according to his
translation of the word upapatti: some logical evidences.

ṡrutatvācca || 3.2.39
and on account of vedic texts (ṡruti)
Shankara quotes Bṛihad 4.4.24. In conclusion to his teaching about the becoming of the
person after death (already mentioned) and his possible awaking to the self ("pratibuddha
ātmāsmin" 4.4.13) to Yājñavalkya, king Janaka tells him: "sa vā eṣa mahān aja ātmā annādo
vasudānaḥ vindate vasu ya evam veda" – This One is this great unborn Self, eater and granter
of wealth. He who knows this obtains wealth."

dharmaṁ jaiminirata eva || 3.2.40

Hence (atas) Jaimini (speaks of) morality/virtue (dharma)
Jaimini is the leader of the vṛittikāra current of thought, who wrote some dharma sūtras called
Pūrva-Mīmāṁsa (previous examination of vedic texts). His point of view is that the action has
in itself some unseen potency in a subtle state, producing an actual result after some time.
That is in fact the usual definition of karma. Likewise dharma is the unseen potency to hold
the universe. But the vedāntin considers that karma is the action itself, lasting a moment and
vanishing, which I would name kṛiti instead.

pūrvaṁ tu bādarāyaṇo hetuvyapadeṡat ||3.2.41

But previously (pūrvam tu) from indication (vyapadeṡa) of the cause (hetu) by Bādarāyaṇa.
Bādarāyaṇa is the author of the Brahma sūtras. Now, Shankara translates: but Bādarāyaṇa
(considers) the former (pūrva in accusative case: pūrvam) (who here is God) as being the
bestower of fruits because He is mentioned as the cause of all causes. Of course for Shankara,
the word but in itself is an indisputable refutation of Jaimini point of view. Bādarāyaṇa (or
Vyāsa) expresses the truth only. Here he finds convenient to quote the Gītā (7.21-22), where
Kṛiṣṇa informs us that whatever the deity one is worshipping and whatever desire he has
expressed, the result of his worship is provided by Kṛiṣṇa Himself.

Third Section
sarvavedāntapratyayaṁ codanādyaviṡeṣāt || 3.3.1
The conviction (pratyaya) of any (sarva) conclusion drawn from the Vedas (veda-anta) is
based on the lack of difference/ distinction (aviṡeṣa) in the precept(s) / direction(s) (codana)
and what follows (ādi).
Prati-i: to come back, to return, and by extension to acknowledge, trust, believe.
Cud means to impel, to incite and codana is the corresponding fact: motivation,
encouragement, precept, direction and by extension a rule. For instance, Kṛiṣṇa says that the
three motivations (codana) of action are the acquired knowledge, the research of knowledge
and the knower (Gītā 18.18). Shankara prefers to translate codana by injunction and he
speaks of a lack of difference in the injunctions: "any conception drawn from meditation on
the Vedas makes no difference on account of the lack of difference in the injunctions (codana)
etc…" But as an example of injunction he quotes the incentitement to meditate on prāṇa as the
oldest and greatest of all the activities of a living entity in both the Chāndogya (5.1.6) and
Bṛihad 6.1.1) in exactly the same terms.
Do the upaniṣāds teach us different conceptions of Brahman, asks the vṛittikāra? His
arguments are quite confused. He could have remembered instead that some sections speak of
Its various attributes, remembering us finally that Brahman is all, and Bṛihadāranayka in
several instances tells us: na iti na iti. Do they teach different injunctions, answers the
vedāntin? No. "Rites do not differ just because difference names are used in them" he says,
quoting the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā (11.4.10). "A same conception leads to similar meditations and
injunctions".

bhedān neti cennaikasyām api || 3.3.2

If its is said (cet iti) that is not so (na), on account of some differences (bheda), not even in a
single one (eka)
It is worth to note that the single entity which is to be considered is of female gender.
Therefore that is nor codana, nor vedānta, nor pratyaya, nor dhyana (meditation), nor vijñāna
(used in Shankara argument). It seems that this entity is vidyā: some knowledge of spiritual
truth, a philosophy. The vedāntin and vṛittikāra argue again on names such as prāṇa for any
kind of life function including senses and their number. Anyway, Bādarāyana assures us that
there is no significant difference between the teachings in various upaniṣads.

svādhyāyasya tathātvena hi samācāre'dhikārācca savavacca tanniyamaḥ|| 3.3.3

From the entitlement/ or competence (adhikāra) in the practice (samācāra) of the recitation/ or
study of the Vedas (svādhyāya) as it is (tathātva) indeed (hi) that self-restraint (niyama) acts
as an instigator (sava-vat)
I am not aware of any book named samācāra mentioned by Shankara, which imparts
isntruction about the practice of vows for the followers of Atharva Veda. Sava is an instigator:
Savitṛ is one name of the Sun god, "tat savitur varenyam" is the first foot of Gāyatrī mantra.
Now sava may also be derived from the verb su (to press a juice) and means the fact of
pressing soma juice or another name of the Moon god (Soma). So the translation proposed by
Shankara is: "(The rite of carrying fire on head is an appendage) of the study of the Vedas,
because it is stated to be so in the samācāra and because of competence also. And that
regulation is like that about libations." And he quotes Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad paragraph 3.2.10,
which which indeed declares tha the knowledge of Brahman should be teached to students
who practice the ritual of holding a fire on head: "kriyāvantas ṡrotriyā brahmaniṣṭhas svayaṁ
juhvata ekarṡim ṡraddhayantaḥ | teṣām evaitām brahmavidyām vadeta ṡirovrataṁ vidhivad
yaistu cīrṇam" – "This transcendental knowledge of Brahman may be told to someone who
performs rites, who has learned the vedic texts, who is firmly resting in Brahman and who
offers himself to the sole seer with faith, to him whose conduct (cīrṇa) is according to the
rules (vidhivat) and who carries fire on his head (ṡirovrata)." In what consists this ritual? Into
the shaving of one's head (muṇḍa – giving its name to the upaniṣad) as a mark of austerity:
someone shaves his head when losing a close relative and austerity (tapas) is heat (also tapas).
"tapasā cīyate brahma tatonnam abhijāyate annāt prāṇo manaḥ satyaṁ." (Muṇḍaka 1.1.8) –
By the practice of austerity (meditation) the Brahman (i.e. the Person of the Brahman)
arranges a sacrifice and expands (double meaning of the verb ci), from which is produced
food, from food life-breath, from life-breath the mind and from the mind truth. But the
whole upaniṣad stresses that rituals are important for those who research the well being of the
worlds (1.2.3), i.e. the improvement of one's own life or that of progenity and ancestors. Then
same section 1.2 declares that those who follow this path of the vṛittikāras are condamned to
be reborn again and again (1.2.7, 1.2.10). All other sections of the Muṇḍaka speak of the
proper understanding of the self through austerity, renunciation, purification of one's life and
mergence in Brahman as brahma-bhūta (3.2.8).

darṡayati ca ||3.3.4
It is shown also (in Vedas)
I don’t know what Bādarāyaṇa intended to say. Shankara quotes the paragraph of the Kaṭha
Upaniṣad where Yama tells to Naciketas: "I will teach you that syllab Aum which is
proclamed by all the Vedas, declared under the form of all the austerities, wishing which all
brahmacari perform their activities" (1.2.15).

upasaṁhāro'rthābhedād vidhiṡeṣavat samāne ca ||3.3.5

A summarizing / or a withdrawing (upa-saṁ-hāra) (takes place?) from the lack of difference
in the purpose (artha-abheda) like a subsidyary rule (vidhi-ṡeṣa-vat) in someone
imperturbable/ equanime (samāna)
But Shankara interprets samāna by "similar meditation" and upa-saM-hāra by "combination".
"Any meditation mentioned in Upaniṣads has to be combined with others because their
applications are not different, like the subsidyary rules of an injunction." And he suggests a
link with "sarva-bheda-anyatra-ime" in sūtra 3.3.10. Now, the verb saṁ-hṛ is used by Kṛṣṇa
about the tortoise withdrawing its limbs inside its shell and the saṁnyasi withdrawing his
senses from their objects (Gītā section 2), and upa adds an idea of closeness: something is
gathered tightly like in a summary. The equanime seer draws a coherent conclusion from the
various texts of the upaniṣāds with their subsidiary differences in details. Or does he become a
saṁnyasi?

anyathātvaṁ ṡabdāditi cennāviṡeṣāt ||3.36

This difference in manner (anyathā-tva) from the vedic texts (ṡabda) is not a proper argument
(iti cet na) on account of the lack of difference (viṡeṣa)
Truism?
Shankara mentions the story told in both the Bṛihadāranayaka (section 1.3) and the
Chāndogya (section 1.2) of the devas resorting to the udgītha for fighting the asuras. Of all the
prāṇas (5, 7 or any other number) which are asked to drone the akṣara (Aum) only the main
outbreath is not corrupted with evil by the asuras and the devas conclude that he (prāṇa is
male like all active entities in saṁskrit) is their leader. Do the meditations in Bṛihad and in
Chāndogya differ in some manner? Shankara points out rightly that the Bṛihad. makes part of
the Yajur Veda and the Chāndogya of the Sāma Veda. Therefore, in the first the devas ask to
the prāṇa (deity) of speech, then to the prāṇa (deity) of hearing, then to the prāṇa of thinking,
etc… to sing the udgītha, whereas in the second upaniṣad the devas meditate on the udgītha
(on Brahman) as speech, sight, smell, sound, thought and outbreath. But there is no difference
in the conclusion: evils afflict all life functions except the outbreath. Outbreath is fit for
vibrating Aum. The Bṛihad adds a pun in paragraph 1.3.23: indeed prāṇa is also ut –gītha. The
parable is perfect. There are plenty of such varations in vedic texts and puranas like the
Mahābhārata, starting with the story of Ganga and Dyu expelled from Indraloka because of
their improper behavior in the gods assembly: Vyāsa tells us three different versions of the
story. With this story one learns to meditate on alternative truths in the description of reality.

na vā prakaraṇabhedāt parovarīyastādivat || 3.3.7

Nor (na vā) from a difference (bheda) in the approach / treatment (prakaraṇa) (of the subject
which is) by nature (vat) higher (paras) than the most excellent (varīyas).
There is also a difference in the framework of the two upaniṣads: the Chāndogy starting with
"lets meditate on the udgītha" (1.1.1) and the Bṛihad with lets meditate on sacrifice. That is
why in Bṛihad the devas ask to one of them to perform the sacrifice by singing the udgītha.
Note that the terms "parovarīya" is used in Chāndogya paragraph 1.9.2: "sa eṣa parovarīyan
udgīthaḥ…" – "This Aum syllab is best of the bests. He who meditates on the udgītha as such
becomes also the best of the bests and he obtains the best of the bests worlds." Therefore the
reference in these sūtras to parables about udgītha is appropriate.

saṁjñātaṡcet taduktam asti tu tadapi || 3.3.8

If that is ackowledged (ced tad saṁjñātaḥ) but that which is said also exists (tu tad uktam api
asti)
The differences in the contexts are also interesting topics of meditation. The Chāndogya urges
us to meditate on udgītha as a symbol of Brahman from so many different points of view. For
instance the udgītha is the space because the space is "ut" (beyond) the world (section 1.9). It
is also the sun because the sun is rising, i.e. like one singing Aum (1.5.1). Section 1.6 suggests
also to meditate on the udgātṛi priest singing the udgītha as praising the One who is "ut"
(beyond) the sun, i.e. beyond the devas since the sun is the eye of the gods, their intelligence
(1.6.8), the One "ut" all evils (1.6.7), the golden Person within the sun (1.6.6). The udgītha is
the best mantra because all songs, all vedic texts start with Aum (section 1.4).
Shankara and his opponent vṛittikāra discuss of the identity of Aum and udgītha. Do the two
names have same meaning. They continue in the discussionof next sūtra.

vyāpteṡca samañjasam || 3.3.9

And that is right/ appropriate (samañjasa) on account of the omnipresence (vyāpti) (of Aum in
Vedas)

sarvābhedādanyatreme || 3.3.10
On account of all (sarva) lack of difference (abheda) these (idam masculine nominative plural:
ime) elsewhere (anyatra)
The demonstrative pronoun idam is declined with masculine gender like bheda but it is plural
whereas bhedāt is in singular ablative case. Anyway, it is suggested by the vedantin and the
vṛittikāra that the topics under duscussion is the lack of difference between various
meditations on prāṇa. Indeed it has been said above that the outbreath is the greatest of all
divinities. His pre-eminence (prāṇa has the appropriate masculine gender for an active
concept and the main divine presence in the body) is mentioned in other upaniṣads such as the
Kauṣītaki (2.14) or Taittirīya (2.3): prāṇo hi bhūtānām āyuḥ… sarvam eva ta āyur yanti ye
prāṇam brahmoāsate" – "The outbreath is the life of creature. Therefore those who worship
Brahman as breath attain a full life." Since there is no difference in the conception of prāña
(or other topics of meditation in the Vedas) the ideas developped in one text are relevant in
the interpretation of all other texts on same topics.

ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya || 3.3.11

Bliss (ananda) etc… (ādi) of the essential receptacle (pradhana)
Since the first characteristics of the principal entity under discussion is bliss, it cannot be the
non manifest material reality nor the impersonal Brahman but the Person of the Brahman.
According to the vedāntin bliss and other characteristics have to be combined, on account of
previous sūtra (3.3.10).

priyaṡirastvādyaprāpti upacayāpacayau hi bhede || 3.3.12

The non obtention (aprāti) (in a text) of (qualificatives like) "having for head love" (priya-
ṡiras-tva) and others (ādi) there are both increase and decrease (upacaya-apacaya) in the
difference (bheda)
Upacaya-apacaya is in nominative or accusative dual case, but the commentators consider
that it is in ablative/ causal dual case (which should be upacaya-apacayābhyam). Anyway, the
description of Brahman as having for body the Self which is made of bliss, then as having
love or pleasure (priya) for head, occurs in the Taittirīya (2.5): "tasyaiṣa eva ṡarīra ātmā yaḥ
pūrvasya tasmād vā etasmād vijñānamayāt anyo'ntara ātmā ānandamayaḥ… tasya priyam
eva ṡiraḥ…" – "Of that Brahman which consists of full understanding the Self is the body
consisting of bliss and Its head is love."

itare tu arthasāmānyāt || 3.3.13

ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt || 3.3.14

ātmaṡabdācca || 3.3.15
ātmagṛhītiritaravaduttarāt || 3.3.16
anvayāditi cet syādavadhāraṇāt || 3.3.17
kāryākhyānādapūrvam || 3.3.18
samāna evam cābhedāt || 3.3.19
sambandhādevam anyatrāpi || 3.3.20
na vā viṡeṣāt || 3.3.21
No or because of difference
darṡayati ca || 3.3.22
that is shown also
sambhṛti dyuvyāptyapi cātaḥ || 3.3.23
collection/ or complete support and also omnipresence of the day from this
puruṣavidyāyām iva cetareṣām anāmnānāt || 3.3.24
vedhādyarthabhedāt || 3.3.25
hānau tūpāyanaṡabdaṡeṣatvāt kuṡācchandaḥ stutyupagānavat taduktam || 3.3.26
sāmparāye tartavyābhāvāt tathā hy anye || 3.3.27
achandata ubhayāvirodhāt || 3.3.28
gaterarthavattvam ubhayathā'nyathā hi virodhaḥ ||3.3.29
upapannastallakṣaṇārthopalabdherlokavat || 3.3.30
 aniyamaḥ sarvāsām avirodhaḥ ṡabdānumānābhyām || 3.3.31
yāvadadhikāram avasthitir ādhikārikāṇām ||3.3.32
akṣaradhiyām tvavarodhaḥ sāmānyatadbhāvābhyām upasadvat taduktam || 3.3.33
iyadāmananāt || 3.3.34
antarābhūtagrāmavat svātmanaḥ || 3.3.35
anyathā bheānupapattiriti cennopadeṡāntaravat || 3.3.36
vyatihāro viṡiṁṣanti hītaravat || 3.3.37
saiva hi satyādayaḥ || 3.3.38
kāmādītaratra tatra cāyatanādibhyaḥ || 3.3.39
ādarādalopaḥ || 3.3.40
upasthite'tastadvacanāt || 3.3.41
tannirdhāraṇāniyamas taddṛṣṭeḥ pṛthag hyapratibandhaḥ phalam || 3.3.42
pradānavadeva taduktam || 3.3.43
liṅgabhūyastvāt taddhi balīyastadapi || 3.3.44
pūrvavikalpaḥ prakaraṇāt syāt kriyāmānasavat || 3.3.45
atideṡācca || 3.3.46
vidyaiva tu nirdhāraṇāt || 3.3.47
darṡanāca || 3.3.48
from sight also
ṡrutyādibalīyastvācca na bādhaḥ || 3.3.49
anubandhādibhyaḥ prajñāntarapṛthaktvavaddṛṣṭaṡca taduktam ||3.3.50
na sāmānyādapyupalabdhermṛtyuvanna hi lokāpattiḥ || 3.3.51
pareṇa ca ṡabdasya tādvidhyam bhūyastvāttvanubandhaḥ || 3.3.52
eka ātmanaḥ ṡarīre bhāvāt || 3.3.53
vyatirekas tadbhāvābhāvitvānna tūpalabdhivat || 3.3.54
aṅgāvabaddhās tu na ṡākhāsu hi prativedam ||
mantrādivadvā'virodhaḥ || 3.3.56
bhūmnaḥ kratuvajjyāyastvaṁ tathā hi darṡayati || 3.3.57
nānā ṡabdādibhedāt || 3.3.58
vikalpo'viṡiṣṭaphalatvāt || 3.3.59
kāmyāstu yathākāmaṁ samuccīyeranna vā pūrvahetvabhāvāt || 3.3.60
aṅgeṣu yathāṡrayabhāvaḥ || 3.3.61
ṡiṣṭeṡca || 3.3.62
samāhārāt || 3.3.63
guṇasādhāraṇyaṡruteṡca || 3.3.64
na vā tatsahabhāvāṡruteḥ || 3.3.65
darṡanācca || 3.3.66