Griaga, Trisha Kerstin B.

Criminal Law II – Case Digests

Newsweek vs IAC G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986

FACTS:
Private respondents filed a Complaint for damages for 1M. The criminal complaint
for libel was filed separately against Newsweek. Private respondents, incorporated
associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental filed a case in their own
behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province
against Newsweek Inc. and two of their non-resident correspondents/reporters,
Fred Bruning and Barry Came.
The complaint alleged that petitioner committed libel against them by the
publication of the article “An Island of Fear” in their magazine. The article
supposedly portrayed the island as a place dominated by big landowners or
sugarcane planters who exploited the impoverished sugarcane laborers and
brutalized and killed them with impunity.
They claim that the article showed a malicious use of falsehood, slanted
presentation, and misrepresentation of facts, putting them in a bad light
They are comprised of 8,500 (number is complied with) Newsweek, is a foreign
corporation who publishes weekly magazine, filed a Motion to Dismiss for libel. CFI
Bacolod denied Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel. IAC affirmed CFI’s denial of
Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel
ISSUE/S:
1. WON IAC erred in affirming CFI’s denial of Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for
libel?
2. WON the case is a class suit?
HELD:
1. YES. IAC erred in affirming CFI’s denial of Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for
libel. Private respondent’s Complaint for libel against Newsweek is dismissed.
2. NO. The case not a class suit. They do not have common or general interest
in the subject matter (each other’s reputation)). It is not a case where one or
more may sure for the benefit of all. Or where the representation of class
interest affected by the decree is indispensable to make each member an
actual party. In this case, the plaintiffs, have separate and distinct reputation
in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the
controversy. The disputed portion of the article that claim to be libelous
never singled out plaintiff SOLA as a sugar planter. The report merely stated
that the victim has been arrested by members of special police unit brought
into the area by SOLA, the mayor of Kabankalan. The report, referring as it
does to an official act performed by an elective public official, is within the
realm or privilege and is protected by the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and press.
Santos v CA G.R. No. L-45031 October 21, 1991

FACTS:
Nanerico Santos was a columnist of the Manila Daily Bulletin. He wrote in his column
an article entitled “Charges Against CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc.” which was quoted
verbatim from an unverified complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on February 13, 1970. The column contained charges against
CMS Stock Brokerage Inc., particularly its board chairman and controlling
stockholder Carlos Moran Sison and its president-general manager Luis Sison, of
engaging in fraudulent practices in the stock market. Carlos Moran Sison met with
Santos so that he could submit to the columnist his reply which he wanted
published the next day and in the same column. Since they met late, the reply could
be published on February 25 only because it was already past the deadline for next
day’s issue. The reply was not published on February 25 as promised, so Carlos
Sison called Santos not to publish the reply anymore as it would only rekindle the
talks. Sison also informed Santos that he would be sued for libel and other persons
of the Manila Daily Bulletin. The trial court rendered the conviction for libel and the
Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. According to the CA, the article in question
is not a privileged communication. At the time the complaint filed with SEC, it was
published in the column of the accused. There was yet no proceeding at which both
parties had an opportunity to be present and to be heard.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of a complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission is privileged and thus not covered libel.
HELD:
Yes, the publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report of a judicial
proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or remarks, even before any
judicial action, is privileged.
The applicable provision of law is Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code which states
as follows:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of
any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are of confidential nature,
or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Lacsa v IAC G.R. No. 74907 May 23, 1988

FACTS:
Petitioner, a CPA, and a former member of the Board of Directors of Philippine
Columbian Association (PCA). He volunteered his services to audit the PCA. During
his audit he found out that PCA President Ponciano Marquez was a mere associate
member of the association and cannot hold position as President. This prompted
petitioner to write to the board and branded the private complainant, Marquez as a
"de facto president." The letter, which the petitioner eventually caused to be
published and circulated among the members of the association. Not content,
petitioner again caused the publication in a newsletter circulated to the
association's members, of an item entitled "Doubt as To the Legitimacy Of The
Incumbent President." Hence Marquez filed a criminal case of libel. Lacsa alleged
the following defenses (1) the term "de facto president," which he used to describe
the private complainant, is not libelous per se; and (2) even assuming that the said
term is indeed libelous, the letter and newsletter in which it appeared nevertheless
constitute privileged communication and cannot give rise to a libel conviction.
ISSUE:
W.O.N. the petitioner is guilty of libel.
HELD:
YES. In the first dismissing the first contention, considering that there are two
classes of membership in the PCA — associate and proprietary — and it is only
those of the latter who are qualified to be voted as president of the association, the
act of the petitioner in branding complainant Marquez as a mere de facto president
and insinuating imperfection in the latter's status as a proprietary member, most
certainly exposed Marquez to public contempt and ridicule. No amount of subtlety
designed to camouflage the ill-effect of the petitioner's misdeed would erase the
impression already created in the minds of the readers of the libelous materials.
The Solicitor General is correct in stating that calling Marquez a de facto president
"is equivalent to saying that he is a pretender, a fraud, and impostor and he is
arrogating unto himself certain powers, rights, and privileges to which he is not
entitled.
Secondly, the Court cannot likewise subscribe to the assertion of the petitioner that
the letter and newsletter article complained of partake of privileged communication.
To be classified as a privileged communication, the disputed letter and article must
be free from any taint of malice which, unfortunately, is not the case here.
People v Motita 59 OG 3020, April 30, 1966

FACTS:
Accused was seen in the public market holding a mirror between the legs of the
complainant Mrs. Pilar N. Letada and thus allowing people to see a reflection of her
private part. Sol-Gen agrees that what was committed was slander by deed but
disagrees on the gravity of the deed and says that it is not serious.
ISSUE:
WON the accused was of guilty or unjust vexation or slander by deed?
HELD:
S.C.:
1. The crime committed could be unjust vexation or slander by deed. However,
though irritation or annoyance exists in both crimes, slander by deed is committed
when such annoyance is attended with publicity, dishonor, or contempt. If the
annoyance were attended by those circumstances mentioned in rape, the crime
would be acts of lasciviousness. The facts of the case show that the act committed
was slander by deed.
2. We disagree with the Sol-Gen regarding his comment on the gravity of the
slander by deed. In considering the seriousness of the act, we are moved by
considerations of public policy and morals, namely, the degeneration of the respect
accorded to Filipinas.
Soriano v IAC G.R. No. 72383 November 9, 1988

FACTS:
An information for libel was filed against petitioner Marcelo Soriano and six (6)
because of press releases and articles imputing to Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. ,the
then Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA), the tampering by COA personnel
of election returns in the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections at his residence in
Tacloban City and in the COA Regional Office in Palo, Leyte. This election offense
was allegedly committed at Tantuico's order to assure the victory of certain
candidates in the said Batasan elections.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground of improper
venue as the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged because under Art
360 of the RPC, the libel case should have been filed at Quezon City where Tantuico
holds office and publishes the "Guardian". When the Trial court ruled that since the
article was printed and first published in the City of Tacloban the venue was proper,
Tantuico once again raised the same issues in his petition for certiorari. The
appellate court dismissed the petition in a decision dated September 12, 1985. It
held that the Regional Trial Court of Leyte had jurisdiction over the libel case. The
appellate court also denied a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Leyte may try the libel case.
HELD:
No. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1289
and Republic Act No. 4363 provides: “The criminal action and civil action for
damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or
city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission on of the offense.”
Provided, however, that where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose
office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city, or
province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such
public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of
the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action
shad be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is
printed and first published: ...
In Agbayani v Sayo the court summarized this as:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time
of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense.
The lower courts applied the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try an offense is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information; since the information
states that the articles were first published in Tacloban, they ruled that the RTC of
Leyte had Jurisdiction.
However, we follow the “Multiple Publication Rule” which makes it so each and
every publication of the same libel constitutes a distinct offense (Montinola v.
Montalvo). In relation to Art 360 this means every time the same written matter is
communicated such communication is considered a distinct and separate
publication of the libel.
Since Petitioner was included as an accused due to his position as publisher of the
“Guardian”; Art 360 of the RPC holds him responsible, as if he were the author, for
the defamation in the articles he published.
Thus, as far as Soriano is concerned, his criminal liability, if any, allegedly stemmed
from his publication of an article captioned "IMPEACH TANTUICO CASE LOOMS"
prepared in Tacloban by Villegas.
The place of 1st publication must be construed as the place where he published
said article in the Guardian. Ergo, since the respondent COA Chairman held office in
Quezon City and the offending newspaper is published in Quezon City; through
applying Art 360 of the RTC, the venue and jurisdiction over subject criminal case
for libel should be lodged not in Tacloban City but in Quezon City.
The case should be filed with a Quezon City court instead of the Leyte RTC.
WHEREFORE the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court of
Leyte, is DIRECTED TO DISMISS Criminal Case in so far its petitioner Marcelo Soriano
is concerned.
People vs Cano G.R. No. L-19660 ; May 24, 1966

FACTS:
Defendant Ambrocio Cano was the driver of La Mallorca Pambusco bus. He was
alleged to be driving with disregard to traffic rules and regulations, causing damage
to another bus and inflicting injuries to the passengers of both buses. He is accused
of the crime damage to property with multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence.
Cano filed a motion to quash the information upon the ground that the crime of
slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence cannot be complexed with damage
to property, serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. He
also contends that the lower court has no jurisdiction of the crime charged, slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The lower court granted such
motion. The prosecution then filed an appeal.
ISSUE:
WON slight physical injuries can validly be complexed with grave or less grave
felonies.
HELD:
The Court held that the information herein does not purport to complex the offense
of slight physical injuries with reckless negligence with that of damage to property
and serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. It is merely
alleged in the information that, thru reckless negligence of the defendant, the bus
driven by him hit another bus causing upon some of its passengers serious physical
injuries, upon others less serious physical injuries and upon still others slight
physical injuries, in addition to damage to property.
It may not be amiss to add that the purpose of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
in complexing several felonies resulting from a single act, or one which is a
necessary means to commit another, is to favor the accused by prescribing the
imposition of the penalty for the most serious crime, instead of the penalties for
each one of the aforesaid crimes which, put together, may be graver than the
penalty for the most serious offense.
from the viewpoint both of trial practices and justice, it is, to say the least, doubtful
whether the prosecution should split the action against the defendant, by filing
against him several informations, namely, one for damage to property and serious
and less serious physical injuries, thru, reckless negligence, before the court of first
instance, and another for slight physical injuries thru reckless negligence, before
the justice of the peace of municipal court. Such splitting of the action would work
unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice in general and to the
accused in particular, for it would require the presentation of substantially the same
evidence before two different courts, the municipal court and the court of first
instance.
People vs Carillo G.R. No. 86890 January 21, 1994

FACTS:
Yolanda Acosta (Yolanda), Catherine’s mother, filed a complaint against Dr. Carillo
and Dr. Madrid before the RTC of Paranaque. The RTC convicted Dr. Carillo of the
crime of simple negligence resulting in homicide. The CA affirmed the judgment of
conviction, Dr. Carillo did not appeal the decision of the CA and thus became final.
Dr. Carillo then filed a petition to question the factual soundness of the CA before
the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether Dr. Carillo and Dr. Madrid acted negligently in their duties which resulted
to the death of their patient.
HELD:
YES, both doctors acted negligently in providing the proper care to their patient,
during and post operation. The Court defined simple negligence, penalized under
what is now Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as "a mere lack of prevision in a
situation where either the threatened harm is not immediate or the danger not
openly visible." The rule in such cases is that while the prosecution must prove the
negative ingredient of the offense, it needs only to present the best evidence
procurable under the circumstances, in order to shift the burden of disproving or
countering the proof of the negative ingredient to the accused, provided that such
initial evidence establishes at least on a prima facie basis the guilt of the accused.
This rule is particularly applicable where the negative ingredient of the offense is of
such a nature or character as, under the circumstances, to be specially within the
knowledge or control of the accused. In the instant case, the Court is bound to
observe that the events which occurred during the surgical procedure (including
whether or not Nubain had in fact been administered as an anesthesia immediately
before or during the surgery) were peculiarly within the knowledge and control of
Dr. Carillo and Dr. Madrid. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the two (2) accused to
overturn the prima facie case which the prosecution had established, by reciting the
measures which they had actually taken to prevent or to counter the obviously
serious condition of Catherine Acosta which was evident right after surgery. This
they failed or refused to do so.
People vs. De los Santos; G.R. No. 131588; Mar 27, 2001

FACTS:
In the early morning of October 5, 1995, at the Maitum Highway in Cagayan de Oro
City, a team of PNP members who were undergoing a Special Training Course,
wearing black T-shirts and black short pants, were performing an “Endurance Run”
of 35 km coming from their camp in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon and heading to
Regional Training Headquarters in Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, running in a
column of three with a distance of two feet or less from one another. The group was
jogging on the right side of the lane. The accused, Glenn de los Santos, driving an
Isuzu Elf, hit and killed members of the jogging PNP team. As a result, some PNP
members were killed on the spot while another trainee died a few days after the
incident. Eleven (11) other trainees were seriously wounded and some sustained
minor injuries. The accused escaped after the incident, leaving behind the victims
helpless.

The trial court convicted Glenn de los Santos of the crime of multiple murder,
multiple frustrated murder, and multiple attempted murder, with use of motor
vehicle as the qualifying circumstance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an intent to kill or injure the jogging the trainees or was it
reckless imprudence.
HELD:
The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG that the accused intentionally rammed
and hit the jogging trainees was premised on the assumption that despite the first
bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead of applying his
brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks or skid marks along the traffic
scenes. The defense, meanwhile, attributed the continuous movement of the
vehicle to the reason that the Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that
even if the brakes were applied, the truck would have still proceeded further on
account of its own momentum, albeit at a reduced speed, and would have stopped
only after a certain distance. It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts
are capable of two or more explanations – one consistent with the innocence or
lesser degree of liability of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or
graver responsibility – the Court should adopt the explanation which is more
favorable to the accused. The Court was convinced that the incident, tragic though
it was in light of the number of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident
and not an intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is no shred of
evidence that Glenn de los Santos had anything against the police trainees that
would drive him into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill. Although proof of
motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the assailant is
positively identified, such proof is important in determining which of two conflicting
theories of the incident is more likely to be true. Considering that the incident was
not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless
driving, the accused should be guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical
injuries.