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SGI 2022 | 2 Japan Report

Executive Summary
Despite a rapidly aging population and alarmingly high levels of public debt,
Japan remains one the three largest economies in the world. Its per capita
economic growth rate is roughly in line with that of the United States and the
EU. However, disposable incomes have risen little since the early 2010s, and
real per capita consumption has been flat. In a country once hailed as the
epitome of equitable growth, income inequality has grown and a new precariat
has emerged, with some 40% of the labor force in non-regular employment.
The situation was further aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic as Japan
saw significant economic contraction and, along with it, a continuous decline
in real wages.

The – for Japanese standards – long-lived government led by Prime Minister

Shinzo Abe (2012-2020) pursued two major policy goals: a robust economic
upturn and introducing changes to Japan’s postwar constitution. Neither of
these aims were achieved. The initial economic-stimulus program of 2013
(“Abenomics”) included an aggressive course of monetary easing and
additional deficit spending. The short-term effects of this policy gamble were
positive, but consumption and investment levels remained anemic, leading to a
weak but prolonged recovery. Deflation gave way to mild inflation without
producing a definitive upswing. Monetary easing reached its limits after a few
years. A lack of serious structural reforms and the population’s limited
purchasing power help to explain the stimulus measures’ poor outcome.

Since 2015, the policy focus on boosting the economy, expanding childcare
and improving social security programs has further deflected attention from
structural reforms. Meanwhile, old-age poverty and the instability of jobs,
especially among young people, remain pressing issues. Prime Minister Fumio
Kishida, in office since October 2021, appears to be steering away from
Abenomics, seeking to raise wages, foster startups, revitalize rural regions and
reduce carbon emissions. The new government’s initial stimulus package
included more funding for universities and digitalization, and incentives for
employers to raise wages. Endowed with solid majorities in both houses of
parliament, the government will not be able to blame political gridlock if it
does not manage to achieve its aims.
SGI 2022 | 3 Japan Report

Since the early 2000s, LDP-led governments have increasingly steered away
from the center. However, some observers have expressed concern that
tightening the political reins has negatively affected the neutrality and
professionalism of the state bureaucracy. The courts and the media remain
unable to provide effective checks on the government. While high-level courts
have become somewhat more restless, social media criticism of the
government has grown in intensity. Civil society organizations have also
become somewhat more active. However, these developments have so far had
a limited impact on public policy. Concerns about press freedom and civil
liberties have been mounting. The governing coalition’s parliamentary
strength severely impedes the opposition’s capacity to exercise effective
oversight. Decreasing voter turnout rates signal indicate that alternative party
options lack appeal. A traditional bulwark of liberal democracy in East Asia,
Japan has become overshadowed in this regard by Taiwan and perhaps even
South Korea.

Faced with an assertive China and a more inward-looking United States

(especially under the Trump administration), Japan has again become more
active internationally. For instance, Japan was instrumental to obtaining a
trans-Pacific free-trade agreement after the United States’ withdrawal. If only
on the surface, relations with China have become somewhat less strained,
while Japan has also signed a free-trade agreement with the European Union,
paving the way for closer strategic relations. Moreover, under the banner of
the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” Japan has strengthened strategic links to
other “like-minded” countries such as Australia and India. Seeing itself as a
defender of a free and rules-based multilateral order, Japan has in recent years
also actively supported multilateral mechanisms and initiatives at the global
and regional levels.

Citation:
Purnendra Jain, Abe and the LDP remain dominant after Japan’s Upper House elections, East Asia Forum,
25 July 2019, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/07/25/abe-and-the-ldp-remain-dominant-after-japans-
upper-house-elections/

77% of general election winners in favor of amending Japan’s Constitution: survey, Mainichi Shimbun, 2
November 2021, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20211102/p2a/00m/0na/006000c

Sakura Murakami, Abe becomes Japan’s longest-serving prime minister, The Japan Times, 20 November
2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/20/national/politics-diplomacy/shinzo-abe-japan-longest-
serving-prime-minister/

Kishida Fumio’s “new capitalism” is many things, but it is not new, The Economist, 12 February 2022,
https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/02/12/kishida-fumios-new-capitalism-is-many-things-but-it-is-not-
new
SGI 2022 | 4 Japan Report

Key Challenges
Serious structural reforms are needed in order to restore vigor and momentum
to Japan’s economy. Vital policy objectives in this regard include a reduction
in agricultural protections, the provision of equality-enhancing reforms and
effective support for women and workers, liberalization of the immigration
regime (paired with corresponding integration policies), a recalibration of
energy policy, and better-targeted social policies. Some progress has already
been made in these areas, one example involves a program inviting more
foreign workers to Japan. However, other developments have moved in the
wrong direction. Given that former long-serving Prime Minister Abe famously
vowed to “let women shine,” the fact that the cabinet appointed in 2021
included only three women constitutes an embarrassment.

Overall, LDP-led governments have since 2012 not pursued structural reforms
whole-heartedly. It is thus not surprising that the Japanese population is
overall among the most pessimistic in the OECD . The LDP managed to hold
onto power after the Lower house election in November 2021, but its success
derives less from its own popularity and performance than from the calamitous
state of the opposition. New Prime Minister Kishida has vowed to strive for a
“new capitalism” that is focused on addressing income inequality and
digitalization issues. The question is whether the government can undertake
relevant reforms to affect changes or whether this will remain just a political
slogan.

The COVID-19 pandemic has been wreaking social and economic havoc in
Japan since 2020, making decisive reform difficult. On the foreign policy
front, the U.S.-China trade conflict, and China’s increasingly aggressive
behavior continues. However, being exposed to the pressure of global
economic cooling and disruptions, possibly including financial turmoil, might
in fact provide a rare opportunity to push through a far-ranging reform agenda.

Given the country’s already ultra-low interest rates, monetary policy can play
only a supportive role in this regard. The country needs to maintain its fiscal
response until the economy recovers from the pandemic. The government
should also consider implementing a major infrastructure drive to exploit the
full potential of digital and artificial intelligence (AI) solutions within and
across borders.
SGI 2022 | 5 Japan Report

Continuous opposition to restarting nuclear reactors from the public, regional

governments and even courts should encourage the government to strive for a
more acceptable and effective energy policy in line with the COP26
agreement. Broader socioeconomic reform will require the government to
strengthen alliances with interest groups supporting such reforms. This may
include Japan’s globally oriented business sector and its more unconventional
tech and startup companies.

Japan’s parliament does not currently provide effective governmental checks

and balances. Parliamentarians need to make better use of their resources to
develop alternative legislative initiatives. Courts, the media (including social
media) and civil society movements should also seek to improve their
capacities to monitor and provide checks on the government. The government
itself should not view media criticism as an obstacle to the fulfillment of its
ambitions, but rather as a necessary corrective.

Moves toward constitutional change will have a negative impact on Japan’s

foreign relations, particularly within the region. The government will also need
to strike a balance between improving relations with an increasingly powerful
China and the need to safeguard sound relations with the United States, which
has become a difficult but still indispensable security and economic partner.
Relations with South Korea are worse than they have been for many years,
though the two democracies are natural partners sharing many challenges.
Common strategic interests should guide their forward-looking relations.

In its pursuit of a liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan needs reliable

allies. In this respect, the EU, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, some
Latin American countries and, indeed, South Korea appear to be suitable
partners with similar values and interests. The country’s policymakers should
thus seek to build on the progress achieved over the past few years, including
the 2019 Strategic Partnership Agreement with the EU. Japan should
consistently strive for and act in the spirit of multilateral collaboration in areas
of global relevance. This should include credible action in pursuit of its
COP26 climate commitments, and an end to any circumvention of generally
accepted rules such as the ban on whaling.

Party Polarization
Given the demise of the Japan Socialist Party in the 1990s and the continued
marginal parliamentary presence of the Japanese Communist Party, party
polarization has not been an important issue in Japan for many years. Both the
SGI 2022 | 6 Japan Report

center-right Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its more recent genuine rival,
the Democratic Party of Japan, have been “big-tent parties,” with personal
allegiances to individual leaders and intra-party factions playing a bigger role
than policy-related differences in terms of structuring intra-party competition.

While the LDP has moved toward the right in recent years (as reflected in the
composition of its leadership and the views held by its parliamentarians), the
main parties still show substantial agreement on many policy issues. The one
especially divisive issue that came to the fore during Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe’s second time at the helm of government (2012-2020) was constitutional
reform. At its core, this issue turns on whether Article 9 of the country’s
constitution, the so-called peace clause, should be changed or not. The
coalition’s loss of its previous two-thirds majority in the upper house in 2019,
however, effectively closed the government’s window of opportunity for
constitutional change.

As there is currently no other important, salient issue for which party

polarization plays a significant role, it cannot be said that party polarization
generally presents a major obstacle for policymaking in today’s Japan. (Score:
8)

Citation:
Kenneth Mori McElwain, The Anomalous Life of the Japanese Constitution, Nippon.com, 15 August 2017,
https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a05602/

Kenneth Mori McElwain, Constitutional Revision in the 2017 Election, in: Robert J. Pekkanen et al. (eds.),
Japan Decides 2017: The Japanese General Election, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2018, 297-312

Tomohiro Osaki and Daisuke Kikuchi, Abe’s dream to revise Japan’s Constitution drifts farther from reach
as long-running scandals chip away at support, The Japan Times, 3 May 2018,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/05/03/national/politics-diplomacy/abes-dream-revise-japans-
constitution-drifts-farther-reach-long-running-scandals-chip-away-support/
SGI 2022 | 7 Japan Report

Sustainable Policies

I. Economic Policies

Economy

Economic Policy Recent macroeconomic developments have been mixed. Japan has
Score: 5
experienced an extremely long business-cycle upswing, lasting since late
2012. But growth rates have remained relatively modest, while structural
constraints such as demographic conditions and labor market rigidities
continue to cast a shadow on future growth prospects. According to the IMF,
the real growth rate in 2019 was only 0.5%. The COVID-19 pandemic, which
hit Japan in January 2020, has made the situation worse. The real growth rate
in 2020 fell to -4.6%, a contraction of 29% on an annualized basis. However,
there are some signs of pandemic recovery in late 2021, with the IMF
projecting 2.4% economic growth in 2021 and 3.2% in 2022.

The policy goals of a 2% annual inflation rate and concomitant increases in

inflation expectations remain elusive. In mid-2019, the Bank of Japan trimmed
its 2020 inflation target and hinted that it would not hesitate to take additional
easing measures if the economic situation worsened. After conducting an
assessment of the economic activities in March 2021, the bank introduced new
policy framework that would strengthen quantitative and qualitative monetary
easing that it had led previously. This signals that existing measures remain
insufficient, particularly as the global economy continues to remain shaky due
to the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has depressed all inflationary
potential. The inflation rate in 2020 stood at 0%, down from 0.5% in 2019, and
in 2021, it fell further to -0.2%. In November 2021, the new LDP government
led by Prime Minister Kishida announced a ¥56tn/0bn stimulus package to
support families and businesses affected by the pandemic. While this
reflationary monetary policy promises some immediate and longer-term
investments, it will contribute to increased national debt.
SGI 2022 | 8 Japan Report

Despite consistent government and central-bank activity, and despite the

presence of significant corporate cash holdings deriving from retained profits,
consumption and domestic investment rates remain sluggish. Compensating
for the negative effects of an aging and shrinking workforce has proven to be
extremely challenging. The initiation of the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the free-trade agreement with the
EU in 2019 may be interpreted as positive signals. The much hoped-for
economic boost from the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games was undermined by the
COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in a one-year postponement and the
eventual banning of audiences and spectators. While the actual impact of the
2021 Tokyo Olympic Games is difficult to calculate, many argue that its cost
was likely greater than its benefits.

Citation:
Noriyuki Suzuki, Japan’s longest growth run in 16 years may not guarantee future prosperity, Japan Times,
15 November 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/11/15/business/economy-business/japans-
longest-growth-run-16-years-may-not-guarantee-future-prosperity/

IMF: World Economic Outlook, October 2021

Japan to spend record ¥55.7 trillion for economic stimulus, Japan Times, November 18, 2021,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/11/18/business/japan-stimulus-spending/

Price Stability Target of 2 Percent, Bank of Japan, 2021, https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outline/qqe.htm/

Tokyo official: No way we can assess economic impact of Games, The Asahi Shimbun, September 21,
2021, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14444808

Labor Markets

Labor Market Despite the devastating impacts of the pandemic on the Japanese economy in
Policy
2020, its effects on employment were relatively mild. The total unemployment
Score: 7
rate stood at 2.9% in October 2021 (although this figure would likely be
somewhat higher if measured in the same manner as in other advanced
economies).

Like many other countries, the Japanese labor market has witnessed a
significant deterioration in the quality of jobs. Retiring well-paid baby
boomers are often been replaced by part-timers, contractors and other lower-
wage workers. The incidence of non-regular employment has risen
substantially to about 40%. Many young people have difficulty finding
permanent employment and are not covered by employment insurance.
Moreover, because of the non-permanent nature of such jobs, they lack
appropriate training to advance to higher-quality jobs. Most economists argue
that the conditions for paying and dismissing regular employees have to be
liberalized to reduce the gap between the two types of employment. The
SGI 2022 | 9 Japan Report

incidence of non-regular employment is not just a concern for young people

but also for women. According to the Japan Statistical Agency, whereas the
total non-regular employment rate in 2021 was 37.1%, the rate among men
was 22.1% and among women was 54.4%. A recent study of job separation
and re-employment due to COVID-19 by the Japan Institute of Labor (JIL)
found that while 93% of workers continued to work at the same company, the
job separation rate was higher among women, younger workers and non-
regular workers than it was among male and older workers as well as
permanent employees.

Adding to the deterioration in the quality of jobs, Japan has been facing a
growing labor shortage in both skilled and semi-/unskilled sectors as a result
of population aging and decline, a situation that has worsened as a result of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Although there are some signs of a shift toward a more
open immigration regime, a reform of immigration policies to attract foreign
workers will be inevitable.

Unemployment insurance payments are available only for short periods. In

combination with the associated social stigma, this has kept unemployment
rates low. The government raised the mandatory minimum-wage to ¥930/hr
(.15/hr) in March 2021. The minimum wage is low enough that it has not
seriously affected employment opportunities, although some evidence shows it
may be beginning to affect employment rates among low-paid groups such as
middle-aged low-skilled female workers.

The Labor Standards Law was changed in 2018. Among its provisions, the
allowed quantity of overtime work, a serious problem in Japan, was limited to
100 hours per month, while the work-hour limitations and overtime payments
for highly paid professionals have been removed. The law also addresses the
wage gap between regular and non-regular work (“equal pay for equal work”).
However, a number of structural issues have not yet been fully addressed. In
December 2018, the OECD published a report in which it recommended
further improvements in job quality and reforms to the mandatory retirement
age.

The government has sought to increase the role played by women in the
economy while additionally boosting the national birth rate. These two goals
have proved difficult to achieve in parallel.

Takahashi, K., Job Separation and Reemployment amid the COVID-19 Crisis in Japan,
https://www.jil.go.jp/english/jli/documents/2021/031-01.pdf

OECD: Working Better with Age: Japan, 20 December 2018

Japan Statistical Agency: Unemployment,

https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/roudou/results/month/index.html
SGI 2022 | 10 Japan Report

Long closed to most immigration, Japan looks to open up amid labor shortage, Washington Times,
November 18, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/11/18/japan-labor-shortage-immigration/

Taxes

Tax Policy Generally speaking, Japan has a reasonably fair tax system that has helped the
Score: 6
government to finance expenditures and allowed the corporate sector to thrive.
Following the international trend, the Japanese government began cutting its
corporate-tax rate (calculated as the statutory national rate plus the local rate)
in 2012. This led to a combined corporate-tax rate decline from 39.5% in 2011
to 29.7% in 2021. The fact that authorities followed up on their initial promise
to lower corporate-tax rates despite the country’s tight fiscal situation provides
a positive signal. However, only around 30% of Japanese firms actually pay
corporate tax, with the remainder exempted due to poor performance.

Increasing the comparatively low consumption-tax rate is an important factor

in easing budgetary stress, particularly given the huge public debt and the
challenges presented by an aging population. The government raised the
consumption-tax rate from 5% to 8% in 2014, increasing it further to 10% in
2019. While this displayed the government’s willingness to tackle difficult
issues, the rate change has not significantly improved the country’s fiscal
situation.

The OECD has recommended that the country’s energy-related taxes be

increased both for environmental and fiscal reasons. Apart from a fairly low
“global warming tax,” imposed since late 2012 on the consumption of fossil
fuels such as petroleum, natural gas and coal, fostering environmental
sustainability does not figure as a prominent consideration in Japan’s tax
system.

Japan’s tax system achieves a reasonable amount of redistribution. However,

salaried employees benefit from far fewer tax deductions than do self-
employed professionals, farmers and small businessmen.

Citation:
Takeshi Kawakatsu, Soocheol Lee and Sven Rudolph, The Japanese Carbon Tax and the Challenges to
Low-Carbon Policy Cooperation in East Asia, Discussion Paper No. E-17-009, Graduate School of
Economics, Kyoto University, December 2017, http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dp/papers/e-17-009.pdf

OECD, Japan: Promoting Inclusive Growth for an Ageing Society, Better Policies Series, Paris, April 2018

United Nations, Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Eighteenth session
New York, 23-26 April 2019, https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/18STM_CRP4-
Environmental-tax-issues.pdf

Robin Harding, Japan data point to bigger than expected hit from sales tax rise, Financial Times, 8 October
2019, https://www.ft.com/content/90f19130-e8e2-11e9-a240-3b065ef5fc55
SGI 2022 | 11 Japan Report

Budgets

Budgetary Policy Gross public indebtedness in Japan amounted to nearly 260% of GDP in 2021,
Score: 2
the highest level among advanced economies. Though the primary balance has
shown a declining tendency since 2009, it dropped sharply from -3.3% in 2018
to -10.3% in 2020, largely as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2018, the
government shifted back its goal of achieving a balanced primary budget to
2025. However, in November 2021, the government announced that it was
unlikely to achieve this until 2027, even under a high economic growth
scenario.

Nominal interest rates remain low, partly due to the fact that more than 90% of
public debt is held by Japanese, mainly institutional investors. The government
and institutional investors appear to have little interest in lower bond prices,
which can help sustain the current price level of Japanese government bonds
for the time being. However, should national savings fall short of domestic
needs – a foreseeable development given the aging Japanese population –
government deficits may be difficult to absorb domestically. In this case,
government bond prices could fall and interest rates could rise quickly, which
could then create serious problems for the Japanese government budget and
the country’s financial sector.

In addition to such structural longer-term concerns, the unprecedented and

continuing presence of the central bank in the financial market could lead to
short- term liquidity shortages with regard to the availability of Japanese
government bonds (JGBs). This could lead to considerable short-term swings
in JGB prices and may ultimately trigger significant concerns regarding the
stability of the financial system.

Given the record levels of public indebtedness in global comparison, Japan’s

fiscal sustainability looks fragile.

Citation:
Japanese Public Finance Fact Sheet, April 2021, Japan Ministry of Finance,
https://www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/budget/budget/fy2021/02.pdf

Scope Ratings AG, Japan Rating Report, March 2018

Takashi Oshio, Managing Japan’s debt and the financial risks, East Asia Forum, 5 August 2018,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/08/05/managing-japans-debt-and-the-financial-risks/

Keiichiro Kobayashi, The Tenuous Myth of Japan’s Fiscal Infallibility, The Tokyo Foundation for Policy
Research, 15 November 2018, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2018/tenuous-myth-of-fiscal-
infallibility
SGI 2022 | 12 Japan Report

Research, Innovation and Infrastructure

R&I Policy Science, technology and innovation (STI) receive considerable government
Score: 7
attention and funding. Building on the 5th Science and Technology Basic Plan
(2016-2020), in which the government aimed to spend 1% of GDP on R&D to
achieve a combined public-private R&D investment of 4% GDP, the
government announced its 6th Science and Technology Basic Plan (2021-
2025) in 2021 with a goal to invest ¥30 trillion/1 billion between 2021 and
2025 in public R&D, cumulating to ¥120 trillion /.04 trillion in combined
public-private investment. In addition to the expected investment of ¥90
trillion to industry, a new university fund of ¥10 trillion has been created to
raise Japanese universities’ global competition and performance. There is
some suggestion of the 6th Plan aiming to incorporate humanities and social
sciences in the National STI policy.

The government and outside observers, pointing to various indicators, realize

that Japan’s strong position among the world’s top technology nations is on
the decline. As a recent government report pointed out, Japan’s international
strength in quality and quantity of scientific output has weakened over the last
20 years. The lack of progress in university reforms and government’s stalled
public investments in R&D are blamed for the country’s anemic industry-
academia partnership development.

Citation:
Council for Science, Technology and Innovation/Cabinet Office, Report on the 5th Science and Technology
Basic Plan, 18 December 2015

Takahiro Ueyama, Japan’s 6th Science, Technology and Innovation Basic Plan, Open Access Government,
September 21, 2021. https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/japans-6th-science-technology-and-
innovation-basic-plan/120486/

Outline of the Fifth Science and Technology Basic Plan, http://www.dst.tokyo/docs/5th-STBP.pdf

Smriti Mallapaty, Japan prepares ‘moonshot’ project to solve global problems, Nature, 09 April 2019,
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01094-w

Global Financial System

Stabilizing Developing initiatives for the reform of the global financial architecture has
Global Financial
not been a high-priority issue for Japan. The 2019 G-20 summit in Osaka led
System
Score: 5
to the creation of Task Force 2 (TF2) which is tasked to review the T20’s
aspirations and achievements during the past decades and to propose ways to
promote an international financial architecture for stability and development.
SGI 2022 | 13 Japan Report

However, since then, there has been very little discussion or follow up on TF2
activities or Japan’s role in relation to the reform of the global financial
architecture.

On the regional and plurilateral levels, Japan’s influence has been somewhat
eclipsed by China, as China is heavily involved in creating a number of new
international financial institutions such as the BRICS New Development Bank,
the BRICS Reserve Contingent Arrangement and the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB). Japan has, for now, chosen not to join these
institutions. Still, Japan developed its own Partnership for Quality
Infrastructure in the mid-2010s, has started to work with its partners in the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), the United States, Australia and India,
on infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific, and pushed the passage of the
G-20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment in Osaka.

On balance, Japan is more of a follower than a leader with regard to global and
regional (financial) initiatives.

Citation:
Task Force 2: International Financial Architecture for Stability and Development/Crypto-assets and Fintech,
T20, https://t20japan.org/task-forces/international-financial-architecture-stability-development-crypto-
assets-fintech/

LDP executive says Japan needs to soon join the AIIB, The Asahi Shimbun, 16 May 2017,
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201705160020.html

Werner Pascha, The new dynamics of multilateral cooperation mechanisms in East Asia – China’s Belt and
Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and Japan’s Partnership for Quality
Infrastructure, in: Yuan Li and Markus Taube (Eds.) How China’s Silk Road Initiative is Changing the
Global Economic Landscape, London and New York: Routledge 2020

II. Social Policies

Education

Education Policy The Japanese educational system has experienced a steady gradual downturn
Score: 6
over the last few decades. One of the challenges it currently faces is to deliver
adequate quality. The LDP-led coalition has renewed emphasis on reaching
the top international tier as well as on improving students’ English-language
skills. While the number of students studying abroad has been on the decline
for a number of years, this trend seems to have halted more recently.

The government is actively promoting reforms. In the context of the Third

Basic Plan for the Promotion of Education (2018 – 2022), which stresses the
SGI 2022 | 14 Japan Report

development of creativity, policymakers announced in May 2019 that the

general curriculum taught at schools would be revamped. A government panel
in June 2019 proposed the inclusion of more digital, tech-based elements in
the education system.

Another issue is rising income inequality at a time of economic stagnation.

Measures providing free early-childhood education and free higher education,
as well as additional policies related to the country’s expensive private high
schools, have to be implemented.

In terms of efficiency, the ubiquity of private cram schools indicates that the
ordinary education system is failing to deliver the desired results. However,
the public’s general willingness to spend money for educational purposes
reduces the pressure to economize and seek efficiencies.

There is growing concern that reform measures have not achieved their
intended goals. Despite major university reforms and the government’s well-
publicized intention to place 10 universities among the world’s top 100, the
rankings accorded to leading Japanese universities have been disappointing in
recent years. In the Times Higher Education 2022 World University Rankings,
only two Japanese universities of (Tokyo and Kyoto) made it into the global
top 200. However, this ranking seems to underrate the country’s university
system.

Citation:
OECD, Education Policy in Japan: Building Bridges Towards 2030, Paris 2018

High School General course Education in Japan Up for Reform, News from Japan, 12 May 2019,
https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2019051000949/high-school-general-course-education-in-japan-up-for-
reform.html

Japan Panel Calls for Promoting Digital Tech-Based Education, News from Japan, 6 June 2019,
https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2019060601162/japan-panel-calls-for-promoting-digital-tech-based-
education.html

Times Higher Education, World University Rankings 2022, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-

university-rankings/2022/world-ranking#!/page/8/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats

Social Inclusion

Social Inclusion Japan has developed considerable problems with respect to income inequality
Policy
and poverty over the past decade. The COVID-19 pandemic worsened this
Score: 4
situation. Former Prime Minister Abe’s economic stimulus measures included
a focus on supporting women’s economic participation (“womenomics”).
Nonetheless, gender inequality has remained a serious issue. The gender wage
gap in Japan is one of the largest in the OECD (23%) while the share of
SGI 2022 | 15 Japan Report

women in parliament is lowest. The country now ranks in the bottom half of
the OECD with respect to its poverty rate, income distribution measured by
the Gini coefficient, and levels of life satisfaction. The World Economic
Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2021 ranks Japan at a dismal 120th place
out of 156 countries in the overall Global Gender Gap Index and among the
bottom third out of 20 East Asian and Pacific nations. Japan also ranked 117th
in terms of economic participation opportunities, and 147th in political
empowerment for women.

Despite the LDP-led government’s relatively strong focus on social-inclusion

issues since 2016 – also targeting groups such as people with disabilities and
the elderly – there is little evidence that these policies have led to positive
outcomes. While 2% of private sector jobs are to be provided to people with
disabilities, the actual share sometimes seems to be over-reported. Recent
reports suggest increased income inequality. In 2019, the government
estimated that there are 1.15 million people in Japan who are socially
withdrawn (hikikomori), which constitutes a major problem. Experts argue
that this number may exceed 10 million. Many of these individuals are
adolescents who are not well integrated into the education and employment
systems, but the problem has also spread to middle-aged people. To combat
the hikikomori problem, the government appointed its first Minister of
Loneliness in February 2021.

Citation:
Cabinet (Japan), The Japan’s Plan for Dynamic Engagement of All Citizens, 2 June 2016

Global Gender Gap Report 2021, World Economic Forum, March 2021,
https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2021.pdf

Japan ministeries may have fiddled numbers of disabled employees, Reuters, 17 August 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-disability/ apan-ministries-may-have-fiddled-numbers-of-disabled-
employees-media-idUSKBN1L20D5

The Rise of Hikikomori in Japan Restrains the Economy, Borgen Magazine, 20 August, 2021,
https://www.borgenmagazine.com/hikikomori-in-japan/

Health

Health Policy Japan has a universal healthcare system. Life expectancies are among the top
Score: 7
three in the world for women (87 years at birth) and for men (81 years). The
Bloomberg Healthiest Country Index ranked Japan at fourth place in 2021.
Infant-mortality rates are among the world’s lowest (2 deaths per 1,000 live
births). A persistent shortage of doctors represents one serious remaining
medical-system bottleneck. The number of doctors per capita is about 40%
lower than that found in Germany or France. However, judging on the basis of
fundamental indicators, Japan’s healthcare system, in combination with
traditionally healthy eating and behavioral habits, delivers good quality.
SGI 2022 | 16 Japan Report

Although Japan has fared comparatively better than other OECD countries in
terms of COVID-19 cases and deaths, the pandemic has nevertheless strained
its healthcare system. The political fallout of the pandemic has also been
serious. The Abe administration was widely criticized for its poor handling of
the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020, and in 2021, Prime Minister Suga was forced
to resign only a year after assuming the position largely due to his
administration’s decision to hold the Tokyo Olympics and the slow response
to the pandemic prior to the event. Japan was also slow to roll out vaccination,
which did not begin until the summer of 2021. By the end of the year, though,
over 70% of the population were reported to be fully vaccinated. Challenges
for the healthcare system also include the need to contain costs, enhance
quality and address imbalances. The national health insurance program
continues to show a structural deficit despite additional fiscal support that was
provided in a 2018 reform package.

Although spending levels are relatively low by international standards, Japan’s

population has reasonably good healthcare access due to the comprehensive
National Healthcare Insurance program. A 2019 OECD review on public
health in Japan reaches a positive verdict on Japan’s primary strategy, Health
Japan 21, but points to room for improved focus and coordination.

Citation:
Japan’s health insurance system remains deficit-ridden despite reforms, The Japan Times, 17 August 2018,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/08/17/national/japans-health-insurance-system-remains-deficit-
ridden-despite-reforms/

OECD, OECD Reviews of Public Health: Japan, Paris 2019

Healthiest Countries 2021, World Population Review, https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-

rankings/healthiest-countries.

Families

Family Policy While the employment rate among women aged 15 to 64 remains at around
Score: 5
71% in 2021 – a level higher than that observed in the United States – the
majority of employed women work in part-time, non-regular jobs. Several
policy measures aimed at addressing these issues have been implemented since
the 1990s but without much success.

The LDP-led government has sought to provide support for women in the
labor force (so-called womenomics). For example, it has made efforts to
expand the provision of childcare in order to improve conditions for working
mothers. Efforts to abolish kindergarten waiting lists have made some
progress, as the daycare capacity has expanded from 2.2 million in 2012 to 2.8
SGI 2022 | 17 Japan Report

million in 2018. The ratio of fathers taking paternity leave has also increased
significantly, from around 2% in 2012 to 5% in 2017, but this number is still
low, and many fathers take only a few days leave.

In 2020, the country recorded its lowest number of births, at 840,832.The birth
rate has stabilized at a low level of around 1.4 births per woman with the
government’s target rate of 1.8 remaining out of reach.

The main reason the Japanese government is unable to achieve its aims of
improving women’s employment conditions and raising fertility rate is that its
family policies are not in sync with labor market and employment policies.
Women are unable to gain a greater foothold and advance their careers despite
generous childcare and other positive family policies because employers and
employment practices continue to discriminate women. As women continue to
experience gender inequality and employment insecurity in the labor market,
they will continue to postpone marriage and childbirth. The question is
whether the government is willing to address this gap between positive family
policies and the lack of gender-sensitive employment and labor market
policies

Citation:
Kathy Matsui et al., Womenomics 5.0, Goldman Sachs, Portfolio Strategy Research, 18 April 2019

Tatsuya Goto, Japan’s moms stay in work in record numbers, 27 February 2018, Nikkei Asian Review,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Japan-s-moms-stay-in-work-in-record-numbers

Japan’s births in 2020 lowest ever: fewer marry since WWII’s end, Asashi Shimbun, June 4, 2021,
https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14365588

Pensions

Pension Policy Given the rapid aging of the population, Japan’s pension system faces critical
Score: 6
challenges. Already, more than 28% of the population is older than 65. The
last major overhaul of the pension system occurred in 2006. Under its
provisions, the value of future pension disbursements would rise less than
inflation, payments would eventually commence at age 65 instead of 60,
contributions would top out at 18.3% of income, and a payout ratio of 50%
was promised. The program’s assumed relationship between future payment
levels, contributions and the starting age for receiving benefits was based on
optimistic macroeconomic forecasts, but so far only minor revisions have
taken place.

In March 2020, the government passed a pension reform bill that is designed
to make it easier for part-time workers to join public corporate pension
SGI 2022 | 18 Japan Report

schemes (kosei nenkin). Starting in October 2022, part-time and contract

workers in workplaces with more than 100 employees will be eligible to join
kosei nenkin. This will be extended to workplaces with more than 50 workers
in 2024. The planned reform also includes benefit reductions for workers aged
60 to 64, and options for workers to continue paying into the pension system
until they reach 70, and to start receiving pensions as late as age 75.

Another pressing issue is Japan’s high old-age poverty rate of 19.6% (OECD
average: 13.5%), with the poverty rate among men standing at 16.2% and
women at 22.3%.

The Government Pension Investment Fund has shifted its asset portfolio
somewhat away from bonds (and away from Japanese government
bonds/JGBs in particular), toward other assets such as domestic and
international stocks. Japanese corporate pension funds are following this trend,
with their exposure to domestic government bonds dropping to 18.3% by
March 2019. Many observers are concerned about the higher levels of risk
associated with stocks. However, JGBs are also risky due to the Japanese
state’s extraordinary level of indebtedness.

Citation:
OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2019. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/fb958d50-
en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/fb958d50-en

How Japan’s prime minister plans to cope with daunting demography, The Economist, 17 November 2018,
https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/11/17/how-japans-prime-minister-plans-to-cope-with-daunting-
demography

Thisanka Siripala, Report: Japan’s Public Pension Fund Not Enough to Cover Post-Retirement Needs, The
Diplomat, 27 June 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/report-japans-public-pension-fund-not-enough-to-
cover-post-retirement-needs/

Japan adopts pension system reform plan, Japan Times, March 3, 2020,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/03/business/pension-system-reform-plan/

Integration

Integration Policy In spite of its aging and shrinking population Japan maintains a fairly
Score: 4
restrictive immigration policy. The number of legal foreign residents reached a
total of 2.9 million in 2020, the highest number on record; yet, the foreign-
born workforce represents only about 2% of the total.

Bilateral economic-partnership pacts have allowed Filipino, Indonesian and

Vietnamese nurses and caregivers to enter Japan on a temporary basis since
2008. Efforts to attract more foreign workers have been piecemeal. For
example, the LDP-led government has relaxed some immigration restrictions
SGI 2022 | 19 Japan Report

in an effort to attracting highly skilled foreign professionals. In mid-2018,

then-Prime Minister Abe announced plans to allow about 70,000 workers into
Japan annually until 2025, for a total of about 500,000. Two new temporary
visa categories were added in 2019, covering low-skilled and semi-skilled
workers in 14 industrial sectors facing labor shortages. The resultant gradual
increase in the number of foreign workers has not lessened the country’s
serious labor shortages, which has been exacerbated by the demographic shifts
and the pandemic-related demand for low- and semi-skilled workers, including
care workers. Concerns over human-rights issues related to the treatment of
the technical interns and other low-skilled workers, and the lack of adequate
labor protection and long working hours imposed on foreign workers have also
contributed to Japan’s reputation as a not-so-attractive destination for foreign
workers. In November 2021, the government announced plans to give foreign
workers in certain blue-collar jobs long-term residency beginning in 2022.
Japan will have to implement more open immigration policies and stronger
employment protections if it wants to attract more foreign workers of all skill
levels.

The Japanese government still appears reluctant to embrace a full-fledged

immigration policy and is cautious of rhetoric pointing in this direction.
Despite the Japanese public’s positive support for immigration, the
nationalistic viewpoints held by many LDP lawmakers pose a particular
challenge in this regard. Nevertheless, while the new measures cannot be
regarded as a comprehensive package, there has been some progress in
facilitating an increased inflow of valuable foreign workers.

Citation:
Himeda Konatsu, Easier Permanent Residency for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals – Is Japan Ready?,
Nippon.com, 11 April 2017, http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00304/

How Japan’s prime minister plans to cope with daunting demography, The Economist, 17 November 2018,
https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/11/17/how-japans-prime-minister-plans-to-cope-with-daunting-
demography

Arnab Dasgupta, Japan’s Immigration Policy: Turned Corner or Cul-de-Sac?, The Diplomat, 21 February
2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/japans-immigration-policy-turned-corner-or-cul-de-sac/

Jeremy Davison and Ito Peng, Views on Immigration in Japan: identities, interests, and pragmatic
divergence, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2021, 47(11): 2578-2595.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1862645

Long closed to most immigration, Japan looks to open up amid labor shortage, Washington Post, 18
November 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/11/18/japan-labor-shortage-immigration/

How Japan risks losing its shine for foreign workers, Nikkei Asia, 22 August 2021,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Japan-immigration/How-Japan-risks-losing-its-shine-for-foreign-workers
SGI 2022 | 20 Japan Report

Safe Living

Internal Security Japan enjoys a very low crime rate, although it is unclear how much the
Policy
effectiveness of internal security policies contributes to this. For major crimes
Score: 9
such as homicide or hard-drug abuse in particular (950 cases or 0.1% of total
crime in 2019), Japan’s good reputation is well deserved. The number of
recorded crimes reached a postwar low in 2020, with thefts accounting for
70%, and seniors making up 22% of offenders. In 2019, Tokyo was again
ranked by the Economist Intelligence Unit as the world’s safest (major) city,
with Osaka ranking third. Low crime rates, however, should not be equated
with low levels of violence as crime such as domestic violence is often not
accounted for in national crime statistics. Indeed, the number of incidents
involving domestic violence in Japan is high. In 2020, it rose to a record level
of 132,355, up from 119,267 in 2019.

Terrorism also poses no major discernible threat today. Nevertheless, ahead of

the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, parliament passed an “anti-conspiracy bill” in 2017
that considerably expanded police power. This bill has been strongly criticized
for curbing civil liberties. Unsurprisingly, the massive security system in place
for the Olympic Games in 2021 and related mobility restrictions were widely
criticized as being overly heavy-handed.

The existence of organized gangs, the so-called yakuza, remains an issue.

These groups have moved into fraud and white-collar crimes. Unlike the
Italian mafia, yakuza gangs are not forbidden in view of the constitutionally
protected right of association. However, the number of their members has
declined sharply, from around 90,000 in the early 1990s to an estimated
25,900 in 2020. Aside from police efforts, low unemployment levels have
played a major role in reducing the incentive, or felt need, to join a gang.

Citation:
Crime at New Low in Japan, But Seniors Commit 22% of Offenses, Nippon.com, 12 January 2021,
https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h00898/

Thisanka Siripala, Japan’s Once Powerful Criminal Underworld Hits Record Low Membership, The
Diplomat, 16 May 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/japans-once-powerful-criminal-underworld-hits-
record-low-membership/

Domestic violence cases in Japan hit record high in fiscal 2020, The Japan Times, 13 January 2021,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/13/national/domestic-violence-cases-record-high/

Fortress Olympics: peak security measures dampen the mood as the games begin, The Independent, 23 July
2021, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/olympics-security-opening-ceremony-tokyo-
b1889195.html

Michelle Ye Hee Lee and Julia Mio Inuma, As Japan’s yakuza mob weakens, former gangsters struggle to
find a role outside crime, The Washington Post, 17 October 2021,
SGI 2022 | 21 Japan Report

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japan-yakuza-crime-gangsters/2021/10/17/556a255c-
2b0a-11ec-baf4-d7a4e075eb90_story.html

Thomas Hahn, Stehen die Yakuza vor dem Aus?, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18 October 2021,
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/panorama/yakuza-japan-mafia-corona-1.5442980

Global Inequalities

Global Social The total amount of official development assistance (ODA) stood at $16.3
Policy
billion in 2020 (at current prices), making Japan the fourth-largest OECD
Score: 7
Donor Assistance Committee donor country in absolute terms and the largest
in Asia. ODA represents 0.31% of Japan’s gross national income (GNI).The
quality of ODA has improved in recent years, but assistance has been
increasingly aligned with Japan’s broader international security concerns, a
trend which can be criticized from the perspective of potential recipients or
indeed the development community at large. The country’s 2015 Development
Cooperation Charter stresses the principle of cooperation for nonmilitary
purposes; the important role of partnerships with the private sector, local
governments, NGOs and other local organizations and stakeholders; an
emphasis on self-help and inclusiveness; and a focus on gender issues.

Another Japanese ODA priority, with strong geostrategic roots, is

infrastructure development. The concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”
has gained further traction, with the Trump and Biden administrations having
latched on, although with a somewhat less pronounced economic focus than is
the case in Japan. Japan has shown active interest in development cooperation
with Africa, underlined by the Tokyo International Conferences on African
Development (TICAD).

The government used the 2019 G-20 Summit in Japan to support major
initiatives aimed at achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Tariffs for agricultural products remain high, as are those for light-industry
products such as footwear or headgear in which developing economies might
otherwise enjoy competitive advantages. On the non-tariff side, questions
about the appropriateness of many food-safety and animal- and plant-health
measures (sanitary and phytosanitary measures) remain.

Ken Okaniwa, Changes to ODA Charter reflect new realities, The Japan Times, 29 May 2015,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/05/29/commentary/japan-commentary/changes-oda-charter-
reflect-new-realities/

Government of Japan, Towards Free and Open Indo-Pacific, June 2019

SEEK Development, Donor Tracker, Japan report, https://donortracker.org/country/japan (accessed 18

February 2022)
SGI 2022 | 22 Japan Report

III. Environmental Policies

Environment

Environmental Japan used to be a global leader in terms of effective anti-pollution policy and
Policy
energy conservation. More recently, however, the government has faced the
Score: 6
top-priority challenge of adjusting its domestic energy mix in the wake of the
triple 3/11 disaster. While the official vision of the government is to create a
“circular and ecological economy,” a goal that necessarily touches on various
public-policy domains, environmental concerns have taken a back seat in
terms of energy policy. The government has reiterated that nuclear power will
remain an important part of the country’s energy mix well into the future. All
48 nuclear-power reactors were shut down between 2011 and 2012. By 2021,
only five nuclear power plants with a total of nine reactors meeting new,
stricter standards had resumed operations. Opposition has made it difficult to
restart more.

The Japanese government also faces the challenge of following up on its

climate change promises. For example, after announcing at the World
Economic Forum in January 2021 that Japan would take on the “Three
Transitions” challenge (decarbonization, circular economy and decentralized
society) and pledging later at COP26 in Glasgow to step up its fight against
climate change by taking actions such as increasing funding to climate finance
and phasing down the use of coal power, the government almost immediately
backtracked by slowing down the shift away from fossil fuels for fear of fuel
shortages. The plan to reducing greenhouse-gas emissions to net-zero by 2050
also seems shaky.

According to the 5th Strategic Energy Plan, released in July 2018, the basic
proportions envisioned for the country’s 2030 energy mix remain unchanged,
including the goal of a 22% to 24% share for renewables and 20% to 22% for
nuclear energy. This is ambitious, and will be hard to achieve if many nuclear
reactors remain shut down. Given the uncertainty, the government has been
slowing down the phasing out coal-based power plants.

Japan has a severe plastics problem. According to a 2018 UN report, Japan is

the world’s second-largest consumer of single-use plastic packaging per
person, trailing only the United States. It is also the world’s second-largest
exporter of plastic waste. While the government supports the development of
SGI 2022 | 23 Japan Report

more plastics recycling facilities, as well as research into biodegradable plastic

and its applications, its 2030 target for a 25% reduction in single-use plastics is
relatively unambitious compared to EU plans, for example.

Japan has made great progress in recent decades with regard to wastewater
management. The country today has one of the world’s highest-quality tap-
water systems, for example. Japan also has a proactive forestry policy. The
2018 Forest Management Law promotes the commercialization of forestry,
which may create some tension with wider societal and environmental
objectives. Japan’s biodiversity is not particularly rich compared with other
Asian countries, but the government has in recent years taken a more proactive
stance under its National Biodiversity Strategy.

Citation:
Ministry of the Environment, Annual Report on the Environment in Japan 2019 (White Paper),
https://www.env.go.jp/en/wpaper/2019/index.html

Japan backs oil and gas even after COP26 climate talks, Japan Times, 2 December 2020,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/12/02/business/economy-business/japan-fossil-fuels-cop26/

The Japan Times, Problematic forestry management law (Commentary), 24 June 2018,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/06/24/commentary/japan-commentary/problematic-forestry-
management-law/

Alex Barreira and Haruka Nuga, Big plastic user Japan fights waste ahead of G-20 summit, AP News, 27
June 2019, https://apnews.com/ecf79d149057422394ea4ea4a789c980

Helmut Weidner, Ups and Downs in Environmental Policy: Japan and Germany in Comparison, in: L. Mez
et al. (eds.), The Ecological Modernization Capacity of Japan and Germany, Springer 2020, pp. 25-40

Global Environmental Protection

Global For many years, international climate policy profited considerably from
Environmental
Japanese commitment to the process, with the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 serving
Policy
Score: 6
as the most visible evidence. Ever since, however, Japan has assumed a more
passive role, though major Japanese cities such as Tokyo, Kyoto and
Yokohama have shown substantial commitment to the elimination of carbon
emissions. Following the Fukushima disaster in 2011 Japan had to find
substitutes for its greenhouse-gas-free nuclear-power generation. This
rendered implausible Japan’s 2009 pledge to decrease greenhouse-gas
emissions by a quarter by 2020. Japan’s position vis-à-vis the environment is
somewhat inconsistent. For example, at COP26 in Glasgow 2021, Japan
declared to reach carbon-neutrality by 2050; yet, it declined to sign the Global
Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement, which called for ending the use of
coal-fired plants by 2030.

Japan supports the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change and has adopted
relevant measures. The plan reconfirms the goal of a 26% reduction in carbon
SGI 2022 | 24 Japan Report

emissions by 2030, which is at the lower end for OECD countries. After much
criticism from international communities, Japan announced in 2021 that it will
strive for 46% emission by 2030 in order to achieve carbon-neutrality by 2050.

Japan put climate change high on the agenda of the 2019 G-20 summit in
Japan. However, due to U.S. opposition, little was accomplished. However,
one notable success was the approval of the Osaka Blue Ocean Vision, aimed
in particular at tackling plastic waste.

With respect to multilaterally organized conservation issues, Japan is known

for its resistance to giving up whaling. Commercial whaling was resumed in
mid-2019.

Japan supports numerous international environmental-protection programs by

contributing funds and making advanced technologies available, with
significant emphasis on the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Through the
Asian Development Bank, the Japanese government helped raised nearly $30
billion between 2011 and 2018 for projects supporting green growth. Over the
past decade, Japanese overseas development assistance has also put a strong
focus on projects addressing energy efficiency and greenhouse-gas emissions.

Citation:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), Analysis and Proposal of Foreign Policies Regarding the Impact of
Climate Change on Fragility in the Asia-Pacific Region – With focus on natural disasters in the Region,
September 2017

Japan 2021 Energy Policy Review, IEA, https://www.iea.org/reports/japan-2021

Japan raises emissions reduction target to 46% by 2030, ABC News, 22 April 2021,
https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/japan-raises-emissions-cut-target-26-2030-77237114

Robin Harding, Japan restarts commercial whaling after 31 years, Financial Times, 2 July 2019,
https://www.ft.com/content/1c128f4c-9bd3-11e9-9c06-a4640c9feebb

Leslie Hook, Japan dilutes G-20 climate pledge in push to win US trade favors, Financial Times, 19
September 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/65c7501e-9692-11e9-8cfb-30c211dcd229

Elliot Silverberg and Elizabeth Smith, Does Japan have a global environmental strategy?, Japan Times, 12
November 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/12/commentary/japan-commentary/japan-
global-environmental-strategy/#.Xe9tpvlKiUk
SGI 2022 | 25 Japan Report

Robust Democracy

Electoral Processes

Candidacy Japan has a fair and open election system with transparent conditions for the
Procedures
registration of candidates. Candidates running in local electoral districts for the
Score: 8
lower or upper house of parliament have to pay a deposit of JPY 3 million
(around €23,000, plus a deposit of JPY 6 million if also running on the party
list). This deposit is returned if certain conditions are met in terms of vote
shares received (individual candidates) or the number of seats won (party list).
The deposit is meant to deter candidatures that are not serious, but in effect
presents a hurdle for small parties and independent candidates. The large
amount required for such a deposit also discourages younger candidates, who
generally find it more difficult to secure such funds. The minimum age for
candidates, set at 25 for the lower house and 30 for the upper house, could also
be lowered, although in other countries such as the United States, the
minimum age to run for office ranges from 18 to 35, depending on the state.

Citation:
Leo Lin, The High Cost of Running for Office, Tokyo Review, 28 August 2017,
http://www.tokyoreview.net/2017/08/election-deposits-japan/

Michael MacArthur Bosack, How the LDP keeps winning, The Japan Times, 12 October 2021,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2021/10/12/commentary/japan-commentary/how-ldp-wins/

Media Access Access to media for electioneering purposes is regulated by the Public Offices
Score: 8
Election Law and basically ensures a well-defined rule set for all candidates.
Since 2013, the law has allowed the use of social media such as Twitter in
electoral campaigning and provided for a more liberal use of banner
advertisements. The use of such campaign-communications tools has varied
among parties and candidates. Regulations are in place to prevent abuses such
as the use of false online identities.

Citation:
Diet OKs Bill To Allow Online Election Campaign, Nikkei.com, 19 April 2013

2017 Lower House Election/Parties bet on the web to reach voters, The Japan News by the Yomiuri
Shimbun, 16 October 2017, http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0004006308

Narumi Ota, Abe using star power, social media to appeal to young voters, The Asahi Shimbun, 3 July
2019, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201907030064.html
SGI 2022 | 26 Japan Report

Doug Tsuruoka, Asia ahead of US in passing laws against social media abuse, Asia Times, Bangkok, 1
March 2018, http://www.atimes.com/article/asia-ahead-us-passing-laws-social-media-abuse/

Voting and The Japanese constitution grants universal adult suffrage to all Japanese
Registration
citizens. The voting age was lowered from 20 to 18 in 2015. One exception
Rights
Score: 8
applies to individuals currently in prison, who are not allowed to vote. Since
2006, Japanese citizens living abroad have also been able to participate in
elections.

One long-standing issue concerns the relative size of electoral districts, as rural
districts contain far fewer voters than urban areas, a malapportionment that has
historically favored the ruling LDP. Vote disparities concerning lower house
electoral districts had been reduced by means of redistricting in 2017 but
climbed back to slightly more than 2:1 in 31 of the 289 single-seat
constituencies before the lower house election held in October 2021.

Vote-weight disparities are even more pronounced for the upper house. In
2018, the LDP-led coalition passed a law adding two seats in the densely
populated Saitama prefecture as well as four party-list seats. The maximum
vote-weight disparity in the July 2019 upper house elections was 3:1. In
October 2019, the Takamatsu High Court ruled that this level of disparity was
unconstitutional, but did not nullify the election results. Other rulings are still
pending.

Citation:
Supreme Court rules vote-value disparity under 2 constitutional, The Asahi Shimbun, 19 December 2018,
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201812190057.html

Court rules July poll result was ‘unconstitutional’ due to vote disparity, The Japan Times, 16 October 2019,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/10/16/national/politics-diplomacy/court-calls-july-poll-result-
question-vote-disparity/

Vote disparity gap widens again ahead of Lower House election, The Asahi Shimbun, 20 October 2021,
https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14464524

Party Financing Infringements of the law governing political-party financing are common in
Score: 5
Japan. To some extent, the problems underlying political funding in Japan are
structural. Under the electoral system that existed until 1993, most candidates
tried to elicit support by building individual and organizational links with local
voters and constituent groups, which was often a costly undertaking. Over
time, these candidate-centered vote-mobilizing machines (koenkai) became a
deeply entrenched fixture of party politics in Japan. Even under the present
electoral system, many politicians still find such machines useful. The
personal networking involved in building local support offers considerable
opportunity for illicit financial and other transactions. While the Political
SGI 2022 | 27 Japan Report

Funds Control Law requires parties and individual politicians to disclose

revenues and expenditures, financial statements are not very detailed.

It is very disappointing that no action has been taken to revise existing laws
despite the recurrence of problems. In 2020/2021, LDP lawmaker Tsukasa
Akimoto was arrested and later given a 4-year prison sentence for bribery
involving a casino project, and Komeito lawmaker Kiyohiko Toyama was
arrested for illegal loan brokering.

Citation:
Philip Brasor, Fundraising loopholes, a political norm, The Japan Times, 15 July 2017,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/15/national/media-national/fundraising-loopholes-political-
norm/

Vice health minister resigns, denies seeking illicit payments, The Asahi Shimbun, 29 August 2019,
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201908290052.html

Lawmaker Tsukasa Akimoto to serve four years in prison over casino bribes, Japan Times, 7 September
2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/09/07/national/crime-legal/akimoto-prison-sentence-
corruption/

Former Komeito lawmaker charged with illegal loan brokering, Japan Times, 29 December 2021,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/12/29/national/crime-legal/komeito-toyama-indicted/

Popular Decision- Politically binding popular decision-making does not exist in Japan, at least in
Making
a strict sense. At the local and prefectural levels, referendums are regulated by
Score: 3
the Local Autonomy Law. A referendum can be called if demanded by two
percent of the voting population, but any such results are non-binding for local
and prefectural assemblies. Despite the legal strictures, referendums have
played an increasingly important role in Japan’s regional politics in recent
years. In February 2019, citizens in Okinawa prefecture voted against the
construction of a new U.S. base to replace an older one. However, the national
government intends to proceed with its plans.

A National Referendum Law took effect in 2010. Since 2018, the minimum
age for voting on constitutional amendments has been 18. According to the
law, any constitutional change has to be initiated by a significant number of
parliamentarians (100 lower house members or 50 upper house members) and
has to be approved by two-thirds of the Diet members in both chambers. If this
happens, voters are given the opportunity to vote on the proposal. An
amendment to the National Referendum Law passed in June 2021 makes it
easier for citizens to vote, allowing them to cast their ballots in heavily-
frequented places such as train stations and shopping centers.

Citation:
Gabriele Vogt, Alle Macht dem Volk? Das direktdemokratische Instrument als Chance für das politische
System Japans, in: Japanstudien 13, Munich: Iudicium 2001, pp. 319-342
SGI 2022 | 28 Japan Report

Okinawa: Tokyo to overrule referendum on US base, BBC News, 25 February 2019,

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47353504

Japan enacts revised referendum law in constitutional amendment push, Kyodo News, 11 June 2021,
https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/06/dc855d516e11-japan-enacts-revised-referendum-law-in-
constitutional-amendment-push.html

Access to Information

Media Freedom Japanese media are largely free to report the news without significant official
Score: 4
interference. While the courts have ruled on a few cases dealing with
perceived censorship, there is no formal government mechanism that infringes
on the independence of the media. The NHK, the primary public broadcasting
service, has long enjoyed substantial freedom. However, the Abe-led
government (2012-2020) pursued a more heavy-handed approach, highlighted
by a number of controversial appointments of conservatives to senior
management and supervisory positions.

In practice, many media actors are hesitant to take a strong stance against the
government or expose political scandals. Membership in government-
associated journalist clubs has long offered exclusive contacts. Fearful of
losing this advantage, representatives of the established media have frequently
avoided adversarial positions.

Apparently bowing to government pressure, Japan’s largest English-language

newspaper, The Japan Times, announced in November 2018 that it would no
longer refer to “forced laborers,” but would instead use the term “wartime
laborers.” It also said it would revise its definition of “comfort women,” no
longer defining these as women “forced” to provide sex to the Japanese army
during the war effort, but rather as “women who worked in brothels, including
women who did so against their will.” Some major Japanese-language
newspapers including the Asahi shimbun, the Mainichi shimbun and the
Tokyo shimbun have to date withstood pressure to engage in this form of
“language revisionism.” Japan’s ranking in the World Press Freedom Index
has plummeted in recent years, from 22nd place in 2013 to 67th in 2021, the
lowest rank among G-7 members.

As a result of the passage of the State Secrets Act, which came into effect in
2014, journalists and others charged with leaking relevant information face jail
sentences of up to five years. What exactly constitutes “state secrets” is left
very much up to the discretion of the government agencies in question. The
UN special rapporteur on the freedom of expression expressed in 2017 serious
concerns, stating that the Act could erode media freedoms and stifle public
debate.
SGI 2022 | 29 Japan Report

The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) formed a

Platform Services Study Group in 2018 to discuss measures combating
misinformation (“fake news”) on social and possibly other forms of media.

Citation:
Arielle Busetto, Press Freedom in Japan: When A Discussion Isn’t A Discussion, Japan Forward, 10 January
2019, https://japan-forward.com/press-freedom-in-japan-when-a-discussion-isnt-a-discussion/

Daisuke Nakai, The Japanese Media in flux: Watchdog or Fake News?, Forum Report 013, Suntory
Foundation, April 2018, download from https://www.suntory.com/sfnd/jgc/forum/013/index.html

Umeda, Sayuri, Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Japan, Library of Congress (United States) Legal Reports,
April 2019, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/fake-news/japan.php

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression
on his mission to Japan, UNHRC, 23 June 2017, http://hrn.or.jp/wpHN/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/A_HRC_35_22_Add.1_AUV.pdf

Reporters without borders, 2021 World press freedom index, https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table

Media Pluralism Japan has an oligopolistic media structure, with five conglomerates controlling
Score: 6
the leading national newspapers and the major TV networks. These include
Asahi, Fuji Sankei, Mainichi, Yomiuri and the Nihon Keizai Group. Another
major force is NHK, the public broadcasting service, which rarely criticizes
the status quo. The main media groups also tend to avoid anything beyond a
mildly critical coverage of issues, although a variety of stances from left-
center (Asahi) to conservative-nationalistic (Sankei) can be observed.

Generally speaking, the small group of conglomerates and major organizations

dominating the media does not capture the pluralism of opinions in Japan.
Regional newspapers and TV stations are not serious competitors. However,
competition has emerged from international media, and particularly from
interactive digital-media sources such as blogs, bulletin boards, e-magazines
and social networks. Their use is spreading rapidly, while the circulation of
traditional newspapers is in decline, and the traditional media have begun
using digital channels more actively as well. Currently, the biggest online
news source is Yahoo! Japan, which is increasing the amount of original
content it produces.

The loss of public trust in the government and in major media organizations
may have intensified the move toward greater use of independent media
channels, also opening some new potential for independent investigative
journalism. However, such channels tend to cater to their specific audiences.
Thus, while there is more pluralism, there is also a tendency toward
increasingly one-sided interpretations of events. Among Japanese youths,
right-wing internet channels have gained a significant following.
SGI 2022 | 30 Japan Report

Citation:
Alessia Cerantola, Investigative Journalism in Japan: Tough Times But Signs of Hope, Global Investigative
Journalism Network, 6 July 2017, https://gijn.org/2017/07/06/investigative-journalism-in-japan-tough-
times-but-signs-of-hope/

Yasuomi Sawa, Japan Digital News Report 2018, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism,
http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/japan-2018/

Yasuomi Sawa, Digital News Report 2019 Japan, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism,
http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2019/japan-2019/

Access to Japan’s Act on Access to Information held by Administrative Organs came

Government
into effect in 2001, followed in 2002 by the Act on Access to Information held
Information
Score: 4
by Independent Administrative Agencies. The 2011 Public Records Act
provides the basis for information access in Japan. Japan does well among
OECD member states with respect to open-government information policies
and practices, according to the OECD’s 2019 OURdata index.

However, there are a number of issues. For example, various exemptions apply
with respect to information concerning specific individuals, national security
issues and confidential business matters. Claims can be denied, and the head of
the agency involved has considerable discretion. Appeals are possible, but
only in court, which involves a very burdensome process.

In 2019, it came to light that no records had been kept of the prime minister’s
meetings with senior bureaucrats in the year ending that January, despite
earlier record-keeping scandals. It also became known that documentation
regarding who had been invited to a huge publicly funded cherry-blossom
viewing reception had been shredded shortly after opposition members of
parliament demanded to see the list of invitees, leading to a major political
scandal engulfing the prime minister. It was also revealed that about half of the
prefectural governments had deleted campaign bulletins, including pledges,
after the last round of local elections.

The controversial 2014 State Secrets Law gives ministries and major agencies
the power to designate government information as secret for up to 60 years.
There are no independent oversight bodies controlling such designations.
Whistleblowing can be punished by up to 10 years in prison, and even trying
to obtain secrets can result in jail terms of up to five years. Critics argue that
governments may be tempted to misuse this new law. Moreover, the rights and
powers of two Diet committees tasked with overseeing the law’s
implementation have been criticized as being too weak.

Citation:
OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: 2019, OECD 2020,
https://www.oecd.org/gov/digital-government/ourdata-index-policy-paper-2020.pdf
SGI 2022 | 31 Japan Report

Ministry excluded panel discussion records from freedom of information request, The Mainichi 21 July
2018, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180721/p2a/00m/0na/018000c

Eric Johnston, Cherry blossom-viewing party: Breaking down Abe’s latest cronyism scandal, The Japan
Times, 27 November 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/27/reference/cherry-blossom-
viewing-party-shinzo-abe-cronyism-scandal/#.Xejq2flKiUk

Hiroyuki Oba et al., No records remain of PM’s meetings with top gov’t officials over 1-yr period, The
Mainichi, 15 April 2019, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190415/p2a/00m/0na/001000c

Shotaro Asano and Shinya Oba, Half of Japan’s prefectural gov’ts delted online campaign pledge info after
elections, The Mainichi, 6 June 2019, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190606/p2a/00m/0fp/016000c

Civil Rights and Political Liberties

Civil Rights Civil and human rights are guaranteed under the Japanese constitution.
Score: 6
However, courts are often considered overly tolerant of alleged maltreatment
by police, prosecutors or prison officials. Moreover, existing laws give
prosecutors and the police substantial leeway. Arrested suspects can be kept in
prison for 23 days without a formal charge being lodged, with a further 10
days of detention possible with a routine court request. Assistance by lawyers
during interrogation can be denied. Interrogations can last for up to eight hours
per day. Supporters of Japan’s justice system point to its high confession rate,
which has produced a record number of convictions. However, there is clearly
a dark side to this.

LDP-led governments have made little effort to address such issues. Critics
have demanded – to date unsuccessfully – the creation of independent
agencies empowered to investigate claims of human-rights abuses. There is no
national or Diet-level ombudsperson or committee tasked with reviewing
complaints. Citizens have no legal ability to take their complaints to a supra-
or international level. Unlike 35 other UN member states, Japan has not signed
the so-called Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.

In response to the ILO international harassment guidelines of 2018, Japan

revised its legislation on the issue of workplace harassment in 2019. The
Comprehensive Labor Policy Promotion Act, aimed at eliminating sexual
harassment, harassment against women and workplace bullying came into
effect in June 2020. While the law mandates employers to take actions aimed
at preventing workplace harassment, there is no punishment for employer non-
compliance.

Japan has been widely criticized for its harsh prison conditions, and for being
one of the few advanced countries that continues to apply the death penalty.
SGI 2022 | 32 Japan Report

Prisoners are given only a few hours’ notice before executions, and families
are usually informed afterward.

Citation:
United Nations Human Rights, Japan Webpage,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/JPIndex.aspx

Kana Inagaki and Robert Harding, Fate of Olympus financier shines light on Japanese legal system,
Financial Times,
9 June 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/382998a4-81f4-11e9-b592-5fe435b57a3b

Jake Adelstein, 23 days later: Getting arrested in Japan, The Japan Times, 28 November 2018,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/12/01/national/media-national/23-days-later-getting-arrested-
japan/

Japan bolsters fight against workplace harassment, but laws lack punitive measures, The Japan Times, 29
May 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/05/29/national/japan-bolsters-fight-workplace-
harassment-punitive-measures-elusive/

Japan, new law to deal with harassment and abuse of power at work, Industrial Relations and Labor Law
Newsletter, March 2021, https://ioewec.newsletter.ioe-emp.org/industrial-relations-and-labour-law-march-
2021/news/article/japan-new-law-to-deal-with-harassment-and-abuse-of-power-at-work

Political Liberties The freedoms of speech, the press, assembly and association are guaranteed
Score: 8
under Article 21 of the constitution. Reported infringements have been quite
rare, though it has often been claimed that the police and prosecutors are more
lenient toward vocal right-wing groups than toward left-wing activists.

In 2019, the organizers of the Aichi (Art) Triennale in Nagoya were strongly
criticized by the authorities for some of the artwork presented, including the
statue of a “comfort woman.” Public funds for the exhibition were recalled.

There are concerns that the anti-conspiracy laws – an amendment to the

existing law against organized crime syndicates that expands the catalogue of
offenses considered illegal – passed in 2017 in preparation for the 2021 Tokyo
Olympics. Critics are concerned that this could undermine political liberties.
Under these rules, “words” rather than simply “deeds” can be grounds for
prosecution.

There is also concern that right-wing activism, including so-called hate speech,
is on the rise, and that this might be supported by politicians associated with
the government. Indeed, some senior LDP politicians have been linked to
ultra-right-wing groups.

An anti-hate-speech law has been in place since 2016, but has run into
problems in terms of implementation. In particular, conflicts exist between
efforts to guarantee free speech and to allow the operation of open public
services such as websites that enable public comments.
SGI 2022 | 33 Japan Report

Citation:
Michael Hoffman, Is Japan slipping into prewar politics?, The Japan Times, 3 June 2017,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/06/03/national/media-national/japan-slipping-prewar-politics/

Lacking direction from Tokyo, Japan’s municipalities struggle to implement anti-hate speech law, The
Japan Times, 24 May 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/05/24/national/lacking-direction-
tokyo-japans-municipalities-struggle-implement-anti-hate-speech-law/

Jeff Kingston, The Politics of Hate and Artistic Expression in Japan, The Diplomat, 14 September 2019,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/the-politics-of-hate-and-artistic-expression-in-japan/

Non- Women still face considerable discrimination, particularly in the labor market.
discrimination
Japan’s gender wage gap is the third-largest among OECD countries at 22.5%
Score: 5
(2020 data), which is well above the OECD average of 12.5%. Women make
up barely 10% of all parliamentarians in the more powerful lower house,
placing Japan among the 30 worst-performing countries worldwide in this
regard. Former Prime Minister Abe called women “Japan’s most underused
resource,” but had only two women in his cabinet formed in September 2019.
In 2021, the new Kishida government added one more female minister.

The government has designated “womenomics” as a key pillar of its reform

program. Programs implemented under this rubric include childcare support
and similar measures. However, given the persistent undercurrent of sexism in
Japanese society, de facto workplace discrimination will be hard to overcome.
This is underscored by the passage of the new anti-workplace-sexual-
harassment (powa hara) law in 2021 that imposes no penalty for employer
non-compliance.

The three million descendants of the so-called burakumin, an outcast group

during the feudal period, still face social discrimination, though it is difficult
for the government to counter this. Korean and Chinese minorities with
permanent resident status also face some social discrimination. Naturalization
rules have been eased somewhat in recent years. Workers from the
Philippines, the Middle East and elsewhere frequently complain of
mistreatment and abuse.

There are no legal protections against racial, ethnic, religious or gender-

identity-based discrimination in Japan. The country ranks below the OECD
average with regard to discrimination against LBGTQ+ individuals.

The country continues to have a rather serious human-trafficking problem with

respect to menial labor and the sex trade, in some cases involving underage
individuals.
SGI 2022 | 34 Japan Report

The treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers is frequently criticized. Asylum

is rarely granted – only 47 asylum-seekers saw their applications approved in
2020, against a total of 3,936 applications lodged that year. In 2019, a hunger
strike protesting harsh conditions occurred in one of the country’s immigrant
detainee centers.

Japan is also criticized for its human-rights abuses of foreign workers,

particularly its foreign technical intern program, including low-wage, forced
overtime work, and dangerous and unsanitary working conditions. The Justice
Ministry announced 759 cases of suspected abuse in 2019. There were 171
trainees’ deaths between 2012 and 2017. The COVID-19 pandemic has made
the situation worse.

Citation:
Inter-Parliamentary Union, Statistical Archive: Women in National Parliaments, http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-
e/arc/classif010219.htm (accessed 16 February 2022)

Kathy Matsui et al., Womenomics 5.0, Goldman Sachs, Portfolio Strategy Research, April 2019

Japan Accepts 47 Refugees in 2020 as Applicants Fall by 60% Due to Pandemic, Nippon.com, 30 April
2021, https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h00991/

Sakari Mesimaki, The Quiet Desperation of Refugees in Japan, The Diplomat, 23 August 2019,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/the-quiet-desperation-of-refugees-in-japan/

COVID-19 Made Life Even Worse for Japan’s Foreign Trainees, The Diplomat, 15 October 2021,
https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/covid-19-made-life-even-worse-for-japans-foreign-trainees/

Rule of Law

Legal Certainty In their daily lives, citizens enjoy considerable predictability with respect to
Score: 6
the rule of law. Bureaucratic formalities can sometimes be burdensome but
also offer relative certainty. Nevertheless, regulations are often formulated in a
way that gives considerable latitude to bureaucrats. For instance, needy
citizens have often found it difficult to obtain welfare aid from local-
government authorities. Such discretionary scope is deeply entrenched in the
Japanese administrative system, and offers both advantages and disadvantages
associated with pragmatism. The judiciary has usually upheld discretionary
decisions by the executive.

In a more abstract sense, the idea of the rule of law per se does not command
much of a following in Japan. Rather, a balancing of societal interests is seen
as demanding a pragmatic interpretation of the law and regulations. Laws, in
this generally held view, are meant to serve the common good, and are not
regarded as immutable norms to which one blindly adheres.
SGI 2022 | 35 Japan Report

Citation:
Carl F. Goodman: The Rule of Law in Japan: A Comparative Analysis, The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 2003

Judicial Review Courts are formally independent of governmental and administrative

Score: 6
interference in their day-to-day business. The organization of the judicial
system and the appointment of judges are responsibilities of the Supreme
Court. Thus, the behavior of its justices is of significant importance. Some
critics have lamented a lack of transparency in Supreme Court actions.
Moreover, the court has an incentive to avoid conflicts with the government,
as these might endanger its independence in the long term. This implies that
the court is careful to come in direct conflict with the government so as to
avoid unwanted political attention. Perhaps because of this, the Supreme Court
engages only in judicial review of specific cases, and does not perform a
general review of laws or regulations.

The conventional view is that courts tend to treat government decisions quite
leniently. This is not to suggest that the future Japanese government might
curtail the freedom of the courts if they decide in a way that disagrees with the
government. Indeed, some of the recent cases suggest that the court is taking
positions that are not in agreement with the government. The evidence is thus
more mixed.
Appointment of According to the constitution, Supreme Court justices are appointed by the
Justices
cabinet, or in the case of the chief justice, named by the cabinet and appointed
Score: 2
by the emperor. However, the actual process lacks transparency. Supreme
Court justices are subject to a public vote in the lower house elections
following their appointment, and to a second review after 10 years (if they
have not retired in the meantime). However, in all of postwar history, no
justice has ever been removed based on this procedure. In response to calls for
more transparency, the Supreme Court has put more information on justices
and their track record of decisions on its website. The Tokyo District Court
ruled in 2019 that voters living overseas cannot be denied the right to review
Supreme Court justices, thus strengthening the role of the constitution.

Citation:
Indictment of Diet inaction over rights to review justices, Editorial, The Asahi Shimbun, 4 June 2019,
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201906040042.html

Corruption Corruption and bribery scandals have emerged frequently in Japanese politics.
Prevention
These problems are deeply entrenched and are related to prevailing practices
Score: 5
of representation and voter mobilization. Japanese politicians rely on local
support networks to raise campaign funds and are expected to “deliver” to
their constituencies and supporters in return.
SGI 2022 | 36 Japan Report

Financial and office-abuse scandals involving bureaucrats have been rare in

recent years. This may be a consequence of stricter accountability rules
devised after a string of ethics-related scandals in the late 1990s and early
2000s. A new criminal-justice plea-bargaining system implemented in June
2018 is expected to create additional pressure on companies to comply with
anti-corruption laws.

There has been some signs of legal action being taken against political
corruption in recent years. For example, in 2021, LDP lawmaker, Tsukasa
Akimoto, was arrested and sentenced to four years in prison over bribery
involving a casino project, and the Komeito lawmaker, Kiyohiko Toyama, was
arrested for illegal loan brokering.

In 2017, Japan joined the UN Convention against Transnational Crime and the
UN Convention against Corruption, which have respectively existed since
2000 and 2005. Still, a 2019 OECD report found the enforcement of Japan’s
foreign bribery law to be lacking.

Citation:
UNODC Chief welcomes Japan’s decision to join crime and corruption conventions, United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime, 12 July 2017, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2017/July/unodc-chief-
welcomes-japans-decision-to-join-crime-and-corruption-conventions.html

OECD, Japan must urgently address long-standing concerns over forein bribery enforcement, 3 July 2019,
https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/japan-must-urgently-address-long-standing-concerns-over-foreign-bribery-
enforcement.htm

Build public trust in the plea bargaining system (Opinion), The Japan Times, 1 June 2018,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/06/01/editorials/build-public-trust-plea-bargain-system/
SGI 2022 | 37 Japan Report

Good Governance

I. Executive Capacity

Strategic Capacity

Strategic The central-government reform of the Koizumi government in 2001

Planning
strengthened the role of lead institutions considerably. The unit officially in
Score: 6
charge of “policy-planning and comprehensive policy coordination on crucial
and specific issues in the cabinet” is the Cabinet Office (Naikaku-fu), which
assists the prime minister and his cabinet. It is supported by a well-staffed
Cabinet Secretariat (Naikaku-kanbō). The Cabinet Office also coordinates a
number of policy councils including the Council on Economic and Fiscal
Policy. While there is a certain amount of overlap between councils
concerning strategic issues, the councils have at least contributed to informing
executive and public discourses. Whereas individual line ministries have
strategic-planning units staffed with mid-ranking officials, their actual
influence on long-term planning seems to be limited compared to the clout of
bureau chiefs and more senior officials such as administrative vice-ministers.
Policy-planning units tend to have very few staff members.

Prime Minister Abe’s (2012-2020) reliance on the same chief cabinet secretary
since 2012 greatly contributed to strengthening the role of the Cabinet Office
as a strategic-planning unit, as it came to dominate fields such as foreign
policy. However, the power rests with the leading politicians rather than the
bureaucrats involved.

Citation:
Harutaka Takenaka, Institutional Foundation for the Abe Government’s Political Power, Japan Foreign
Policy Forum, No. 49, October 2018, https://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/politics/pt20181011174513.html

Dmitry Filippov, How Shinzo Abe Is Changing Japan’s Foreign Policy Apparatus, The Diplomat, 13
December 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/how-shinzo-abe-is-changing-japans-foreign-policy-
apparatus/
SGI 2022 | 38 Japan Report

Expert Advice The Japanese government is assisted by a large number of advisory councils.
Score: 6
These are traditionally associated with particular ministries and agencies, with
some cross-cutting councils chaired by the prime minister. Such councils are
usually composed of private sector representatives, academics, journalists,
former civil servants and trade unionists. The question is whether advisory
boards truly impact policymaking or whether the executive simply uses them
to legitimize extant policy plans. The answer may well vary from case to case.
In some instances, LDP-led governments have used outside expertise to
overcome opposition to policy changes and reform. Think tanks, most of
which operate on a for-profit basis, play only a limited role in terms of
influencing national policymaking.

In 2019, powerful Financial Services Minister Taro Aso publicly rejected

findings of a Financial Services Agency panel report on the pension system,
raising concerns that expert recommendations would in the future be less able
to guide policymaking. Similarly, throughout 2020, the government was
criticized for its failure to consult with experts on COVID-19 policies and its
response to the pandemic.

Sebastian Maslow, Knowledge Regimes in Post-Developmental States: Assessing the Role of Think Tanks
in Japan’s Policymaking Process, Pacific Affairs 91 (2018), 1: 95-117.

Advisory panel in works to speed up review of Japan defense guidelines, The Japan Times, 26 August 2018,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/08/26/national/politics-diplomacy/advisory-panel-established-step-
defense-guideline-review/

Naoko Furuyashiki, Finance minister Aso blasted for rejecting report on inadequate pension system, The
Mainichi, 21 June 2019, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190621/p2a/00m/0fp/015000c

Interministerial Coordination

GO Expertise The Cabinet Secretariat has more than 800 employees, with expertise in all
Score: 7
major policy fields. These employees are usually seconded by their ministries.
While these staffers possess considerable expertise in their respective fields, it
is doubtful whether they can function in an unbiased manner on issues where
the institutional interests of their home organizations are concerned. Moreover,
the system lacks adequate infrastructure for broader coordination (including
public relations or contemporary methods of policy evaluation).

It is widely acknowledged that during his second administration (2012-2020),

Prime Minister Abe was able to gradually implement institutional reforms
within the Cabinet Office by strengthening the Cabinet Secretariat’s (Kantei)
coordinating capacities, and creating new decision-making bodies such as the
National Security Council and the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs, which
helped minimize the power of external veto players and enhanced the prime
minister’s power in the policymaking process.
SGI 2022 | 39 Japan Report

Citation:
Izuru Makihara, The Role of the Kantei in Making Policy, nippon.com, 27.06.2013,
http://www.nippon.com/en/features/c00408/

Markus Winter, Abe and the Bureaucracy: Tightening the Reins, The Diplomat, 16 June 2016,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/abe-and-the-bureacracy-tightening-the-reins/

Karol Zakowski, 2020. Gradual Institutional Change in Japan: Kantei Leadership under the Abe
Administration, Abingdon, Oxon: Taylor and Francis.

Line Ministries In Japan, the role of line ministries vis-à-vis the government office is
Score: 7
complicated by the influence of a third set of actors: entities within the
governing parties. During the decades of the LDP’s rule, the party’s own
policymaking organ, the Policy Affairs Research Council, developed
considerable influence, ultimately gaining the power to vet and approve policy
proposals in all areas of government policy.

Under the current LDP-led coalition government, former Prime Minister Abe
was able to ensure that he and his close confidants determine the direction of
major policy proposals. The Cabinet Office seems to drive reform programs,
with the ministries either following this course or trying to drag their feet.
Given his short term as the prime minister, Yoshihide Suga (2020-2021)
proved unable to engage in a push for reform.

While ministries have sometimes sought to regain their former control over
their portfolios, nearly eight years under one prime minister (Abe, 2012-2020)
have entrenched centralized policymaking practices.

Citation:
Leo Lewis and Kana Inagaki, Japan Inc.: Heavy meddling, The Financial Times, 15 March 2016,
https://www.ft.com/content/0118e3a6-ea99-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8

Jesper Koll, Abe’s lesson in stability and pragmatism, The Japan Times, 13 September 2019,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/09/13/commentary/japan-commentary/abes-lesson-stability-
pragmatism/

Cabinet Government committees exist in a number of important fields in which

Committees
coordination among ministries with de facto overlapping jurisdictions plays an
Score: 6
important role. The most important is the Council for Economic and Fiscal
Policy (CEFP), headed by the prime minister. However, this has never been a
“ministerial committee” in a strict sense. First, it has only an advisory
function. Second, individuals from the private sector – two academics and two
business representatives in the current configuration – are included. This can
increase the impact of such councils, but it also means they are somewhat
detached from political processes.
SGI 2022 | 40 Japan Report

Former Prime Minister Abe (2012-2020) strengthened the formal role of the
CEFP and setup the Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization as a
“quasi-sub-committee” of the CEFP encompassing all state ministers. The
CEFP or the Headquarters are expected to hold initial discussions on the
assignment of policies to committees, while the cabinet has to approve
decisions. However, given Abe’s strong grip on the policy process, council
discussions lost some of their relevance.

There are currently four councils operating directly under the Cabinet Office:
the CEFP, Council for Science and Technology Policy, Central Disaster
Management Council, and Council for Gender Equality (CGE). Among them,
the CGE probably has the lowest profile.

The creation of the National Security Council in 2013 was a similar case in
which interministerial coordination was intensified in the interest of asserting
the prime minister’s policy priorities.

Citation:
Important councils, Cabinet Office, https://www.cao.go.jp/en/importantcouncil.html (accessed 17 February
2022)

‘Bold’ economic and fiscal policy in Japan becoming a mere facade, Editorial, The Mainichi, 22 June 2019,
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190622/p2a/00m/0na/009000c

Ministerial The LDP-led government in power since 2012 has worked effectively with the
Bureaucracy
bureaucracy. In 2014, the government introduced a Cabinet Bureau of
Score: 7
Personnel Affairs tasked with helping the prime minister make appointment
decisions regarding the 600 elite bureaucrats in ministries and other major
agencies. This significantly expanded the Cabinet Office’s involvement in the
process and its influence over the ministerial bureaucracy. There are more
political appointees in the ministries than before, and during Abe’s long spell
in power (2012-2020), the average stay of such appointees became longer,
giving them greater expertise and clout in their ministries. There are growing
concerns that basing the promotion of senior ministry civil servants on
political considerations and personal allegiances may diminish their utility in
terms of offering neutral expertise.

Citation:
Hideaki Tanaka, Should Civil Servants Offer Allegiance or Expertise? Lessons from the Moritomo and
Kake Scandals, Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research, 1 May 2018,
http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2018/role-of-civil-servants

Informal Informal relations and related agreements, which are very common in Japan,
Coordination
can facilitate coordination but may also lead to collusion. In terms of
Score: 9
institutionalized informal coordination mechanisms in the realm of
policymaking, informal meetings and debates between the ministries and the
SGI 2022 | 41 Japan Report

ruling party’s policy-research departments have traditionally been very

important.

The LDP-led government in power since 2012 has skillfully navigated

between the coalition partners, line ministries and their bureaucrats, and the
public. The chief cabinet secretary is a key actor in this regard. Cabinet
meetings are essentially formalities, with sensitive issues informally discussed
and decided beforehand. Ministries collect and make public few, if any,
records of meetings between politicians and bureaucrats as they are supposed
to do under the 2008 Basic Act of Reform of the National Civil Servant
System.

The general trend toward greater transparency may even have strengthened the
role of informality in order to avoid awkward situations. In a number of
instances, it has become apparent that senior agencies have deleted files
relating to discussions extremely early. In 2019, the chief cabinet secretary
admitted that no records of meetings between the prime minister and senior
officials are kept at the prime minister’s office.

Citation:
Cabinet minutes show formality, no substance, The Japan Times, 5 October 2015,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/05/national/politics-diplomacy/cabinet-minutes-show-formality-
no-substance/

Enhancing government accountability (Ediorial), The Japan Times, 13 August 2017,

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/08/13/editorials/enhancing-government-accountability/

Tadashi Kobayashi and Taiji Mukohata, Japan trade ministry told employees to obscure meeting records,
The Mainichi, 30 August 2018, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180830/p2a/00m/0na/004000c

Hiroyuki Oba, Suga admits Japan PM office kept no records of meetings between Abe, gov’t agency execs,
The Mainichi, 4 June 2019, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190604/p2a/00m/0na/011000c

Digitalization for Digital technologies designed for interministerial coordination and broader
Interministerial
government-to-government (G2G) services are not at the core of Japan’s e-
Coordination
Score: 4
government initiative. Rather, the focus of e-government policies is on the
creation and use of e-platforms that enable citizens to interact with the various
levels of government more effectively and efficiently (G2C). This approach
was confirmed in the Digital Government Action Plan released in 2018, in
which G2G models do not play a prominent role.

Recent public discussion has focused on how to properly use official email
services and other features such as shared folders. Quite a few civil servants,
including senior ones, consider such technologies to be cumbersome. More
importantly, these critics seem concerned that emails will be stored as public
documents, a fact that might result in the emergence of unwelcomed evidence
in the case of scandal, based on the requirements and disclosure rules of the
SGI 2022 | 42 Japan Report

Public Records and Archives Management Act and the Information Disclosure
Law. Given this perspective, it is doubtful that G2G technologies will gain
much momentum among senior ministry officials.

In 2020, Prime Minister Suga launched an initiative to complete the

digitalization of the government by 2025 and created the Digital Agency in
September 2021 to facilitate the process. The current Kishida administration
appears thus far to be continuing this digitalization initiative.

Citation:
Leading administrative reform under premise of digitalization, METI Journal in the Japan Times, 11 January
2019, https://meti-journal.japantimes.co.jp/2019-01-11/

Bureaucrats reveal that most official emails are not kept properly, The Mainichi, 15 January 2018,
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180115/p2a/00m/0na/017000c

New Digital Agency Pursues Inclusive Digitalization, Government of Japan, 16 September 2021,
https://www.japan.go.jp/kizuna/2021/09/new_digital_agency.html

Evidence-based Instruments

RIA Application Japan’s RIA process has improved over the recent years. The government
Score: 8
introduced the Basic Program on Reducing Administrative Burden in 2017 as
a part of its regulatory and institutional reform initiatives. A report of the
review of this program by the Subcommittee for the Administrative Burden
Reduction in 2018 found that the government was able to reduce
administrative costs quite significantly.

The most recent OECD review of Japan’s regulatory policy commends the
positive changes in the country’s regulatory review processes, including more
and more regular ex post evaluations of primary laws and subordinate
regulations since 2017. It, however, also notes that stakeholders are rarely
consulted for either the ex post or ex-ante-evaluations nor are they consulted in
any of the RIA development processes. The OECD review thus urges the
government to make information about RIAs accessible to the public and to
engage more with stakeholders.

OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, OECD, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-regulatory-

policy-outlook-2021_196ce20a-en

Basic Program on Reducing Administrative Burden: Review results and future policies, Subcommittee for
Administrative Burden Reduction, 24 April 2018, https://www8.cao.go.jp/kisei-
kaikaku/english/pdf/180424/gyosei.pdf

Quality of RIA According to the Basic Guidelines for Implementing Policy Evaluation,
Process
revised in March 2007, the necessity, efficiency and effectiveness of measures
Score: 7
are to be the central considerations in evaluations. However, issues of equity
SGI 2022 | 43 Japan Report

and priority are also to be included. The structure and content of assessments
are further clarified in the Policy Evaluation Implementation Guidelines of
2005 and the Implementation Guidelines for Ex Ante Evaluation of
Regulations of 2007. All of these specifications contain quite demanding tasks
that must be performed as a part of the evaluations.

Critics have argued that many officials regard RIA as bothersome and lack
strong incentives to take it seriously. Having RIA run by a line ministry, the
MIC, instead of a powerful independent agency, does not seem to be very
effective.

According to recent data, Japan scores below the OECD average with regard
to RIA implementation, particularly in the areas of oversight and quality
control. However, the most recent OECD report notes improvements taking
effect since 2017.

Citation:
OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, OECD, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-regulatory-
policy-outlook-2021_196 ce20a-en

Naohiro Yashiro, Regulatory Coherence: The Case of Japan, ERIA Discussion Paper 2016-16, March 2016,
http://www.eria.org/publications/discussion_papers/DP2016-16.html

Nikolai Malyshev, Regulatory Impact Assessment: State of Play in OECD Countries, Paper for the KDI-
OECD Seminar on Improving Regulatory Governance: trends, practices and the way forward, 6 September
2017

Sustainability The 2001 Government Policy Evaluation Act sets its evaluation criteria for
Check
policy effects on three indicators: necessity, efficiency and effectiveness.
Score: 2
These terms are somewhat flexible and do not necessarily encompass
sustainability concerns. Indeed, actual evaluations apply the three guiding
principles in a somewhat loose way, with few rigorous quantitative
assessments. Reviews cover both ex ante as well as ex post evaluations.

The Basic Program on Reducing Administrative Burden introduced in 2017,

which sets the new framework for RIAs, also focuses almost entirely on cost
reduction and cost effectiveness. As such, there is little consideration in
relation to a regulation’s impacts on sustainability and the implementation of
the SDGs.

Citation:
MIC (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan), Website on evaluation results,
http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_seisakuhyouka/kekka.html

Basic Program on Reducing Administrative Burden: Review results and future policies, Subcommittee for
Administrative Burden Reduction, 24 April 2018, https://www8.cao.go.jp/kisei-
kaikaku/english/pdf/180424/gyosei.pdf
SGI 2022 | 44 Japan Report

Quality of Ex Government ministries evaluate their policies on an ex post basis. The

Post Evaluation
Administrative Evaluation Bureau (AEB) conducts inspections, and each
Score: 7
ministry carries out independent evaluations of the effects of its own policies.
The AEB supports such activities, for instance by encouraging ministries to
share methodologies and experiences. It also works to standardize and
prioritize policy evaluations, and reviews ministry and agency evaluations.

Japan ranked comparatively low in an OECD ex post evaluation index for

2014. However, things started to improve with the introduction of the Basic
Program on Reducing Administrative Burden in 2017. The program required
regulatory enforcement ministries and agencies, which had previously mostly
evaluated regulations themselves, to engage in ex post evaluations.

Citation:
Council for Promotion of Regulatory Reform, Third Report by the Council for Promotion of Regulatory
Reform – For New Era to Come, Provisional Translation, 4 June 2018

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Administrative Counseling Division), Japanese

Ombudsman System, Tokyo, March 2018

OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, OECD, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-regulatory-

policy-outlook-2021_196 ce20a-en

Societal Consultation

Public LDP-led governments have traditionally engaged in societal consultation

Consultation
through the so-called iron triangle, that is, the dense links between
Score: 5
parliamentarians, the ministerial bureaucracy and large companies. However,
these mechanisms tended to exclude other societal actors such as trade unions.
With the onset of economic problems in the 1990s, tensions within this
triangle increased, and relations over time became strained enough to indicate
the effective demise of the iron triangle system
at the national level.

The exclusion of societal actors in consultation processes and the lack of real
and perceived political changes have also contributed to public mistrust and
political disengagement. A 2014 NHK survey found over 70% of respondents
claiming no interest in engaging in political issues, while the Economist’s
Democracy Index in 2020 ranks Japan one of the lowest in terms of political
participation among full democracies. Since 2020, a number of public
consultations have been initiated on issues such as immigration, nuclear
energy, education, etc., often by soliciting comments from the public on an e-
government digital platform. How effective such mechanisms are in effecting
government policies remains to be seen.
SGI 2022 | 45 Japan Report

It is frequently argued that business has considerable influence on government

decision-making. Substantiating such claims is difficult, as there is a lack of
transparent rules governing lobbying. There seems to be little scope for
business – state alignment, as major firms have become global players that are
decreasingly interested in or bound to the home market. Some lobbying firms
now cater primarily to smaller and foreign-owned companies. One traditional
mechanism of bureaucracy – business alignment, the “amakudari” system of
providing bureaucrats with lucrative post-retirement jobs – has been
suppressed since the 2008 reform to the National Civil Service Law.

Citation:
Grant Newsham, Japan’s conservative Nippon Kaigi lobby: Worth worrying about?, Asia Times, 19 July
2016, http://www.atimes.com/article/japans-conservative-nippon-kaigi-lobby-worth-worrying-about/

Democracy Index 2020: In sickness and in health?, The Economist,

https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/

Yumiko Yokota, Ending “Amakudari” Descent from Heaven at Last?,

http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00317/

Rieko Miki, Lobbying firms offer outsiders access to Japan’s policy machine, Nikkei Asian Review, 30
March 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Lobbying-firms-offer-outsiders-access-to-Japan-s-policy-
machine

Policy Communication

Coherent Policy communication has always been a priority for Japanese governments.
Communication
Ministries and other governmental agencies publish regular reports on their
Score: 6
work, including white papers and other materials.

However, the triple disaster of March 2011 seriously undermined the

population’s trust in governmental information, due to the lack of transparency
and the failure to deliver timely public information. The degree to which
Japan’s public trusts the government has since recovered somewhat, but
according to the Edelman Trust Barometer 2019 survey, only 39% of citizens
trust the government, a significantly lower share than in many other countries.

The LDP-led coalition has pushed through its policy priorities more assertively
than earlier governments, while giving less consideration to dissenting
opinions. This is partly a result of Prime Minister Abe’s strategic move to
create new decision-making bodies such as the National Security Council and
the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs which in turn strengthened Cabinet
Secretariat’s coordinating capacities and reduced the voices of dissenters
within and outside of the LDP coalition.

Citation:
SGI 2022 | 46 Japan Report

Edelman, 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer – Japan, https://de.slideshare.net/EdelmanJapan/2019-edelman-

trust-barometer-japan

Hideo Hayakawa, Japan’s Statistics Scandal: The Need for New Approaches, Nippon.com post, 18 March
2019, https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00475/japan%E2%80%99s-statistics-scandal-the-need-for-
new-approaches.html

Implementation

Government While the economy improved when Prime Minister Abe was in power (2012-
Effectiveness
2020), major aspects of the government’s economic-policy program remained
Score: 6
unrealized. Most critically, structural reforms have not been carried out as
promised, partly because the government’s key policy agenda has been
sidetracked by the COVID-19 pandemic. Economic growth remains weak and
the two percent inflation goal unrealized. The consumption-tax hike of
October 2019 is too small to achieve fiscal consolidation any time soon.

Many longer-term issues continue to linger in the area of social policy. This is
particularly true with regard to the much-needed reform of the social security
system. While a new government panel was created in late 2019 to discuss
sweeping measures in this area, the future course is still unclear and contested.

Although the new Digital Agency was created in pursuit of former Prime
Minister Suga’s digitalization policy reform – one of the two structural
reforms announced in 2020 – there are already signs of backtracking and
reduced tempo with respect to the second reform, that is, achieving carbon-
neutrality by 2050.

In terms of international relations, the Japanese government has been at the

forefront of pushing the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region, also
seeking to balance an increasingly assertive China. A trade pact was
successfully concluded in late 2019 with Japan’s core ally, the United States,
though this came at the price of major concessions.

Citation:
Kaori Kaneko, Japan’s Abe gets middling marks on his economic performance, Reuters, 12 September
2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-economy-poll/japans-abe-gets-middling-marks-on-his-
economic-performance-from-analysts-poll-idUSKCN1LU0FB

Japan seen as unlikely to achieve fiscal consolidation target despite tax hike, The Japan Times, 1 October
2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/10/01/business/japan-seen-unlikely-achieve-fiscal-
consolidation-target-despite-tax-hike/

Song Jung-a and Kana Inagaki, Why Japan-South Korea relations have soured, The Financial Times, 28
August 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/94ce21dc-c584-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9
SGI 2022 | 47 Japan Report

Ministerial Japan’s political framework formally provides the prime minister with
Compliance
powerful tools to control ministers. Prime ministers can appoint and fire
Score: 8
ministers at will. Moreover, prime ministers can effectively veto specific
sectoral policies. In practice, however, prime ministerial options have been
more limited, as most have lacked full control over their own parties and over
the powerful and entrenched bureaucracy.

Recent governments have sought to centralize policymaking within the core

executive. Some measures have been institutional, such as giving new weight
to the Cabinet Secretariat attached to the Cabinet Office and to the Council for
Economic and Fiscal Policy, a cabinet committee in which the prime minister
has a stronger voice. Other measures include affording the prime minister a
stronger role in top-level personnel decisions, aided by the creation of the
Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs in 2014. Such institutional measures have
proved quite successful, and certainly former Prime Minister Abe (2012-2020)
had a strong grip on ministerial appointments.

Michael Macarthur Bosack, Abe shows his command over LDP in reshuffle, The Japan Times, 12
September 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/09/12/commentary/japan-commentary/abe-
shows-command-ldp-reshuffle/

Monitoring Generally speaking, the Cabinet Secretariat, upgraded over a decade ago,
Ministries
offers a means of monitoring ministry activities. In recent years, its staff has
Score: 6
expanded, improving its monitoring capacity. However, effective use of the
secretariat has been hindered in the past by the fact that the ministries second
specialists to serve as secretariat employees. It de facto lacks the ability to
survey all activities at all times, but former long-serving chief cabinet
secretary Yoshihide Suga, who later became premier in 2020, served as an
effective enforcer of official positions.

At the same time, some critics argue that the need to handle the simmering
scandals engulfing Prime Minister Abe prior to his resignation in 2020
distracted him and his central staff from following up on major policy issues.

Citation:
Heizo Takenaka, The season of economic policy (Commentary), The Japan Times, 1 July 2018,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/07/01/commentary/japan-commentary/season-economic-policy/

Monitoring Japanese ministries are traditionally run by civil servants who work in a single
Agencies,
ministry throughout their career. Government agencies that belong to a
Bureaucracies
Score: 7
specific ministry’s sectoral area are thus also directed by civil servants
delegated from that ministry, who may return to it after a number of years.
From that perspective, control of executive agencies below the ministerial
level can be quite effective. This mechanism is supported by budget
allocations and peer networks.
SGI 2022 | 48 Japan Report

In 2001, so-called independent administrative agencies were established,

following new-public-management recommendations for improving the
execution of well-defined policy goals by making them the responsibility of
professionally managed quasi-governmental organizations. These agencies are
subject to evaluation mechanisms similar to those discussed in the section on
regulatory impact assessment (RIA), based on modified legislation. In recent
years, voices skeptical of this arrangement have gained ground because the
effectiveness of this independent-agency mechanism has been hindered to
some extent by the network effects created by close agency-ministry staffing
links. In addition, the administrators in charge have typically originated from
the civil service, and thus have not always possessed a managerial mindset.
Task Funding In Japan, local governments – prefectures and municipalities – strongly
Score: 6
depend on the central government. Local taxes account for less than half of
local revenues and the system of vertical fiscal transfers is fairly complicated.
Pressures to reduce expenditures have increased, as local budgets are
increasingly tight given the aging of the population. In 2019, the Ministry of
Finance issued proposals to reduce the local-government workforce
accordingly.

Other measures have included a merger of municipalities designed to create

economies of scale, and a redefinition of burdensome local-agency functions.
In rural regions, the merger of municipalities has led to some serious
challenges and declines in provisions of services such as long-term care and
other social and healthcare services. Since 2014 – 2015, special regional
vitalization zones and special economic zones (tokku), where national
regulations have been eased, have served as field experiments for improved
policymaking. Many observers have criticized this approach as being
insufficiently bold. In late 2018, the government unveiled a plan to designate
82 regional cities as core urban centers and support them with special
assistance.

Citation:
Takuji Okubo, The truth about Japan’s tokku special zones, JBpress Website, 02.07.2014,
http://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/41109

Promoting local autonomy, The Japan Times, 9 January 2017,

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/01/09/editorials/promoting-local-autonomy/

Eric Johnston, Abe’s plan to battle Japan’s regional brain drain draws mixed reviews, The Japan Times, 9
January 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/01/09/national/social-issues/abes-plan-battle-japans-
regional-brain-drain-draws-mixed-reviews/

Japan’s Finance Ministry proposes cuts to local-government workforce as population drops, The Japan
Times, 23 May 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/05/23/business/japans-finance-ministry-
proposes-cuts-local-government-workforce-population-drops/
SGI 2022 | 49 Japan Report

Constitutional The Japanese constitution guarantees the autonomy of local governments.

Discretion
However, articles 92 to 95 discussing local self-government are very short and
Score: 4
lack specifics. The central government makes its power felt through three
mechanisms in particular: control over vertical fiscal transfers, the delegation
of functions that local entities are required to execute, and personnel relations
between local entities and the central ministry in charge of local autonomy.
Moreover, co-financing schemes for public works provide incentives to follow
central-government policies.

Over the last decade, there have been a growing number of initiatives aimed at
strengthening local autonomy. However, the success of the government’s
regional revitalization drive remains questionable given the continuing allure
of Tokyo and its surroundings. This issue is gaining in urgency as remote
regions age and lose population with increasing speed.

The most recent example of a push for local autonomy by merging the Osaka
prefecture and Osaka city to create an Osaka metropolis failed to materialize,
partly due to the lack of central government interest.

Citation:
Local autonomy in dire peril (Editorial), The Japan Times, 26 January 2019,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/01/26/editorials/local-autonomy-dire-peril/

Shuntaro Iizuka, Consequences of Agencification in Japan: An Analysis of Survey Data, Paper for IPSA
Conference 2018, https://wc2018.ipsa.org/events/congress/wc2018/paper/consequences-agencification-
japan-analysis-survey-data

National Japanese government authorities put great emphasis on the existence of

Standards
reasonable unitary standards for the provision of public services. The move
Score: 8
toward decentralization makes it particularly important to raise standards for
the local provision of public services. Within the central government, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is in charge of this task,
which involves direct supervision, personnel transfers between central and
local entities, and training activities. While a 2000 reform abolished local
entities’ agency functions in a strict sense (with direct administrative
supervision losing some importance as compared to legal and judicial
supervision), other channels have remained important. At the local and
particularly the prefectural level, there is an elaborate training system that is
linked in various ways to national-level standards. The government seeks to
promote evidence-based policymaking through new data platforms, which are
also meant to support local governments in the implementation of plan-do-
check-adjust cycles.

A unified digital “My Number Card” system (based on the new social security
and tax number system) was introduced for citizens in 2015 to help authorities
SGI 2022 | 50 Japan Report

provide and enforce uniform services. The take-up rate for the card remained
initially very low (22% in late 2020), which was due in part to its limited
usage and in part to concerns over privacy. The government has thus
implemented a variety of initiatives and incentives to increase usage, including
the use of these cards for health insurance and as a driver’s license. However,
the government’s goal of achieving universal take-up by March 2023 seems
out of reach, also as a result of local bottlenecks in the provision of cards to
citizens.

Citation:
My Number law takes effect amid privacy fears, The Japan Times, 5 October 2015,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/05/national/number-law-now-effect-notifications-set-sent/

Japan starts My Number card use for health insurance, The Japan Times, 20 October 2020,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/10/20/national/my-number-insurance/

Cabinet Office, Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform 2017 – Increasing
productivity through investment in human resources, Overview, 9 June 2017

Japan gov’t wants ‘My Number’ ID cards distributed pronto, but local gov’ts can’t keep up, The Mainichi,
19 November 2020, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20201118/p2a/00m/0na/026000c

Effective During the early postwar period, the operations of the so-called iron triangle
Regulatory
between LDP politicians, the ministerial bureaucracy and big business served
Enforcement
Score: 6
to promote overall economic growth, with a bias in favor of large enterprise
groups. At the same time, this system ensured that policymaking was not
captured by selective industry interests. Following the collapse of the bubble
economy around 1990, the iron triangle declined, but a bias in favor of larger
enterprises can still be noted.

In some policy areas, however, the role of vested interests is conspicuous. A

notable example is energy policy, where the relationship between ministerial
bureaucrats, specialized politicians and the nuclear-power industry – basically
the major regional energy providers – has remained rather close. Another
example is agriculture, which has received particularly favorable treatment and
protection for decades as governments have sought to secure rural votes.
Whereas the government has stepped up the liberalization of agriculture in
recent times, trade agreements such as the Japan-EU FTA and even the 2019
Japan-U.S. trade pact have reflected this to only a limited degree.

Citation:
Jeff Kingston, Japan’s nuclear village. Power and resilience, in: Jeff Kingston (ed.), Critical Issues in
Contemporary Japan, Abingdon: Routledge 2013, pp. 107-119

Masayoshi Honma and Aurelia George Mulgan, Political Economy of Agricultural Reform in Japan under
Abe’s Administration, Asian Economic Policy Review, Volume13, Issue1, January 2018, pp. 128-144

Xiaochen Su, The Toxic Influence of Japan’s Rural Political Interest Groups, The Diplomat, 5 January
2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/the-toxic-influence-of-japans-rural-political-interest-groups/
SGI 2022 | 51 Japan Report

Adaptablility

Domestic Japan’s reform processes are usually driven by domestic developments and
Adaptability
interests, but international models or perceived best practices do play a role at
Score: 6
times. Actors interested in reform have frequently appealed to international
standards and trends to support their position. Some of the recent reforms
adopted in response to international standards are digitalization and regulatory
impact assessment process.
International Japan is actively involved in G-7 and G-20 mechanisms. While the country
Coordination
has a lower profile in international and global settings than might be expected
Score: 7
in view of its global economic standing, the growing linkages between
international economic and political issues have helped the LDP-led
government to raise its profile, for instance by chairing the G-20 in 2019, with
various initiatives getting underway. Like various other nations, Japan
committed in 2020 to reaching carbon-neutrality by 2050. It remains to be
seen, though, how implementation will pan out. The Climate Action Tracker,
run by an international scientific consortium, rates Japan’s current efforts as
insufficient.

The Japanese constitution makes it difficult for Japan to engage in

international missions that include the use of force, although it can contribute
funds. As a result of Japan’s five-year participation in a UN peacekeeping
mission in South Sudan (which ended in 2017), the government has flexibly
expanded various procedures stopping just short of active military
engagement, such as providing ammunition to endangered military units from
partner countries. In 2015, despite considerable public opposition, new
security laws were passed that allow military intervention overseas in defense
of (somewhat vaguely defined) allies.

Japan has actively supported and contributed to regional initiatives and

organizations like the Asian Development Bank. Also in response to Chinese-
led institutions and signature initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, Japan
has successfully promoted its own geostrategic initiatives such as the Free and
Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, which aligns with, or has fed into, related designs
of Australia, India and the United States. There has also been an invigoration
of development cooperation with Africa, also in the context of the Tokyo
International Conference on African Development (TICAD).

Citation:
Japan’s Roadmap to “Beyond-Zero” Carbon, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry,11 November 2020,
https://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/energy_environment/global_warming/roadmap/report/20201111.html
SGI 2022 | 52 Japan Report

Climate Action Tracker, Japan country site, https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/japan/ (accessed 17

February 2022)

Mitsuru Obe, Japan Parliament Approves Overseas Military Expansion, The Wall Street Journal, 18
September 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-parliament-approves-abe-security-bills-1442596867

Werner Pascha, The political economy of new multilateral initiatives in Pacific Asia, in: Carmen Mendes
(ed.): China’s New Silk Road. An Emerging World Order, Routledge: London and New York, 2019, pp. 69-
86

Michael Bosack, What did Japan Learn in South Sudan?, The Diplomat, 10 June 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/what-did-japan-learn-in-south-sudan/

Paul Goldstein, Japan’s growing geostrategic role, The Japan Times, 23 June 2019,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/06/23/commentary/japan-commentary/japans-growing-
geostrategic-role/

Organizational Reform

Self-monitoring Reform of the executive has been a major topic in Japan for two decades.
Score: 7
During Prime Minister Abe’s second administration (2012-2020), the LDP-led
government sought to readjust institutional arrangements by establishing
and/or reinvigorating a number of councils and committees. To some extent,
the Abe government was able to bring back the leadership framework that
characterized the government under Prime Minister Koizumi (2001–2006), for
instance through a strong Cabinet Office. Whether these institutional changes
will result in more effective self-monitoring of the government or whether
these new institutional arrangements will become more permanent under the
current Prime Minister Kishida’s administration remains to be seen.
Institutional The failure of the reform initiatives led by the short-lived DPJ governments
Reform
(2009-2012) demonstrated the difficulties of transplanting elements from
Score: 7
Westminster-style cabinet-centered policymaking into a political environment
with a tradition of parallel party-centered policy deliberation. Reverting to the
traditional system coupled with strong central leadership, the Abe-led
government (2012-2020) was quite successful in getting at least parts of its
policy agenda implemented. The passage of the security laws in 2015 – a
major success from the government’s perspective – may seem to provide
evidence of more robust institutional arrangements than in earlier years.
However, problems in moving the government’s economic-reform agenda
decisively forward, particularly in fields such as labor market reform, suggest
that the Abe-led government also struggled to overcome resistance to change
in a number of policy areas. This also applies to the slow progress of plans to
change the constitution.
SGI 2022 | 53 Japan Report

II. Executive Accountability

Citizens’ Participatory Competence

Political A substantial amount of information about policies is available in Japan. For

Knowledge
instance, ministries regularly use so-called white papers to explain the current
Score: 7
parameters and content of policies in many areas, often in great detail.

However, this does not necessarily mean that citizens feel satisfied with the
information available or consider it trustworthy. According to the Edelman
Trust Barometer, only 42% of participating Japanese citizens said in 2020 that
they trusted the government; only Russia exhibited a lower score among the 26
countries covered. Voter apathy also reflects the public’s lacking confidence in
the government to bring about changes. The voting turnout in the most recent
lower house election in November 2021 was barely 56%, the third lowest in
the postwar history.

Citation:
Edelman, 2020 Edelman Trust Barometer – Japan, https://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanJapan/2020-
edelman-trust-barometer-japan-full-version

Japan’s Election Turnout Third Lowest in Postwar Era, Nippon.com, 2 November 2021,
https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h01156/

Open E-government issues, particularly services aimed at making public information

Government
available to citizens in a secure and timely manner, have been on the
Score: 8
government agenda since the 2000s. Current efforts are based on the Basic
Plan for the Advancement of Utilizing Public and Private Sector Data and the
Policy for Open Data, both released in May 2017. The various branches of
government make an overwhelming number of statistics, data and reports
available, with coordinated access through sites like e-Gov, Data.go.jp and e-
Stat.

However, ensuring transparency, usability and security remains an ongoing

challenge. In late 2018, it was revealed that the Monthly Labor Survey had
used an improper methodology for collecting data since 2004, leading to an
overestimation of wage growth. Following this exposure, weaknesses in other
government statistical measures also became apparent. In a February 2019
survey, 67% of the population indicated that this incident had eroded their
trust in government statistics.

Citation:
SGI 2022 | 54 Japan Report

Government of Japan, Digital Government in Japan, January 2018,

https://de.slideshare.net/hiramoto/170119-digital-government-in-japan

English-language access points to major sites: http://www.e-gov.go.jp/en/,

http://www.data.go.jp/?lang=english, https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en/

61% think Abe inadequately handles labor survey scandal, The Asahi Shimbun, 19 February 2019,
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201902190053.html

Legislative Actors’ Resources

Parliamentary Parliamentarians have substantial resources at their disposal to independently

Resources
assess policy proposals. Every member of parliament can employ one policy
Score: 7
secretary and two public secretaries paid through an annual fund totaling
around JPY 20 million (€153,000 as of February 2022). However, in many
cases, these secretaries are primarily used for the purposes of representation at
home and in Tokyo. Both houses of parliament have access to a 560-staff-
member Research Bureau tasked with supporting committee work and helping
in drafting bills. A separate Legislative Bureau for both houses, with around
160 staff members, assists in drafting members’ bills and amendments. The
National Diet Library is the country’s premier library, with parliamentary
support among its primary objectives. It has a Research and Legislative
Reference Bureau with over 190 staff members whose tasks include research
and reference services based on requests by policymakers and on topics of
more general interest such as decentralization. For such research projects, the
library research staff collaborates with Japanese and foreign scholars.

Notably, the substantial available resources are not used in an optimal way for
purposes of policymaking and monitoring. The Japanese Diet tends toward
being an arena parliament, with little legislative work taking place at the
committee level. Bills are traditionally prepared inside the parties with support
from the national bureaucracy. Ruling parties can rely on bureaucrats to
provide input and information, while opposition parties can at least obtain
policy-relevant information from the national bureaucracy.

Jun Makita, A Policy Analysis of the Japanese Diet from the Perspective of ‘Legislative Supporting
Agencies,’ in Yukio Adachi, Sukehiro Hosono and Iio Jun (eds), Policy Analysis in Japan, Bristol: Policy
Press 2015, pp. 123-138

Junko Hirose, Enhancing our Role as the “Brains of the Legislature”: Comprehensive and Interdisciplinary
Research at the National Diet Library, Japan, paper for the IFLA Library and Research Services for
Parliaments Section Preconference 2014, http://www.ifla.org/files/assets/services-for-
parliaments/preconference/2014/hirose_japan_paper.pdf

Obtaining Government documents can be obtained at the discretion of legislative

Documents
committees. There are typically no problems in obtaining such papers in a
Score: 9
timely manner.
SGI 2022 | 55 Japan Report

Summoning Committees may request the attendance of the prime minister, ministers and
Ministers
lower – ranking top ministry personnel such as senior vice-ministers. When
Score: 9
summoned, these ministers often attend the meetings to answer questions.
Summoning Under Article 62 of the constitution, the Diet and its committees can summon
Experts
witnesses, including experts. Summoned witnesses have the duty to appear
Score: 7
before parliament. The opposition can also ask for witnesses to be called, and
under normal circumstances such requests are granted by the government.
However, the use of expert testimony in parliamentary committees is not
widespread; experts, academic and otherwise, are relied upon more frequently
within the context of government advisory committees, in particular at
ministerial level.
Task Area The Diet’s standing committees (17 in both chambers) closely correspond to
Congruence
the sectoral responsibility of the government’s major ministries. The portfolios
Score: 9
of the ministers of state cover special task areas and are in some cases
mirrored by special committees (e.g., consumer affairs). Special committees
can and have been setup to deal with current (or recurring) issues. In the lower
house, there are currently nine such committees that deal with issues such as
disaster management.

Citation:
The House of Representatives, Japan, Committees, n.d.
https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_english.nsf/html/statics/guide/committee.htm

Media

Media Reporting The Japanese media system has historically been dominated by five major TV
Score: 6
networks, including the public broadcaster NHK, along with a handful of
major national newspapers. These publications remain widely read even
though their circulation is declining, and provide information in a sober style.
However, because of their close personal links to political figures, which finds
its institutionalized expression in the journalist club system (kisha kurabu),
these newspapers rarely expose major scandals while freelancers are often
locked out. Investigative journalism is typically undertaken by weekly or
monthly publications. While some of these are of high quality, others are more
sensationalist in character. Personnel changes at NHK after the Abe-led
government took power produced a leadership that openly declared its
intention to steer a pro-government course. The government’s assertive
approach has also been evident in other media areas. For these reasons, Japan
is ranked 67th in the 2021 World Press Freedom Index.

In recent years, social media outlets such as YouTube, Line, Twitter and
Facebook, along with the news channels based on them, have gained a
considerable following. This also holds true for new online publications such
SGI 2022 | 56 Japan Report

as BuzzFeed Japan and the Huffington Post. While the impact of the new
media on the overall quality of information remains unclear, they do seem to
be contributing to the emergence of so-called partisan media in Japan.

Citation:
Tomohiro Osaki, Academics, TV journalists slam minister’s threat against ‘biased’ programming, fear
media self-censorship, The Japan Times, 2 March 2016,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/02/national/tv-journalists-slam-ministers-threat-biased-
programs-fear-media-self-censorship/

Philip Brasor, Sticky bonds of the media and government, The Japan Times, 24 June 2017,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/06/24/national/media-national/sticky-bonds-media-government/

2021 World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders, https://rsf.org/en/japan

Parties and Interest Associations

Intra-party Parties in Japan are fairly insider-oriented, with policy and personnel decisions
Decision-Making
driven by leading politicians and their networks.
Score: 3

Japan’s strongest party is the LDP (holding 259 of 465 seats in the lower
house after the 2021 election). Its coalition partner, Komeito, holds 32 seats.
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which has for some time been the
LDP’s main rival, suffered a major blow before the 2017 election, when many
of its lower house members left to form the Constitutional Democratic Party
(CDP, 96 seats), an entity primarily devoted to opposing changes to the
existing constitution.

The LDP has traditionally revolved around individual politicians, their

personal local-level support organizations and the intra-party factions built by
key party leaders. Local party chapters may play decisive roles in choosing a
parliamentary candidate if there is no “natural” successor to the former
incumbent. Ordinary party-member involvement is usually limited to
membership in a local-level support organization for a politician, and is mainly
(but not solely) based on mutual material interests: While members want
tangible support for their communities, politicians want secure “vote banks”
for (re-)election.

Party congresses offer little real opportunity for policy input by delegates.
However, delegates from regional party branches have participated in party
leader elections since the early 2000s. When Fumio Kishida was elected LDP
president in September 2021, votes from party members in the various
prefectures counted for half the votes cast in the first round of voting. If no
candidate can secure majority in the first round, the party’s Diet members
decide the contest. While the LDP has also paid some lip service to increased
intra-party democracy, it has shied away from major internal reforms.
SGI 2022 | 57 Japan Report

Citation:
Eric Johnston, The LDP’s leadership race kicks into high gear this week: This is how it will go down, The
Japan Times, 14 September 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/09/14/national/politics-
diplomacy/ldp-presidential-campaign-explainer/

Association Japan’s leading business and labor organizations regularly publish policy
Competence
proposals aimed at influencing public debate and policymaking. The three
(Employers &
Unions)
umbrella business federations – Keidanren, the Japan Association of Corporate
Score: 7 Executives (Doyukai), and the Japanese Chamber of Industry and Commerce
(Nissho) – as well as Rengo, the leading trade-union federation, try to impact
policy by publishing policy papers and participating in government advisory
committees. As the business sector’s financial support of political parties has
declined and major companies have globalized their operations, politicians
may have become less willing to accommodate the views of these interest
groups.

While there is an obvious scramble for influence between Rengo and the
business organizations, there is also a notable degree of competition among the
business organizations themselves. For instance, Keidanren is dominated by
large enterprise groups, and has been somewhat slow in demanding further
economic opening. Critics also contend that its membership policies are too
conservative, de facto keeping startups and tech companies at bay. However,
the accession of new members such as Facebook in 2019 may indicate that the
federation is trying to adapt. The Doyukai is characterized more by strong
independent companies, and has been outspoken in demanding a more open
business environment.

Citation:
On 70th anniversary, top business lobby looks at what distance to keep from politics, The Mainichi, 31 May
2017, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170531/p2a/00m/0na/021000c

Shigenori Arai, Facebook joins Keidanren, Japan’s leading business lobby, Nkkei Asian Review, 2 July
2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Facebook-joins-Keidanren-Japan-s-leading-business-
lobby

Association Civil society organizations with a public-policy focus are rare in Japan. With
Competence
few exceptions, such organizations in Japan have limited depth and breadth.
(Others)
Score: 4
Japan has only a few well-resourced public policy-oriented think tanks. Some
non-profit organizations are used by the government bureaucracy as auxiliary
mechanisms in areas where it cannot or does not want to become directly
involved.

Following the 3/11 disasters, and more recently in the context of the
controversy over the government’s security-law extension, civil society groups
have taken on an increased role in expressing public concerns and organizing
SGI 2022 | 58 Japan Report

mass rallies. High levels of engagement on the part of activists

notwithstanding, it is difficult for such actors to create professionally
operating, sustainable organizations. Among the general population, the idea
of NPOs does not enjoy strong support.

Citation:
Susanne Brucksch, Japan’s Civil Society and its Fight against Nuclear Energy, Sustainable Governance
Indicators Website, 09.04.2014, http://news.sgi-network.org/news/details/1212/theme-democracy-
sustainability/japans-civil society-and-its-fight-against-nuclear-energy/

U.S.-Japan Council, Japan’s NPO Sector Today, Summary of a breakout session of the 2018 Annual
Conference, http://www.usjapancouncil.org/japans_npo_sector_today

Independent Supervisory Bodies

Audit Office The Board of Audit of Japan is considered to be independent of the executive,
Score: 6
legislative and judiciary. Its yearly reports to the cabinet are forwarded to the
Diet along with the cabinet’s own financial statements. The board is free to
direct its own activities but parliament can request audits on special topics.
The Board can also present opinions, reports and recommendations in between
its annual audit reports. In these reports, the board frequently criticizes
improper expenditures or inefficiencies, fulfilling its independent watchdog
function.

Citation:
Colin Jones, Japan’s Board of Audit: unlikely guardians of the Constitution?, The Japan Times, 4 December
2016, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2016/12/04/issues/japans-board-audit-unlikely-guardians-
constitution/

Ombuds Office While there is no national-level ombuds office as such, both houses of
Score: 5
parliament handle petitions received through their committees on audit and
administrative oversight. Citizens and organized groups also frequently submit
petitions to individual parliamentarians.

An important petition mechanism is located in the Administrative Evaluation

Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The bureau
runs an administrative counseling service with around 50 local field offices
that can handle public complaints, with some 220 civil servants engaged in
administrative counseling. About 5,000 volunteer administrative counselors
serve as go-betweens. A related mechanism is the Administrative Grievance
Resolution Promotion Council, which includes non-governmental experts.

Administrative Evaluation Bureau, News from Japan, accessed in November 2018 from Asian Ombudsman
Association website http://asianombudsman.com/

Administrative Evaluation Bureau, Japanese Ombudsman System, March 2018

SGI 2022 | 59 Japan Report

Data Protection Based on the Act on the Protection of Personal Information, a Personal
Authority
Information Protection Commission was established in January 2016. The
Score: 7
commission is a cross-sectoral, independent government body overseeing the
implementation of the act. The body’s chairperson and commissioners are
appointed by the prime minister, with the consent of both chambers of
parliament. It is still difficult to judge whether this commission will be able to
maintain independence from the government and, ultimately, whether it will
prove effective. A tightening of existing rules proposed by the commission
found its way into the mid-2020 revision of the Personal Information
Protection Law. The amended law requires firms and the like to better take
into account the personal data protection interests and preferences of Japanese
citizens.

Citation:
Akemi Suzuki and Tomohiro Sekiguchi, Data Protection & Privacy Japan, Getting the Deal Through lawyer
and law firm network, September 2018, https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/52/jurisdiction/36/data-
protection-privacy-japan/

A step toward the restoration of privacy (Editorial), The Japan Times, 30 May 2018,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/05/30/editorials/step-toward-restoration-privacy/

Fumiko Kuribayashi, Users in Japan to get more rights to stop abuse of personal data, The Asahi Shimbun,
26 April 2019, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201904260045.html

Hiroyuki Tanaka and Noboru Kitayama, Japan enacts Amendments to the Act on the Protection of Personal
Information, International Association of Privacy Professionals, https://iapp.org/news/a/japan-enacts-the-
act-on-the-protection-of-personal-information/
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