Pakistan-from 1977-1988: During this period, Pakistan was not only

an authoritarian in political structure; it also aspired to be an ideological

state. Furthermore, the period of rapid economic growth during the 1980s6
also dampened threats to Zia's power, although it was based more on the
bounty of remittances from overseas' workers than on economic policies.
Significantly Pakistan's long-term problems of poor infrastructural
development and weak domestic resource mobilization remained unresolved.
Zia was transformed overnight from an international pariah to America's
front-line ally in the fight against communism. Admirers such as Shahid Javed
Burki have stressed his personal traits of humility, courtesy and piety. In the
realm of public affairs, conservative Western scholars and their Pakistani
counterparts have praised his bold Afghan policy which contributed to the
collapse of the Soviet Empire, his halting of the country's moral decay and
the economic progress which occurred during his decade in power. opened
the floodgates to drug trafficking and the widespread ethnic and sectarian
violence which are the hallmarks of the so-called 'Kalashnikov culture'.
Indeed, by the time his protege Nawaz Sharif designated 1993 a year of jihad
against drug addiction, one in every sixteen Pakistani males was an addict.
while the Punjab's Western-educated elite chafed under the social and
political restrictions of the Zia regime, the lower middle class and the
emerging industrial class provided a solid backbone of support.

Human rights violations: The Pakistan Human Rights Society in

August.1983 registered its protest against the flogging of women as an
Islamic punishment. Early in January 1982, Amnesty International charged
the Pakistan authorities with torture, imprisonment and other human rights
abuses. The greatest tension of all was between the state's legalistic
imposition of Islam and the humanist traditions of Sufism. This was
particularly explosive in Sindh where Sufism had always been an integral
component of regional cultural identity.

Steps to strengthen federalism: Baloch and Pushtun political opposition

to the center was muted during the Zia era. The Chief Martial Law
Administrator began a process of co-opting Baloch nationalists by releasing
as many as 9,000 prisoners who had been incarcerated during the Bhutto
period. The co-option of the Pushtun elite through the Army into national
power was also a marked feature of this period. The later 1980s also saw the
emergence within Sindh of a muhajir ethnic identity. But Zia administration
failed to pacify Sindhi nationalists and Muhajirs.
Elections in 1985: Zia was of the opinion that a Western-style democracy
was unsuitable for Pakistan. The advisory Council of Islamic Ideology (CCI) in
August 1983 made the pronouncement that a presidential form of
government was the 'nearest to Islam'. It was later to rule that political
parties were non-Islamic. Zia announced that National Assembly elections
would be held on a non-party basis in February 1985. Alongside the feudal
powerholders, members of the emerging industrial and commercial elite also
secured election to the 217-strong National Assembly and to the four
Provincial Assemblies. Zia took the oath of office as elected President. The
party less elections of 1985 further encouraged ethnic and baradari loyalties.

Islamization: Differences between the fiqh-e-Jafria and the Hanafi fiqh

became increasingly politicized, not only because of the Sunni state-
sponsored Islamization process, but also due to the impact of the Khomeini
revolution in Iran. Another factor which undermined the impact of
Islamization was, in the words of Hasan-Askari Rizvi, its emphasis on the
'regulative, punitive and extractive' aspects of Islam, rather than on its
'social and economic egalitarianism. ‘The Hudood Ordinance, federal
sharia court etc. The Zina Ordinance, it was also discriminatory: in many
cases female rape victims were not only 'doubly' punished, but saw their
violators go free. Charles Kennedy has argued that Anita Weiss and other
scholars who have claimed that the Hudood Ordinances were discriminatory
are mistaken. He bases this claim on a sample of cases drawn from the files
of the Federal Shariat Court, which revealed that 70 per cent of those
convicted for zina crimes during the period 1980-4 were men. The hadd
punishments did not deter robbery, rape, murder, theft or drug abuse. If
anything, they encouraged the brutalization of society. Pictures of public
whippings sustained Western misapprehensions and misconceptions
concerning Islam. Pakistan's own image plummeted.

The economy and Islamization: Islamization in the economic sphere

included policies such as the abolition of riba (interest), and the introduction
of the charity taxes zakat and ushr. The abolition of interest on domestic
transactions but not on Pakistan’s foreign debt obligations in 1979. The
Zakat Ordinance came into effect on 20 June 1980. The establishment of a
state-run administration of zakat inevitably led to Shia protests over being
forced to follow a-Sunni Hanafi system of jurisprudence.

Islam and educational reform: Further measures included the

establishment in 1980 of an Islamic University in Islamabad and the proposal
for a women's university. At primary level, the Government sought to tackle
the problem of mass illiteracy through patronage of mosque schools.

Women, the minorities and Islamization: An Islamic dress code was

imposed on women in the public eye such as newsreaders and air
stewardesses but not on their male counterparts. Equally discriminatory was
an attempt to ban female models from appearing in commercial
advertisements. Women's groups opposed the Diyat Ordinance which set
the blood money compensation for a female victim at half that for a male, as
it moved from its draft stage to acceptance by the Majlis-i-Shura. The Law
of Evidence (Qanoon-i-Shahadat) was finally decreed by a presidential
order in October 1984. By way of compromise, it laid down that the
testimony of two women was equal to one man only with respect to financial
transactions, otherwise women had equal voice in giving legal evidence. This
represented a minor victory for the women's organizations. Proponents It
should be acknowledged that Islamic law would increase the rights of women
living in the tribal areas, in the areas of divorce and inheritance, d end such
un-Islamic practices as bride-price. Low social status and poor access to
education in rural areas resulted from the absence rather than presence of
Islamization. Furthermore, it is simplistic to portray the Zia regime as
irremediably misogynistic, concerned only with confining women to the
boudoir and kitchen. Zia not only appointed the first female Cabinet
Secretary in Pakistan's history, but also set up a Women's Division at cabinet
level. In 1980, Zia appointed a National Council on Population Planning, 141
headed by a female expert Dr Attiya Inayatullah.

Minorities: The impact of the Law of Evidence and the introduction of

separate electorates for the minorities148 conflicted with this reassurance
and led some minority leaders to fear that their position would be reduced
from that of citizens with full rights to the protected dhimmi (non-Muslim
taxpayers) status. Cases concerning the abduction of Hindu women and
forcible conversions were increasingly reported from the Sukkur, Larkana and
Mirpurkhas districts of Sindh. denounce the Ahmadis as kafirs (infidels).

Pakistan politics: 1988-93: Pakistan may be seen as having made the

transition from authoritarianism to procedural democracy, but as lacking any
of the characteristics of a consolidated democracy. Benazir displayed little
interest in strengthening and democratizing her own party, while
simultaneously leading the national crusade for democratization of Pakistan's
politics. We have repeatedly pointed to two predominant features of
Pakistani politics: the absence of accommodationist attitudes and the uneasy
relationship between the center and the provinces. The running battle
between the PPP and the IJI administration in Punjab sapped much of the
energy of Benazir Bhutto's government. The use of rival governmental
institutions by the PPP and IJI was most conspicuous during the by-elections
on 28 January 1989. Indeed, in the preceding weeks, there were almost two
parallel administrations in Punjab. The PPP sought to mobilize support by
promising electrification to far-flung voters through its control of WAPDA.
More dangerous than the use of rival institutions for patronage politics was
the polling day showdown between the police and the federally controlled
rangers. In some respects, the PPP-IJI tussle may be viewed as an action
replay of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's struggle with the PNA in 1977. The large-scale
riots of the mid-1980s and a Sindhi-muhajir complexion. AKPP and AKMC
tussle was proceeding in Azad Kashmir, there was continued agitation in the
northern areas of Gilgit and Baltistan.

The 1990 elections and Nawaz Sharif's rise to power: No new themes
or visions for making Pakistan's democracy more workable emerged during
the elections, as politicians concentrated on winning power rather than
considering the issues which would confront them afterwards. Nawaz Sharif
in power, 1990-93 Nawaz Sharif's tenure saw a continuation of
confrontational politics, a crisis in Sindh and claims of corruption which had
dogged his predecessor. Despite his close association with the Zia regime, he
was discomfited by its legacies in the fields of Islamization and civil-military
relations. Economic management was constrained by the country's
continued reliance on IMF and World Bank assistance, following the setbacks
arising from the cut-off of US aid and a decline in migrant remittances from
the Gulf. Corruption was also draining the national exchequer, with state-
owned banks reporting a loan recovery rate of less than 8 per cent in the first
quarter of 1990.

Nawaz Sharif embraced economic liberalization more enthusiastically than

the PPP had done. He announced the lifting of all controls on foreign currency
entering the country along with other policies to encourage foreign
investment. 89 state enterprises had been put up for sale by oct. In January
1993 Pakistan was placed on the watch-list of potential terrorist states for
six months.

Nawaz Sharif introduced a number of populist measures to address poverty

and social inequality. Govt fixed a minimum wage of RS 1500 per month for
unskilled workers.
The word 'dacoits' was on the lips of everyone following the kidnapping early
in 1991 of Japanese students and Chinese engineers. The dacoits were
traditionally part of the rural social order and indeed were protected and
encouraged by the large landowners who could use them against rivals.
There was also an element of social banditry in the dacoits' actions.

The Nawaz Sharif Government went the way of its predecessor on similar
charges of corruption, nepotism and maladministration.

DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS: PAKISTAN POLITICS, 1993-98

The years 1993-7 were filled with almost continuous crisis. Civil war in
Karachi carried overtones of the earlier breakdown in Dhaka. Meanwhile
economic collapse loomed in the background, darkened by a further use of
presidential authority to dismiss an elected government and by mounting
sectarian violence. Moreover, the country continues to pay a high cost for its
weak political institutionalization and a culture of confrontation. Nawaz
Sharif's bold televised address of 17 April 1993, in which he directly accused
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan of conspiring to overthrow him, finally sealed
his fate. The struggle between President and Prime Minister for control of the
province could not have illustrated more graphically the region's crucial
position in Pakistani political life. After resolution of the conflict between PM
and President brokered by the Army.

Moeen Qureshi, had spent over a quarter of a century working abroad. He

was far more at home in English than in Urdu and used it in his national radio
and television addresses. Qureshi had been accepted as a compromise
caretaker leader by both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. However, it was
clear from the outset that his primary role was not to oversee fresh elections,
but rather to introduce major economic reforms under cover of army support.

The 1993 elections

Parallels can be seen with earlier elections in the role of the baradari in
mobilizing voters, 13 the importance of local political influence compared to
party organization and manifestos, especially in the smaller Provincial
Assembly constituencies. The results in Baluchistan once again revealed the
regional character of its politics, with the Jamhoori Watan Party and PKMAP17
confined respectively to the Baloch and Pushtun ethnic areas. In the absence
of the restoration of women's reserved seats, candidates for both National
and Provincial Assembly seats, with the notable exception of the MQM's
Feroza Begum, were restricted to a handful of elite family members.
Benazir Bhutto's second administration, 1993-96

Despite worrying electoral trends in both Punjab and Sindh, Benazir Bhutto
took office in a much stronger position after the 1993 elections than she had
done five years earlier. Asif Ali Zardari had lobbied vigorously for Leghari as
the 'Mr. Clean' candidate for President. Leghari promised that he would be
'neutral and non-interventionist' when elected, and it thus seemed likely that
Benazir Bhutto might become the first Prime Minister since 1985 to see
through a full term in office. Within three years,. however, Leghari had. There
are strong parallels between Benazir Bhutto's two tenures of office.
Parliament continued to have little standing as a law-making body, with most
bills being enacted through presidential ordinance. As in the period 1988-90,
foreign policy successes were overshadowed by mounting mayhem in
Karachi and debilitating confrontation with the Nawaz Sharif-led opposition.
While the Army and presidential straitjacket had loosened a little during the
second tenure, the constraints imposed by the IMF' s conditions had
tightened. Unemployment caused by privatization policies hit organized
labor, which had formed another traditional PPP vote-bank. Finally, weak
party institutionalization and the 'death of ideology' forced the PPP to rely
brazenly on patronage to sustain itself in power.

Benazir Bhutto was at her most effective when addressing Western

audiences. She projected an image of Pakistan as a moderate Islamic state,
open for business and willing to assist the West in its international struggle
against drugs and terrorism. Diplomacy was linked to the encouragement of
foreign investment. While Pakistan's relations with the United States had
thus improved from the low point they had reached in 1993, the cold war
with India continued. At the beginning of 1996 Indian and Pakistani forces
had exchanged heavy fire along the Line of Control.

Islamic militancy and sectarianism: the defeat of the religious parties in

the 1993 elections was followed by an upsurge of militancy and
sectarianism. This was particularly dangerous because of the continued twin
backlash effects of the Afghan war -jihad mentality and Kalashnikov culture.
Rival Sunni and Shia students fought each other. Earlier in November 1994,
the Pakistan Government faced an armed Islamic insurrection in the
Malakand region of the NWFP. This was led by the black-turbaned Tehrik-e-
Nifaze-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) followers of Maulana Sufi Muham. the
TNSM stepped up its efforts for the enforcement of the Shariat. Roads were
blocked for five days. Sectarian violence was at its peak.
Civil war in Karachi: Pakistan's post-1988 democracy faced its gravest
crisis in the deteriorating law and order situation in Karachi. Any hopes of a
reconciliation between the MQM(A) (Altaf Hussain Pachhou) and the PPP were
dashed in April 1994. the violence in Karachi increased dramatically in the
wake of the Army's hasty retreat early in December from a futile two-year
operation in the city. Sectarian violence also added to the death-toll. There
were also claims of Indian involvement and of conflict arising from rivalries
between Pakistani intelligence agencies. An almost unbridgeable chasm
existed between the political interests of rural and urban Sindh, and this lay
at the heart of the failure to achieve dialogue between the PPP and the
MQM(A). Karachi's violence thus continued unabated during the second half
of 1995 - the body count between late August and early November alone
stood at 500.

The immediate background to Benazir Bhutto's dismissal was the mounting

economic crisis, her clash with the judiciary, and deteriorating personal
relations with Farooq Leghari.

The strife in Karachi had depressed both investment and production level.
Investment was further discouraged by the publication of the Berlin-based
transparency international report which ranked Pakistan as the second-most
corrupt country in the world. The caretaker administration headed by the
octogenarian former PPP stalwart Meraj Khalid appeared a strange mixture of
both its 1993 Mazari and Moeen-Qureshi (predecessors. Like the former it
suffered a lack of credibility and neutrality. Elections: In many rural
constituencies in Sindh and in parts of the Punjab, patron-client and baradari
ties continued to hold the key to successful electioneering. The importance
of personality rather than party was starkly demonstrated. The PML(N)'s
crushing victory inevitably grabbed the headlines. The second trend is the
continued strength of ethnic/regional identities for political mobilization.
Despite the shattering experience of state repression and the continued exile
of Altaf Hussain, the MQM(A) retained its hold on urban Sindh.

Book: Pakistan; A modern history by Ian Talbot