Agency Theory in Management Accounting
Agency Theory in Management Accounting
business people and their agents. Most commonly, that relationship is the relationship between
representation theory has not been unified by researchers, according to the timeline and from the
author's summary documents, which summarize the development process of agency theory.
According to research Arrow 1971, Wilson 1968 on the problem of risk sharing between parties
and organizations, they found that there are individuals and groups in the company with different
risk tolerance and different actions. . Owners who invest capital with economic interests in the
company can bear the risk because the representatives or managers of the company also always
want to maximize personal interests. Both the principal and the principal have opposing risk
priorities and their problem, in risk sharing, creates a conflict of agency theory.
In Ross and Mitnick's work on surface theory, the authors have introduced two different
approaches in their studies. Ross sees the agent problem as a matter of preference, while Mitnick
sees the problem as a result of institutional structure, the central ideas behind their theory being
similar. Ross identified the principal agent problem as the result of the compensation decision
and argued that the problem is not limited to the company, but prevails in society as well.
Mitnick's institutional approach helped develop the logics of agency theory, and it can be
designed to govern the behavior of parties. His theory propagates that organizations are built
In the study Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined a firm as a set
of contracts between factors of production. They describe that companies are legal entities where
some contractual relationship exists between the people involved in the company. An agency
relationship is also a type of contract between an owner and an agent, where both parties work
for their benefit resulting in a conflict of interest. In this context, owners perform various
monitoring activities to limit the actions of agents to control agency costs. In the principal
agency contract, incentive structure, the labor market and information asymmetry play an
important role and these factors have helped to develop the theory of ownership structure.
This was followed by a study by Jensen and Meckling (1976) which described the company
as a black box, working to maximize its value and profits. Wealth maximization can be achieved
through a suitable synergies and teamwork among the stakeholders within the company.
However, the interests of the parties differ, a conflict of interest arises, and it can only be limited
through ownership and management control. The parties also understand that their interests can