Ivler y Aguilar vs.

Modesto-San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716
Nov 17, 2010

In August 2004, Jason Ivler was involved in a vehicular accident that led to two
separate charges being filed against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Pasig City. The first charge, Criminal Case No. 82367, was for reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries to Evangeline Ponce, while the
second charge, Criminal Case No. 82366, was for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property due to the death of Evangeline’s husband,
Nestor Ponce, and the damage to their vehicle. Ivler posted bail for both cases.

On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence

resulting in slight physical injuries, which is the first charge (Criminal Case No.
82367) and was sentenced to public censure. Following this conviction, Ivler sought
to have the second case (Criminal Case No. 82366) dismissed, arguing that
prosecuting him for both offenses would constitute double jeopardy, as both
charges arose from the same incident of reckless imprudence. However, the MeTC
denied his motion, ruling that the two cases involved different offenses—one for
slight physical injuries and the other for homicide and damage to property.

Unsuccessful in his attempts to have the second case quashed, Ivler elevated the
matter to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) by filing a petition for certiorari (under
S.C.A. No. 2803) At the same time, he asked the MeTC to suspend the proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366, including his arraignment, arguing that S.C.A. No.
2803 raised a prejudicial question that needed to be resolved before the second
case could continue. Despite this, the MeTC proceeded with the scheduled
arraignment on May 17, 2005. Since Ivler failed to appear, the court canceled his
bail and issued a warrant for his arrest.

After the court issued an arrest order against Jason Ivler for missing his
arraignment, Evangeline Ponce (the respondent) used this to argue that Ivler had
lost his right (standing) to continue his appeal in the higher court (S.C.A. No. 2803).
She asked the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to dismiss Ivler’s petition because, in her
view, his failure to appear in court and the arrest order meant he no longer had the
right to challenge the case.

However, Ivler disagreed with this and contested Ponce’s motion, arguing that he
still had the right to continue his appeal despite the arrest order.

Issue:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when
the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366.
2. If in the negative or if not, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under
the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366.
3. Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense
with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting
to light offenses which will be tried separately)?
4. Should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively
alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized
separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Ruling:
1. No. Ivler's non-appearance at the arraignment did not cause him to lose
his right to continue with the petition in S.C.A. No. 2803.
- The Court noted that dismissals of appeals due to an appellant’s
escape or bail violations are governed by specific rules (sec. 8, rule 124 in
relation to sec. 1 rule 125), which apply to cases reviewing judgments of
conviction. Since Ivler's petition was not a traditional appeal but a special
civil action for certiorari, these rules should not apply to his situation.
- The Court pointed out that under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(sec. 21 rule 114), a defendant’s absence from post-arraignment
hearings does not automatically equate to losing their standing. Instead,
the defendant may still be tried in absentia, retaining their legal rights.
- The Supreme Court ruled that Jason Ivler's non-appearance at the
arraignment did not deprive him of his petition. The RTC incorrectly
claimed that Ivler provided ‘no explanation’ for his absence, which was
contradicted by records showing he had sought a suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 prior to the arraignment. His
motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
2. The ruling for this issue established that Ivler's constitutional right under
the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366.
- The Court found that because Ivler had previously been convicted for a
related offense of reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 82367, he
could not be prosecuted again for the same act of reckless imprudence,
regardless of the different consequences alleged in the two cases. This
reinforced the principle that once an individual has been acquitted or
convicted for a specific act, they cannot be tried again for the same act
under the same offense.
- The Court highlighted that reckless imprudence as defined in Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code is classified as a single quasi-offense, with the
outcomes being relevant solely for penalty assessment.
- Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
3. Article 48 should not apply to complex the single quasi-offense of reckless
imprudence with its non-criminal consequences. Reckless imprudence is
treated as a single quasi-offense under Article 365, with consequences
relevant only for penalties.
4. The prosecution proceeded under a single charge, collectively alleging all
the consequences of the single quasi-offense, with penalties to be
imposed separately in accordance with the scheme under Article 365.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2

February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner
Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Other note:

Criminal Case No. 82367: Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical

Injuries, filed by Evangeline L. Ponce.

Criminal Case No. 82366: Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and

Damage to Property, concerning the death of Nestor C. Ponce and damage to
their vehicle.

Public censure is a formal reprimand from a court that publicly expresses

disapproval of someone's actions. It serves as a punishment without imposing jail
time or fines. In Jason Ivler's case, after he pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries, the court issued a public censure, meaning he
was criticized by the court but faced no harsher penalties.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing

to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases

in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger
clearly manifest.

Reckless imprudence is considered a single quasi-offense, meaning that if

someone is convicted or acquitted of it, they cannot be prosecuted again for the
same offense, even if the results (like injuries or property damage) are different.

In double jeopardy, Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless

imprudence, the accused cannot be prosecuted again for the same act,
regardless of the resulting consequences.
- Therefore, Ivler's prior conviction for reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries barred his subsequent prosecution for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property arising from the
same incident.

Lesson of the case:

Single Quasi-Offense: Reckless imprudence is considered a single quasi-

offense under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. This means that any act of
reckless imprudence—regardless of its consequences—counts as one offense.
No Complexing for Non-Criminal Consequences: The law does not allow for
the complexities of this quasi-offense to include multiple non-criminal
consequences. Instead, these consequences are only relevant for determining
penalties.
Separate Charges for Light Offenses: If the consequences of reckless
imprudence involve light offenses (like slight physical injuries), these must be
tried separately.