Hearsay

Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
a trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein.
A statement is an oral or written assertion or a non-verbal conduct of a person, if it
is intended by him or her as an assertion.

Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as otherwise provided in these Rules.

Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

1. DYING DECLARATION

The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending

death, may be received in any case wherein his or her death is the subject of
inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

Conviction based on dying declaration:

While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own
perception, a report in open court of a dying person's declaration is recognized as
an exception to the rule against hearsay if it is "made under the consciousness of an
impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case." It is considered as
"evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person
aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation

Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible;

A. The declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of

the declarant's death.

This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before
and after the assault having a direct causal connection with it. Statements
involving the nature of the declarant's injury or the cause of death; those imparting
deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating the reason or motive for the
killing; justifying or accusing the accused; or indicating the absence of cause for
the act are admissible.

B. At the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the
consciousness of an impending death.
The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in
inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in
impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders
the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be
presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as
certainly impending.

C. The declarant is competent as a witness.

The rule is that where the declarant would not have been a competent witness
had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible. Thus, in the
absence of evidence showing that the declarant could not have been competent to
be a witness had he survived, the presumption must be sustained that he would
have been competent.

D. The declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder,

or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. (People vs. Umapas, G.R. No.
215742, March 22, 2017.

2. STATEMENT OF DECEDENT OR PERSON OF UNSOUND

MIND.

In an action against an executor or administrator or other representative of a

deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
unsound mind, where a party or assignor of a party or a person in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted testifies on a matter of fact occurring before the
death of the deceased person or before the person became of unsound mind,
any statement of the deceased or the person of unsound mind, may be
received in evidence if the statement was made upon the personal
knowledge of the deceased or the person of unsound mind at a time
when the matter had been recently perceived by him or her and while
his or her recollection was clear. Such statement, however, is inadmissible
if made under circumstances indicating its lack of trustworthiness.

Under the new rule, the testimony of the survivor, as well as hearsay
evidence of the deceased, may now be admitted, provided that the statement
was made upon the personal knowledge of the deceased or the person of
unsound mind at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by
 him or her and while his or her recollection was clear, Provided however,
that if such statements indicates lack of trustworthiness, the same should
be inadmissible as evidence.

3. DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST.

The declaration made by a person deceased or unable to testify against the

interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to the declarant’s own interest that a reasonable
person in his or her position would not have made the declaration unless he
or she believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or
herself or his or her successors in interest and against third persons.

There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration
against interest:
(a) The declarant must not be available to testify.
(b) The declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant.
(c) The circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and

offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

FUENTES, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

Facts: Petitioner Alejandro Fuentes Jr. stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a
hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions rushed to his side.
Petitioner fled. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen
he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.

Alejandro Fuentes, Jr. claims on the other hand, that it was his cousin Zoilo
Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that when the victim was
killed he was conversing with him; that he was compelled to run away when he
heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill all those from San Isidro"
because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from San
Isidro he sought refuge in his brother's house where he met "Jonie;" that "Jonie"
admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina.
Such confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of
petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr.
Felicisimo testified that while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr.,
confessed that he killed Malaspina in "retaliation;" that he even showed him the
knife he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if
possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased. The
following day however he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone and
that petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did not commit.

Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after the criminal information
for murder was filed, petitioner met Felicisimo who informed him of the disclosure
by Zoilo. Conde then advised Felicisimo that if it was true that it was Zoilo who
fatally stabbed Malaspina, Felicisimo must persuade Zoilo to surrender. Conde
then personally went to Barangay San Isidro to investigate. There he was told by
the townsfolk that Zoilo had already fled.

Issue: Whether or not the declaration against penal interest attributed to Zoilo
Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.

Held: Yes. The admission attributable to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. being the perpetrator
of the crime is is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.

One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to

declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that "The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the
time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man
in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,
may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and
against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is
grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.

The alleged declaration of Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-appellant,

whom he verbally admitted to the petitioner, and later to their common uncle
Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of a grudge, after
which he disappeared, cannot be accepted because its patent untrustworthiness.
Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate.

The far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be
accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There
is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically
incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the
jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is
incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can
break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the
gratuitous statements of accused-appellant Alejandro Fuentes Jr. and his uncle
Felicissimo to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records
show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness.
The Court is always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent
declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the
extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability
of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify;
and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify.

There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against
interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must
concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it
improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly against penal interest
attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule.

4. ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE.

The act or declaration of a person deceased or unable to testify, in respect to

the pedigree of another person related to him or her by birth, adoption, or
marriage or, in the absence thereof, with whose family he or she was so
intimately associated as to be likely to have accurate information concerning
his or her pedigree, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two (2) persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

The word “pedigree” includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,

marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred,
and the names of the relatives.
It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

Requisites:
 1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.

2. The pedigree must be in issue.

3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.

4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.

5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is
in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.

CASIMIRO MENDOZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING

TUÑACAO, G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991.

FACTS: Teopista Toring claimed that she was the illegitimate daughter of
Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter, who is already 91 years old denied her claim
until to his dying day.

However, the two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio
Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro.

Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring, the
mother of Teopista, because she used to work with him in a saltbed in Opao.
Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-
between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant
in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to
Brigida at Teopista's baptism. Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be
delivered to Brigida.

Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his
father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so
informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his
salary, he would also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be
delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain
properties to Teopista.

The acts and declarations of the two witnesses may be received in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule. The requisites for declaration regarding pedigree
were present in the case at bar.

1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.

 2. The pedigree must be in issue.

3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.

4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.

5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is
in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.

The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the
mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead
at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of
Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in
the complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before
the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between
her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and
Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such declaration,
consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in
which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.

5. FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING

PEDIGREE.

The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy,

in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family,
either by consanguinity, affinity, or adoption. Entries in family bibles or
other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

Elements:

1) That there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members

of a family.
(2) That the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned
existed previous to the controversy.
(3) That the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the
pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person.
 PEOPLE VS ALEGADO
G.R. No. 93030-31, August 21, 1991.

Facts:
On April 14, 1988, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, complainant was playing
at the Freedom Square inside the public market of San Carlos City when
Alegado 53years old market watchman at the time, held her by the hand and took
her upstairs to the second floor of the public market building from which the crime
of Rape was consummated. The incident happened again on April 20, 1988. Upon
trial, accused was convicted of Statutory Rape.
Accused contends that the offended party's actual age at the time of the alleged
incidents of rape was not established with certainty, hence, it was an error on
the trial court to convict him of Statutory rape.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of the accused-appellant is correct

Held: The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself
and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim
was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by
the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as
provided under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Under Section 40 of the said Rule, it is provided, in part, that:

SEC. 40. — Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree . — The

reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in
respect to the pedigree of any of its members, may be received in evidence if
the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity.

The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
these facts occurred and the names of the relatives.

In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence to prove the victim's age is beyond question. The said provision
contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely:

(1) That there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a
family;
(2) That the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned
existed previous to the controversy; and

(3) That the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree
of the person must be a member of the family of said person.

All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of
birth of the rape victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's
grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching the age
of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness
testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.

6. COMMON REPUTATION.

Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, as to boundaries of

or customs affecting lands in the community and reputation as to events of
general history important to the community, or respecting marriage or
moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in
public places may be received as evidence of common reputation.

Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts of

public or general interest more than THIRTY YEARS OLD, or respecting
marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and
inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common
reputation.

7. PART OF THE RES GESTAE.

Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or

immediately prior or subsequent thereto, under the stress of excitement
caused by the occurrence with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying
an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may
be received as part of the res gestae.

The rule of res gestae, which literally means "things done" refers to:

1. Spontaneous statements in connection with a startling occurrence relating to

that fact and in effect forming part thereof, and
2. Statements accompanying an equivocal act, otherwise known as verbal acts, on
the theory that they are the verbal parts of the act to be explained.

People vs Lobrigas, G.R. No. 147649, December 17, 2002

Facts: The victim Felix Taylaran was a regular farmhand of Castor Guden. On
February 19, 1996, he asked for permission not to work for it was raining and he
had to go to the store of Teodorico Mante. At 4:00 p.m., Felix returned to Castor
Guden’s house with bruises on his face and injuries all over his body. He told
Castor that he was mauled by accused-appellant Frank Lobrigas, accused Marlito
Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante at the store. Felix spent the night in Castor’s house
and left the following morning to go to the seaside house of Lorie Aguilar, his
cousin, to heal his wounds in the saltwater. However, the next day, Felix Taylaran
died.

Rosa Taylaran Solarte, daughter of the victim, testified that a day after the
mauling, her father came to her house and told her that he was beaten up by Frank
Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante. He told her that he was in pain
and felt weak. He then went to the house of Lorie Aguilar apparently to recuperate.

Accused-appellant contends that there was no direct evidence linking him as one of
the assailants. He claims that while there were ante-mortem declarations made by
the victim to the two prosecution witnesses pointing to him as one of the maulers,
the trial court, nevertheless, dismissed them as invalid dying declaration since
they were uttered by the victim not under a consciousness of an impending
death. Neither should such declarations be considered as part of res gestae since
the victim was drunk and very mad at Teodorico Mante for confiscating his knife
while he was being attacked by his assailants. Lastly, the evidence of flight is not
sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Accused-appellant insists that the statements made by the victim to Castor Guden
and Rosa Solarte cannot be considered as dying declarations for they were made
not under the consciousness of an impending death. Neither can they be deemed
part of the res gestae because the victim was drunk and mad at Teodoro Mante
for taking away his knife.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Contention of the Accused-Appellant is tenable.

HELD: The trial court held that although the foregoing declarations cannot be
deemed a dying declaration since they do not appear to have been made by the
declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, the same are
nonetheless part of the res gestae. However, only the declaration made to
Castor Guden are admissible in evidence as such.

A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as

an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur:

(1) The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

(2) The statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
and

(3) The statements must concern the occurrence in question and it’s immediately
attending circumstances.

All these requisites concur in the case at bar. The principal act, the mauling of the
victim, was a startling occurrence. The declarations were made shortly after the
mauling incident while the victim was still under the exciting influence of the
startling occurrence, without any prior opportunity to contrive a story
implicating accused-appellant. The declaration concerns the circumstances
surrounding the mauling of Felix Taylaran. However, the declaration made by the
victim to his daughter does not satisfy the second requirement of spontaneity
because they were made a day after the incident and the exciting influence of the
startling occurrence was no longer present. Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa
Solarte’s testimony on what her father told her constitutes INDEPENDENT
RELEVANT STATEMENTS distinct from hearsay, and are thus admissible not
as to the veracity thereof, but as proof of the fact that they had been uttered.

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such
statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply, hence, the statements are admissible
as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but
primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.

Finally, accused-appellant’s argument that the trial court’s reliance solely on the
evidence of flight cannot overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence is
not well-taken. In criminal law, flight means an act of evading the course of
justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the
institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of
the accused person may, as a general rule, be taken as evidence having tendency to
establish his guilt.

In the case at bar, not only did accused-appellant evade arrest when he went to
Cebu under the pretext that he was going to work at Southern Island Hospital, but
justice was further frustrated when he escaped from detention with the flimsy
excuse that no one was guarding them. These two instances of flight by accused-
appellant, taken together with the other circumstances established by the
prosecution, support the trial court’s finding of accused-appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

8. RECORDS OF REGULARLY CONDUCTED BUSINESS

ACTIVITY.

A memorandum, report, record or data compilation of acts, events, conditions,

opinions, or diagnoses, made by writing, typing, electronic, optical or other
similar means at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of
information by a person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course
or conduct of a business activity, and such was the regular practice to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation by electronic, optical or
similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.

KUWAIT AIRWAYS CORPORATION VS. THE TOKIO MARINE AND FIRE

INSURANCE CO., LTD., AND TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE
CO., INC., G.R. No. 213931. November 17, 2021

FACTS: Fujitso Company imported 10 pallets containing crates of STC disk

drives from Slough, Berkshire, United Kingdom. It was shipped thru Freight
Forwarder O'Grady Air Services (OAS) based in UK. The articles was transported
by Kuwait Airways Corporation.

Upon arrival in NAIA, the shipment was found that one crate had a hole on the
side and another was dented. Such findings was based upon a photocopy of
MIASCOR Storage and Delivery Receipt.

Because of such incident, the Fujitsu Company filed a claims against the Freight
Forwarder O'Grady Air Services (OAS) and the Kuwait Airways Corporation for
damages. However, said company did not pay the Fujitsu Company. As a recourse,
it claimed Insurance from the Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company, the
insurer of the goods shipped. Thereafter, Fujitsu was subrogated with all the rights
and interest by the Insurance company Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance
Company.

During trial, the RTC held that respondents Tokio Marine Insurance had failed to
discharge their burden of proof, opining that the respondents relied too heavily on
the photocopies of the MIASCOR Storage and Delivery Receipt. RTC also
pointed out that the receipts were not authenticated as required by Section 5, Rule
130. Respondents' witnesses did not personally witness the preparation and
execution of said receipt nor could they identify the signatures therein. As such, the
RTC found no probative value in the receipts.

On Appeal, The CA reversed the RTC’s ruling, in the appreciation of evidence, the
CA held that the cargo was in good condition when it was loaded in the aircraft but
already damaged when unloaded. Therefore, the cargo could only have been
damaged when it was in the aircraft, which was within petitioner's exclusive
control. For these reasons, the CA held that all requisites for the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur are present in this case and on this basis, Kuwait Airways
Corporation is presumed to be negligent.

Issues

1) Whether the MIASCOR Storage and Delivery Receipt and the Japan Cargo
Delivery Receipt are adequate proof of damage to the goods.

Held: No. The Court held that Under the Original Document Rule (previously
called the Best Evidence Rule), when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, writing, photograph or other record, no evidence is admissible other
than the original document itself. In this case, respondents formally offered the
MIASCOR Storage and Delivery Receipt and the Japan Cargo Delivery Receipt as
proof of their respective contents. As such, the originals should have been
presented at trial.

However, under Section 4, Rule 130 of the 2019 Rules an original document may
consist of a "duplicate" produced by means of photography, mechanical or
electronic re-recording, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately
reproduce the original. A photocopy of an original, therefore, may consist of a
"duplicate" if there is no question that it is an accurate reproduction of the original.
But even though this case was tried before the effectivity of the 2019 Rules on
Evidence, petitioner had already objected to the admissibility of the MIASCOR
Delivery Receipt and Japan Cargo Delivery Receipt, arguing that they are
secondary evidence because they are mere photocopies.

Under Section 5 of Rule 130, a party is allowed to submit secondary evidence to

prove the contents of a lost or destroyed document by a copy, a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or the testimony of witnesses, provided that
the offeror of the secondary evidence proves: (1) that the original existed and duly
executed; (2) it was lost or destroyed; and (3) its unavailability is not due to bad
faith on his or her part.

Regardless of whether an exhibit is an original, a "duplicate" of a document, or

secondary evidence, it must still be presented at trial in the manner provided for by
the Rules on Evidence before it can be admitted into evidence. For such purposes,
it is important to distinguish between public or private documents. Public
documents are admissible in evidence without further proof of their due execution
and genuineness. On the other hand, under Section 20 of Rule 132, a private
document cannot be admitted into evidence unless its due execution and
authenticity is proven by: (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written;
(b) evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or (c) other
evidence showing its due execution and authenticity.

Upon a review of the records, The Court agreed with the RTC's finding that the
MIASCOR Delivery Receipt and Japan Cargo Delivery Receipt were not
authenticated as required by Section 20 of Rule 132. Not one of respondents'
three witnesses testified that they saw the receipts, and importantly, the notations
of damage, being executed or written. As such, the photocopies of said receipts are
inadmissible and have no evidentiary value.

Neither can the annotations in the MIASCOR Storage and Delivery Receipt be
considered prima facie evidence of damage to the goods as "entries in the course
of business" under Section 43, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Evidence, which
provides as follows:

Section 43. Entries in the course of business. - Entries made at, or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who
was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or
in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business
or duty.
The Rules of Evidence has since been revised and "entries in the course of
business" have now been replaced with "records of regularly conducted
business activity" under Section 45, Rule 130 of the 2019 Rules, which provides
as follows:

Section 45. Records of regularly conducted business activity. - A memorandum,

report, record or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
diagnoses, made by writing, typing, electronic, optical or other similar means at
or near the time of or from transmission or supply of information by a person with
knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a business
activity, and such was the regular practice to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation by electronic, optical or similar means, all of which
are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is
excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.

In Canque v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the requisites for admission in
evidence of entries in the course of business:

(1) The person who made the entry is dead, outside the country, or unable to
testify;

(2) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer;

(3) The person who made the entry was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;

(4) The entries were made in a professional capacity or in the performance of a

duty; and

(5) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

In this case, the first, second, and third requisites were not proven at the trial
because respondents failed to establish who made the annotation in the
MIASCOR receipt that the cargo was damaged. Barcena, the cargo surveyor,
never met the person who made the annotation on the MIASCOR receipt. The
records do not bear out who made the annotation, when they made it, whether they
were competent to make such an annotation, and why they could not testify in
court on this matter. For these reasons, the annotation of damage, as they appear on
the photocopy of the MIASCOR delivery receipt, cannot be considered as an
entry in the course of business or as prima facie evidence of damage to the
goods under Section 43, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Evidence. A ruling to the
contrary would make carriers susceptible to spurious claims of negligence in the
transport of goods merely on the basis of a photocopy of an annotation, the
provenance of which is uncertain.

9. ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS.

Entries in official records made in the performance of his or her duty by a

public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.

Requisites:

a. That the records were made by a public officer or by another person

specially enjoined by law to do so.
b. That it was made in the performance of his duty specially enjoined by
law.
c. That the Public officer or other person has sufficient knowledge of the
facts stated therein either personally or through official information.

Guerrero vs. Phil. Phoenix Surety & Insurance, Inc.

G.R. No. 223178, December 09, 2020.

Facts:

On December 31, 2008 at 6:30 p.m., an Isuzu Sportivo vehicle owned by Gaticales
involved in a vehicular accident. When the incident was reported to the nearest
police station, Zarraga Municipal Police Station, a certain PO2 Jose Diestro was
sent to the place of the accident to investigate and make a police report on his
findings. It was found that Guerrero's Chevrolet overlapped the center lane of the
highway, encroaching the line occupied by the Isuzu (which was moving in the
opposite direction and resulting in a head-on collision between the two vehicles. It
was also noted that Cordero, the driver of the Chevrolet fled after the incident. The
incident was recorded in the police blotter under entry no. 1327 dated December
31, 2008 and entered at 7:30 p.m.
Gaticales then filed a claim with Phoenix Insurance Corporation, where Gaticales
Isuzu had insured.

After Phoenix paid the amount of P810,000.00 to Gaticales, It subrogated

Gaticales to all his rights to recover on all claims as a consequence of the accident.

Thereafter, Phoenix filed a claim against Cordero and Guerero as Cordero's

employer.

For its claim they presented the police certificate, certifying the contents of the
police blotter issued by PO2 Diestro. They presented as its lone witness its
claims manager, Roberto Salaver. Aside from identifying his judicial affidavit,
Salaver also identified the police certificate, which he also referred to as the
police investigation report.

Issue: Whether or Not the Police Certificate has probative value to be admissible
as evidence

Held: No, the certification issued by the Zarraga Municipal Police Station's Chief
of Police, Police Inspector Peregil, did not state that PI Peregil was the legal
custodian of the police blotter. Assuming that PI Peregil had legal custody of the
police blotter as Zarraga Municipal Station's Chief of Police, the Certification
should still be identified by PI Peregil himself or his representative to attest of
the contents of the Certification, as copied from the police blotter, and the
authenticity of PI Peregil's signature. Salaver is incompetent to testify on the
Certification's authenticity and due execution because Salaver is not an
authorized representative of PI Peregil or even a police officer assigned to the
Zarraga Municipal Police Station.

A police blotter entry, or a certification thereof, is admissible in evidence as an

exception to the hearsay rule under Section 46, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
Section 46. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the
performance of his or her duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”

In order for it to be admissible, the said evidence must be properly presented as

evidence. What must have been presented in evidence was either the police blotter
itself or a copy thereof certified by its legal keeper.
Otherwise stated, the nature of the evidence as admissible being an exception to
the hearsay rule is different from how a party should introduce the evidence to
make it admissible. In this case, Salaver is not competent to identify the pictures
presented in evidence. Salaver was not at the scene of the crime. Therefore, he
does not have personal knowledge of the scene or objects shown in the pictures.

10. COMMERCIAL LISTS AND THE LIKE

Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an

occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant
matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged
in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.

When is a document considered a commercial list

a) The commercial list is a statement of matters of interest to persons

engaged in an occupation.

b) Such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other

published compilation.

c) Said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that

occupation.

d) It is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same

occupation. (PNOC Shipping and Transport Co. vs. CA, 297 SCRA 402).

11. LEARNED TREATISES

A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history,

law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter
stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the
subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or
pamphlet is recognized in his or her profession or calling as expert in the
subject.
Requisites for its admissibility:

a. Published Treatise, periodical or pamphlet is on subject of history, law,

science or art.
b. The Court takes Judicial Notice of it.
c. Witness expert in the subject testifies that the writer of the statement in the
treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as
expert in the subject.

12. TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING.

The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or out of the

Philippines or who cannot, with due diligence, be found therein, or is
unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him or her.

Requisites for its admissibility:

a. The witness is dead or is unable to testify.
b. His/her testimony or deposition was given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interest.
c. The former case involved the same subject as that in the present case,
although of different causes of action.
d. The issue testified to by witness in the former trial is the same issue
involved in the present case.
e. The adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness in
the former case.

13. RESIDUAL EXCEPTION

A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions,

having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is
admissible if the court determines that;
(a) The statement is offered as evidence of a material fact.
(b) The statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.
 (c) The general purposes of these Rules and the interests of justice will be best
served by admission of the statement into evidence.

However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the
hearing, or by the pre-trial stage in the case of a trial of the main case, to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.

DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENTS- only the

fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial.

The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence.
Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to
the existence of such a fact. (People of the Philippines vs. Lobrigas et.al, G.R. No.
147649, December 17, 2002)

OPINION RULE

General rule. – The opinion of a witness is not admissible, except as indicated

in the following sections.

Opinion of expert witness. – It is the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring

special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, which he or she is
shown to possess.
it requires judicial notice before court can admit the testimony of an expert
witness.

Opinion of Ordinary Witnesses. – It is the opinion of a witness, for which proper

basis is given, as to the:
(a) The identity of a person about whom he or she has adequate knowledge.
(b) A handwriting with which he or she has sufficient familiarity.
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he or she is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his or her impressions of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person.

Character Evidence

Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. – Evidence of a

person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.

The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally

irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not
admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by
evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to
have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the
merits of the case.

This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who might otherwise
be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad
character. (People vs Noel Lee, G.R. No. 139070, May 29, 2002.)

Exception:

A. In Criminal Cases:

1. The character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in

any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

Refers to the character of the offended party. Character evidence, whether good or
bad, of the offended party may be proved "if it tends to establish in any reasonable
degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged." Such evidence is
most commonly offered to support a claim of self-defense in an assault or
homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case.

Rape Shield Rule. - In prosecutions for rape, evidence of complainant's past sexual
conduct, opinion thereof or of his/her reputation shall not be admitted unless, and
only to the extent that the court finds, that such evidence is material and relevant to
the case.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL LEE
G.R. No. 139070, May 29, 2002

Facts: Noel Lee was charged for the crime of murder for the killing of one joseph
Marquez. Six days before the killing, Noel Lee caught him stealing his car stereo.
During trial, Noel Lee insisted that Joseph is man of bad reputation. He presented
the handwritten letter of the mother of Joseph, Herminia, as his evidence that
Joseph is a menace to the society. The said letter was addressed to Mayor
Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City, and sent through PO3 Willy Tuazon and his
wife, Baby Ruth. In the letter, it stated that Herminia was surrendering her son to
the Mayor for rehabilitation because he was hooked on shabu, a prohibited drug,
and was a thief. Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might not just steal
but kill her and everyone in their household because of his drug habit.

Issue: Whether or Not the letter presented by the Accused-Appellant proving bad
reputation of the victim is admissible as evidence.

Held: No. proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine
the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged
that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense.
There is no connection between the deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with
his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive
eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victim’s bad character he could
have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple
speculation.

Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases
of murder committed with treachery and premeditation.

While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the
probability or improbability of the commission of an offense. Such is not
necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is committed through
treachery or premeditation.

The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show “that
it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the
accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was
necessary. This rule does not apply to cases of murder.”
(2) The accused may prove his or her good moral character, pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged. However, the prosecution may not
prove his or her bad moral character unless on rebuttal.

The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged. When the accused presents proof of his
good moral character, this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and
where good character and reputation are established, an inference arises that
the accused did not commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from the
theory that a person of good character and high reputation is not likely to have
committed the act charged against him.

Once the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in
rebuttal, offer evidence of the defendant’s bad character. Otherwise, a defendant,
secure from refutation, would have a license to unscrupulously impose a false
character upon the tribunal. (People vs Noel Lee, G.R. No. 139070, May 29, 2002.)

B. In Civil Cases:

Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case is admissible only

when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.

C. In Criminal and Civil Cases:

Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until such

character has been impeached.

In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is

admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony
in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into
relevant specific instances of conduct.

In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential

element of a charge, claim or defense, proof may also be made of specific
instances of that person’s conduct.