Factual Causation

The nearest thing to a firm rule existing in the field of causation is that if the
harmful result would have occurred irrespective of the defendant’s conduct so
he cannot be legal cause of that harm. Put it in another way, if the defendant is
not the factual cause of a criminal harm, he cannot be legal cause. In R v White,
D poisoned his mother’s drink. She died on a heart attack before taking that
drink. His conviction on murder was quashed on the basis that the poisoning
had not caused the death. The answer would have been the same if D’s mother
took the poison, she had died in heart attack before the poison begun to work. In
both scenario, D’s conduct made no difference to the outcome and would have
occurred anyway.
Relevant example shown in the case of R v Dalloway. Dalloway was driving a
horse and not holding reins. A child subsequently ran out and killed by one of
the wheel moving. He was convicted with negligence. During the trial, it was
held that by holding a reins, Dalloway would not have been able to stop the cart.
It was held that Dalloway not holding the reins is not the cause of the death of
the child. As the result of this, Dalloway was acquitted.
In the event of ‘but for’ test, Hart and Honore have describe a cause as
‘something which interferes with or intervenes in, the course of event which
will normally take place. To be a cause, an event must be something
extraordinary which makes a different between accident and things going on as
usual.
Example Case
A shoots B. He left him dying in the road. C, a driver who is not paying
attention, runs over B, advancing the death of time a few minutes.
It was held that A and C are factual causes of B’s death. An act causes death
when it advances the time when death would otherwise occur. A is factual cause
because but for his act, B would not be dead. C is the factual cause because but
for his act, B’s life would not have been further shortened.

Legal Causation
Robert Goff LJ stated that “simply in law the accused’s act need not to be sole
cause, or even main cause, of the victim’s death, it being enough that his act or
omission contributed significantly to that result’.
In the case of AG’s Reference (No 4. 1980), D slapped V and caused her to fall
a flight of stairs and hit her head. D then dragged her upstairs with a rope
around her neck. D put her in the bathroom and slit her throat and drained her
blood. Cut her into pieces and dispose of them. It was held that if the accused
had committed several unlawful acts, which all could be subjected to the
consequences, then the prosecution would not need to prove which specific act
caused the consequence.
Third party’s action
The fact that other causes contributed to or could have prevented the result does
not generally bears upon the issue of causal responsibility, unless the later cause
was overwhelming as to rid the initial act of casual significance. So, in R v
Benge, D the foreman of track laying crew, misread the railway timetable so
that the track was up at the time when the train was due. A worker was killed. D
argued that he cannot be the cause since the flag was placed in a mistake place
and the driver did not give a proper look. It was held that the contribution of the
defendant was substantially enough to justify attributing responsibility for the
death to him.
In the case of R v Pagett, the accused trying to escape from police came out,
holding a pregnant victim as his shield. The victim shot at the police and the
police spontaneously shot back at the accused without taking aim and killed the
pregnant victim. In this case the court held the neither novus actus interveniens
nor cause of causation was break. Accused has committed several unlawful act
of which all can be contributed to cause harm, firstly, firing at a police officer
and secondly, forcing the victim as a shield for return fire.
However, in the case of R v Michael, D purchase an opium and put it in a baby
bottle for the sake of easing the baby’s sickness, with the intention of feeding
the baby. The mother refused. Eventually, a child took the bottle and fed it to
the baby, who then died. D was charged with wilful killing. It was held in this
case, that if the third party’s action or intervention was a voluntary act (meaning
the action of the third party can be said to be free, deliberated and informed)
then this will break either the chain of causation or novus actus interveniens.
In the case of Empress Car Case, the weakening of third party’s voluntary
intervention was seen in this case. A company was held responsible for causing
the release of polluted matter into a river although the release was in fact by a
voluntary act of a trespasser. Since such an intervention was reasonable
foreseeable the company could not defend themselves by saying the release was
not their doing.
In Campbell, Yateman, Henry, case, V was attacked by a group of men
including Campbell and Henry. Sometimes later, Yateman further attacked V in
the absence of Henry and Campbell. Campbell and Henry appealed against their
convictions for manslaughter and murder respectively, arguing that the
subsequent attack caused the V’s death. The COA dismiss their appeal and held
that there was medical evidence on which the jury was entitled to conclude that
their actions in an earlier incident is a significant cause of death and that coulb
be establish from the injuries sustained by V being Yateman’s attack. It was
held that Henry and Campbell is the factual cause and legal cause of V’s death
because but for their conduct, V would not have died; Yateman’s act was a
factual cause In R v Pagett, Robert Golf LJ stated that “simply in law, the
accused’s act need not to be sole cause or even main cause, of the victim’s
death, it is being enough that his act or omission contributed significantly to
that result”. The case affirmed that the third-party intervention did not break the
cause of causation.
Egg-shell skull rule
Lawton LJ stated that those who use violence on other people must take their
victim as they find them. The Lord Justice means the whole man and not just
the physical man but also their religious belief, health condition etc.
If the victim of the defendant’s violence suffers from fragile health, eponymous
thin skull and haemophilia, the defendant will bear the causal responsibility for
whatever injury is sustained by consequence of the condition although the
condition is unforeseeable.
In Murton, D was held liable for the manslaughter of his wife when the
undiagnosed medical condition affecting her caused her literally to die of fright
ten days after D assaulted and bruised her. The jury was told that the death
could be caused by frightening so long as the chain of causation begun at the
unlawful attack.
William Wilson stated if the defendant must take the risk that the victim may be
unusually susceptible, then he also takes the risk of other subsiding conditions
which may have impact upon the harm which the victim sustains.